Global
An analysis on Brazil is available below. Feature Chart I-1Poor Performance By EM Stocks, Currencies And Commodities I had the pleasure of meeting again with a long-term BCA client Ms. Mea last week during my trip to Europe. Ms. Mea and I meet on a semi-annual basis, where she has the opportunity to query my analysis and view. In our latest meeting, she was more perplexed than usual by the global macro developments and financial market dynamics. Ms. Mea: All the seemingly positive news on the trade front is pushing up global share prices. In fact, a substantial portion -if not all -of the global equity price gains have occurred on days when there has been positive news surrounding the US-China trade negotiations. Given EM financial markets were the most damaged by the trade war, one would have thought that EM markets would outperform in a rally stemming from progress in negotiations. Yet this has not occurred. EM currencies have failed to advance (a number of currencies are in fact breaking down), EM sovereign credit spreads are widening and the relative performance of EM vs. DM share prices has relapsed (Chart I-1). What is causing this disconnect? Answer: The disconnect is due to a somewhat false narrative that the global trade and manufacturing recession as well as the EM/China slowdown were primarily caused by the US-China trade confrontation. The principal reason behind the global manufacturing and trade recession has been a deceleration in Chinese domestic demand. The latter can only partially be attributed to the US-China trade tariffs and tensions. Chart I-2 illustrates that mainland exports are not contracting while imports excluding processing trade1 are down 5% from a year ago. This implies that China’s growth slump has not been due to a contraction in its exports but rather due to weakness in its domestic demand. The principal reason behind the global manufacturing and trade recession has been a deceleration in Chinese domestic demand. The basis as to why mainland exports have held up so well is because Chinese exporters have been re-routing their shipments to the US via other countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan. Critically, the key force driving EM currencies and risk assets has been Chinese imports (Chart I-3). Mainland imports continue to shrink, with no recovery in sight. This is the reason why EM risk assets and currencies have performed so poorly, even amid the global risk-on environment. Chart I-2Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Chart I-3China Imports Drive EM Currencies Ms. Mea: Are you implying that a ceasefire in the trade war will not help Chinese growth rebound, and in turn support EM economies? The “Phase One” agreement and possible reductions in US tariffs on imports from China may help the Middle Kingdom’s exports, but not its imports. Crucially, the Chinese authorities will likely be reluctant to augment their credit and fiscal stimulus if there is a “Phase One” deal with the US. Absent greater stimulus, China’s domestic demand is unlikely to stage a swift recovery. In the case of a “Phase One” agreement, a mild improvement in business confidence in China and worldwide is likely, but a major upswing is doubtful. The basis is that business people around the world have witnessed the struggles faced by the US and China in their negotiations. They will likely doubt the ability of both nations to reach a structural resolution – and rightly so. Investors should realize that the Chinese economy does not depend on exports to the US nearly as much as is commonly believed. Importantly, global investors are miscalculating China’s negotiating strategy and tactics. We put much greater odds than many other investors on the possibility that China will continue to drag out the negotiations without signing the “Phase One” agreement. This could easily derail the global equity rally. Investors should realize that the Chinese economy does not depend on exports to the US nearly as much as is commonly believed. China’s shipments to the US have been around 3.3% of GDP, even before the trade war began. The value-added to the economy/income generated from China’s exports to the US is less than 3% of its GDP. In contrast, capital spending accounts for the largest share (42%) of China’s GDP. In turn, investment outlays are driven by the credit cycle and fiscal spending, rather than by exports. Chart I-4China: Stimulus And Business Cycle Ms. Mea: Turning to stimulus in China, the authorities have been easing for about a year. By now, the cumulative effect of this stimulus should have begun to revive the mainland’s domestic demand. Why do you still think China’s business cycle has not reached a bottom? Answer: Indeed, our credit and fiscal spending impulse has been rising since January. Based on its historical relationship with business cycle variables – it leads those variables by roughly nine months – China’s growth should have troughed in August or September (Chart I-4). However, the time lags between the credit and fiscal spending impulse and economic cycle are not constant as can be seen in Chart I-4. On average, the lag has been nine months but has also varied from zero (at the trough in early 2009) to 18 months (at the peak in 2016-‘17). Relationships in economics – as opposed to those in hard sciences – are not constant and stable. Rather, correlations and time lags between variables vary substantially over time. In addition, the magnitude of stimulus is not the only variable that should be taken into account. The potential multiplier effect is also significant. One way to proxy the multiplier effect is via the marginal propensity to spend by households and companies. In our opinion, the prime cause behind households’ and businesses’ reluctance to spend is the weak property market. Our proxies for Chinese marginal propensity to spend by companies and households have been falling (Chart I-5). This entails that households and businesses in China remain downbeat, which caps their expenditures, in turn offsetting the positive impact of stimulus. In our opinion, the prime cause behind households’ and businesses’ reluctance to spend is the weak property market. Without rapidly rising property prices and construction volumes, boosting sentiment and growth will prove challenging. We discussed the current conditions and outlook of China’s property market in last week’s report. Construction is the single largest sector of the mainland economy, and it is in recession: floor area started and under construction are all shrinking (Chart I-6). Chart I-5China: A Weak Multiplier Effect Chart I-6China Construction Is In Recession It is difficult to envision an improvement in manufacturing and a rebound in demand for commodities/materials and industrial goods without a recovery in construction. Notably, Chart I-6 displays the most comprehensive data on construction, as it encompasses all residential and non-residential construction by property developers and all other entities. Ms. Mea: Why are some global business cycle indicators turning up if, as you argue, the global manufacturing slowdown originated from Chinese domestic demand and the latter has not yet turned around? Answer: At any point of the business cycle, it is possible to find data that point both up and down. Our ongoing comprehensive review of global business cycle data leads us to conclude that the improvement is evident only in a few circumstances, and is not broad-based. In particular: In China and the rest of EM, there is no domestic demand recovery at the moment. China and EM ex-China capital goods imports are shrinking (Chart I-7). Chinese consumer spending is also sluggish (Chart I-8). The rise in China’s manufacturing Caixin PMI over the past several months is an aberration. Chart I-7EM/China Capex Is Very Weak Chart I-8No Recovery For Chinese Consumers In EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan, narrow and broad money growth are underwhelming (Chart I-9). These developments signify that EM policy rate cuts have not yet boosted money/credit and domestic demand. We elaborated on this in more detail in our recent report. The basis for such poor transmission is banking-system health in many developing countries. Banks remain saddled with non-performing loans (NPLs). The