Europe
Highlights China is moving from virus containment to normalization and economic stimulus. The full weight of the virus panic is only now hitting the US public and has not yet peaked. The US – and western democracies in general – have the raw capabilities to manage the virus outbreak. The profile of global political risk is shifting as a result of the economic shock stemming from the virus. This implies that while equity markets are close to their bottom, they face more volatility. Feature Chart 1No Peak In New Cases Outside China China’s President Xi Jinping visited Wuhan, the epicenter of the coronavirus breakout that has triggered a global bear market, on March 10. While he did not declare outright victory over the virus, his symbolic visit reinforced the fact that China has drastically reduced the number of new daily cases both within and without Hubei province. Meanwhile the virus is spreading rapidly across the rest of the world (Chart 1). It is not clear if the outbreak and emergency response in the United States will follow the Italian or South Korean trajectory. The initial US response is not encouraging, but the US has latent institutional strengths. Either way the US is facing a tsunami of new cases in the very near term. Hence the panic among the American population can still escalate from here (Chart 2). Panic among households translates to a drop in economic activity that will ensure financial markets remain volatile, even if US equities are close to their bottom. Chart 2US Public Panic Has Not Peaked Yet Can Democracies Manage The Crisis? Chart 3Developed Economies Have Better Health The question has become salient because of the poorly managed cordon sanitaire in Italy and the slow and halting initial reaction of the United States. Moreover, to distract from China’s domestic crisis, the Communist Party has turned up the volume of its propaganda organs, advertising the success of China’s draconian containment measures and warning that the virus cannot be contained if the rest of the world does not follow suit. However, it is not the case that the pandemic can only be managed through absolutist policies. To date, developed economies and democracies – including westernized countries like Japan – have the best record in the world of improving public health and reducing mortality from infectious diseases. This is apparent simply by looking at life expectancy for those aged 60. Europe and Japan have the longest lives beyond 60, including extension of life when dealing with late-life health problems, while other regions lag, including Asia. The United States is on the low end of the developed countries but still considerably better than emerging market economies at prolonging life, even for unhealthy elderly folks (Chart 3). Chart 4US Has Reduced Flu/Pneumonia Deaths Dramatically The United States, like other countries, has done battle with a range of infectious diseases over the course of its history – in which it was the leader in economic, scientific, and technological advancement. These include cholera and viral epidemics like smallpox, Yellow Fever, the Spanish Flu, and SARS. The death rate for influenza and pneumonia has generally declined since the 1950s, although a counter-trend increase is conceivable given what occurred in the 1980s-90s (Chart 4). The strategy that the US and developed economies have used, embodied in documents like the World Health Organization’s interim protocol for rapid operations to contain pandemics, is one of creating a containment zone with movement restrictions and a closely watched buffer zone in which a combination of anti-viral treatment and non-pharmaceutical treatment (e.g. social distancing) is employed. “Containment and isolation” strategies are generally successful even though they often fail to establish an impenetrable geographic cordon sanitaire, must rely on voluntary behavior, and will never receive total compliance. The survival instinct and social pressure are powerful enough to convince most individuals and households to keep their distance from others once they are informed of the risks. Targeted government measures by credible regimes with a monopoly on the use of force – in cases where strong restrictions are necessary – are effective. And in democracies they are kept in place only as long as necessary (the incubation period of the virus plus a few more weeks). Developed economies and democracies have the best record of improving public health and reducing mortality from infectious diseases. The overall effect is to “flatten the curve,” e.g. to slow the spread of the virus, and delay and reduce the peak intensity of the number of cases and burden on hospitals and doctors.1 Of course, nations need institutional capacity and leadership to deal with a pandemic and the indirect impacts on their economies, trade, and supply chains. When businesses grind to a halt, will households be able to get what they need? If not, civic order could break down. Supply security is a fundamental national interest and governments that cannot provide it risk a loss of legitimacy and control. Major nations devote extensive resources to building and maintaining internal lines of communication so that neither natural nor man-made disasters can stop them from ensuring security and essential goods and services. Europe and North America will ultimately deal with the crisis successfully. A look at some basic indicators and indexes of national capabilities shows which nations are best and worst positioned to meet the logistical and supply challenges of the virus’s economic shock: The US ranks close to Japan in logistical capabilities, while Italy ranks between these two and Iran, which is woefully lacking (Chart 5). Chart 5Italy Suffers From Logistic Weaknesses Italy resembles China in having significant supply chain vulnerabilities (Chart 6), including quality of infrastructure (Chart 7). Obviously China has made leaps and bounds, but interior regions are still underserviced. Clearly China has benefited from greater government authority and capacity relative to Italy. Chart 6US Supply Chains Are Resilient Chart 7US Infrastructure Is High-Quality Even when it comes to basic food security, Italy and China are more vulnerable than others (Chart 8). Yet China has kept food shortages to a minimum throughout the crisis. The US is large enough that different regions will have greater vulnerabilities when it comes to the health crisis. The National Health Security Preparedness Index shows California, Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Michigan are below the national average in the ability to execute countermeasures to health crises (Chart 9). Chart 8Food Security Risks Under Control In China Chart 9US: Regional Differences In Health Preparedness These institutional factors suggest that Europe and North America will ultimately deal with the crisis successfully, although in the near term the consequences are unpredictable. Italy’s experience has made it apparent to all nations that if the reproduction rate is not suppressed through containment and isolation, then the health system will be overwhelmed and the death rate will go up. But clearly this has nothing to do with Italy’s being a democracy, as neither Japan nor South Korea have had the same experience. Investment Conclusions The United States is moving more aggressively to mitigate the problem, beginning with President Trump’s ban on travel with continental Europe and declaration of a national emergency. With a bear market having occurred, and a recession likely, President Trump is losing the primary pillar of his reelection campaign. He will continue to make reflationary efforts to salvage the economy. He has announced $50 billion in emergency spending and a waiver on student debt loan payments worth as much as $85 billion. But he has also become a “crisis president.” This means that he may take dramatic, surprise actions that are market-negative in the short term in order to delay the spread of the virus. Emergency powers are extensive and he will utilize them not only to combat the pandemic but also to double down on the narrative that got him elected: closing off America’s borders and reducing its exposure to the risks of globalization. This can include the movement of people, from places other than China and continental Europe (already halted), and even capital flows. This is another reason to expect greater volatility in the near term despite the huge discounts on offer. We are not bottom-feeding yet. The profile of global political risk is shifting as a result of the virus and its economic shock. If Trump is seen as having mishandled the health and wellbeing of the nation, then he loses the election regardless of whether stimulus measures help the economy rebound by November. Whereas if he takes drastic, economically painful measures now to control the virus, and ultimately the virus subsides, there is still a slim chance he can win election. His approval rating, at an average of 45%, has lost its upward momentum but has not yet collapsed. Regardless of the election, the financial bloodbath should not obfuscate for investors the fact that the US is the world’s most advanced economy and longest continuously running constitutional republic. It has survived a total Civil War, two World Wars, a Great Depression, and countless outbreaks of disease. It has the ability to take emergency action and mitigate pandemics. This means that a great buying opportunity is just around the corner. The profile of global political risk is shifting as a result of the virus and its economic shock. The above should make it clear that the US and Italy face the most immediate ramifications – both are much more likely to see changes in ruling party over the next year than they were. Policy, however, will remain counter-cyclical (reflationary) regardless. Rogue regimes like Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea face renewed risks of regime failure and/or military confrontation with the US and its allies beginning in the immediate term, especially if President Trump becomes a clear “lame duck” in the coming months. Down the line, the Japanese, German, and French elections will be affected by the economic fallout of the virus scare. China and Russia face medium-term risks due to new difficulties in improving their populations’ quality of life. Their leaders and ruling parties have an authoritarian grip, but political risk will increase as a result of slower growth. China retains the ability to stimulate aggressively – which it is doing – but that will slow the reform and rebalancing process. Russia, meanwhile, faces another wave of internal devaluation if it does not call off its emerging market-share war with Saudi Arabia. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are likely to re-consolidate power by 2022, but they face much greater risks of domestic instability than they did before this year’s turmoil. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Martin S. Cetron, “Quarantine, Isolation and Community Mitigation: Battling 21st Century Pandemics with a 14th Century Toolbox,” September 20, 2006, available at nationalacademies.org.
