Equities
Highlights Financial markets in both mainstream EM and China are undergoing an adjustment that is not yet complete. EM equity and currency valuations are neutral. When valuations are neutral, the profit and liquidity cycles become the key drivers of share prices. Both these factors are currently headwinds to equity prices. Our investment strategy is to remain defensive going into the new year. Yet, the longer-term outlook is brighter. We see with high odds that the first half of the year will present an opportunity to turn positive on EM assets in absolute terms, and upgrade EM versus DM within global equity and fixed-income portfolios. Our checklist of fundamental factors that will cause us to turn bullish on EM and China include: (1) significant stimulus in China leading to a strong recovery in its credit impulse; (2) a rollover in Latin America’s core inflation that will open the door for monetary policy easing in these economies; and (3) the Fed abandoning its plans to hike rates, creating conditions for durable US dollar weakness. Feature Introduction: Beyond Omicron There is low visibility regarding the Omicron variant of the COVID-19 virus’s impact on societies and economies. We do not pretend to be experts in virology and on pandemics. So, in this 2022 outlook, we will focus on the macro fundamentals that go beyond Omicron. If the latter proves to be very disruptive for many economies, EM risk assets will sell off materially in the coming weeks. If Omicron proves to be a non-issue, macro fundamentals will prevail. In this case (and if our analysis is correct) EM risk assets will still fare poorly, at least in the early months of 2022. Chart 1The EM Selloff Has Been Occurring Since February 2021 Notably, the cross rate between the Swedish krona and Swiss franc correlates well with EM share prices and both had already been falling well before Omicron arrived (Chart 1). Overall, our investment strategy is to remain defensive going into the new year. Nevertheless, odds are significant that in H1 2022 there will be a buying opportunity in EM assets in absolute terms, and a better entry point to upgrade EM relative to DM within global equity and fixed-income portfolios. China’s Business Cycle And Macro Policy Will China ease policy substantially? It depends on how bad the economy, financial markets and business/consumer sentiment get. Beijing has already initiated piecemeal monetary and fiscal easing. However, if the growth slowdown is gradual and orderly, and financial markets do not panic, then policy easing will be measured. On the contrary, if growth tumbles sharply, business and consumer confidence deteriorate markedly and onshore share prices sell off hard, then policymakers will accelerate the stimulus. In a nutshell, substantial policy easing is not likely unless Chinese onshore stocks experience a meaningful deterioration. In the meantime, the Mainland economy will continue disappointing, and the path of least resistance for China-related plays is down: The annual change in excess reserves – that PBOC injects into the banking system – leads the credit impulse by six months (Chart 2, top panel). The former has stabilized but has not yet turned up. Hence, in the near term, the credit impulse will be stabilizing at very low levels but will not revive materially until spring 2022. This entails more growth disappointments in China’s old economy (Chart 2, bottom panel). In turn, the average of the manufacturing PMI’s new orders and backlog of orders series heralds more downside in EM non-TMT share prices (Chart 3). Chart 2China: An Economic Revival Is Not Imminent Chart 3EM Non-TMT Stocks Remain At Risk Property construction will not recover quickly. Marginal easing of real estate regulations and restrictions will not be sufficient to revive animal spirits among property developers and buyers. As we argued in a recent special report on the property market, real estate in China benefited from the biggest carry trade in the world over the past decade. With borrowing costs below the pace of house price appreciation, property developers in China have done what any business would do: they borrowed as much as they could and accumulated real estate assets in the forms of land, incomplete construction, and completed but unsold properties. Chart 4The Carry Trade In China's Real Estate The top panel of Chart 4 illustrates that developers have been starting many more projects than they have been completing. As a result, their unfinished construction has ballooned (Chart 4, bottom panel). Such a business model was profitable since developers’ borrowing costs were below the pace of real estate asset price appreciation. This dynamic will reverse going forward: real estate asset price appreciation will be below developers’ borrowing costs. Thus, property developers have every incentive to shed their assets as quickly as possible. This will discourage new land investment and new construction. In brief, odds are rising that the property market downtrend will be an extended one. In 2015, when property inventories swelled (Chart 4, bottom panel), it took outright monetization of residential properties by the PBOC through the PSL program1 to revive real estate demand and construction. Currently, anything short of aggressive monetization or a very large policy boost will be insufficient to reignite property market sentiment. Thus, the real estate market will continue to struggle. Chart 5 illustrates that real estate developer financing has dried up, heralding a significant contraction in floor space completion, i.e., construction activity. This will weigh on industrial commodities (Chart 5, bottom panel). Even if the government approves a larger special bond quota for local governments, traditional infrastructure spending is unlikely to accelerate meaningfully (Chart 6). The basis is that local governments will continue facing financing constraints from an ongoing slump in their land sales. The RMB 3.65 trillion special bond issuance quota in 2021 accounted for only 18% of local government on- and off-budget revenues. Meanwhile, land sales by local governments account for 40% of their on- and off-budget revenues. As the property market travails continue, local governments will not be able to materially increase traditional infrastructure spending. Chart 5Less Funding = Less Completions = Less Commodity Demand Chart 6China: Traditional Infrastructure Has Been Weak In sum, the Chinese economy has developed formidable downward momentum that will not be easy to reverse. That said, authorities will likely begin injecting more stimulus in 2022 to secure a stable economy and financial markets in the second half of 2022, ahead of the important Party Congress. Bottom Line: The slowdown in the Chinese old economy will continue for now with negative ramifications for China-related financial markets. A buying opportunity for China plays leveraged to its old economy is likely sometime in 2022. Chinese Internet Stocks Chart 7Chinese Internet Stocks Are Not Cheap The outlook for Chinese TMT stocks remains uninspiring. We maintain that the regulatory changes affecting Chinese internet stocks are structural rather than cyclical in nature. There could be periods when the pace of regulatory clampdown eases, but these regulations will not be rolled back in any meaningful way. While Chinese platform companies’ equity valuations have already de-rated, these stocks are not cheap: their trailing and forward P/E ratios stand at 35 and 30, respectively (Chart 7). Their multiples will compress further for the following reasons: Their business models have to change because of regulatory requirements. Higher uncertainty about their future business models currently entails a higher equity risk premium. Authorities will cap these companies’ profitability like regulators do with monopolies and oligopolies, which heralds a lower return on equity. In addition, in line with the common prosperity policy, these companies will perform social duties – redistributing profits from shareholders