Labor Market
Highlights Fed: The Fed will be forced to clarify its definition of “maximum employment” in 2022, and the path of inflation will ultimately dictate how far the Fed tries to push the labor market. We expect Fed rate hikes to start in December 2022 and that the pace of hikes will proceed more quickly than is currently priced in the yield curve. Duration: Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration in anticipation of a rate hike cycle starting in December 2022. Yield Curve: Investors should position in Treasury curve flatteners. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. Feature Chart 1Bonds De-Coupled From Inflation In 2021 One of our themes this year is that US bond investors should pay more attention to the employment data than the inflation data.1 This is because the Fed has successfully convinced markets that it will not lift rates until “maximum employment” is achieved, even if inflation is strong.2 This story has played out during the past few months as bond yields have remained low despite surging prices (Chart 1). Our view is that the muted reaction in bonds is due to the widespread belief that the labor market remains far from “maximum employment” and that rate hikes are therefore a long way off. In this environment, only surprisingly strong employment prints can upset the market’s narrative and send bond yields higher. This playbook for the bond market will continue to function for the next few months. Strong employment data will pull bond yields higher and disappointing employment data will push them down. Inflation prints will be largely irrelevant for the market. But this will change next year. In fact, we see the employment data taking a back seat to the inflation data in the minds of bond investors in 2022. A More Explicit Definition of “Maximum Employment” Must Emerge In 2022 Almost everyone agrees that the US labor market is far from “maximum employment” today, but that will no longer be the case in 2022. The Appendix to this report shows the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth that is required to reach different possible definitions of “maximum employment” by a few specific future dates. For example, we calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 414 thousand would cause the unemployment rate to reach 3.8% and the labor force participation rate to reach 63% by the end of 2022. Our sense is that the US economy will be able to add more than 414 thousand jobs per month between now and December 2022. This means that if Fed officials believe that an unemployment rate of 3.8% and a participation rate of 63% meet the definition of “maximum employment”, then they will start to lift interest rates by then. This example sets the scene for what will become next year’s most important monetary policy debate. What constitutes “maximum employment”? Does our example of a 3.8% unemployment rate and a 63% participation rate meet the definition? Or does the Fed have different targets in mind? The Fed will be forced to clarify its position on the topic as the labor market gets closer to reasonable definitions of “maximum employment”. Our sense is that, as of now, there are a range of views on the committee with some FOMC participants taking a more hawkish view of how much slack is left in the labor market and some adopting a more dovish posture. We outline the differences between the hawkish and dovish positions below, but ultimately the path of inflation in 2022 will determine which camp wins out. If inflation remains high next year, then the Fed will be quicker to declare that the labor market is at “maximum employment”, and vice-versa. The Fed’s reliance on the inflation data to settle the argument of what constitutes “maximum employment” will make inflation the most important economic indicator for bond yields in 2022. Labor Market Slack: The Hawkish Case Chart 2The Unemployment Rate Is Falling Fast The hawkish case for the US labor market reaching “maximum employment” sooner rather than later was outlined nicely last month by our own Bank Credit Analyst.3 First, the Bank Credit Analyst points out that the US labor market was likely beyond “maximum employment” before COVID-19 struck. The implication being that the Fed may move to lift interest rates before the unemployment and participation rates fully recover their pre-pandemic levels. Notice that the unemployment rate (adjusted for the post-COVID surge in people employed but absent from work) was 3.5% in February 2020, well below the Congressional Budget Office’s 4.5% estimate of the natural rate of unemployment (Chart 2).4 Today, the adjusted unemployment rate is 5.5%, not that far above the 3.5%-4.5% range of FOMC participant estimates of the natural rate. If this year’s rate of decline continues, the unemployment rate will hit 4.5% by January 2022 and 3.5% by May 2022. Of course, we know that the Fed takes a broader view of labor market utilization than just the unemployment rate. In particular, we observed sharp declines in labor force participation rates across a wide range of demographic groups when the pandemic struck last year (Chart 3). While the Fed will want to see some improvement in labor force participation, it might be unrealistic to expect the overall labor force participation rate to return to its pre-pandemic level. This is because the aging of the US population imparts a structural downtrend to the participation rate. The dashed line in Chart 4 shows where the participation rate would be if the rate of labor force participation of every individual age cohort remained constant at its February 2020 level. Even in this case, the greater flow of people into the older age groups causes the part rate to fall over time. The message from Chart 4 is that even if the participation rates of every age cohort tracked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics rebound to their February 2020 levels, we would still only expect an overall participation rate of 62.8% by the end of 2022, significantly below the 63.3% seen in February 2020. Chart 3Labor Force Participation By Age Cohort Chart 4The Demographic Downtrend In Participation On top of the demographic argument, we also notice that the pandemic led to a surge in the number of retired people last year, a number that continues to rise quickly (Chart 5). While we should probably expect some increase in the flow of people coming out of retirement to re-join the labor force as the economy recovers, it’s also logical to assume that there will be at least some hysteresis among the retired population. That is, the longer someone is retired, the less likely they are to re-enter the labor force at all. To the extent that the increase in retired people is sticky, it may be ambitious to expect a full convergence of the 55-year+ part rate back to February 2020 levels (Chart 3, bottom panel). All else equal, this will cause the labor market to reach “maximum employment” more quickly than even our demographic trendline for participation suggests. Chart 5A Surge In Retirees The question of how many FOMC participants agree with the above arguments remains open, but our sense is that there are some who will be eager to declare that “maximum employment” has been achieved before we see a full rebound in the unemployment and participation rates back to pre-COVID levels. For example, Fed Vice-Chair Richard Clarida mentioned the “demographic trend” in labor force participation in his most recent speech.5 Also, Dallas Fed President Robert Kaplan said the following in a recent interview: We’ve had 3 million retirements since February 2020. […] Some of these workers will come back into the workforce, but some of these workers are 55 and older and they’re in reasonably good financial shape and COVID has caused them to re-think whether they really want to re-enter the workforce.6 Labor Market Slack: The Dovish Case There are also good arguments on the side of those who think that an appropriate definition of “maximum employment” involves an unemployment rate closer to 3.5% than 4.5% and a participation rate that does return to pre-COVID levels, and maybe even moves higher. First, a study from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City noted that the bulk of the recent increase in the number of retired people is explained, not by an increase in the number of retirements, but by a reduction in the flow of people from retirement back into the workforce (Chart 6).7 This suggests that pandemic-related health risks are the likely culprit behind the increase in the number of retired people, casting doubt on the idea that the increase in retired people will be sticky. Chart 6Increased Retirees: A Closer Look Second, there is a strong case to be made that even the February 2020 labor force participation rate is not high enough to meet the definition of “maximum employment”. If we look at the participation rates for 25-54 year old men and women, we see that both were in strong uptrends prior to the pandemic (Chart 7), and there is every reason to believe that they would have continued to move higher if COVID hadn’t cut the recovery short. Chart 7Part Rates Were Rising Pre-Pandemic Consider what some FOMC participants were saying prior to the pandemic: The strong labor market is also encouraging more people in their prime working years – ages 25 to 54 – to rejoin or remain in the labor force, […] So far, we have made up more than half the loss in the Great Recession, which translates to almost 2 million more people in the labor force. But prime age participation could still be higher. - Jerome Powell, November 20198 Whether participation will continue to increase in a tight labor market remains to be seen. But I note that male prime-age participation still remains below levels seen in previous business cycle expansions. - Richard Clarida, November 20199 In a more recent interview, Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari expressed skepticism about the idea that labor force participation is destined to remain in a long-run structural downtrend and said that he’s “not convinced we were actually at maximum employment before the COVID shock hit us.” He also said: Getting [labor force participation] and employment-to-population at least back to where they were before [the pandemic], but not necessarily even