need to boost provisions and fears of more NPLs continues to make banks reluctant to lend. Besides, real (inflation-adjusted) lending rates are high, discouraging credit demand. In the US and euro area, consumption – outside of autos – as well as money and credit growth have never slowed in this cycle. The slowdown has largely been due to exports and the auto sector. The latter may be bottoming in the euro area (Chart I-10). This might be behind the improvement in some business surveys in Europe. Chart I-9EM Ex-China: Money Growth Is At Record Low Chart I-10Euro Area’s Auto Sales: Is The Worst Over? European business survey data are mixed, but the weakest segment - manufacturing – remains lackluster. In particular, Germany’s IFO index for business expectations and current conditions in manufacturing have not improved (Chart I-11, top panel). Similarly, the Swiss KOF economic barometer remains downbeat (Chart I-11, top panel). The only improvement is in Belgian business confidence, and a mild pickup in the euro area manufacturing PMI (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Chart I-11European Manufacturing And Business Confidence In the US, shipping and carload data are rather grim. They are not corroborating the marginal improvement in the US manufacturing PMI. Overall, at this point there are no signs that domestic demand is recovering in China and the rest of EM, which have been the epicenter of the slowdown. The improvement is limited to some data in the US and Europe. Consistently, US and European share prices have been surging, while EM equities have dramatically underperformed. Ms. Mea: What about lower interest rates driving multiples expansion in both DM and EM equities? Answer: Concerning multiples expansion, our general framework is as follows: So long as corporate profits do not contract, lower interest rates will likely lead to equity multiples expansion. However, when corporate earnings shrink, the latter overwhelms the positive effect of a lower discount rate on multiples, and share prices drop along with lower interest rates. DM corporate profits are flirting with contraction, but are not yet contracting meaningfully. Hence, it is sensible that US and European stocks have experienced multiples expansion. In contrast, EM corporate earnings are shrinking at a rate of 10% from a year ago as illustrated in Chart I-12. The basis for an EM profit recession is the downturn in Chinese domestic demand and consequently imports. EM per-share earnings correlate much better with Chinese imports (Chart I-13, top panel) than US ones (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12EM Profits And Share Prices Chart I-13EM EPS Is Driven By China Not The US In fact, we have documented numerous times in our reports that EM currencies and share prices correlate well with China’s business cycle/global trade/commodities prices, more so than with US bond yields. This does not mean that EM share prices are insensitive to interest rates. They are indeed sensitive to their own borrowing costs, but not to US Treasury yields. Chart I-14 demonstrates that EM share prices move in tandem with inverted EM sovereign US dollar bond yields and EM local currency bond yields. Similarly, emerging Asian share prices correlate with inverted high-yield Asian US dollar corporate bond yields (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Chart I-14EM Share Prices And EM Bond Yields Chart I-15Chinese Bond Yields Herald Relapse In EM Stocks And Currencies In short, EM share prices typically sell off when EM borrowing costs rise – regardless if it is driven by mounting US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Looking forward, exchange rates hold the key. A relapse in EM currencies will push up both the US dollar and local currency bond yields in many EMs. That will in turn warrant a setback in EM share prices. Ms. Mea: What about the correlation between EM performance and Chinese local rates? Answer: This is an essential relationship. Chart I-15 demonstrates that EM share prices and currencies have a strong positive correlation with local interest rates in China. The rationale is that all of them are driven by China’s business cycle. Relapsing interest rates in China are presently sending a bearish signal for EM risk assets and currencies. Ms. Mea: What does all this mean for investment strategy? A few weeks ago, you wrote that if the MSCI EM equity US dollar index breaks above 1075, you would reverse your recommended strategy. How does this square with your fundamental analysis that is still downbeat? Answer: My fundamental analysis on EM/China has not changed: I do not believe in the sustainability of this EM rebound in general, and EM outperformance versus DM in particular. The key risk to my strategy on EM stems from the US and Europe. It is possible that US and European share prices continue to rally. EM share prices typically sell off when EM borrowing costs rise – regardless if it is driven by mounting US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Notably, the high-beta segments of the US equity market and the overall Euro Stoxx 600 index are flirting with major breakouts (Chart I-16A and I-16B). If these breakouts transpire, the up-leg in US and European share prices will be long-lasting. This will also drag EM share prices higher in absolute terms. This is why I have placed a buy stop on the EM equity index. Chart I-16AUS High-Beta Stocks Chart I-16BEuropean Equities: At A Critical Juncture That said, I have a strong conviction that EM will continue to underperform DM, even in such a scenario. Hence, I continue to recommend underweighting EM versus DM in both global equity and credit portfolios. As we have recently written in detail, the global macro backdrop and financial market dynamics in such a scenario will resemble 2012-2014, when EM currencies depreciated, commodities prices fell and EM share prices massively underperformed DM ones (Chart I-17). Further, I am not arguing that the current global trade and manufacturing downtrends will persist indefinitely. The odds are that the global business cycle, including China’s, will bottom sometime next year. The point is that EM share prices have decoupled from fundamentals – namely corporate earnings growth – since January. The point is that EM share prices have decoupled from fundamentals – namely corporate earnings growth – since January (please refer to Chart I-12 on page 8). This is an unprecedented historical gap, making EM stocks, currencies and credit markets vulnerable to continued disappointments in EM corporate profitability. Ms. Mea: What market signals give you confidence in poor EM performance going forward? Answer: Even though the S&P 500 has broken to new highs, multiple segments of EM financial markets have posted extremely disappointing performance. These include: Small-cap stocks in EM overall and emerging Asia as well as the EM equal-weighted equity index have struggled to rally (Chart I-18). Chart I-17EM Underperformed During 2012-14 Bull Market Chart I-18Various EM Equity Indexes: Failure To Rally Is A Bad Omen Various Chinese equity indexes – onshore and offshore, small and large – have failed to advance and continue to underperform the global equity index. EM ex-China currencies and industrial commodities prices have remained subdued (please refer to Chart I-1 on page 1). Ms. Mea: Would you mind reminding me of your country allocation across various EM asset classes such as equities, credit, currencies and fixed-income? Answer: Within an EM equity portfolio, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, central Europe, Korea and Thailand. Our equity underweights are Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey, South Africa and Colombia. We continue recommending to short an EM currency basket including ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Today, we add the BRL to our short list (please refer to the section below on Brazil). As to the country allocation within EM local currency bonds and sovereign credit portfolios, investors can refer to our asset allocation tables below that are published at the end of each week’s report and are available on our web site. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Brazil: Deflationary Pressures Warrant A Weaker BRL The Brazilian real is breaking below its previous support. We recommend shorting the BRL against the US dollar. The primary macro risk in Brazil is not inflation but rather mounting deflationary pressures. Inflation has fallen to very low levels, to the bottom of the central bank’s target range (Chart II-1). Deflation or low inflation is dangerous when there are high debt levels. The Brazilian government is heavily indebted. With nominal GDP growth still below government borrowing costs and a primary budget balance at -1.3% of GDP, the public debt trajectory remains unsustainable as we discussed in previous reports (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Brazil: Undershooting Inflation Target Chart II-2Public Debt Dynamics Are Still Not Sustainable The cyclical profile of the economy is very weak as shown in Chart II-3. Tight fiscal policy and a drawdown of foreign exchange reserves have caused money growth to slow. That in turn entails a poor outlook for the economy, which will reinforce the deflationary trend. Accordingly, Brazil needs to reflate its economy to boost nominal GDP, which is the only scenario where the nation escapes a public debt trap. Yet, fiscal policy is straightjacketed by the spending cap rule, which stipulates that government spending can only grow at the previous year’s IPCA inflation rate. Federal government spending is set to grow only at the low nominal rate of 3.4% in 2020. Hence, monetary policy is the sole tool available for policymakers to reflate. Both bond yields and bank lending rates remain elevated in real terms. This hampers any recovery in the business cycle. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend by companies and consumers is declining, foreshadowing weaker economic activity ahead (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Brazil: The Economy Is Weak Chart II-4Brazil: Propensity To Spend Is Declining The central bank is determined to reduce interest rates further. As such, they cannot control the exchange rate. Indeed, the Impossible Trinity thesis states that in an economy with an open capital account (like in Brazil), the authorities cannot control both interest and exchange rates simultaneously. Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes stated in recent days that tight fiscal and easy monetary policies are consistent with a lower currency value. Brazilian policymakers are open to the idea of a weaker exchange rate and will not defend the real. Their currency market interventions are intended to smooth volatility in the exchange rate but not preclude depreciation. In fact, currency depreciation is another option to boost nominal growth that the nation desperately needs. Brazilian policymakers are open to the idea of a weaker exchange rate and will not defend the real. Their currency market interventions are intended to smooth volatility in the exchange rate but not preclude depreciation. Commodities prices remain an important driver of the Brazilian real (Chart II-5). These have failed to rebound amid the risk-on regime in global financial markets. This suggests that the path of least resistance for commodities prices is down, which is bad news for the real. Brazil’s current account deficit is widening and has reached 3% of GDP (Chart II-6). Notably, not only are export prices deflating but export volumes are also shrinking (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Chart II-5BRL And Commodities Prices Chart II-6Widening Current Account Deficit Chart II-7The BRL Is Not Cheap Meanwhile, the nation’s foreign debt obligations – the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months – are at $190 billion, all-time highs. As the real depreciates, foreign currency debtors (companies and banks) will rush to acquire dollars or hedge their dollar liabilities. This will reinforce the weakening trend in the currency. Finally, the Brazilian real is not cheap - it is close to fair value (Chart II-7). Hence, valuation will not prevent currency depreciation. Bottom Line: We are initiating a short BRL / long US dollar trade. Investors should remain neutral on Brazil within EM equity, local bonds and sovereign credit portfolios. Investors with long-term horizon should consider the following strategy: long the Bovespa, short the real. This is a bet that Brazil will succeed in reflating the economy at the detriment of the currency. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Processing trade includes imports of goods that undergo further processing before being re-exported. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights Global High-Yield: The widening of US Caa-rated high-yield spreads is narrowly focused in Energy-related companies. The conditions for a spillover into the broader junk bond market (tight monetary policy, tightening lending standards & deteriorating corporate health) are not currently in place. Stay overweight high-yield in both the US and euro area, where Caa-rated spreads have also widened. Australia: A sluggish economy and soggy inflation, with little evidence of an imminent turnaround, imply that the Reserve Bank of Australia may not be done with its rate cutting cycle. Maintain an overweight stance on Australian sovereign debt relative to global benchmarks. Feature There’s Nothing To “Caa” Here The clouds of pessimism on global growth, and financial markets, continue to slowly dissipate. The global manufacturing PMI has clearly bottomed, our rising global leading economic indicator is signaling more upside for the first half of 2020, equity markets worldwide are grinding higher, volatility is subdued, while corporate credit spreads in the US and Europe remain generally tight. Yet within the corporate bond market, a peculiar dynamic has emerged. We do not see a reason to extrapolate the weakness in lower-rated US junk bonds into a broader macro issue for the corporate bond market, and the US economy. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) for the overall Bloomberg Barclays US high-yield (HY) index now sits at 376bps. While this spread is relatively narrow from a longer-term perspective, investors may have become more discerning about credit risk. Lower-rated HY has dramatically underperformed higher-rated HY debt of late, with the US Caa-rated OAS now sitting at 985bps compared to Ba-rated spreads of 196bps (Chart of the Week). The divergence across credit tiers is unprecedented, in that Caa spreads are widening while Ba spreads are narrowing – typically, spreads move in tandem directionally, both in bull and bear markets for US junk bonds. The widening of US Caa-rated junk bond spreads has started to raise concerns that this is a “canary in the coal mine” signaling future financial stress among US corporate borrowers. Yet the same dynamic is occurring in euro area HY, with Caa-rated and Ba-rated spreads tracking the US on an almost tick-for-tick basis. In a report published yesterday, our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy investigated the history of Caa spread widenings dating back to 1996.1 They noted that Caa spread widening has typically been a good predictor of one-year-ahead negative excess returns for the overall US junk bond index. However, there has never been a period like today where Caa spreads have widened while overall HY spreads have remained stable. Chart of the WeekSome Odd Divergences In Global Credit We do not see a reason to extrapolate the weakness in lower-rated US junk bonds into a broader macro issue for the corporate bond market, and the US economy, for two main reasons: Chart 2Lower Energy Prices Hurt Lower Rated US HY 1) The widening is focused on Energy related debt The widening of US Caa-rated spreads in 2019 has occurred alongside a parallel increase in the spreads of Energy-related companies in the US junk bond universe (Chart 2). A similar trend played out during the 2014/15 HY bear phase, which was triggered by the collapse of world oil prices that ravaged the US shale oil industry which dominated the lower-rated tiers of the junk bond market. In 2019, oil prices have declined, although not as dramatically, and HY Energy spreads have widened but to nowhere near the levels seen five years ago. More importantly, non-Energy junk spreads remain very subdued and stable, unlike the case in 2014/15 (bottom panel). When looking at the 2019 year-to-date excess returns for the Bloomberg Barclays US HY index, it is clear that the overall negative returns for the Caa-rated bucket have been driven by the lagging performance of Energy names (Chart 3). The rest of the market has generally been delivering solid excess returns. Chart 3Contribution To 2019 YTD US HY Excess Returns* 2) The widening has not been confirmed by signals from other reliable credit cycle indicators We believe that, from a top-down macro perspective, corporate credit performance in the US is influenced by three main factors: the state of US corporate health, the stance of the Fed’s monetary policy and the trend in lending standards for US banks. We have dubbed this our “Credit Checklist”, and we present a version of that checklist for US high-yield in Chart 4. Chart 4Conditions Not In Place For A Broad US HY Selloff Our “bottom-up” US HY Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) aggregates, for a sample set of US HY issuers, published financial ratios that are typically used to determine the creditworthiness of borrowers – measures like interest coverage, operating margins and leverage. The US HY CHM is currently at a “neutral” reading (2nd panel), unlike past periods where Caa-rated spreads widened sharply: during the early 2000s telecom bust, the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices. The readings for the three components of our US HY Credit Checklist are all at neutral levels, suggesting that there is no fundamental underpinning at the moment for a sustained increase in US HY spreads. Yet another reason why the latest widening of Caa-rated spreads looks unusual. Turning to measures of the stance of US monetary policy, we look at both the slope of the US Treasury curve (2-year vs 10-year) and the gap between the real fed funds rate and the New York Fed’s estimate of the neutral “r-star” rate. Prior to the early 2000s and 2008 blowout in Caa spreads, the Fed had pushed the real funds rate into restrictive territory above r-star, and the Treasury curve subsequently inverted. That was not the case during the 2014/15 Caa widening, as the Fed was only beginning to transition away from its QE/zero-rate era at that time. Currently, the real funds rate is right at r-star, and the Treasury curve is very flat but not inverted, indicating a broadly neutral monetary policy stance. Finally, we look at data from the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey to evaluate lending standards for US banks. On that front, the latest reading on standards for commercial and industrial loans showed a very modest tightening in the third quarter of 2019, but the overall level remains broadly neutral – unlike the sharp tightening of conditions seen in the early 2000s and 2008 (and the modest tightening in 2014/15). The readings for the three components of our US HY Credit Checklist are all at neutral levels, suggesting that there is no fundamental underpinning at the moment for a sustained increase in US HY spreads. Yet another reason why the latest widening of Caa-rated spreads looks unusual, rather than a sign of future stress in US credit markets. We even see a similar dynamic at work in the euro area. In Chart 5, we present a Credit Checklist for euro area HY, using the same indicators that go into our US HY Credit Checklist. The readings here are even more positive for corporate credit performance than in the US. Our euro area bottom-up HY CHM is showing no deterioration of euro area corporate health, the real ECB policy rate is well below the estimate of r-star, the German yield curve is not inverted and the ECB’s survey of euro area bank lending standards showed a modest easing in the third quarter. Just like in the US, the fundamental backdrop does not argue for a sustained period of euro area HY spread widening, making the latest move higher in euro area Caa spreads as unusual as the move in US Caa. We cannot even blame lower oil prices for the spread widening, as Energy represents only a tiny fraction of the euro area HY market, compared to the large weighting of Energy borrowers in the US junk bond universe. Chart 5Conditions Not In Place For A Broad European HY Selloff We suspect that the correlation between US and euro area HY spreads, by credit tier, has more to do with the increased correlation of trading within global credit markets. Or perhaps it is a sign of investors staying cautious and staying up in quality, even within the riskier HY market. Whatever the reason, we see little fundamental reason to expect the widening of Caa-rated spreads to leak into the broader high-yield market. In fact, if oil prices begin to move higher again, as our commodity strategists are expecting for 2020, that might create a tactical buying opportunity in Caa-rated junk bonds in both the US and euro area. In the meantime, we see no reason to change our recommended overweight stance on US and euro area HY corporate bonds, even with the widening of lower-rated spreads. Bottom Line: The recent widening of US Caa-rated high-yield spreads is narrowly focused in Energy-related companies. The conditions for a spillover into the broader junk bond market (tight monetary policy, tightening lending standards & deteriorating corporate health) are not currently in place. Stay overweight high-yield in both the US and euro area, where Caa-rated spreads have also widened. Australia: The RBA May Not Be Done Yet The rally in Australian government bonds has been driven by the dovish policy response from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to weak economic growth and tepid inflation – a backdrop that is showing little sign of reversing quickly. We have maintained a recommended overweight investment stance on Australian government bonds since December 19, 2017. Since then, the yield on Bloomberg Barclays Australian Treasury index has declined by -140bps, sharply outperforming bonds in the other developed markets and ending Australia’s long-time status as a “high-yielding” developed economy bond market (Chart 6). The rally in Australian government bonds has been driven by the dovish policy response from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to weak economic growth and tepid inflation – a backdrop that is showing little sign of reversing quickly. The central bank has already cut interest rates by 75bps this year, taking the Cash Rate down to a record low of 0.75%. At the November 5th monetary policy meeting, the RBA held off on additional easing but still delivered what was perceived by the market to be a dovish surprise, emphasizing persistently below-target inflation and potential downside risks stemming from the housing market. The door was kept wide open for further rate cuts, if necessary. RBA Governor Philip Lowe has even discussed the possibility that the RBA may have to cut rates to the zero bound and start buying assets via quantitative easing to try and restore inflation back to the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% target band. Chart 6Australian Bonds Have Outperformed Sharply The RBA’s dovishness is justified, given sluggish economic growth and tepid inflation. Real GDP growth slowed sharply in the first half of 2019 to a meager 1.4% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 7). Consumer sentiment and business confidence remain depressed, having both declined since the start of the year. The former is being hit by weak house prices and sub-par income growth, while the latter is suffering under the weight of weaker demand from Australia’s most important trade partner, China. In addition, persistent drought conditions in much of the country have pushed up food prices and brought down incomes related to the farming sector. Chart 7Sluggish Australian Domestic Demand Chart 8From Boom To Bust In Australian Housing A bellwether for the Australian economy, the housing market, has not fared much better (Chart 8). Building approvals for new dwelling units have fallen almost 20% since September of last year, while house prices in the major cities have been contracting since the fourth quarter of 2017. Responding to easy financial conditions in Australia and the rest of the world, the standard variable mortgage rate has now fallen to a 60-year low. It remains to be