Fixed Income
Dear Client, We are sending you our Quarterly Strategy Outlook today, where we outline our thoughts on the macro landscape and the direction of financial markets for the rest of the year and beyond. We will also be hosting a webcast on Thursday, October 1st at 10:00 AM EDT (3:00 PM BST, 4:00 PM CEST, 10:00 PM HKT) where we will discuss the outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Macroeconomic outlook: Global growth faces near-term challenges from a resurgence in the pandemic and the failure of the US Congress to pass a stimulus deal. However, growth should revive next year as a vaccine becomes available and fiscal policy turns stimulative again. Global asset allocation: Favor equities over bonds on a 12-month horizon, while maintaining somewhat larger than normal cash positions in the short run that can be deployed if stocks resume their correction. Equities: Prepare to pivot from the “Pandemic trade” to the “Reopening trade.” Vaccine optimism should pave the way for cyclicals to outperform defensives, international stocks to outperform their US peers, and for value to outperform growth. Fixed income: Bond yields will rise modestly, suggesting that investors should maintain below average duration exposure. Favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. Spread product will outperform safe government bonds. Currencies: The US dollar will weaken over the next 12 months. The collapse in interest rate differentials, stronger global growth, and a widening US trade deficit are all bearish for the greenback. Commodities: Rising demand and constrained supply will support oil prices, while Chinese stimulus will buoy industrial metals. Investors should buy gold and other real assets as a hedge against long-term inflation risk. I. Macroeconomic Outlook Policy And The Pandemic Will Continue To Drive Markets Going into the fourth quarter of 2020, we are tactically neutral on global equities but remain overweight stocks and other risk assets on a 12-month horizon. As has been the case for much of the year, both the virus and the policy response to the pandemic will continue to be key drivers of market returns. Coronavirus: Still Spreading Fast, But Less Deadly On the virus front, the global number of daily new cases continues to trend higher, with the 7-day average reaching a record high of nearly 300,000 this week (Chart 1). Chart 1Globally, The Number Of Daily New Cases Continues To Trend Higher The number of daily new cases in the EU has risen above its April peak. Spain and France have been particularly hard hit. Canada is also seeing a pronounced rise in new cases. In the US, the number of new cases peaked in July. However, the 7-day average has been creeping up since early September, raising the risk of a third wave. On the positive side, mortality rates in most countries remain well below their spring levels. There is no clear consensus as to why the virus has become less lethal. Better medical treatments, including the use of low-cost steroids, have certainly helped. A shift in the incidence of cases towards younger, healthier people has also lowered the overall mortality rate. In addition, there is some evidence that the virus may be evolving to be more contagious but less deadly.1 It would not be surprising if that were the case. After all, a virus that kills its host will also kill itself. Lastly, pervasive mask wearing may be mitigating the severity of the disease by reducing the initial viral load that infected individuals receive.2 A smaller initial dose gives the immune system more time to launch an effective counterattack. It has even been speculated that the widespread use of masks may be acting as a form of “variolation.” Prior to the invention of vaccines, variolation was used to engender natural immunity. Perhaps most famously, upon taking command of the Continental Army in 1775, George Washington had all his troops exposed to small amounts of smallpox.3 The gamble worked. The US ended up winning the Revolutionary War, making Washington the first president of the new republic. Waiting For A Vaccine Despite the decline in mortality rates, there is still much that remains unknown about Covid-19, including the extent to which the disease will lead to long-term damage to the vascular and nervous systems. Thus, while governments are unlikely to impose the same sort of severe lockdown measures that they implemented in March, rising case counts will delay reopening plans, and in many cases, lead to the reintroduction of stricter social distancing rules. Chart 2Some States Have Started To Relax Lockdown Measures This has already happened in a number of countries. The UK reinstated more stringent regulations over social gatherings last week, including ordering pubs and restaurants to close by 10pm. Spain has introduced tougher mobility restrictions in Madrid and surrounding municipalities. France ordered gyms and restaurants to close for two weeks. Canada has also tightened regulations, with the government of Quebec raising the alert level to maximum “red alert” in several regions of the province. In the US, the share of the population living in states that were in the process of relaxing lockdown measures has risen above 50% for the first time since July (Chart 2). A third wave would almost certainly forestall the recent reopening trend. Ultimately, a safe and effective vaccine will be necessary to defeat the virus. Fortunately, about half of experts polled by the Good Judgment Project expect a vaccine to become available by the first quarter of 2021. Only 2% expect there to be no vaccine available by April 2022, down from over 50% in May (Chart 3). Chart 3When Will A Vaccine Become Available? Premature Fiscal Tightening And The Risk of Second-Round Effects Even if a vaccine becomes available early next year, there is a danger that the global economy will have suffered enough damage over the intervening months to forestall a rapid recovery. Whenever an economy suffers an adverse shock, a feedback loop can develop where rising joblessness leads to less spending, leading to even more joblessness. Fiscal stimulus can short-circuit this vicious circle by providing households with adequate income to maintain spending. Fiscal policy in the major economies turned expansionary within weeks of the onset of the pandemic (Chart 4). In the US, real personal income growth actually accelerated in the spring because transfers from the government more than offset the loss in wage and salary compensation (Chart 5). Chart 4Fiscal Policy Has Been Very Stimulative This Year Chart 5Personal Income Accelerated Earlier This Year Chart 6Drastic Drop In Weekly Unemployment Insurance Payments Starting in August, US fiscal policy turned less accommodative. Chart 6 shows that regular weekly unemployment payments have fallen from around $25 billion to $8 billion since the end of July. At an annualized rate, this amounts to over 4% of GDP in fiscal tightening. While President Trump signed an executive order redirecting some of the money that had been earmarked for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to be given to unemployed workers, the available funding will run out within the next month or so. On top of that, the funds in the small business Paycheck Protection Program have been used up, while many state and local governments face a severe cash crunch. US households saved a lot going into the autumn, so a sudden stop in spending is unlikely. Nevertheless, fissures in the economy are widening. Core retail sales contracted in August for the first time since April. Consumer expectations of future income growth remain weak (Chart 7). Permanent job losses are rising faster than they did during the Great Recession (Chart 8). Both corporate bankruptcy and mortgage delinquency rates are moving up, while bank lending standards have tightened significantly (Chart 9). Chart 7Consumer Expectations Of Future Income Growth Remain Weak Chart 8Permanent Job Losses Are Rising Faster Than They Did During The Great Recession Chart 9Corporate Bankruptcy And Mortgage Delinquency Rates Are Moving Up … While Bank Lending Standards Have Tightened Significantly Fiscal Stimulus Will Return We ultimately expect US fiscal policy to turn accommodative again. There is no appetite for fiscal austerity. Both political parties are moving in a more populist direction, which usually signals larger budget deficits. Even among Republicans, more registered voters support extending emergency federal unemployment insurance payments than oppose it (Chart 10). Chart 10There Is Much Public Support For Fiscal Stimulus As long as interest rates stay low, there will be little market pressure to trim budget deficits. US real rates remain in negative territory. Despite a rising debt stock, the Congressional Budget Office expects net interest payments to decline towards 1% of GDP over the span of the next couple of years, thus reaching the lowest level in six decades (Chart 11). Outside the US, there has been little movement towards tightening fiscal policy. The UK government unveiled last week a fresh round of economic and fiscal measures to help ease the burden on both employees, by subsidizing part-time work for example, and firms, by extending government-guaranteed loan programs. At the beginning of the month, the Macron government announced a 100 billion euro stimulus plan in France. Meanwhile, European leaders are moving forward on a euro area-wide 750 billion euro stimulus package that was announced this summer. In Japan, the new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has indicated that he will pursue a third budget to fight the economic downturn, adding that “there is no limit to the amount of bonds the government can issue to support an economy battered by the coronavirus pandemic.” The Japanese government now earns more interest than it pays because two-thirds of all Japanese debt bears negative yields (Chart 12). At least for now, a big debt burden is actually good for the Japanese government’s finances! Chart 11Low Interest Payments Amid Skyrocketing Debt In The US Chart 12Japan: Ballooning Debt And Declining Interest Payments China also continues to stimulate its economy. Jing Sima, BCA’s chief China strategist, expects the broad-measure fiscal deficit to reach a record 8% of GDP this year and remain elevated into next year. The annual change in total social financing – a broad measure of Chinese credit formation – is expected to hit 35% of GDP, just shy of its GFC peak (Chart 13). Not surprisingly, the Chinese economy is responding well to all this stimulus. Sales of floor space rose 40% year-over-year in August, driven by a close to 60% jump in Tier-1 cities. Excavator sales, a leading indicator for construction spending, are up 51% over last year’s levels, while industrial profits have jumped 19%. A resurgent Chinese economy has historically been closely associated with rising global trade (Chart 14). Chart 13China Continues To Stimulate Its Economy Chart 14Chinese Economic Rebound Has Historically Been Closely Associated With Rising Global Trade Biden Or Trump: How Will Financial Markets React? Betting markets expect former Vice President Joe Biden to become president and for the Democrats to gain control of the Senate (Chart 15). A “blue wave” would produce more fiscal spending in the next few years. Recall that House Democrats passed a $3.5 trillion stimulus bill in May that was quickly rejected by Senate Republicans. More recently, Democratic leaders have suggested they would approve a stimulus deal in the range of $2-to-$2.5 trillion. Chart 15Betting Markets Putting Their Money On The Democrats In addition to more pandemic-related stimulus, Joe Biden has also proposed a variety of longer-term spending initiatives. These include $2 trillion in infrastructure spending spread over four years, a $700 billion “Made in America” plan that would increase federal procurement of domestically produced goods and services, and new spending proposals worth about 1.7% of GDP per annum centered on health care, housing, education, and child and elder care. As president, Joe Biden would likely take a less confrontational stance towards relations with China. While rolling back tariffs would not be an immediate priority for a Biden administration, it could happen later in 2021. Less welcome for investors would be an increase in taxes. Joe Biden has proposed raising taxes by $4 trillion over ten years (about 1.5% of cumulative GDP). Slightly less than half of that consists of higher personal taxes on both regular income (for taxpayers earning more than $400,000 per year) and capital gains (for tax filers with over $1 million in income). The other half consists of increased business taxes, mainly in the form of a hike in the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28% and the introduction of a minimum 15% tax on the global book income of US-based companies. Netting it out, a blue sweep in November would probably be neutral-to-slightly negative for equities. What about government bonds? Our guess is that Treasury yields would rise modestly in response to a blue wave, particularly at the longer end of the yield curve. Additional fiscal support would boost aggregate demand, implying that it would take less time for the economy to reach full employment. That said, interest rate expectations are unlikely to rise as sharply as they did in late 2016 following Donald Trump‘s victory. Back then, the Fed was primed to raise rates – it hiked rates nine times starting in December 2015, ultimately bringing the fed funds rate to 2.5% by end-2018. This time around, the Fed is firmly on hold, with the vast majority of FOMC members expecting policy rates to stay at rock-bottom levels until at least 2023. The Fed’s New Tune In two important respects, the Fed’s new Monetary Policy Framework (MPF) represents a sharp break with the past. Chart 16The Mechanics Of Price-Level Targeting First, the MPF abandons the Fed’s historic reliance on a Taylor Rule-style framework, which prescribes lifting rates whenever the unemployment rate declines towards its equilibrium level. Second, the MPF eschews the “let bygones be bygones” approach of past monetary policymaking. Going forward, the Fed will try to maintain an average level of inflation of 2% over the course of the business cycle. This means that if inflation falls below 2%, the Fed will try to engineer a temporary inflation overshoot in order to bring the price level back up to its 2%-per-year upward trend (Chart 16). Some aspects of the Fed’s new strategy are both timely and laudable. A Taylor rule approach makes sense when there is a clear relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate, as governed by the so-called Phillips curve. However, if inflation fails to rise in response to declining economic slack – as has been the case in recent years – central banks may find themselves at a loss in determining where the neutral rate of interest lies. In this case, it might be preferable to keep interest rates at very low levels until the economy begins to overheat. Such a strategy would avoid the risk of raising rates prematurely, only to discover that they are too high for what the economy can handle. Targeting an average rate of inflation also has significant merit. When investors purchase long-term bonds, they run the risk that the real value of those bonds will deviate significantly from initial expectations when the bonds mature. If inflation surprises on the upside, the bonds will end up being worth less to the lender as measured by the quantity of goods and services that they can be exchanged for. If inflation surprises on the downside, borrowers could find themselves facing a larger real debt burden than they had anticipated. An inflation targeting system that corrects for past inflation surprises could give both borrowers and lenders greater certainty about the future price level. This, in turn, could reduce the inflation risk premium embedded in long-term bond yields, leading to a more efficient allocation of economic resources. In addition, an average