Money/Credit/Debt
Highlights The DXY correction has a bit more to run as G10 economic surprises are likely to roll over. EM-related plays like commodity currencies can rally for a few more months, but the outlook for 2017 is troublesome. China is at risk of a deceleration. Global liquidity is tightening. Protectionism is rising. Feature Dollar Correction: It Ain't Over 'til It's Over Can the dollar correction advance further, or is the dollar bull market about to resume? We prefer to position ourselves for additional dollar weakness in the coming months. Despite persistently high bond yields, the DXY is still softening. It is being dragged down by a euro supported by strong economic news such as this week's Belgian business confidence, our favorite bellwether for the euro area. The pound too continues to show some vigor, which is also a byproduct of economic data pointing toward better growth (Chart I-1). We expect the support for the greenback from higher Treasury yields to be temporary. Momentum in U.S. 10-year government bond yields is driven by G10 economic surprises (Chart I-2). Currently, economic surprises are flirting with the upper end of their distribution of the past 12 years. Chart I-1The British Economy Is Picking Up Chart I-2G10 Economic Surprises Drive Treasury Yields Accentuating the odds of a rollover in surprises are two factors: First, as bond yields and risk-asset prices attest, investors are revising their growth expectations upward, lifting the hurdle for data to surprise to the upside. Second, having expanded for 10 months, the global credit impulse has experienced its longest upswing in a decade. Yet, the increase in global borrowing costs, along with the widening in cross-currency basis swap spreads, points to tightening global liquidity conditions, a poison for the credit cycle (Chart I-3). As credit slows, the economy will deteriorate. Chart I-3The Credit Cycle Is Stretched This means that the key factor that has supported the stronger dollar in recent months - higher U.S. yields - will begin to dissipate, putting downward pressure on the USD. Finally, our dollar capitulation index, after hitting overbought conditions, is now falling. Moreover, it currently stands below its 13-week moving average, conditions under which the greenback has recorded an average 8.1% annualized weekly loss since 1994, and an average 5.3% annualized weekly loss since 2011 (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Negative Momentum For The Dollar We continue to play this correction by shorting USD/JPY. As we have pointed out before, USD/JPY remains a function of the level of global bond yields (Chart I-5). Additionally, a negative surprise in global growth is likely to hurt risk assets. To conclude with the favorable backdrop for the yen, the high degree of uncertainty created by the seemingly erratic policy changes of the new Trump administration suggests that equity implied volatility remains too low. After all, we do not know what changes will hit global tax regimes, what the Fed policy will look like, nor how protectionist Trump will really be. Imbedding a premium for these risks will require higher equity implied vols. A higher VIX tends to support the yen against the USD (Chart I-6). Chart I-5USD/JPY And G10 Bond Yields Chart I-6The Yen Likes Uncertainty Bottom Line: The correction in the dollar should continue, as bond yields still have downside on a one- to three-month basis. The yen remains the best-placed currency to take advantage of these dynamics, especially if risk assets experience a correction. Focus - Emerging Markets and Liquidity: A March To The Scaffold This week, we re-examine our bearish view on emerging markets, a key theme underpinning our bearish stance on commodity currencies. EM assets, and therefore commodity currencies, have outperformed our expectations, reflecting the percolation of previous positive economic surprises in EM relative to the U.S. (Chart I-7). EM and commodity currencies are priced for perfection, with the risk-reversals on EM currencies displaying elevated levels of optimism (Chart I-8). For EM and commodity currencies to rally further, EM economies need to continue to outperform durably. This requires the Chinese economy and the global liquidity backdrop to only improve further. Can this happen? Chart I-7Surprise Beat In EM Versus The U.S. Has ##br##Helped EM And Commodity Currencies Chart I-8EM And Commodity Currencies ##br##Priced For Perfection While the next month or two may continue to generate generous returns for EM-related plays, the rest of 2017 may not prove as kind. The China Syndrome Let's begin with China. The recent upsurge in metal prices has reflected an improvement in Chinese economic activity (Chart I-9). As we have pinpointed before, the Keqiang index is near cycle highs, and, Chinese railway freight volumes have been growing at their fastest pace since 2010. This situation is unlikely to continue much longer. The upsurge in Chinese commodity intake - metals in particular - has been fueled by a vigorous rebound in Chinese real estate construction. However, Chinese real estate price appreciation has hit dangerous levels, and the authorities are already leaning against it, with the PBoC increasing rates by 10 basis points this week. The roll-over in Chinese real estate activity should deepen Chart I-10), hurting commodity prices - particularly iron ore, steel and copper - and commodity currencies along the way. Chart I-9China's Rebound Explains ##br##The Metals Rally Chart I-10The Risk Of A China Real Estate ##br##Slowdown Is Growing Moreover, some of the upswing in Chinese economic activity was also related to large amounts of fiscal stimulus in that nation. In mid-2015, the Middle Kingdom was inching ever closer to a hard landing, prompting a panicked Beijing to boost fiscal support and to speed up the roll-out of US$1.2 trillion of infrastructure public-private partnerships. Today, this fiscal hand-out is fading (Chart I-11). This could once again cause industrial activity and investments to weaken as Chinese capacity utilization remains near recession troughs. The recent disappointing investment growth reading in the latest Chinese GDP release could be a harbinger of this reality. Finally, as we have highlighted last week, Chinese monetary conditions have massively improved as Chinese producer-price inflation rebounded, pushing down Chinese real rates in the process. However, with commodity price inflation set to slow - courtesy of a dissipating base effect and of last year's dollar rally - Chinese PPI should roll over, pulling up real rates and tightening monetary conditions (Chart I-12). A tightening in Chinese monetary conditions represents a big problem for EM as it portends a slowdown in economic activity (Chart I-13). This will ultimately lead to a big drag on DM commodity producers, as EM commodity intake decreases, pushing down the likes of the AUD, CAD, and NZD as their terms of trade suffer. Chart I-11Fading Chinese##br## Fiscal Stimulus Chart I-12Commodity Inflation Will Peak, ##br##So Will Chinese Inflation Chart I-13Tightening China Monetary Conditions##br## Will Hurt EM Economic Activity Bottom Line: In early 2016, global markets were not positioned for a rebound in Chinese economic activity. Yet, Chinese industrial activity improved, resulting in a rebound in EM assets, commodity prices, and commodity currencies. The crackdown on real estate activity, the removal of Chinese fiscal stimulus, and the expected tightening in Chinese monetary conditions should result in a reversal of these trends, hurting commodity producers and their currencies in the process. Global Liquidity In Retreat While China represents a problem for EM plays and commodity currencies, deteriorating global liquidity could prove an even stronger hurdle. Our tactical expectation of a lower dollar and lower rates may support EM plays temporarily, but the cyclical outlook remains grim. To begin with, EM economies are dependent on global liquidity as they run a current account deficit expected to hit US$140 billion in 2017, or US$400 billion if China is excluded. Moreover, they sport large external debts of US$4.8 trillion, excluding Taiwan and China. Especially worrisome are the large funding requirements of many EM countries, especially for Turkey, Malaysia, and Colombia. (Chart I-14). Chart I-14EM Debt Vulnerability Ranking Why is this a problem? Two reasons: Global Interest rates and the dollar. Global Interest rates, driven by higher Treasury yields, are rising as the U.S.'s economic slack vanishes, suggesting that the current tightening campaign by the Fed will be durable (Chart I-15). Higher U.S. rates lift the U.S. dollar against EM currencies, tightening EM liquidity conditions. But an unrelated shock is also putting exogenous upward pressure on the dollar. This force is the widening in LIBOR spreads (Chart I-16). This is the result of the regulation-related 90% melt down in the asset under management of U.S. prime money-market funds, an important source of global dollar liquidity. Moreover, U.S. banks, with their balance sheets under pressure by the binding constraints of Basel III, have not been able to fill the gap. Chart I-15The Fed has A Green Light To Hike Chart I-16Stresses In The Libor Market Remain The end result has been a widening of cross-currency basis swap spreads, which usually tends to