Yesterday, the ECB did not cut rates. This can be forgiven, pushing rates further into negative territory will only hurt banks and barely help economic activity. The ECB also eased the terms of the TLTRO-III programs, both in terms of rates (25bps below the…
On a happy personal note, I will be away on paternity leave for a short time, reacquainting myself with nappies. As such, there will be no Weekly Reports for the next two weeks, but you will receive two excellent Special Reports penned by my colleagues. Given the ongoing turbulence in the financial markets I will also send out short Alerts as and when necessary. Highlights After the worst three-day rout for stocks versus bonds in living memory, six-month investors have fully capitulated, and the markets are now priced for a technical recession. If the recession can be limited to two quarters, stocks are more likely to outperform long-dated bonds by 12 percent than to underperform by a further 12 percent. Tactical trade: overweight S&P500 versus German 30-year bund, currency hedged, setting a 12 percent profit target with symmetrical stop-loss. The closer that a bond yield gets to the -1 percent lower bound, the more limited becomes the possibility for a further yield decline. Overweight positive yielding bonds versus negative yielding bonds, currency hedged. The most attractive structural pair is overweight the US 30-year T-bond versus the German 30-year bund. Feature Chart of the WeekWidow Makers: Shorting Bonds In Japan, Switzerland... And Now The US A Recession Is Now Fully Priced Financial markets have fully priced a downturn when the time horizon of investors that have fully capitulated = the length of the downturn. A week can be a long time in the financial markets. Seven days ago, the markets were not priced for a global recession. Then came the worst three-day rout for stocks versus bonds in living memory, in which stocks underperformed long-dated bonds by 25 percent (Chart I-2).1 Chart I-2The Worst 3-Day Rout: Stocks Underperformed Bonds By 25 Percent The upshot is that investors with six-month horizons have now fully capitulated, meaning the markets are now fully priced for a technical recession (Chart I-3) – defined as a downturn lasting two straight quarters. But the markets are not priced for a more prolonged downturn lasting longer than two quarters. Raising the question: can the downturn be limited to the first half of the year? Chart I-3Six-Month Investors Have Capitulated, Meaning A Recession Is Fully Priced The pessimistic case is that the coronavirus can neither be contained nor normalised by the summer. Or that even if its direct impact ebbs, there might be second-round effects. A major credit default from, say, a distressed airline or other travel-dependent company could trigger aftershocks in the financial system. Moreover, the recent collapse in the oil price injects new uncertainty into the energy patch as well as into geopolitics. The optimistic case is that large segments of the economy are set to receive a 2009 type triple-boost: from a sharp deceleration in bond yields; from a sharp deceleration in the oil price; and from government spending and/or tax cuts – creating a potent cocktail of stimulants for the second half of this year. Investors with six-month horizons have now fully capitulated. Balancing the pessimistic and optimistic cases, we assess that the downturn can be limited to two quarters – albeit this cannot be our highest conviction view, as we are not experts in epidemiology or immunology. Nevertheless, if this assumption holds, there is now a higher probability that stocks outperform long-dated bonds by 12 percent than that they underperform by a further 12 percent. This three-month tactical trade has a slight twist. It is best expressed as: overweight US stocks versus European bonds (currency hedged). This is because core European bond yields are close to their lower limit, meaning that core European bond prices are close to their mathematical upper limit. All of which brings us to a much higher conviction recommendation. The ‘Widow Maker’ Is Back First the widow maker came to Japan, next to Switzerland, then to the rest of Northern Europe. Now the widow maker has come to America. In the financial lexicon, ‘widow maker’ refers to the fatal strategy of shorting high-quality government bonds in an era when yields have been grinding inexorably lower. Any investment manager who has dared to bet that government bond yields would rise, whether starting from 3 percent, 2 percent, or even 1 percent, and whether in Japan, Switzerland, or even the US – has ended up being carried out of their job in a box, feet first (Chart of the Week). Except that in Switzerland over the past year, the widow maker trade has not been as fatal as it used to be. While the 5-year yield in the US has collapsed by 200 bps, in Switzerland it has edged down by just 20 bps (Chart I-4). Put another way, shorting the US 5-year T-bond has cost 11 percent, but shorting the Swiss 5-year bond has been relatively painless (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Swiss Bond Yields Cannot Fall Much... Chart I-5...Meaning Swiss Bond Prices Cannot Rise The simple reason is that Swiss government bond yields are now very close to their lower bound. The Lower Bound To Bond Yields Is Around -1 Percent The practical lower bound to the policy interest rate is -1 percent, because -1 percent counterbalances the storage cost of holding physical cash and/or other stores of value.2 Imagine the policy rate fell to well below -1 percent. If banks passed this deeply negative rate to their depositors, it would be logical for the bank depositors to flee wholesale into cheaper-to-hold physical cash. This deposit flight would kill the banking system. But if the banks didn’t pass the deeply negative policy rate to their depositors, it would wipe out the banks’ net interest margin – the gap between rates on loans and deposits. This inability to make profits would also kill the banking system. At deeply negative interest rates, bank deposits would flee. Could policymakers just abolish physical cash, forcing us all into ‘digital cash’ with unlimited negative interest rates? No, because that would just push us into other stores of value: for example, gold, or ‘decentralised’ cryptocurrencies. The common objections to cryptocurrencies are that their susceptibility to volatility and fraud makes them a poor store of value. But both objections are also true for gold. Yet who has ever argued that gold cannot be a store of value just because it is volatile and can be stolen (Chart I-6)! Chart I-6Gold Is A Store Of Value Despite Its Volatility The lower bound to the policy rate at around -1 percent also sets the lower bound of the bond yield, because a bond yield is just the expected average policy rate over the bond’s lifetime. For completeness, we should mention one technical exception. If bond investors price in the possibility of being repaid in a different and more valuable currency, the bond yield will carry a further redenomination discount as an offset for the potential currency gain. This is relevant to euro area bonds because there remains the remote possibility of euro disintegration. Therefore, bonds which carry the small possibility of a currency redenomination gain – notably, German bunds – possess a small additional discount on their yields. But in jurisdictions where no currency redenomination is possible, such as Switzerland or Sweden, the practical lower bound to bond yields is around -1 percent. Overweight Positive Yielding Bonds Versus Negative Yielding Bonds Switzerland teaches us that the closer that a bond yield gets to the -1 percent lower bound, the more limited becomes the possibility for a further yield decline (price gain), whereas the possibility for a yield increase (price loss) stays unlimited. Making such bonds a ‘lose-lose’ proposition. The convergence in bond yields has much further to go. Therefore, our high conviction recommendation is to short negative yielding bonds in relative terms. In