inflation targeting system could make the zero lower bound constraint less vexing by keeping long-term inflation expectations from slipping below the central bank’s target. This would give the central bank more traction over monetary policy. A Bias Towards Higher Inflation Despite the advantages of the Fed’s new approach, it faces a number of hurdles, some practical and some political. On the practical side, it may turn out that the Phillips curve, rather than being flat, is kinked at a fairly low level of unemployment. Theoretically, that would not be too surprising. If I have 100 apples for sale and you want to buy 60, I have no incentive to raise prices. Even if you wanted to buy 80 apples, I would have no incentive to raise prices. However, if you wanted to buy 105 apples, then I would have an incentive to raise my selling price. The point is that inflation could remain stubbornly dormant as slack slowly disappears, only to rocket higher once full employment has been reached. Since changes in monetary policy only affect the economy with a lag, the central bank could find itself woefully behind the curve, scrambling to contain rising inflation. This is precisely what happened during the 1960s (Chart 17). Chart 17Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Chart 18Something Has Always Happened To Preempt Overheating Over the past three decades, something always happened that kept the US economy from overheating (Chart 18). The unemployment rate reached a 50-year low in 2019. Inflation may have moved higher this year had it not been for the fact that the global economy was clotheslined by the pandemic. In 2007, the economy was heating up only to be sandbagged by the housing bust. In 2000, the bursting of the dotcom bubble helped reverse incipient inflationary pressures. But just because the economy did not have a chance to overheat at any time over the past 30 years does not mean it cannot happen in the future. The Political Economy Of Higher Inflation On the political side, average inflation targeting assumes that central banks will be just as willing to tolerate inflation undershoots as overshoots. This could be a faulty assumption. Generating an inflation overshoot requires that interest rates be kept low enough to enable unemployment to fall below its full employment level. That is likely to be politically popular. Generating an inflation undershoot, in contrast, requires restrictive monetary policy and rising unemployment. More joblessness would not sit well with workers. High interest rates could also damage the stock market and depress home prices, while forcing debt-saddled governments to shift more spending from social programs to bondholders. None of that will be politically popular. If central banks are quick to allow inflation overshoots but slow to engineer inflation undershoots, the result could be structurally higher inflation. Markets are not pricing in such an outcome (Chart 19). Chart 19Markets Are Not Pricing In Structurally Higher Inflation II. Financial Markets Global Asset Allocation: Despite Near-Term Dangers, Overweight Equities On A 12-Month Horizon An acceleration in the number of COVID-19 cases and the rising probability that the US Congress will fail to pass a stimulus bill before the November election could push equities and other risk assets lower in the near term. Investors should maintain somewhat larger than normal cash positions in the short run that can be deployed if stocks resume their correction. Chart 20The Decline In US Real Yields Since March Has Largely Offset The Rise In Stock Prices Provided that progress continues to be made towards developing a vaccine and US fiscal policy eventually turns stimulative again, stocks will regain their footing, rising about 15% from current levels over a 12-month horizon. Negative real bond yields will continue to support stocks (Chart 20). The 30-year TIPS yield has fallen by over 90 basis points in 2020. Even if one assumes that it will take the rest of the decade for S&P 500 earnings to return to their pre-pandemic trend, the deep drop in the risk-free component of the discount rate has still raised the present value of future S&P 500 cash flows by nearly 20% since the start of the year (Chart 21). Chart 21The Present Value Of Earnings: A Scenario Analysis Thanks to these exceptionally low real bond yields, equity risk premia remain elevated (Chart 22). The TINA mantra reverberates throughout the investment world: There Is No Alternative to stocks. To get a sense of just how powerful TINA is, consider the fact that the dividend yield on the S&P 500 currently stands at 1.67%. That may not sound like much, but it is still a full percentage point higher than the paltry 0.67% yield on the 10-year Treasury note (Chart 23). Chart 22Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated Chart 23S&P 500 Dividend Yield Is Above The Treasury Yield Imagine having to decide whether to place your money either in an S&P 500 index fund or a 10-year Treasury note. Dividends-per-share paid by S&P 500 companies have almost always increased over time. However, even if we make the pessimistic assumption that dividends-per-share remain unchanged for the next ten years, the value of the S&P 500 would still have to fall by 10% over the next decade to equal the return on the 10-year note. Assuming that inflation averages around 1.9% over this period, the real value of the S&P 500 would need to drop by 25%. The picture is even more dramatic outside the US. In the euro area, the index would have to fall by over 30% in real terms for investors to make more money in bonds than stocks. In the UK, it would need to fall by over 50% (Chart 24). Chart 24 (I)Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Chart 24 (II)Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds A Weaker US Dollar Favors International Stocks Outside the US, price-earnings ratios are lower, while equity risk premia are higher. Cheap valuations are usually not enough to justify a high-conviction investment call, however. One also needs a catalyst. Three potential catalysts could help propel international stocks higher over the next 12 months, while also giving value stocks and economically-sensitive equity sectors a boost: A weaker US dollar; the end of the pandemic; and a recovery in bank shares. Let’s start with the dollar. The US dollar faces a number of headwinds over the coming months. First, interest rate differentials have moved sharply against the greenback (Chart 25). Second, as a countercyclical currency, the dollar is likely to weaken as the global economy improves (Chart 26). Third, the current account deficit is rising again. It jumped over 50% from $112 billion in Q1 to $170 billion in Q2. According to the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model, the trade balance is set to widened further in Q3. This deterioration in the dollar’s fundamentals is occurring against a backdrop where the currency remains 11% overvalued based on purchasing power parity exchange rates (Chart 27). Chart 25Interest Rate Differentials Have Moved Sharply Against The Greenback A weaker dollar is usually good for commodity prices and cyclical stocks (Chart 28). In general, commodity producers and cyclical stocks are overrepresented outside the US. Chart 26The Dollar Is Likely To Weaken As The Global Economy Improves Chart 27USD Remains Overvalued Chart 28A Weaker Dollar Is Usually Good For Commodity Prices And Cyclical Stocks BCA’s chief energy strategist Bob Ryan expects Brent to average $65/bbl in 2021, $21/bbl above what the market is anticipating. Ongoing Chinese stimulus should also buoy metal prices. A falling greenback helps overseas borrowers – many of whom are in emerging markets – whose loans are denominated in dollars but whose revenues are denominated in the local currency. It is thus no surprise that non-US stocks tend to outperform their US peers when global growth is strengthening and the dollar is weakening (Chart 29). Chart 29Non-US Equities Tend To Outperform Their US Peers When Global Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening The outperformance of non-US stocks in soft dollar environments is particularly pronounced when returns are measured in common-currency terms. From the perspective of US-based investors, a weaker dollar raises the dollar value of overseas sales and profits, justifying higher valuations for international stocks. From the perspective of overseas investors, a weaker dollar reduces the local currency value of US sales and profits, implying a lower valuation for US stocks. This helps explain why European stocks tend to outperform their US counterparts when the euro is rising, even though a stronger euro hurts the European economy. It’s Value’s Turn To Shine Value stocks have often outperformed growth stocks when the US dollar has been weakening and global growth strengthening. Recall that value stocks did poorly during the late 1990s, a period of dollar strength and economic turbulence throughout the EM world. In contrast, value stocks did well between 2001 and 2007, a period during which the dollar was generally on the back foot. The relationship between value stocks, the dollar, and global growth broke down this summer. Growth stocks continued to pull ahead, even though global growth turned a corner and the dollar began to weaken. There are two reasons why this happened. First, investors were too slow to price in the windfall that growth stocks in the tech and health care sectors would end up receiving from the pandemic. Second, rather than rising in response to better economic growth data, real rates fell during the summer months. A falling discount rate benefits growth stocks more than value stocks because the former generate more of their earnings farther into the future. The tentative outperformance of value stocks in September suggests that the tables may have turned for the value/growth trade. Retail sales at physical stores are rebounding, while online sales growth is coming down from highly elevated levels (Chart 30). Bank of America estimates that US e-commerce penetration doubled in just a few short months earlier this year. Some “reversion to the trend” is likely, even if that trend does favor online stores over the long haul. Chart 30Are Brick-And Mortar Retailers Coming Back To Life? Chart 31The Pandemic Has Caused Global Server And PC Shipments To Surge Meanwhile, PC shipments soared during the pandemic as companies and workers rushed out to buy computer gear to allow them to work from home (Chart 31). To the extent that this caused some spending to be brought forward, it could create an air pocket in tech demand over the next few quarters. A third wave of the virus in the US and ongoing second waves elsewhere could give growth stocks a boost once more, but the benefits are likely to be short-lived. If a vaccine becomes available early next year, investors will pivot from the “pandemic trade” to the “reopening trade.” The “reopening trade” will support companies such as banks, hotels, and transports that were crushed by lockdown measures and which are overrepresented in value indices. From a valuation perspective, value stocks are cheaper now compared to growth stocks than at any point in history – even cheaper than at the height of the dotcom bubble (Chart 32). Chart 32Value Stocks Are Extremely Cheap Relative To Growth Stocks The lofty valuations that growth stocks enjoy can be justified if the mega-cap tech companies that dominate the growth indices continue to increase earnings for many years to come. However, it is far from clear that this will happen. Close to three-quarters of US households already have an Amazon Prime account. Slightly over half have a Netflix account. Nearly 70% have a Facebook account. Google commands 92% of the internet search market. Together, sites owned by Google and Facebook generate about 60% of all online advertising revenue. While all of these companies dominate their markets, this could change. At one point during the dotcom bubble, Palm’s market capitalization was over six times greater than Apple’s. The Blackberry superseded the PalmPilot; the iPhone, in turn, superseded the Blackberry. History suggests that many of today’s technological leaders will end up as laggards. Investors looking to find the next tech leader can focus on smaller, fast growing companies. Unfortunately, picking winners in this space is easier said than done. History suggests that investors tend to overpay for growth, especially among small caps. Based on data compiled by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French, small cap growth stocks have lagged small cap value stocks by an average of 6.4% per year on a market-cap weighted basis, and by 10.4% on an equal-weighted basis, since 1970 (Table 1). Table 1Small Caps Vis-A-Vis Large Caps: Comparison of Total Returns Bank On Banks Financial stocks are heavily overrepresented in value indices (Table 2). Banks have made significant provisions against bad loans this year. If global growth recovers in 2021 once a vaccine becomes available, some of these provisions will end up being released, boosting profits in the process. Table 2Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector Chart 33Modestly Higher Bond Yields Will Benefit Bank Shares A stabilization in bond yields should also help bank shares. Chart 33 shows that a fall in bank stocks vis-à-vis the overall market has closely matched the decline in bond yields. While we do not think that central banks will tighten monetary policy in the next few years, nominal bond yields should still drift modestly higher as output gaps narrow. What about the outlook for bank earnings? A massive new credit boom is not in the cards in any major economy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that global bank EPS was able to return to its long-term trend in 2019, until being slammed again this year by the pandemic (Chart 34). Global bank book value-per-share was 30% higher in 2019 compared to GFC highs (even though price-per-share was 30% lower). Chart 34Global Bank EPS Was Able To Return To Its Pre-GFC Peak In 2019 Until The Pandemic Hit Chart 35European Bank Earnings Estimates Have Lagged Credit Growth Admittedly, the global numbers disguise a lot of regional variation. While US banks were able to bring EPS back to its prior peak, and Canadian banks were able to easily surpass it, European bank EPS was still 70% below its pre-GFC highs in 2019. The launch of the common currency in 1999 set off a massive credit boom across much of Europe, leaving European banks dangerously overleveraged. The GFC and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis led to a spike in bad loans, necessitating numerous rounds of dilutive capital raises. At this point, however, European bank balance sheets are in much better shape. If EPS simply returns to its 2019 levels, European banks will trade at a generous earnings yield of close to 20%. That may not be such a hurdle to cross. Chart 35 shows that European bank earnings estimates have fallen far short of what would be expected from current credit growth. If, on top of all this, European banks are able to muster some sustained earnings growth thanks to somewhat steeper yield curves and further cost-cutting and consolidation, investors who buy banks today will be rewarded with outsized returns over the long haul. Fixed Income: What Is Least Ugly? As noted above, a rebound in global growth should push up both equity prices and bond yields. As such, we would underweight fixed income within a global asset allocation framework. Within the fixed income bracket, investors should favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. They should underweight government bonds in favor of a modest overweight to spread product. Spreads are quite low but could sink further if economic activity revives faster than anticipated. The upper quality tranche of high-yield corporates, which are benefiting from central bank purchases, have an especially attractive risk-reward profile. EM debt should also fare well in a weaker dollar, stronger