boost the dollar (Chart I-17). This phenomenon increases the hedging costs to foreign investors of holding U.S. dollar assets. These investors become increasingly tolerant of purchasing U.S. assets unhedged, pushing up the value of the dollar in the process. This is best illustrated by the fact that net portfolio investments in the U.S. moved from a deficit of US$300 billion in Q1 2015 to a surplus of more than US$550 billion. Yet, hedges put in place, as approximated by the BIS's volume of OTC FX derivatives, have flat-lined since 2013 (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Widening Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Equals A Higher Dollar Chart I-18Hedging Activity is Receding A rising dollar and LIBOR stresses are tightening global dollar liquidity, creating a big problem for EM. Wider-than-normal cross-currency basis swap spreads have been associated with declining global trade (Chart I-19). The stronger dollar plays a role, as it hurts the price of globally-traded good prices. Also, higher borrowing costs result in a mild disintermediation of global trade flows. As physical exports are 26% of EM GDP versus 13% for the U.S., this represents a huge drag on EM currencies, especially versus the USD. As a corollary, it is also a problem for the small open commodity producing DM economies like Australia, Canada, or New Zealand. Furthermore, the strength in the dollar associated with LIBOR shocks further hurts EM domestic economies by impeding EM credit growth (Chart I-20). The combined assault of a stronger dollar and higher rates increases the cost of EM foreign debt. Also, according to the BIS, between 2002 and 2014, 55% of EM commodity producers' debt issuance has been in USD.1 When the dollar rises, they see both their borrowing costs rise and the prices of the products they sell fall. Altogether, these forces preempt capex and credit accumulation in EM nations. Chart I-19Tightening Global Liquidity##br##Is Bad For Trade Chart I-20A Stronger Dollar Will Hamper##br## EM Credit Growth Bottom Line: The global liquidity backdrop is deteriorating. DM rates are rising cyclically, which is lifting the dollar. Moreover, a global dollar shortage is also supporting the greenback, further hurting EM liquidity conditions. Thus, we expect EM growth to deteriorate, hurting EM assets and commodity currencies. Protectionism The final issue affecting EM economies is the rise of protectionism, especially in the United States. EM - Asia and China in particular - have been the main beneficiaries of globalization (Chart I-21). Currently, they are in the line of sight of President Trump. Thus, we expect that any potential trade war between the U.S. and the rest of the world will focus on EM economies and China. Chart I-21EM And Asia Are In Trump's Line Of Sight EM are much more dependent on the U.S. than the other way around. As an example, China's exports to the U.S account for 3.5% of Chinese GDP, while U.S. exports to China account for less than 1% of U.S. GDP. EM economies have a lot more to lose from a trade war than the U.S. Because of this imbalance in relative trade-exposures, EM economies are at risk from the border-adjustment tax being discussed in the U.S. These taxes would be very deflationary for EM economies as they could force a downward adjustment in EM labor costs and further depress capex in these nations. To ease these adjustments, falling EM exchange rates would be required. Once again, commodity currencies would suffer from these developments. First, lower capex in EM hurts Australian, New Zealand, or Canadian terms of trade. Second, lower EM exchange rates means that that exports from the dollar bloc to EM would suffer. Finally, and most perversely, lower EM exchange rates will give EM commodity producers an advantage versus DM producers, in that a stronger U.S. dollar means their local-currency costs are falling. EM commodity producers would keep producing more than warranted, putting additional downward pressure on commodity prices and stealing market shares from the dollar bloc producers. This is not a pretty picture. Bottom Line: EM should bear the brunt of the pain of any rise in U.S. protectionism. The tight link between EM economies and DM commodity producers suggests that this pain should adversely affect the AUD, the CAD, and the NZD. Risks To Our View Chart I-22Chinese Tariffs Are Falling The biggest risk to our view is a redoubling of Chinese fiscal stimulus. The threat of U.S. tariffs and trade sanctions is obviously deflationary and negative for the Chinese economy. We know this, as do the relevant powers in Beijing. A tool to mitigate any of these negative repercussions on the Chinese economy might be for Beijing to press on the gas pedal once more. Additionally, as our colleague Yan Wang wrote in this week's China Investment Strategy, key members of the new U.S. administration have been on record saying that the threat of tariffs is not an end game, but rather a negotiating tool to extract concessions from U.S. trade partners, implying a potentially more pragmatic stance from the U.S. than current rhetoric suggests.2 Moreover, the Chinese side of the negotiation table is also more open minded than most observers fear. China has been cutting its own tariffs and could continue to do so (Chart I-22). Moreover, Premier Li Keqiang has made a new pledge to move faster toward opening and liberalizing Chinese markets for access by foreign companies. A deal may be less elusive than feared. Finally, regarding the global liquidity deterioration, the recent rebound in gold and silver prices may be a harbinger of improving liquidity conditions globally. We doubt that the economic situation will let this rally be durable, but it remains something to monitor. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Bruno Valentina, and Hyun Song Shin, "Global Dollar Credit And Carry Trades: A Firm-level Analysis", BIS, Working Papers, August 205. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Dealing With The Trump Wildcard", dated January 6, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was mixed this week. The labor market saw both continuing and initial jobless claims rise above expectations. However, the economy is still near full employment and the Fed will not respond to this news. Furthermore, the Beige Book, released last week, also highlights that the U.S. economy remains resilient with employment and pricing activity particularly strong. This week the DXY broke through the key 100 level, as the market continues to reprice capricious assumptions of Trump's policies. Nevertheless, it has rebounded since then. The dollar is unlikely to see any real movement until the administration releases concrete information about its policies. For the time being, the Fed also seems to be on the sidelines in anticipation of more information. Report Links: U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017 - January 20, 2017 Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Although the euro area has seen a brighter economic environment as of late, this week's data has been mixed: German and overall euro area services and composite PMI underperformed, while manufacturing PMI outperformed consensus. The IFO Business Climate and Expectations both underperformed consensus, while the Current Assessment remained in line with consensus. All measures still remain over 100. Finally, Belgian Business Confidence accelerated sharply. The ECB is unlikely to change its dovish stance. The euro will therefore see little upside. The recent uptrend in EUR/USD is due to dollar weakness, but the recent downtrend in EUR/GBP and EUR/SEK indicate that the market is not necessarily hopeful that the ECB will reach its inflation target anytime soon. Report Links: GBP: Dismal Expectations - January 13, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data indicates that last year's sharp depreciation of the yen is helping the Japanese economy: Exports increased by 5.4% YoY, crushing expectations of 1.2% growth. Nikkei Manufacturing PMI reached 52.8, also beating expectations. In November machinery orders grew by more than 10% YoY. The BoJ will be more resolute on its radical monetary measures, as recent data shows that their approach is working. This will prove very bearish for the yen on a cyclical basis, given that the cap in Japanese rates will cause the rate differential between the U.S. and Japan to widen. In the short term, USD/JPY will resume its correction. We estimate that USD/JPY will cease to be attractive as a short opportunity at around 110. Report Links: Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 On Tuesday, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, requiring a parliamentary vote to authorize the exit of the U.K. from the European Union. This news is an added boon for cable, which has surged by almost 5% after bottoming at 1.20 about 10 days ago. As political risks start to dissipate, and the currency trades more on economic fundamentals, the pound should become a more attractive buy, particularly against the euro, given that the U.K. economy should outperform the market's dismal expectations. Recent data supports this view: Average earning growth outperformed expectations in November. GDP growth was 2.2% YoY in Q4, also outperforming expectations. Furthermore, short-term technicals point to a stronger pound. EUR/GBP has broken through its 100-day moving average, which indicates that momentum should continue to drive this cross downwards for the time being. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Two weeks ago, we argued that the rally in AUD lacks fundamental domestic causes. This week, the momentum of the recent AUD rally, caused by rising iron ore and copper prices, has seemingly paused. Exacerbating this change of pace is recent data which indicates a weak economic backdrop: the RBA trimmed mean CPI, and the more common CPI measure, underperformed consensus at both a quarterly and yearly pace. This could be due to depressed consumer sentiment, as the labor market remains mired in a slump, with the unemployment rate increasing to 5.8%, and total hours worked falling. Given recent data, it is likely that markets reprice growth prospects in Australia. U.S. trade policies could also potentially curtail global trade, painting a bearish picture for AUD. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The Kiwi has appreciated 4.4% since the start of 2017. Although this rally might eventually be limited against the U.S. dollar, the NZD will likely have more upside against its crosses, particularly the AUD. Indeed it seems that low inflation, one of the only sore spots for the RBNZ in an otherwise stellar kiwi economy, has turned the corner, surging to 1.3% on the latest reading Wednesday. More importantly, not only did inflation beat expectations but it also surpassed 1% for the first time since 2014. This is a significant development, given that persistently low inflation in New Zealand was keeping the dovish bias of the RBNZ. With this hurdle gone, and an economy that continues to be the best performing in the G10, this dovish bias should disappear, which will ultimately lift the NZD against its crosses. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Despite the dissipating oil slump, potential risks may weigh on Canada's future. These risks are likely to emanate from an international sphere. Key concerns revolve around U.S. policies: recent statements have increased yields and tightened financial conditions, but global trade worries are not fully priced in. Recent news indicates that Trump has no ill-intentions aimed at Canada, however, protectionist policies could hurt global trade, indirectly curtailing Canadian exports. A U.S. corporate tax cut can also deviate investment from Canada to the U.S. The recent appreciation in the CAD against major currencies can also hurt Canadian competitiveness going forward. As oil is likely to remain relatively stable in the near future, we may again see a disassociation of CAD with oil, and a continued tight relationship with interest rate spreads. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Yesterday, EUR/CHF fell below the crucial 1.07 level. As we have recommended many times, any time that this cross falls below this threshold, it becomes an excellent buying opportunity. The SNB has not been shy to intervene in the currency markets, and they have been very clear that they will not tolerate any currency strength past a certain threshold as it could add additional deflationary pressures to an economy that has not had a positive inflation rate since 2014. We have identified a level of 1.07 for EUR/CHF as this threshold. Moreover given that the euro is the currency of reference for interventions, the behavior of USD/CHF should roughly mirror the behavior of the dollar against the Euro. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The Norwegian Krone has rallied along other commodity currencies so far this year, in spite of the meek performance of oil over this timeframe. This surge might prove unsustainable in the short term, as USD/NOK is very close to oversold territory. In the long term, the outlook for the NOK is more positive, particularly against other commodity currencies. Rising oil prices resulting from the OPEC cuts should supercharge the already high inflationary pressures in the Norwegian economy. This factor will eventually push the Norges Bank off its dovish bias, and the NOK higher in the process. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The Swedish economy seems to be finally benefitting from last year's weaker krona; PPI numbers came in at 2.1% MoM, and 6.5% YoY, higher than previous numbers. This will feed into CPI in the near future. Additionally, 1-year, 2-year, as well as the important 5-year Prospera Inflation Expectations have all picked up, with the 5-year at 2%, in line with the Riksbank's target. The bank is aware of the krona's recent strength against major currencies, and realizes that it is important that the appreciation slows. In the short term, the SEK could continue to rally on the back of the dollar's correction and the Swedish economic outperformance vis-Ã -vis the euro area. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The global 6-month credit impulse is now in its longest upcycle in a decade. Given also that bond yields have had their sharpest spike in a decade, we would not bet on the upcycle lasting much longer. Lean against the rise in bond yields and bank equities. Underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Underweight the IBEX versus the Eurostoxx600. Feature A few days into the New Year, two over-arching economic questions are exercising our minds. Is the relationship between sharply higher bond yields and weaker bank credit creation still valid? And is the relationship between weaker bank credit creation and decelerating economic growth still valid? Chart of the WeekCredit Impulses Heading In Different Directions We suspect the answers are yes and yes. European Investors Must Think Globally, Not Locally Europe is not an investment island. Major European stock market indexes comprise large multinational companies whose sales and profits come from across the world. The upshot is that European stock markets almost always move up and down in tandem with other major world stock markets, such as the S&P500 and Nikkei225 (Chart I-2). Mainstream bond markets might seem to be more parochial, given that they are supposedly under the influence of the local central bank. But investors buy and sell high quality bonds as a global asset class. The upshot is that European bond markets also almost always move up and down in tandem with other major developed bond markets (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Major Equity Markets Move Together Chart I-3Major Bond Markets Move Together Hence, European investors must look first and foremost at global drivers. For us, the most important such driver is the global 6-month credit impulse - which sums the 6-month (dollar) credit impulses in the euro area, the United States and China. Does the global 6-month credit impulse have any predictive power? Yes. Chart I-4 shows that it has consistently led the 6-month cycle in the global government bond yield, which is a good proxy for the global growth cycle. Admittedly, this powerful predictive relationship weakened somewhat through 2013-14 during the most aggressive and distortive phase of worldwide QE. However, in the past couple of years, as QE has waned, the global 6-month credit impulse's predictive power has strongly re-asserted itself (Chart I-5). Chart I-4The Credit Impulse Leads ##br##The Global Growth 'Mini-Cycle' Chart I-5The Credit Impulse's Predictive ##br##Power Has Re-Asserted Itself In effect, the charts illustrate that whatever the structural economic backdrop, the global economy experiences a perpetual 'mini-cycle' lasting about 15-24 months. Higher bond yields (or credit restrictions) weaken the credit impulse; the weaker impulse then depresses growth; the depressed growth lowers bond yields; lower bond yields (or credit easing) strengthen the credit impulse; the stronger impulse then boosts growth; the boosted growth lifts bond yields; and back to the beginning... Remember, the credit impulse measures the growth in the credit flow. The important point to grasp is that the impulse can weaken even if the credit flow numbers themselves seem strong. For example, if the credit flow increased from $100bn to $150bn to $190bn it might appear to be growing very healthily. But actually, the impulse would have weakened from $50bn to $40bn, creating a headwind. Where are we in the perpetual mini-cycle? Today, the euro area credit impulse is losing momentum, while the U.S. impulse is waning. Which leaves China's rising credit impulse as the only component supporting the global credit impulse (Chart of the Week). But for how much longer? To repeat, it would just take the global credit flow to decelerate for the impulse to roll over. Now consider that high-quality bond yields have had their sharpest 6-month spike in a decade. And that the current 10 month upcycle in the global credit impulse already makes it the longest in a decade. Hence, we would not bet on this mini-upcycle lasting much longer. A Few Words On Our Credit Cycle Framework Our credit cycle framework has several features which uniquely define it. First, the framework focusses on bank credit. This is because the magic of fractional reserve banking allows a bank to create money and new spending power out of thin air. When somebody borrows from a bank, his bank account and spending power goes up, but nobody's spending power has to go down. In contrast, when somebody borrows by issuing a