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The S&P utilities sector yields 3.5% but when the yield offered by the competing risk free asset nears 3.2% and is rising, investors prefer to shed riskier high-yielding equities and park the proceeds in U.S. Treasurys. While arguably most of the bad news…
Against such a backdrop, the coming quarters should see sectors that benefit from rising interest rates and that also serve as inflation hedges outperform. This means we favor "FIT" stocks, which refers to financials, industrials and selected technology…
It turns out that what matters for implied volatility of oil is the slope of the crude futures curve. A futures curve in contango, where long-dated futures trade at a higher price than short-dated futures, tends to be associated with high implied volatility.…
Highlights Portfolio Strategy A playable sector rotation opportunity has emerged, as we first argued at the recent BCA investment conference: Financials, industrials and select tech subgroups will lead the next phase of the market advance, a result of the bond market selloff gaining steam into year-end and beyond. In contrast, rising interest rates, a vibrant U.S. economy, softening operating metrics and high indebtedness signal that it is time to shed utility stocks. Recent Changes Trim the S&P Utilities sector to underweight today. Table 1 Feature On the eve of earnings season, the SPX remains close to an all-time high. The most recent spate of investor optimism was driven by President Trump cementing another deal last week, this time with Canada. While the renaming of NAFTA to USMCA is a step in the right direction (i.e. a deal was struck), a deal with China remains the elephant in the room. On that front, U.S. hawkish trade rhetoric should remain in vogue and any deal will have to wait until at least after the election, if not until Q1/2019. Up to now Trump's trade hawkishness has not infiltrated U.S. profits, but we continue to closely monitor IBES reported profit growth expectations. Following up from last week, the rest of the world is bearing the brunt of the U.S. trade-related rhetoric according to our profit growth models, a message sell-side analysts' forecasts also corroborate (we use forward EBITDA in order to gauge trend profit growth and filter out the tax-induced jump in U.S. EPS, Chart 1). Meanwhile, at the margin, seasonality can prop up stocks. While September - a historically negative return month, but not this year - is behind us, stock market crash-prone October is upon us, and thus a pick-up in volatility would not come as a surprise. Beyond October's dreaded crash history, the Presidential cycle has piqued our interest, especially years two and three. Building on our sister Geopolitical Strategy publication's research,1 and given the upcoming midterm elections, we created a cycle-on-cycle profile of SPX returns during these two middle Presidential cycle years (Chart 2). Chart 1U.S. Has The Upper Hand Chart 2Seasonality Boost Until Midyear 2019? In more detail, we analyzed 17 cycles starting in 1950 using S&P 500 daily data (reconstructed S&P 500 prior to 1957). During these iterations, only two two-year periods ended in the red, 1974/75 and 2002/03. The first coincided with a recession and the second took place in the aftermath of the dotcom bust. In addition, two other cycles produced roughly 5% two-year returns, 1962/63 and 1966/67. Finally, 1954/55 was the outlier when the SPX went parabolic and nearly doubled. While every cycle is different, it is clear from Chart 2 that the Presidential cycle should continue to underpin the SPX, if history is an accurate guide, especially given our forecast of no recession in the coming 9-to-12 months. In fact, the S&P could rise another 10%, in line with our 2019 expectation, predicated upon a 10% increase in profits and a lateral multiple move. Interestingly, according to the median Presidential cycle-on-cycle roadmap, while the back half of 2019 is likely to prove more challenging, the first half of next year should enjoy most of the returns (Chart 2). An assessment of recent data releases in the U.S. and abroad is also revealing. Chart 3 shows that the domestic economy is firing on all cylinders. Consumer confidence and sentiment hit multi-decade highs recently. Similarly, the job market remains vibrant and small business euphoria reigns supreme. Not only are small business owners optimistic on all employment-related subcomponents of the NFIB survey, but SME capex intentions are also as good as they get. The ISM manufacturing survey ticked down from the August peak, but remains close to 60. Its close sibling, the ISM services survey, vaulted into uncharted territory. All of this is reflected in the still-growing U.S. leading economic indicator and signals that the U.S. equity market remains on a solid footing. Outside U.S. shores, the bearish narrative is well established with EMs, especially the U.S. dollar debt-saddled fragile five that have to contend with twin deficits, sinking in a bear market. China's debt load is also coming under intense scrutiny as U.S. tariffs are all but certain to weigh on Chinese output growth. Nonetheless, there is a chance that the EMs have depreciated their currencies by enough to engineer a modest rebound (bottom panel, Chart 4). In other words, absent the currency peg straightjacket that dominated the region in the late-1990s, free-floating FX devaluations may serve as a relief valve in order to boost exports. The latest Korean MARKIT manufacturing PMI spiked above the boom/bust line to a multi-year high signaling that already humming Korean factories (industrial production is accelerating) will likely remain busy in the coming months. Other hard economic data also confirm these greenshoots: Korean manufacturing exports are expanding smartly. In particular, exports to China are soaring. Reaccelerating manufacturing selling prices also corroborate this budding Korean recovery (third panel, Chart 4). Chart 3U.S. Is On Fire Chart 4Reflationary Impulse? While it is premature to call an end to the EM carnage, most of the bad news on global export volumes and prices may be nearing an end and the EMs may even export some of their inflation to the U.S. Play The Sector Rotation Into Financials And Industrials... In recent research, we have been highlighting that inflation is slowly rearing its ugly head and there are high odds that the selloff in the bond market gains steam into year-end and beyond2 (as a reminder BCA's fixed income publications continue to recommend below-benchmark portfolio duration). Against such a backdrop, sectors that benefit from rising interest rates and that serve as inflation hedges should outperform in the coming quarters. The "FIT" market refers to financials, industrials and select technology stocks. In more detail, we expect a sector rotation, especially into financials and industrials that have been laggards and remain compellingly valued (Chart 5). With regard to financials, Chart 6 shows that this early cyclical sector enjoys a positive correlation with interest rates and inflation expectations, and a catch up phase in relative share prices looms in the coming quarters. Chart 5Rotate Into Financials... Chart 6...And Industrials Industrials stocks also benefit from rising inflation and interest rates as large parts of this deep cyclical sector are levered to the commodity cycle (Chart 7). In other words, industrials stocks are an indirect inflation hedge and trouble surfaces only when capital goods producers cannot pass rising input costs down the supply chain or to the consumer. But, we are not there