to the society. All these will lower their profitability, warranting permanently lower multiples than those in the past 10 years. Beijing’s involvement in their management and the prioritization of national and geopolitical objectives over shareholder interests will lead foreign investors to dis-invest from these companies. Some large companies face non-trivial risks of delisting from the US. Last week, Beijing reportedly asked Didi to delist from the US due to concerns over its data security. For very different reasons, US and Chinese authorities do not want Chinese companies to be listed in the US. And when Chinese and US authorities do not want to see some of these stocks listed in the US, they will not be. Odds are rising that a few of them might be delisted in the coming years. In such a scenario, US institutional investors will offload their holdings of these companies. Chart 8China: Online Retail Sales Have Slowed Down In addition to the risk to multiples, these internet companies’ profits are also under threat. Chart 8 shows that online retail sales of goods and services have been lackluster compared to their torrid pace in the past 10 years. Bottom Line: The path of least resistance for Chinese internet/platform share prices remains down. Mainstream EM Economies In the majority of EM economies ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (herein referred to as mainstream EM), domestic demand will remain in the doldrums in H1 2022: Monetary policy has tightened in Latin America and Russia while real interest rates are elevated/restrictive in the ASEAN region. In countries where central banks have been hiking rates, domestic demand is bound to decelerate (Chart 9, top panel). In fact, domestic demand remains below pre-pandemic levels in many mainstream EMs (Chart 9, bottom panel). Rate hikes and/or high borrowing costs in real terms will continue to weigh on money and credit growth. The annual growth rates of broad money and bank loans have already reached record lows in both nominal and real terms (Chart 10). These are equity market-weighted aggregates for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan. Chart 9Mainstream EM: Domestic Demand Is At Risk Of A Relapse Chart 10Mainstream EM: Tepid Money And Credit Growth Chart 11Mainstream EM: No Fiscal Reprieve In 2022 For the same universe, the fiscal thrust in 2022 will be around -1% of GDP (Chart 11). Chart 12 illustrates the 2022 fiscal thrust – defined as the yearly change in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit – for individual countries. Only Turkey is projected to have a small positive fiscal thrust next year. The slowdown in China’s old economy will weigh on Asian economies and commodity producers elsewhere. Table 1 demonstrates that China is the top destination for Asian and commodity producing economies’ exports. Finally, political uncertainty and volatility will remain high in Latin America while geopolitical tensions will linger and escalate from time to time around Russia and Taiwan. We do not think political and geopolitical risks are fully reflected in these financial markets. This leaves these bourses vulnerable to these risks. Bottom Line: Economic growth in mainstream EM economies will disappoint, at least in H1 2022. What We Are Looking To Turn Bullish On EM Assets? Equities: A combination of the following will make us consider issuing a buy recommendation on EM equities: Significant stimulus in China leading to a strong recovery in its credit impulse (shown in Chart 2 above). A rollover in Latin America’s core inflation that will open the door for monetary policy easing in these economies. Regarding indicators, we would need to see all three of the following: EM M1 growth accelerates (Chart 13) Analysts’ net EPS expectations drop to their previous lows (Chart 14) Investor sentiment on EM equities declines to its previous lows (Chart 15). EM equity valuations are neutral in absolute terms. When valuations are neutral, share prices could rise or fall. In these cases, the profit cycle is the key driver of share prices. EM equity market cap-weighted narrow money (M1) growth suggests that EM EPS growth will decelerate well into 2022 (Chart 13 above). Such a profit slump is not yet priced in according to Chart 14. Chart 13An EM Profit Slump Is Imminent Chart 14Analysts Are Not Pricing In An EM Profit Slump Chart 15Investor Sentiment On EM Stocks Is Not Downbeat Chart 16Mainstream EM Currencies: Spot And Total Return Indexes Exchange Rates: The mainstream EM equity market cap-weighted currency spot rate versus the US dollar is not far from its 2020 spring lows. On a total return basis – when carry is taken into account – mainstream EM currencies are still above their March 2020 lows (Chart 16). Chart 17Mainstream EM: Real Effective Exchange Rates Critically, EM currencies are not particularly cheap (Chart 17). Given the lingering headwinds, they are likely to depreciate further. The mainstream EM aggregate real effective exchange rate will likely drop to one or two standard deviations below its mean before these currencies find a bottom (Chart 17). Barring a scenario in which the Omicron variant becomes a major drag on the US economy, the Federal Reserve will maintain its recent hawkish rhetoric due to rising core US inflation. This will support the US dollar and weigh on EM currencies. If Omicron produces a major selloff in financial markets, EM currencies will depreciate. In a nutshell, weak domestic demand and return on capital, political volatility, a slowdown in China and potentially lower commodity prices will all continue depressing EM currencies in the early months of 2022. In the following section about local rates, we list signposts that will make us turn positive on EM currencies Local Rates: EM local rates have gone up a great deal and they offer good value. However, as long as EM currencies do not find a floor, interest rates in high-yield local bond markets will not decline. Critically, US dollar returns on EM local currency bonds are primarily determined by exchange rates. Hence, a buying opportunity for international investors in EM high-yield local bonds will coincide with a bottom in their currencies. We recommend turning positive on mainstream EM currencies versus the US dollar if two out of these three conditions are met: The Fed abandons its intention to hike rates. Significant stimulus in China leading to a strong recovery in its credit impulse Mainstream EM’s aggregate real effective exchange rate drops more than one standard deviation below its mean (Chart 17). Chart 18EM Credit Spreads Are Driven By The EM Business Cycle And Currencies Credit Markets: As we discussed in a report published earlier this year titled A Primer on EM USD Bonds, the two key drivers of EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads are economic growth and the exchange rate (Chart 18). A positive turn on the EM/China business cycles and their currencies will make us immediately bullish on EM sovereign credit. As for high-yield Chinese USD property developers’ bonds, they are not a buy given their extremely high indebtedness and the dismal outlook for real estate. Investment Strategy Odds are that there will be a buying opportunity in EM equities, fixed income and currencies in 2022. The checklists we highlighted above outline what we will be monitoring to make us turn positive on EM equities, local rates, exchange rates and credit. Our current investment stance is as follows: There is likely to be more downside in EM equities in absolute terms. They will also continue underperforming their DM peers. We downgraded EM equities from neutral to underweight on March 25, 2021 and this strategy remains intact. Within the EM benchmark, our overweights are Korea, Singapore, China (favoring A shares over investable stocks), Vietnam, Russia, central Europe and Mexico. Our equity underweights are Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia. We recommend a neutral allocation to all other bourses in mainstream EM. A word on