bond, it merely reallocates spending power from one person to another person. The borrower sees his bank account and spending power go up, but the lender sees his bank account and spending power go symmetrically down. Spending will rise to the extent that the borrower has a higher propensity to spend than the lender, but this may or may not be the case. Second, as already discussed, the framework focusses on the bank credit impulse - which measures the growth in the bank credit flow. This is just to compare apples with apples. Remember that GDP is itself a flow statistic. So the growth in GDP receives a contribution from the growth in the credit flow1 (and not from the flow itself). Third, the framework focusses on the 6-month bank credit impulse. We choose this periodicity because 6 months is about the time that it takes to for credit to be fully spent, thereby yielding the greatest predictive power from the credit impulse to economic activity. Fourth, the framework calculates the credit cycle using bank credit to the non-financial sector2 rather than the more commonly-quoted money supply statistics such as euro area M3. The simple reason is that not all loans generate economic activity. Bank to bank lending may stay trapped in the financial system. The money supply - which is on the liabilities side of the banks' balance sheet - would not pick up this distinction. As M3 captures all bank deposits, it would still be expanding rapidly, giving the false signal that demand should be growing. Hence, it is better to focus on bank lending - which is on the assets side of the banks' balance sheet - and only count lending that is likely to generate economic activity (Chart I-6). This reasoning only works if the official data on bank loans is accurate and complete. In China, this is unlikely to be the case, given its large shadow banking system. But unofficial shadow lending must eventually show up in the money supply. Therefore, exceptionally for the China sub-component, our credit cycle framework does prefer to use the money supply (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Our Euro Area Credit Impulse##br## Uses Bank Lending... Chart I-7...But Our China Credit Impulse ##br##Uses Money Supply A Few Words On Our Reductionist Framework We are also strong believers in Investment Reductionism. This philosophy stems from two guiding principles: Occam's Razor - which says that when there are competing explanations for the same effect, the simplest explanation is usually the best; and the Pareto Principle - which says that 80% of effects come from just 20% of causes.3 The important point is that most of the moves in most financial markets result from a very small number of over-arching macro drivers. To reiterate, Europe is not an investment island. Investment Reductionism means that much of asset allocation, sector selection, and regional and country allocation distills down to getting the global growth cycle right. The remaining charts should leave readers in no doubt. Chart I-8 shows that the global 6-month credit impulse leads the cyclical direction of the global bond yield, and thereby determines asset class selection. Chart I-9 then shows that the direction of bond yields determines sector selection: for example Banks versus Technology. Chart I-8Investment Reductionism Step 1: The Global##br## Credit Impulse Leads The Bond Yield Cycle Chart I-9Step 2: The Bond Yield ##br##Drives Sector Selection Chart I-10 and Chart I-11 then show that the sector selection of Banks versus Technology determines both the regional allocation of Eurostoxx600 versus S&P500, and the country allocation of IBEX versus Eurostoxx600. Chart I-10Step 3: Sector Selection Drives##br## Regional Allocation Chart I-11Step 4: Sector Selection Drives ##br##Country Allocation To sum up, the global 6-month credit impulse is now in its longest up-cycle in a decade, and bond yields have had their sharpest spike in a decade. Hence, we would not chase cyclicality at this juncture. Which means that on a 6-month horizon: Lean against the rise in bond yields and bank equities. Underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500.4 Underweight the IBEX versus the Eurostoxx600. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Equivalently, the credit impulse is the growth in the growth (second derivative) of the credit stock. 2 The non-financial sector includes households, (non-financial) firms and government. 3 Often known as the 80-20 rule. 4 BCA Strategists differ on this position. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to express a tactical short in equities via Italy's MIB. An alternative market-neutral trade is to go short Italy's MIB and symmetrically long Hong Kong's Hang Seng. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 Chart I-13 Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II_2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Overall Strategy: The global economy is entering a reflationary sweet spot that will last for the next two years. Investors should overweight equities, maintain slightly below benchmark exposure to government bonds, and underweight cash over a 12-month horizon. Fixed Income: Global bond yields will rise only modestly over the next two years, reflecting an abundance of spare capacity in many parts of the world. A major bond bear market will begin towards the end of the decade, as stagflationary forces gather steam. Equities: Investors should underweight the U.S. for the time being, while overweighting Europe and Japan in currency-hedged terms. Emerging markets will benefit from the reflationary tailwind, but deep structural problems will drag down returns. Currencies: The broad trade-weighted dollar will appreciate another 6% from current levels. The yen still has considerable downside against the dollar. The euro will grind lower, as will the Chinese yuan. The pound is approaching a bottom. Commodities: Favor energy over metals. Gold will move higher once the dollar peaks later this year. Feature I. Key Theme: A Reflationary Window The global economy is entering a reflationary sweet spot where deflationary forces are in retreat but fears of excess inflation have yet to surface. Activity data are surprising to the upside and leading economic indicators have turned higher (Chart 1). Falling unemployment in most major economies is boosting confidence, fueling a virtuous cycle of rising spending and even further declines in joblessness. Manufacturing activity is bouncing back after a protracted inventory destocking cycle (Chart 2). In addition, the stabilization in commodity prices has given some relief to emerging markets, while fueling a modest rebound in resource sector capital spending. Meanwhile, easier fiscal policy is providing a welcome tailwind to growth. The aggregate fiscal thrust for advanced economies turned positive in 2016 - the first time this has happened in six years. We expect this trend to persist for the foreseeable future. Reflecting these developments, market-based measures of inflation expectations have risen, offsetting the increase in nominal interest rates. In fact, real rates in the euro area and Japan have actually declined across most of the yield curve since the U.S. presidential election (Chart 3). This should translate into higher household and business spending in the months ahead. Chart 1Global Growth Is Accelerating Chart 2Inventory Destocking Was A Drag On Growth Chart 3Falling Real Rates In The Euro Area And Japan Supply Matters Yet, there has been a dark side to this reflationary trend, and one that could sow the seeds for stagflation as the decade wears on. Simply put, much of the reduction in spare capacity over the past eight years has occurred not because of much faster demand growth, but because of continued slow supply growth. Chart 4 shows that output gaps in the main developed economies would still be enormous today if potential GDP had grown at the rate the IMF forecasted back in 2008. Chart 4AWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Chart 4BWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Unfortunately, we do not expect this state of affairs to change much over the coming years. The decline in birth rates that began in the 1960s has caused working-age populations to grow more slowly in almost all developed and emerging economies (Chart 5). In some countries such as the U.S., the downward pressure on labor force growth has been exacerbated by a structural decline in participation rates, especially among the less educated (Chart 6). Chart 5Slowing Workforce Growth Chart 6U.S.: The Less Educated Are Shunning The Labor Force Productivity growth has also fallen (Chart 7). Part of this phenomenon is cyclical in nature, reflecting the impact of several years of weak corporate investment in new plant and equipment. However, much of it is structural. As Fed economist John Fernald has shown, the slowdown in productivity growth since 2004 has been concentrated in sectors that benefited the most from the adoption of new information technologies in the late 1990s (Chart 8).1 Recent technological innovations have focused more on consumers than on businesses. This has resulted in slower productivity growth. Chart 7Slowing Productivity Growth Around The World Chart 8The Productivity Slowdown Has Been ##br##Greatest In Sectors That Benefited The Most From The I.T. Revolution To make matters worse, human capital accumulation has decelerated both in the U.S. and elsewhere, dragging productivity growth down with it. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the rate it did in the 1990s (Chart 9). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores, has also peaked, and is now falling in many countries (Chart 10). Chart 9The Contribution To Growth ##br##From Rising Human Capital Is Falling Chart 10Math Skills Around The World From Deflation To Inflation To reiterate what we have discussed at length in the past, the slowdown in potential GDP growth tends to be deflationary at the outset, but becomes inflationary later on.2 Initially, lower productivity growth reduces investment, pushing down aggregate demand. Lower productivity growth also curtails consumption, as households react to the prospect of smaller real wage gains. Eventually, however, economies that suffer from chronically weak productivity growth tend to find themselves rubbing up against supply-side constraints. This leads to higher inflation (Chart 11). One only needs to look at the history of low-productivity economies in Africa and Latin America to see this point - or, for that matter, the U.S. in the 1970s, a period during which productivity growth slowed and inflation accelerated. Likewise, a slowdown in labor force growth tends to morph from being deflationary to inflationary over time. When labor force growth slows, two things happen. First, investment demand drops. Why build new factories, office towers, and shopping malls if the number of workers and potential consumers is set to grow more slowly? Second, savings rise, as spending on children declines and a rising share of the workforce moves into its peak saving years (ages 35-to-50). The result is a large excess of savings over investment, which generates downward pressure on inflation and interest rates. As time goes by, the deflationary impact of slower labor force growth tends to recede (Chart 12). Workers who once brought home paychecks start to retire en masse and begin drawing down their accumulated wealth. Since there are few young workers available to take their place, labor shortages emerge. At the same time, health care spending and pension expenditures rise as a larger fraction of the population enters its golden years. The result is less aggregate savings and higher interest rates. Chart 11A Decline In Productivity Growth Is Deflationary In The Short Run, But Inflationary In The Long Run Chart 12An Aging Population Eventually Pushes Up Interest Rates Is Debt Deflationary Or Inflationary? The answer is both. Excessively high debt levels are deflationary at the outset because they limit the ability of overstretched borrowers to spend. However, high debt levels also reduce investment in new capacity - homes, office buildings, machinery, etc. This undermines the supply-side of the economy. Moreover, once the output gap is closed, high debt levels can become inflationary by increasing the incentive for central banks to keep rates low in order to suppress interest-servicing costs and reduce real debt burdens. Acting on that incentive also becomes easier as the output gap evaporates. Consider the case of forward guidance. If an economy has a large output gap, a central bank's promise to maintain interest rates at ultra-low levels, even after full employment has been reached, may hold little sway. After all, many things can happen between now and then: A change of central bank leadership, an adverse economic shock, etc. In contrast, if the output gap is already close to zero, a promise to let the economy run hot is more likely to be taken seriously. The U.S. Economy: Still In A Reflationary Sweet Spot The stagflationary demons described above will eventually come back to haunt the U.S., but for now and probably for the next two years, the economy will remain in a reflationary sweet spot. After a weak start to 2016, growth has bounced back. Real GDP grew by 3.5% in Q3. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model points to still-healthy growth of 2.9% in Q4. We expect growth to stay robust in 2017, as improving confidence and a stabilization in energy-sector investment lift overall business capex, homebuilding picks up after contracting in both Q2 and Q3 of 2016, and rising wages push up real incomes and personal consumption. Above-trend growth will continue to erode spare capacity. The headline unemployment rate has fallen to 4.6%, close to most estimates of NAIRU. Broader measures of unemployment, which incorporate marginally-attached and involuntary part-time workers, are also approaching pre-recession levels (Chart 13). Consistent with this observation, the job openings rate in the JOLT survey, the share of households reporting that jobs are "plentiful" versus "hard to get" in the Conference Board's Consumer Confidence survey, and the share of small businesses reporting difficulty in finding suitably qualified workers in the NFIB survey are all at or above 2007 levels (Chart 14). In contrast to most measures of labor market slack, industrial utilization still remains quite low by historic standards (Chart 15). In fact, the Congressional Budget Office's "capacity utilization-based" estimate of the output gap stands at around 3% of GDP, whereas its "unemployment-based" estimate is close to zero. Chart 13U.S. Labor Market: Not Much Slack Left Chart 14Most U.S. Labor Market Measures ##br## Are Back To Pre-Recession Levels Chart 15U.S.: Industrial Capacity Utilization Remains Low A strong dollar, as well as the ongoing decline of the U.S. manufacturing base, partly explain the low level of industrial utilization. However, another important reason bears noting: Years of depressed real wage growth has made labor scarce compared with capital. The free market solution to this problem is higher wages for workers. Good news for Main Street; but perhaps not so good news for Wall Street. Stagflation Is Coming, Just Not Yet While inflation will creep higher in 2017, a major spike is unlikely over the next two years. There are two main reasons for this. First, if the economy does run into severe capacity constraints, the Fed will have to step up the pace of rate hikes. Higher interest rates will push up the value of the dollar, curbing growth and inflation. Second, the historic evidence suggests that it takes a while for an overheated economy to generate meaningfully higher inflation. Consider how inflation evolved during the 1960s. U.S. inflation did not reach 4% until mid-1968. By that time, the output gap had been positive for five years, hitting a whopping 6% of GDP in 1966 due to rising military expenditures on the Vietnam War and social spending on Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs (Chart 16). The relationship between economic slack and inflation is depicted by the so-called Phillips curve. As one would intuitively expect, inflation tends to rise when slack diminishes. However, this correlation has weakened over the past few decades (Chart 17). For example, U.S. core inflation declined only modestly during the Great Recession, and has been slow to bounce back, even as the output gap has shrunk. Chart 16It Can Take A While For Inflation To Rise In Response To An Overheated Economy Chart 17The Phillips Curve Has Flattened The adoption of inflation targeting, coupled with more transparent Fed communication, has helped anchor inflation expectations. This has flattened the Phillips curve. A flatter Phillips curve implies a lower "sacrifice ratio." This means that the Fed could let the economy overheat without putting undue upward pressure on inflation. Going forward, the temptation to exploit the flatness of the Phillips curve may be too great to resist. While the Fed would have reservations about pursuing such a strategy, Janet Yellen's musings about running a "high-pressure economy" suggest that she is at least willing to entertain the idea. Interest rates are still fairly low and a few more hikes are unlikely to cause much distress among corporate and household borrowers. As rates continue to climb, however, this may change, making it difficult for the Fed to further tighten monetary policy. This is especially the case if potential real GDP growth remains lackluster, as this would make it harder for borrowers to generate enough income to service their debts. Trump's budget-busting fiscal deficits may also put some pressure on the Fed to eschew raising rates too much in an effort to hold down interest costs. Even if such political pressures do not materialize, the challenges posed by the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates could still justify efforts to raise the Fed's 2% inflation target. After all, if inflation were higher, this would give the Federal Reserve the ability to push down real rates further into negative territory in the event of an economic downturn. Admittedly, such a step is unlikely to be taken anytime soon. Nevertheless, given that a number of well-regarded economists - including prominent policymakers such as Olivier Blanchard, the former chief economist at the IMF; San Francisco Fed President John Williams; and former Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota - have floated the idea of raising the inflation target, long-term investors should be open-minded about the possibility. The bottom line is that inflation is likely to move up slowly over the