other words, overweight positive yielding bonds versus negative yielding bonds. And currency hedge the position – as, right now, the cost of currency hedging is low. The recommendation is applicable for both tactical (3-month) and structural (2-year plus) investment horizons, and it is applicable for all bond maturities: 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year. Given where yields now stand, the most attractive structural pair is overweight the US 30-year T-bond versus the German 30-year bund (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Expect Yields To Converge At 10-Year Maturities... Chart I-8...And At Ultra-Long ##br##Maturities Our structural overweight to a 50:50 combination of U.S. T-bonds and Italian BTPs versus a 50:50 combination of German Bunds and Spanish Bonos at 30-year bond maturities is up by 7 percent in just nine months. But the convergence in yields has much further to go (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Overweight Positive Yielding Bonds Versus Negative Yielding Bonds Fractal Trading System* As discussed, this week’s recommended trade is to overweight stocks versus long-dated bonds expressed as overweight S&P500 versus German 30-year bund. The profit target is 12 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In a turbulent week for financial markets, overweight Poland versus Portugal achieved its profit target, short US utilities versus oil and gas and short EUR/CHF hit their stop-losses, and short palladium versus nickel moved comfortably into profit. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 62 percent. Chart I-10Poland Vs. Portugal When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 MSCI All-Country World Index (in dollars) versus US 30-year T-bond. 2 The cost of holding physical cash or gold is the cost of its safe storage. Fractal Trading Model Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
The Bank of England followed on the path of the Fed and executed a 50bps inter-meeting interest rate cut. Markets did not feel relieved. Instead, they sold off, a move that continued after the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic. As we have written before,…
Highlights Uncertainty & Yields: Global bond yields, driven to all-time lows as investors seek safety amid rioting markets, now discount a multi-year period of very weak global growth and inflation. Bond Portfolio Strategy: Maintain overall neutral portfolio duration exposure with so much bad news already priced into yields. Downgrade overall global spread product exposure to underweight versus governments on a tactical (0-3 months) basis given intense uncertainties on COVID-19 and oil markets. Model Bond Portfolio Changes – Governments: Upgrade countries that are more responsive to changes in the level of overall global bond yields and with room to cut interest rates (the US & Canada) to overweight, while downgrading sovereign debt with a lower “global yield beta” and less policy flexibility (Germany, France, Japan) to underweight. Model Bond Portfolio Changes – Credit: Downgrade US high-yield, euro area corporates and emerging market USD sovereigns & corporates to underweight. Feature Chart of the WeekOn The Verge Of Global ZIRP The title of this report is a quote from a worried BCA client this morning, discussing his daily commute into Manhattan from the New York suburbs. We can think of no better analogy for the mood of investors in the current market panic. After having enjoyed a decade of riding the gravy train of recession-free growth and robust returns on risk assets, all underwritten by accommodative monetary policies, worries about a deflationary bust following the boom have intensified. The global spread of COVID-19, the ebbs and flows of the US presidential election and, now, a stunning collapse in oil prices – markets have simply been unable to process the investment implications of these unpredictable events all at once. At times of such stress, the obvious thing to do is to stand aside and hedge portfolios while awaiting better visibility on the uncertainties. At times of such stress, the obvious thing to do is to stand aside and hedge portfolios while awaiting better visibility on the uncertainties. It is clear that global government bonds have been a preferred hedge, with yields collapsing to record lows worldwide. While most of the market attention has been on the breathtaking fall in US yields that has pushed the entire Treasury curve below 1% as the market has moved to discount a swift move to a 0% fed funds rate. New lows were also hit yesterday in countries that had been lagging the Treasury rally: the 10-year German bund reached -0.85% yesterday, while the 10-year UK Gilt fell to an intraday all-time low of 0.08% with some shorter-maturity Gilt yields actually dipping into negative territory (Chart of the Week). The common driver of yesterday’s yield declines was the 25% plunge in global oil prices after the weekend collapse of the OPEC 2.0 alliance between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The inflation expectations component of global bond yields fell accordingly, continuing the correlation with energy prices seen over the past decade. Yet the real component of global bond yields has also been falling, with markets increasingly pricing in an extended period of weak growth and negative real interest rates – especially in the US. Collapsing US Treasury Yields Discount A Recession, Not A Financial Crisis Chart 2Re-opening Old Wounds While this latest plunge in US equity markets has been both rapid and powerful, the damage only takes us back to levels on the S&P 500 last seen as recently as January 2019 (Chart 2). The turmoil, however, has reopened old wounds in markets that had suffered their own crises over the past decade, with European bank stocks hitting new all-time lows and credit spreads on US high-yield Energy bonds and Italian sovereign debt (versus Germany) sharply blowing out. The backdrop remains treacherous and global equity markets will likely remain under pressure until the number of new COVID-19 cases peaks outside of China (especially in the US). If there is one silver lining amidst the market carnage, it is that there appears to be few signs of 2008-style systemic financial stress. If there is one silver lining amidst the market carnage, it is that there appears to be few signs of 2008-style systemic financial stress. Bank funding indicators like Libor-OIS spreads and bank debt spreads have widened a bit over the past week but remain at very subdued levels (Chart 3). This is in sharp contrast to classic risk aversion indicators like the price of gold and the value of the Japanese yen versus the Australian dollar, which are closing in on the highs seen during the 2008 global financial crisis and 2012 European debt crisis. Chart 3A Growth Downturn, Not A Systemic Crisis We interpret this as investors being far more worried about a deep global recession than another major financial crisis. That is also confirmed in the pricing of US Treasury yields, especially when looking at the real yield. Chart 4Does The UST Market Think R* Is Negative? Chart 5Another Convexity-Fueled Bond Rally The entire TIPS yield curve is now negative for the first time, even with the real fed funds rate below the Fed’s estimate of the “r*” neutral real rate (Chart 4). The combination of low and falling inflation expectations, and plunging real yields, indicates that the Treasury market now believes that the neutral real funds rate is not 0.8%, as suggested by the Fed’s estimate of r*, but is somewhere well below 0%. With the fed funds rate now down to 0.75% after last week’s intermeeting 50bps cut, the Treasury market is not only pricing the Fed quickly returning to the zero lower bound on the funds rate, but staying trapped at zero for a very long time. The Treasury market is not only pricing the Fed quickly returning to the zero lower bound on the funds rate, but staying trapped at zero for a very long time. Yet that may be too literal an interpretation of the incredible collapse