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The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) surprised to the upside in January, increasing to 0.69 versus expectations of 0.16. Moreover, the December figure was revised up from -0.15 to 0.07. The positive readings suggest that the US economy grew at an…
Despite the Ukraine conflict (see Market Focus), we expect the Fed to proceed with a 25 basis point rate hike at its meeting in March. However, risks and uncertainty surrounding the crisis reduce the likelihood of a steeper 50 basis point rate hike. This is…
Special Report Executive Summary The Excess Return Of Corporate Bonds Is Driven By Corporate Profits Given that a sustainable business cycle acceleration in China is unlikely in the short term, onshore government bond yields will likely drop further. In the long run, odds are that Chinese government bond yields will drop below US Treasury yields. For domestic asset allocators, we continue to recommend overweighting government bonds over stocks for now. The excess return of corporate bonds is driven by the corporate profit cycle. On a volatility-adjusted basis, the total return on equities exceeds the excess return on corporate bonds during periods when economic growth is accelerating and underperforms during deceleration phases. Bottom Line: Given our view that a meaningful growth recovery in China will only be a theme for the second half of this year, onshore asset allocators should continue favoring corporate credit over stocks and government bonds over corporate bonds. The bear market in Chinese offshore corporate credit might be in its late stages but it is not yet over. Feature In this report we (1) elaborate on our outlook for Chinese government and corporate bonds and (2) offer a framework for understanding how asset allocation for fixed-income (government and corporate bonds) and multi-asset portfolios (comprised of fixed-income plus equities) should be implemented. Domestic Government Bonds Chart 1Chinese Bond Yields Have Bucked The Global Trend The risk-reward profile of Chinese domestic government bonds remains attractive. Chinese government bond yields have been declining,  bucking the global trend of surging government bond yields (Chart 1, top panel). Odds are that Chinese bond yields will drop further, both cyclically and structurally: In contrast with the Americas and Europe, China’s consumer price inflation has remained subdued. Its core, trimmed mean and headline inflation rates have remained low (Chart 2). The ongoing growth slump will cap core inflation in China at around 1%, allowing monetary authorities to lower interest rates further. Real bond yields in China remain well above those in the majority of DM (Chart 1, bottom panel). Hence, risk-free bonds in China offer value. As to the Chinese stimulus and business cycle, the recent pickup in Chinese credit numbers has been entirely due to local government bond issuance. After excluding local government bonds, credit growth and its impulse have not improved (Chart 3). While infrastructure spending will pick up in the coming months (given large special bond issuance), sentiment among consumers and private companies remains downbeat and local government budgets are severely impaired by the collapse in revenues from land sales. Hence, it will take some time before a boost in infrastructure activity lifts broader business and consumer sentiment such that a sustainable economic recovery can take hold. Chart 2Chinese Consumer Price Inflation Is Subdued Chart 3Recent Credit Improvement Is Entirely Due to Local Government Bond Issuance The special bond quota for Q1 stands at RMB 1.46 trillion and is equivalent to 28% of local government aggregate quarterly revenue. Even though the special bond issuance in Q1 is massive, it will be largely offset by the drop in local governments’ land sales revenue. The latter is shrinking and makes up more than 40% of local government aggregate revenues. In brief, strong headwinds from the property market in the form of shrinking land sales might counteract the increase from front-loaded special bond issuance in Q1 2022. As to real estate construction, funding for property developers is down dramatically from a year ago (Chart 4). In the absence of financing, real estate developers will shrink construction volumes in the months ahead. Chart 5Debt Service Burden For Chinese Enterprises And Households Is High Chart 4Property Completions Will Roll Over   Structurally, high enterprise and household debt levels in China amid slumping incomes mean that borrowing costs should drop to facilitate debt servicing. BIS estimates that debt service costs for the private sector (enterprises and households) in China are 21% of disposable income, much higher than in many other economies (Chart 5). Finally, China’s large and persistent current account surpluses mean that the nation is a major international creditor rather than a debtor. Thus, China does not need to offer high yields to attract foreign capital. Structurally speaking, foreign fixed-income inflows into Chinese domestic bonds will likely continue. Chart 6Credit Cycle And Government Bond Yields Bottom Line: Bond yields will likely drop further as a sustainable business cycle acceleration in China is unlikely in the short term. Chart 6 illustrates that the total social financing impulse leads bond yields by nine months and a cyclical bottom in yields will probably occur a few months from now. In the long run, Chinese government bonds yields will likely drop below US Treasury yields. Onshore Corporate