next two years, but could begin to accelerate more sharply towards the end of the decade. Japan: The End Of Deflation? Like the U.S., Japan has also entered a reflationary window. Retail sales surprised on the upside in November, rising 1.7%, against market expectations of 0.8%. Industrial production and exports continue to rebound, a trend that should persist thanks to the yen's recent depreciation (Chart 18). Stronger economic growth is causing the labor market to heat up. The Bank of Japan estimates that the "labor input gap" is now positive, meaning that the economy has run out of surplus workers (Chart 19). Reflecting this, the ratio of job openings-to-applicants has reached a 25-year high (Chart 20). Chart 18Japan: Some Positive Economic News Chart 19Japan: Labor Market Slack Has Evaporated, But Industrial Capacity Utilization Has Fallen Chart 20Japan: Sign Of Tightening Labor Market Wage growth so far has been tepid, but that should change over the next two years. The labor force expanded by 0.9% year-over-year in November - the latest month for which data are available - largely due to the continued influx of women into the labor force. Chart 21 shows that the employment-to-population ratio for Japanese prime-age women now exceeds that of the U.S. by three percentage points. As Japanese female labor participation stabilizes, overall labor force growth will turn negative, pushing up wages in the process. Chart 21Japan: Female Labor Force ##br##Participation Now Exceeds The U.S. In contrast to the Fed, the BoJ is unlikely to tighten monetary policy in response to higher inflation. As a consequence, real yields will continue to fall as inflation expectations rise further. This will lead to higher net exports via a weaker yen, as well as increased spending on interest-rate sensitive goods such as consumer durables and business equipment. Indeed, a virtuous circle could develop where an overheated labor market pushes down real rates, causing aggregate demand and inflation to rise, leading to even lower real rates. If this occurs, growth could accelerate sharply, avoiding the need for more radical measures such as "helicopter money." In short, Japan may be on the verge of escaping its deflationary trap. This is something that could have happened shortly after Prime Minister Abe assumed office, but was short-circuited by the government's lamentable decision to tighten fiscal policy by 3% of GDP between 2013 and 2015. It won't make the same mistake again. Europe: Fine... For Now The European economy grew at an above-trend pace in 2016. Real GDP in the EU is estimated to have expanded by 1.9%, compared to 1.6% in the U.S. The euro area is estimated to have grown by 1.7% - the first time that growth in the common currency bloc exceeded the U.S. since the Great Recession. Euro area growth should remain reasonably strong in 2017, as telegraphed by a number of leading economic indicators (Chart 22). Fiscal austerity has been shelved in favor of modest stimulus. The European Commission is now even advising member countries to loosen fiscal policy more than they themselves are targeting (Chart 23). Chart 22Euro Area Growth Will Remain On Solid Footing In 2017 Chart 23The European Commission Recommends Greater Fiscal Expansion Ongoing efforts to strengthen the euro area's banking system will also help. As we noted in the "Italian Bank Job," the costs of cleaning up the Italian banking system are modest compared with the size of the Italian economy.3 The failure to have done it earlier represents a massive "own goal" by the Italian and EU authorities. As banking stresses recede, the gap in economic performance between northern and southern Europe should narrow. The overall stance of monetary policy will facilitate this trend. If the ECB keeps interest rates near zero for the foreseeable future, as it almost certainly will, Germany's economy will overheat. Chart 24 shows that the German unemployment rate has fallen to a 25-year low, while wage growth is now running at twice the rate as elsewhere in the euro area. Chart 24German Labor Market Going Strong An overheated German economy will help the periphery in two important ways: First, higher wage inflation in Germany will give a competitive advantage to Club Med producers seeking to sell their goods in the euro area's biggest economy. Second, faster wage growth and stronger domestic demand in Germany will erode the country's gargantuan current account surplus of nearly 9% of GDP. This will put downward pressure on the euro, giving the periphery a further competitive boost. Of course, all this rests on the assumption that Germany accepts an overheated economy. One could objectively argue that it is in Germany's political best interest to do so, as this may be the only means by which to hold the euro area together. One could also argue that rebalancing German growth towards domestic demand, and away from its historic reliance on exports, would be in the country's long-term best interest. One might also contend that German banks would accept a few more years of low rates if this helped lower nonperforming loans across the euro area, while also paving the way for the eventual abandonment of ZIRP and NIRP. Chart 25Italy Lags Peers On Euro Support Whatever the merits of these arguments, they clash with Germany's historical antipathy towards inflation. This means that political risk could escalate over the coming years. Against the backdrop of growing anti-establishment sentiment - fueled in no small measure by the EU's deer-in-the-headlights response to the migration crisis - Europe's populist parties will continue to make gains at the polls. Timing is important, however. With unemployment trending lower, our hunch is that any truly disruptive populist shock may have to wait until the next recession, which is likely still a few years away. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team holds a strong conviction view that Marine Le Pen, the leader of the eurosceptic National Front, will be defeated in the second round of the presidential election in May. They also think that Angela Merkel will cling to power, partly because Germany still lacks an effective anti-establishment opposition party. Italy is more of a concern, given that support for the common currency among Italians has been falling and is now lower than virtually anywhere else in the euro area (Chart 25). Nevertheless, our geopolitical strategists assign very low odds to Italy following Britain's example and voting to leave the EU. Indeed, it is still not even clear that the U.K. will actually follow through and exit the EU. Brussels is likely to play hardball with the U.K. during the negotiations slated to begin in March. EU officials are keen to send a clear warning to other EU members who may be tempted to leave the club. It is still quite possible that another referendum will be held in one or two years concerning the terms of the negotiated agreement that would govern Britain's future relationship with the EU. Given how close the first referendum was, there is a reasonable chance that U.K. voters will choose EU membership over a bad deal. In that case, Brussels will back off from its threat that triggering Article 50 would irrevocably lead to the U.K.'s expulsion from the EU. China: Still In Need Of A Spender-Of-Last Resort Investor angst about China rose to a fever pitch early last year, but has since faded into the background. The main reason for this is that the deflationary forces which once threatened to precipitate a hard landing for the economy have abated. Growth has picked up and producer price inflation has risen from -5.3% in early 2016 to 3.3% in November (Chart 26). As our China strategists have argued, the end of PPI deflation is a major positive development for the Chinese corporate sector, as it improves its pricing power while reducing its real cost of funding (Chart 27). Real bank lending rates deflated by the PPI rose to near-record highs early last year, but have since tumbled by a whopping 10 percentage points - largely due to easing deflation. This has bestowed dramatic relief on some highly-levered, asset-heavy industries. These industries were the biggest casualties of the growth slowdown and posed material risks to the banking sector due to their high debt levels. In this vein, rising PPI and easing financial stress among these firms also bode well for banks. Chart 26China: Improving Growth Momentum Chart 27China: Real Interest Rates Dropping ##br## Thanks To Easing Deflation Unfortunately, the reflationary forces in China are masking deep underlying problems. Structural reform has been patchy at best; credit continues to expand much faster than GDP; and speculation in the real estate sector is rampant (Chart 28). Meanwhile, capital continues to flow out of the country, taking the PBOC's foreign exchange reserves down from a high of $4 trillion in June 2014 to $3.1 trillion at present. There are no easy solutions to these problems. Tightening monetary policy could help fend off capital flight, but this would hurt growth and potentially plunge the economy back into deflation. This week's spike in interbank rates is evidence of just how sensitive the economy has become to any withdrawal of monetary accommodation (Chart 29). Chart 28China: Credit Continues Expanding And The##br## Real Estate Sector Is Getting Frothy Chart 29China: Yet Another