Money/Credit/Debt
Highlights Most narratives surrounding G7 bond yields, the U.S. dollar, Chinese credit/fiscal impulses, and the RMB exchange rate - which justified the EM rally from February's lows - have been overturned. To be consistent, this warrants a relapse in EM risk assets. In China, recent property market and marginal credit policy tightening will weigh on growth. Feature The more recent strength in Chinese and emerging markets' (EM) manufacturing PMI indexes as well as the bounce in industrial metals prices have gone against our negative view on EM/China growth and related markets. While it is hard to predict market patterns over the next several weeks, we maintain that the EM rally is on borrowed time, and that the risk-reward profile for EM risk assets (stocks, credit markets and currencies) remains very unfavorable. Tracking Correlations And Indicators The overwhelming majority of indicators and variables that supported the rally in EM since February have reversed in recent months. Specifically: China's credit and fiscal spending impulses have rolled over (Charts I-1 and Chart I-2, on page 1). This will likely lead to a rollover in mainland industrial activity early next year (Chart 1, top panel). Similarly, this bodes ill for much-followed Chinese ex-factory producer prices - i.e., producer price deflation will probably recommence early next year (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Chart I-1China: Industrial Sectors To Retreat? Chart I-2China: Credit And Fiscal Impulses In a nutshell, the strong credit and fiscal impulses of late 2015 and early 2016 explain the stabilization and mild improvement in the Chinese economy during the past few months. However, these same impulses project renewed weakness/rollover in the economy in early 2017. If financial markets are forward looking, they should begin pricing-in deteriorating growth momentum sooner than later - especially as Chinese policymakers are announcing marginal tightening policies (see below for more details). One of the narratives that triggered the EM and global equity rally in February was speculation that there was a "Shanghai accord" between global central banks. According to this narrative, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) promised not to devalue the RMB in exchange for the Federal Reserve not hiking rates. Since then, the RMB has continued to depreciate, both versus the greenback and the CFETS1 basket. Yet EM and global stocks have completely disregarded the RMB depreciation (Chart I-3). We do not have good explanation as to why. Indeed, the RMB has weakened meaningfully, despite the PBoC's massive currency defense: the latter's foreign exchange reserves have shrunk further since then (Chart I-4), as capital flight has exceeded the enormous current account surplus by a large margin. Chart I-3Investors Are ##br##Complacent About RMB Chart I-4China: Foreign Exchange ##br##Reserves Still Shrinking Chart I-5PBoC Liquidity Injections ##br##Have Been Enormous The PBoC's selling of U.S. dollars to prop up the yuan has drained domestic currency liquidity and one would expect interbank rates to rise. However, the PBoC has been re-injecting RMBs into the system to keep interest rates low (Chart I-5). Such RMB liquidity proliferation makes further declines in the currency's value all the more likely. We expect the RMB to continue depreciating. Yet global financial markets have become extremely complacent about the potential for additional RMB depreciation. After having been bullish on U.S./G7 bonds for the past several years, in our July 13 Weekly Report,2 we highlighted that U.S./G7 bond yields would rise and closed our strategic short EM equities/long 30-year U.S. Treasurys position. Even though U.S./G7 bond yields have risen since July, EM equities have not declined. Given that falling G7 bond yields were used as justification for the EM rally, the opposite should also hold true. We expect U.S. bond yields to rise further. Our EM Corporate Health Monitor - constructed using bottom-up financial variables of companies with outstanding U.S. dollar corporate bonds - points to a reversal in the EM corporate credit market rally (Chart I-6). Furthermore, EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads have tightened considerably and are now very overbought and expensive. As we argued in our Special Report titled EM Corporate Health Is Flashing Red3 that introduced the EM Corporate Financial Health (CFH) Monitor, EM corporate credit spreads are as expensive as they were before they began widening in 2013 and 2014 (Chart I-7). Chart I-6EM Corporate Bond Rally To Reverse? Chart I-7EM Corporate Spreads Are Too Tight Finally, the U.S. dollar sold off early this year, but it has held firm in recent months. Nevertheless, EM risk assets have not retreated, despite the greenback's strength (Chart I-8). Few would argue that sharp U.S. dollar appreciation is negative for EM risk assets, but there is a debate among investors and analysts about whether EM risk assets can rally amidst a gradual appreciation in the U.S. dollar. Turning to the empirical evidence, Chart I-9 reveals that in the past 30 years any U.S. dollar appreciation - whether gradual or not - even versus DM currencies has coincided with weakness in EM share prices. Chart I-8EM Investors Have ##br##Ignored U.S. Dollar Strength Chart I-9EM Equities And ##br##U.S. Dollar: A 30 Year History Bottom Line: The majority of narratives that justified the EM rally from February's lows have been