declaring victory when we do that. I think that’s a reasonable thing for us to try to achieve.10 Inflation: The Ultimate Argument Settler What the above arguments make clear is that there are good reasons to think that the US labor market will reach some policymakers’ definitions of “maximum employment” perhaps by as early as the middle of next year. However, there are also some policymakers who will adopt a more dovish view of what constitutes “maximum employment”. Ultimately, the path of inflation will determine which camp wins out. This is because the entire concept of “maximum employment” is only meaningful when viewed alongside inflation. If employment is pushed beyond its “maximum”, it definitionally means that labor market tightness is leading to unwanted inflationary pressures. With that in mind, the Fed will increasingly refer to the inflation data next year as it tries to make its definition of “maximum employment” more precise. Crucially, what will matter for the Fed (and for the bond market) is where inflation is next year, not where it is right now. Right now, core inflation is well above the Fed’s price stability target, but it is well known that the recent increase in inflation is concentrated in a few sectors – COVID-impacted services and autos – where prices will decelerate as post-pandemic bottlenecks ease (Chart 8). Just as the Fed ignored surging prices in those sectors this year, it will ignore plunging prices in those sectors next year. What will matter for monetary policy is whether core inflation excluding COVID-impacted services and autos remains contained or rises above levels consistent with the Fed’s target (Chart 8, bottom panel). The Fed will also be inclined to declare that “maximum employment” has been achieved if wage growth is accelerating. Currently, there is some evidence of rising wages but also some major supply bottlenecks in the labor market, as evidenced by the all-time high in job openings (Chart 9). Labor supply constraints should ease next year, but the Fed will be watching closely to see if wage growth moderates in kind or continues to increase. Chart 8Watch CPI (ex. COVID-Impacted Services And Autos) In 2022 Chart 9Watch Wages In 2022 Finally, the Fed will keep a close eye on inflation expectations next year. In particular, it will monitor the Common Inflation Expectations Index and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate (Chart 10). If either of these indicators break above levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target, then policymakers will be more inclined to think that “maximum employment” has been attained. Chart 10Watch Inflation Expectations In 2022 Bottom Line: The Fed will be forced to clarify its definition of “maximum employment” in 2022, and the path of inflation will ultimately dictate how far the Fed tries to push the labor market. The key indicators to monitor to decide when the Fed will declare that “maximum employment” has been attained are: core inflation excluding COVID-impacted services and autos, wage growth, inflation expectations and the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate (Chart 3, panel 2). Investment Implications For bond markets, the question of when the Fed decides that the labor market has reached “maximum employment” is crucial because it will determine the start of the next rate hike cycle. At present, the overnight index swap curve is priced for Fed liftoff in January 2023 and for a total of 78 bps of rate hikes by the end of 2023 (Chart 11). Chart 11Rate Hike Expectations Our expectation is that the Fed will start lifting rates in December 2022 and that rate hikes will proceed more quickly than what is currently priced in the market. The unemployment rate will be close to 3.5% by December 2022 and inflation will be sufficiently above the Fed’s target that policymakers will be inclined to view the labor market as at “maximum employment”. Investors should run below-benchmark duration in US bond portfolios to profit from this outcome. We also recommend that investors position for a flatter yield curve by the end of 2022. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. Table 1A shows fair value estimates for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year yields as of the end of 2022 assuming the market moves to price-in the following path for the fed funds rate: The first 25 bps rate hike occurs in December 2022 Rate hikes proceed at a pace of 100 bps per year The fed funds rate levels-off at a terminal rate of 2.08%11 Table 1ATreasury Curve Fair Value Estimates: December 2022 Liftoff Scenario In that example, the 2-year and 5-year yields both rise by much more than the 10-year yield and both exceed the change that is priced into the forward curve by more than the 10-year yield. Table 1B shows the results from a similar scenario, the only difference is that the liftoff date is pushed back to March 2023. Both the 2-year and 5-year yields also rise by more than the 10-year yield in this scenario, though the delayed liftoff dampens the relative upside in the 2-year yield. Table 1BTreasury Curve Fair Value Estimates: March 2023 Liftoff Scenario Bottom Line: Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and position in Treasury curve flatteners in anticipation of a rate hike cycle that will start in December 2022. Appendix: How Far From “Maximum Employment” And Fed Liftoff? Chart A1Defining “Maximum Employment” The Federal Reserve has promised that the funds rate will stay pinned at zero until the labor market returns to “maximum employment”. The Fed has not provided explicit guidance on the definition of “maximum employment”, but we deduce that “maximum employment” means that the Fed wants to see the U3 unemployment rate within a range consistent with its estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, currently 3.5% to 4.5%, and that it wants to see a more or less complete recovery of the labor force participation rate back to February 2020 levels (Chart A1). Alternatively, we can infer definitions of “maximum employment” from the New York Fed’s Surveys of Primary Dealers and Market Participants. These surveys ask respondents what they think the unemployment and labor force participation rates will be at the time of Fed liftoff. Currently, the median respondent from the Survey of Market Participants expects an unemployment rate of 3.5% and a participation rate of 63%. The median respondent from the Survey of Primary Dealers expects an unemployment rate of 3.8% and a participation rate of 62.8%. Tables A1-A4 present the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth required to reach different combinations of unemployment rate and participation rate by specific future dates. For example, if we use the definition of “maximum employment” from the Survey of Market Participants, then we need to see average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of +414k in order to hit “maximum employment” by the end of 2022. Table A1Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 4.5% By The Given Date Table A2Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 4% By The Given Date Table A3Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 3.5% By The Given Date Table A4Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required To Reach “Maximum Employment” As Defined By Survey Respondents Chart A2 presents recent monthly nonfarm payroll growth along with target levels based on the Survey of Market Participants’ definition of “maximum employment”. This chart is to help us track progress toward specific liftoff dates. For example, if monthly nonfarm payroll growth continues to print at the same level as last month, then we could anticipate a Fed rate hike by June 2022. Chart A2Tracking Toward Fed Liftoff We will continue to track these charts and tables in the coming months, and will publish updates after the release of each monthly employment report. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Watch Employment, Not Inflation”, dated June 15, 2021. 2 Specifically, the Fed’s forward guidance states that it will not lift interest rates until (i) inflation is above 2%, (ii) inflation is expected to remain above 2% for some time and (iii) the labor market has reached “maximum employment”. 3 Please see Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “The Return To Maximum Employment: It May Be Faster Than You Think”, dated August 26, 2021. 4 For details on the adjustment we make to the unemployment rate please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Overreaction”, dated July 13, 2021. 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20210804a.htm 6 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-09/dallas-fed-president-rob-kaplan-on-the-economy-and-monetary-policy-right-now?sref=Ij5V3tFi 7 https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/economic-bulletin/what-has-driven-the-recent-increase-in-retirements/ 8 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20191125a.htm 9 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20191114a.htm 10 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-16/neel-kashkari-on-the-fed-s-quest-to-get-to-full-employment?srnd=oddlots-podcast&sref=Ij5V3tFi 11 We assume a target range of 2% to 2.25% for the terminal fed funds rate. We also assume that the effective fed funds rate trades 8 bps above the lower-end of its target band, as is presently the case. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns
Highlights Stocks tend to perform worse when unemployment is low. Since 1950, the S&P 500 has risen at an annualized pace of 12% when the unemployment rate was above its historic average compared to 6% when the unemployment rate was below its average. Three reasons help explain this relationship: 1) The unemployment rate has historically been mean-reverting; 2) Low unemployment often leads to monetary tightening; and 3) Valuations are usually more stretched when unemployment is low. In the spring of 2020, stocks benefited from what turned out to be a very auspicious environment: A steady decline in the unemployment rate from very high levels, assisted by a massive dose of monetary and fiscal stimulus. Today, the situation is less clear-cut. The labor market has improved dramatically, while both monetary and fiscal policy are turning less accommodative. Nevertheless, the Fed is unlikely to hike rates for at least 12 months, and it will take much longer than that for monetary policy to turn restrictive. This suggests that we are still in the middle-to-late stages of a business cycle expansion that began following the Great Recession (and was only briefly interrupted by the pandemic). Historically, cyclical stocks have done well during this phase of the business cycle. To the extent that cyclicals are overrepresented in overseas indices, investors should favor non-US stock markets. Non-US stocks also trade at a substantial valuation discount to their US peers. A Surprising Relationship One of the best pieces of advice I received when I was starting my research career was to get to the punchline as soon as possible. As a strategist, you are not writing a detective novel where the answers are shrouded in mystery until the very end. You are providing conclusions to readers with supporting evidence. Chart 1Stocks Do Best When Unemployment Is High With that in mind, let me answer the question posed in the title of this report: Is low unemployment good or bad for stocks? As Chart 1 shows, the answer is bad. The interesting issues are why it is bad and what this may mean for investors today. There are three key reasons why low unemployment has typically corresponded with paltry equity returns: The unemployment rate has historically been mean-reverting: Low unemployment is often followed by high unemployment. And, when the unemployment rate starts rising, it keeps rising. There has never been a case in the post-war era where the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession occurring (Chart 2). Chart 2When Unemployment Starts Rising, It Usually Keeps Rising Low unemployment often leads to monetary tightening: An economy can only grow at an above-trend pace if there is labor market slack. Once the slack runs out, growth is liable to weaken as supply-side constraints kick in. Worse yet, labor market overheating has historically prompted central banks to raise rates (Chart 3). Higher rates in the context of slowing growth is toxic for stocks. Valuations are usually more stretched when unemployment is low: During the post-war period, the S&P 500 has traded at an average Shiller P/E ratio of 22.5 when the unemployment rate was below its historic average compared to 16.3 when the unemployment rate was above its average. Implications For The Present Day Stocks fare best when unemployment is high but falling. In contrast, stocks fare the worst when unemployment is low and rising (Chart 4). My colleague Doug Peta, BCA’s Chief US Investment Strategist, reached a similar conclusion in his August report entitled Level Or Direction? Chart 3Low Unemployment Often Leads To Monetary Tightening Chart 4Stocks Do Best When Unemployment Is Falling From High Levels In the spring of 2020, stocks benefited from what turned out to be a very auspicious environment: A steady decline in the unemployment rate from very high levels, assisted by a massive dose of monetary and fiscal stimulus. Controversially at the time, this led us to argue that the pandemic could lead to much higher stock prices. Chart 5There Is Still Slack Today, the situation is less clear-cut. On the one hand, the unemployment rate has fallen dramatically, while monetary and fiscal policy are turning less accommodative. This week, the ECB reduced the pace of net asset purchases under the PEPP. The Fed will start paring back asset purchases by the end of this year. Governments are also withdrawing fiscal policy support. In the US, emergency federal unemployment benefits expired, somewhat ironically, on Labor Day. On the other hand, the unemployment rate in most economies is still above pre-pandemic levels. In the US, the unemployment rate for prime-age workers is 1.7 percentage points higher than in February 2020, while the employment-to-population ratio is 2.4 points lower (Chart 5). The presence of labor market slack ensures that policy support will be withdrawn only gradually. Granted, core CPI inflation in the US is running above 4%. Standard Taylor Rule equations suggest that the Fed funds rate should be well above zero (Chart 6). That said, these equations use realized inflation, which may be misleading given that both market participants and Fed officials expect inflation to fall rapidly (Chart 7). Indeed, the widely followed 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate is below the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 8).1 With long-term inflation expectations still subdued, there is no urgency for the Fed to sound more hawkish. Chart 6What Rate Does The Taylor Rule Prescribe? Chart 7Investors Expect Inflation To Fall Rapidly From Current Levels Chart 8Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Muted Cyclical Stocks Usually Do Best In The Latter Innings Of The Business Cycle Expansion Monetary policy is unlikely to become restrictive in any major economy during the next 18 months, which should allow global growth to remain at an above-trend pace. Hence, it is too early to turn bearish on stocks. Nevertheless, given that the unemployment rate in most countries is closer to a trough than to a peak, it is reasonable to conclude that we are somewhere in the middle-to-late stages of a business cycle expansion that began following the Great Recession (and was only briefly interrupted by the pandemic). As Chart 9 shows, cyclical equity sectors, such as industrials, energy, and materials, typically do best in the latter innings of business cycle expansions. Such was the environment that prevailed in 2005-08, and such will be the environment that prevails over the coming quarters as the unemployment rate falls further, capital spending increases, and commodity prices rise further. Chart 9The Business Cycle And Equity Sectors Increased government infrastructure spending should help cyclical sectors. The US Congress is set to pass a 10-year $500 billion package. The EU’s €750 billion Next Generation fund is finally up and running. Chinese local government infrastructure spending is poised to accelerate over the remainder of the year. Chart 10The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 11Past Another Covid Wave A weaker US dollar should also buoy cyclical stocks (Chart 10). As a countercyclical currency, the greenback usually weakens when global growth is strong. A cresting in the Delta variant wave should help jumpstart global growth over the coming months (Chart 11). Meanwhile, interest rate differentials have moved sharply against the US dollar, while the US trade deficit has widened noticeably (Charts 12A & B). Chart 12AInterest Rate Differentials Have Moved Against The Dollar Chart 12BThe US Trade Deficit Has Widened Noticeably Cyclical sectors are overrepresented outside the US (Table 1). Although not a classically cyclical sector, financials are also overrepresented in overseas indices. BCA’s global fixed-income strategists recommend a moderately underweight duration stance. As bond yields rise, bank shares should outperform (Chart 13). In contrast, tech stocks often lag in a rising yield environment. Table 1Cyclicals Are Overrepresented Outside The US Chart 13Higher Rates: A Boon For Banks And A Bane For Tech How Expensive Are Stocks? A high Shiller P/E predicts low future returns (Chart 14). Today, the Shiller P/E stands at 37 in the US. This is consistent with an expected 10-year total real return of close to zero for the S&P 500. Thus, the long-term outlook for US stocks is poor. We stress the words “long term.” As the bottom panel of Chart 14 shows, no matter what the starting point of valuations is, the average return over short-term horizons is very low relative to realized volatility. This is another way of saying that valuations provide a great deal of information about the long-term outlook for stocks, but little information about their near-term direction. Over horizons of about 12 months, the business cycle drives the stock market, as a simple comparison between purchasing manager indices and stock returns illustrates (Chart 15). Chart 14Valuation Is The Single Best Predictor Of Long-Term Equity Returns Chart 15AThe Business Cycle Drives Cyclical Swings In Stocks Chart 15BThe Business Cycle Drives Cyclical Swings In Stocks Outside the US, the Shiller P/E stands at 20. In emerging markets, it is only 16 (Chart 16). This is significantly below US levels, implying that the long-term prospect for equities is much more attractive abroad. Thus, both medium-term cyclical factors and long-term valuation considerations favor non-US stocks. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Chart 16US Stocks Are Pricey Footnotes 1 The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index. The TIPS breakeven is based on the CPI index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of about 2.3%-to-2.5%. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Highlights Chart 1Employment Growth Will Rebound August’s weak employment growth reflects the surge of Delta variant COVID cases in the United States. This is evidenced by the fact that Leisure & Hospitality sector payrolls held flat in August after having grown by 415k in July and 397k in June (Chart 1). While Delta could still be a drag on employment growth for another month or two, there is mounting evidence that the daily new case count is close to its peak. Leisure & Hospitality employment growth will regain its prior pace as new Delta cases trend down. This will lead to a resumption of strong monthly payroll reports (500k – 1000k) as we head into the new year. For monetary policy, we calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 414k will be sufficient for the Fed to start rate hikes before the end of 2022 (bottom panel). We anticipate that this threshold will easily be met. The Treasury curve will bear-flatten as employment growth improves and the market prices-in an earlier start and quicker pace of Fed rate hikes. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and stay short the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +166 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports continued positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. At 91 bps, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope remains steep. This is a strong signal that monetary conditions are accommodative. But despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade valuations are extremely tight (Chart 2). A recent report looked at what different combinations of Treasury slope and corporate spreads have historically signaled for corporate bond excess returns.1 It shows that tight corporate spreads only correlate with negative excess returns once the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is below 50 bps. Though we retain a positive view of spread product as a whole, better value can be found outside of the investment grade corporate sector. Specifically, we recommend that investors shift into high-yield corporates, municipal bonds and USD-denominated Emerging Market sovereigns and corporates. We also advise investors to favor long-maturity corporate bonds and those corporate sectors with elevated Duration-Times-Spread.2 Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 66 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +502 bps. A recent report looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.3 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 3.0% (Chart 3). Using a model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards, we estimate that the 12-month default rate will fall to between 2.3% and 2.8%, below what the market currently discounts. Notably, the corporate default rate is tracking at an annualized rate of roughly 1.7% through the first seven months of the year, well below the estimate generated by our macro model. Another recent report looked at the incremental spread pick-up investors can earn by moving out of investment grade corporates and into junk.4 It concluded that the extra spread available in high-yield is worth grabbing and that B-rated bonds look particularly attractive in risk-adjusted terms. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -67 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries tightened 4 bps in August. The spread is wide compared to recent history, but it remains tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The conventional 30-year MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) widened 2 bps in August (panel 2), and it is now starting to look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread sectors. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS sits at 38 bps, below the 56 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds but above the 20 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS and the 35 bps offered by Agency CMBS. In a recent report we looked at MBS performance and valuation across the coupon stack.5 We noted that the higher convexity of high-coupon MBS makes them likely to outperform lower-coupon MBS in a rising yield environment. Higher coupon MBS also have greater OAS than lower coupons. This makes the high-coupon MBS more likely to outperform in a flat bond yield environment as well. Given our view that bond yields will be higher in 6-12 months, we recommend favoring high coupons (4%, 4.5%) over low coupons (2%, 2.5%, 3%) within an overall underweight allocation to Agency MBS. Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 27 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +84 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 122 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +7 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 8 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +44 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 9 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +382 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 3 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +30 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +31 bps. USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign bonds outperformed US corporates in August and relative valuation between the two sectors is starting to equalize (panel 4). That said, we retain a preference for EM sovereigns over US corporates, particularly the bonds of Russia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar where value remains attractive. A recent report looked at valuation within the investment grade USD-denominated EM corporate space.6 It found that EM corporates are attractively priced relative to US corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum. It also found that EM corporates are attractive relative to EM sovereigns within the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns have the edge in the Aa credit tier. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 9 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +262 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The economic and policy back-drop remains favorable for municipal bond performance. Trailing 4-quarter net state & local government savings were already positive through the end of Q1 2021 and they received another significant boost in Q2 as funds from the American Rescue Plan were doled out (Chart 6). With state & local government balance sheets in such good shape, we are comfortable moving down in quality within municipal bonds. A move down in quality is especially compelling because of tight Aaa muni valuations relative to Treasuries (top panel). Valuation is more compelling in the lower investment grade credit tiers, especially at the long-end of the curve.7 GO munis in the 12-17 year maturity bucket offer a 5% breakeven tax rate versus corporates with the same credit rating and duration. 12-17 year Revenue munis actually offer a before-tax yield pick-up (panel 2). Finally, high-yield muni spreads are reasonably attractive relative to high-yield corporates, offering a breakeven tax rate of 23% (panel 4). But despite the attractive spread, we recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield munis versus high-yield corporates as the deep negative convexity of high-yield munis makes them susceptible to extension risk if bond yields rise. Treasury Curve: Buy 2/10 Barbell Versus 5-Year Bullet Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury yields moved higher in August, with the 5-year and 7-year maturities bearing the brunt of the sell-off. The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope steepened 5 bps to end the month at 110 bps. The 5-year/30-year slope flattened 5 bps to end the month at 115 bps. We expect bond yields to be higher in 6-12 months, but we also anticipate that the next significant move higher in bond yields will coincide with curve flattening, not steepening. At 1.93%, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is not that far below our target fair value range of 2% - 2.25%. In a recent report, we demonstrated that yield curve steepening only occurs when either the Fed is cutting rates or the 5-year/5-year forward yield rises.8 This means that the 2/10 Treasury curve is more likely to flatten than steepen during the next 6-12 months, even as bond yields move higher. Similarly, we observe that the overnight index swap (OIS) curve is priced for the fed funds rate to be 0.21% in one year’s time and 1.47% in five years (Chart 7). The latter rate has 146 bps of upside if it converges all the way back to its 2018 high, but this pales in comparison to the 265 bps of upside in the 12-month forward rate. The yield curve will flatten as the 12-month forward OIS rate converges with the 5-year forward rate (panel 3). Investors should position in yield curve flatteners on a 6-12 month horizon. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. TIPS: Neutral Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS performed in line with the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index in August, leaving year-to-date excess returns unchanged at +578 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates both fell by 7 bps in August. At 2.37%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the middle of the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with inflation expectations being well anchored around the Fed’s target (Chart 8). Meanwhile, at 2.21%, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is only just below target (panel 3). With long-dated inflation expectations close to the Fed’s target levels, we see limited upside on a 6-12 month investment horizon. We also see the cost of short-maturity inflation protection falling during the next few months as realized inflation continues to moderate from its current extremely high level. This will lead to some modest steepening of the inflation curve (bottom panel). While the inflation curve has some room to steepen, we don’t see it returning to positive territory. An inverted inflation curve is simply more consistent with the Fed’s Average Inflation Target than a positively sloped one. This is because the Fed’s new framework calls for it to attack its inflation target from above rather than from below. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +40 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 2 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +30 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES Act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed in April 2020. That excess savings has still not been spent and the most recent round of stimulus checks has only added to the stockpile (Chart 9). The extraordinarily large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is also extraordinarily high. Indeed, many households have been using their windfalls to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should also take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +193 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 10 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 9 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +529 bps (Chart 10). Though returns have been strong and spreads remain attractive, particularly for lower-rated CMBS, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to the sector because of the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +91 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread held flat on the month. It currently sits at 35 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have recovered to well below pre-COVID levels, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of August 31st, 2021) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of August 31st, 2021) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 12 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 12 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of August 31st, 2021) Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 2 For ideas on how to increase the average spread of a US bond portfolio please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 8 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “A Bump On The Road To Recovery”, dated July 27, 2021.