yet. Keep in mind that during the last cycle, relative (and absolute) industrials performance peaked prior to relative energy stock prices. Similarly, the relative industrials stock price ratio troughed in early 2009 before their deep cyclical brethren put in a (temporary) bottom a year later (Chart 8). Chart 7Industrials Lead Chart 8Undervalued True, energy stocks are also going to perform well if our thesis of higher interest rates/inflation pans out in the coming quarters and especially if BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service's view of a looming oil price spike materializes (Chart 9). Thus, we sustain the high-conviction overweight stance in the broad sector and reaffirm our recent upgrade to an above benchmark allocation in the S&P oil & gas exploration & production (E&P) subgroup.3 We also reiterate our recent market-neutral and intra-commodity pair trade: long S&P oil & gas E&P / short global gold miners.4 This trade is off to a great start up 10.3% since inception and will benefit further from an inflationary impulse. Chart 9Energy Remains A High-Conviction Overweight While tech stocks have really delivered and led the market advance year-to-date, a bifurcated tech market should remain in place with capex levered S&P software and S&P tech hardware, storage & peripherals indexes (both are high-conviction overweights) outperforming early cyclical tech groups, semi and semi equipment stocks (we remain underweight both semi subindexes). Bottom Line: A playable rotation into financials and industrials is in the offing especially if the selloff in the bond market accelerates on the back of an inflationary whim. We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to both the S&P financials and S&P industrials sectors. ...But Lights Are Out For Utilities Utilities stocks are the ultimate loser from a backup in interest rates as they serve as premier fixed income proxies in the equity space and we are compelled to trim exposure to below benchmark. The niche S&P utilities sector yields 3.5% and when the competing risk free asset is near 3.2% and rising, investors prefer to shed, at the margin, riskier high-yielding equities and park the proceeds in U.S. Treasurys (Chart 10). While arguably most of the bad news is already reflected in washed out technicals and bombed out short and even long-term profit expectations (Chart 11), the selling will only accelerate into yearend and 2019. Chart 10Higher Yields Bite Chart 11Oversold And Unloved... Apart from the tight inverse correlation utilities have with interest rates, they are also a defensive sector that outperforms the broad market when the economy is in retreat. Currently a plethora of recent economic releases are signaling that the U.S. economy is overheating. Chart 12 illustrates the safe haven status of utility stocks (ISM surveys shown inverted). On the operating front, despite the upbeat economic data, electricity capacity utilization remains anemic. Capacity growth is likely responsible for this weak resource utilization signal as utilities construction continues unabated (private construction shown inverted, top panel, Chart 13). Adding insult to injury, inventory accumulation is also weighing on the sector (turbine inventories shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 13). Chart 12...But More Pain Looms Chart 13Weak Operating Metrics Worrisomely, all these expansion plans have been financed with debt. While this is not typically an issue for stable cash flow generating utilities, the sector's net debt-to-EBITDA profile has gone parabolic, nearly doubling since the GFC and even overtaking the early 2000s when a California deregulation wave first led to exuberance and then an electricity crisis (Chart 14). Any letdown in cash flow growth will be disruptive, especially given that the sector has no valuation cushion (bottom panel, Chart 14). Nevertheless, there are some risks that could put our underweight position offside. Natural gas prices have spiked of late and given that they are the marginal price setter for the sector they could boost utility pricing power and thus profits (top & middle panels, Chart 15). As the U.S. economy is firing on all cylinders, electricity demand should remain brisk and provide an offset to the otherwise weakening utility operating backdrop (bottom panel, Chart 15). Chart 14Heavily Indebted And Pricey Chart 15Risks To Underweight View Netting it all out, rising interest rates, a vibrant U.S. economy, softening operating metrics and high indebtedness signal that the time is ripe to sell utility stocks. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P utilities sector to underweight. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit," dated September 12, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Deflation - Reflation - Inflation," dated August 20, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Soldiering On," dated July 16, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Deflation - Reflation - Inflation," dated August 20, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Jair Bolsonaro, an ex-army captain and a right-leaning, law-and-order candidate has won a surprising victory in the first round of the Brazilian presidential election (Chart I-1). Bolsonaro came within striking distance of 50%, but did not cross that threshold, which means that the second round will go ahead on October 28. Given that he only needs another 4% to gain a majority of votes, his victory in the second round is now the most likely outcome by far. Importantly, the results of the congressional election similarly saw a swing to the right in both legislative houses. Chart I-1Bolsonaro Outperformed In The First Round What are the prospects for pro-market structural reforms amid this apparent regime shift in Brazilian politics? How should investors be positioned over the coming months? In the short term, a Bolsonaro presidency will boost business and market sentiment. This is mainly due to the right-leaning balance of parties in Congress and hence Bolsonaro's ability to form a majority coalition. This should lead to an outperformance of Brazilian assets relative to EM on expectations of reforms being passed and implemented. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service recommends upgrading Brazil to an overweight within EM equity, credit, and local fixed-income portfolios. However, in the longer term, we expect that Bolsonaro's presidency will still be constrained on social security reforms. It is still not clear if Brazil's median voter is demanding the kind of policies touted by Bolsonaro's economic advisors. Given Bolsonaro's populism, he may not be willing to expend his political capital on painful and unpopular reforms. In light of this, investors with a 2-5 year horizon should be wary of increasing their absolute exposure to Brazilian assets. Private investors looking for long-term exposure to Brazil should be especially concerned about Bolsonaro's anti-democratic, pro-military inclinations. A New Political Regime... Bolsonaro outperformed expectations in the first round by winning 46% of the popular vote, soundly beating his main rival Fernando Haddad of the left-wing Worker's Party. Polls over the past few weeks had seen him pegged at around 30%. Yet, Sunday night's results showed Bolsonaro beating all pollsters' expectations and nearly gaining the victory in the first round. Table I-1First Round Turnout Was Low In Contrast To Pass Elections Notably, and in contrast to previous elections, overall turnout for the first round was low, standing at just 79% (Table I-1). This played into