Spike In Interbank Rates As we controversially argued in "China Needs More Debt," China's underlying problem is a chronic excess of savings.4 This has kept aggregate demand below the level commensurate with the economy's productive capacity. In the past, China was able to export some of those excess savings abroad via a large current account surplus, which peaked at 10% of GDP in 2007 (Chart 30). However, China is now too large to export its way out of its problems. It was one thing for China to run a current account surplus of 10% of GDP when its economy represented 6% of global GDP. It is quite another to do so when the economy represents 15% of global GDP, as it does now. This is especially the case when other economies are also keen to have cheap currencies. Faced with this reality, the government has been trying to buttress aggregate demand by funneling a huge amount of credit towards state-owned companies, which have then used these funds to finance all sorts of investment projects. The problem is that China no longer needs as much new capacity as it once did. As trend GDP growth has slowed, the level of investment necessary to maintain a constant capital-to-output ratio has fallen by about 10% of GDP over the past decade.5 China's aging population will eventually lead to a drop in savings. Government plans to strengthen the social safety net should also help this transition along by reducing household precautionary savings. However, these are long-term developments. Over the next couple of years, China will have little choice but to let credit grow at a rapid pace. The good news is that China has ample domestic savings to continue financing credit expansion. The ratio of bank loans-to-deposits remains near all-time lows (Chart 31). The government also has plenty of fiscal resources to safeguard the banks from losses on nonperforming loans extended to local governments and state-owned enterprises. Chart 30China Used To Rely On Large ##br##Current Account Surplus To Export Excess Savings Chart 31China: Banks Have Ample Deposit Coverage All that may not be enough, however. Given the risks to financial stability from excessive investment by state-owned enterprises, the government may have little choice but to cajole households into spending more by suppressing bank deposit rates while purposely engineering higher inflation. The resulting decline in real rates will reduce the incentive to save while helping to inflate away the mountain of debt that has already been accumulated. II. Financial Markets Equities Chart 32Investors Are Optimistic Deflation is bad for equities, as is stagflation. But between deflation and stagflation there is reflation - and that is good for stocks. This reflationary window should remain open for the next two years. As such, we expect global equities to be higher in 12 months than they are today. However, the risks for stocks are tilted to the downside over both a shorter-term horizon of less than two months and a longer-term horizon exceeding two years. The near-term outlook is complicated by the fact that global equities are overbought, and hence vulnerable to a selloff. Chart 32 shows that bullish sentiment is stretched to the upside. Expectations of long-term U.S. earnings growth have also jumped to over 12%, something that strikes us as rather fanciful. Renewed rumblings in China could also spook the markets for a while. We expect global equities to correct 5%-to-10% from current levels, setting the stage for a more durable recovery. Once that recovery begins, higher-beta developed markets such as Japan and Europe should outperform the U.S. As my colleague, Mark McClellan, has shown, Europe and Japan are considerably cheaper than the U.S., even after adjusting for sector skews and structural valuation differences.6 The relative stance of monetary policy also favors Europe and Japan. Neither the ECB nor the BoJ is likely to hike rates anytime soon. This means that rising inflation expectations in these two economies will push down real rates, weakening their currencies in the process. Emerging markets are a tougher call. The combination of a strengthening dollar, growing protectionist sentiment in the developed world, and high debt levels are all bad news for emerging markets. EM equity valuations are also not especially cheap by historic standards (Chart 33). Nevertheless, a reflationary environment has typically been positive for EM equities. The tight correlation between EM and global cyclical stocks has broken down over the past three months (Chart 34). We suspect the relationship will reassert itself again over the course of 2017, giving EM stocks a bit of a boost. Chart 33EM Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap Chart 34EM Stocks Are Lagging On balance, EM equities are likely in a bottoming phase where returns over the next 12 months will be positive but not spectacular. BCA's favored markets are Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Thailand, and Russia. We would avoid Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, and Peru. Turning to global equity sectors, a bias towards cyclical names is appropriate in an environment of rising global growth. Longer term, our equity sector specialists like health care and technology names. The outlook for financial stocks remains a key area of debate within BCA. Most of my colleagues would still avoid banks. I am more partial to the sector. As I argued in September in "Three Controversial Calls: Global Banks Finally Outperform," steeper yield curves will boost net interest margins over the next few years while rising demand for credit will support top-line growth (Chart 35). On a price-to-earnings basis, global banks are quite cheap, despite being much better capitalized than they were in the past (Chart 36). Chart 35AHigher Yields Will Benefit Banks Chart 35BHigher Yields Will Benefit Banks Lastly, in terms of size exposure, we prefer small caps over large caps. Small capitalization stocks tend to do better in reflationary environments (Chart 37). The ongoing retreat from globalization will also benefit smaller domestically-focused firms at the expense of those with large global footprints. In the U.S. specifically, small caps face a potential additional benefit. If the new Trump administration follows through with promised corporate tax cuts, then small caps will benefit disproportionately given that the effective tax rate of multinationals is already low. Chart 36Global Banks Are Cheap ##br##And Better Capitalized Since The Crisis Chart 37Reflationary Backdrop ##br##Favors Small Caps Outperformance Fixed Income And Credit Back in March 2015, we predicted that the 10-year Treasury yield would fall to 1.5% even if the U.S. economy avoided a recession.7 The call was notably out of consensus at the time, but proved to be correct: The 10-year yield reached a record closing low of 1.37% on July 5th. As luck would have it, on that very same day, we sent out a note entitled "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," advising clients to position for higher bond yields. Global bonds have sold off sharply since then, with the selloff intensifying after the U.S. presidential election. As discussed above, inflation in the U.S. and elsewhere will be slow to rise over the next two years. Hence, global bond yields are unlikely to move significantly higher from current levels. Indeed, the near-term path for yields is to the downside if our expectation of a global equity correction proves true. However, once the stagflationary forces described in this report begin to gather steam towards the end of the decade, bond yields could spike higher, imposing significant pain on fixed-income and equity investors alike. Regionally, we favor Japanese and euro area bonds relative to their U.S. counterparts over a 12-month horizon. Inflation in both Japan and the euro area remains well below target, suggesting that neither the BoJ nor the ECB will tighten monetary policy anytime soon. In contrast, the Fed is likely to raise rates three times in 2017, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. In addition, we would underweight U.K. gilts. While U.K. growth will decelerate next year as uncertainty over the Brexit negotiations takes its toll, a weaker pound and some fiscal loosening will keep the economy from flying off the rails. In this light, the market's expectations that U.K. rates will rise to only 0.66% at end-2019 seems too pessimistic. Elsewhere in the developed world, our global fixed-income strategists are neutral on Canada and New Zealand bonds, but are underweight Australia. A modest underweight to EM government bonds is also warranted. Turning to credit, a reflationary backdrop is positive for spread product insofar as it will keep defaults in check, while also propping up the appetite for riskier assets. That said, U.S. high-yield credit is now quite expensive based on our fundamental models (Chart 38). Private-sector leverage remains at elevated levels and our Corporate Health Monitor is still in deteriorating territory (Chart 39). Rising government yields could also prompt yield-hungry investors to move some of their money back into sovereign debt. On balance, U.S. corporate spreads are likely to narrow slightly this year, but corporate credit will still underperform equities. Regionally, we see more upside in European credit, given the ECB's continued