Money/Credit/Debt
Executive Summary The Market Has Priced An Aggressive Path For US Rate Hikes The Federal Reserve has joined other G10 central banks in increasing interest rates this week. However, this has been well priced by both the dollar and short rates in the US (Feature Chart). The key call for currencies therefore is whether the Fed delivers more or less hikes than is currently priced by markets over the course of the next few months. More aggressive rate hikes will boost US bond yields, and send the dollar higher. But it will also undermine US equity multiples, given the tight correlation between the price-to-earnings ratio in the US and the real bond yield. More importantly, US equity market leadership has been an important driver of portfolio inflows into the dollar. Should the Fed deliver less hikes than the aggressive path currently priced by markets, currency investors will also be caught offside. This conundrum puts the DXY at risk. The caveat is that if the US economy is genuinely stronger than the rest of the world, and more insulated from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, this will warrant higher real US interest rates. We went short NOK/SEK last week given our bias that oil prices had overshot. Tighten stops to protect profits. Bottom Line: Being long the dollar is a consensus trade. While in the near term, this could prove to be the right call, the dollar is also expensive and overbought, which is bearish from a contrarian perspective. Feature The 25 basis point interest rate hike by the Federal Reserve this week has probably been one of the most telegraphed macro events. Interest rate expectations in the US have risen sharply compared to last year (Chart 1). More importantly, as Chart 2 shows, two-year bond yields (a proxy for short rates) have climbed in the US relative to pretty much every other G10 country. Correspondingly, rising interest rate expectations in the US have led to substantial speculative flows into the US dollar. Chart 2The Market Expects The Fed To Hike Faster Than Other Central Banks This Year Chart 1The Market Has Priced An Aggressive Path For US Rate Hikes On the flipside, the outperformance of the US equity market is being threatened by rising interest rates. If rates rise substantially, that could derate US equity multiples, as portfolio inflows are curtailed. US profits also tend to underperform when rates rise. However, if US rates rise by less than what the market expects, net long speculative positioning in the dollar will surely reverse. Non-US Markets Benefit More When Bond Yields Rise Profits tend to drive the equity market over the short run, with valuation starting to matter over longer horizons. When it comes to the US, it is also true that profits tend to underperform the rest of the world as bond yields rise. Why it matters for the dollar is because a better profit picture in the US helps drive portfolio flows into US equities, buffeting the exchange rate (Chart 3). Related Report Global Investment StrategyA Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle Chart 4 shows that US profits lag the rest of the world when bond yields are in an uptrend. This is because of the composition of the US equity market. Specifically, the US equity market is underweight financials, energy, materials, and industrials, while overweight information technology, health care, and communication services. Rising inflation benefits commodity-linked sectors, the income statements of which are directly juiced by rising prices. Similarly, banks tend to do better as interest rates rise because net interest margins improve. In a nutshell, rising rates and inflation tend to be better for the profits of value stocks and cyclicals, sectors that are underrepresented in the US. Chart 3The Dollar And US Equities Chart 4Bond Yields And US Profits There is also a valuation angle to higher rates. Because the US market is more overweight sectors with cash flows that backwardated, higher rates will undermine the valuation premium currently commanded by these sectors. This is true both in absolute terms and relative to other markets (Chart 5A and 5B). Chart 5AThe S&P 500 P/E Ratio And Real ##br##Yields Chart 5BThe Valuation Premium In The US Is Inversely Correlated To Bond Yields The key point is that the US equity market is at risk relatively from higher global yields that could undermine relative profit growth and its valuation premium. The US trade deficit currently runs at $90 billion. In 2021, at least 45% of that was financed via foreign equity purchases. A reversal in these flows could undermine the dollar. The Dollar And Relative Interest Rates While portfolio flows into US equities have been reversing, bond inflows have improved (Chart 6). Over the long term, bond flows tend to be the key driver of the US dollar. As Chart 2 shows, most market participants expect the Fed to be among the most hawkish central banks in 2022 and beyond. In fact, December Eurodollar contracts are pricing the Fed to hike interest rates by 218 bps more than the ECB, and 235 bps more than the Bank of Japan (allowing for a small risk premium in this pricing) (Chart 7). Chart 7Investors Are Very Bullish On US Rate Expectations Chart 6Investors Have Been Aggressively Purchasing US Treasurys There are two key risks to a hawkish Fed view, relative to other central banks: First, the Fed is already behind the curve relative to its G10 counterparts. The BoE, RBNZ, BoC, and the Norges Bank have already increased rates. Even the rhetoric at the ECB is shifiting. Relative bond yields do not reflect this reality. Second, and related, rising inflation is a global phenomenon and not specific to the US. Almost every central bank is acknowledging that inflation is a key risk to their mandate, compared to the transitory narrative last year. Chart 8 plots headline inflation across G10 countries. On this basis, it becomes difficult to justify why two-year yields in the UK, for example, are much lower, compared to the US. Chart 8Rising Inflation Is Not A US-Centric Problem If inflation does indeed prove to be sticky, other central banks will have to keep hiking interest rates along with the Fed. If inflation subsides, the Fed might not be as aggressive in tightening policy as the market expects. On a relative basis, this suggests there is a mispricing of how the market views Fed action, relative to other central banks. The key risk to this view is that the US economy can actually withstand much higher rates compared to the rest of the world. While this could be the case, higher rates in Norway and New Zealand are not yet hurting domestic conditions. In fact, it can be argued that weakness in their currencies has unwound a lot of the tightening in financial conditions from higher interest rates. A commodity boom also suggests that these currencies will benefit from rising terms of trade. Conclusion Bond markets have priced higher relative rates in the US, but the Fed could actually lag market expectations, especially relative to commodity-linked currencies (Chart 9). Chart 9Commodity Currencies Have Been Tracking Rate Expectations With A Lag Specifically, higher rates than the market expects in the US will undermine US equity market leadership, reversing substantial portfolio inflows in recent years. This is already occurring at the margin. On the other hand, fewer rate hikes will severely unwind speculative inflows into the US dollar. Housekeeping We went short NOK/SEK on the expectation that oil prices had overshot, especially relative to forward markets (Chart 10). We are tightening the stop loss on this trade to 1.09. Finally, the Bank of England met this week and its transcript reinforced our stance that the BoE will be cornered as it attempts to raise rates amidst a slowing economy. Stay long EUR/GBP. Chart 10Stay Short NOK/SEK But Tighten Stops Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