Bolsonaro's hands. Even though there will be strategic voting in the second round - and our expectation is that most left-leaning voters will switch to Haddad, the remaining left-wing candidate - Haddad's chances look slim. He needs a mass wave of Lula supporters to turn out for the vote. The fact that they did not in the first round bodes ill for him. Thus, Bolsonaro stands at strong odds of becoming Brazil's next president. Attention will turn to the mandate that Bolsonaro will receive over the next four years. In our view, the factors below will be key: Short-term constraints have fallen off: The surprising surge in right-leaning parties at the congressional level suggests that President Bolsonaro will have no immediate legislative constraints to his agenda. He will be free to pursue his policy preferences relatively unimpeded. Chart I-2Chamber Of Deputies Results This is due to both legislative houses shifting towards the right, giving Bolsonaro a mandate to form a majority right-wing government for the first time since 1998 (Chart I-2). So far, 63% of seats in the lower house have gone to center-right and right-wing parties (according to our back-of-the-envelope calculation). If all of these parties joined into a coalition it would represent a historically strong mandate. Markets will surely interpret this as a positive development. However, not all of these parties will necessarily join Bolsonaro. Moreover, reforms requiring a constitutional amendment, such as the all-important reform of Brazil's unsustainable pension system, would require a supermajority of 308 out of 513 seats (60%) in the lower house. Historically, this has proven difficult, and it will be especially tricky for a president with no executive experience, little legislative record, and who denounces the use of pork-barrel spending.1 Otherwise, Congress can ultimately be cajoled into following Bolsonaro. As such, for the first time since Lula's first election (2002 to 2006), the Brazilian president is well-positioned to pursue his agenda. Bolsonaro will likely initiate some easy supply-side policies like cutting corporate taxes and red tape for businesses. Besides, business sentiment could surge due to the emergence of a business-friendly government. Hence, Bolsonaro has some short-term, easy "boosters" before the long-term challenges resurface. Long-term constraints uncertain: Despite the above, the pace of reforms will be slow given that Bolsonaro is, in the end, a populist who will want to maintain power above all. We continue to doubt Bolsonaro's willingness and ability to pursue social security reforms. We suspect that the vast majority of his voters chose to cast their ballot due to his law-and-order agenda that included a focus on battling crime and corruption. His economic advisor, Paulo Guedes, spent more time touting his reformist credentials in foreign financial publications than on the campaign trail. As such, it is difficult to conclude that Bolsonaro actually has a strong mandate for painful pension reforms. Polls ahead of the election suggest that only 4% of the public wants pension reforms (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Brazil's Population Is Not Open To Fiscal Austerity Chart I-4The J-Curve Of Structural Reform That said, we are open-minded and willing to be proved wrong. If Bolsonaro supports very dramatic reforms in his first 12 months in office, when his political capital is strongest, he could pull through despite the likely opposition from the median voter. As our J-Curve Of Structural Reform suggests, Bolsonaro can survive the "danger zone" if he pushes ahead with painful reforms right away (Chart I-4). He will start with sufficient political capital to do so. For long-term investors, the chief question is this: Is Bolsonaro a Brazilian Ronald Reagan or merely a Brazilian Rodrigo Duterte? Judging from everything he himself - not his advisors - has said in the past and on the campaign trail, we would bet on the latter. ...But The Same Economic Problems Brazil is getting a new government, but the macro economic challenges remain the same. Namely, ballooning public debt, still high interest rates and an unsustainable pension system (Chart I-5). As discussed above, it is not evident that Bolsonaro will strive to enact major cuts in the social security system that would be very unpopular. Apart from pensions and privatization, other choices to tackle the unsustainable public debt dynamics include reducing interest rates and boosting nominal growth (Chart I-6). Bolsonaro's economic team has repeatedly discussed the need to reduce high interest rates. Chart I-5Much Needed Pension Reform! Chart I-6Brazil's Macro Distortions   Chart I-7The Real Is Still At Risk Of Depreciation Rapid and large interest rate cuts by the central bank will help to service the public debt given that 96% of public debt is in local currency. Yet, lower interest rates could put pressure on the currency to depreciate - the interest rate differential between Brazil and the U.S. is at all-time lows (Chart I-7). Meanwhile, a weaker currency is needed to increase nominal growth. Notably, extremely low inflation and weak nominal growth have worsened the nation's public debt dynamics in recent years. Overall, lower policy rates and currency devaluation are required to reflate Brazil out of a public debt trap. If the exchange rate stabilizes in the short run as foreign investors come back to Brazil, the central bank will reduce interest rates considerably. Lower borrowing costs in combination with a sharp rise in business confidence and existing pent-up investment demand will propel capital spending, employment and overall growth. In short, these are necessary conditions for Brazilian markets to outperform their EM peers, i.e., for relative outperformance. As to absolute performance, it also depends on the outlook for global markets. In a complete global risk-off mode (the odds of which are considerable at the moment) - in which EM currencies and risk assets continue rioting and U.S. share prices drop - it will be difficult for Brazilian risk assets to rally meaningfully. That said, they will still outperform their EM peers. In the long run, pursuing policies of lower-than-needed interest rates and, hence, of chronic currency depreciation appears to be more palatable to Bolsonaro's populist credentials than difficult structural reforms. Therefore, investors who look to commit long-term capital to Brazil should mind the exchange rate. Populist policies favoring nominal growth in the long run lead to chronic currency depreciation. Bottom Line: Bolsonaro's election and his initial policies will be cheered by markets and will help Brazilian markets to outperform their EM peers for now. However, Bolsonaro is a populist and in the long term will choose economic policies that favor high nominal growth and, thereby, warrant chronic currency depreciation. Investment Recommendations Chart I-8Overweight Brazilian Assets Relative To EM In terms of market recommendations, we have the following: For EM dedicated portfolios, we recommend upgrading Brazil to overweight within the equity, credit, and local currency bonds universes (Chart I-8). BCA's Emerging Market Strategy service is taking a 14% profit on its structural short BRL versus USD position. Also, we are closing the short BRLMXN and short BRLARS trades with a 12% gain and a 5.7% loss, respectively. We also recommend closing the short Brazilian bank stocks trade initiated on May 16, 2018, as its return is now flat due to the recent rebound over the past few days. Absolute performance of Brazilian risk assets is contingent on global financial markets sentiment and at the moment odds of global risk off are considerable. This could cap the rally in Brazilian risk assets for now. Long-term investors should realize that timing Brazilian markets in general, and the exchange rate in particular, will be critical to protect gains. We believe that the path of least resistance for Bolsonaro and his team will be to depreciate the currency and engender nominal GDP growth in order to inflate away the country's public debt. This is a smart strategy for which they have a political mandate. But it will be a death-knell for foreign investors with major positions in the country.   Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In late 1998, for instance, even President Cardoso's own PSDB party deprived him of the votes needed to seal a painstakingly negotiated deal with the IMF, which led to a loss of confidence among creditors and a sharp devaluation of the real in January 1999.  