India, Korea and Mexico is warranted. We will publish a report on India next week. Concerning our overweight in the Korean bourse, lower DRAM prices and China’s slowdown have weighed on its performance in 2021 (Chart 19). However, weakness in semiconductor prices will prove to be short lived as the semiconductor industry is in a structural upswing. Besides, Korea and Mexico are two countries in the EM universe that will benefit from the US industrial boom – one of our major multi-year themes. Chart 20 shows that Korea’s relative equity performance versus the overall EM benchmark closely tracks global industrials relative share prices versus global non-TMT stocks. Chart 19A Soft Spot In The DRAM Industry Chart 20Overweight The KOSPI Within The EM Equity Space The path of least resistance for EM currencies versus the US dollar is presently down. We continue to recommend shorting the following basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar: BRL, CLP, COP, PEN, ZAR, KRW, THB and PHP. Last week, we recommended adding the Indonesian rupiah to this list and today we are booking profits on the short position in TRY. The currencies that we currently favor are CNY, INR, MYR, SGD, TWD, RUB, CZK and MXN. In local rates, we have been betting on the yield curve flattening in Mexico and Russia, have been recommending receiving 10-year swap rates in China and Malaysia as well as paying 10-year rates in the Czech Republic. In the EM credit space, we continue to recommend underweighting EM versus US corporate credit, quality adjusted. As with equities, we downgraded this allocation from neutral to underweight on March 25, 2021. Within the EM credit space, we favor sovereign versus corporate credit, quality adjusted. For EM sovereign credit and domestic bond portfolios, our recommended allocations across various countries are shown in the tables enclosed below. Finally, today we are closing our volatility trades: long EM equity volatility and EM currency volatility. Both positions were initiated on February 4, 2021 and have been profitable. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Pledged Supplementary Lending was in effect in 2014-2018: The PBOC lent at very low interest rates to the three policy banks who in turn re-lent to local governments and regional property developers (mainly in tier-2 and smaller cities). These entities then bought slums from their owners, putting cash in their hands to purchase new and better properties. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
BCA Research’s Equity Analyzer service’s MacroQuant model remains bullish on global equities. The model is calibrated to provide recommendations over a 30-day investment horizon. For December, MacroQuant’s view on equities is bullish (74.7%). Bearish signals…
Highlights Investors and consumers expect that inflation will remain quite high over the next year, but they are unconcerned that upward price pressures will last: According to surveys and market prices, inflation will exceed 4% next year before subsiding over the longer term to the comfortable levels of the last two decades. The Fed also views elevated inflation as a near-term phenomenon and accordingly expects to hike the fed funds rate at a deliberate pace: The Fed is on the same page as the hoi polloi, and is not gearing up to remove accommodation with any particular haste. While the decade following the financial crisis demonstrated that extremely easy monetary policy does not by itself promote high inflation, the landscape has changed: A decade of ZIRP and QE failed to produce any dire effects, but it remains to be seen how extreme monetary and fiscal accommodation will interact. We expect the bull market will end once the Fed falls behind the curve on inflation and is forced to tighten monetary policy aggressively to catch up: We think the bull has another year to run, but excessive stimulation will eventually bring about its demise. Feature For most of the year, every discussion with our investor-clients has eventually worked its way around to inflation. How high is it going to go? How long will it last? What will it mean for the economy? What will it mean for stocks? How will the Fed react? As the year-over-year change in the Consumer Price Index has climbed steadily higher, breaking above 6% last month for the first time in 31 years (Chart 1), the tenor of the conversations has shifted. Investors have come to recognize that the economy is subject to upward price pressures that are more than the temporary by-product of pandemic base effects. Inflation is nonetheless still largely viewed as a temporary phenomenon that will fade once reopening supply bottlenecks can be resolved. While markets are resigned to another year of high inflation, they are secure in the notion that the disinflationary currents of the last several decades will squelch them over the longer term. Chart 1Long Time, No See The tension between the competing ideas that both inflationary and disinflationary currents are real sets up a potential market showdown. If it is only a matter of time before disinflationary forces return to smother today’s post-COVID disruptions, the widely shared consensus view that the fed funds rate will meander its way to a peak of 2% will be validated. The equity bull market will continue, albeit at a slower pace, until it dies of natural causes. Markets could be in for a rude awakening, however, if the forces supporting higher prices outlast the pandemic and overcome the long-running disinflationary trend. This report considers how inflation could ruin the party. Our base-case view is that the Fed will find itself behind the curve. When it does, it will be forced to tighten monetary policy fast and furious, moving more swiftly to a higher terminal fed funds rate than markets currently expect. That will bring down the curtain on the bull market in risk assets and it may also spark the next recession, but we think the good times will last for at least one more year. What Markets Expect: Inflation Despite all the attention higher prices have drawn, investors haven’t gotten too worked up over them. Although they’ve made considerable revisions to their near-term expectations, their expectations for inflation ten years from now haven’t budged since the start of the year. As the Treasury1 (Chart 2) and CPI swaps (Chart 3) markets show, big consumer price increases are expected to be concentrated in the next year, come off the boil in year two and then slowly cool over the next few years. At the back half of the 10-year curve, year-over-year CPI increases are expected to settle into the range that prevailed during the nineties’ and early 2000s’ inflation moderation. Financial markets do not exist in a vacuum, of course, and the expectations of participants in the real economy matter as well. The University of Michigan’s consumer survey indicates that households’ expectations accord with financial markets’ (Chart 4): inflation will be uncomfortably high over the next year but an afterthought five years from now. Whether the phenomenon is called adaptive expectations or recency bias, everyone’s – investors’, consumers’, businesses’, and economists’ (Chart 5) – expectations of the future are colored by the recent past. It is not a stretch to envision consumer prices rising by more than 4% in 2022 after having watched them surge since March, but apparently economic participants will need to see them remain elevated for a longer stretch before they can picture inflation enduring for two or three years, much less five to ten years. Chart 45% Now, But Only 3% Later Chart 5Reliably Anchoring To The Recent Past What Markets Expect: Fed Policy Chart 6Faster, Yes; Farther, No If inflation isn’t expected to persist at an elevated rate for an extended period, there’s no reason to expect that the Fed will aggressively tighten monetary policy. Higher-than-expected inflation readings have led money markets to bring their first rate hike ETA (the liftoff date) forward to next July, and to price in two rate hikes in the second half