Executive Summary The RMB And Real Interest Rates The RMB has overshot and will likely consolidate gains in the coming months. The said, the yuan remains underpinned by a current account surplus, positive real rates, and a valuation cushion. This will support modest appreciation over the next 12-18 months (Feature Chart). The dollar is likely to enter a period of weakness beyond the Russo-Ukrainian crisis, underpinning a firm RMB. Yield spreads between China and the US will narrow across the bond curve, slowing the pace of any RMB appreciation. In its quest to dominate Asian trade flows, China will also seek a stable yuan which can be an anchor for regional currencies. Low volatility in the Chinese bond and currency market will increasingly make it an attractive hedge for global portfolio managers. This will encourage RMB inflows. The financial sanctions on Russia from the ongoing Ukrainian conflict will accelerate Chinese diversification from US assets. It will also boost the use of RMB in global trade, lifting its share in global FX reserves. Bottom Line: In the near term, USD/CNY is due for a bounce and could retrace to 6.5. It is also the case that a lot of the gains in the Chinese RMB have been frontloaded, suggesting a flattish path ahead. Beyond the near term, we expect the DXY to hit 90 in the next 12-18 months, which will boost the RMB towards 6.0. Feature The RMB has been strong across the board versus most major currencies (Chart 1). Year-to-date, the DXY dollar index is up 2% while the CFETS basket is up 3%. This places the Chinese yuan as one of the best performing major currencies this year. Such a configuration where USD/CNY diverges from the broad dollar trend has been very rare in recent history (Chart 2). More importantly, this has occurred amidst very low volatility. Chart 1A Bull Market In Yuans Chart 2USD/CNY And The Dollar Diverge In this Special Report, we try to understand the driving forces behind a rising RMB, to gauge its likely path going forward. In our view, while the yuan is vulnerable tactically, it is underpinned by strong structural forces that support modest appreciation over the next 12-18 months. The Chinese Economy, Interest Rates, And The RMB An exchange rate is simply a mechanism to equalize rates of returns across countries. For most currencies, the key determinants of this arbitrage window are real interest rate differentials. In China, while nominal interest rates vis-à-vis the US have been collapsing, real interest rate differentials are near a record high. This has been the key driver of a rising RMB (Chart 3). Real interest rates tend to matter because high and rising inflation destroys the purchasing power of any currency. Our bias is that higher real rates in China versus the US will persist and keep the RMB firm. Five key reasons underpin this view: The Chinese economy is expected to accelerate this year relative to the US. The IMF expects 4.8% GDP growth in China, versus 4% in the US. Bloomberg consensus estimates corroborate this view – 5.2% growth is expected for China this year, versus 3.6% for the US. Even the Chinese government’s GDP growth target this year is 5.5%, much higher than street estimates. US interest rates are likely to rise over the medium term, but so will those in China. The Chinese credit impulse has bottomed, and it is usually a good precursor to both stronger economic activity and higher relative government bond yields (Chart 4). Chart 3The RMB And Real Versus Nominal Rates Chart 4Interest Rate Differentials And The Credit Impulse While Chinese productivity growth is slowing, it remains structurally higher compared to that in the US or Europe. Stronger productivity growth suggests the neutral rate of interest in China will remain higher than in Western economies for years to come. This will continue to attract further fixed-income inflows. The RMB is a procyclical currency and tends to benefit when flows into emerging market assets in general, and Chinese stocks in particular, are fervent. While the Chinese authorities have cracked down on the property and information technology/communication service sectors, they have done so without causing widespread capital flight and hurting the RMB (Chart 5). Going forward, odds are that the interest from foreign bargain hunters will rise as these sectors reset from lower and much cheaper levels. It is well known that the Chinese economy has excess capacity, which is inherently deflationary (and positive for real rates). Like Japan, China has excess savings and deficient demand (Chart 6). However, in an inflationary world, this excess capacity can easily be exported, especially to the US, which is on the verge of overheating. A healthy trade balance in China suggests there is little reason for the RMB to depreciate meaningfully. Chart 6Excess Savings In China And Low Inflation Chart 5The RMB And Chinese Equities It is remarkable that despite being the largest commodity importer in the world, terms of trade in China is picking up. Rising terms of trade is usually synonymous with a stronger currency. On the flip side, a stronger currency will also temper inflationary pressures in China (Chart 7). Chart 7The RMB, Terms Of Trade And Inflation The bottom line is that real interest rates will remain relatively high in China, even as the US begins to tighten monetary policy while China eases. The reason is that the US economy is much more inflationary, and Chinese bond yields tend to rise when the PBoC stimulates growth. Market Liberalization And Portfolio Flows With attractive real yields, Chinese bonds have been gaining widespread investor appeal. Their inclusion in the world’s three major bond indices has been a seminal milestone in the process of liberalizing the Chinese fixed-income market. Chinese bonds have also acted as perfect portfolio hedges, moving inversely to US and global equities (Chart 8). The result has been significant portfolio inflows into Chinese bonds. As a reminder, Chinese bonds