of US Treasury yields. The power of negative convexity is also at work, driving intense demand for long-duration bonds that puts additional downward pressure on yields. Large owners of US mortgage backed securities (MBS) like the big commercial banks have seen the duration of their MBS holdings collapse as yields have fallen. The result is that banks are forced to buy huge amounts of Treasuries (or receive US dollar interest rate swaps) to hedge their duration exposure of negative convexity MBS, hyper-charging the fall in Treasury yields – perhaps over $1 trillion worth of buying, by some estimates.1 This is a similar dynamic to what occurred last summer in Europe, when sharply falling bond yields triggered convexity-related demand for duration from large asset-liability managers like pension funds, further fueling the decline in bond yields (Chart 5). Yet even allowing that some of the Treasury yield decline has been driven by a mechanical demand for duration, a 10-year US Treasury yield of 0.56% clearly discounts expectations of a US recession, as well – which appears justified by the recent performance of some critical US economic data. In Charts 6 & 7, we show a “cycle-on-cycle” analysis of some key US financial and indicators and how they behave before and after the start of the past five US recessions. The charts are set up so the vertical line represents the start of the recession, and we line up the data for the current business cycle as if the latest data point represents the start of a recession. Done this way, we can see if the current data is evolving in a similar fashion to past US economic downturns. Chart 6The US Business Cycle Looks Toppy Chart 7COVID-19 Will Likely Trigger A Confidence-Driven US Recession The charts show that the current flat 10-year/3-month US Treasury curve and steady decline in corporate profit growth are both accurately following the path entering past US recessions. Other indicators like the NFIB Small Business confidence survey, the Conference Board’s leading economic indicator and consumer confidence series typically peak between 12-18 months prior to the start of a recession, but appear to be only be peaking now. The same argument goes for initial jobless claims, which are usually rising for several months heading into a recession but remain surprisingly steady of late – a condition that seems unlikely to continue as more companies suffer virus-related hits to their sales and profits and begin to shed labor. Net-net, these reliable cyclical US data suggest that the Treasury market is right to be pricing in elevated recession risk – especially with US cases of COVID-19 starting to increase more rapidly and US financial conditions having tightened sharply in the latest market rout. Bottom Line: Global bond yields, driven to all-time lows as investors seek safety amid rioting markets, now discount a multi-year period of very weak global growth and inflation – most notably in the US. Allocation Changes To Our Model Bond Portfolio The stunning fall in global bond yields has already gone a long way. Yet it is very difficult to forecast a bottom in yields, even with central banks easing monetary policy to try and boost confidence, before there is evidence that the global COVID-19 outbreak is being contained (i.e. a decreasing total number of confirmed cases). By the same token, corporate bonds (and equities) will continue to be under selling pressure until the worst of the viral outbreak has passed. We raised our recommended overall global duration stance to neutral last week – a move that was more tactical in nature as a near-term hedge to our strategic overweight corporate bond allocations in our Model Bond Portfolio amid growing market volatility. Yet with the new stresses coming from the collapse in oil prices and increasing spread of COVID-19 in the US and Europe, we are moving to a much more cautious near-term stance on global credit. Yet with the new stresses coming from the collapse in oil prices and increasing spread of COVID-19 in the US and Europe, we are moving to a much more cautious near-term stance on global credit. This week, we are making the following additional changes to our model bond portfolio to reflect the growing odds of a global recession: Downgrade global corporates to underweight versus global governments Maintain a neutral overall portfolio duration, but favor countries within the government bond allocation that are more highly correlated to changes in to the overall level of global bond yields. Chart 8Favor Higher-Beta Bond Markets With Room To Cut Rates Given how far yields have declined already, we think raising allocations to “high yield beta” countries that can still cut interest rates, at the expense of reduced weightings toward low beta countries that have limited scope to ease policy, offers a better risk/reward profile than simply raising duration exposure across the board. Such a nuanced argument is less applicable to global corporates, where elevated market volatility, poor investor risk appetite and deteriorating global growth momentum all argue for continued near-term underperformance of corporates versus government bonds. Specifically, we are making the following changes to our recommended allocations, presented with a brief rationale for each move: Upgrade US Treasuries and Canadian government bonds to overweight: Both Treasuries and Canadian bonds are higher beta markets, as we define by a regression of monthly yield changes to changes in the yield of the overall Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index (Chart 8). The Fed cut 50bps last week as an emergency measure and has 75bps to go before reaching the zero bound, which the market now expects by mid-year. Additional bond bullish moves after reaching the zero bound, like aggressive forward guidance, restarting quantitative easing and even anchoring Treasury yields in a BoJ-like form of yield curve control, are all possible if the US enters a recession. Meanwhile, the Bank of Canada (BoC) followed the Fed’s cut with a 50bp easing the next day and signaled that additional rate cuts are likely to prevent a plunge in Canadian consumer confidence. The collapsing oil price likely seals the deal for additional rate cuts by the BoC in the next few months. Downgrade Japanese government bonds to maximum underweight: Japanese government bonds (JGBs) are the most defensive low-beta market in model bond portfolio universe, thanks to the Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control policy that anchors the 10yr JGB yield around 0%. This makes JGBs the best candidate for a maximum underweight stance when global bond yields are not expected to rise in the near term, as we expect. Downgrade Germany and France to Underweight: The ECB meets this week and will be under pressure to ease policy given recent moves by other major central banks. A -10bps rate cut is expected, which may happen to counteract the recent increase in the euro versus the US dollar, but there is also possibility that ECB will increase and/or extend the size and scope of its current Asset Purchase Program. Given the ECB’s lack of overall monetary policy flexibility, and low level of inflation expectations, we see limited scope for the lower-beta German and French government bonds to outperform their global peers. Remain overweight UK and Australia: While both Australian government bonds and UK Gilts have a “median” yield beta in our model bond portfolio universe, both deserve moderate overweights as there is still the potential for rate cuts in both countries. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) cut the Cash Rate by -25bps last week and they are still open to cut further to boost a sluggish economy hurt by wildfires and weak export demand from China. The RBA will stay more dovish for longer until we will see clear signs of a rebound of the Chinese economy from the COVID-19 outbreak. The Bank of England (BoE) will likely cut its policy rate later this month, or even before the next scheduled policy meeting, as COVID-19 is starting to spread through the UK. Downgrade US High-Yield To Underweight: US junk bonds had already taken a hit during the global market selloff in recent weeks, but the collapse in oil prices pummeled the market given the high weighting of US shale producers in the index (Chart 9). With additional weakness in oil prices likely as Russia and Saudi Arabia are now in a full-fledged price war, US high-yield will come under additional spread widening pressure focused on the weaker Caa-rated segment that contains most of the energy names. We recommend a zero weight in the Caa-rated US junk bonds, within an overall underweight allocation to the entire asset class. Downgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporates to underweight: COVID-19 is now spreading faster in Germany and France, after leaving Italy in a full-blown national crisis. The export-oriented economies of the euro area were already vulnerable to a global growth slowdown, but now domestic growth weakness raises the odds of a full-blown recession – not a good environment to own corporate bonds, especially with the euro now appreciating. Downgrade emerging market (EM) USD-denominated sovereigns and corporates to underweight: EM debt remains a levered play on global growth, so the increased odds of a global recession are a problem for the asset class – even with sharply lower interest rates and early signs of a softening in the US dollar (Chart 10). Chart 9Downgrade US Junk Bonds To Underweight Chart 10Still Not Much Broad-Based Weakness In The USD We will present the new specific model bond portfolio weightings, along with a discussion of the risk management implications of these changes, in next week’s report. Bottom Line: Maintain overall neutral portfolio duration exposure with so much bad news already priced into yields. Downgrade overall global spread product exposure to underweight versus governments on a tactical (0-3 months) basis given intense uncertainties on COVID-19 and oil markets. Upgrade high-beta countries with room to cut interest rates (the US & Canada) to overweight, while downgrading lower-beta countries with less policy flexibility (Germany, France, Japan) to underweight. Downgrade US high-yield, euro area corporates and emerging market USD sovereigns & corporates to underweight. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.wsj.com/articles/fear-isnt-the-only-driver-of-the-treasury-rally-banks-need-to-hedge-their-mortgages-1158347080 Recommendations Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
The German economy has suffered its set of woes in 2019, and 2020 is starting poorly. True, factory orders in January improved significantly, but Germany could suffer greatly from COVID-19. First, its industrial economy is very exposed to the supply-side…
Highlights The latest interest rate cuts by central banks confirms the narrative that the authorities view economic risks as asymmetrical to the downside. This all but assures that competitive devaluation will become the dominant currency landscape in the near future. If the virus proves to be just another seasonal flu, the global economy will be awash with much more stimulus, which will be fertile ground for pro-cyclical currencies. In the event that we get a much more malignant outcome, discussions around interest rate cuts will rapidly evolve into quantitative easing and debt monetization. The dollar will be the ultimate loser in both scenarios, but this path could be lined with intermediate strength. Our highest-conviction call before the dust settles is to short USD/JPY. We are also making a few portfolio adjustments in light of recent market volatility. Buy NOK/SEK and NZD/CHF and take profits soon on long SEK/NZD. Feature The DXY rally that began last December faltered below overhead psychological resistance at 100, and has since broken below key technical levels. The V-shaped reversal has been a mirror image of developments in equity markets, with the S&P 500 off 6% from its lows. The catalyst was aggressive market pricing of policy action from the Federal Reserve, to which the authorities yielded. The latest policy action confirms the narrative that most central banks continue to view deflation as a much bigger threat than inflation, since few have been able to achieve their mandate. This all but assures that competitive devaluation will become the dominant currency landscape, as each central bank prevents appreciation in their respective currency. Should the Fed continue on the path of much more aggressive stimulus, this will have powerful implications for the dollar and across both G10 and emerging market currencies. The US 10-year Treasury yield broke below 1% around 1:40 p.m. EST on March 3rd. This was significant not because of the level but because it emblematically erased the US carry trade for a number of countries (Chart I-1). Should the Fed continue on the path of much more aggressive stimulus, this will have powerful implications for the dollar and across both G10 and emerging market currencies. Chart I-1The Big Convergence To Buy Or Sell The DXY? If the virus proves to be only slightly more lethal than the seasonal flu, the global economy will be awash with much more stimulus, which will be fertile ground for pro-cyclical currencies. As a counter-cyclical currency, the dollar will buckle, lighting a fire under our favorites such as the Norwegian krone and the Swedish krona. The euro will be the most liquid beneficiary of this move. Chart I-2 shows that the global economy was already on a powerful V-shaped recovery path before the outbreak. More importantly, this recovery was on the back of easier financial conditions. Chart I-2V-Shaped Recovery At Risk Chart I-3A Second Wave Of Infections? Our roadmap is the peak in the momentum of new infections outside of China. During the SARS 2013 episode, the bottom in asset prices (and peak in the DXY) occurred when the momentum in new cases peaked. Currency markets are currently pricing a much worse outcome than SARS. The risk is that we are entering a second wave of infections outside Hubei, China, which will be more difficult to control than when it was relatively more contained within the epicenter (Chart I-3). As we aptly witnessed a fortnight ago, currency markets will make a binary switch to risk aversion on such an outcome. This warns against shorting the DXY index or buying the euro or pound in the near term. As we go to press, the virus has been identified on almost every continent except Antarctica. Even in countries such as the US, with modern and sophisticated health facilities, the costs to get tested are exorbitant for underinsured individuals.1 This all but assures that the number of underreported cases is likely non-trivial, which could trigger another market riot once they surface. Chart I-4DXY and USD/JPY Tend To Move Together Our highest-conviction call before the dust settles is therefore to short USD/JPY. As Chart I-1 highlights, the Bank of Japan is much closer to the end of their rope in terms of monetary policy tools. Long bond yields have already hit the zero bound, which means that real rates in Japan will continue to rise until the authorities are forced to act. One of the triggers to act will be a yen soaring out of control, which is not yet the case. Speculative evidence is that it will take a yen rally in the order of 12% to catalyze the BoJ. More importantly, the speed of the rally will matter. This was the trigger for negative interest rates in January 2016 as well as yield curve control in September of 2016. The first rally from USD/JPY 125 to around 112 and the subsequent rise towards 100 were both in the order of 12%. A similar rally from the recent peak near 112 will pin the USD/JPY at 100. Bottom Line: The yen is the most attractive currency to play dollar downside at the moment. Remain short USD/JPY. If global growth does pick up and the dollar weakens, the USD/JPY and the DXY tend to be positively correlated most of the time, providing ample room for investors to rotate into more pro-cyclical pairs (Chart I-4). Competitive