of next year (Chart 6, top panel). They continue to expect that the Fed will conclude its tightening cycle once the fed funds rate is around 2% (the terminal rate). They also expect that the Fed will take its time getting to that terminal rate, hiking by no more than 75 basis points (“bps”) in a single year (Chart 6, bottom two panels), roughly in line with the 100-bps annual pace of 2017 and 2018. The Fed concurs. As per the latest Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), released after the September FOMC meeting, the 18 board members and regional presidents casting votes expect the FOMC to take its time hiking rates. With exactly half of the voters calling for no rate hikes next year, the median and mean expectations were for one-half and two-thirds of a 25-bps rate hike in 2022, respectively (Chart 7A). By the end of 2023, the median and mean SEP voter expects a cumulative 3.5 and 3.1 25-bps rate hikes, respectively (Chart 7B). By the end of 2024, median and mean expectations are for a cumulative 6.5 and 6.1 25-bps rate hikes, respectively (Chart 7C). Table 1Same Terminal Rate, Different Liftoff Date Conditions have changed since late-September upon the release of September and October inflation data, though Chair Powell didn’t give any ground in his press conference following the November 3rd meeting. Rounding the expectations at each year-end period as of the September 22nd meeting, the median SEP voter expected zero or one rate hike in 2022, three in 2023 and three in 2024, pushing the top end of the fed funds rate range to 2% as of the end of 2024. Market expectations have moved since the last SEP, with the overnight index swap curve going from zero rate hikes in the next twelve months to two, and from two rate hikes in the next 24 months to five, but financial markets and the Fed remain on the same page (Table 1). A Kinder, Gentler Fed Emboldened by the experience of the last expansion, in which worrisome inflation did not materialize despite a zero fed funds rate and 50-year lows in unemployment, the Fed has embarked on a course quite different from the one the late Paul Volcker might have charted. Nagged by persistently low post-crisis inflation, the FOMC has decided that pursuing an average inflation target that makes up for previous shortfalls will best allow it to meet its price stability mandate. Letting undershoot bygones be bygones paved the way for inflation expectations to slide, constraining its ability to stimulate the economy at the zero bound. To re-anchor expectations in its preferred 2.3-2.5% range, and give a zero fed funds rate more zip, the FOMC must convince markets that it will occasionally let inflation run hot. A more aggressive pursuit of its full employment mandate, as outlined in the August 2020 revisions to the FOMC’s Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, should also help nudge expectations upward. Per the revisions commentary on the Fed’s website, “The previous expansion demonstrated that a strong labor market can be sustained without inducing an unwanted increase in inflation. To the contrary, when unemployment fell to levels that were previously thought to be unsustainable, the labor market proved remarkably adaptable, bringing many benefits to families and communities that all too often had been left behind. Accordingly, the new Statement … only … [pledges to address] ‘shortfalls of employment from its maximum level’ rather than the [previous] ‘deviations from its maximum level’[.] This change signals that high employment, in the absence of unwanted increases in inflation or the emergence of other risks that could impede the attainment of the Committee’s goals, will not by itself be a cause for policy concern.”2 The Fly In The Ointment Chart 8Wall Street And Main Street While we acknowledge that the September 22nd SEP may be somewhat out of date as a guide to the board members’ and regional presidents’ fed funds rate expectations, the easier stance outlined in the revised monetary policy strategy statement remains very much in effect. The upshot, from our perspective, is that the FOMC intends to be behind the inflation curve in the coming rate-hiking cycle. If inflation remains contained after lingering pandemic dislocations are resolved, the behind-the-curve takeaway will not be all that impactful for investors. After all, those who positioned for dollar debasement and runaway inflation when the Bernanke Fed introduced QE and ZIRP were clobbered by investors who loaded up on risk assets and blithely rode easy money tailwinds higher. There is a critical difference this time, however, beyond the increasing magnitude of the Fed’s accumulated asset purchases. Pandemic fiscal stimulus has dwarfed the comparatively meager fiscal response to the global financial crisis. And going forward, the Biden administration’s spate of ambitious spending proposals contrasts sharply with the Obama administration’s deficit reduction focus. The post-crisis era has served as a natural experiment on the effects of unprecedented monetary accommodation on economic activity and consumer price inflation. Asset prices surged, buoyed by a negative real fed funds rate and a ballooning Fed balance sheet (Chart 8, top panel), but the rate of growth in consumption (Chart 8, bottom panel) was unchanged. Although household net worth gains lead consumption growth, the vast majority of financial assets are held by households with a low marginal propensity to consume. Asset price inflation doesn’t necessarily lead to consumer price inflation because it doesn’t necessarily have an observable impact on aggregate demand. Fiscal stimulus is different, however. The stimulus packages created to counter the economic effects of COVID-19 put money directly in the hands of households with high marginal propensities to consume. They have been consuming avidly since emerging from their spring 2020 lockdowns (Chart 9) and we expect that they will continue to do so until they’ve run down at least one half of their $2.3 trillion of excess pandemic savings. Rising wages may additionally promote demand, as will the baby boomers’ shift into their peak consumption years, along with the massive investment required to meet green energy goals. Chart 9Consumers Have Momentum (And The Savings And Borrowing Capacity To Sustain It) Demand was sluggish for an entire decade following the GFC, but it appears as if it will be quite robust for a while after the pandemic. We believe that aggregate demand is on a course to exceed aggregate supply after reopening supply chain issues are resolved. At that point, the transitory inflation view will no longer be credible, and the Fed may find itself having to play catch up. When it does, it will have to hike rates more and faster than financial markets expect. Once the Fed has shifted into fast and furious mode, or markets develop a widespread conviction that it will, the bull markets in risk assets will end and the expansion might, too. In the meantime, setting investment strategy will depend on how long it takes for the inflation inflection point to arrive. We do not yet think the inflection point is in sight and therefore continue to recommend that investors with a twelve-month timeframe overweight equities and credit in multi-asset portfolios. We remain on the alert, however, and will shift our view if events move faster than we currently expect. We would rather leave some upside on the table than stay at the party too long. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Off-the-run Treasury maturities do not trade all that well, and TIPS other than 1-, 2-, 5- and 10-year maturities are even less liquid. The TIPS inflation expectations curve (Chart 2) is therefore less reliable than the CPI swaps curve (Chart 3) at individual points, but it confirms the broad direction of investors’ inflation expectations. 2 Question 6, How has the review altered how the Federal Reserve will pursue its maximum employment objective? Accessed November 22, 2021. Emphasis added. Federal Reserve Board - Q&As.