were initially included in the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index (BBGA) in April 2019. Following that, they were added to the JP Morgan Government Bond - Emerging Market Index (GBI-EM) in February 2020. Finally, FTSE Russell announced their inclusion of in the FTSE World Government Bond Index (WGBI) as of October 2021. Since their inclusion, a net US$350 billion has flowed into Chinese bonds. We estimate that about 35% of that has been due to index inclusion. The amount of Chinese onshore bonds held by overseas investors has breached US$600 billion, a record high (Chart 9). Chart 9A Healthy Appetite From Foreign Investors Chart 8RMB Bonds As A Portfolio Hedge In a nutshell, the path of the RMB in the short term will follow relative growth dynamics between China and the rest of the world, but structural factors such the inclusion of RMB bonds in global portfolios will underpin strong inflows into the Chinese fixed-income market. The Dollar, Trade, And Lessons From The Ukrainian Conflict Chart 10China Is Destocking USDs Another factor to consider vis-à-vis the RMB is the dollar’s reserve status, and the overreach that it commands. Quite simply, transactions conducted in US dollars anywhere fall under US law. This means that if a company in any country buys energy from Iran and the transaction is done in US dollars, the Treasury has powers to sanction the parties involved. Russian holdings of US Treasurys peaked during the Georgian war and have since fallen to near 0% of total reserves. Even so, the world has witnessed how vulnerable the Russian economy has been to a cut-off from the Society For Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) messaging system. China is the largest holder of US Treasurys and what it decides to do with this war chest of savings is of critical importance. At a minimum, a few trends that have been underway in recent years are likely to accelerate. China will continue to destock its holding of Treasurys into gold and other currencies (Chart 10). This will put downward pressure on the dollar and boost the RMB. In fact, ever since China started destocking Treasurys in earnest in 2015, the DXY has been unable to sustainably punch through the 100 level. Trade flows in Asia remain rather buoyant, even as globalization has peaked (Chart 11A and 11B). With most Asian countries having China as a large trading partner, the logical step will be more and more invoicing in RMB. Most global trade hubs in history (such as Hong Kong for example) have always sought a stable currency with low volatility to instill confidence in trade. China is likely to also favor a stable RMB. Chart 11AChina Could Dominate Asian Trade Chart 11BAsian Trade Is Booming As Asian trade continues to expand, the PBoC can step in as the regional central bank and lender of last resort. It is notable that China is already engaging in this role. Since the global financial crisis, the number of bilateral swap lines offered to foreign central banks by the PBoC has ballooned (Chart 12). According to the most recent data (from the PBoC), the Chinese central bank had bilateral local currency swap agreements with central banks or monetary authorities in 40 countries and regions, with a total amount of around 4 trillion yuan. The People’s Bank of China has massive foreign exchange reserves, worth about US$3.2 trillion. This means it can provide swap agreements that will almost cover the totality of EM foreign dollar debt. The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) already allows the transfer and clearing of yuan-denominated payments. In 2021, the system processed US$12.7 trillion, a 75% increase in turnover from the previous year.1 While the system still largely relies on SWIFT messaging for most cross-border transactions, progress towards independence is moving fast. The key point is that as China continues to rise as an economic power and increases the share of RMB trade within its sphere of influence, the yuan will naturally become the de facto Asian currency. This will allow the RMB to continue to gain international appeal (Chart 13). Chart 12The People's Bank Of Asia? Chart 13The RMB And International Appeal Valuation Concerns Most of the discussion above has focused on the cyclical outlook for the Chinese economy and bond yields, as well as the geopolitical ramifications from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. While the macro environment is by far the most important driver of currencies, valuation and sentiment tend to matter as well. On this note: Our productivity model suggests the RMB is at fair value. Productivity in China remains higher than among its western trading partners, but the gap has been closing. This has flattened the slope of the fair-value model (Chart 14). That said, the US and Europe are generating much higher inflation than China, suggesting there is higher pressure for unit labor costs to rise in these countries. This will improve the competitive profile of the RMB. Our PPP model for the RMB, using an apples-to-apples consumer basket vis-à-vis the US suggests the RMB is undervalued by 11% (Chart 15). Historically, such levels of undervaluation have seen the RMB appreciate by 2% per year over the next 4 years (Chart 16). Chart 14The RMB Is At Fair Value Based On Productivity Trends Chart 15The RMB Is Cheap Based On Relative Prices Chart 16Potential RMB Returns For Foreign Investors Valuation tends to be important because it is usually the trigger for imbalances to manifest themselves. Back in 2015-20162 when Chinese capital outflows (especially illicit flows) were rampant amongst global and Chinese concerns, the RMB also happened to be very overvalued. Today, such a risk is much limited. Concluding Thoughts The RMB and the dollar tend to move in harmony, and so a discussion of one entails talking about the other. We have characterized the dollar this year as caught in a tug of war. Specifically, aggressive rate hikes by the Federal Reserve will boost interest rate differentials in favor of the US but undermine the equity market via a derating in stocks. This will tighten financial conditions, nudging the Fed to pivot. On the other hand, less accommodation by the Fed will significantly unwind the rate-driven rally that has nudged the DXY close to 100. On the other hand, the Chinese credit impulse has bottomed meaning bond investors will benefit from rising bond yields in China. Equity investors will also benefit from a cheaper market, as well as exposure to sectors that are primed to benefit as the global economy reopens. This combination could sustain the pace of foreign capital inflows. In the near term, USD/CNY is due for a bounce and could retrace to 6.5. It is also the case that a lot of the gains in the Chinese RMB have been front loaded, suggesting a flattish path ahead. Beyond the near term, we expect the DXY to hit 90 in the next 12-18 months, which will boost the RMB towards 6.0. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/what-is-chinas-onshore-yuan-clearing-settlement-system-cips-2022-02-28/ 2 Please see Chinese Investment Strategy Special Report, titled “Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows,” dated March 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