Dear Client, There will be no US Investment Strategy next week as we take our summer vacation. We will return on Monday, September 6th. We wish everyone a happy and safe conclusion to the summer. Best regards, Doug Peta Highlights Economy – COVID-19 and the official and individual responses to it continue to exert considerable influence over economic activity: We expect that labor force participation and employment will rise as people return to the workforce, provided that resurgent infection rates don’t provide a new reason to stay on the sidelines. Markets – Financial asset valuations are elevated, but a de-rating catalyst may not emerge any time soon: Massive infusions of fiscal aid and a Fed that is determined to err on the side of being too easy should support the fundamental backdrop, even as the Delta variant runs wild in communities with low vaccination rates. Strategy – Be alert, but stay the course unless policy makers change direction or their measures lose their force: We continue to expect that risk assets will outperform Treasuries and cash. Feature Labor Day, just two weeks away, will mark the unofficial end of summer in the United States and this year the end of August will mark its own milestone: eighteen months of the pandemic. COVID-19’s year-and-a-half residency has been filled with uncertainty and misdirection, but it now seems clear that it will be staying for good. It is disheartening to concede that we will have to accommodate an unwanted malign presence, especially when we seemed to be on the verge of cornering and trapping it. The emotional letdown may have accounted for the slide in consumer confidence, but it is important to note that the virus we’ll be living with indefinitely has morphed from a peril to a nuisance. One constant amidst the pandemic confusion has been the federal shock-and-awe campaign to protect the economy from its ravages. The Fed went big immediately, cutting the fed funds rate to zero, instituting $120 billion of monthly securities purchases and unveiling a range of novel programs to ease financial stresses. Before the first month was out, Congress passed the gigantic CARES Act package, raining money down on the unemployed and households in all but the top quartile of the income distribution. It followed up with a more modest stopgap measure in late December before embarking on the largest round of economic impact payments this spring. The net effect has been to do more than enough to buffer the economy from the pandemic and push any potential hangover beyond the range of our twelve-month investment timeframe. Away from the constant of the policy efforts, however, there is much that is uncertain about key elements of the economic and market outlook. We do not have a definitive answer about what the future holds for the labor market, consumption, or equity valuations. For each topic we consider what is known, what is unknown and list the series we’ll be monitoring to assess whether our base case is on track. We remain constructive on financial markets and the economy, though we recognize that our conviction levels must be lower given the lack of close empirical comparisons to the current backdrop. We will shift with the data series if they move in ways that convincingly challenge our base-case scenarios. The Work Force Known Factor(s): The pandemic has driven a reduction in labor force participation. After catching up from the cyclical damage inflicted by the Global Financial Crisis, the share of people age 16 and above who are working or looking for work has once again fallen well off its implied demographic pace (Chart 1, top panel). GDP and S&P 500 earnings are making new highs, but labor force participation is still down by 2%, after having fallen a whopping 4.9% at the April 2020 trough (Chart 1, bottom panel). Labor force participation typically slips during recessions, but the pandemic’s peak-to-trough decline was more than five times the decline experienced during the GFC, which held the previous record. Chart 1The Pandemic Washed Away A Chunk Of The Work Force Unknown Factor(s): The explosion in unemployment while communities were sheltering in place was a foregone conclusion, and it’s easy to see how people might have slipped out of the labor force as they withdrew from jobs that lost their luster. There are more job openings than unemployed people now, though (Chart 2), and there are still 3.2 million fewer people in the labor force than there were before the pandemic. The persistence of high unemployment and low participation is a mystery that no study has fully explained. The most frequently cited hypotheses involve generous unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, difficulty securing care for children or adults, and fear of infection. Chart 2The Labor Market Is Unusually Tight We are skeptical of claims that supplemental UI benefits and the additional cushion provided by the three rounds of direct payments to households are a principal driver. $3,200 per adult ($1,200 in Round 1, $600 in Round 2 and $1,400 in Round 3) is nice but it won’t replace even $10 hourly wages for more than a couple months. UI benefits can’t be blamed for the low participation rate (you can’t collect them if you drop out), and their impact on the unemployment rate may also be less than it’s been cracked up to be. We found a very weak negative relationship between state-level replacement rates (the value of average UI benefits relative to average compensation) and changes in state unemployment rates while the most generous $600 weekly federal UI benefit supplement was in effect (Chart 3). Chart 3State Unemployment Rates Were Indifferent To Replacement Rates July’s state unemployment rates were inconclusive on the question of whether exiting the federal supplemental UI benefit program reduced unemployment. The 25 states that ended their participation early (Chart 4, top panel) saw a smaller decline in their average unemployment rate than the 26 (including Washington, DC) that remain in the program (Chart 4, bottom panel), but the early-exit states had a lower starting average unemployment rate. Of the 18 states that had statistically significant month-on-month unemployment rate declines, 8 have already exited the supplement UI benefit program and 10 remain. Of the 39 states with statistically significant employment gains, 17 have already exited the supplement UI benefit program and 22 remain. We expect the end of augmented benefits in early September will give the labor market a modest boost, but curtailing benefit supplements does not appear to be a silver bullet for reducing unemployment or increasing participation. Chart 4Much Ado About Nothing Chart 5Fewer Care Options, Fewer Workers We suspect family care burdens have been more of a drag on participation and/or exiting the unemployment rolls. Young children attending school remotely had to have adult supervision, sidelining adults who could not work remotely. Similarly, many workers who relied on outside providers to care for adult family members during the day found themselves unable to work or petrified of exposing their homebound loved ones to the virus if they did. Family care burdens regularly fall more heavily on females than males and the greater decline in aggregate female participation (Chart 5, top panel) and across the below prime-age (second panel), prime-age (third panel) and above prime-age (bottom panel) categories suggests care issues are restraining employment. Infection fears likely waned with the development of effective vaccines and their initially rapid distribution, but the spread of the Delta variant may have rekindled them, especially in areas with low vaccination rates. It will take progress in vaccinating the reluctant and the dissemination of antibodies via new infections to hasten the peak in the Delta wave, which should align with a peak in infection fears. What We’re Watching: Net nonfarm payrolls gains; labor force participation; COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations and deaths; vaccinations; schools’ ability to host in-person learning; ongoing data from states exiting the federal UI benefit; approval of vaccines for children under 12. Consumption Chart 6More Came In, Less Went Out Known Factor(s): Increased income from fiscal transfers and decreased spending from activity constraints have allowed households to amass $2.3 trillion of excess pandemic savings (Chart 6). Some of the savings went to pay down outstanding debt, with households cutting their credit card balances by 14% before slowly starting to build them back up over the last few months (Chart 7). The combination of less debt and low rates has pushed debt-service burdens to their lowest level in four decades (Chart 8). Powered by savings, financial market gains and home price appreciation, household net worth grew at its fastest five-quarter rate ever from 1Q20 through 1Q21. Chart 7Households Actively De-levered During The Pandemic Chart 8Plenty Of Room To Service New Debt Unknown Factor(s): Changes in household net worth lead changes in personal consumption expenditures by two quarters, though 2020 consumption fell way short of the level predicted by the best-fit regression line. We do not know how much of last year’s consumption was lost to the pandemic and how much was merely deferred. We also don’t know where the savings rate will stabilize going forward or how much it might overshoot to the downside before settling into its new longer-run range. Simply put, we don’t know how much households will spend from their newly accumulated stash. We do know, however, that the savings rate fell steadily from the mid-seventies, when the baby boomers began entering their prime working years, to the onset of the GFC (Chart 9). In recent client meetings we