US equity breadth measured as the share of stocks trading above their 200-day moving average has collapsed since earlier this year. This development raises the question whether a constructive outlook on US equities is still appropriate. At 21.5x forward…
Dear Client, We will be working on our 2022 Outlook for China, which will be published on December 8. Next week we will be sending you BCA Research’s Annual Outlook, featuring long-time BCA client Mr. X, who visits towards the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook for the year ahead. Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Feature In meetings with our North American clients this past week, we expressed the view that China’s economic growth is on a downward trend and easing measures have been gradual and modest in scope. Most clients agreed that China’s economy faces tremendous headwinds, however, some investors were more optimistic about the outlook for Chinese stocks in the next 6 to 12 months. Valuations in both China’s onshore and offshore equity markets have dropped to multi-year lows and macro policies have started to ease. Cheaply valued Chinese stocks should have more upside in the wake of policy support. Policy tone recently pivoted to a more growth supporting bias, but the existing easing measures will not offset the deceleration in both credit growth and domestic demand. China’s economic activity may worsen before it stabilizes in mid-2022. Moreover, China’s financial markets do not seem to have priced in the economic weakness. Therefore, in the next one to two quarters, risks to Chinese stocks are tilted toward the downside. Chart 1Chinese Stocks Will Truly Bottom When The Economy Troughs Below are some of the main questions from our meetings and our answers. Q: Policies have started to be more pro-growth. Why do you still underweight Chinese stocks? A: There are two reasons that we maintain a cautious view on Chinese stocks for at least the next six months, in both absolute terms and relative to global equities. First, we do not think that the magnitude of existing easing measures is sufficient to offset the economy’s downward momentum. Secondly, China’s business cycle lags credit growth by about six to nine months. The timing of a turnaround in the economy and stock prices may be later than investors have priced in. In short, we need to see more reflationary measures and a rebound in credit growth to have a legitimate macro fundamental basis to overweight Chinese stocks (Chart 1). Credit growth on a year-on-year basis stopped falling in October. The underlying data in credit creation, however, points to a weakening in demand for corporate loans (Chart 2). Loans to the housing sector are well below a year ago (Chart 3). Chart 2Weakening Loan Demand Chart 3Bank Loans To The Housing Sector Have Not Turned Around Chart 4It Will Take Time For Policy Easing To Restore Confidence In The Corporate Sector Despite an acceleration in local government bond issuance in October and RMB300 billion in additional bank loans to support small and medium enterprises, growth in medium- to long-term corporate loans peaked (Chart 4). In previous cycles, a rollover in corporate demand for longer-term bank lending on average lasted more than nine months, suggesting that any policy adjustments will take a while to restore confidence in the corporate sector. Without a decisive pickup in credit growth, corporate earnings growth will be at risk of deteriorating. Moreover, policy tightening since earlier this year is still working its way through the economy and major economic indicators in China continue to decline (Chart 5). We think that China’s economy is set to decelerate even more in the next several months, suggesting that earnings uncertainty will likely rise. This, combined with reactive policymakers, already slowing earnings momentum, and a downward adjustment in 12-month forward earnings, suggests that investors have not yet reached the maximum bearishness for Chinese stock prices (Chart 6). Chart 5No Signs Of Improvement In The Economy Chart 6The Earnings Adjustement Process Is Only Beginning Q: What is the impact of China’s property market slowdown on the economy? Will recent policy easing stop deterioration in the real estate sector? A: Policy has been recalibrated by relaxing restrictions on mortgage lending and rules for land sales.1 However, the negative financing loop among developers, households and local governments may take longer to improve. Meanwhile, the market may underestimate the downside risks in housing-related activity in the next 6 to 12 months. Chart 7Households' Home Buying Intentions Have Plummeted Our view is based on the following: Home sales will likely remain in contraction in the next two quarters. Aggressive crackdowns on property market speculation in the past 12 months have fundamentally shifted consumers’ expectations for future home prices. The impending pilot property tax reform2 (details yet to be disclosed) will only encourage the wait-and-see sentiment of potential buyers. Home sales contracted by 24% in October from a year ago. In previous cycles, contractions in home sales normally lasted for more than 12 months. Moreover, the proportion of households planning to buy a house dropped to only 7.7% in Q3 2021 from 11.6% in Q4 2020 (Chart 7). Real estate developers have slashed new projects and land purchases to preserve liquidity for debt servicing (Chart 8, first and second panels). Policymakers may succeed in prompting banks to resume lending to developers in order to alleviate the escalating risk of widespread defaults. However, so far the marginal easing has failed to reverse the downward trend in bank credit to developers along with home sales (Chart 8, third and bottom panels). Funding constraints for real estate developers will probably be sustained for another six months, despite the recent easing measures. Construction activity, housing starts, and real estate investment will likely remain in doldrum at least through 1H22 (Chart 9). Chart 8Housing Activities Are Still Falling Chart 9Less Funding = Less Investment And Completions The marked reduction in land sales will impede local governments’ revenues and weigh on infrastructure investment (Chart 10). Real estate and infrastructure financing contributed 50% of the increase in total Chart 10Local Government Revenues Largely Depend On The Housing Sector social financing in 2020. Given that local governments face funding constraints from a slump in land sale incomes, policies on leverage from local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) will have to meaningfully loosen up to allow a rise in bank lending to support infrastructure investment. As discussed in previous reports, an acceleration in local government special-purpose bond issuance can only partially offset weak credit growth. Furthermore, shadow banking activity, which comprises LGFV borrowing and is highly correlated with China’s infrastructure investment growth, remains in contraction and indicates that growth in infrastructure investment is unlikely to rebound strongly (Chart 11). The sharp weakening of real estate construction activities will drag down the demand for building materials, machinery, home appliances and automobiles. Real estate accounts for about 60% of Chinese households’ wealth, thus any substantial drop in home prices will further weaken households’ propensity to consume (Chart 12). Chart 11More Easing Needed For A Meaningful Pickup In Infrastructure Investment Chart 12Falling Demand For Commodities And Consumer Goods Chart 13AOn The Surface Housing Inventories Are Lower Than Six Years Ago... There are nontrivial risks that the real estate slowdown will evolve into a downturn similar to that of 2014-15. Although the existing housing inventory is more modest than the start of the 2014/15 property downturn, developers have accumulated more debt and unfinished projects in this cycle