Executive Summary No Contagion Yet The risk of contagion into other FX pairs from the collapse of the RUB remains contained but is rising. The main transmission mechanism will be a global rush into dollars, should the crisis trigger a global recession. For now, European countries with big trade and financial relationships with Russia are the ones in the firing range of any escalation. The euro has already adjusted lower. As such, while the crisis could get worse before it gets better, the broad DXY index is unlikely to rally much beyond 100. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve will be swift in addressing any offshore dollar funding crises, via facilities revived during the depths of the COVID-19 crisis. Crude prices could be near capitulation highs. A reversal in oil prices (as the forward curve suggests) will benefit oil consumers versus producers. Long EUR/CAD and short NOK/SEK positions are on our shopping list. Recommendations Inception Level Inception Date Return Short NOK/SEK 1.11 Mar 3/2022 - Bottom Line: Bottom Line: If a further escalation in the crisis triggers a global recession, it will lead to another down leg in stocks, and a rally in the dollar. Meanwhile, a détente will allow the bull market in stocks to continue, and the dollar rally to reverse. As we argue below, while the crisis could get worse before it gets better, the broad DXY index is unlikely to rally much beyond 100. Feature The market is treating the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as a localized event that is unlikely to trigger a global recession. While the DXY index is fast approaching the psychological 100 level, other FX pairs forewarning a major risk-off event on the horizon remain rather sanguine. For example, the AUD/JPY cross is toppy but has tracked the mild correction in global stocks. The big losers in the DXY index have been the Swedish krona and the euro, currencies directly in the firing range of any escalation in the crisis (Chart 1). Chart 2Investors Have Bought FX Hedges Chart 1No Contagion Yet Specific to the euro, risk reversals — the difference in implied volatility between out-of-the-money calls versus puts — have collapsed below COVID-19 lows. Across a broad spectrum of currencies, investors have been building hedges against losses (Chart 2). The mirror image of this is near record-high net speculative positioning in the dollar. Given this market configuration, the key question is where next? Clearly, if a further escalation in the crisis triggers a global recession, it will lead to another down leg in stocks, and a rally in the dollar. Meanwhile, a détente will allow the bull market in stocks to continue, and the dollar rally to reverse. As we argue below, while the crisis could get worse before it gets better, the broad DXY index is unlikely to rally much beyond 100. A Review Of The Fed Put Chart 3The Fed And Liquidity Crises Both a global pandemic and fear of a global war are existential threats which have occurred throughout history. As such, should we survive an escalation in tensions, the DXY could behave as it did during the COVID-19 crisis. Specifically, the pandemic triggered a rush into dollars amidst a global shortage. This was a key reason why the DXY punched above 100. Fast forward to today, and a lot of the facilities that were tapped into during the COVID-19 crisis can be reactivated. A review of the sequence of events back then is instructive: The Fed began by offering unlimited funding through swap lines to five major central banks at the overnight index swap + 25 basis points.1 This was effective as of the week of March 16, 2020 (Chart 3). When this proved insufficient to satiate the demand for dollars, the swap lines were extended to nine more central banks, with a cap of US$60 billion and a maturity of 84 days.2 This was announced on March 19, 2020. Finally, FIMA account holders were allowed to temporarily exchange their Treasury securities held with the Fed for US dollars. This was announced on March 24, 2020. In hindsight, it turned out that the Fed’s actions on March 19 marked the peak in the dollar at 103, even though we continue to live with Covid-19 today. That peak was 5% above current levels. What ensued was a period of volatility, with periodic rallies towards 100, but these provided excellent shorting opportunities for the DXY. The behavior of the DXY today could be more sanguine, with the benefit of hindsight. Barometers Of Contagion Chart 4Defaults Less Likely Outside Russia No two crises are the same. It is likely that holders of Russian US dollar debt will never be made whole, with coupon payments already suspended. As a result, the risk is that investors liquidate other holdings of emerging market dollar bonds to cover margin calls. This will lead to a self-reinforcing spiral which will transform a localized liquidity crisis into a global solvency one. Credit default swaps in major EM economies are rising, as they blow out for Russian debt (Chart 4). That said, there are a few similarities with past Russian incursions: The selloff in Russian debt during the invasion of Crimea was a localized event. The invasion of Georgia took place at the heart of the global financial crisis of 2008. In the former, a self-reinforcing feedback loop of higher refinancing rates and defaults did not ensue. The reaction from other EM currencies and equity markets has been rather constructive, despite the wholesale liquidation in Russian assets (Chart 5). As adjustment mechanisms, currencies are good at sniffing out the risk of contagion. That is not the case yet. Finally, the DXY and the RUB have already decoupled, as they did in previous episodes of a Russian invasion (Chart 6). In the past, this was a good indication that the event was localized, even though the RUB only bottomed after falling 35% and 47% in 2008 and 2014, respectively. While the risk today can be characterized as much greater, this dynamic remains the same (the dollar is up only 1.6% since the incursion). Chart 5Spot The Outlier Chart 6The Dollar And Rouble Have Already Decoupled What is clear is that the longer the conflict lasts, the less likely it is that the Fed will deliver the aggressive rate hikes originally priced by the market this year. This will keep US policy very accommodative, at a time when the real fed funds rate is still well below estimates of neutral (Chart 7). Chart 7The Fed Is Still Very Accomodative The message from the Bank of Canada this week could be a model for other central banks, where quantitative tightening (QT) and rate hikes complement each other. This could signal a slower pace of hikes than the