seen how quickly the housing market will turn around and when that, in turn, will lift dwelling investment, but the RBA cuts in 2019 should give a bit of a lift to Australian housing in 2020. As in other developed markets, trade uncertainty and fears of a recession have made Australian firms more hesitant to invest. Real private business investment is now falling in year-over-year terms, even with the boost to the terms of trade (and corporate profits) from the increase in prices for Australia’s most important commodities seen in 2019 (Chart 9). That impact may be starting to fade, however. The price for iron ore – a major Australian commodity export – has already fallen 28% from the 2019 peak. In addition, Chinese iron ore imports from Australia are contracting in year-over-terms, even with Chinese growth starting to show signs of stabilization in response to stimulus measures implemented earlier this year. Those is an ominous signal for Australian growth, given the massive swing in net exports seen this year. Chart 9Terms Of Trade Turning Negative For Australian Capex Chart 10An Unsustainable Lift From Net Exports Driven by the persistent depreciation of the Australian dollar, and supportive terms of trade, the Australian trade balance has reached its highest value as a percent of nominal GDP (3.7%) since 1959, when quarterly data began (Chart 10). The surge has come almost entirely from the export side, occurring alongside the boost to commodity prices that was concentrated in iron ore, and looks both unsustainable and unrepeatable on a rate-of-change basis. Slowing Australian economic momentum has also impacted the labor market. Employment growth is slowing and the unemployment rate has ticked up to 5.3% from a cyclical low of 5% in February 2019 (Chart 11). The so-called “underemployment rate”, is a much higher 8.5%, indicating that there is still ample slack in the Australian labor market as workers are working fewer hours than they wish (and are hence, “underemployed”). The underemployment rate is negatively correlated to wage growth, suggesting that the modest upturn in the latter seen since the end of 2016 is likely to cool off (bottom panel). Chart 11Some Softening In The Australian Labor Market Chart 12Australian Inflation Remains Subdued The RBA has already warned that wage growth expectations may have become anchored at a lower level given the anemic growth over the past several years. That mirrors the trend seen in overall price inflation. Headline CPI inflation was only 1.6% in the third quarter of 2019, as was the “trimmed mean” CPI inflation rate that is favored by the RBA. Both are below the bottom end of the RBA’s target range of 2-3%, as are survey-based expectations of short-term inflation (Chart 12). The previously mentioned drought conditions have put some upward pressure on overall inflation via grocery food prices, but that is expected to be transitory. With depressed house prices and ongoing issues with spare capacity in the labor market, longer-term market-based inflation expectations, captured by the 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap rate, have dipped below the 2% level. The combination of weakening growth and soggy inflation poses a problem for the RBA, as it tries to use monetary policy tools to reverse those trends at a time when Australian banks have seen an unprecedented level of scrutiny of their lending practices. Australian banks have been under the harsh political spotlight after the government’s Royal Commission on misconduct in the financial industry released its findings back in February of this year. Many banks were exposed for serious violations, including money laundering and “improperly” selling financial products to households. Several top bank executives lost their jobs as a result, with the overall industry duly chastised and humbled. Australian banks remain well capitalized, following the path of most developed market banks in response to the Basel III reforms, while non-performing loans remain modest. Yet the risk moving forward is that Australian banks become more prudent in their lending practices after the public “flogging” they received this year, which may impair the transmission mechanism from low RBA policy rates to increased loan growth - and, eventually, faster economic activity. Already, private credit growth has slowed sharply, with the sharpest declines coming for housing and business lending (Chart 13). Investment implications for Australian bonds In the case of Australia, however, the underlying economy and inflation trends still point to a possibility that the RBA will have to ease again sometime in the next few months – a move that is unlikely to be matched in the other major developed markets. This likely means that Australian government bonds can continue to outperform in 2020. Despite signs that the global economy is starting to bottom out after the 2019 downturn, the momentum in Australian economic growth and inflation remains tepid. This suggests that Australian sovereign debt is likely to continue outperforming global peers on a relative basis over the next 6-12 months. Our RBA Monitor continues to signal that more interest rate cuts from the RBA are needed. Yet the Australian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve now discounts only 19bps of rate cuts over the next year (Chart 14). This mirrors the trend seen in other developed interest rate markets, as investors have shifted to pricing out the dovish policy expectations as global growth starts to improve. Chart 13Weakening Loan Demand, But No Credit Crunch Chart 14Stay Overweight Australian Government Bonds In the case of Australia, however, the underlying economy and inflation trends still point to a possibility that the RBA will have to ease again sometime in the next few months – a move that is unlikely to be matched in the other major developed markets. This likely means that Australian government bonds can continue to outperform in 2020. We advise staying strategically overweight Australian government bonds in global fixed income portfolios. Bottom Line: A sluggish economy and soggy inflation, with little evidence of an imminent turnaround, imply that the Reserve Bank of Australia may not be done with its rate cutting cycle. Maintain an overweight stance on Australian sovereign debt relative to global benchmarks. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Global borrowing rates will rise, but only to a limited extent. Rightly or not, major central banks are terrified by the prospect of the Japanification of their economies. Practically speaking, this means that they want inflation expectations to move back up…
Global growth expectations for oil demand are diverging sharply in the lead-up to OPEC 2.0’s December 5 meeting in Vienna. At the low end, the US EIA expects 2019 growth of 760k b/d this year, a sharply lower estimate than OPEC or the IEA projections. We…
Highlights Lingering weakness evident in fundamental supply-demand data will fade next year, and with it the downward pressure on oil prices. Price risk is skewed to the upside: Continued monetary accommodation from systematically important central banks and fiscal stimulus will revive oil demand; OPEC 2.0 production restraint and market-imposed discipline in the US will slow the growth of oil supply. Shale-oil supply growth also is threatened by flaring of associated natural gas in the Bakken and Permian basins. Failure to limit the burn-off into the atmosphere at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth. Elevated geopolitical tensions cannot be ignored, particularly as economic and political discontent boils over in Iraq and Iran, where leaders could feel compelled to lash out. To the downside, global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated. It continues to keep the USD well bid. This raises consumers’ local-currency costs in the EM economies driving demand growth, and lowers production costs ex-US, incentivizing supply growth at the margin. Weaker 2019 data showing up in demand and upward revisions to inventories pushed our 4Q19 Brent forecast down to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. We continue to expect WTI will trade $4/bbl below Brent. Feature In the multi-level game that drives the political economy of