Highlights Duration: Last week's bond market rout was driven by strong U.S. data. Global growth (ex. U.S.) continues to weaken. Weak foreign growth that migrates stateside via a stronger dollar remains the biggest risk to our below-benchmark duration stance. For now, we prefer to hedge that risk by owning curve steepeners and maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product. High-Yield: A supply shock in the oil market would most likely lead to steep backwardation in the oil futures curve and an increase in implied oil volatility. An increase in implied oil volatility will translate into a higher risk premium embedded in junk spreads. Emerging Market Sovereigns: All of the recent widening in USD-denominated EM sovereign spreads has been concentrated in Turkey and Argentina, two nations that remain highly exposed to global growth divergences and a stronger U.S. dollar. Most other EM countries offer less attractive spreads than comparable U.S. corporate debt. Remain underweight USD-denominated EM sovereign bonds. Feature Bond Breakout Chart 1The Long End Breaks Out Bond markets sold off sharply last week and long-dated Treasury yields took out some noteworthy technical levels in the process. The 10-year Treasury yield broke above its May 2018 peak of 3.11% and settled at 3.23% as of last Friday. The next big test for the 10-year's cyclical uptrend is the 2011 peak of 3.75% (Chart 1). The 30-year yield similarly broke above its May 2018 peak of 3.25%, settling at 3.39% as of last Friday. The next resistance for the 30-year occurs at the early-2014 peak of 3.96%. Removing our, admittedly uncomfortable, technical analysis hat, it is instructive to note which macro factors were responsible for last week's large bear-steepening of the Treasury curve and which weren't. Strong U.S. economic data - the non-manufacturing ISM survey hit its highest level since 1997 (Chart 2) - and Fed Chairman Powell commenting that the fed funds rate is "a long way from neutral at this point, probably" were the key drivers of the move.1 Taken together, these two developments suggest that the Fed is further behind the curve than was previously thought. This is consistent with an upward revision to the market's assessment of the neutral fed funds rate, which explains why the yield curve steepened and the price of gold edged higher.2 But it's equally important to note the factors that didn't drive the increase in yields. In this case, yields weren't driven by a rebound in growth outside of the U.S., which continues to flag (Chart 2, panel 2). The Global Manufacturing PMI fell for the fifth consecutive month in September. While our diffusion index based on the number of countries with PMIs above versus below the 50 boom/bust line ticked higher (Chart 2, panel 3), our diffusion index based on the number of countries with rising versus falling PMIs remained deeply negative (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2Growth Divergences Deepen Chart 3Global PMIs Taken together, our diffusion indexes are consistent with an environment where most countries are experiencing decelerating growth from high levels. This message is confirmed by looking at the PMIs from the five largest economic blocs (Chart 3). The Eurozone PMI continues to fall rapidly, though it remains well above 50. The Emerging Markets (ex. China) PMI is also trending lower from a relatively high level, while the Chinese PMI is threatening to break below 50. Only the U.S. and Japan have healthy looking PMIs. The precariousness of non-U.S. growth leads us to reiterate the biggest risk to our below-benchmark duration view. The risk is that weak foreign growth eventually migrates to the U.S. via a stronger dollar and forces the Fed to pause its +25 bps per quarter rate hike cycle. If current trends continue, it is highly likely that U.S. growth will slow in the first half of next year, though it is unclear whether such a slowdown would be severe enough for the Fed to pause rate hikes.3 In any event, the bond market is only priced for the Fed to maintain its quarterly rate hike pace until June of next year (3 more hikes) before going on hold (Chart 4). Essentially, the market already discounts a rate hike pause, even after last week's large increase in yields. Chart 4Market's Rate Expectations Still Too Low For this reason, we prefer to maintain our below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, and to hedge the risk of weakening foreign growth by owning curve steepeners,4 and maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product. Bottom Line: Last week's bond market rout was driven by strong U.S. data. Global growth (ex. U.S.) continues to weaken. Weak foreign growth that migrates stateside via a stronger dollar remains the biggest risk to our below-benchmark duration stance. For now, we prefer to hedge that risk by owning curve steepeners and maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product. In Case You Needed Another Reason To Be Nervous About Junk As Treasury yields broke higher last week, the average high-yield index option-adjusted spread tightened to a fresh cyclical low of 303 bps. It has since rebounded to 316 bps (Chart 5). Our measure of the excess spread available in the high-yield index after adjusting for expected default losses is now at 196 bps, well below its historical average of 247 bps (Chart 5, panel 2). We have previously pointed out that even this below-average excess spread embeds a very low 12-month default loss expectation of 1.07%.5 Rarely have default losses been below that level. With job cut announcements forming a tentative bottom (Chart 5, bottom panel), we see high odds that default losses surprise to the upside during the next 12 months. In the absence of further spread tightening, that would translate to 12-month excess junk returns of 196 bps or less. But this week we want to highlight an additional risk to junk spreads. That risk being our Commodity & Energy Strategy service's view that crude oil prices could experience a positive supply shock in the first quarter of next year. At present, our strategists see high odds of $100 per barrel Brent crude oil in the first quarter of next year, and are forecasting an average price of $95 per barrel for 2019. At publication time, the Brent crude oil price was $85.6 At first blush it isn't obvious why high oil prices would pose a risk to junk spreads, and in fact there is no consistent correlation between the level of oil prices and junk spreads. However, there is a correlation between implied volatility in the crude oil market and junk spreads, with higher implied vol coinciding with wider spreads and vice-versa (Chart 6). Chart 5Default Loss Expectations Too Low Chart 6Higher Oil Vol = Wider Junk Spreads Would higher oil prices necessarily induce a spike in implied volatility? Not necessarily. It turns out that what matters for implied oil volatility is the slope of the futures curve.7 A contangoed futures curve where long-dated futures trade at a higher price than short-dated futures tends to be associated with high implied volatility. A steeply backwardated futures curve where long-dated futures trade well below short-dated futures is equally associated with elevated implied vol (Chart 7). Implied volatility tends to be lowest when the futures curve is in mild backwardation. A mild backwardation is typical when crude prices are in a gradual uptrend, as is the case at present. All in all, the following features provide a reasonable description of the current environment: Gradual uptrend in crude oil price Mild oil futures curve backwardation Low implied crude volatility Tight junk spreads However, as we head into next year, our commodity strategists anticipate that supply constraints will bite in the oil market. The U.S. is poised to implement an oil embargo against Iran in November, and Venezuela - another important oil exporter - remains on the brink of collapse. With global oil inventories already tight, and the loss of further production from Venezuela and Iran looming, our strategists anticipate that the number of days of demand covered by crude oil inventories will decline sharply. This decline will lead to a steep backwardation of the futures curve (Chart 8). Chart 7Brent Crude Oil Volatility Vs. Forward Slope Chart 8Supply Shock Will Lead To Steep Backwardation The bottom line for junk investors is that a supply shock in the oil market would most likely lead to a steep backwardation in the futures curve and an increase in implied oil volatility. An increase in implied oil volatility will translate into a higher risk premium embedded in junk spreads. We continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield in U.S. bond portfolios. We will await a signal that profit growth is set to deteriorate before advocating for a further reduction in exposure. Still No Buying Opportunity In EM Sovereigns Chart 9EM Index Spread Looks Cheap As growth divergences between the U.S. and the rest of the world increase, we are on high alert for an opportunity to shift some allocation out of U.S. corporate credit and into USD-denominated emerging market (EM) sovereign debt. However, so far EM spreads are simply not wide enough to merit attention from U.S. bond investors. This is not apparent from the average index spreads. In fact, a quick glance at the indexes shows that EM sovereign spreads have widened a lot relative to duration- and quality-matched U.S. corporates, and actually offer a healthy spread pick-up (Chart 9). However, a more detailed look at the spreads from individual countries shows that the spread advantage in EM is only available in a select few markets (Charts 10A & 10B). At the lower-end of the credit spectrum: Turkey, Argentina, Ukraine and Lebanon all offer higher breakeven spreads than comparable U.S. corporates. In the upper credit tiers: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE) look attractive. All other EM countries off lower breakeven spreads than comparable U.S. corporates. Chart 10ABreakeven Spreads: USD EM Sovereigns Vs. U.S. Corporates Chart 10BBreakeven Spreads: USD EM Sovereigns Vs. U.S. Corporates We would be very reluctant to shift any allocation out of U.S. corporates and into either Turkey or Argentina. Both of those countries are highly exposed to the tightening in global liquidity conditions that occurs alongside a strengthening U.S. dollar. Our Foreign Exchange and Global Investment Strategy teams created a Vulnerability Heat Map to identify which EM countries are likely to struggle as the U.S. dollar appreciates (Chart 11).8 These tend to be countries with large current account deficits and high external debt balances, though several other factors are also considered. The results show that Argentina and Turkey are the two most exposed nations. Chart 11Vulnerability Heat Map For Key EM Markets At the upper-end of the credit spectrum, the USD bonds from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE are more interesting. Our geopolitical strategists anticipate an escalation of tensions between the U.S. and Iran following the U.S. midterm elections, and such tensions could increase the political risk premium embedded in all Middle Eastern debt. But for longer-term U.S. fixed income investors, it is worth noting that extra spread is available in the hard currency sovereign debt of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE compared to A-rated U.S. corporates. Bottom Line: All of the recent widening in USD-denominated EM sovereign spreads has been concentrated in Turkey and Argentina, two nations that remain highly exposed to global growth divergences and a stronger U.S. dollar. Most other EM countries offer less attractive spreads than comparable U.S. corporate debt. Remain underweight USD-denominated EM sovereign bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Powell's full interview can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CqaBSSl6ok 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "A Signal From Gold?", dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com, where we note that every time the Global (ex. US) LEI has dipped below zero since 1993, the U.S. LEI has eventually followed. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners", dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Out Of Sync", dated July 3, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl", dated September 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets", dated August 2, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Bear And The Two Travelers", dated August 17, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
We have long argued that the U.S. economy can withstand a tightening of up to 100-125bps (using the 10-year UST yield) in a short time span. Empirical evidence supports our view, and with regard to stocks, what is most important is the correlation between the bond yield year-over-year change and momentum in the SPX (middle panel). In early March, we compared cyclical momentum in the S&P 500 with the annual change in the 10-year UST yield and documented the correlation shifts going back to the 1960s. We also filtered for a minimum of 100bps change in the 10-year UST yield and a concurrent negative correlation between the two variables. In other words, we searched for tightness in monetary conditions that caused equity market consternation, excluding recessions. Our analysis revealed that there have been five iterations when rising bond yields proved restrictive for equities: once in each of the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s and twice in the 1980s. On average, the SPX drawdown from peak-to-trough during these five iterations was 19% and lasted 6.5 months. While the correlation currently has clearly made a turn toward the zero line (bottom panel), it is not in negative territory yet. Using this simple rule of thumb suggests that it would take a selloff in the bond market that pushed yields above 3.70% to cause a significant hiccup in stocks (as a reminder this year’s trough in the 10-year UST yield is 2.72%). With regard to portfolio positioning and given BCA’s interest rate view of a continuation of a selloff in the bond market, we would shy away from interest rate-sensitive sectors (please see the next Insights).