market expects and, in turn, could help lead to a steeping of yield curves, especially as growth eventually recovers. Applying The Russian Template The bigger question for currency markets longer term is what happens to foreign holders of US assets when the dust settles. Russian holdings of US Treasurys peaked during the Georgian war and have since fallen to nearly 0% of total reserves (Chart 8). This has been replaced by gold, RMB assets, euro assets, and other currencies. With US geopolitical rivals having seen how vulnerable the Russian economy has been to a cut-off from the SWIFT messaging system, currency alliances outside the scope of the dollar are likely to solidify. China is the number one contributor to the US trade deficit, which is hitting record lows. It is also the largest holder of US Treasurys, which it continues to destock. This could be a subtle retaliation against past US policies, or perhaps a way to make room for the internationalization of the RMB (Chart 9). What is clear is that nations getting cutoff from the US financial system can only accelerate this trend. Chart 8Template For US Geopolitical Rivals? Chart 9China Has Stopped Recycling Surpluses Into Treasurys From a broader perspective, the process of reserve diversification out of US dollars, into other currencies has been accelerating in recent years. International Monetary Fund (IMF) data shows that the global allocation of foreign exchange reserves to the US dollar peaked at about 72% in the early 2000s and has been in a downtrend ever since. Meanwhile, allocations to other currencies as well as gold have been surging. Ever since the trend began to accelerate in 2015, the DXY has been unable to sustainably punch through the 100 level (Chart 10). Chart 10The DXY: 100 Is The Line In The Sand Portfolio Strategy Deflationary shocks tend to be bullish for US Treasurys and the dollar. An inflationary dislocation will push investors towards gold (and currencies that act as an inflation hedge such as the NOK, CAD, AUD, and NZD). So far, the market seems to be betting on stagflation, where both Treasury yields and gold rise in tandem (Chart 11). The response of the Federal Reserve will be the key arbiter. A growth slowdown arising from the pandemic will slow the pace of rate hikes. As such, rising inflation and low real yields will reduce the appeal of US Treasurys and boost the appeal of gold in the near term. Historically, this has been bearish for the US dollar (Chart 12). Chart 11Competing Safe-Haven Assets Have Diverged Chart 12The Bond-To-Gold Ratio And The Dollar In our portfolio, we have two trades: A short CHF/JPY position, as we believe the yen will be a better hedge than the franc given higher real rates in Japan; and a long EUR/GBP position, given that the euro is closer to pricing in a recession, compared to the pound (or even the Canadian dollar). We will adjust our positions accordingly as the crisis unfolds. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 These included the Bank of Canada, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank. 2 These include the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Danmarks Nationalbank (Denmark), the Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, the Norges Bank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Sveriges Riksbank. Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
Executive Summary Lots Of Pent-Up Demand The yen is unlikely to meaningfully appreciate until global bond yields stabilize. That said, very cheap valuations and a large net short position provide ample ammunition for an explosive rebound should macroeconomic conditions fall into place. The macro catalyst is likely to come from a domestic growth rebound. Unlike other developed economies, private consumption in Japan has been rather anemic on the back of cascading lockdowns. Inflation in Japan will remain contained in 2022, meaning the Bank of Japan will stay dovish. That said, the Japanese economy is also one of the best candidates for generating non-inflationary growth, a bullish backdrop for the currency. Our 2022 target for the yen is 104. Our sense is that most of the downside risks are well understood by markets, while upside surprises are much underappreciated. Recommendations Inception Level Inception Date Return Short CHF/JPY 125.05 2022-02-17 - Bottom Line: Real rates are likely to remain quite attractive in Japan. While that has not been a key driver of the currency in the short term, it remains an anchor over a longer horizon. According to our in-house PPP models, an investor who buys the yen today can expect to make 6% a year over the next decade, based on the historical correlation between valuation and subsequent currency returns. Feature Chart 1Anemic Passenger Volumes The Japanese economy grew by 1.7% in 2021. For an economy with a potential growth rate of only 0.5%, this is an impressive feat. Even more remarkable is that this growth occurred within the context of very anemic domestic demand. The external sector in Japan has been benefiting from a global trade boom, while the domestic sector has been under siege from the pandemic. Anecdotally, the situation on the ground remains rather dire. Shinkansen passenger volumes are still down 35% this year after an even bigger collapse last year. According to Nikkei Asia, the waiting list to enter Japan continues to grow, as border restrictions are enforced. Of the 626,000 individuals approved for residence in Japan since January 2020, only 35% have filtered through. More broadly, at the peak, tourist arrivals (a meaningful source of demand) represented 25% of the overall Japanese population. Today, that number remains near zero (Chart 1). Amidst the gloom, pockets of Japanese financial markets are beginning to suggest a turnaround in economic conditions. The yield curve in Japan is steepening, usually a sign that monetary conditions remain very conducive to growth. Historically, that has been a bullish signal for the yen (Chart 2). Meanwhile, despite the surge in global bond yields, Japanese bank stocks are outperforming. The banking sector is usually one of the first to sniff out an improvement in economic fortunes (Chart 3). Chart 2The Yen And The Japanese Yield Curve Chart 3Japanese Banks Are Outperforming Outside financials, with inflation surging around the world, the Japanese economy is one of the best candidates for generating non-inflationary growth. This is bullish for the currency as real rates rise. Our bias is that while it might be too early to go long the yen today, conditions are gradually falling into place for a coiled spring rebound. The Case For Japanese Growth While the manufacturing PMI in Japan hit an 8-year high of 55.4 in January, the services PMI sits at 47.6, the lowest in the G10. The number of daily new COVID-19 cases breached 100,000 this month, the highest since the pandemic began two years ago. Hospitalizations and deaths are also rising