have made the conservative assumption that half of the $2.3 trillion of excess savings will be spent by the end of 2022. That would amount to a tailwind equivalent to 5% of a year’s GDP and keep the US growing at well above trend in 2021 and 2022. It remains to be seen, however, how much of their excess savings households will spend and when. Chart 9The Savings Rate Will Come Down What We’re Watching: Household income, consumption, savings rate, credit card and other consumer loan balances, borrower performance, lender willingness, spending on services and spending on goods. Asset Prices Known Factor(s): Ample and immediate monetary and fiscal accommodation put a floor under financial asset prices at the beginning of the pandemic. Thanks to the policy actions, stock prices have soared, investment grade and high yield bonds have delivered solid excess returns and home prices have surged (Table 1). The S&P 500 has risen 36% on a fundamental boost from an 18% increase in forward four-quarter earnings estimates and a valuation boost in the form of a 15% forward multiple expansion (Chart 10). Investment grade and high yield spreads have tightened to near their all-time lows (Chart 11) while trailing and forecasted defaults are low and rating upgrades are outpacing rating downgrades. Table 1Riskier Assets Are Having A Great Pandemic Chart 10Fundamentals Have Taken The Baton From Valuation Unknown Factor(s): We have argued that the next four quarters’ S&P 500 earnings estimates, which project a 1.9% decline from last quarter’s annualized run rate, will have to be revised higher to align with expected nominal annualized GDP growth near 9% in the second half of this year and 6% in the first half of next year. The future direction of forward earnings multiples is a much harder call, as it is largely a function of sentiment. It is also influenced by investors’ asset allocation options, and it does not look to us like TINA is going to be dislodged any time soon, as caution at the major developed world central banks will keep interest rates from gaining much upward momentum and a surfeit of liquidity will keep fixed income spreads tight. We argued with high conviction in a recent Special Report that housing poses no immediate threat to US financial stability because banks have no more than modest exposure to residential mortgages and the loans they have made are eminently sound. We stand by that view and further note that home prices are well supported in the near term by tight supplies and limited new construction activity. Finally, mortgage rates are extremely low and though we expect they will rise, we think they will do so at a slow, grinding pace throughout the second half and across 2022. What We’re Watching: Corporate earnings, interest rates, mortgage availability, flows into and out of risky assets, Fed guidance and anything bearing on risk appetites. Chart 11Don't Look For Further Capital Gains On Bonds Investment Implications Investors’ default position seems to be to assume that policy interventions will be exposed as artifice and elevated valuations will soon deflate. Neither has happened yet, however, and it doesn’t look like either will over the next twelve months. The Fed’s measures will have an extended influence because the fed funds rate will likely be zero until at least late 2022, monetary policy works with a lag and it will be a while before policy settings become truly restrictive. As for the fiscal transfers, they’ve largely been squirreled away as excess savings and their effect will only be felt as they’re consumed and/or funneled into financial markets. We don’t see elevated valuations retreating without a catalyst, given the ocean of liquidity in the US and the rest of the major developed economies. The money has to go somewhere as rapidly accelerating home prices around the world attest. Upward pressure on asset prices, especially for homes, has been a reliable source of instability but we don’t yet have concerns in the US, where mortgages have been extended to highly rated borrowers and the banking system has comparatively little exposure to residential loans. We are not saying multiples (or spreads) will remain elevated (tight) forever. We believe that today’s high prices will suppress long-term returns. Conditions look favorable for the next twelve months, however, and we think investors should take advantage of them before the longer-term adverse consequences emerge to weigh on returns. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Fed: The Fed is preparing markets for a taper announcement in Q4 of this year. But we don’t see asset purchase tapering as a catalyst for higher bond yields. Rather, bond yields will move higher as the employment data continue to come in hot. Job growth will be strong enough to reach the Fed’s definition of maximum employment by the end of 2022, and the fed funds rate will rise more quickly than is implied by current market expectations. Duration: The 10-year Treasury yield will reach a range of 2% to 2.25% by the time the Fed is ready to lift rates, near the end of 2022. Strong employment data will catalyze the next significant jump in bond yields, but this may not happen until Q4 of this year. The spread of the delta COVID variant could limit the pace of hiring during the next month or two, and bond market positioning may need to turn more bullish before yields can rise. Labor Market: After July’s strong employment report, we calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 431k is required to reach the Fed’s “maximum employment” liftoff criteria by the end of 2022. Feature Chart 1A Tapering Announcement Is Coming It’s finally time to talk about tapering. Several Fed governors and regional presidents made media appearances last week, each one presenting a timeline that sets up a tapering announcement before the end of this year. Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller: I think you could be ready to do an announcement by September. That depends on what the next two jobs reports do. If they come in as strong as the last one, then I think you have made the progress you need. If they don’t, then I think you are probably going to have to push things back a couple of months.1 St Louis Fed President James Bullard: I don’t think that we need to continue with these purchases now that we’ve got new risks on the horizon and possibly inflation risks on the horizon. […] What I think we should do here is start sooner and go faster and get finished by the end of the first quarter of next year. We don’t really need the purchases anymore.2 Dallas Fed President Robert Kaplan: As long as we continue to make progress in July (jobs) numbers and in August jobs numbers, I think we’d be better off to start adjusting these purchases soon. Doing so gradually, over a time frame of plus or minus about eight months, will help give ourselves as much flexibility as possible to be patient and be flexible on the fed funds rate.3 Fed Governor Lael Brainard presented the most detailed description of what it will take for the Fed to start paring its asset purchases.4 Since December, the Fed’s criteria for tapering has been “substantial further progress” toward its employment and price stability goals. In December, nonfarm payrolls were about 10 million below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 2A). In her speech, which was given prior to the release of July’s jobs report, Brainard noted that if employment grows at the same rate in Q3 as it did in Q2, then “about two-thirds of the outstanding job losses as of December 2020” would be made up by the end of 2021. That figure rose to 71% after July’s strong jobs number (Chart 2B). Chart 2AConditions For Tapering Chart 2BDefining "Substantial Further Progress" In other words, as long as employment growth stays solid – in the 500k/month range – then the Fed will be well over 50% of the way toward its maximum employment goal by the end of this year. This would certainly count as “substantial further progress”. Our expectation is that Q3 jobs growth will be strong enough for the Fed to make an official taper announcement in Q4, with the actual tapering starting in January 2022.5 There is an outside chance that the Fed will rush to start tapering earlier, but only if long-dated inflation expectations rise to well above the Fed’s target range (Chart 2A, bottom panel). As for market impact, we don’t expect the tapering announcement to move markets all that much. First, we mainly care about asset purchase tapering because it could signal that the Fed intends to move more quickly toward rate hikes (Chart 1). This is the concern that prompted the 2013 taper tantrum. This time around, however, the Fed has tied liftoff to explicit employment and inflation criteria. This forward guidance significantly weakens the signaling power of any tapering announcement. Second, surveys indicate that market participants already anticipate that tapering will start in early-2022 (Tables 1A & 1B). In other words, a Q4 taper announcement shouldn’t be that much of a shock to expectations. Table 1ASurvey Of Market Participants Expected Fed Timeline Table 1BSurvey Of Primary Dealers Expected Fed Timeline Interestingly, Fed Vice-Chair Richard Clarida did manage to shock markets with his speech last week, but only because he went further than just a discussion of tapering. Specifically, Clarida articulated his expected timeline for lifting interest rates: Chart 3Median FOMC Forecasts While, as Chair Powell indicated last week, we are clearly a ways away from considering raising interest rates and this is certainly not something on the radar screen right now, if the outlook for inflation and outlook for unemployment I summarized earlier turn out to be the actual outcomes for inflation and unemployment realized over the forecast horizon, then I believe that these three necessary conditions for raising the target range for the federal funds rate will have been met by year-end 2022.6 What are the economic forecasts that Clarida says would meet the conditions for liftoff by the end of 2022? It turns out that they are very close to the FOMC’s median projections (Chart 3). The Fed’s forecast calls for 3% core PCE inflation in 2021, falling to 2.1% in 2022 and 2023. The Fed also sees the unemployment rate falling to 4.5% by