Highlights U.S. domestic demand will remain robust for the foreseeable future thanks to fiscal stimulus, stronger credit growth, a falling savings rate, and plentiful sources of pent-up demand. Economic and financial imbalances in the U.S. are also muted, while the financial system is fairly resilient. All this implies that the Fed can raise rates quite a bit more - certainly above the 3% level that the market regards as the threshold at which the economy will go off the rails. Since both monetary and fiscal policy will remain accommodative for the foreseeable future, a recession is unlikely before 2020, with risks tilted to an even later onset date. The combination of a stronger dollar, slowing global trade, high EM debt levels, and the Chinese government's reluctance to pursue a massive fiscal/credit stimulus program due to concerns about financial stability and debt sustainability, all spell trouble for emerging markets. Investors should favor developed market equities over their EM counterparts. Within the developed market universe, remain overweight the U.S. over both Europe and Japan in common-currency terms. As we predicted two years ago, bonds have entered a secular bear market. However, a temporary countertrend rally is a growing risk in the near term, especially in light of extremely stretched short positioning and technically oversold conditions. Feature A New Record Will Be Set Next Year The current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record if it makes it to July 2019, at which point it will surpass the 1990s expansion (Chart 1). Will it last that long? We think so. In fact, the risk to our 2020 recession call is tilted towards a later downturn rather than an earlier one. Chart 1The Current Economic Expansion Will Likely Be The Longest On Record To understand why, it is useful to consider the forces that generate recessions. In one sense, business cycles are very simple things: Recessions occur when spending begins to decline in relation to the economy's productive capacity. This often sets in motion a vicious circle where rising unemployment reduces both income and confidence, leading to less spending and even higher unemployment. Conversely, recoveries occur when spending rises relative to the economy's productive capacity. This may happen because fiscal and/or monetary policy turn stimulative. It can also happen because the excesses that were built up in the lead-up to the recession are purged, allowing the economy to grow from a clean slate. Lessons From The Great Recession The Great Recession offers a vivid demonstration of these processes. The run-up in home prices starting in the early 2000s pushed up consumption. Rising housing demand also lifted residential investment. Once the housing bubble burst, everything went into reverse: Home prices and construction collapsed. Household debt, which had grown rapidly over the preceding 25 years, began to contract. The importance of shifts in aggregate demand in explaining business-cycle fluctuations may seem simple if not obvious, but it is remarkable how many people fail to understand them. One of the more strangely controversial reports I wrote while working in the global markets group at Goldman Sachs in September 2009 was a piece predicting that the Fed would need to keep rates low for "many years" to come.1 It is easy to forget now, but the U.S. 10-year yield rose as high as 3.92% in December 2009 on the expectation that the Fed would start "normalizing" monetary policy in the near future (Chart 2). Chart 2Rate Expectations Were Too Hawkish Shortly After The Great Recession, But Are Now Too Dovish Those who understood the mechanics of recessions and recoveries should have realized that the Fed would not be able to abandon its ultra-loose monetary stance so quickly. Yes, the financial crisis had ended in the sense that credit spreads were falling, equity prices were recovering, and fears of a massive bank run were receding. But the sources of demand that propped up spending prior to the Great Recession were not coming back anytime soon. The U.S. needs about 3.5% of GDP in residential investment to keep up with population growth. After the recession ended, it probably required something closer to 2% of GDP in residential investment in order to work off the excess inventory of homes that was created during the bubble years. Residential investment averaged nearly 6% of GDP between 2002 and 2006. Where exactly was that 4% of GDP in lost demand going to come from? Certainly not from the Obama stimulus package, which was too small and too transient. Likewise, while one could have reasonably debated in 2009 the extent to which debt levels would ultimately fall, it should have been pretty obvious that they would not start rising at least for the next few years. Conceptually, the level of demand is determined by the rate of growth of debt.2 Rising debt added to aggregate demand in the years leading to the Great Recession. If debt levels had simply stabilized in the aftermath of the recession, this would have still left the economy with less spending power than it had before the downturn. It took a long time, but by 2016 investors had finally internalized the lessons discussed above. The U.S. 10-year yield hit a record closing low of 1.37% on July 5, 2016. As luck would have it, this was also the day that we published a note declaring "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market." Our decision to turn more cautious on bonds was motivated by both valuation considerations and the fact that many of the forces that had dragged down bond yields were starting to drive them back up: The output gap had shrunk; fiscal policy had become more stimulative; and credit was growing anew. In addition, eight years of frugal living created plenty of pent-up demand for fixed capital and consumer durable goods. Chart 3 shows that the average age of the residential capital stock shot up from 25.8 years in 2007 to 30.1 years in 2016. The average age of the nonresidential capital stock also continued to drift up, rising to the highest level since 1963. The average age of consumer goods also increased (Chart 4). Chart 3The U.S. Capital Stock Has Aged (Part I) Chart 4The U.S. Capital Stock Has Aged (Part II) Where Things Stand Today This brings us to the present. Today, the output gap is fully closed, private-sector credit growth has returned to its long-term trend, and fiscal policy is even looser than it was two years ago (Chart 5). The replacement cycle for business investment still has further to run. Both capex intention surveys and the recent easing in lending standards for commercial and industrial loans suggest that capital expenditures will remain strong for the foreseeable future (Chart 