acutely. However, there is rising evidence that Japan is beginning to put the worst of the pandemic behind it. 79.5% of the population is fully vaccinated, versus just about 50% six months ago. Booster shots are being ramped up quickly. The effective reproduction rate of the virus has dropped sharply, from 2.29 at the end of last year to 1.19 currently. According to government officials, there will be sufficient progress made on the virus front to begin relaxing border requirements and restrictions by next month. Optimism on the COVID-19 front will be a welcome fillip to much subdued consumer and business sentiment. Consumption outlays in Japan remain well below the pre-pandemic trend, especially towards services (Chart 4). As the economy reopens, and the labor market recovery continues, the war chest of Japanese savings that have been built in recent years should be modestly unwound. The job-to-applicants ratio is inflecting higher and workers’ propensity to consume has been improving (Chart 5). Chart 5A Labor Market Recovery Will Boost Spending Chart 4Lots Of Pent-Up Demand Wage increases remain very modest in Japan. Fumio Kishida, the Japanese prime minister has called for wage increases above 3%. His government also wants to raise the minimum wage from ¥930 to ¥1000, after a 3% increase last year. As the Shuntō (spring wage negotiations) begin, unions are likely to become more vocal in demanding wage increases. However, with a large share of temporary workers in Japan, and company preferences for one-time bonuses versus permanent pay increases, overall wage growth in Japan should remain in the 1-2% range, in line with BoJ forecasts. This puts Japan miles away from a wage inflation price spiral. From a contrarian perspective, it also means that falling unit labor costs are making the currency extremely competitive (Chart 6). Chart 6Japanese Workers Are Both Productive And Competitive Chart 7A Smaller Fiscal Drag In 2022 In a nutshell, Japan has had cascading shocks from the consumption tax hike in 2019 to six waves of COVID-19 over the last two years. These have led to a massive build in pent-up demand, which should be unleashed in the coming quarters. Government outlays will also go a long way towards boosting aggregate demand. A supplementary budget of ¥36tn was put together last year and approved for the fiscal year that ends this April. The even bigger 2022 budget of ¥107.6tn should also help ease the fiscal drag in 2022 (Chart 7). For a low-growth economy like Japan, with ultra-loose monetary settings, the fiscal multiplier tends to be much larger. The Export Machine Continues To Hum A boom in external demand has been a much welcome cushion for Japanese growth. Rising energy prices are hurting the nominal trade balance, but real net exports remain firm. Foreign machinery orders are still rising over 30% year on year, boosting industrial production in Japan (Chart 8). Demand from China has been an important component of foreign sales. As monetary policy is eased in Beijing, domestic demand should start to improve, preventing Japanese exports from collapsing. One of the most cyclical components of Japanese exports is machine tool orders, which remain firm (Chart 9). Chart 9A Chinese Recovery Will Cushion Export Growth Chart 8Machinery Orders Remain Robust Monetary Policy And Inflation The Bank of Japan is unlikely to adjust monetary settings aggressively, amidst a recovery in demand. It could widen the target band for yield curve control, while bringing short rates back to zero, but this will require a vigorous rebound in demand and inflation. It could also scrap its 0% bank loan scheme but given these are targeted (especially towards renewable industries, and small/medium-sized firms), that is unlikely. Remarkably, the BoJ has not had to increase its holdings of government securities over the last year, as markets have viewed its policy as credible (Chart 10). Doing little is likely the best path of action for the BoJ in 2022. Chart 112% Inflation = Mission Impossible? Chart 10Not Much QE By The BoJ The key variable for the BoJ remains its 2% inflation target, which seems elusive for the time being. Inflation does not tend to accelerate in Japan until the output gap is fully closed. That has yet to occur. Meanwhile, the political push to cut mobile phone prices has been a drag on CPI. Mobile phone charges alone have cut around 1.2%-1.5% from the core core measure of Japanese inflation, according to the BoJ (Chart 11). Moreover, the decline in phone charges has been structural, even though it is usually touted as a one-off. A falling yen would allow some pass-through inflation, but this is unlikely to be sticky. The yen needs to fall 20% every year to generate 2% inflation in Japan (Chart 12). The pass-through is likely to be much higher for price-volatile items such as food and energy, which is likely to create angst among the rapidly ageing population. Chart 122% Inflation = 20% Yen Depreciation Putting it all together, real rates are unlikely to fall very much in Japan. This is very positive for the yen in a world with deeply negative real rates. As demand recovers, and the Japanese economy generates non-inflationary growth, the currency should find a solid footing. The Yen And Portfolio Flows It will be very difficult for the yen to rally if global yields continue to rise aggressively (Chart 13). With yield curve control in Japan, the nominal spread with foreign yields has been narrowing. However, the cost of hedging those foreign yields has also risen dramatically, which has prevented Japanese investors from aggressively flocking to overseas fixed income markets (Chart 14). That said, the weakness in the yen also suggests speculators have been borrowing in JPY to bet on carry strategies. Chart 13Global Yields Need To Stabilize To Cushion The Yen Chart 14No Massive Outflows From Japan Yet The rise in Treasury yields has yet to hit exhaustion from a technical perspective. Our bond strategists expect the 10-year yield to reach 2.25%, which will also enter the zone where we have historically seen some consolidation. The J.P. Morgan survey shows that most of its clients are short duration, but speculators are only modestly short 10-year or 30-year Treasurys (Chart 15). Chart 16USD/JPY And DXY Tend To Move Together Chart 15Modest Upside In Treasury Yields? Once yields stabilize, and the dollar starts to weaken, the positive real rate spread between Japan and the US should attract yen inflows, or at least nudge speculators to start liquidating massive short positions. As a counter-cyclical currency, the yen usually weakens against other developed market currencies, but USD/JPY tends to fall, on broad dollar weakness (Chart 16). Finally, the recent turbulence in markets has seen the yen begin to shine as a safe haven, more so than the US dollar and the Swiss franc (Chart 17). In the near term, this is a catalyst for long yen positions. With US interest