Bonds The proper measure of corporate bond performance is excess return over similar government bonds (herein excess return). The basis for using excess return instead of total return for corporate bonds is because investors can attain government bond return by purchasing them outright. Essentially, investors prefer corporate bonds over government bonds because of credit spreads. Hence, a corporate bond performance assessment – whether in absolute terms or relative to other asset classes – should be based on excess return. In China, the excess return on onshore corporate bonds1 usually moves in tandem with the business cycle and government bond yields. In particular: The excess return of corporate bonds is positive during periods of growth acceleration and negative during slowdowns (Chart 7, top panel). The middle panel of Chart 7 illustrates that the excess return of corporate bonds correlates with analysts’ net EPS revisions for onshore listed companies. This confirms the above point that corporate bonds correlate with the profit/business cycle. Significantly, even though industrial profit growth is not yet negative (Chart 8, top panel), earnings in commodity-user industries have crashed (Chart 8, bottom panel).  This explains the negative excess return for onshore corporate bonds in the past 12 months. Chart 7The Excess Return Of Corporate Bonds Is Driven By Corporate Profits Chart 8Corporate Profit Cycle: Mind The Divergence Furthermore, the excess return of corporate bonds declines and rises with interest rate expectations (Chart 7, bottom panel). As the outlook for corporate profits remains sour, fixed-income investors should continue to favor government bonds over corporate bonds. Now, how do corporate bonds perform versus stocks? What drives their relative performance? To compare stock performance to corporate bond excess return, one should adjust for volatility. In other words, share prices are much more volatile than the excess return on corporate bonds. Hence, during risk-on periods equities always outperform corporate bonds and vice versa. Chart 9The Performance of Stocks over Corporate Bonds is Very Pro-Cyclical Chart 9 demonstrates that even on a volatility-adjusted basis, the total return on equities exceeds the excess return on corporate bonds during periods when economic growth is accelerating and underperforms during deceleration phases. In short, the performance of stocks over corporate bonds is very pro-cyclical. Bottom Line: The excess return of corporate bonds is driven by corporate revenue and profits rather than by interest rate expectations. Getting China’s business cycle right is critical to the allocation between government and corporate bonds in fixed-income portfolios and to the allocation between corporate bonds and equities in multi-asset portfolios. Given our view that a meaningful growth recovery in China will only be a theme in the second half of this year, onshore asset allocators should continue favoring corporate bonds over stocks and government bonds over corporate credit. Offshore Corporate Bonds What drives the excess return of Chinese USD corporate bonds in absolute terms as well as versus Chinese non-TMT investable stocks2 and onshore corporate bonds? Given that the offshore corporate bond universe is dominated by property developers, their excess return correlates with perceived risks to the mainland property market in general and the financial health of property developers in particular (Chart 10, top panel). Property developers are very overleveraged, their sales are shrinking and their financing has dried up. Yet, authorities are compelling them to complete construction of their pre-sold housing. Property developers will therefore continue to experience financial distress. Odds are that bond prices of corporate developers – both investment grade and high yield - will continue falling (Chart 10, middle and bottom panels). Chart 11Investable Stocks Vs. Offshore Corporate Credit: Volatility-Adjusted Performance Chart 10A Massive Bear Market In Offshore Corporate Bonds On a volatility-adjusted basis, non-TMT investable stocks outpace the excess return of offshore corporate bonds during periods of growth improvement and underperform during growth slowdowns (Chart 11, top panel). The same pattern holds true when it comes to the performance of offshore corporate bond versus the aggregate MSCI Investable equity index (including TMT stocks) (Chart 11, bottom panel). The credit cycle leads the business cycle and, thereby, it leads these financial market trends. Bottom Line: The bear market in Chinese offshore corporate credit might be in its late stages but it is not yet over. Chinese offshore corporate bonds will continue underperforming EM corporate bonds as well as Chinese onshore corporate bonds. Investment Recommendations Investors often read market signals across asset classes to gauge which market moves will persist and which ones will be short-lived.  In this regard, we have two observations for Chinese onshore markets: Chart 12Moving In Tandem The sustainability of an equity rally is higher when it is confirmed by rising excess returns of corporate bonds and rising government bond yields (Chart 12). Presently, there is no strong signal to switch from government bonds to either corporate bonds or stocks. Unfortunately, the yield curve in China does not correlate with its business cycle and, hence, cannot be used as a tool in macro analysis.  