6). Meanwhile, household spending will be supported by accelerating wage growth and a savings rate that has plenty of scope to fall from current levels (Chart 7). Chart 5The Need For Ultra-Low Rates Has Passed Chart 6Business Investment Still Going Strong Chart 7Stronger Wage Growth And A Falling Savings Rate Will Lift Spending Perhaps most importantly, the sort of financial imbalances that have triggered recessions in the past are largely absent today. Unlike a decade ago, the mortgage market is in good shape. The Urban Institute's Housing Credit Availability Index, which measures the percentage of housing loans that are likely to default over the next 90 days, remains near all-time lows (Chart 8). The corporate debt market is more problematic, and we continue to see it as the "weakest link" in the financial system. The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP has climbed to a record high, while so-called "covenant-light loans" have proliferated. The situation is particularly bad among companies with publicly-traded bonds, who have generally been the worst offenders. Nevertheless, the situation is far from dire. The ratio of corporate net debt-to-EBITD is still reasonably low. The interest coverage ratio is fairly elevated, as is the "quick ratio," which takes the difference between current corporate assets and inventories and divides it by short-term liabilities. Corporate assets have also risen quite briskly over the past few years, which has kept the corporate debt-to-asset ratio broadly stable (Chart 9). Chart 8U.S. Mortgage Market Is In Good Shape Chart 9Corporate Debt: Problematic, But Far From Dire Looking out, rising interest rates will lift debt-servicing costs while faster wage growth will put downward pressure on profit margins. This is likely to strain corporate balance sheets, causing spreads to widen from today's ultra-low levels. However, a major wave of defaults is unlikely to occur unless earnings collapse, which rarely happens outside of recessions. The Financial System Is More Resilient Is it possible that rising defaults will force firms to lay off workers, leading to less spending throughout the economy, higher corporate defaults, and even more layoffs? Such a vicious circle cannot be dismissed, but its likelihood is mitigated by the fact that most corporate debt is held by unleveraged investors. Defaults are most economically pernicious when they lead to "leveraged losses," a term coined by my former Goldman Sachs colleague, Jan Hatzius. If a leveraged institution wishes to hold ten times as much assets as capital, a $1 loss on a bad loan will force it to reduce its assets by $10. This could result in a downward spiral in asset prices - one where fire sales lead to big haircuts to asset holders, generating even more forced sales. A credit crunch is almost inevitable in such a scenario. Unlike mortgages, which are often held by leveraged institutions, most corporate debt is held by unleveraged players such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. Bank loans account for only 18% of nonfinancial corporate-sector debt, down from 40% in 1980 (Chart 10). The share of leveraged loans held by banks has declined from about 25% a decade ago to less than 10% today. Moreover, banks today hold much more high-quality capital than in the past (Chart 11). Chart 10Banks Have Reduced Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Chart 11U.S. Banks Are Well Capitalized Tellingly, we already had a dress rehearsal for what a corporate debt scare might look like. Credit spreads spiked in 2015. Default rates rose, but the knock-on effects to the financial system were minimal (Chart 12). This suggests that corporate America could withstand quite a bit of monetary tightening without buckling under the pressure. Chart 12Corporate Debt Scare: 2015 Was A Preview No Recession On The Horizon The discussion above suggests that U.S. aggregate demand growth will remain robust for the foreseeable future thanks to fiscal stimulus, stronger credit growth, a falling savings rate, and still-abundant sources of pent-up demand. Economic and financial imbalances are also muted, while the financial system is fairly resilient. All this implies that the Fed can raise rates quite a bit more - certainly above the 3% level that the market regards as the threshold at which the economy will go off the rails (Chart 13). Comments this week from key Fed officials, including Chair Powell, suggest that the FOMC is finally starting to see things our way. Since it will take a while for the Fed to lift interest rates into restrictive territory, it follows that the next recession is nowhere on the horizon. This observation is supported by a variety of leading economic indicators, including the ISM index, initial unemployment claims, and core durable goods orders (Chart 14). Only the yield curve is sending a modestly worrying signal, although as we discussed in a prior report,3 the danger posed from a flatter yield curve is lower today than in the past. Chart 13Markets Expect No Fed Hikes Beyond Next Year Chart 14No Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession It will not be until 2020, and perhaps even later, that monetary policy turns restrictive. By that time, imbalances will have grown, which implies that debt levels and asset prices will probably be higher. The unemployment rate could be in the low 3% range and core PCE inflation will likely have moved squarely above the Fed's target. Risks To The View While our baseline scenario foresees a recession happening later rather than sooner, it would be unwise to ignore the risks to that sanguine view. Four things could hasten an economic downturn: A full-blown trade war with China: Trump's procyclical fiscal policy will drain domestic savings, causing the current account deficit to widen. Since Trump is unlikely to blame his own macro policies for a rising trade deficit, he will try to find a scapegoat. He cannot blame Canada or Mexico anymore since he just negotiated a "tremendous" new USMCA agreement with them, which allegedly redresses all the injustices of the prior trade deal. Japan and the EU will also get a break, if for no other reason than they are still needed as geopolitical allies. This just leaves China as the fall guy. The risk is that the Chinese government not only raises tariffs on U.S. exports, but also retaliates against U.S. firms with operations in China. Even more dangerously, a trade war with China could escalate into an outright military conflict. The underreported story of the near collision between a Chinese warship and a U.S. destroyer this week highlights the risk of such an outcome.4 An oil superspike: Our energy strategists have argued that extremely tight supply conditions, exacerbated by