rates having risen significantly versus almost all G10 countries in recent quarters, the dollar has become a carry currency. It is difficult for any currency to act as both a safe haven and carry currency, due to opposing driving forces. A rise in volatility will be a boost for the yen. Chart 17The Yen Is The Better Hedge Valuations And A Trade Idea In a report titled “A Short Note On US Dollar Valuations,” we suggested that the yen was the most undervalued G10 currency. According to our in-house PPP models, an investor who buys the yen today can expect to make 6% a year over the next decade, based on the historical correlation between valuation and subsequent currency returns (Chart 18). This will especially be the case if Japanese inflation keeps lagging inflation in the US. As a play on rising volatility, cheaper valuations, and a positive carry, we suggest investors short CHF/JPY today, with a stop at 127, and a target of 115. Historically, these currencies have tended to move together. However, more recently, CHF has risen substantially versus JPY, suggesting some mean reversion is due (Chart 19). Chart 18The Yen Is Very Cheap Chart 19Sell CHF/JPY Housekeeping We are closing our long AUD/NZD trade for a modest profit of 2.5%. We introduced this tactical trade over 6 months ago and are now cognizant of the negative carry as global yields rise. As a reminder we usually hold tactical trades for 6 months, and cyclical trades for 6-18 months. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
Executive Summary Foreign And Domestic Politics Won't Stop The Fed Investors woke up to the Ukraine risk this week. It is not yet resolved. Stay defensive. Market reactions to Ukraine suggest investors will favor defensive sectors and growth stocks in the short term, with the notable exception of the energy sector. External risks will not dissuade the Fed from hiking rates in the face of 6% core inflation. Later the Fed might adjust to foreign crises but the stock market faces more downside in the interim. Polarization is reviving ahead of the midterm elections, which will usher in gridlock. Gridlock is disinflationary, reinforcing a tactically defensive market positioning despite our cyclical House View. Bottom Line: Biden’s external risks are not yet subsiding. The Fed will hike rates even in the face of external supply shocks. Stay tactically defensive. Feature Our three key views for the year are: gridlock, executive power, and foreign policy. First, Congress will become gridlocked even prior to the midterm elections. Second, President Biden will have to shift to executive power to achieve policy objectives. Third, Biden’s focus will be forced to engage in foreign policy more than he would prefer due to rising external risks. The Ukraine crisis – covered extensively in our Geopolitical Strategy – is the most pressing external risk but it is not the only one that we think will trouble markets this year. We expect politically induced volatility to persist all year. The cyclical investment view should be driven by the underlying macroeconomic reality. But that macro reality will change if external risks materialize and cause greater supply disruptions or if they alter the US midterm election outlook. We maintain our tactically defensive positioning for now. Mr. Market Wakes Up To Ukraine Risk The reason for the crisis is the historic Russian military buildup on all sides of Ukraine, in the face of US defense cooperation with Ukraine, not the “hysterical” American propaganda over the risk of war. When and if Russian forces withdraw, the crisis will melt away. But for now, Russia’s reported withdrawal of some troops is contradicted by movements of other troops as well as the fact that the Russian navy has effectively blocked off the Black Sea. Investors must judge by capabilities, not intentions, and Russia still has the capability to stage a limited attack at present so investors should maintain a defensive or cautious approach. In this context investors are rightly bidding up the US dollar and bidding down US equities in absolute terms (albeit not relative to European equities). Bond yields have not responded much to the external risk due to the high rate of inflation, which is pushing yields up (Chart 1). If Russia re-invades, stocks and bond yields will fall at least temporarily and the dollar will rise higher. When Russia initially invaded Ukraine eight years ago, in February 2014, the US stock-to-bond ratio moved sideways for several months but cyclicals outperformed defensives. Energy stocks rallied, until the oil crash in summer 2014. Small caps underperformed large caps, yet value outperformed growth stocks (Chart 2). Small caps likely suffered from risk-off sentiment and expectations of a drag on global growth, while value benefited from gently rising interest rates at that time. Chart 1Ukraine Crisis Escalates Chart 2Market Response To Crimea Invasion, 2014 Comparing the situation today, the difference is that cyclicals are trailing defensives and small caps are trailing large caps even more than they were in 2014. Yet value stocks have performed far better against growth now than then, in accordance with higher inflation and bond yields (Chart 3). Further escalation of the Ukraine crisis should drive investors to favor defensives, large caps, and growth stocks on a tactical time frame, even though this decision runs against our BCA House View on a cyclical time frame. The past week’s market moves reinforce the 2014 experience in general, with the stock-to-bond ratio faltering and cyclicals falling back (Chart 4). Small caps and value have benefited but these charts suggest that a negative hit to global growth will hurt small caps, while value is overextended relative to growth in the short term. The market only really began to discount the risk of a new war in Europe this past week, specifically on Friday, February 11 and Monday, February 14. Chart 3Market Response 2022 Versus 2014 Chart 4US Equities Just Woke Up To Ukraine There is not yet a solid diplomatic solution as we go to press on Tuesday, February 15, but some positive signs are fueling a rebound in risk assets. Fade these improvements in risk appetite until Russia makes its decision on whether to use military force and, if so, until Europe makes its decision on whether to impose crippling sanctions. Bottom Line: Tactically stay long growth stocks versus value, but prepare to switch back to overweighting value if the Ukraine crisis abates. The Energy Sector Response To Ukraine So Far Commodity prices and the energy sector are naturally benefitting from rising supply risks. But there is a risk that they will suffer later if a war breaks out and generates a supply shock and energy price shock that weigh on European and global growth. Russia will likely maintain energy production to help pay for its military adventures. The Saudis could increase production to prevent demand destruction. It is also possible