than in the past (Charts 13A & 13B). Policymakers will have to relax property sector policies much more forcefully to prevent the downturn from intensifying. In the interim, we will likely witness more deterioration in the sector. Chart 13B...But Developers Have Built Up Massive Leverages And Hidden Inventories In The Past Three Years Q: If the property market accounts for such a big portion of local governments’ revenues, why hasn’t the waning housing market forced policymakers to loosen restrictions? A: We think regulators have been slow to backtrack property market reforms because this year China’s fiscal deficit has narrowed from last year due to lower government spending and improved income from corporate taxes. In previous property market downturns, such as 2011/12, 2015/16 and 2019, property policy restrictions were lightened following major declines in government revenues (Chart 14). However, in 2021 China’s fiscal balance sheet has been stronger than in previous cycles; central and local governments have collected much more taxes, particularly corporate taxes, than in 2020 (Chart 15). Meanwhile, government expenditures so far this year have been lower, resulting in a large improvement in the country’s fiscal deficit (Chart 16). Chart 14Falling Gov Revenues Forced Policymakers To Backtrack Reforms In The Past... Chart 15...But This Year Gov Tax Revenues Have Been Strong Chart 16Fiscal Deficit Improved This Year Despite Falling evenues From Land Sales As discussed above, slightly loosened restrictions on land purchases by some regional governments will not restore developers’ confidence and boost the demand for land. The sharp increase in government's corporate tax collection will also start to ebb as economic growth slows and corporate profits decline. As such, even if government expenditures remain the same next year, the fiscal deficit will grow because revenues will be under substantial downward pressure. We expect that Chinese policymakers will have to take more actions to stabilize fiscal conditions. Forecasting exactly when this will occur is difficult, but a benign government balance sheet in much of this year is delaying policymakers’ response to the flagging housing market. Meantime, both policymakers and investors may be complacent about the state of the economy until the full scale of the property sector spillover risk becomes clear. Q: Rates are low and industrial profit growth has been strong this year. Why has capex been so sluggish? A: Investment growth in the manufacturing sector has been lackluster because their profit margins have been squeezed by rising input costs. On the other hand, investment in the mining industry has been constrained by policy restrictions. An acceleration in China’s de-carbonization efforts this year has likely constrained investment in the mining sector. Even though industrial profit growth has been concentrated among the upstream industries such as mining which profits grew by a stunning 100% this year, investment in the sector was mostly flat from a year ago (Chart 17). During the first half of the year, mid- to downstream firms were caught between rising input prices and a weak recovery in domestic consumption. Manufacturing investment grew faster than the mining sector, but manufacturing profit growth only increased by about 30% year to date (Chart 18). However, we think manufacturing investment growth may improve slightly into 2022 as the sector continues to gain pricing power. Chart 17Mining Sector's Profit Growth Way Outpaced Investment Chart 18Manufacturing Sector Profit Growth Has Been Much More Muted Than Upstream Industries Q: The RMB has been strong against the dollar, despite China’s maturing business cycle. What is your outlook for the RMB next year? A: The RMB exchange rate has been boosted by China’s record current account surplus, wide interest rate differentials and speculation that tension between the US and China will abate. However, all three favorable conditions supporting the RMB are in danger of reversing next year. Chart 19The RMB Has Been Appreciating Despite A Strong USD Chart 20The RMB's Appreciation Deviates From Economic Fundamentals Despite broad-based dollar strength, the CNY/USD has appreciated by 4.5% year to date (Chart 19). The RMB’s appreciation deviates from China’s economic fundamentals (Chart 20). Strong global demand for goods has boosted Chinese exports while travel restrictions curbed foreign exchange outflows by domestic households (Chart 21). China-US real interest rate differentials have been in favor of the CNY versus USD, bringing net foreign inflows to China’s onshore bond market (Chart 22). Additionally, the recent meeting between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping has prompted speculation that the US will lessen tariffs on Chinese imports. Chart 21Large Current Account Surplus Chart 22Favorable Interest Rate Differentials And Strong Fund Inflows Chart 23China's Extremely Robust Export Growth Unlikely To Sustain In 2022 Chart 24A Strong RMB Does Not Bode Well For Chinese Exporters' Profits These factors will likely turn against the CNY next year. First, export growth will moderate as the composition of US consumption rotates from goods to services (Chart 23). Secondly, it would not be in the PBoC’s best interests to let the RMB strengthen too rapidly because an appreciating currency would be a deflationary force on China’s export and manufacturing sectors (Chart 24). While we expect policymakers to maintain their preference for a gradual approach to stimulus, we assign a high probability to a reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut in early 2022. In this environment, Chinese bond yields will decline, which would narrow the China-US interest rate differential. Finally, while there may be some changes to US tariffs on China, it is doubtful that there would be a broad-based removal of tariffs. Chart 25The CNY/USD Will Likely Fall And Converge To Chinese Stocks' (Under)performance The CNY’s outperformance stands out as it marks a break from its correlation with China’s relative equity performance vis-à-vis the US (Chart 25). The signal from the currency suggests that either global equity investors are overly pessimistic about economic and regulatory risks in China, or overly optimistic about the value of China’s currency. The latter option is more likely at the moment, and the CNY/USD exchange rate is at the risk of converging to the underperformance of Chinese investable stocks next year. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 China Cities Ease Land Bidding Rules as Property Stress Spreads - Bloomberg 2 China’s Pilot Property Tax Reforms Benefit Markets Despite Short-Term Pain, Analysts Say - Caixin Global Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance
A key area of contention among BCA Research strategists is the outlook for US equities relative to their global peers. The Global Investment Strategy and Bank Credit Analyst services expect US stocks to underperform Euro Area equities over a 12-month horizon.…