oil, domestic and international factors shaping supply-demand fundamentals are always shifting. As multiple constituencies vie for advantage, market participants will be forced to grapple with the consequences of policies now under consideration. The bullet points above provide a restricted aperture through which to view some of the issues currently in play.1 Markets are responding favorably to the unwinding of tighter global financial conditions this year brought about by tighter US monetary policy last year, and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. Demand-side impacts of policy shifts and policy signaling remain the most prominent feature of fundamental adjustments markets will continue to grapple with, as fall-out from the Sino-US trade war; political discontent in DM and EM electorates; and ad hoc economic policy raise global economic policy uncertainty. Markets are responding favorably to the unwinding of tighter global financial conditions this year brought about by tighter US monetary policy last year, and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. This is most visible in our global Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs), particularly in EM economies, although DM demand also looks like it could pick up (Chart of the Week). For the real economy, it is useful to remember Milton Friedman’s “long and variable lags” regarding the effects of monetary policy and how they affect oil markets.2 Chart of the WeekGlobal LEIs Point To Demand Recovery Chart 2BCA's EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Points Toward Upturn in Oil Demand EM growth is hugely important to global oil-demand growth in our analysis. Our proprietary EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast continues to indicate EM economies are responding to easier global financial conditions (Chart 2).3 Global growth expectations for oil demand are diverging sharply in the lead-up to OPEC 2.0’s December 5 meeting in Vienna. At the low end, the US EIA expects 2019 growth of 760k b/d this year, a sharply lower estimate than the agency’s co-eval institutions; OPEC is closing in on the 1mm b/d growth threshold at 0.98mm b/d, followed by the IEA at 1mm b/d. We lowered our estimate of oil-demand growth this year to 1.1mm b/d, in line with weaker consumption data being reported by these big agencies. Shale-oil production growth faces an additional risk from the flaring of associated natural gas in the Permian and Bakken basins. We are maintaining our expectation for growth of 1.4mm b/d next year, which is close to the EIA’s estimate (Chart 3). The IEA’s estimate for 2020 stays at 1.2mm b/d, while OPEC’s is just under 1.1mm b/d. On the supply side, we expect lower US shale-oil output growth next year. Lower prices, backwardated WTI futures curves – which results in lower forward prices for producers hedging their output – and recalcitrant investors who are unwilling to commit capital to all but the most profitable shale-oil producers will take their toll (Chart 4). As a result, we expect US shale output to reach ~ 9.35mm b/d on average next year in the Big Five basins (Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken, Niobrara and Anadarko). This leads to an 800k b/d increase in our US lower 48 output over this year’s levels, which is down from our earlier estimate of a 900k b/d increase. Chart 3Stronger Oil Demand, Tighter Supply Will Lift Oil Prices in 2020 Chart 4Lower Prices, Backwardated WTI Curve Lead to Lower Rig Count, Shale-Oil Output Shale-oil production growth faces an additional risk from the flaring of associated natural gas in the Permian and Bakken basins. Failure to limit the burn-off into the atmosphere at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth, as the electorate grows increasingly restive with the practice. Industry officials in Texas and North Dakota – home to the Permian and Bakken plays – already have been sounding the alarm on this issue.4 According to Rystad Energy, flaring reached another record high in the Permian at 752 million cubic feet per day in 3Q19 amid growing oil production. Lastly, we continue to follow events in Iraq and Iran closely where economic and political discontent with the status quo has led to civil unrest. We also are penciling in an extension of OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm-barrel-per-day output cut to year-end 2020. Over-compliance likely persists, particularly from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Stronger non-OPEC output from Norway and Brazil offsets this somewhat (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Lastly, we continue to follow events in Iraq and Iran closely where economic and political discontent with the status quo has led to civil unrest. As our colleague Roukaya Ibrahim notes, “The country continues to be plagued by high unemployment, corruption, and an utter lack of basic services … . This has ultimately resulted in a lack of confidence in Iraqi leadership who are being increasingly perceived as benefiting from the status quo at the expense of the populace.”5 There is an underlying tension within the society between Iraqi forces loyal to Iran’s Shia theocracy and Iraqis seeking full autonomy for their country. “The widening rift between the rival Iraqi Shia blocs implies that any détente will be temporary,” according to BCA’s geopolitical strategists. We have consistently maintained markets are too complacent regarding these geopolitical risks, which also encompass US-Iran hostilities in the Persian Gulf. We are reducing our 4Q19 Brent forecast to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. That said, our balances still reflect the lingering demand weakness discussed above, and continue to work through higher inventories. In line with revisions by the EIA to historical inventory levels and lower demand growth, we are reducing our 4Q19 Brent forecast to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl (Chart 5). We continue to expect WTI will trade $4/bbl below Brent (Chart 6). Chart 5Storage Revisions Help Weaken Price Forecasts Chart 6BCA 2020 Oil Price Forecasts Fall Slightly To $67/bbl For Brent, $63/bbl For WTI Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Persists While accommodative monetary policy and stimulative fiscal policy will foster a revival in commodity demand, global economic uncertainty remains elevated.6 This risks keeping the broad trade-weighted USD index for goods (TWIBG) well bid (Chart 7). This raises consumers’ local-currency costs in the EM economies driving growth, and lowers production costs ex-US, incentivizing supply growth at the margin. Chart 7Elevated Global Economic Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid, Retards Demand We remain confident the combination of global monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus will revive commodity demand. However, given the economic uncertainty confronting policymakers globally, this revival likely will be modest. As the multi-level game dominating the evolution of the political economy of the oil market becomes more complex and uncertain – particularly in re the Sino-US trade war and domestic politics in systemically important economies – monetary and fiscal policy have an additional headwind to battle in the attempt to revive aggregate commodity demand. Bottom Line: We remain confident the combination of global monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus will revive commodity demand. However, given the economic uncertainty confronting policymakers globally, this revival likely will be modest, with oil prices rising ~ 10% next year. That said, if the phase-one Sino-US trade deal leads to a phase-two and –three – i.e., a durable resolution to the trade imbroglio and political discontent roiling markets, the recovery could be more significant.7 Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Trade-related news continues to drive short-term price movements. On Tuesday, Brent prices fell 2.5% on rising pessimism about the US-China “phase one” deal. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0 countries will meet in early December to assess whether the group should extend – and possibly deepen – output cuts. Russia signaled it is unlikely to support deeper cuts, but appears to be open to extending the current quotas until year-end 2020. Our updated global oil market balances assume OPEC 2.0 will agree to extend the current production curbs. Separately, anti-government protests in Basra, Iraq, are impacting the oil sector. On Monday, protesters reportedly blocked roads leading to the major oil fields and to commodity export terminals. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper prices seem detached from their current fundamentals, moving up and down with expectations related to the US-China trade war and ongoing protests in Chile – the world’s largest copper producer. Negative sentiment has weighed on copper most of this year. Speculative short positioning reached a high of 137k contracts in August, pushing our Copper Composite Indicator into “oversold” territory. Going forward, the metal’s fundamentals will support higher prices; quarter-to-date copper prices increased 3.5%. Global visible copper inventories resumed their downward trend in 2H19 – reaching a 10-year low. We expect global growth to pick up in the coming months – led by emerging economies. Risks are skewed to the upside. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices recovered to $1475/oz after trading close to our $1450/oz stop-loss last week. Slightly weaker real rates in the US and ratcheted-up trade tensions supported the yellow metal’s price this week. Over the short term, prices could be pushed lower as markets await positive developments re a Sino - US trade agreement. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Corn futures traded lower earlier in the week, but rebounded slightly Tuesday after the USDA Crop Progress reported the harvest rate for it was 76%, which was below analysts’ expectations of 77% and well below the five-year average of 92%. Wheat performed better, marking a 0.9% weekly increase in March futures on the back of a lower percentage of the crop being rated good or excellent by the USDA. Finally, soybeans were flat throughout the week but fell almost 0.8% on Wednesday, amid reports that a phase-one trade deal between US and China may not be completed by the end of 2019. Footnotes 1 Understanding and balancing these interests is difficult, as is forecasting outcomes. Please see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988). 2 Friedman’s classic paper, “The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy,” appeared in the Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Oct., 1961). Our own research suggests these lags range from six to 18 months in commodity markets. 3 Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast uses our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and our Global Commodity Factor (GCF) and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models to characterize the current state of commodity demand. The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity, which is highly correlated with trade-related activity. The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different commodity prices traded globally. Lastly, the EMIV model is driven by EM import volumes, which are highly correlated with income; as income rises, oil demand – and commodity demand in general – rises. Please our report entitled Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand, which was published October 31, 2019, for additional discussion. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Concerns over associated natural-gas flaring into the atmosphere are rising in the shale-oil community, as political discontent with the practice grows. Please see Gas Flaring “Running Rampant” In The Permian, published by oilprice.com, and New Initiative will Map and Measure Methane Emissions Across the Permian Basin, a press release issued by the Environmental Defense Fund outlining their initiative to install methane emissions-monitoring gear around the Permian to begin logging the massive amount of flaring in that basin. According to the Oil & Gas Journal, “… collective volumes of flared and vented gas from (the Permian and Bakken) basins up to about 1.15 bcfd. For comparative purposes, that represents 12 billion cu m/year of wasted gas, which exceeds the yearly gas demand of nations such as Israel, Colombia, and Romania.” Please see Permian gas flaring, venting reaches record high published by the OGJ June 4, 2019. Please see Permian gas flaring reaches yet another high, published by Rystad Energy on its website November 5, 2019. 4 S&P Global Platts posted an interesting podcast on its website featuring an interview with Lynn Helms, director of the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources. He said flaring in the Bakken – where production is hitting record highs – will force state regulators to throttle back on the rate of shale-production growth beginning in 2Q20, when growth could slow substantially if gas-capture technologies are not deployed. Growth could remain subdued for 2020-21, he said. Please see North Dakota’s record oil growth to be upended by flaring rules, posted November 18, 2019. 5 Please see Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated, published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy November 8, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 We measure uncertainty using the Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index. This is a GDP-weighted index of newspaper headlines containing a list of words related to economic policy uncertainty, which are found in newspapers and articles online from 20 countries representing almost 80% of global GDP are scoured for reports reflecting economic uncertainty. Please see our October 17 and October 31, 2019, reports Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth and Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand for the original research on this topic. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 This is not our base case. Our geopolitical strategists expect a temporary ceasefire in the trade war, but doubt that a “grand compromise” leading to a new period of US-China economic engagement will emerge from the negotiations. Strategic tensions will keep rising on a secular basis between the two countries. Please see BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy weekly report entitled How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
Highlights Stock markets are set to produce low single digit returns in 2020. Favour stocks over bonds and cash, especially where bond yields are zero or negative – specifically, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. Underweight zero and negative yielding high-quality bonds versus higher yielding bonds – for example, underweight Swiss bonds versus US T-bonds. Favour lower yielding currencies because the central bank loses the ability to depress its own currency. For 2020, our preferred expression of this is long SEK/USD. The biggest risk in 2020 is if the global bond yield were to rise towards 2.5 percent exposing the fragility of risk-asset prices to higher bond yields. The $400 trillion global risk-asset edifice dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy by five to one. Fractal trade: Short Ireland (ISEQ 20) versus Europe (Stoxx Europe 600). Feature For all the talk of economic growth driving stock markets, the big story through 2018-19 has been bond yields driving stock markets. This is true in Europe as well as more broadly – and it is very easy to demonstrate by decomposing the stock market price into its two components: the underlying profits (earnings per share) and the valuation multiple paid for those profits (Chart of the Week). Chart of the Week2018 And 2019 Were All About Valuations. What About 2020? 