overturned. To be consistent, this warrants a relapse in EM risk assets. China's Credit And Property Tightening In recent weeks, there have been numerous policy tightening efforts in China. In particular: At the annual World Bank/IMF meetings in Washington last month, PBoC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan stated that once markets stabilized there would no longer be additional large increases in bank credit. His exact words were: "With the gradual recovery of the global economy, China will control its credit growth".4 As U.S. and European PMIs have firmed up and U.S. employment and wage growth is robust, Chinese policymakers will be emboldened to moderate unsustainable credit growth and not to repeat the massive fiscal push of early this year. In a bid to curb excessive bank credit growth and discourage "window dressing" accounting, the PBoC announced on October 255 that going forward it will include off-balance-sheet wealth management products (WMPs) in the calculation of banks' quarterly Marco Prudential Assessment ratios, starting from the third quarter. The clampdown on WMP accounting will reduce banks' capital adequacy ratios (CARs). One key reason that banks had aggressively boosted the size of their off-balance-sheet WMP assets was that they were not required to have capital charges against them, helping banks extend more credit while complying with CARs. In short, Chinese banks' CARs are inflated. This policy measure along with provisioning and writing-off non-performing loans, if reinforced, could meaningfully reduce the CARs of all Chinese banks, especially small- and medium-sized ones, as well as force them to reduce the pace of credit expansion. Given that the majority of medium and small banks have been more aggressive than the country's five biggest banks in expanding credit in recent years, this may have a damping effect on credit growth in 2017. In fact, the 110 medium and small banks retain 60% of on- and off-balance-sheet credit claims on companies, while the five largest banks hold 40% (Table I-1). Hence, credit trends in small and medium banks are at least as important as those among large banks. Table I-1China: Five Largest Banks Hold Only 40% Of Credit Assets Finally, a number of cities have announced various tightening measures on property markets of late, including the re-launch of house purchasing restrictions and increases in minimum down payments. Similar restrictions on home purchases served as an efficient tool for curbing property purchases in 2013-14, and there is no reason why it will be different this time around. This is especially true given the market is more expensive than it was back in 2013. In addition, the government has curbed financing for property developers. The biggest economic risk remains construction activity. Even though housing sales and prices have skyrocketed by 20-40% in the past 12 months (Chart I-10, top and middle panels), residential floor space started has been very timid - it has in fact failed to recover (Chart I-10, bottom panel). As residential property sales contract again due to new purchasing restrictions, property developers will certainly curtail new investment, and housing construction activity will shrink anew. The same is true for commercial properties (Chart I-11). Chart I-10China's Residential Market: ##br##Demand, Prices And Starts Chart I-11China's Non-Residential ##br##Market: Demand And Starts An interesting question is why property starts have been so weak, as indicated in the bottom panels of Chart I-10 and Chart I-11 - particularly when both floor space sold (units) and property prices have surged exponentially in the past 12 months. Our view is that there is a large hidden inventory overhang in the Chinese property market. For example, government data on residential floor space started, completed and under construction attest that there is still a large gap between floor space started versus completed (Chart I-12). From these data/charts and the enormous leverage carried by property developers, we infer the latter have been accumulating / carrying on their balance sheets vast amounts of inventory in excess of what market-based sources suggest, and what is widely followed by analysts. It is very hard to make sense of the Chinese property inventory data, but we suspect these market-based data sources may track only inventories that have been completed and released to the market - and do not account for inventories classified as "under construction". For residential housing, according to government data the "under construction floor space" is 5 billion square meters (Chart I-13, top panel), which is equal to 3.5-4 years of sales at the fervent pace of the past 12 months (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Another way to assess this is as follows: Assuming an average construction cycle of three years, there will be supply of new housing in amounts of 16.7 units in each of the next three years. This compares with sales of 13.3 million units in the past 12 months that occurred amid a buying frenzy and booming mortgage lending. Faced with a potential drop in sales due to the recent purchasing restrictions, elevated inventories, enormous leverage (Chart I-14), and tighter financing, property developers will most likely curtail new starts. In turn, a reduction in property starts means less construction activity next year, and weak demand for commodities. Consistent with the rollover in the fiscal spending impulse, infrastructure spending