that a US-Iran nuclear deal could release Iranian oil to the market. The global economy can handle gradually rising energy prices but maybe not a sharp supply shock. Oil prices are rising on signs of escalating tensions and energy sector equities are generally outperforming the broad market and other cyclical sectors. Domestically oriented small cap energy stocks are rising relative to large caps, suggesting that the market does not believe that global growth will suffer greatly from any conflict. Apparently investors do believe that US energy companies will benefit from shipping more fossil fuels abroad (Chart 5). Bottom Line: Cyclically stay long small cap energy stocks versus their large cap brethren. Chart 5US Energy Sector Just Woke Up To Ukraine Peak-To-Trough Drawdowns Amid Geopolitical Crises The peak-to-trough equity drawdown amid major geopolitical crises ranges from 11%-15%, depending on the magnitude and nature of the crisis (Chart 6). In this case, the US will not be directly involved in any war in Ukraine, but US NATO allies will be right next door and providing aid to Ukraine. For “limited incursion” scenarios we looked at over a dozen crises, from the Berlin Blockade of 1949 to the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. The peak-to-trough drawdown averages 10%. For an unlimited or “full-scale” invasion, we looked at the S&P500 reaction to major invasions at the dawn of World War II as well as significant wars in the twentieth century, down to the US invasion of Iraq and NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. The peak-to-trough equity drawdown averaged 13%. Chart 6Range Of US Equity Peak-To-Trough Drawdowns Amid Geopolitical Crisis Given that the S&P500 has fallen by 8% since its peak on January 3, 2022, investors should be prepared for more downside. Health care stocks and consumer staples are outperforming the broad market this year so far, though they are underperforming energy where the supply squeeze is happening (Chart 7). The magnitude of war and sanctions will determine whether energy ultimately falls in expectation of demand destruction. Bottom Line: It is too soon to buy the dip in the S&P 500. Stay long health stocks relative to the broad market. Chart 7Health Care And Consumer Staples Will The Fed Respond To External Risks? No. Over the past year, we have argued with investors who tried to differentiate the current bout of inflation from the inflation of the 1970s by arguing that there is no energy supply shock. We argued that an energy shock could transpire by pointing to external risks such as Russia and Iran. While the Biden administration will likely prove risk-averse, for fear that higher prices at the pump will weigh on the Democratic Party in the midterm elections, what about the Federal Reserve? During the Arab oil embargo of late 1973, and the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Federal Reserve continued to hike interest rates, responding to domestic inflation and rising bond yields. Foreign supply shocks threatened to push up inflation, so the Fed was not deterred from hiking rates (Chart 8). When the US itself engages in war, the Fed might react differently (Chart 9). Chart 8The Fed Responds to Oil Shocks by Hiking Rates But... Chart 9... US At War Could Trigger Looser Monetary Policy In 1990, the Fed cut the policy rate once after the US entered the Iraq war, then kept rates flat for a few months before cutting more at the end of the year. Bond yields were falling due to recession. In 2001, the Fed was already cutting rates due to the business cycle and the September 11 terrorist attacks reinforced that process. In 2003, the Fed cut rates after the beginning of the Iraq war and did not start hiking rates until mid-2004 when the initial phase of the war ended. The implication is that Fed Chair Alan Greenspan accommodated both the war and the 2004 presidential election. Most external risks will not prevent the Fed from hiking rates, especially during an inflation bout when the nature of the external risk may be an energy supply disruption that pushes up prices. However, while we do not doubt that the Fed could hike by 50bps in March, we doubt that the consensus of 175bps in hikes in 2022 will pan out. The combination of initial hikes, fiscal drag, and foreign growth shocks would temper the Fed’s enthusiasm. Bottom Line: Stocks face more downside risk in this environment. Bipartisanship And The Return Of Gridlock Polarization and partisanship are recovering. The Philadelphia Fed “Partisan Conflict Index” is now only 0.6% below its 2020 peaks as the midterm election approaches (Chart 10). Interestingly, one of our key views from last year – bipartisan reform – is still taking place beneath the surface. Our 2022 view of gridlock has not yet fully set in. Congress is stealthily cooperating on fiscal spending, the US Postal Service, women’s issues, public servants’ stock trading, and an attempt to revise the Electoral Count Act. Congress is also passing a bipartisan bill to make the US more economically competitive with China and impose sanctions against Russia. Chart 10Foreign And Domestic Politics Won't Stop The Fed The only area where bipartisanship is not happening is Biden’s “Build Back Better” reconciliation bill, which even lacks sufficient support from moderate Democratic senators due to high inflation. Passage is still possible in a partisan, watered-down, and deficit-neutral form. These developments show that Republican lawmakers are demonstrating some pragmatic governing ability and will use their voting records to make a case in the midterms, while pinning the blame for inflation, crime, immigration, and any foreign crises on Democrats. As such they reinforce the market consensus that Republicans are likely to take back Congress this fall. Thus while last year’s bipartisanship is spilling into the current legislative session, gridlock is rapidly approaching. When investors look to the second half of the year and beyond, they should expect to see legislative cooperation dry up, especially if Republicans only take the House and not the Senate. Bottom Line: Gridlock will freeze fiscal policy, which is non-inflationary or disinflationary for 2022-24. As such the midterm election is not fully priced. Midterm dynamics will support an overweight or at least neutral stance toward defensives and growth stocks. Investment Takeaways Tactically stay long defensives, notably health care, and growth stocks. Cyclically remain invested in the bull market – and stay long energy small caps. The chief risks to these views would be a speedy diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine and Iran conflicts or a dramatic revival of the Democratic Party’s popular support ahead of the midterm election. Diplomacy would remove risks to global growth, whereas a Democratic comeback would boost inflation expectations. Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Footnotes