Devaluation? In the event that we get a much more malignant outcome, discussions around interest rate cuts will rapidly evolve into quantitative easing and debt monetization. The Reserve Bank of Australia has already stated that QE is on the table if rates touch 0.25%.2 Other central banks are likely to follow suit. As the chorus of central banks cutting rates and stepping into QE on COVID-19 rises, the rising specter of currency brinkmanship is likely to unnerve countries pursuing more orthodox monetary policies. The currency of choice will be gold and other precious metals, though the dollar, Swiss franc, and yen are likely to also outperform. The velocity of money in both the US and the euro area was in a nascent upturn, but has started to roll over. Whether or not countries adopt QE, what is clear is that balance sheet expansion at both the Fed and the European Central Bank is set to continue. Chart I-5 shows that the velocity of money in both nations was in a nascent upturn, but has started to roll over. This tends to lead inflation by a few quarters. On a relative basis, our bias is that the pace of expansion should be more pronounced in the US. This will eventually set the dollar up for a significant decline, albeit after a knee-jerk rally. Chart I-5ADownside Risks To US Inflation Chart I-5BDownside Risks To Euro Area Inflation In terms of quantitative easing, it is most appealing when a country has low growth, low inflation, and large amounts of public debt. If we are right that inflation is about to roll over in the US, then the public debt profile and political capital to expand the budget deficit places the nation as a prime candidate for QE (Chart I-6). Fiscal stimulus is a much more difficult discussion in Europe, Japan, or elsewhere for that matter, and likely to arrive late. Chart I-6US Government Debt Is Very High The backdrop for the US dollar is a 37% rise from the bottom. The New York Fed estimates that a 10 percentage point appreciation in the dollar shaves 0.5 percentage points off GDP growth over one year, and an additional 0.2 percentage points in the following year.3 With growth now hovering around 2%, a strong currency could easily nudge US growth to undershoot potential. The Fed is one of the few G10 central banks with room to ease monetary policy. This sets the dollar up for an eventual decline. However, the path to QE will be lined by a strong dollar if the backdrop is flight to safety. This entails rolling currency depreciations among some developed and emerging markets. When looking for the next candidates for competitive devaluation, the natural choices are the countries with overvalued exchange rates that are exerting a powerful deflationary impulse into their economies. Chart I-7 shows the deviation of real effective exchange rates from their long-term mean, according to the BIS. Chart I-7Competitive Devaluation Candidates Bottom Line: The Fed is one of the few G10 central banks with room to ease monetary policy. This sets the dollar up for an eventual decline. It will first occur among the safe havens (currencies with already low interest rates), before it rotates to more procyclical currencies. Where Does US Politics Fit In? Politics should start to have a meaningful impact on the dollar once the democratic nominee is sealed. Super Tuesday revealed a powerful shift to the center, pinning former Vice President Joe Biden as the preferred candidate (Chart I-8). The dollar tends to thrive as political uncertainty rises. While not a forgone conclusion, a Sanders–Trump rivalry would have been a very polarized outcome, putting a bid under the greenback. Markets are likely to take a more conciliatory tone from a Biden victory, which will be negative for the greenback. Chart I-8US Politics Will Be Important Our colleague Matt Gertken, chief geopolitical strategist, just published his analysis of Super Tuesday.4 While a contested convention remains unlikely, it will likely favor Trump’s reelection odds. What is common about a Biden-Sanders-Trump trio is that fiscal policy is set to expand in the US. This will ultimately be dollar bearish (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Dollar And Budget Deficits Bottom Line: The election is still many months away and much can change between now and then. For now, Biden is the preferred democratic nominee. Portfolio Adjustments Chart I-10Sell CHF/NZD The sharp rally in the VIX index has opened up a trading opportunity on the short side. The historical pattern of previous spikes in the VIX is that unless the market starts to price in an actual recession, which is quite plausible, the probability of a short-term reversal is close to 100%. Given our base case that we are not headed for a recession over the next six to 12 months, we are opening a short CHF/NZD trade today. The cross tends to benefit from spikes in volatility, correcting sharply as the market unwinds overreactions. More importantly, the cross has already priced in an overshoot in the VIX in an order of magnitude akin to 2008. Place stops at 1.75 with a target of 1.45 (Chart I-10). We are also placing a limit buy on NOK/SEK at parity. The risk to this trade is a further down-leg in oil prices, but at parity, the cross makes for a compelling tactical trade. Momentum on the cross is currently bombed out. We will be closely watching whether Russia complies with OPEC production cuts and act accordingly. Remain long NOK within our petrocurrency basket against the euro. We are also looking to take profits on our long SEK/NZD trade, a nudge below our initial target. The market has fully priced in a rate cut by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, suggesting the kiwi could have a knee-jerk rally, similar to the Aussie on the actual announcement. Finally, we were stopped out of our short gold/silver trade for a loss of 5.5%. We will be looking to re-establish this trade in the coming weeks. Stay tuned. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Bertha Coombs and William Feuer, “The coronavirus test will be covered by Medicaid, Medicare and private insurance, Pence says,” CNBC, dated March 4, 2020. 2 Michael Heath, “RBA Says QE Is Option at 0.25%, Doesn’t Expect to Need It,” Bloomberg News, dated November 26, 2019. 3 Mary Amiti and Tyler Bodine-Smith, “The Effect of the Strong Dollar on U.S. Growth,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, dated July 17, 2015. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, titled “US Election: A Return To Normalcy?”, dated March 4, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been positive: The ISM manufacturing PMI fell slightly to 50.9, dragged down by the prices paid and new orders component, while the non-manufacturing index ticked up to 57.3. Core PCE inflation increased to 1.6% year-on-year in January. Unit labor costs came in at 0.9% quarter-on-quarter in Q4 of last year. This is a deceleration from the previous print of 2.5%. The DXY index depreciated by 1.4% this week. Following a conference call with G7 central banks, the Fed made an emergency rate cut of 50bps. Chairman Powell cited risks to the outlook from Covid-19 but acknowledged that the Fed can keep financial conditions accommodative, not fix broken supply chains or cure infections. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been positive: Core CPI inflation increased slightly to 1.2% year-on-year in February. The producer price index contracted by 0.5% year-on-year in January. The unemployment rate remained flat at 7.4% in January. Retail sales grew by 1.7% year-on-year in January, remaining flat from the previous month. The euro appreciated by 3.6% against the US dollar this week. As the ECB is limited by the zero lower bound, the euro strengthened on expectations that rate differentials with the US will continue to narrow. The ECB could resort to policy alternatives such as a special facility targeting small and medium enterprises. Markets are pricing in an 81% probability of a rate cut as we go into the ECB meeting next week. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: The Tokyo CPI excluding fresh food grew by 0.5% year-on-year in February from 0.7% the previous month. The jobs-to-applicants ratio decreased to 1.49 from 1.57 while the unemployment rate increased to 2.4% from 2.2% in January. The consumer confidence index declined to 38.4 from 39.1 in February. Housing starts contracted by 10.1% year-on-year in January from 7.9% the previous month. The Japanese yen appreciated by 2.5% against the US dollar this week. Lower US yields, combined with continued risk-on flows, have extended the rally in the Japanese yen. Weakness in the Japanese economy is broad based, but the BoJ has limited policy space and fiscal action looks unlikely anytime soon. Global central bank action will drive the yen in the near term. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been mixed: Consumer credit decreased to GBP 1.2 billion from GBP 1.4 billion while net lending to individuals fell to GBP 5.2 billion from GBP 5.8 billion in January. Mortgage approvals increased to 70.9 thousand from 67.9 thousand in January, while the Nationwide housing price index grew by 2.3% year-on-year in February from 1.9% the previous month. The British pound appreciated by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. At a hearing this week, incoming governor Andrew Bailey stated that the BoE is still assessing evidence on the nature of the shock from Covid-19. The BoE has limited room to cut and is constrained by possible stagflation; we expect targeted supply chain finance and cooperation with fiscal authorities to take precedence. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed: GDP grew by 2.2% year-on-year in Q4 2019, improving from 1.7% the previous quarter. Imports and exports both contracted by 3% while the trade balance dropped to AUD 5.2 billion in January. Building permits contracted by a dramatic 15.3% month-on-month in January, compared to growth of 3.9% in December. The RBA commodity price index contracted by 6.1% year-on-year in February. The Australian dollar appreciated by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. The Reserve Bank of Australia cut its official cash rate to 0.5%, an all-time low, citing the impact of Covid-19 on domestic spending, education, and travel. Watch to see if the signal from building permits is confirmed by other housing market indicators. The RBA might not be done easing. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: The terms of trade index grew by 2.6% quarter-on-quarter in Q4 2019, improving from 1.9% in Q3. The ANZ commodity price index contracted by 2.1% in February, deepening from 0.9% the previous month. Building permits contracted by 2% month-on-month in January, from growth of 9.8% in December. The global dairy trade price index contracted by 1.2% in March. The New Zealand dollar appreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. There is pressure on the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to ease at its next meeting on March 27, with markets pricing in 42 basis points of easing over the next 12 months. However, the RBNZ has dispelled notions of a pre-meeting cut. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: Annualized GDP grew by 0.3% quarter-on-quarter in Q4 2019, slowing from 1.4% the previous quarter. The raw material price index contracted by 2.2% and industrial product price index contracted by 0.3% month-on-month in January. Labor productivity contracted by 0.1% quarter-on-quarter in Q4 2019, compared to growth of 0.2% the previous quarter. The Canadian dollar depreciated by 0.1% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of Canada (BoC) followed the Fed and cut rates by 50bps. In addition to the confidence hit from Covid-19, the BoC cited falling terms of trade, depressed business investment, and dampened economic activity due to the CN rail strikes. The BoC stands ready to ease further, and Prime Minister Trudeau has raised the possibility of a fiscal response. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: GDP grew by 1.5% year-on-year in Q4 2019, from growth of 1.1% the previous quarter. The SVME PMI increased to 49.5 from 47.8 in February. The KOF leading indicator increased to 100.9 from 100.1 in February. CPI contracted by 0.1% year-on-year in February, from growth of 0.2% the previous month. The Swiss franc appreciated by 1.6% against the US dollar this week. A combination of strong domestic data and global risk-off flows contributed to strength in the Swiss franc. However, the Swiss government will be revising down growth forecasts and a recent UN report has estimated that Switzerland lost US$ 1 billion in exports in February due to Chinese supply disruptions. Combined with a strong franc, this puts the domestic outlook at risk. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been positive: The current account decreased to NOK 19.1 billion from NOK 29.5 billion in Q4 2019. The credit indicator grew by 5% year-on-year in January. Registered unemployment decreased slightly to 2.3% from 2.4% in February. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. Expect the petrocurrency to trade on news from the OPEC meetings in the coming days. The committee has proposed a production cut of 1.5 million barrels per day through Q2 2020, conditional on approval from Russia, to offset the demand shock from Covid-19. Report Links: Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: The Swedbank manufacturing PMI increased to 53.2 from 52 in February. Industrial production grew by 0.9% year-on-year, from a contraction of 2.6% the previous month. GDP grew by 0.8% year-on-year in Q4 2019, slowing from 1.8% the previous month. The Swedish krona appreciated by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. After hitting a 2-decade high near 10, USD/SEK has violently reversed and is now trading at the 9.45 level. What is evident from incoming data is that the cheap currency has been a perfect shock absorber, cushioning the domestic economy. We are protecting profits on long SEK/NZD today and we will be looking for other venues to trade SEK on the long side. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights Financial markets are now fully priced for an economic downturn lasting one quarter… …but they are not fully priced for a recession. To go tactically long equities versus bonds requires a high conviction that the coronavirus induced downturn will last no longer than one quarter. The big risk is that the coronavirus incubation period might be very long, rendering containment strategies ineffective. Hence, a better investment play is to go long positive yielding US T-bonds and/or UK gilts versus negative yielding Swiss bonds and/or German bunds… …or go long negative yielding currencies versus positive yielding currencies. Our favoured expression is long CHF/USD. Fractal trade: overweight Poland versus Portugal. Feature Chart I-1AFinancial Markets Are Priced For A One-Quarter Downturn... Chart I-1B...But Not For A ##br##Recession They say that when China sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold. But the saying was meant as an economic metaphor, not as a literal medical truth.1 The current coronavirus crisis has two potential happy endings: ‘containment’, in which its worldwide contagion is halted; or ‘normalisation’, in which it becomes accepted as just another type of winter flu. The virus crisis also has a potential unhappy ending in which neither containment nor normalisation can happen. Containing Contagion To determine whether the virus crisis has a happy or unhappy ending, we must answer three crucial questions: 1. Does the virus thrive only in cold weather? If yes, then the onset of spring and summer should naturally contain the contagion (in the northern hemisphere). We are not experts in epidemiology or immunology, but we understand that the Covid-19 virus surface is a lipid (fat) which could become fragile at higher temperatures. Albeit this might just be a temporary containment until temperatures drop again. 