the end of this year, 3.8% by the end of 2022 and 3.5% by the end of 2023. Clarida said that he views this forecast as consistent with overall employment returning to its pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2022. We think Clarida’s expected timeline is reasonable. The Appendix at the end of this report presents different scenarios for when the Fed’s “maximum employment” liftoff condition might be met. We estimate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 431k will get us to maximum employment by the end of 2022, in time for early-2023 liftoff. At least so far, monthly nonfarm payroll growth is tracking well above the 431k threshold. If we compare our (and Clarida’s) forecast to market prices, we conclude that market rate expectations are too low. The overnight index swap curve is priced for Fed liftoff in January 2023 but for not even three 25 basis point rate hikes in total by the end of 2023 (Chart 4). This seems too low if the Fed’s liftoff criteria are in fact met by the end of 2022, as is our expectation. Chart 4Rate Expectations Bottom Line: The Fed is preparing markets for a taper announcement in Q4 of this year. But we don’t see asset purchase tapering as a catalyst for higher bond yields. Rather, bond yields will move higher as the employment data continue to come in hot. Job growth will be strong enough to reach the Fed’s definition of maximum employment by the end of 2022, and the fed funds rate will rise more quickly than is implied by current market expectations. Timing The Move Higher In Yields Our expectation for a return to maximum employment by the end of 2022 implies that bond yields will be significantly higher by then. Specifically, we expect that both the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield and the 10-year Treasury yield will be in a range between 2% and 2.25% by the time of the first rate hike (Chart 5). The 2% to 2.25% range is consistent with survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate. But a big question remains over the timing of the next move higher in yields. Are bond yields poised to jump higher immediately? Or will they remain low for the next few months and move up only in 2022? Our sense is that the catalyst for the next significant jump in bond yields will be surprisingly strong employment data. There is widespread consensus that inflation will be close to the Fed’s target (if not higher) by the end of 2022, but recent concerns about labor supply have increased the uncertainty around employment projections. Ultimately, we think that labor supply constraints will ease and that the unemployment rate will catch up to levels implied by different labor demand indicators (Chart 6). However, this may not happen during the next month or two. Chart 5A Target For Long-Dated Yields Chart 6Labor Demand Is Strong The spread of the Delta coronavirus variant has just started to ramp up in the United States (Chart 7). The UK’s experience with the variant shows that vaccination significantly limits the number of hospitalizations and suggests that economic lockdowns can be avoided. However, it took about one month for the UK’s new case count to peak once the variant started spreading. A similar roadmap could lead to hiring delays in the US during the next month or two, at least until the new case count starts to fall and concerns abate. From a market technical perspective, we also note that bond market positioning remains significantly net short and that bond market sentiment is less bullish than is often the case at major inflection points (Chart 8). This is not the ideal technical set-up for a large immediate jump in bond yields. Chart 7Delta Is A Near-Term Risk To Hiring Chart 8Positioning & Sentiment Bottom Line: The 10-year Treasury yield will reach a range of 2% to 2.25% by the time the Fed is ready to lift rates, near the end of 2022. Strong employment data will catalyze the next significant jump in bond yields, but this may not happen until Q4 of this year. The spread of the delta COVID variant could limit the pace of hiring during the next month or two, and bond market positioning may need to turn more bullish before yields can rise. Appendix: How Far From “Maximum Employment” And Fed Liftoff? Chart A1Defining “Maximum Employment” The Federal Reserve has promised that the funds rate will stay pinned at zero until the labor market returns to “maximum employment”. The Fed has not provided explicit guidance on the definition of “maximum employment”, but we deduce that “maximum employment” means that the Fed wants to see the U3 unemployment rate within a range consistent with its estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, currently 3.5% to 4.5%, and that it wants to see a more or less complete recovery of the labor force participation rate back to February 2020 levels (Chart A1). Alternatively, we can infer definitions of “maximum employment” from the New York Fed’s Surveys of Primary Dealers and Market Participants. These surveys ask respondents what they think the unemployment and labor force participation rates will be at the time of Fed liftoff. Currently, the median respondent from the Survey of Market Participants expects an unemployment rate of 3.5% and a participation rate of 63%. The median respondent from the Survey of Primary Dealers expects an unemployment rate of 3.7% and a participation rate of 63%. Tables A1-A4 present the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth required to reach different combinations of unemployment rate and participation rate by specific future dates. For example, if we use the definition of “maximum employment” from the Survey of Market Participants, then we need to see average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of +431k in order to hit “maximum employment” by the end of 2022. Table A1Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 4.5% By The Given Date Table A2Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 4% By The Given Date Table A3Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 3.5% By The Given Date Table A4Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required To Reach “Maximum Employment” As Defined By Survey Respondents Chart A2 presents recent monthly nonfarm payroll growth along with target levels based on the Survey of Market Participants’ definition of “maximum employment”. This chart is to help us track progress toward specific liftoff dates. For example, if monthly nonfarm payroll growth continues to print at the same level as last month, then we could anticipate a Fed rate hike by June 2022. Table A2Tracking Toward Fed Liftoff We will continue to track these charts and tables in the coming months, and will publish updates after the release of each monthly employment report. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-02/waller-says-strong-job-reports-may-warrant-september-taper-call?sref=Ij5V3tFi 2 https://www.stlouisfed.org/from-the-president/video-appearances/2021/bullard-washington-post-inflation-tapering 3 https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/exclusive-feds-kaplan-wants-bond-buying-taper-start-soon-be-gradual-2021-08-04/ 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210730a.htm 5 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “A Central Bank Timeline For The Next Two Years”, dated June 1, 2021. 6 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20210804a.htm Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns
Highlights Economy – A range of economic and fundamental indicators are at such high levels that deceleration is inevitable: US growth will peak any day if it hasn’t done so already. Markets – Financial markets typically pay closer heed to direction than level: All else equal, we prefer direction to level as well, but levels are likely to remain elevated for a while even as deceleration takes hold, and investors should take that into account when assessing the outlook. Strategy – Remain overweight equities and credit in multi-asset portfolios: Risk assets are likely to continue to generate positive excess returns over Treasuries and cash despite moderating growth. Feature COVID-19’s arrival ushered in a wave of extremes in monetary and fiscal policy measures, economic data and financial markets. Everywhere investors look, data series are at unusually outlying levels. Inflation pressures are more intense than they have been in decades, as measured by consumer price indexes and a range of business surveys. Household net worth has advanced at its fastest-ever five-quarter pace despite the record setback that began the pandemic, S&P 500 earnings growth has demolished analyst expectations over the last five quarters, the federal government has injected a head-spinning amount of fiscal stimulus into the economy and the Fed has done all it seemingly could to cushion the pandemic’s economic blow. Much of the growth has resulted from Herculean stimulus measures that cannot be maintained on a rate-of-change basis. The slowdown in fiscal and monetary thrust implies that economic growth, along with several other series that are viewed as significant financial market drivers, will soon peak if they haven’t already. The looming deceleration has kindled a recurring debate among BCA researchers: What matters most for financial markets, level or direction? The answer to the most challenging questions in markets and economics is often “it depends,” and that’s the way we view the level-versus-direction debate. We’d position a portfolio based on direction if key series were just breaking above or below trend levels with robust momentum, but it’s a more nuanced decision when they are slowing from exceedingly high levels and a modestly decelerating pace should have them still sitting well above trend this time next year. Our view, then, is that the interaction between level and direction will drive markets going forward. Given that we have cited a range of levels in support of our bullish stance, however, it is prudent to ask how good might be too good for reliably mean-reverting series. We therefore examine the empirical record of how S&P 500 returns have interacted with the level and direction of the unemployment rate, earnings-per-share growth, and interest rates. We conclude that the humble level matters as well as the more celebrated