Our key investment conclusions are: For fixed-income investors, we continue to recommend receiving 10-year swap rates in China and for dedicated EM local currency bond managers to remain overweight China. The renminbi has been firm versus the US dollar despite a considerable narrowing in the interest rate differential between China and the US. In the long run, the real interest rate differential between China and the US will drive the exchange rate, and it will favor the RMB. While US real bond yields might rise relative to Chinese bond yields in the coming months, triggering a period of yuan softness, it will prove to be transitory. The basis is that the Federal Reserve is very sensitive to asset prices. As US share prices decline and corporate spreads widen, the central bank will eventually turn dovish and will lag behind the inflation curve. When a central bank falls behind the inflation curve, real rates stay low and its currency depreciates. Chart 13China’s Stock-to-Bond Ratio For domestic asset allocators, we continue to recommend favoring government bonds over stocks (Chart 13). Within fixed-income portfolios, investors should overweight government bonds over corporate bonds. Finally, corporate bonds will fare better than equities in the near term. In a few months there will be an opportunity to shift these positions.  More aggressive stimulus from authorities and aggressive property market relaxation measures will create conditions for an improvement in domestic demand. Finally, the risk-reward profile for offshore USD corporate bonds remains unattractive. Chinese offshore corporate credit will continue underperforming EM USD corporate credit as well as Chinese onshore corporate bonds.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    Due to the lack of excess return data from the index provider (Bloomberg Barclays onshore bond indexes), we calculated the excess return on onshore corporate bonds as the ratio of the total return on the corporate bond index divided by the total return on the government bond index. This measure is not ideal as it does not account for duration mismatches between the corporate and government bond indexes. However, the key conclusions of this report will hold true for the duration-adjusted excess return not least because this framework is valid for financial markets in the US and Europe. 2    The reason to compare it to non-TMT (technology, media and telecommunication, i.e., Chinese tech and internet stocks) is that offshore corporate bond issuers are largely old economy industries.
Wages in Australia increased at the fastest annual pace in just over three years in Q4 2021. The wage price index grew by 2.3% y/y following Q3’s 2.2% y/y rise. Nevertheless, the rate of wage growth fell below expectations of a 2.4% y/y increase. The pace of…
As expected, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand lifted the Official Cash Rate (OCR) by 25 basis points to 1% at its Wednesday meeting. The Monetary Policy Committee also announced it will begin reducing bond holdings purchased under the Large Scale Asset…
According to BCA Research’s US Political Strategy service, there are three reasons why the US political structure will remain stable enough to sustain economic productivity over the coming years, despite the enormous upheaval on the cyclical level of…
Special Report Executive Summary US Policy Uncertainty Rises With ERP The US is witnessing a rolling political crisis that will escalate again in the 2022-24 election cycle and presents a tail-risk of constitutional fracture. However, fundamental economic, constitutional, and geopolitical factors are structurally positive. US domestic political risk is not greater than foreign geopolitical risk affecting other major markets like Europe. The US faces challenges to maintain its competitive and technological edge. But the combination of a vibrant private sector and increasingly proactive fiscal policy give reason for optimism. The 2022-24 macroeconomic and political cycles will likely cause an increase in policy uncertainty and hence the equity risk premium – but foreign markets face even greater risks. Recommendation (Tactical) Inception Level Initiation Date Stop Loss Long DXY   Feb 23/2022   Bottom Line: Go tactically long US dollar (DXY) on the anticipation that US and especially global policy uncertainty and political risk premiums will rise. Feature With President Joe Biden’s approval rating falling to a new net low of -13%, investors are starting to ask about the future of American politics once again. It is highly likely that Democrats will lose control of Congress this fall, setting up a tumultuous 2024 election cycle. With political polarization at historic highs, it is worth asking whether US policy uncertainty will inject a risk premium into US equities. Our answer is yes, uncertainty and the risk premium will rise. But the US also contains fundamental strengths, especially relative to other major markets. With geopolitical risk rising for Europe as Russia engages in new military adventures, the US market will remain attractive over the long run. Natural Advantages Any fundamental assessment of US capability should begin with its people. The US working-age population continues to grow, while that of Europe and China has started to plateau or decline (Chart 1). China’s working population is four times bigger than that of the US, so if China can manage its transition to a higher-wage economy (i.e. if it can maintain productivity growth) then it can compete for global investment capital. But the US’s continued labor force growth, despite social change and political instability, suggests that the US will not follow Japan and