growth environment (Chart 36). Chart 36BB-Rated And EM Debt Offer Reasonable Risk-Reward Profiles Given that some investors have no choice but to own developed economy government bonds, which countries or regions should they buy from within this category? Chart 37 shows the 3-year trailing yield betas for several major developed bond markets. In general, the highest-yielding currencies (US and Canada) also have the highest betas, implying that their yields rise the most when global bond yields are rising and vice versa. Chart 37High-Yielding Bond Markets Are The Most Cyclical In economies such as Europe and Japan where the neutral rate of interest is stuck deep below the zero bound, better economic news is unlikely to lift policy rate expectations by very much. After all, the optimal policy rate would still be above its neutral level even if better economic data brought the neutral rate from say, -4% to -3%. In contrast, when the neutral rate is close to zero or even positive, better economic data can lift medium-to-long-term interest rate expectations more meaningfully. As such, we would underweight US Treasurys and Canadian bonds, while overweighting Japanese government bonds (JGBs) over a 12-month horizon. On a currency-hedged basis, which is what most bond investors focus on, 10-year JGBs yield only 20 basis points less than US Treasurys (Table 3). This lower yield is more than offset by the risk that Treasury yields will rise more than yields on JGBs. Table 3Bond Markets Across The Developed World The End Game What will end the bull market in stocks? As is often the case, the answer is tighter monetary policy. The good news is tight money is not an imminent risk. The Fed will not hike rates at least until 2023, and it will take even longer than that for interest rates to rise elsewhere in the world. The bad news is that the day of reckoning will eventually arrive and when it does, bond yields will soar and stocks will tumble. Investors who want to hedge against this risk should consider owning more real assets. As was the case during the 1970s, farmland will do well from rising inflation. Suburban real estate will also benefit from more people working from home and, if recent trends persist, rising crime in urban areas. Gold should also do well. The yellow metal has come down from its August highs, but should benefit from a weaker dollar over the coming months, and ultimately, from a more stagflationary environment later this decade. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 “More infectious coronavirus mutation may be 'a good thing', says disease expert,” Reuters, August 17, 2020. 2 Nina Bai, ”One More Reason to Wear a Mask: You’ll Get Less Sick From COVID-19,” University of California San Francisco, July 31, 2020. 3 Dave Roos, “How Crude Smallpox Inoculations Helped George Washington Win the War,” History.com, May 18, 2020. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Highlights Most sentiment and technical indicators suggest the dollar is undergoing a countertrend bounce rather than entering a new bull market. However, the internal dynamics of financial markets remain short-term constructive for the DXY. The DXY could rise to 96 before working off oversold conditions. Stay short USD/JPY as a core holding. Look to rebuy a basket of Scandinavian currencies versus the USD and EUR at a trigger point of -2%. Go long sterling if it drops to 1.25. Remain short EUR/GBP. Feature Chart I-1The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency The world remains dominated by the reflation trade. The equity market downdraft this past March and the subsequent recovery since April has been a mirror image of the rise and fall of the dollar (Chart I-1). This suggests that at a minimum, the Federal Reserve’s actions and Washington’s policy decisions have served as important pillars in the global economic recovery. A falling dollar tends to reflate the global economy, so it is important to gauge whether the recent bounce is technical in nature or at risk of a more meaningful increase. From an investment perspective, the economic outlook as we enter the final stretch of 2020 is as uncertain as ever. Factors such as the potential for renewed lockdowns, a fiscal cliff in the US, political uncertainty due to Brexit, and the possibility of a contested US election all make for a very complex decision tree. As investors try to decipher the end game, we turn to the internal dynamics of financial markets for a more sober view. Sentiment and technical indicators make up an important component of our currency framework, and are usually good at gauging important shifts in financial markets. Given market action over the past few weeks, we are reviewing a few of these key indicators to help guide currency strategy into year-end and beyond. The Signal From Currency Markets The message from our currency market indicators suggests a technical bounce in the dollar rather than a renewed bear market. The exchange rate that best signals whether we are in a reflationary/deflationary environment is the AUD/JPY rate. Chart I-2DXY Is Testing Strong Resistance From a broad perspective, the DXY index was oversold, having broken below key support levels this year. More recently, the bounce in the DXY index has brought it a nudge above the upward-sloping trend line, which had defined the bull market since the 2011 lows (Chart I-2). A significant bounce from current levels will be worrisome. More likely, the dollar will churn near current levels before resuming its downtrend. In other words, we expect that, going forward, this upward-sloped line will act as powerful overhead resistance. The exchange rate that best signals whether we are in a reflationary/deflationary environment is the AUD/JPY rate (Chart I-3). Since the Great Recession, the yen has been the best performer during equity drawdowns, while the Aussie has been the worst. As a result, the AUD/JPY cross has consistently bottomed at the key support zone of 72-74. This defensive line notably held during the European debt crisis, China’s industrial recession, and the global trade war. The frontier was clearly breached during the March drawdown this year, but we have since re-entered the safe zone (Chart I-4). Going forward, a break below 72 will be worrisome. Looking at the intra-day charts, we see a clear pattern of lower highs and lower lows since the September 10th peak. That said, speculators are still short the cross, suggesting that the level of complacency going into the February equity market drawdown is not there today (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart I-3The Reflation Trade Chart I-4AUD/JPY: Watch The 72-24 Zone High-beta carry currencies such as the RUB, ZAR, MXN, and BRL have been rather weak, even if they are still holding above their lows. These currencies are usually good at sniffing out a change in the investment landscape, specifically one becoming fertile for carry trades. Carry trades usually do well when US yields are low and the global growth environment is improving (Chart I-5). The message so far is that the drop in U.S. bond yields may not have been sufficient to make these currencies attractive again. This is confirmed by the performance of the Deutsche Bank carry ETF, DBV, which has been struggling to recover amid very low rates (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Carry Trades Are Lagging Chart I-6Carry Trade ETFs Have Underperformed Speculators are very short the dollar. Whenever the percentage of leveraged funds and overall speculators that are short the dollar is at or below 20%, a meaningful rally ensues (Chart I-7). However, because the dollar is a momentum currency, reversion-to-the-mean strategies work in the short term but not so much longer term. The dollar advance/decline line remains well below its 200-day moving average. Meanwhile, there is a death-cross formation between the 200-day and 400-day moving averages. This is a very bearish technical profile (Chart I-8). We cannot rule out rallies toward the 200-day moving average, but for now we remain well below this danger zone. Chart I-7Rising Number Of Dollar Bears Chart I-8A Cyclical Bear Market Finally, currency volatility is rising from very depressed levels. Usually, low currency volatility is a sign of complacency among traders and investors, while higher volatility signals a more balanced and healthy market rotation. Over the last three episodes where volatility rose from these oversold levels, the dollar soared and pro-cyclical currencies suffered severe losses. For example, the most significant episodes were 1997-1998, 2007-2008, and 2014-2015 (Chart I-9). The one difference this time around is that the dollar is expensive, while it was very cheap during previous riot points. This argues for a technical bounce, rather than a renewed bull market. Chart I-9Currency Volatility Has Spiked In a nutshell, the message from technical indicators is that the bounce in the dollar was to be expected. However, we are monitoring a few worrisome developments. First, the consensus is overwhelmingly bearish on the dollar, which could make this bounce advance much further than most expect. Second, spikes in volatility, especially as the equity market corrects, are traditionally dollar bullish. The Signal From Commodity Markets Commodity prices hold a special place as FX market indicators, since they are both driven by final demand and financial speculation. Over the years, we have found that the internal dynamics of commodity prices usually send key signals for underlying FX market trends. Overall, the signals are also mixed: The copper-to-gold ratio has bottomed and is heading higher from deeply oversold levels. Together with the stabilization in government bond yields, it signifies that the liquidity-to-growth transmission mechanism might be working. This is usually dollar bearish, as rising global growth leads to capital outflows from the US (Chart I-10). The Gold/Silver ratio (GSR) tends to track the US dollar, and its recent rebound is worrisome (Chart I-11). The GSR provides important information on the battleground between easing financial conditions and a pickup in economic (or manufacturing) activity. Gold benefits from plentiful liquidity and very low real rates, while silver benefits from rising industrial demand. Therefore, the GSR rallies during periods of financial stress that forces policymakers to act, and peaks as we exit a recession into a recovery. Chart I-10The Copper/Gold Ratio Leads The Dollar Chart I-11The Gold/Silver Ratio Is Rebounding We had a limit-sell order on the GSR at 75 that was triggered this week, putting our position offside by 7%. The key driver of GSR price action over the next few weeks will be silver prices. The next important technical level for silver is the $18-to-$20-per-ounce zone. This has acted as a strong overhead resistance since 2015, which should now provide strong downside support. If silver is able to stabilize around this level, it will indicate that the precious metals bull market remains intact. We eventually expect the GSR to drop toward 50. The Signal From Fixed-Income Markets The fixed-income market is a very powerful sentiment barometer for the dollar. Both cross-border flows and global allocation to FX reserves provide important information about investor preferences for the dollar. Below, we go through the indicators that we track frequently and which constitute an integral part of our framework. The bond-to-gold ratio is an important signal for the dollar, since both US Treasurys and gold are competing assets. Chart I-12Gold And Treasurys Are Competing Assets The bond-to-gold ratio is an important signal for the dollar, since both US Treasurys and gold are safe-haven assets and thus, by definition are competing assets (Chart I-12). As the Fed continues to increase the supply of bonds, the ratio of the US bond ETF (TLT)-to-gold (GLD) will be an important proxy for investor sentiment on the dollar (Chart I-13). For now, the ratio is sitting on the key 0.94 support zone. Remarkably, the ratio of the total return in US government bonds-to-gold prices has tracked the dollar pretty well since the end of the Bretton Woods system in the early ‘70s (Chart I-14). This makes it both a good short-term and long-term barometer. Chart I-13Watch The Bond-To-Gold Ratio Chart I-14Competing Assets And The Dollar Inflows into US government bonds are falling sharply, while those into gold are rising sharply (Chart I-15). With interest rates near zero and real rates deeply negative, this pattern is likely to continue in the near future. This should pressure the bond-to-gold ratio lower. It is remarkable that in recent days investors have begun pricing even more negative real rates in the US compared to other G10 countries (Chart I-16). Again, should this materialize, this will send gold prices higher and cause further erosion in foreign bond purchases. Chart I-15Gold And USD Inflows Diverge Chart I-16Real Rate Expectations Are Relapsing Overall, the signal from fixed-income markets remain US dollar bearish. The Signal From Equity Markets Equity market indicators continue to flag that the rally in the dollar has a bit further to go, but should remain a counter-trend bounce. Currencies tend to move in sync with the relative performance of their equity bourses. Chart I-17Cyclicals Have Outperformed Defensives Cyclical stocks have been underperforming defensive ones of late, but the pattern of higher lows in place since the March bottom continues to persist (Chart I-17). The dollar tends to weaken when cyclical stocks are outperforming defensive ones. This is because non-US equity markets have a much higher concentration of cyclical stocks in their bourses. Thus, whenever cyclical sectors are outperforming defensives, it is a clear sign that the marginal dollar is rotating outside of the US. Correspondingly, currencies tend to move in sync with the relative performance of their equity bourses (Chart I-18A and I-18B). So far, non-US equity markets have relapsed relative to the US, but are not yet breaking down. Earnings revisions continue to head higher across all markets. Bottom-up analysts are usually too optimistic about the level of earnings, but are generally spot on about their direction. That said, higher earnings revisions have been concentrated in the US so far, and will need to improve in other markets for the dollar bear market to resume (Chart I-19). Chart I-18ACurrencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Chart I-18BCurrencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Chart I-19V-Shape Recoveries In Earnings Revisions In a nutshell, corrections in equity markets are usually a healthy reset for the bull market to resume, but the character of this particular selloff is worth monitoring. Cyclical and value stocks that are already at historically bombed-out levels have started to underperform. This is usually dollar bullish. Whether the correction ensues or the bull market resumes, it will require a change in equity market leadership from defensives to cyclicals for the dollar bear market to resume. Investment Implications It is very difficult to gauge whether the current market shakeout will last just a few more weeks or continue into year-end. Given such a lack of clarity, our strategy is as follows: Stay long safe-haven currencies. Our preferred vehicle is the Japanese yen, which sports an attractive real rate relative to the US. Focus on relative value at the crosses rather than outright dollar bets. We are short the NZD/CAD and EUR/GBP as a play on relative fundamentals. Stick with them. We already have limit orders on a few currencies, and are adding the Nordic currency basket to this list if it drops another 2%. We initially took profits on this trade last week, when our stop loss was triggered. As Scandinavian currencies continue to fall, they are becoming more compelling buys. Chart I-20Place Stops On Short GSR At 85 We have been long petrocurrencies versus the euro, and the drop in the EUR/USD has helped hedge that trade against market volatility. That said our stop-loss of -5% was triggered amid market volatility. We are reinstating this trade today, and will be looking to rotate into USD shorts once there is more clarity on the economic front. Our short gold/long silver trade was triggered at 75, putting the position offside. For risk management purposes, we are implementing a tight stop at 85 (Chart I-20). Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies US Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been mixed: The current account deficit widened from $111.5 billion to $170.5 billion in Q2. The preliminary Markit Manufacturing PMI increased from 53.1 to 53.5 in September while the services PMI declined from 55 to 54.6. The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index increased from 74.1 to 78.9 in September. Existing home sales increased by 2.4% month-on-month in August. Initial jobless claims increased by 840K for the week ending on September 19. The DXY index appreciated by 1.8% this week amid an equity market correction. While the risk-off sentiment provides a positive backdrop for the US dollar, rising twin deficits and unfavorable real rates both suggest a weaker dollar in the long term. Meanwhile, any incoming positive news on the vaccine will support cyclical currencies against the US dollar. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 A Simple Framework For Currencies - July 17, 2020 DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area have been mostly generally constructive: The current account surplus narrowed from €20.7 billion to €16.6 billion on a seasonally-adjusted basis in July. While the preliminary Markit Manufacturing PMI increased from 51.7 to 53.7 in September, the services PMI dropped from 50.5 to 47.6. Consumer confidence marginally increased from -14.7 to -13.9 in September. The German Ifo Business Climate index rose to 93.4 in September. The expectations component has broken above pre-pandemic levels. The euro declined by 1.6% this week against the US dollar. The ECB Economic Bulletin released this Thursday warned that the unemployment rate will continue to rise in the euro area as current figures are skewed by job subsides. The ECB also sees little upside in demand for consumer goods and repeated that it is ready to further adjust its policies to support the economy and boost inflation. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been positive: The manufacturing PMI was largely unchanged at 47.3 in September. The services PMI ticked up from 45 to 45.6. The All Industry Activity Index increased by 1.3% month-on-month in July. The Japanese yen depreciated by 1% against the US dollar this week. The latest BoJ Monetary Policy Meeting Minutes released on Thursday expects economic activity to pick up in the second half of 2020 through pent-up demand and supported by accommodative monetary policies, but it also warned about a slower recovery in the event of an upturn in COVID cases. Moreover, the Minutes said that core inflation is likely to be negative in Japan for now. Japan’s higher real rates make the yen an attractive safe-haven hedge. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been mixed: The Markit Manufacturing PMI declined from 55.2 to 54.3 in September. The services PMI also dropped from 58.8 to 55.1. Retail sales increased by 2.8% year-on-year in August. House prices increased by 5% year-on-year in September. The British pound plunged by 1.9% against the US dollar this week amid broad USD strength. Besides global synchronized risks, the internal risk from Brexit uncertainties still poses a big threat to the British pound. That said, the pound is still undervalued at current levels and its year-to-date performance lags behind those of other risky G10 currencies. The pound is poised to rebound with positive vaccine and Brexit news. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been mostly positive: The manufacturing PMI increased from 53.6 to 55.5 in September. The services PMI also ticked up from 49 to 50. The ANZ Consumer Confidence index increased from 92.4 to 93.5 for the week ending on September 20. Retail sales declined by 4.2% month-on-month in August. The Australian dollar dropped by 4% against the US dollar this week, only slightly above the pre-crisis level. We continue to favor the Australian dollar due to lower domestic COVID cases and effective measures for containing the virus. Moreover, China’s data continues to surprise to the upside, which bodes well for the Australian dollar. Report Links: An Update On The Australian Dollar - September 18, 2020 On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data from New Zealand have been negative: Exports declined from NZ$5 billion to NZ$4.4 billion in August, while imports increased from NZ$4.6 billion to NZ$4.8 billion. The trade balance shifted from a positive NZ$447 million to a deficit of NZ$353 million. The New Zealand dollar plunged by 3.8% against the US dollar this week. On Wednesday, the RBNZ held its interest rate at 0.25%, but warned that the economy needs further support and implied further easing. The rising possibility of negative interest rates in New Zealand would hurt the kiwi especially against the Aussie dollar. Moreover, New Zealand’s services trade surplus evaporated as tourism continues to suffer. We will go long AUD/NZD at 1.05. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been positive: Retail sales increased by 1.1% month-on-month in August. New housing prices increased by 2.1% year-on-year in August. Bloomberg Nanos Confidence edged up from 52.9 to 53.1 for the week ending on September 18. The Canadian dollar fell by 1.2% against the US dollar this week. Both retail sales and the housing market have been quite resilient so far, providing support for the Canadian dollar. We are long the Canadian dollar against the New Zealand dollar. Stay with it. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There have been scant data from Switzerland this week: Total sight deposit declined from CHF 704.1 billion to CHF 703.9 billion for the week ending on September 18. The Swiss franc fell by 1.4% against the US dollar this week. On Thursday, the SNB kept its interest rate unchanged at -0.75% and warned of a longer coronavirus impact on economic activity. We like the Swiss franc as a safe-haven hedge especially during a second COVID-19 wave. Moreover, if the October US Treasury Report lists Switzerland as a currency manipulator, it will limit downward pressure on the Swiss franc against the US dollar. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There is no significant data from Norway this week. The Norwegian krone dropped by 2.8% against the US dollar this week. The Norges Bank held its key policy interest rate on hold at a record low 0% on Thursday, as widely expected, and said no rate hike is likely within two years. That said, with core inflation at 3.7% year-on-year in August, it’s unlikely that the Norges Bank will further lower rates into negative territory. Our NOK/USD and NOK/EUR trades from the long Nordic basket were stopped out last week with profits of 18.4% and 9.5%, respectively. We continue to like the Norwegian krone in the long term. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 There is no significant data from Sweden this week. The Swedish krona fell by 3.2% against the US dollar this week. On Tuesday, the Riksbank kept its interest rate unchanged at 0% and implied that the rate will likely remain unchanged at least through late 2023. However, the Bank is also ready to further lower the repo rate if necessary. The Swedish krona remains one of our favorite procyclical currencies among the G10 universe supported by its cheap valuation. Kelly Zhong Research Analyst Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Footnotes Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights While we are bearish on the US dollar in the long run, the greenback is primed for a rebound in the near term. Consistently, commodities prices will relapse and EM currencies will depreciate versus the US dollar. Global growth stocks will correct further because they are overbought/over-owned and expensive. The rest of the equity market will relapse because its fundamentals are poor, especially given the renewed rise in new infection cases across Europe and the US. Feature Global financial markets are in the process of a reset. Several segments have been through very sharp and considerable movements in recent months, and these movements are starting to partially unwind. The US dollar will rebound, commodities prices will correct and global equities will continue selling off. In brief, EM risk assets and currencies are entering a period of weakness, which will eventually lead to buying opportunities. Inter-Linkages Between Fixed-Income, Currencies And Commodities Chart I-1A Reset In US Inflation Expectations And Real Rates Is Overdue US inflation expectations have risen meaningfully, and US TIPS (real) yields have plummeted since April (Chart I-1). Consistent with plunging US real rates, the US dollar has sold off sharply (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Although our bias is that US inflation will rise in the coming years, for now, the rise in inflation expectations seems excessive. Given the tight correlation between oil prices and US breakeven inflation, as illustrated in the top panel of Chart I-1, lower crude prices will cause a drop in inflation expectations. Moreover, the absence of another large US fiscal stimulus will also lead to a downgrade in growth and inflation expectations. US nominal bond yields will likely remain largely range bound, and a drop in breakeven inflation will lead to higher real yields. The latter will help the US dollar to rebound from oversold levels, and EM currencies will depreciate against the dollar. In turn, a rebound in the greenback will be associated with lower commodities prices. Notably, investors’ net long positions in copper have become very elevated (Chart I-2). Investor sentiment on commodities in general is quite positive. Hence, from a contrarian perspective, commodities prices are primed for a pullback. In addition, Chinese imports of commodities will slow in the near term, reinforcing the correction in resources prices. China has evidently been stockpiling commodities, as its commodities imports have been considerably stronger than its underlying final demand. In particular, Chart I-3 demonstrates that mainland imports of copper, crude oil, steel and iron ore have been surging. Chinese imports of crude and industrial metals are likely to drop temporarily. Chart I-2Long Copper Is A Crowded Trade Chart I-3China Has Been Stockpiling Commodities China’s booming intake of commodities in recent months was stipulated by the country’s previously depleted commodity inventories, low prices and the availability of cheap bank financing. Granted commodity inventories have been replenished and resource prices are no longer low, Chinese imports of crude and industrial metals are likely to drop temporarily. That said, from a cyclical perspective, China’s economic recovery will continue, and final demand for resources will expand. Thus, we will see a material correction, not a crash, in commodities prices. EM credit spreads inversely correlate with commodities prices and currencies – EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads are shown as inverted on both panels of Chart I-4. As commodities prices retreat and the US dollar rebounds, EM credit markets will sell off. Chart I-4EM Credit Markets Will Weaken As EM Currencies And Commodities Sell Off EM local currency bond yields might slightly back up as EM currencies depreciate and US real yields rebound. However, economic conditions in many EM countries outside China remain extremely weak, and inflation is very subdued. Hence, any back up in EM domestic bond yields will be limited. Bottom Line: While we are bearish on the US dollar in the long run, the greenback is primed for a rebound in the near term. Consistently, commodities prices will relapse and EM currencies will sell off versus the US dollar. Notably, oil prices, as well as several EM and DM currencies, have rolled over at technical levels which typically herald a major reversal (Chart I-5A and I-5B). Chart I-5AFacing A Major Resistance Chart I-5BFacing A Major Resistance Finally, EM fixed-income markets will experience a correction that will provide a buying opportunity. The Equity Correction: More To Go The correction in global share prices has further to run. Market leaders – growth stocks – remain overbought, and it is reasonable to expect that they will at least retest their 200-day moving averages. Meanwhile, the parts of the global equity universe hardest-hit during March have failed to break above their 200-day moving average. This can be interpreted as an indication that they have not yet entered a bull market. These include: EM ex-TMT1 and global value stocks as well as the US Value Line Geometric Composite Index (Chart I-6). In short, growth stocks will correct further because they are overbought/over-owned and expensive; the rest of the equity market will relapse because its fundamentals are poor, especially given the renewed rise in new infection cases across Europe and the US. Chart I-6These Stocks Have Not Entered A Bull Market Yet Chart I-7Downside Risks To EM Equities In addition, the following indicators also point to further selloff in EM and DM share prices. Our Risk-On / Safe-Haven currency ratio2 has been falling since June and continues pointing to lower EM share prices (Chart I-7). The EM and DM advance-decline lines have relapsed below zero indicating a deteriorating equity market breadth (Chart I-8). This heralds lower stock prices. As EM corporate bond yields rise due to either weaker EM currencies or lower commodities prices, as we argued above, EM share prices will tumble (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Deteriorating Breadth Points To Lower Share Prices Chart I-9Rising EM Corporate Bond Yields Will Reinforce EM Equity Selloff Bottom Line: Global and EM share prices are in a correction that has not run its course. Investment Strategy A meaningful setback in their EM currencies will lead us to recommend switching from receiving long-term rates to buying their cash local currency bonds (taking currency risks as well). EM Domestic Bonds: We continue recommending receiving 10-year swap rates in Mexico, Colombia, Russia, India, China, Korea and Malaysia. A meaningful setback in their EM currencies will lead us to recommend switching from receiving long-term rates to buying their cash local currency bonds (taking currency risks as well). EM Equities: Absolute-return investors should be cautious at the moment as EM share prices are set to deflate further. Within a global equity portfolio, we continue recommending a neutral allocation to EM. Better equity valuations in EM than in the US will be offset by a rebound in the US dollar, warranting a trading range in EM versus DM relative equity performance. Our country equity allocation within the EM universe is always presented at the end of our report (please refer to page 10). EM Exchange Rates: Even though we expect a meaningful rebound in the nominal broad trade-weighted US dollar, we believe the safe-haven currencies – such as the JPY, CHF and the euro – will outperform EM currencies. As such, we reiterate our strategy of shorting a basket of EM currencies versus an equally-weighted basket of JPY, CHF and the euro. Our short EM currency basket consists of BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, PHP, KRW and IDR. Finally, we recommend a neutral allocation to EM credit markets (US dollar bonds) versus US corporate credit. Absolute-return investors should accumulate this asset class on a weakness. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Technology, media and telecom stocks excluding information technology (IT) sector before December 2018 and excluding IT, media & entertainment and internet & direct marketing retail as of December 2018 2Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, IDR, MXN, RUB, CLP & ZAR total return indices relative to average of JPY & CHF; rebased to 100 at January 2000 Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights Bank credit 6-month impulses are plunging, and the pandemic is resurging. Maintain an overweight to growth defensives (technology and healthcare). In the short term, profits will be more resilient in a resurgent pandemic. In the long term, profits are well set to grow in an increasingly online, decentralised, remote-working, health-conscious world. The European stock market’s massive underweighting to growth defensives will weigh on its relative performance. Go underweight China economy plays. Fractal trade: Fractal analysis confirms that basic resources are vulnerable to a reversal. Within value cyclicals, tactically overweight financials versus basic resources. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Greatest Ever Monetary Stimulus Is Over... For Now Monetary stimulus, as measured by the increase in banks’ six-month credit flows, reached an all-time high during the summer months. But now, the greatest ever monetary stimulus is fading (Chart of the Week). In the US and China, the increase in banks’ six-month credit flows peaked at $700 billion and $800 billion respectively during May. In the euro area, the increase peaked at over $1 trillion during July. The combination constituted the greatest ever global monetary stimulus, trumping even the stimulus that followed the 2008 financial crisis (Charts I-2 - I-4). Chart I-2US Monetary Stimulus Is Fading Chart I-3China Monetary Stimulus Is Fading Chart I-4Euro Area Monetary Stimulus To Fade However, the increase in six-month credit flows has recently slumped to around $200 billion in both the US and China. The euro area has yet to update its data beyond July, but we expect it to fade too. The upshot is that the greatest ever monetary stimulus is over… for now. Bond Yields Are No Longer Stimulating Our preferred metric for assessing the transmission of monetary stimulus on an economy is the increase in the banks’ six-month credit flows. In turn, this depends on the six-month deceleration in the bond yield – meaning, the bond yield decline in the most recent six months must be greater than the decline in the previous six months. At first glance, this seems counterintuitive. Why focus on the bond yield’s deceleration rather than its plain vanilla decline? Box 1 explains how it follows from a fundamental accounting identity of GDP statistics. Box 1 Why The Bond Yield’s Deceleration Matters GDP is a flow statistic. It measures the flow of goods and services produced in a period. Hence, the GDP flow receives a contribution from the bank credit flow in that period. In turn, the bank credit flow is established by the decline in the bond yield (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Decline In The Bond Yield Establishes The Bank Credit Flow It follows that GDP growth receives a contribution from bank credit flow growth. Which, in turn, receives a contribution from the bond yield deceleration. In other words, the bond yield decline in the most recent period must be greater than the decline in the previous period. Finally, our preferred period is six months because it empirically equals the time to fully spend a bank credit flow. A quarter is too short: a year is much too long. Admittedly, during this year’s pandemic recession and rebound, the link between monetary stimulus and the real economy has weakened. Fiscal stimulus has played a more important role. Even when it comes to bank credit, much of the recent increase was not due to new loans. It was due to firms tapping pre-arranged credit lines, which they used to reinforce cash buffers, rather than to spend. Nevertheless, some impact of monetary stimulus will reach the real economy. This means that while this year’s earlier deceleration of bond yields was good news for the economy, the more recent acceleration of bond yields is bad news (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Recent Acceleration Of Bond Yields Is Bad News Tactically Underweight China Plays Through the summer months, 10-year bond yields flipped from sharp six-month decelerations to sharp accelerations. But the reversals were much more extreme in China and the US than in the euro area. Seen in this light, it is hardly surprising that the increase in six-month bank credit flows has already slumped in China and the US, and could soon turn negative. If so, they would be a contractionary force on the economy. One tactical investment conclusion is to underweight China economy plays. Specifically, with China’s bank credit six-month impulse in freefall, the 40 percent outperformance of basic resources versus financials is vulnerable to a sharp reversal (Chart I-7). This is also confirmed by fractal analysis (see later section). Chart I-7With China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse In Freefall, Basic Resources Are Vulnerable Stay underweight cyclicals. But within cyclicals, tactically overweight financials versus basic resources. A Resurgent Pandemic Will Force People Back Into Their Shells A resurgence of the pandemic will create a further headwind to the economy, irrespective of whether governments impose fresh lockdowns or not. This is because most of us have an instinct for self-preservation as well as protecting our loved ones. In response to a resurgent pandemic, we will go back into our shells. Shunning public transport, shopping, and other crowded places, some might even think twice about letting their children go to school. But if this cautious behaviour is voluntary, then why do governments need to impose lockdowns? The answer is that while the majority behaves responsibly, a minority behaves irresponsibly. In the pandemic, this is critical because less than 10 percent of infected people are responsible for creating 90 percent of all Covid-19 infections. If this tiny minority of so-called ‘super-spreaders’ is left unchecked, then the pandemic will let rip. At first glance, it appears that the lockdown is causing the recession. In fact, this is a classic confusion between correlation and causation. The true cause of the recession is the pandemic, which forces people into their shells. But to the extent that severity of the lockdown correlates with the severity of the pandemic, many people confuse the correlated lockdown with the underlying cause, the pandemic. The ultimate proof comes from Scandinavia. Sweden imposed no lockdown, while its neighbour Denmark imposed the most extreme lockdown in Europe. If it was the lockdown that caused the recession, then the economy of no-lockdown Sweden should have fared much better than that of lockdown Denmark. In fact, the two Scandinavian economies suffered identical 9 percent recessions (Chart I-8). Chart I-8No-Lockdown Sweden Suffered An Identical Recession To Lockdown-Denmark Focus On Sectors That Can Thrive In The New World Tactically we have recommended an underweight to stocks versus bonds since July 9, and this tactical position is broadly flat. Stick with it for now.1 A crucial question is: can bond yields go significantly lower? It is a crucial question because it was the collapse in bond yields earlier this year that saved the aggregate stock market. As long-duration bond yields plunged by 1 percent, the forward earnings yield of long-duration technology and healthcare stocks also plunged by 1 percent (Chart I-9). This surge in the valuation of the growth defensive sectors compensated for the collapsed profits of the value cyclical sectors – banks, basic resources, and oil and gas (Chart I-10). A resurgent pandemic combined with the end of the greatest ever monetary stimulus means that this playbook may get a rerun in the coming months. Chart I-9The Collapsed Bond Yield Explains The Collapsed Earnings Yield (Surging Valuation) Of Tech And Healthcare Chart I-10Tech And Healthcare Saved The Aggregate Stock Market The worry is that, from current levels, long-duration bond yields will struggle to plunge by another 1 percent and provide the same boost to valuations that they did in the first wave of the pandemic. In which case, the outlook for stocks and sectors will hinge more on their profits. On this basis, we still favour the growth defensives – which we define as technology and healthcare – both for the short term and the long term. In the short term, their profits will be more resilient in a resurgent pandemic. In the long term, their profits are well set to grow in an increasingly online, decentralised, remote-working, health-conscious world. One unfortunate consequence is that the European stock market’s massive underweighting to the growth defensives sectors will weigh on its relative performance, both in the short term and in the long term. Fractal Trading System* Supporting the fundamental analysis in the main body of this report, fractal analysis confirms that basic resources are vulnerable to a reversal versus financials. Hence, this week’s recommended trade is to go long financials versus basic resources. One way of implementing this is: long XLF, short XLB. Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 3.5 percent. In other trades, long ZAR/CLP reached the end of its holding period flat, and is now closed. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 58 percent. When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Expressed as short DAX versus 10-year T-bond. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Bond Yields & Growth: Developed market bond yields have ignored improving cyclical economic data over the past few months, remaining stuck in narrow trading ranges at low levels. That broken correlation will persist until central banks become less concerned about supporting pandemic-ravaged economies and begin worrying more about rising inflation, financial stability or the size of their balance sheets. That shift will not happen anytime soon. Inflation-Linked Trades: Our models suggest US TIPS breakevens are now at fair value. We are taking profits on our tactical long US 10-year inflation breakevens trade for a return of 2.88%. Stay long 10-year breakevens in Italy and Canada until we see further shrinkage in the gap between inflation breakevens and model-implied fair value and watch for a selling opportunity in UK 10-year breakevens. Feature Do bond investors even care about economic growth anymore? This is a valid question to ask, given how government bond yields in the developed markets have stayed in very narrow trading ranges over the past few months, even as economic data has rebounded from the global COVID-19 recession in the first half of 2020. Investors should get used to the current backdrop of rock-bottom interest rates and bond yields, which is unlikely to change anytime soon. Chart of the WeekBond Yields Are Responding To Inflation, Not Growth For example, the benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield has stayed between 0.65% and 0.75% since June 11, even though the US ISM Manufacturing index rose from 43 in May to 56 in August. Yields are also ignoring the ups and downs of the equity market. The 10-year Treasury yield now sits at 0.66% - the same level as on September 2 even though the NASDAQ equity index has fallen 12% from the all-time peak seen on that day. Our own Global Duration Indicator, comprised of cyclical measures like the global ZEW index and our global leading economic indicator, has surged to the highest level since 2008 (Chart of the Week). Given the usual lead time between broad turns in the Duration Indicator and the level of global bond yields (around 6-9 months), this suggests that yields have bottomed and should soon begin rising. Yet the reality is that the usual factors that typically drive yields higher during a cyclical upturn – namely, rising inflation expectations and a clearly understood signal from central banks that such a move would lead to tighter monetary policy – are not currently in place. Investors should get used to the current backdrop of rock-bottom interest rates and bond yields, which is unlikely to change anytime soon. Four Potential Triggers For A Rise In Bond Yields Chart 2A Breakdown Of The PMI/Yield correlation The breakdown of the positive correlation between growth and bond yields is not just visible in the US. For example, yields on German Bunds and UK Gilts also remain stuck at low levels despite sharp improvements in the German and UK manufacturing PMIs (Chart 2). Yet in China – where there is no zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) or large-scale quantitative easing (QE) programs - bond yields have steadily risen since the China manufacturing PMI bottomed back in April (bottom panel). What could change this backdrop? We see four potential catalysts, ranked below in our own subjective order of importance: Inflation Sustainably Returning Back To Central Bank Targets It may seem obvious, but it still needs to be said – dovish central bank policies are the biggest reason why developed market bond yields have de-linked from economic growth. That includes not only ZIRP or QE, but also forward guidance on future changes in interest rates. Central banks are telling markets they will not raise rates for a period measured in years, and will continue to expand their balance sheets to purchase assets and support bank lending, all in an effort to push undershooting inflation back to policy targets. This is a different message than bond investors have grown accustomed to hearing from central banks, most notably in the US. The Fed is trying to do something that it has never intentionally done before – erode some of its hard-earned inflation fighting credibility. The Fed is trying to do something that it has never intentionally done before – erode some of its hard-earned inflation fighting credibility. The recent shift by the Fed to an Average Inflation Targeting framework – where above-target inflation would be tolerated if inflation was below target for an extended period – is intended to change the perception that the Fed will hike rates preemptively based on a forecast of inflation, as they have done in the past. Chart 3Latest FOMC Projections Justify Years Of 0% Rates The latest set of Fed economic projections is consistent with this new framework (Chart 3): the unemployment rate is forecasted to fall back to the FOMC median estimate of full employment (4.1%) by 2023; headline PCE inflation is also projected to climb back to 2% by 2023; the fed funds rate is projected to stay unchanged near 0% until at least 2023. In many ways, the Fed is trying to atone for the mistakes made while normalizing policy after the extraordinary easing measures taken after the 2008 crisis. From signaling a slowing of QE bond purchases in 2013, to the 250bps of rate hikes and tapering of its balance sheet during 2016-18, the Fed moved aggressively relative to what was actually happening with US inflation. Core PCE inflation only inched above 2% for a few months in 2018 – towards the end of the normalization process - as did market-based inflation measures like TIPS breakevens (Chart 4). The Fed ended up raising the real fed funds rate during that tightening cycle to above its own estimate of neutral (r-star), even with inflation still not close to its target. Unsurprisingly, real US bond yields also rose during that same period, which tightened monetary conditions even further by boosting the value of the US dollar. No wonder US inflation could not stay at the 2% target for very long. This time around, the Fed is sending a much different signal to markets – that it wants to see inflation rise before raising rates, thus keeping real policy rates in negative territory for an extended period. If the Fed is looking for a real world case study of such an approach, it can look across the Atlantic to the Bank of England (BoE). On the surface, the BoE has been acting like a typical inflation-targeting central bank over the past several years, turning more hawkish in its commentary when the UK economy was improving and becoming more dovish when the economy was