rate of change and that deceleration will not spell the end of the equity bull market. The Unemployment Rate We used the unemployment rate as a proxy for the impact of macroeconomic changes on S&P 500 returns. While the unemployment rate is quite variable from month to month, it tends to follow a clear pattern over longer periods of time, rising very rapidly to cyclical peaks before meandering its way to cyclical troughs. Over the series’ 73-year history, there have been eleven complete rising phases and it is currently in its eleventh declining phase (Chart 1). Owing to unemployment’s established pattern – it takes the elevator up and the stairs down, flipping equity indexes’ pattern on its head – the eleven rising phases have spanned 30% of the nearly 900 months while the falling phases currently total 70% of them. Chart 1Unemployment Takes The Elevator Up And The Stairs Down A simple compilation of one-month forward S&P 500 returns based on the level of the unemployment rate has a clear theme – stocks do well when the rate is at least one standard deviation above the mean (about 7.4% or higher) and poorly when it is one or more standard deviations below it (about 4.2% or lower) (Chart 2, left side). A compilation based on the month-to-month direction of the unemployment rate – up, down or unchanged – also favors rising unemployment, though it is unclear what investors should conclude from the fact that rising and falling both outperform unchanged (Chart 2, right side). Chart 2The S&P 500 Is Sensitive To Anticipated Turns In Unemployment We think the analysis is much improved if the unemployment rate is combined with its direction as indicated by the cycle phase. The interaction of level and phase provides more information than the simple message that high unemployment is good for equities and low unemployment is bad. Applying the rising or falling unemployment rate phase to the ranges shown in Chart 2, we find that direction matters quite a lot within four of the five ranges, where the annualized return differs by thirteen to sixteen percentage points based on the underlying trend (Table 1). Table 1Level And Direction Tell The Most Compelling Story Equities are just coming off their bottom, on balance, when the unemployment rate exceeds a standard deviation above its mean and is still rising. Direction is everything when the rate is below its mean (5.8%). When it’s falling, there’s plenty of money to be made in an expanding economy before the Fed has designs on removing the punch bowl, though once the rate is a standard deviation below the mean (4.2% or lower), the equity top is near. Once the unemployment rate rises off the bottom, even though it’s still at an unusually low level, the equity tide has already begun to go out. Losses are in store until the rate gets back above the mean, signaling future improvement. Chart 3Up, Up And Away It is important to recognize that we can only demarcate the unemployment rate’s phases in retrospect. There is no telling with certainty in real time how far a nascent trend will go. We do expect, however, in line with every FOMC voter, that the unemployment rate is likely to approach the vicinity of last cycle’s lows before the current phase ends. If that expectation is realized, there is a stretch of downward movement ahead (a good chunk of the 1.7% standard deviation, though July claimed 50 basis points of it) that has empirically been quite favorable for the S&P 500. The speed with which it covers the ground from here to 4% or below is unknown. Given the tremendous pent-up demand for labor, as evidenced by a record high job openings rate (Chart 3), the unemployment rate may come down much faster than it normally does. The level-and-direction analysis makes it clear that 5.9% and falling has provided an auspicious backdrop for equity investors, and the Fed’s more relaxed reaction function may allow the economy to run a little hotter than it normally would once unemployment falls below its natural rate. All in all, the empirical record of the relationship between the unemployment rate and equities suggests that stocks have room to run while the labor market improves. Earnings The unemployment rate may not be too low for equities to continue to rally, but is earnings growth too good for stocks’ own good? It doesn’t appear to be, given the historical interaction between forward one-quarter S&P 500 performance and the speed and acceleration of growth in trailing four-quarter earnings. We use trailing earnings because they exhibit extended trends that highly variable sequential changes in single-quarter data do not. Since 1948, trailing four-quarter operating earnings have experienced eleven complete double-digit declines from cycle peaks and eleven complete earnings growth phases, while beginning a new growth phase in the first quarter (Chart 4). Chart 4Steady Growth With Occasional Hiccups The chart shows that four-quarter earnings have grown in a pattern that features extended growth phases punctuated by concentrated declines that are occasionally severe. This pattern is the mirror image of the unemployment rate’s and S&P 500 earnings have been in a growth phase three out of every four quarters on the way to an annualized growth rate of 6.4%. Since P/E multiples are a mean-reverting series, stocks need to grow earnings to rise over time, but there is little difference in lagged S&P 500 returns when earnings are in growth or contraction mode (Chart 5). The disparity widens within each broad phase when we considered the growth rates – deceleration has been better for stock prices than acceleration within expansion phases, while a slowing rate of decline has been a tremendous catalyst when earnings are in a contraction phase. Chart 5More Money Is Made From Terrible To Bad Than From Good To Great To explore S&P 500 index performance during acceleration and deceleration phases within growth ranges, we repeated the unemployment rate analysis. The return disparities for different earnings ranges were not nearly as clear cut as they were for different unemployment ranges, but acceleration was good for near-term equity returns in the middle of the earnings growth distribution, while deceleration trumped acceleration at growth rates plus or minus three quarters of a standard deviation from the mean (Table 2). Table 2Headed Out Of The Earnings Sweet Spot The muddled empirical record does not point to a clear path for S&P 500 returns over the next few quarters. We assign a very low probability to a recession over the next year, virtually ensuring that the growth phase that began last quarter will continue. If actual earnings turn out to be somewhat close to the current consensus expectation, however, all subsequent quarters in this growth phase will be decelerating, and deceleration within growth phases (Table 2, circled three outcomes) has previously yielded below-average price returns. Trailing four-quarter earnings growth appears sustainable over the next year, however, and history is hardly sounding an alarm. Interest Rates We have already examined the relationship between moves in real 10-year Treasury yields and equity performance in a dedicated Special Report.1 The executive summary is that the level of real rates has exerted a greater influence on S&P 500 returns than their direction. The empirical evidence suggests that stocks generally outperform when real rates are rising, though they hit a wall once the real 10-yield exceeds estimated potential real GDP growth. They also underperform at the other extreme, as extremely negative real rates tend to be associated with dire economic conditions, but potentially frightening weakness is not a feature of today’s negative real-rate backdrop. Per the potential-GDP-rule-of-thumb, the nominal 10-year Treasury yield that would begin to crimp economic activity is around 4.5-5%, assuming potential GDP growth of 1.75-2% and annual inflation with a central tendency near 3%. It is very difficult to see the 10-year yield exceeding one-half of that threshold level in the next twelve months. Though a yield backup to 2% or above over the next year would likely have significant implications for relative returns within the S&P 500, we do not think it would spell the end of the equity rally. The bottom line, then, is that we do not believe that interest rates are at a level that makes equities especially vulnerable. Price-earnings multiples may well contract if real rates rise in line with our expectations, but we expect that earnings and earnings estimates would rise enough to offset the de-rating pressure. Investment Implications Mean reversion is a bedrock investment concept, and it helps explain why the level of variables that impact equity returns can be deceiving. When key variables reach extremes, the potential of an abrupt reversal increases. Financial markets are additionally forward discounting mechanisms and the rate of change – a variable’s “second derivative” – may offer more insight into its future path than its existing position. It is easy to see why investors typically favor direction over level when looking ahead. Level does not always take a back seat to direction, however, and we think a consideration of how level and direction interact is important when assessing the current landscape. Economic growth will surely slow from double or triple its long-run trend level, earnings will surely stop beating estimates by three or four times the maximum magnitude of the previous 32 quarters, nonfarm payrolls won’t expand by 900,000 every single month (though they may for much of the rest of this year) and a range of other variables won’t keep setting records. But deceleration from record highs will not necessarily spell the end of the rallies in risk assets. While important variables remain at elevated levels, equities and credit are likely to continue to generate excess returns. Extraordinary monetary and fiscal accommodation, combined with remarkably swift and successful action to blunt the threat of COVID-19, have carried financial markets for the last year-plus and we don’t think they’re finished yet. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the September 24, 2018 US Investment Strategy Special Report, "When Will Higher Rates Hurt Stocks?", available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