sanctions against Iranian oil exports, could cause the price of crude to shoot up to $100 dollars per barrel by early next year. Every U.S. recession over the past 40 years has been preceded by a rapid increase in oil prices (Chart 15). While there are reasons to think that an oil shock would be less damaging than in the past - the U.S. is now a net energy exporter; the volume of oil consumption as a share of real GDP has fallen by a third since 1995, and by half since 1980; inflation expectations are much better anchored - a big enough oil spike, if combined with other adverse shocks, could create the conditions for another recession. An Italian sovereign debt crisis: Italy is caught between a rock and a hard place. The Italian private sector saves too much and spends too little. A shrinking population has reduced the need for firms to invest in new capacity. The prior government's pension cuts have also incentivized people to save more for their retirement. The result is a private sector savings-investment surplus that stood at 5% of GDP in 2017 compared to close to breakeven a decade ago (Chart 16). Unlike Germany, Italy cannot export its savings to the rest of the world through a large trade surplus because it does not have a hypercompetitive economy. Nor can the Italian government risk running afoul of the bond vigilantes by emulating Japan's strategy of absorbing private-sector savings with large budget deficits. It is unlikely that these tensions will come to a head before the next global recession. Nevertheless, Italy's fiscal woes certainly make global financial markets more vulnerable to a risk-off event. Emerging market meltdown: As our EM strategists have highlighted, the combination of a stronger dollar, slowing global trade, high EM debt levels, and the Chinese government's reluctance to pursue a massive fiscal/credit stimulus program due to concerns about financial stability, all spell trouble for emerging markets. It is doubtful that an EM crisis would bring down the U.S. economy - even the 1990s crises did not do that - but it could exacerbate a preexisting slowdown, especially if the spillovers from EM lead to a tightening in U.S. financial conditions via a sharp appreciation of the dollar, wider credit spreads, and a selloff in U.S. stocks. Chart 15Rapid Increases In Oil Prices Tend To Precede Recessions Chart 16Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Investment Conclusions In many respects, the economic and financial landscape today resembles that of late-1997 and early-1998. Back then, the U.S. stock market was rallying while emerging market assets were selling off. The decoupling between U.S. and global stocks came to a thunderous end in the summer of 1998. Popular lore attributes the 22% plunge in the S&P 500 from July 20 to October 8 to the implosion of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), but in fact almost all of the decline in the index occurred before the problems at LTCM surfaced. It was more the steady drip of bad news over the course of 1998 - the spread of the crisis from Thailand to Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea; the collapse of Hong Kong-based Peregrine Investments Holdings, Asia's largest private investment bank; growing fears that China would devalue its currency; and finally, the Russian sovereign debt default - which caused market sentiment among U.S. investors to turn from euphoric ambivalence to bearish hysteria (Chart 17). Chart 17Key Events During The Asian Crisis It is impossible to know if such a phase-transition will occur again, but prudent investors should consider scaling back risk if they are currently overweight risk assets. We moved to neutral from overweight on global equities in June, while maintaining our preference for developed over emerging markets. Within the developed market universe, we continue to favor the U.S. over both Europe and Japan in common-currency terms, given our expectation of further dollar strength. If global stocks do suffer a correction during the next few months, this will present a buying opportunity. U.S. equities, which account for over half of global stock market capitalization, tend not to peak until six months or so before the start of a recession (Table 1). Keep in mind that the S&P 500 rallied by 68% between its October 1998 lows and April 2000. Emerging market stocks bottomed in September 1998, before doubling over the subsequent 18 months. Following this script, we expect to flip our recommendation from being underweight to overweight EM equities at some point in 2019, probably in the first half of the year. The 1998 template is also helpful for thinking about the outlook for bond yields. The 10-year Treasury yield rose from 4.16% in October 1998 to 6.79% in January 2000, but not before falling from nearly 7% in April 1997. We do not expect a similar decline in yields this time around, but a modest dip from current levels would not be surprising, particularly because bond sentiment is highly bearish at the moment (Chart 18). As with stocks, any decline in bond yields would be temporary. Bonds are now in a secular bear market that could last a decade, if not longer. Our baseline views for global equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities are illustrated in Appendix A. Table 1Stocks And Recessions: Case-By-Case Chart 18Bond Sentiment Is Very Bearish Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 "Goldman Says Deleveraging May Keep Fed Rate Low for 'Years,' " Bloomberg, September 10, 2009. 2 Recall that GDP is a flow variable (how much production takes place every period), whereas credit is a stock variable (how much debt there is outstanding). Thus, credit growth affects GDP and, by extension, the change in credit growth (the so-called credit impulse) affects GDP growth. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve," dated December 22, 2017. 4 Steven Lee Myers, "American and Chinese Warships Narrowly Avoid High-Seas Collision," The New York Times, October 2, 2018. Appendix A Appendix Chart IMarket Outlook: Equities Appendix Chart IIMarket Outlook: Bonds Appendix Chart IIIMarket Outlook: Currencies Appendix Chart IVMarket Outlook: Commodities Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Corporates remain expensive with 12-month breakeven spreads for both A and Baa-rated bonds standing below the 25th percentiles of their distribution that has prevailed since 1989. Furthermore, with inflation now at the Fed's target, monetary policy will…
The above chart presents the alphas and betas of 23 industry groups within the MSCI China index from mid-June to the end of September. Several points are worth mentioning: The relative performance of Chinese industry groups since mid-June has been determined…