2. Does the virus have a short incubation period before symptoms arise? If yes, then quarantining and containment will be effective because infected people are quickly identified. But if, after infection, there is a long asymptomatic period, then containment would be impossible – because for an extended period the virus would be ‘under cover’. In this regard, the dispersion of infections is as important as the number of infections. A thousand cases across a hundred countries is much more worrying than a thousand cases concentrated in two or three countries (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Covid-19 Has Spread To 80 Countries 3. Are most infections going undetected because the symptoms are very mild? If yes, then the true mortality rate of the Covid-19 virus is much lower than we think, and perhaps not that different to the mortality rate of winter flu, at around 1 in a 1000. In which case, the new virus could become ‘normalised’ as a variant of the flu. But if the current mortality rate, at ten times deadlier than the flu, is accurate, then it would be difficult to normalise (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Covid-19 Mortality Rate Is Ten Times Deadlier Than The Flu. Or Is It? An unhappy ending to the crisis will happen if the answer to all three questions is ‘no’. The main risk is that the asymptomatic incubation period appears to be quite long, rendering containment strategies ineffective. Still, even if the happy ending happens, there are two further questions. How much disruption will the economy suffer before the happy ending? And what have the financial markets priced? The Economic Disruption The disruption to the economy comes from both the supply side and the demand side: the supply side because containment strategies such as quarantining entire towns, shuttering factories, and cancelling major sports and social events hurt output; the demand side because a fearful public’s reluctance to use public transport, visit crowded places such as shopping malls, or travel abroad hurt spending. In this way, both production and consumption will suffer a large hit in the first quarter, at the very least. However, when normal activity eventually resumes, production and consumption will bounce back to pre-crisis levels, and in some cases overshoot pre-crisis levels. For example, if the crisis lasts for a quarter, movie-goers will return to the cinemas as usual in the second quarter, albeit they will not compensate for the visit they missed in the first quarter; but for manufacturers, the backlog of components that were not made during the first quarter will mean that twice as many will be made in the second quarter. For the financial markets, it is not the depth of the V that is important so much as its length. Therefore, economic output will experience a ‘V’ (Chart I-4): a lurch down followed by a symmetrical, or potentially even larger, snapback. However, for the financial markets, it is not the depth of the V that is important so much as its length. Chart I-4Economic Output Will Experience A 'V' The Financial Market Disruption Anticipating the economy to experience a V, investors respond to the crisis according to the expected length of the V versus the different lengths of their investment horizons. By length of investment horizon, we mean the minimum timeframe over which the investor cares about a price move, or ‘marks to market’. Say the market expects the downturn to last three months, followed by a full recovery. A three-month investor, caring about the price in three months, will capitulate. He will sell all his equities and buy bonds. Whereas a six-month investor, caring about the price only in six months, will not capitulate because he will factor in both the down-leg and subsequent up-leg of the V. Meanwhile, a twelve-month investor will be completely unfazed by the short-lived downturn. Therefore, if the downturn lasts one quarter only, the market will bottom when all the three-month investors have capitulated, which is to say become indistinguishable in their behaviour from a 1-day trader. In technical terms, the tell-tale sign for this capitulation is that three-month (65-day) fractal structure of the market totally collapses. Last Friday, the financial markets reached this point, meaning that financial markets are now fully priced for an economic downturn lasting one quarter (Chart I-5). Chart I-5When 3-Month Investors Capitulate It Usually Signals A Trend-Reversal... However, six-month and longer horizon investors are still a long way from capitulation. Meaning that the markets are not yet priced for a recession – defined as a contraction in activity lasting two or more straight quarters. It follows that if the down-leg of the V lasts significantly longer than a quarter then equities and other risk-assets have further downside versus high-quality bonds (Chart of the Week). During the global financial crisis, three-month investors had fully capitulated by September 3 2008 when equities had underperformed bonds by a seemingly huge 20 percent. However, equities went on to underperform bonds by a further 50 percent and only found a bottom when eighteen-month investors had fully capitulated in early 2009 (Chart I-6). This makes perfect sense, because profits contracted for a full eighteen months (Chart I-7). Chart I-6...But In The Global Financial Crisis The Market Turned Only When 18-Month Investors Had Capitulated... Chart I-7...Because In The Global Financial Crisis, Profits Contracted For 18 Months All of which brings us to a very powerful investment identity: Financial markets have fully priced a downturn when the time horizon of investors that have fully capitulated = the length of the downturn. The message right today is to go tactically long equities versus bonds if you have high conviction that the coronavirus induced downturn will last no longer than one quarter. Given that the coronavirus incubation period appears to be quite long, rendering containment strategies ineffective, we do not have such a high conviction on this tactical trade. Central banks that are already at the limits of monetary policy easing cannot ease much more. Instead, we have much higher conviction that those central banks that are already at the limits of monetary policy easing cannot ease much relative to those that have the scope to ease. The conclusion is: go long positive yielding US T-bonds and/or UK gilts versus negative yielding Swiss bonds and/or German bunds. Conversely, go long negative yielding currencies versus positive yielding currencies. Our favoured expression is long CHF/USD (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Overweight Positive-Yielding Bonds, And Overweight Negative-Yielding Currencies Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is to overweight Poland versus Portugal. Set the profit target at 3.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, long EUR/GBP achieved its 2 percent profit target at which it was closed. And short palladium has quickly gone into profit, given that the palladium price is down 10 percent in the last week. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 62 percent. Chart I-9Poland Vs. Portugal When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The original version of the metaphor is attributed to the nineteenth century Austrian diplomat Klemens Metternich who said: “When France sneezes all of Europe catches a cold”. Subsequently, the Metternich metaphor has been adapted for any economy with outsized influence on the rest of the world. Fractal Trading Model Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Two key structural factors support the Spanish economy. First, following the collapse in real wages and the productivity-boosting draconian labor market reforms that ensued from the debt crisis, Spanish competitiveness continues to improve. Second, the…
After underperforming through 2019, Spanish equities have become attractive relative to their Italian counterparts for the following reasons: Italy, with 2036 confirmed cases at the time of writing, has become the European epicenter for COVID-19, and its…