languishing. Yet since the 2008 crisis, the BoE has kept the Bank Rate in a range of 0.1% to 0.75%, well below realized UK inflation. While it has been difficult for the BoE to attempt to raise rates given the Brexit uncertainty since 2016 – which has also weakened the British pound, helping boost UK inflation - real UK policy rates have now been negative for 12 years (Chart 5). The result: steadily declining UK real bond yields with inflation expectations rising to levels well above the BoE 2% inflation target. Chart 4The Fed Is Trying To Erode Its Hard-Earned Credibility Chart 5Lessons From The BoE On How To Not Be Credible The experience of the ECB provides a cautionary tale for central banks not appearing dovish enough, even when policy settings are already extraordinarily accommodative. The message from central banks on future rate increases – namely, that there will not be any without sustainably higher inflation – must change before bond yields can have any hope of climbing higher. Chart 6Does The ECB Have Any Credibility Left? Inflation expectations have stayed below the ECB’s “just below 2%” target since 2013 (Chart 6), which forced the central bank into cutting nominal rates into negative territory while aggressively expanding its balance sheet through QE and long-term bank liquidity provision (i.e. LTROs). Yet the ECB has always put an expiration date on each of these programs, which sent a message to the markets that the central bank was not fully committed to keeping policy easy until inflation was back to target – however long that would take. In sum, the message from central banks on future rate increases – namely, that there will not be any without sustainably higher inflation – must change before bond yields can have any hope of climbing higher. A Shift From Central Banks To Concerns About Asset Price Bubbles Chart 7When Will CBs Start Worrying About Financial Market Valuations? Policymakers are paying lip service to the notion of the “financial stability” risks inherent in their new promises to keep rates low for a lot longer while intervening in financial markets more aggressively through asset purchase programs. Given the signs of froth in many important asset classes like US equities or global corporate debt, policymakers should at least be somewhat concerned that easy money policies are fueling asset bubbles (Chart 7). A big enough decline could erode confidence and spill over into the real economy, defeating the original purpose of easy money policies. However, given the still fragile state of much of the global economy that remains dependent on fiscal support amid ongoing COVID-19 restrictions, concerns over asset values will take a backseat to maintaining adequate monetary stimulus. Asset bubbles would have to become much larger before a central bank would even consider turning more hawkish to prick them through higher policy rates that would push up bond yields. The Announcement Of A Trustworthy COVID-19 Vaccine That Is Ready For Widespread Distribution Markets have already begun to worry about the “second wave” of the coronavirus that health officials had warned would happen in the cooler autumn months. The development of an effective, and safe, vaccine would thus be a game-changer for financial markets, particularly after the recent surge in new COVID-19 cases in Europe and the still elevated level of new cases in the US (Chart 8). Chart 8A Second Wave Of COVID-19 BCA Research’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin (a big fan of interesting data sets!), noted in his most recent report that, according to The Good Judgement Project, around 60% of “superforecasters” now expect a vaccine ready for mass distribution to be available by Q1/2021 (Chart 9).1 A vaccine appearing that rapidly – much faster than the usual multi-year process leading to a vaccine declared safe for use – would help boost business and consumer confidence and raise the odds of a return to pre-virus levels of economic activity. Bond yields would likely get a lift, as well, as markets would price in a shorter period of super low policy rates and a faster return of inflation to central bank targets. Yet even if a vaccine is presented to the world by next spring, there is no guarantee that a large enough share of the population will deem the vaccine safe enough to take to ensure “herd immunity”. A recent Economist/YouGuv survey noted that only 36% of American adults would choose to get vaccinated when a COVID-19 vaccine becomes available, 32% would not get vaccinated, while 32% were unsure (Chart 10). Thus, a vaccine would be a bond-bearish development only if it is trusted to be safe to use – the mere announcement of a vaccine will not be enough to declare an “end” to the pandemic. Chart 9High Odds Of A Vaccine In 6-To-12 Months Chart 10Will Enough People Take The Vaccine? Central Banks Slowing QE Purchases Relative To Increased Fiscal Issuance Chart 11Still Room For The Fed, ECB and BoE To Expand QE Right now, it is easy for the major central banks to aggressively expand their balance sheets and provide additional monetary stimulus through asset purchases. Yet there may come a point where a capacity constraint is reached on buying government bonds if it impairs market functionality. That is currently the case in Japan, where the Bank of Japan now owns 49% of the Japanese government bond (JGB) market after years of aggressive QE purchases of JGBs. This has damaged the day-to-day liquidity of JGBs, where there have been instances of days where no single JGB has traded in the secondary market. A move by central banks to buy fewer bonds because they own too many of them could potentially push bond yields higher by worsening the demand/supply balance for government bonds - assuming private investors do not pick up the slack and buy more bonds, of course. Currently, the Fed only owns 22% of the US Treasury market with little evidence suggesting that its purchases are impairing the trading of Treasuries (Chart 11). The BoE and ECB own much larger shares of the UK and euro area government bond markets – 37% and 38%, respectively – suggesting that those central banks are closer to a BoJ-like capacity constraint. However, given the rising budget deficits and surging government bond issuance seen in Europe (and the US) so far in 2020, the odds of a capacity constraint soon being reached that could result in slower QE purchases are low. Bottom Line: Developed market bond yields have ignored improving cyclical economic data over the past few months, remaining stuck in narrow trading ranges at low levels. That broken correlation will persist until central banks become less concerned about supporting pandemic-ravaged economies and begin worrying more about rising inflation, financial stability or the size of their balance sheets. That shift will not happen anytime soon. Reviewing Our Tactical Inflation Breakeven Trades Back in June, we initiated a series of recommended inflation-focused trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio. Specifically, we went long 10-year inflation breakevens in the US, Italy, and Canada by buying on-the-run inflation-linked bonds and selling government bond futures.2 We chose those trades based on the output of our fundamental valuation models for 10-year inflation breakevens in eight inflation-linked bond (ILB) markets: the US, UK, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, Canada, and Australia. Our fair value models use two inputs for all regions: a) a long-run moving average of headline inflation, representing the medium-term trend that anchors inflation expectations; and b) the annual percentage change of the Brent oil price in local currency terms, which creates shorter-term deviations from the trend to account for moves in oil and currencies. There looks to be little remaining upside to our tactical long TIPS breakeven position. The past few months have seen a sharp rise in global inflation expectations, owing to the extraordinary monetary policy actions taken by the major developed market central banks and recovering growth prospects coming out of the COVID-19 recession. This has led to a convergence between 10-year inflation breakevens and their model-implied fair values in the aforementioned ILB markets (Chart 12). Most notably, breakevens in the US are now at fair value, while breakevens in the UK and Australia are trading above fair value. In the US, 10-year breakeven inflation rates are now back to the long-run average of realized headline inflation, while the -8% decline in the Brent oil price so far this month has lowered the model-implied fair value (Chart 13). Therefore, there looks to be little remaining upside to our tactical long TIPS breakeven position with most of the easy gains following the pandemic-induced collapse having already been realized. Chart 12Global Inflation Breakevens Have Moved Higher Our colleagues over at BCA Research US Bond Strategy have reached a similar conclusion, noting that the Fed’s Jackson Hole announcement of the move to Average Inflation Targeting supercharged the rising trend in TIPS breakevens.3 Chart 13US Breakevens Are At Fair Value Although they also note the likelihood of stronger US CPI prints over the next few months should keep US breakevens well supported heading into year-end. The time horizon for trades that enter our Tactical Overlay portfolio is limited to no longer than six months. Thus, with TIPS breakevens reverting back to fair value after just three months in the trade, we are choosing to take profits on our long 10-year US inflation breakeven trade for a total return of 2.88%. Chart 14UK Breakevens Are Above Fair Value In other ILB markets, UK breakevens are now an intriguing case, and not only for the monetary policy driven interplay between UK real yields and breakevens discussed earlier in this report. The overshoot of UK breakevens relative to our fair value model may be related to growing market speculation that the BoE will move to negative interest rates – an outcome we deem to be unlikely, as we discussed in a recent report.4 Alternatively, the higher breakevens may be a reflection of UK political uncertainty. The risk of a hard Brexit has resurfaced as UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Conservatives have now backed a bill that includes powers for the government to override its withdrawal agreement with the European Union; understandably, this has caused a sell-off in the pound. Within our fundamental fair value framework, the UK 10-year breakeven inflation rate has overshot both the 3-year moving average of headline inflation and the growth of GBP-denominated oil prices, leaving breakevens 0.72 standard deviations expensive (Chart 14). One possible explanation is that markets are pricing in a significant further depreciation in the pound given this resurfacing of Brexit risk. Within our model, GBP/USD impacts the fair value of breakeven inflation via Brent oil prices, which are denominated in local currency terms. Thus, we can back out an implied change in GBP/USD that would make the model-derived fair value breakeven rate equal to the actual 10-year UK inflation breakeven rate, holding all other variables in the model constant. This does produce some extreme results during periods of very rapid moves in UK breakevens, but we can standardize the data to use as an indicator of ILB market-implied views on the currency (Chart 15). With that in mind, pound bearishness in ILB markets is nearing levels where it has historically troughed. A favorable development in Brexit negotiations could cause a reversal in this pound-bearish trend and a sharp downward correction in UK inflation breakevens. We see a potential opportunity to play for narrower UK breakevens if our view on Brexit and negative rates in the UK prove to be correct. On that front, BCA Research’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Matt Gertken, sees a no-deal Brexit by year-end as the less likely outcome, with odds of only 35%, given the political calculus that PM Johnson faces with the decision.5 Polls show that the UK public does not support a no-deal Brexit (Chart 16), which would severely hurt a UK economy that remains fragile due to the coronavirus, and would raise the odds of a new independence referendum in Scotland in 2021. Chart 15UK Breakevens Already Discount A Big Fall In GBP Chart 16Only 25% In The UK Think A No-Deal Brexit Is A Good Outcome We will monitor the situation closely in the coming weeks, but we see a potential opportunity to play for narrower UK breakevens if our view on Brexit and negative rates in the UK prove to be correct. Finally, although the majority of the gains from our long inflation breakeven trades in Canada and Italy have likely been realized, there are still some chips left on the table. Canadian breakeven inflation rates have risen in lockstep with Brent prices but have yet to converge with the long-run moving average of inflation (Chart 17). In Italy, the increases in oil prices in euro terms has outstripped the rise in breakevens, pushing up the model-implied fair value and leaving breakevens remain more than one standard deviation under fair value (Chart 18). We will look for the gap between breakevens and fair values to shrink further in these two countries before closing these trades, even though we are substantially in the green on both (see the Tactical Overlay table on page 19). Chart 17Canadian Breakevens Are Just Below Fair Value Chart 18Italian Breakevens Are Well Below Fair Value Bottom Line: Our models suggest US TIPS breakevens are now at fair value. We are taking profit on our tactical long US 10-year inflation breakeven trade for a return of 2.88%. Stay long 10-year breakevens in Italy and Canada until we see further shrinkage in the gap between inflation breakevens and model-implied fair value and watch for a selling opportunity in UK 10-year breakevens. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Pivot To Value", dated September 18, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. You can also learn more about The Good Judgement Project here: https://goodjudgment.com/about/ 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations", dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "The Fed’s New Framework Is Bond Bearish…But Not Yet", dated September 8, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rate Club", dated August 26, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The End-Game For Trump And Brexit", dated September 18, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Kenya: An Incomplete Adjustment The Kenyan shilling will depreciate by 15-20% in the next 12 months. The downward pressure on the currency stems from the country’s sizeable current account deficit. In addition, Kenya needs lower local interest rates and a weaker exchange rate to boost nominal growth and stabilize public debt dynamics. Kenya has gone through an extensive macro adjustment since 2015 when the current account deficit was 10% of GDP and the primary fiscal deficit was 8% of GDP. Since then the current account deficit has narrowed to 6% of GDP as the private sector deleveraged and fiscal policy tightened substantially over the past 3-years (Chart I-1, top panel). Remarkably, the primary fiscal deficit has narrowed to a mere 0.4% of GDP as of June 2020 (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Yet, the macro adjustment is incomplete with a lingering current account deficit and public debt on an unsustainable path. Further, economic growth is extremely weak (Chart I-2). Crucially, core inflation is at 2% - an all-time low, suggesting that low inflation/deflationary pressures is the main problem in Kenya (Chart I-3). Chart I-1Kenya: The Twin Deficits Remains Large Chart I-2Kenya: Tame Domestic Growth In this context, the optimal policy choice for Kenya is to reduce local interest rates, while allowing the currency to depreciate. This will reduce the interest burden on public debt, boost both economic activity (real growth) and inflation as well as make exports more competitive. Balance Of Payments Strains Persist Kenya’s balance of payments will weigh on the currency in the next 6-9 months. While improving, its exports will remain tame over the next 6-12 months. The volume of tea, horticulture and coffee exports, which account for about 50% of total Kenyan exports, has rebounded. Yet, their prices have failed to rebound meaningfully. Meanwhile, substantial fiscal tightening – an 11% drop in government non-interest nominal expenditures – has led to a collapse in imports (Chart I-4). If and when fiscal policy is relaxed, it will boost imports weighing on the trade balance. Chart I-3Kenya Suffers From Low Inflation Chart I-4Tight Fiscal Policy = Weak Domestic Demand Chart I-5Kenya Is Losing Market Share In Export Markets The biggest headwind to the balance of payments has been the drastic fall in both tourism revenues and remittances. Combined, they represent around $4 billion (4.2% of GDP). It is unlikely that international travel will resume in the next six months. Remittances will also remain subdued in the coming months as unemployment rates remain elevated worldwide. Kenya has been losing its export market share in neighboring countries such as Uganda and Tanzania (Chart I-5). Hence, this nation needs to improve its competitiveness via tolerating a cheaper currency and undertaking structural reforms to bolster productivity growth. FDI inflows have been subdued. In the near term, FDI inflows will be discouraged by very weak domestic demand. Critically, the outlook for Chinese FDI inflows into the country remains uncertain due to the debacle with previous China-financed projects in Kenya. In particular, Kenyan courts declared the construction contract awarded to the China Road and Bridge Corporation for the Nairobi-Mombasa railway illegal.1 This impasse between Kenyan courts and Chinese companies could for now dissuade financing and investment from China. In the medium term, international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank could step in to fill in for Chinese investments. As recent financing by the World Bank and IMF of $1.74 billion (1.9% of GDP) to Kenya suggest, the US might be enticed alongside European nations to step in to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of China’s financial backing. However, this might take some time and there will be shortage in foreign financing in the coming months. Chart I-6Kenya Lacks Foreign Exchange Reserves Finally, another risk is the considerable amount of foreign debt obligations (FDOs) and the lack of foreign currency reserves at the central bank to meet these obligations (Chart I-6). Kenya’s FDOs in the next 12 months are about $6 billion, while the central bank has only $8.8 billion of foreign exchange reserves. In this case, FDOs measure the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months. Bottom Line: The exchange rate will continue facing depreciation pressures. The optimal policy for the central bank will be to allow the currency to weaken meaningfully and to reduce interest rates rather than use high interest rates or deplete its foreign exchange reserves to defend the exchange rate. Public Debt Sustainability Despite substantial fiscal tightening, Kenya’s public debt trajectory remains worrisome. Two prerequisites for capping the rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio are (1) running continuous primary fiscal surpluses and (2) for local government borrowing costs to be below nominal GDP growth. Neither of these two are presently satisfied in Kenya. Crucially, interest payments are taking up a quarter of overall government revenues (Chart I-7). This necessitates considerably lower domestic interest rates to reduce this ratio. In brief, public debt sustainability hinges on the central bank reducing local borrowing costs, which will both boost nominal growth/government revenues and lower interest costs of public debt. The government of President Uhuru Kenyatta announced a new budget in June (for the period of July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2021) with a projected primary deficit of -3% and -1.8% of GDP, for 2020/21 and 2021/22 respectively (Chart I-1, bottom panel on page 1). Meanwhile, the new budget’s nominal annual growth projections for 2020/21 and 2021/22 are 10.6% and 11.5%, respectively. Chart I-8presents both the government’s as well as our projections for public debt dynamics until the end of 2022 based on assumptions for nominal GDP, government expenditures and revenues for the next two fiscal years. The public debt-to-GDP ratio will reach 75% of GDP in our scenario and 66% in the government’s scenario. Chart I-7Public Debt Servicing Costs Are High Chart I-8Kenya: Public Debt Will Continue To Rise The key difference between the two projections are expectations for nominal GDP and government revenue growth. If fiscal and monetary policy remain tight, nominal output growth will disappoint. Notably, broad money supply growth is tame (Chart I-9). Sluggish nominal growth risks derailing government revenue projections. Notably, recent comments by finance minister Ukur Yatani suggests that revenues have already begun underperforming government expectations in the first two months of the new fiscal year. On the whole, public debt will rise by more than what the government expects over the next two years as borrowing costs remain above nominal GDP growth (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Kenya: Weak Policy Response To Low Growth Chart I-10Kenya: Local Rates Are Above Nominal Growth Faced with the prospect of rising public debt dynamics over the next two years, the economically less painful response for policymakers is for the central bank to lower interest rates and to instruct domestic commercial banks to buy government domestic debt. This will boost nominal GDP growth and push local interest rates below nominal GDP growth. There is scope for the central bank to cut interest rates and allow the currency to depreciate without feeding into runaway inflation. Notably, core consumer price inflation excluding fuel and food items is presently at an all-time low, running below the lower bound of the central bank’s inflation target (Chart I-2 on page 2). Higher inflation also feeds into higher nominal growth, which is good for public debt dynamics. A weaker currency will augment the cost of servicing foreign debt. The latter accounts for 52% of public debt and 32% of GDP. However, a large share (65%) of foreign debt is owed to bilateral and multilateral creditors. This debt can be renegotiated/restructured, which would in turn benefit private creditors. Bottom Line: To stabilize public debt dynamics, local interest rates should be lowered considerably. This will increase nominal GDP and government revenue growth as well as lower debt servicing costs. In this scenario, currency will depreciate a lot. Investment Implications Faced with very depressed economic growth, very low inflation, unsustainable public debt dynamics and a wide current account deficit, the optimal policy for Kenya is to ease monetary policy dramatically and tolerate material currency depreciation. So long as the central bank does not reduce interest rates, the economy will continue to underwhelm, public debt dynamics will be worrisome and share prices will stumble (Chart I-11). Critically, as the public debt-to-GDP ratio continues rising, sovereign credit will underperform (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Weak Domestic Dynamics = Lower Share Prices Chart I-12Rising Public Debt Burden = Sovereign Credit Underperformance If and when the central bank brings interest rates down substantially, nominal growth will improve and share prices will fare well. Lower domestic borrowing costs and higher nominal GDP growth will help stabilize public debt dynamics. In such a scenario, EM sovereign credit portfolios should overweight the nation’s US dollar bonds. The Kenyan shilling also is set to depreciate materially. If the government embarks on this macro adjustment early, currency depreciation could be gradual. If the government delays this macro adjustment and resists currency weakness by tolerating high interest rates, the exchange rate depreciation could be delayed, but will be abrupt and disorderly. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Nigeria: Devaluation As The Least-Worst Policy Choice Chart II-1Nigeria: Poor BoP Position The Nigerian naira is facing a considerable risk of major devaluation stemming from strains on its balance of payments (BoP). That said, the risk of a sovereign default is very low over the next 12-18 months. Nigeria suffers from large external imbalances in an environment of low oil prices and dreadful FDI inflows. The nation’s current account deficit is wide at 5% of GDP and its foreign currency (FX) reserves are low (Chart II-1). Importantly, oil prices have hit a critical technical resistance – their 200-day moving average – and have relapsed (Chart II-2). Global oil demand weakness stemming from some renewed tightening of lockdown measures will result in lower crude prices. We at BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team expect Brent prices to be in a trading range of $35-$45 over the next 12 months.2 An Optimal Macro Adjustment A low oil price environment creates a dillemma for Nigeria’s policymakers given their limited FX reserves. They can either (i) draw down FX reserves to support the exchange rate, or (ii) preserve FX reserves and allow a major currency devaluation. So far, Nigerian authorities have avoided these options by resorting to strict capital controls and limiting imports. Yet, capital controls are derailing much needed foreign capital inflows in general and FDIs in particular. These capital account controls are also restricting the ability of domestic firms to access US dollars to service their foreign debt payments, undermining the confidence of foreign investors and multilateral creditors. Allowing currency depreciation is the least-worst macro policy solution. Propping up the currency by administrative restrictions amid low oil prices will foster various imbalances impeding the nation’s structural adjustments and its potential growth rate. Remarkably, Nigeria’s current account excluding oil has been structurally wide, a sign of weak domestic productivity and a non-competitive currency (Chart II-3). Chart II-2A Relapse In Oil Prices Is Likely Chart II-3Nigeria Has A Current Account Deficit Ex-Oil Bottom Line: Capital controls and import restrictions are impeding FDIs and productivity growth in this most populous African country (Chart II-4). While a steep devaluation will spur inflation in the short run, a cheapened currency and the abolishment of import and capital controls will help to attract foreign capital that the nation desperately needs. Running Out Of FX Reserves Critically, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is running out of FX reserves: Nigeria’s foreign exchange (FX) reserves are very low at $35.6 billion. That compares with foreign debt obligations (FDOs) of $28 billion in the next 12 months and foreign funding requirements of $47 billion in the next 12 months (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Nigeria: Weak FDI = Low Productivity Chart II-5Nigeria: Large Foreign Funding Required In Next 12 Months FDOs measure the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months. Meanwhile, foreign funding requirements is the sum of the current account deficit and FDOs. FDI inflows were a mere $2.5 billion in 2019 compared with a $20 billion current account deficit. Along with foreign portfolio inflows, FDI inflows will remain depressed so long as capital controls persist. The FX reserves-to-broad money ratio currently stands at 0.4. A ratio below one indicates foreign currency reserves do not entirely cover currency in circulation and local currency deposits. How much should the exchange rate be devalued versus the US dollar for this ratio to reach 1? For the broad money supply coverage ratio to be equal to 1, the currency must depreciate by 56% against the US dollar. Bottom Line: CBN’s FX reserves are insufficient to maintain the current de-facto crawling currency peg in the long run. No Worries About Sovereign Credit For Now Chart II-6Nigeria: Low Public Debt Burden While the Nigerian government is reeling from lower oil prices, the likelihood of a sovereign default is presently low. Public debt is low, currently standing at 22.5% of GDP. Notably, foreign debt represents nearly 30% of overall public debt or 6.5% of GDP. Moreover, only 40% of external debt (3% of GDP) is owned to private foreign investors (Chart II-6). The rest is split between bilateral and multilateral creditors. Foreign bilateral and multilateral debt is easier to renegotiate. While overall (domestic and foreign) debt servicing costs have risen to 55% of government revenues, foreign currency debt servicing costs only represent 2% of overall revenues. Provided foreign public debt servicing is minimal, even a large currency depreciation will not make public debt dynamics unsustainable. Crucially, a substantial currency devaluation will ameliorate the fiscal position. A large share (about 55%) of fiscal revenues come from oil, i.e., they are in US dollars. Conversely, expenditures are in local currency terms. As a result, currency depreciation will boost revenues but not expenditures, narrowing the budget deficit. According to the newly revised budget for the 2020 fiscal year, fiscal spending will grow by 8.7% in nominal terms but most likely contract in real terms (Chart II-7). Overall, the fiscal balance will widen to 3.65% of GDP in 2020 according to government projections. In nutshell, policymakers refrained from large fiscal stimulus amid lockdown measures earlier this year. This is bad for the economy but positive for the trajectory of public debt. Finally, public debt dynamics are presently not worrisome with nominal GDP growth above local interest rates (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Nigeria Will Run Tight Fiscal Policy Chart II-8Nigeria: No Public Debt Sustainability Problem Bottom Line: The risk of a sovereign default is low in the coming years. The low starting points in both public debt levels and debt servicing costs will allow the government to boost fiscal spending to support the economy. Investment Implications Overall, a currency devaluation will help restore balance of payment dynamics without causing a major stress for sovereign credit. A 25-30% devaluation over the next 12 months will be the least-worst policy choice. Currency forwards are currently pricing a 20% depreciation in the naira versus the US dollar in next 12 months (Chart II-9). Yet, the average black market exchange rate, currently at around 470, implies almost a 25% discount from the current official rate. Sovereign credit spreads are presently tight (Chart II-10). Investors should consider buying Nigerian sovereign credit only after a substantial devaluation takes place. Chart II-9Naira Forwards Discount Will Widen With Lower Oil Prices Chart II-10Nigeria: Buy Sovereign Credit After Devaluation Finally, equity investors should continue avoiding the local bourse. Due to capital controls, the latter is uninvestable for now. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The standard gauge railways project built between the port city of Mombasa and its capital Nairobi has been heavily scrutinized by Kenyan authorities. After only three years of operation, the Kenyan Railways Company (KRC) has already defaulted on its loan from Chinese lenders. Kenyan courts have been arguing that Kenyan government and state-owned enterprises are facing sovereign risk over Chinese debt overhang. More than half of Kenya’s loans from China are attached to the construction of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway project. 2 This differs from BCA Commodity and Energy Strategy service’s expectation that Brent prices will average $65 in 2021.
BCA Research's US Bond Strategy service concludes that US dollar weakness will be bearish for bonds during the next 6-12 months. As long as the global economic recovery is maintained, the dollar will weaken further and bond yields have room to rise. We like…