Dear Client, There will be no report next week as we will be working on our Quarterly Strategy Outlook, which will be published the following week. In the meantime, please keep an eye out for BCA Research’s Annual Outlook, featuring long-time BCA client Mr. X, who visits towards the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook for the year ahead. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Highlights Inflation in the US, and to a lesser extent, in other major economies, will follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows. While inflation will fall in the first half of next year as goods prices stabilize, an overheated labor market will cause inflation to re-accelerate into 2023. The Fed will be slow to respond to high inflation, implying that monetary policy will remain accommodative next year. This should help propel stocks to new highs. Chinese stimulus will offset much of the drag from a weaker domestic property market. The dollar is a high momentum currency, so we wouldn’t bet against the greenback in the near term. Nevertheless, with “long dollar” now a consensus trade, we would position for a weaker dollar over a 12-month horizon. A depreciating dollar next year should help non-US equities, especially beleaguered emerging market stocks. The dollar will strengthen anew in 2023, as the Fed is forced to turn more hawkish, and global equities begin to buckle. From Ice To Fire In past reports, we have contended that inflation in the US, and to a lesser extent, in other major economies, would follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows. We are currently near the top of those two steps. The pandemic ushered in a major re-allocation of spending from services to goods (Chart 1). US inflation should dip over the next 6-to-9 months as the demand for goods decelerates and supply-chain disruptions abate. Chart 1The Pandemic Caused A Major Shift In Spending From Services To Goods CHart 2Those With Low Paid Jobs Are Enjoying Stronger Wage Gains The respite from inflation will not last long, however. The labor market is heating up. So far, most of the wage growth has been at the bottom end of the income distribution (Chart 2). Wage growth will broaden over the course of 2022, setting the scene for a price-wage spiral in 2023. We doubt that either fiscal or monetary policy will tighten fast enough to prevent such a spiral from emerging. As a result, US inflation will surprise meaningfully on the upside. Our view has no shortage of detractors. In this week’s report, we address the main counterarguments in a Q&A format: Q: What makes you think that service spending will rebound fast enough to offset the drag from weaker goods consumption? Chart 3Inventory Restocking Could Be A Source Of Growth Next Year A: There is still a lot of pent-up demand for goods. Try calling any auto dealership. You will hear the same thing: “We have nothing in stock now, but if you put in an order today, you might get a vehicle in 3-to-6 months.” Thus, durable goods sales are unlikely to weaken quickly. And with inventories near record low levels, firms will need to produce more than they sell (Chart 3). Inventory restocking will support GDP growth. As for services, real spending in the US grew by 7.9% in the third quarter, an impressive feat considering that this coincided with the Delta-variant wave. Service growth will stay strong in the fourth quarter. The ISM non-manufacturing index jumped to a record high of 66.7 in October, up from 61.9 in September. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model is tracking real PCE growth of 9.2% in Q4. Goldman’s Current Activity Indicator has hooked up (Chart 4). Q: Aren’t you worried that spending on services might stall next year? A: Not really. Chart 5 shows the percentage change in real spending for various types of services from January 2020 to September 2021, the last month of available data. The greatest decline in spending occurred in those sectors that were most directly affected by the pandemic. Notably, spending on movie theaters, amusement parks, and live entertainment in September was still down 46% on a seasonally-adjusted basis compared to last January. Hotel spending was down 22%. Spending on public transport was down 26%. Only spending on restaurants was back to normal. The number of Covid cases has once again started to trend higher in the US, so that path to normalization will take time (Chart 6). Nevertheless, with vaccination rates still edging up and new antiviral drugs set to hit the market, it is reasonable to assume that many of the hardest-hit service categories will recover next year. Q: What about medical services? Some have speculated that the shift to telemedicine will require much lower spending down the road. A: It is true that spending on outpatient services in September was $43 billon below pre-pandemic levels. However, over two-fifths of that shortfall was in dental services, which are not amenable to telemedicine. Spending on dental services was down 16% from its January 2020 levels, compared to 6% for physician services. A more plausible theory is that many people are still worried about venturing to the doctor’s or dentist’s office. In addition, a lot of elective procedures were canceled or postponed due to the pandemic. Clearing that backlog will lift medical spending next year. Chart 7The Flow Of Savings Has Fallen Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels But The Stock Of Accumulated Savings Remains High In any case, the cost of a telemedicine appointment is typically no different from an in-person one. And, to the extent that telemedicine does become more widespread, this could encourage more people to seek medical assistance. Lastly, even if spending on certain services does not fully recover after the pandemic, this will probably simply result in a permanent increase in spending on goods. The only way that overall consumer spending will falter is if the savings rate rises, which seems unlikely to us. Q: Why do you say that? The savings rate has been very high throughout the pandemic. A: The savings rate did spike during the pandemic, but that was mainly because fewer services were available, and because households were getting transfer payments from the government. Now that these payments have ended, the savings rate has dropped to 7.5%, roughly where it was prior to the pandemic. There is good reason to think the savings rate will keep falling next year. Households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings, most of which reside in bank deposits (Chart 7). As they run down those savings, consumption will rise in relation to income. The household deleveraging cycle is over. After initially plunging during the pandemic, credit card balances are rising (Chart 8). Banks are eager to make consumer loans (Chart 9). Household net worth has risen by over 100% of GDP since the start of the pandemic (Chart 10). As we discussed three weeks ago, the wealth effect alone could boost annual consumer spending by up to 4% of GDP. Chart 8APost-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Chart 8BPost-GFC Deleveraging Has Ended And People Are Swiping Credit Cards Again Following The Pandemic Scare Chart 9Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Chart 10A Record Rise In Household Net Worth Q: Household wealth could fall as the Fed starts tapering and eventually raising rates. Wouldn’t that cool the economy? A: The taper is a fait accompli, and markets are already pricing in rate hikes starting in the second half of next year. If the Fed were to signal its intention to raise rates more quickly than what has been priced in, then home prices and stocks could certainly weaken. We do not think the Fed will pivot in a more hawkish direction before the end of next year, however. The Fed’s estimate of the neutral rate is only 2.5%, a big step down from its estimate of 4.25% in 2012. The market’s view is broadly in line with the Fed’s (Chart 11). Despite the upward move in realized inflation, long-term inflation expectations remain in check – expected inflation 5-to-10 years out in the University of Michigan survey has increased from 2.3% in late 2019 to 2.9%, bringing it back to where it was between 2010 and 2015. The 5-year/ 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 12). Chart 11The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation Chart 12Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not Yet A Concern For The Fed Q: What about fiscal policy? Isn’t it set to tighten sharply next year? A: The US budget deficit will decline next year. However, this will happen against the backdrop of strong private demand growth. Moreover, budget deficits are likely to remain elevated in the post-pandemic period. This week, President Biden signed a $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill into law, containing $550 billion in new spending. BCA’s geopolitical strategists expect Congress to pass a $1.5-to-$2 trillion social spending bill using the reconciliation process. All in all, the IMF foresees the US cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit averaging 4.9% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, compared to 2.0% of GDP between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 13). Chart 14While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend It should also be noted that government spending on goods and services has been quite weak over the past two years (Chart 14). The budget deficit surged because transfer payments exploded. Unlike direct government spending, which is set to accelerate over the next few years, households saved a large share of transfer payments. Thus, the fiscal multiplier will increase next year, even as the budget deficit shrinks. Q: We have focused a lot on demand, but what about supply? There are over 4 million fewer Americans employed today than before the pandemic and yet the job openings rate is near a record high. Chart 15Despite A Notable Decline, There Are Still A Lot Of People Avoiding Work Because Of Worries About Contracting Or Transmitting Covid A: Some people who left the workforce will regain employment. According to the Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey, there are still 2.5 million people not working because they are afraid of catching or transmitting the virus (Chart 15). That said, some workers may remain sidelined for a while longer. The very same survey also revealed that about 8 million of the 100 million workers currently subject to vaccine mandates say that “they will definitely not get the vaccine.” In addition, about 3.6 million workers have retired since the start of the pandemic, about 1.2 million more than one would have expected based on pre-existing demographic trends. Most of these retirees will not work again. Lifestyle choices may keep others from seeking employment. Female labor participation has declined much more during the pandemic and than it did during the Great Recession (Chart 16). While many mothers will re-enter the labor force now that schools have reopened, some may simply choose to stay at home. The bottom line is that the pandemic has reduced labor supply at a time when labor demand remains very strong. This is likely to exacerbate the labor shortage. Q: Any chance that higher productivity will offset some of the damage to the supply side of the economy from decreased labor participation? A: US labor productivity did increase sharply during the initial stages of the pandemic. However, that appears to have been largely driven by composition effects in which low-skilled, poorly-paid service workers lost their jobs. As these low-skilled workers have returned to the labor force, productivity growth has dropped. The absolute level of productivity declined by 5.0% at an annualized rate in the third quarter, leading to an 8.3% increase in labor costs. It is telling that productivity growth has been extremely weak outside the US (Chart 17). This gives weight to the view that the pandemic-induced changes in business practices have not contributed to higher productivity, at least so far. It is also noteworthy that a recent study of 10,000 skilled professionals at a major IT company revealed that work-from-home policies decreased productivity by 8%-to-19%, mainly because people ended up working longer. Increased investment spending should eventually boost productivity. Core capital goods orders, which lead corporate capex, are up 18% since the start of the pandemic (Chart 18). However, the near-term impact of increased investment spending will be to boost aggregate demand, stoking inflation in the process. Chart 18US Capex Should Pick Up Q: We have spoken a lot about the US, but the world’s second biggest economy, China, is facing a massive deflationary shock from the implosion of its real estate market. Could that deflationary impulse potentially cancel out the inflationary impulse from an overheated US economy? A: You are quite correct that inflation has risen the most in the US. While inflation has picked up in Europe, this mainly reflects base effects (Chart 19). Inflation in China has fallen since the start of the pandemic despite booming exports. There are striking demographic parallels between China today and Japan in the early 1990s. The bursting of Japan’s property bubble corresponded with a peak in the country’s working-age population (Chart 20). China’s working-age population has also peaked and is set to decline by more than 40% over the remainder of the century. Chart 19The US Stands Out As The Inflation Leader Chart 20Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan That said, there are important differences between the two nations. In 1990, Japan was a rich economy; output-per-hour was nearly 70% of US levels. China is still a middle-income economy; output-per-hour is only 20% of US levels (Chart 21). China has the ability to outgrow some of its problems in a way that Japan did not. In addition, Chinese policymakers have learned from some of Japan’s mistakes. They have been trying to curb the economy’s dependence on property development; real estate development investment has fallen from 12% of GDP in 2014 to less than 10% of GDP (Chart 22). China is still building too many new homes, but unlike Japan in the 1990s, the government is likely to pursue stimulus measures to compensate for a shrinking property sector. This should keep the economy from entering a deflationary slump. Chart 22Real Estate Investment Has Peaked In China Q: Let’s bring this back to markets. What is the main investment takeaway from your view? A: The main takeaway is that investors should remain bullish on stocks and other risk assets for the next 12 months but be prepared to turn more cautious in 2023. The neutral rate of interest in the US is higher than generally assumed. This means that monetary policy is currently more accommodative than widely believed, which is good for stocks. Unfortunately, it also means that a policy error is likely: The Fed will keep rates too low for too long, causing the economy to overheat. Chart 23Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise This overheating will not be evident over the next six months. As we noted at the outset of this report, the US economy is currently at the top of the proverbial two steps in our projected “two steps up, one step down” trajectory for inflation. The cresting in durable goods inflation will provide a temporary respite from inflationary worries, even as the underlying long-term driver of higher inflation – an increasingly tight labor market – gains traction. Strong consumer demand and persistent labor shortages will incentivize companies to invest in new capacity and automate production. This will benefit industrial stocks and select tech names. Rising bond yields will also boost bank shares (Chart 23). A country’s current account balance is simply the difference between what it saves and what it invests. With savings on the downswing and investment on the upswing, the US will find it increasingly difficult to finance its burgeoning trade deficit. The US dollar is a high momentum currency, so we wouldn’t necessarily bet against the greenback in the near term (Chart 24). Nevertheless, with “long dollar” now a consensus trade, we would position for a weaker dollar over a 12-month horizon (Chart 25). Chart 25Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Chart 26A Depreciating Dollar Next Year Should Help Non-US Equities A depreciating dollar next year should help non-US equities, especially beleaguered emerging markets (Chart 26). The dollar will strengthen anew in 2023, as the Fed is forced to turn more hawkish, and global equities begin to buckle. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