Europe into sluggish trend growth, unless sharp curbs on immigration are put into place. The maxim that “the people are the riches of a nation” is only true if economic opportunity and job creation are sufficient. People need access to capital to become more productive. Europe has the largest capital stock in the world, at $100,000 per capita, compared to the US’s $71,000 and China’s $33,000. But Europe’s capital stock has been flat-to-down since the Great Recession. China’s capital stock is rising rapidly and has a lot further to go given its low level. But the country also faces a difficult transition to a new economic model and a debt-deleveraging process that may slow down the pace of capital deepening in the coming years, forcing the government to step in and promote capital projects (Chart 2). Meanwhile the US’s capital stock continues to grow steadily.  Chart 1The People Are The Riches Of A Nation... Chart 2...As Long As The People Are Not Starved Of Capital Since the shale boom the US has become nearly energy self-sufficient and now produces 20% of global oil and fuel. This development is a blessing from an economic and national security perspective. But it also poses the risk of a kind of resource curse, in which the US could lack the motivation to pioneer renewable energy technology. Currently the US only produces 4% of the world’s renewable energy, a share that has been declining. Europe and China are both energy import-dependent, which is a national security vulnerability, and they will continue to invest in renewable solutions to improve their energy security (Chart 3). Russian aggression will motivate Europe to go down this path, whereas China will go down this path for fear of American strategic containment. For now, however, the US is energy self-sufficient while technologically capable of advancing in renewable energy. The US has a range of structural problems: rising income inequality, extreme political polarization, and a policy turn away from globalization over the past 20 years. However, these problems have not weighed on GDP per capita growth. Of course, the greatest strides in GDP per capita are occurring in the developing world: China and India show the most promise. But the US’s GDP per capita is still growing at an annual average rate of 3%, putting it alongside Germany and ahead of the much less developed Brazil (Chart 4). Germany did not see anywhere near as big of increases in inequality and polarization and is still generally committed to globalization, yet its GDP per capita growth is about the same as the US’s, despite faster US population growth. Chart 3North America's Natural Resource Blessing Chart 4Does Political Instability Harm Productivity? Partisanship Means Big Government None of the above benefits have been reversed by the US’s historic increase in political polarization and partisanship over the past three decades. Make no mistake, the latter trends are harmful and could weigh on US stability and productivity in coming years, primarily through deteriorating fiscal management. But so far their bad effects have been contained. The two US political parties have won control of the White House, the Senate, and the House of Representatives a roughly equal number of times. While Republicans have a larger regional presence, across the 50 states, and tend to perform better in the Electoral College and the Senate, this advantage is very slight judging by the number of electoral victories. Meanwhile Democrats have a larger popular presence and perform better in the House of Representatives but this advantage is also slight (Chart 5). The two parties are evenly balanced, which is one explanation for why they compete so viciously for marginal victories. But it also prevents either party from achieving absolute power and distorting or corrupting American bureaucracy and corporate structures to perpetuate single-party rule. Chart 5An Even Balance Of Power Between The Parties The size of the federal government fluctuates within a fairly low and narrow range. Federal government receipts hovered around 16% of GDP in the 1950s-60s, peaked at 20.4% in 2000, and today stand right in the middle of this post-war range at 18.5%. Major increases in revenue follow the business cycle and it is rare that Democrats manage to raise taxes enough to have a substantial impact. This point is clear from looking at periods when Democrats controlled both the House of Representatives and the White House (shaded areas in Chart 6): the large increases in tax take mostly coincide with economic growth spurts. It is conceivable that the Biden administration will raise a minimum corporate tax this year via the budget reconciliation process, but the odds of that have been falling and it will not change the pattern in this chart, which shows rising revenue relative to GDP as the economy recovers but is not likely to match what was seen in the late 1990s. From the perspective of federal government spending, the growth in the size of government is clearer, rising from the post-war 15% of GDP to today’s 25% of GDP, with a pronounced structural uptrend. Republicans rarely control both the White House and the House of Representatives and only in the 1950s did they reduce spending outright. The past two Republican administrations presided over large increases in spending, while also capping revenue via tax cuts (Chart 7). Chart 6US Federal Revenue Does Not Change Much Over Time Chart 7US Federal Spending Does Not Change Much Over Time Thus in America’s highly polarized and populist political scene, Republicans