2018 And 2019 Were All About Valuations Contrast 2018-19 with 2017. In 2017, the stock market’s stellar return came almost entirely from growth – profits surged while the multiple drifted sideways. But in 2018 and 2019, the story was all about valuation multiples – profits drifted sideways while the multiple plunged in 2018, and then symmetrically surged in 2019 (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Decomposing Stock Market Performance... Chart I-3...Into Valuation And Profits The cause of the stock market multiple contraction and re-expansion was the dramatic swing in bond yields. This is hardly surprising given that the prospective return on bonds drives the prospective return on competing long-duration assets, like equities and real-estate. Higher bond yields require a higher prospective return on equities, meaning a lower valuation multiple, while lower bond yields require a higher valuation multiple. In driving the swing in bond yields, the principal player was the Federal Reserve. Again, this is hardly surprising given that the ECB and BoJ are stuck on the side lines with monetary policy already locked at ‘maximum accommodative’, while the Fed can still move the lever in both directions. The cause of the stock market multiple contraction and re-expansion was the dramatic swing in bond yields. Through 2018-2019, the 10-year T-bond yield took a round trip from around 2 percent to 3.3 percent and then down again to around 2 percent where it stands today. This explains the mirror-image round trip in the stock market’s multiple: from 16 down to 13 and then back up again to 16 where it stands today (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Round Trip In The T-Bond Yield Explains The Round Trip In The Stock Market's Valuation Admittedly, the Fed’s dramatic pivot was influenced by the trade war, and the perceived threat to global growth. But two other considerations loomed large: the persistent undershoot of inflation versus its 2 percent target; and the fragility of risk-asset valuations – and thereby financial conditions – to higher bond yields. Bear in mind that the value of global risk-assets at over $400 trillion now dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy by a factor of five to one. So the main danger is not that economic imbalances and fragilities will drag down the financial markets; the main danger is that financial market imbalances and fragilities will drag down the economy – as we painfully felt in 2000, 2007, and 2011. The Valuation And Growth Outlook In 2020 The two key investment questions for 2020 are: What will happen to bond yields, and what will happen to stock market profits? Starting with bond yields, most of the major central banks are, to repeat, out of play. Leaving the Fed as the principal player. But at the last press conference, Jay Powell, made it crystal clear that the Fed is also out of play for the time being, at least when it comes to raising rates. “We've just touched 2 percent core inflation, and then we've fallen back. So, I think we would need to see a really significant move up in inflation that's persistent before we even consider raising rates to address inflation concerns.” Reinforcing this, Powell also hinted at introducing a potential ‘tolerance band’ around the 2 percent inflation target – perhaps 1.5-2.5 percent – before the central bank would need to react. “We're also, as part of our review, looking at potential innovations… changes to the framework that would be more supportive of achieving inflation on a symmetric 2 percent basis over time… these changes to monetary policy frameworks don't happen really quickly (but)… I think we'll wrap it up around the middle of next year. I've some confidence in that.” What about profits – could 2020 be a repeat of the 2017 stellar growth story? No, there are two reasons why it will be very difficult to repeat the 2017 story on profits. The two reasons come from the two components of profits: sales and profit margins. Unlike in 2017, global sales will not start 2020 at the very depressed levels from which they can play a very strong catch-up. The first reason is that, unlike in 2017, global sales will not start 2020 at the very depressed levels from which they can play a very strong catch-up (Chart I-5). Significantly, the recession in global sales through 2015-16 was comparable to that suffered in 2008-09. The 2015-16 recession just hasn’t been well documented because it was essentially an emerging markets recession rather than the developed market recession of 2008-09. Chart I-5Global Sales Are Not Depressed The second reason is that today’s profit margins are still close to their structural and cyclical peak; whereas at the start of 2017, they were at a cyclical low (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Profit Margins Are Elevated Hence, the two components of profits – sales and profit margins – will start 2020 at elevated levels. The upshot is that profits can grow in 2020, but the growth will be pedestrian at best. Let’s summarise some of the key investment messages for 2020. High quality bond yields that are near the lower bound of -1 percent cannot go much lower, but those yields in the region of 2 percent cannot go significantly higher. It follows that fixed-income investors should underweight zero and negative yielding bonds versus higher yielding bonds – for example, underweight Swiss bonds versus US T-bonds. In a negative growth shock, T-bonds can still offer substantial capital gains but Swiss bonds cannot. For currencies, it is the opposite message. Favour lower yielding currencies because the central bank loses the ability to depress its own currency. For 2020, our preferred expression of this is long SEK/USD. Stock markets are set to produce low single digit returns. This is uninspiring, but in a world of low prospective returns from all major asset-classes, favour stocks over bonds and cash. This is especially true in those regions and countries where bond yields are zero or negative – specifically, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. Today’s profit margins are still close to their structural and cyclical peak The biggest risk to this view is if the global bond yield were to rise towards 2.5 percent exposing the fragility of the risk-asset edifice to higher bond yields. To repeat, the value of global risk-assets, at over $400 trillion, dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy. So the biggest risk comes from the valuation of global financial markets, it does not come from the global economy. More About Price To Sales Having completed our 20 paragraphs on 2020, we would like to follow up on the analysis in last week’s report: Are European Stocks Attractive? To recap, we found that price to sales is the stock market valuation metric that has the best predictive power for prospective returns – because unlike other metrics such as assets, profits, and cash flow, sales are quantifiable, unambiguous, and undistorted by profit margins. In last week’s report our prospective return forecasts were based on price to sales data sourced from Thomson Reuters. To which, several clients asked if the analysis would be the same using the price to sales data sourced from MSCI (Chart I-7). The answer is broadly yes. Chart I-8-Chart I-10 illustrate that: Chart I-7Despite The US, Germany, And Japan Trading On Different Valuations... Chart I-8...The Prospective Return From The US Is Low Single Digit... Chart I-9...The Prospective Return From Germany Is Low Single Digit... Chart I-10...The Prospective Return From Japan Is Low Single Digit... First, despite vastly different stock market valuations in Germany, Japan, and the US, the implied prospective 10-year annualised returns are almost identical. Second, the implied prospective returns from the MSCI calculated price to sales are slightly lower than from the Thomson Reuters data, because current MSCI valuations are closer to the dot com bubble peak. Third, this just reinforces the point that stock market valuations are very fragile to higher bond yields, as already discussed in our preceding 20 paragraphs on 2020. Fractal Trading System* This week we note that the strong outperformance of the Irish stock market is vulnerable to a correction based on its broken 65-day fractal structure. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short Ireland (ISEQ 20) versus Europe (Stoxx Europe 600). Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 4 percent. In other trades, we are pleased to report that long gold versus nickel achieved its 11 percent profit target and is now closed. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
The lagging performance of the DM component of our global LEI is consistent with the more subdued signals from the individual DM country data. The US LEI continues to drift lower, while the LEIs within the euro area for Germany, Italy and (most notably)…