bond-buying program and greater scope for corporate profit margins to rise across the region. Chart 38U.S. High-Yield Valuations Chart 39U.S. Corporate Health Keeps Deteriorating Currencies And Commodities BCA's Global Investment Strategy service has been bullish on the dollar since October 2014, a view that has generated a gain of nearly 17% for our long DXY trade recommendation. We reiterated this position last October in a note entitled "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen,"8 where we predicted that the dollar would rally a further 10%. Since that report was published, the real trade-weighted dollar has gained 4%, implying another 6% of upside from current levels. Chart 40Real Rate Differentials Are Driving Up The Dollar Both economic and political forces have conspired to keep the dollar well bid. The resurgent U.S. economy has pushed up real rate expectations in the U.S. relative to its trading partners. Chart 40 shows the amazingly strong correlation between the trade-weighted dollar and real interest rate differentials. Rate differentials should widen further over the coming months as investors price in more Fed rate hikes, and rising inflation expectations abroad push down real rates in economies such as Japan and the euro area. As we predicted in "A Trump Victory Would Be Bullish For The Dollar" and "Three Controversial Calls: Trump Wins And The Dollar Rallies," Donald Trump's triumph on November 8th has given the greenback an additional boost. Progress in implementing any of Trump's three signature policy proposals - fiscal stimulus, trade protectionism, and immigration restrictions - will cause the U.S. output gap to narrow more quickly than it otherwise would, forcing the Fed to pick up the pace of rate hikes. Chart 41The Pound Is A Bargain The adoption of a "destination-based tax system" would further strengthen the dollar. Under the existing corporate tax structure, taxes are assessed on corporate profits regardless of where they are derived. In contrast, under a destination-based system, taxes would be assessed only on the difference between domestic sales and domestic costs. In practice, this means that imports would be subject to taxes, while exports would receive a tax rebate. In the simplest economic models, the imposition of a destination-based tax has no effect on domestic economic activity, inflation, or the distribution of corporate profits across the various sectors of the economy. This is because the dollar is assumed to appreciate by precisely enough to keep net exports unchanged. For that to happen, however, the requisite change in the currency needs to be quite large. For example, if the Trump administration succeeds in bringing down effective corporate tax rates to 20%, the required appreciation would be 1/(1-tax rate)=25%. Under current law, the required appreciation would be over 30%! In reality, the dollar probably would not adjust that quickly, implying that the transition period to a destination-based tax system would disproportionately benefit exporters at the expense of importers. Partly for this reason, the proposal will probably be heavily watered down if it is ever passed. Nevertheless, overall U.S. policy will continue to be biased towards a stronger dollar. Looking at the various dollar crosses, we still see more downside for the yen. The BoJ's policy of pegging the 10-year nominal yield will result in ever-lower real yields as Japanese inflation expectations rise. The euro should also continue to drift lower, most likely reaching parity against the dollar later this year. The pound could dip further if an impasse is reached during Brexit negotiations, as is likely at some point this year. That said, sterling is now very cheap, which limits the downside for the currency (Chart 41). Chart 42The Dollar Has Weighed On Gold The Chinese yuan will continue to grind lower, in line with most other EM currencies. As we discussed in March 2015 in a report entitled "A Weaker RMB Ahead," China's excess savings problem necessitates a weaker currency. The real trade-weighted RMB has fallen by 7% since that report was written, but a bottom for the currency remains elusive.9 As noted above, the Chinese government may have no choice but to boost household spending by suppressing deposit rates while working to engineer higher inflation. Negative real borrowing rates will keep capital flowing out of the country, putting downward pressure on the yuan. The overall direction of the Canadian and Aussie dollars will be dictated by the path of commodity prices. A reflationary environment tends to be bullish for commodities. Nevertheless, an uncertain macro outlook in China muddies the waters. We prefer oil over metals, given that the former is more geared towards growth in developed economies while the latter is heavily dependent on Chinese demand. This also makes the Canadian dollar a more attractive currency than the Aussie dollar. Lastly, a few words on gold: The combination of political uncertainty, rising inflation expectations, and continued easy money policies should provide support to bullion prices over the next year. The main negative is the potential for a further rise in the dollar. The strengthening of the dollar clearly was a factor undermining gold prices in the second half of 2016 (Chart 42). On balance, we would maintain a modest position in gold for the time being, but would look to increase exposure later this year as the dollar peaks. Peter Berezin Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 John G. Fernald, "Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2014-15, (June 2014), and John G. Fernald, "The Pre-Great Recession Slowdown in U.S. Productivity Growth," (November 16, 2015). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2016: Supply Constraints Resurface," dated October 7, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Italian Bank Job," dated July 29, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Needs More Debt," dated May 20, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Back in 2007, trend growth was around 10%. Consistent with the empirical literature, let us assume that an appropriate capital-to-GDP ratio is 250% and that the capital stock depreciates at 5% a year. With a trend growth of 10%, China needs 2.5*10%=25% of GDP in new investment before depreciation to keep its capital-to-GDP ratio constant, and an additional 2.5*5%=12.5% of GDP in investment to cover depreciation, for a grand total of 37.5% of GDP in required investment. With a trend GDP growth rate of 6%, however, the required investment-to-GDP ratio would only be 2.5*6%+2.5*5%=27.5%. 6 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Reports Section 2, "Are Eurozone Stocks Really That Cheap?" dated June 30, 2016, and "Japanese Equities: Good Value Or Value Trap?" dated November 24, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Seven Structural Reasons For A Lower Neutral Rate In The U.S.," dated March 13, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Weaker RMB Ahead," dated March 06, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Today we are publishing an overview of EM external debt. As EM currencies have resumed their depreciation over the past few months, the issue of foreign currency debt has once again become acute. Feature The tables and charts in this report rank EM countries by size of external debt relative to their GDP, and also provide details about foreign liabilities by category of borrower (government, non-financial companies or financials), by type of debt (loans versus bonds issued) and by maturity (short-term up to 1 year versus medium- and long-term). The charts and tables particularly elaborate on short-term external debt across various types of borrowers. In our opinion, from a macro perspective the most relevant statistic are foreign funding requirements, which are calculated by subtracting the current account balance from external debt servicing in the next 12 months. The chart below shows that based on this parameter the most vulnerable countries are Turkey, Malaysia and Colombia, while the least exposed ones are Korea, China and Thailand. Chart 1Dependency On Foreign Funding Table 1External Debt Statistics Chart 2Overall Outstanding External Debt Ranking Chart 3Government External Debt Ranking Chart 4Non-Financial Corporate External Debt Burden Chart 5Financials External Debt Burden Chart 6Outstanding External Inter-Company Loans Table 2Short-Term External Debt Statistics ##br##(Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) Table 3Short-Term External Debt Statistics ##br##(Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) Table 4Short-Term External Debt Statistics ##br##(Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) Table 5Short-Term External Debt Statistics ##br##(Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) Chart 7Aggregate External Short-Term Debt Chart 8Non-Government External Short-Term Debt Chart 9Companies' External Short-Term Debt Chart 10Financials' External Short-Term Debt Table 6Short-Term External Debt Composition Table 7Short-Term External Debt Composition Chart 11Financials' Short-Term Foreign Loans Chart 12Private Sector Short-Term Foreign Loans Table 8EM Aggregate (Excludes Taiwan And China) Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy & Frontier Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