fail to cut spending while Democrats fail to increase taxes. The takeaway is that budget deficits will remain structurally large. The political outlook reinforces this point as it promises a return to congressional gridlock. Historically speaking, Biden’s net negative approval rating implies that Democrats will lose 40 seats in the House of Representatives and 4 seats in the Senate this fall. It is unlikely that Democratic fortunes will improve much between now and this November given that midterm elections almost always punish the ruling party and midterm voters tend to make up their minds early in the year. Moreover the ruling party’s ailments are not easily reversed: headline inflation is running at 7.5%, crime and immigration are growing at historic rates, while foreign policy challenges will likely feed the narrative that the Biden administration is weak on the global stage. The likelihood of congressional gridlock from 2022-24 (and maybe beyond) entails that future increases in fiscal spending will be automatic, through lack of entitlement reform, rather than through grandiose new spending programs, which will not pass into law. As such, “Big Government” is back but it is still “limited government” in the US tradition – i.e. limited big government. Neither party has a blank check or dominates for long. And if anything a period of fiscal normalization (or pseudo-normalization) is on the horizon. Constitutional And Geopolitical Advantages The balance of the parties is not accidental but essential to the American constitutional system. This system is based on the tradition of “mixed” or “balanced” constitutionalism, which developed in ancient Greece and Rome and came to the Americas via the United Kingdom. The system can be discussed in philosophical or ideological terms but it is rooted in real, physical, institutional power. The tradition begins with great philosophers like Plato and Aristotle but is perhaps best illustrated by the Greek historian Polybius. Polybius observed a violent historical cycle that ceaselessly shifted from despotism to oligarchy to the tyranny of the masses to anarchy and finally back to despotism. He argued that the Roman constitution, by mingling the different social classes (the leaders, the elite, and the masses), could produce a durable constitutional order that would prolong the time period until the state decayed and collapsed. We call this the “Polybius Solution” (Diagram 1). Diagram 1The Polybius Solution The US constitution is successful because, like several of the oldest European constitutions, it mixes the different social classes and sources of power so that the leaders, elites, and masses each have a share in the political system and no single group can predominate and overwhelm the others. It is an extra benefit that the US constitution is one of the longest continually operating constitutions in the world, since the long fortification of the system in practice helps provide sociopolitical and economic stability, whereas the ideas themselves are not well taught or understood (Table 1). The fact that the constitution is written in a single document is useful but not decisive, as the British constitution similarly provides stability over long periods of change and upheaval both at home and abroad. Table 1The Balanced Constitution Investors should not mistake this constitutional system merely for a set of preferential ideas. Opinions change very easily. But it is physically difficult for ruling classes to take away rights and privileges that the masses of people have been given. Thus the mixture of constitutional powers is based in political realism, not idealism. The US constitution operates not because Americans are more well-meaning, educated, civic-minded, altruistic, or enlightened than others. It operates because the oligarchy is not powerful enough to disenfranchise the democracy, while the democracy is not powerful enough to purge the oligarchy. The government leaders themselves (the president, the lawmakers, the career bureaucrats, etc) are not powerful enough to suspend term limits and stay in power forever. Nor have they been able to ally with either the oligarchy or the democracy closely enough to permanently exclude the other one from its share of power within the system. There is a clear and present danger that the constitutional system could come under too much strain and fracture amid recent power struggles among the American social classes. The struggles between the classes have intensified since the fall of the Soviet Union (which deprived America of a common enemy) and especially the Great Recession (which provoked populist democratic movements). Some fear that a president could turn into an autocrat and refuse to yield power, others fear that the oligarchic faction could steal elections or manipulate the legal system, others fear that the democratic faction could steal elections or ride roughshod over legal procedures. Of these risks, the risk of autocracy is the lowest, while the risk of institutional corruption or electoral manipulation or majoritarian rule-breaking are the highest. Certainly political risk and policy uncertainty will rise from current levels over the 2022-24 election cycle, which promises to be extremely disruptive. However, there are three reasons to hold the baseline view that the US political structure will remain stable enough to sustain economic productivity over the coming years, despite enormous upheaval on the cyclical level of politics. The US remains secure from invasion, while provoked to meet rising geopolitical