Highlights Monetary Policy: The Fed will keep rates at the zero bound at least until inflation is above 2% and it will maintain an accommodative policy stance until long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation rates move above 2.3%. Remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries and stay in nominal yield curve steepeners. Bond Yields & The Dollar: US dollar weakness will be bearish for bonds during the next 6-12 months. As long as the global economic recovery is maintained, the dollar will weaken further and bond yields have room to rise. EM Sovereigns: Remain underweight USD-denominated EM Sovereigns in a US bond portfolio, with the exception of Mexico. Economy: August’s poor retail sales figures strengthen our conviction that further fiscal stimulus is required to sustain the economic recovery. Our base case outlook is that Congress will deliver that stimulus in the coming weeks, and that yields will be higher in 6-12 months. But the risk of no deal is too great to ignore. Keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for now. Fed Adopts Explicit Forward Guidance, But Leaves Many Questions Unanswered Chart 1Fed And Markets Agree: No Rate Hike Until 2024 Following last month’s adoption of an average inflation targeting regime, the next logical step was for the Fed to translate its new policy framework into more explicit forward rate guidance.1 The Fed took that step at last week’s FOMC meeting by adding the following language to its post-meeting statement: The Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent and expects it will be appropriate to maintain this target range until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the Committee’s assessments of maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time.2 Chart 2A Long Way From 2% The new guidance says that the funds rate will not rise off the zero bound until three criteria are met: The labor market must be at “maximum employment” Inflation must be at or above 2% Inflation must be “on track to moderately exceed 2%” Notice that the criteria of “maximum employment” and inflation that “moderately exceeds 2%” are quite vague. In fact, Fed Chair Powell stated in his post-meeting press conference that “maximum employment” refers to a range of different labor market indicators, not just the unemployment rate. He also refused to provide more detail on how much of an inflation overshoot would qualify as “moderate”. This means that, practically, the only actionable information that the Fed gave investors is the promise that the funds rate won’t rise at least until inflation is at or above 2%. This is important info that can be easily visualized on a chart (Chart 2). We can plainly see that core inflation has a long way to go before it reaches the Fed’s target, and also that the Fed will not be making the same hawkish policy mistake it made in 2015, when it lifted rates with year-over-year core PCE inflation at 1.2%. Monetary policy will remain accommodative and supportive for risk assets until TIPS breakeven inflation rates return to well-anchored levels. For their part, FOMC participants don’t expect inflation to reach the 2% target for quite a while. The median participant doesn’t see core inflation reaching 2% until sometime in 2023, and only 4 out of 17 participants expect to lift rates before 2024. This is consistent with market pricing. The overnight index swap curve doesn’t price-in a full 25 basis point rate hike until September 2024 (Chart 1). Investment Implications We know that the Fed wants inflation to overshoot 2% for some period of time. Now, based on last week’s new guidance, we also know that no rate hikes will occur until inflation is above 2%. However, we still don’t know how much or how long of an inflation overshoot the Fed is targeting. For this reason, we think investors would be wise to keep in mind that the goal of the Fed’s new framework is to ensure that inflation expectations return to well-anchored levels. Our sense is that “well anchored” can be defined as a range of 2.3% to 2.5% for long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates (Chart 3). Chart 3Inflation Expectations: The Fed's Real Target We see monetary policy staying accommodative and supportive for risk assets until TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach those levels. This argues for maintaining an overweight 6-12 month allocation to spread product versus Treasuries. This also argues for staying overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, and for positioning in nominal yield curve steepeners. The Fed will maintain its firm grip on the front-end of the curve for a long time yet, but the market will eventually start to price-in liftoff at the long end. A Weaker Dollar Will Be Bearish For Bonds, Bullish For EM Sovereign Spreads The broad trade-weighted US dollar is 8% off its 2020 peak, and the BCA house view is that the dollar will weaken further during the next 12 months. This section explores what that will mean for Treasury yields and for USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign debt. The Dollar And Treasury Yields Bond yields and the dollar are intimately related, but the relationship is more complex than a simple coincident correlation. We like to think of the relationship as a feedback loop between the exchange rate, bond yields and global economic growth (Chart 4). Chart 4The Dollar/Bond Feedback Loop Since the dollar is currently falling, let’s start at the left-hand side of the feedback loop shown in Chart 4. The dollar’s current weakness is both a reflection of improving global economic growth and a catalyst for even stronger global economic growth. It is reflective because, compared to the rest of the world, the US is a large and stable economy. Firms and investors will respond to a positive global growth environment by sending capital overseas in search of higher returns. This puts downward pressure on the dollar. Dollar weakness also boosts global economic growth by making US dollars cheaper to acquire in global markets. This is particularly important for emerging markets, where a weaker dollar gives policymakers leeway to boost domestic growth via easier monetary and fiscal policies, without sacrificing the purchasing power of their currencies. Higher yielding countries tend to have less economic slack than low yielders. Moving to the top of the loop, stronger global economic growth (aka global reflation) will obviously impart upward pressure to bond yields. What’s less obvious is that US yields will rise by more than yields in the rest of the world. Chart 5 shows 3-year trailing yield betas for several major developed bond markets. Notice that the highest-yielding countries (US and Canada) also have the highest yield betas. This means that their yields rise the most when global bond yields are rising and fall the most when global bond yields are falling. This pattern holds because higher yielding countries tend to have less economic slack than low yielders. In other words, the high yielders will be quicker to price-in eventual monetary tightening when global growth is on the upswing. The high yielders also have more room to fall when growth ebbs. Chart 5High Yielding Bond Markets Are The Most Cyclical Initially, global reflation sends US bond yields higher. But eventually, US yields will become too high relative to the rest of the world. At that point, the US dollar will respond to wide interest rate differentials and start to appreciate. This dollar appreciation will eventually lead to slower economic growth (“global deflation”), which will cause bond yields to decline. Finally, just as US bond yields rise more than non-US yields during the global growth upswing, they also fall more during the downswing. Eventually, the tightening rate differentials lead to US dollar depreciation and the cycle repeats. Where are we situated in the cycle right now? As of today, we contend that rate differentials between the US and the rest of the world have fallen a lot, and we are at the stage of the loop where the dollar is weakening in response (Chart 6). This means that dollar weakness has further to run, and we should expect that it will eventually lead to global reflation and higher US bond yields. In fact, Chart 7 shows that sentiment toward the dollar has already soured considerably, and that increasingly bearish dollar sentiment has a habit of leading to higher bond yields. Chart 6Rate Differentials Signal More Downside For Dollar Chart 7Bearish Dollar Sentiment Leads To Higher Bond Yields Eventually, US yields will rise too much compared to the rest of the world and the dollar’s depreciation will stop. But for now, dollar weakness is bearish for bonds. The Dollar And USD-Denominated EM Sovereign Spreads USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereigns are an obvious sector that benefits from a weaker US dollar. Since the debt is denominated in US dollars but the country collects tax revenues in its local currency, any dollar weakness makes the issuer’s debt easier to service, and presumably leads to tighter sovereign spreads. Most of the dollar’s weakness this year has come against other developed market currencies, not against EMs. Despite this relationship, we are reluctant to advocate an overweight allocation to EM Sovereigns. First, most of the dollar’s weakness this year has come against other developed market currencies, not against EMs (Chart 8). Chart 8EM Currencies Have Lagged Second, an environment of US dollar depreciation and global reflation is also a good environment for US corporate bonds and, with a couple exceptions, US corporate spreads are more attractive than EM Sovereign spreads. The vertical axis of Chart 9 shows the spread differential between the USD-denominated bonds of several EMs relative to a position in US corporate bonds with identical duration and credit rating. After differences in duration and credit rating are considered, only Turkey, Colombia, South Africa, Mexico and Russia offer a spread advantage over US corporate credit. The horizontal axis of Chart 9 shows each country’s export coverage of its foreign debt obligations. Greater coverage should make that country’s currency less vulnerable to depreciation, and vice-versa. In our view, the Turkish, Colombian and South African currencies are simply too risky. But Mexico and Russia present more interesting opportunities. Chart 9EM Sovereign Spread Over US Credit Versus Currency Vulnerability We recommend an overweight allocation to Mexican Sovereigns because they offer a spread advantage relative to US corporates, and because the currency has been on an appreciating trend versus the dollar that still has further to run to get back to pre-COVID levels (Chart 8, panel 3). Despite the small spread pick-up, we would avoid Russian Sovereigns, at least until after the US election. The Ruble has been depreciating versus the dollar since mid-year (Chart 8, bottom panel) and a Democratic sweep in November will likely lead to the imposition of fresh US sanctions on Russia.3 Bottom Line: Remain underweight USD-denominated EM Sovereigns in a US bond portfolio. Despite the outlook for US dollar weakness, US corporate bonds offer more value and will deliver better returns. Mexican debt is the sole exception. Mexican spreads are attractive and the peso has room to appreciate. Economic Update: Signs Of Weakness In Consumer Spending Chart 10A Warning From Retail Sales In last week’s report, we warned that without a fresh round of fiscal stimulus, the 12-month outlook for US consumer spending is dire.4 Then, last Wednesday, we received August’s retail sales figures – the first month of spending data since the expiry of the CARES act’s income support provisions – and learned that spending contracted on the month, after having rebounded sharply in May, June and July when the CARES act was in full force (Chart 10). There had been some hope that US consumers might be able to compensate for the lack of income by deploying some of the savings they had built up in the spring, thus keeping spending at decent levels for at least a few months. But August’s weak retail sales report challenges that narrative, as does the fact that consumer sentiment surveys have not improved very much since April (Chart 10, panel 3). Still low consumer sentiment suggests that households remain cautious and that they will be reluctant to spend with the same abandon they showed prior to COVID. We also note that, while weekly initial jobless claims continue to fall, the pace of improvement has significantly tapered off during the past few weeks and initial claims are still coming in about 4 times higher than they were last year (Chart 10, bottom panel). Bottom Line: While significant strides have been made, the US economy is not out of the woods. Our base case view is that Congress will deliver sufficient household income support in the coming weeks, allowing the economic recovery to continue. But the risk that they won’t is too great to ignore. Keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for now, and position for higher yields on a 6-12 month horizon via less risky duration-neutral yield curve steepeners. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Table 1Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For a more detailed examination of the Fed’s new average inflation targeting regime please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “A New Dawn For Monetary Policy”, dated September 1, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/monetary20200916a1.pdf 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy / Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)”, dated July 3, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Stimulus Needed”, dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Feature In last week’s US Bond Strategy report, we presented the results of a scenario analysis on consumer spending.1 The goal of that analysis was to assess how much additional federal government income support is required to achieve consumer spending growth targets that won’t disappoint markets. The calculations regarding the amount of additional stimulus required to hit different spending targets are correct. However, a typo in our code (in fact, a missing letter “c”) caused us to specify the wrong targets. Last week, we targeted -3% 12-month over 12-month consumer spending growth for the period between March 2020 and February 2021. The rationale being that -3% was the worst spending growth seen during the 2008 Great Recession and would likely be the minimum that markets could tolerate this time around. As shown in the second panel of Chart 1, this number should have been -1.9%. Chart 1Consumer Spending Driven By Income & The Savings Rate We also considered spending growth targets for the 12-month period between August 2020 and July 2021. Last week we set our target range for that period at between 2% and 6%, the growth rates seen during the recovery years that followed the Great Recession. That range should have been set at 2.5% to 5%. We present revised results from our scenario analysis in Table 1 and Table 2. These tables are identical to the ones presented last week, except that they now have the correct consumer spending targets. Table 1Without More Stimulus COVID's Impact On Consumer Spending Will Be Worse Than The GFC Table 2At Least $600 Billion More Government Income Support Is Needed Our conclusion remains similar, though our corrected numbers suggest that more income support from the federal government will be required to hit reasonable spending targets. Last week, we concluded that extra income support on the order of $500 - $800 billion is the minimum that will be required. Our corrected numbers suggest that more stimulus will be necessary, on the order of $600 billion to $1 trillion. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Stimulus Needed”, dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com