challenges. Neither Canada nor Mexico poses a fundamental threat to US national security – the US is capable of militarizing the borders, however undesirable – and the US is inaccessible to more distant enemies due to the tyranny of distance across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Yet the resurgence of Russia and the rise of China are likely to present common external rivals around which America’s elites will attempt to galvanize public opinion to maintain national security and keep themselves in office. Because elections still tend to swing on historically critical regions, such as the Midwestern heartland, politicians will need to pursue some degree of economic nationalism to stay in power (Map 1). Map 1USA: Splendid Isolation? The US continues to benefit from a “brain drain” of talented foreign immigrants and will keep that door open if and when it curbs immigration more broadly. Immigration flows into the US are typically robust according to various indicators, including the numbers of newly naturalized citizens, which is itself an indicator of the US’s abiding advantages (Chart 8). The global pandemic caused a decline that is quickly rebounding. Immigration is one of the major outstanding sources of power struggle between the US political factions. It will become a centerpiece of the 2022-24 election cycle. The outcome is unclear. But general American attitudes toward immigration are not hostile, while elite attitudes favor immigration. Therefore whatever government policy finally emerges, it will likely preserve the US’s national interest of continuing to import global talent . Chart 8People Voting With Their Feet The US’s chronic trade imbalance generated a new policy consensus in favor of strengthening American competitiveness. The US pursued a policy of globalization and de-industrialization for decades but it became untenable in the wake of the Great Recession, which spawned a populist backlash. The Biden administration has largely coopted the Trump administration’s hawkish approach to trade. While US trade and current account deficits will remain very large for the foreseeable future, reflecting a fundamental imbalance of savings relative to investment (Chart 9), nevertheless the US will undertake targeted policies to improve supply chain resilience and domestic high-tech competitive edge. The Congress’s likely passage of the American Competes Act of 2022 exemplifies the new bipartisan consensus around the need to invest in American industrial and technological capabilities so as to better compete with great powers overseas (Table 2). Chart 9US Competitiveness Waning? Table 2US Bipartisan Consensus On Restoring Competitiveness By contrast, other regions face greater geopolitical threats to their homelands and greater difficulties coping with hypo-globalization. Europe’s strategic vulnerability to Russia will dampen investment sentiment and risk appetite. Russia’s economic trajectory has suffered since 2014 and its ongoing conflict with the West will result in isolation and lower productivity. China will see rising tensions with its neighbors due to its economic transition, emerging protectionism, and its need to become more assertive for the sake of supply security. By contrast the US is relatively insulated. Investment Takeaways The US’s economic, constitutional, and geopolitical advantages are structural positives. Rising domestic policy uncertainty over the 2022-24 election cycle might overshadow these positives temporarily, but they are likely to persist over the long run. Increasing geopolitical risks abroad suggest that domestic American policy uncertainty is likely to be overrated. Great power competition – stemming from geopolitical risks – will fuel capital spending among the major nations as well as research and development investments. In this respect the United States faces challenges to maintain its competitive edge. But it is still the leader and the combination of a vibrant private sector and an increasingly proactive public sector are positive (Chart 10). Are the US’s structural advantages already priced? To a great extent, yes. The US equity risk premium today stands at 300 basis points, compared to 660 in Europe and 570 in China. And yet global geopolitical risk, highlighted by Russia’s escalating conflict with the West, suggest that this divergence can get worse before it gets better. We expect the 2022-24 election cycle to cause an increase in policy uncertainty and the political risk premium. But as things stand the increase in uncertainty and risk premiums abroad will be even greater (Chart 11). Chart 10US Investing In The Future? Chart 11US Stocks Priced The Good News?       Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)   Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Footnotes  
The preliminary estimate of the Markit PMI suggests that US economic activity rebounded in January. The Composite index gained 4.9 points to 56.0, beating expectations of a more moderate improvement to 52.5. Greater than expected improvements in both the…
Chinese authorities have asked state-owned firms and banks to closely examine their exposure to Ant Group and report their findings as soon as possible. The move highlights that the regulatory clampdown on Chinese companies operating in the technology, media,…
The German Ifo survey for February corroborates the upbeat signal from the Eurozone Flash PMIs, highlighting that the recent soft patch does not reflect underlying economic weakness. The Business Climate Index increased from 96 to 98.9, above the anticipated…