will likely also lose its potency in early 2017. Chart I-12China's Residential ##br##Market: Hidden Inventories Chart I-13Chinese Real Estate: Massive ##br##Volumes Under Construction Chart I-14Leverage Of Chinese ##br##Listed Property Developers Bottom Line: Recent property market and marginal credit policy tightening will weigh on construction activity and depress Chinese demand for commodities and industrial goods next year. Confirmation Bias, Or Bias Based On Fundamentals? Why did we not follow the indicators discussed above from February through June, when the EM rally emerged and these indicators bottomed? Do we have a confirmation bias? We did not recommend playing the EM rebound early this year because we did not believe the rally would last this long or go this far. If we had had conviction about the duration and magnitude of the rally, we would have changed our strategy - tactically upgrading EM risk assets despite our negative structural and cyclical views. Simply put, we were wrong on strategy. In our April 13, 2016 Weekly Report,6 we argued that based on China's injection of massive amounts of fiscal and credit stimulus, growth would marginally improve in the months ahead. Yet, we stopped short of recommending chasing the EM rally given the menace of numerous cyclical and structural negatives surrounding the EM/China growth outlook. As to the reasons why we put more emphasis on some indicators and less on others at various times, we have the following points: We are biased in so far as our assessment and analysis of EM/China is based on fundamentals. In this sense, we are biased towards centering our investment strategy on fundamentals. Specifically, given our view/analysis that EM/China have credit bubbles/excesses, rapidly falling or weak productivity growth and record-low return on capital (Chart I-15), we cannot help but to have a fundamentally bearish bias on EM. This, in turn, means that we view any rally in EM risk assets or uptick in EM/China economic indicators with suspicion and likely as unsustainable. The opposite also holds true. All in all, if we are wrong on our fundamental view and analysis, we will be wrong on financial markets. When investors expect a bear market, they are better off selling rallies and not buying dips. When an asset class is in a multiyear bull market, it pays off to buy dips rather not sell rallies. Unless one can time market swings well, it is hard to make money on the long sides of bear markets. Similarly, it is difficult to profit from short positions in bull markets. In brief, countertrend moves are about timing. Timing does not depend on fundamentals. It is often a coin toss. Typically we do not recommend clients invest based on a coin toss. For example, it is impossible to rationalize why the EM rally did not begin following the August 2015 selloff, but instead started in February 2016. In late August 2015, with carnage in EM risk assets pervasive, it was clear that Chinese policymakers would stimulate and in fact the massive fiscal stimulus was initiated in August/September 2015 not in 2016. Similarly, China's manufacturing PMI bottomed in September 2015, not in 2016 (Chart I-16). Chart I-15EM Non-Financial Return ##br##On Equity Is At All Time Low Chart I-16China's Manufacturing PMI ##br##Bottomed In October 2015 In September 2015, EM and global equities rebounded, but chasing momentum at that time did not pay off as risk assets cratered in the following months. This is all to say that timing markets is often a random walk. We do attempt to time market moves that go along with our fundamental bias, but prefer not to time market moves that go against the primary trend. We assume any countertrend move is typically short-lived and unsustainable. That said, we also realize these moves can be very painful for investors if they last long enough, like this EM rally. Finally, we often get questions on fund flows. We do not make investment recommendations based on fund flows - even though we recognize they are very important in driving markets. The reason is that there is no comprehensive data on global fund flows that one can analyze and make reasonably educated bets. The often-cited EPRF dataset only tracks inflows and outflows of mutual funds and ETFs. It does not account for flows and positioning of various asset managers, sovereign funds, pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds and private wealth managers, among many others. What's more, the EPRF dataset only covers the funds located in advanced countries and offshore jurisdictions, but not emerging countries where investment pools have become large and important. In brief, the available investment flow and portfolio positioning data are not comprehensive at all, and they cannot be relied upon too much to make investment recommendations. In this vein, a question arises: Why can't flows into EM sustain the current rally for a while even though it is not based on fundamentals? In this context, let's consider the case of the rally in euro area share prices when markets sensed the arrival of the European Central Bank's quantitative easing efforts at the beginning of 2015. There was a fervent rush to buy/overweight euro area stocks heading into the QE announcement by the ECB. European bourses surged. Nevertheless, euro area equity prices have been sliding and massively underperforming the global equity benchmark since March 2015 (Chart I-17). The reason the ECB's QE has not helped euro area stocks is because their fundamentals were bad - profits have been shrinking despite the ECB's QE. We suspect EM stocks and currencies will have a similar destiny: EM profits will disappoint considerably, and the current rally will prove unsustainable. Notably, net EPS revisions have so far failed to move into the positive territory (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Euro Area Stocks And EPS: ##br##Why The QE Rally Proved To Be Bogus Chart I-18EM Stocks And EPS: ##br##Earning Revisions Are Still Contracting Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy & Frontier Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 China Foreign Exchange Trading System. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Risks To Our Negative EM View," dated July 13, 2016; a link is available on page 15. 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "EM Corporate Health Is Flashing Red," dated September 14, 2016; a link is available on page 15. 4 Please see http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3155686/index.html 5 Please see http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3183204/index.html 6 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Revisiting China's Fiscal And Credit Impulses," dated April 13, 2016; a link is available on page 15. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights ECB Monetary Policy: Euro Area inflation will likely remain below the European Central Bank (ECB) 2% target for the next few years due to persistent excess capacity in Europe. The ECB will signal this at the December monetary policy meeting, providing the justification to extend their quantitative easing (QE) asset purchase program beyond the current March 2017 expiration date. ECB QE Changes: The constraints imposed on the ECB's bond purchases are self-imposed, and can be easily altered in the event of potential "shortages" of available debt for the QE program. Fears of a potential taper of ECB buying because of those constraints, which have bearish implications for Euro Area bond yields, are overstated. Country Allocation: Move to an above-benchmark stance on core European government debt, which are a low-beta safe haven in the current environment of a cyclical rise in global bond yields. Feature After spending the past couple of months fretting over the next move by the U.S. Federal Reserve or the Bank of Japan, investors' attention shifted to Europe last week. With the current European Central Bank (ECB) government bond quantitative easing (QE) program set to expire in March of next year, the markets were seeking any sort of guidance on whether the ECB will end the program as scheduled, or extend the program beyond March - perhaps with a reduction ("taper") in the size of the bond buying. ECB President Mario Draghi provided no new information at the post-meeting press conference last Thursday, leaving bond investors in limbo until the December meeting when the results of the ECB's assessment of their QE program will be published. Some alterations of the program will likely be announced, but it is too soon for the ECB to consider ending their QE program. With regards to the title of this Weekly Report - the most likely outcome is that the ECB will extend the QE program past March 2017, but will tinker with the rules of QE in an effort to pretend that the central bank is still following a prudent logic for its purchases. Fears of an early taper are overstated, and this makes core European government debt a potential oasis of safety while global bond yields remain in a bear phase. Plenty Of Reasons For The ECB Not To Taper This talk of a tapering of ECB asset purchases following the scheduled end of the current QE program seems premature. After all, neither the ECB's own economic forecasts, nor those of its Survey of Professional Forecasters, are calling for inflation to get close to the 2% target until at least 2018 (Chart of the Week). The ECB staff will prepare a new set of forecasts for the December policy meeting that will include projections for 2019 - perhaps these new estimates will have inflation finally reaching the 2% goal. But in the absence of a credible forecast of inflation returning to target, the ECB will be hard pressed to signal any move to a less-accommodative monetary policy. Headline Euro Area inflation is currently only 0.4%, despite a recent increase in the oil price denominated in Euros, which has been a reliable directional indicator for Euro Area inflation (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekNo Need For An ECB Taper Chart 2European Inflation Is Stubbornly Low The steady decline in the Euro Area unemployment rate over the past three years has coincided with a move higher in overall labor compensation, but this has been purely a "volume" effect resulting from steadily increasing employment growth. With the entire region not yet at full employment, there has been minimal upward pressure on wages or inflation in domestically focused sectors like services (bottom panel). In other words, the lack of Euro Area inflation is a direct function of the excess capacity in Euro Area product and labor markets. According to the IMF, the Euro Area output gap will not close until 2020, which will limit any rise in inflation over the rest of the decade (Chart 3). It will take a more prolonged period of above-trend economic growth to close the output gap, reducing the Euro Area unemployment rate below the full employment NAIRU level, before any recovery in wages or core inflation can take place (bottom panel). This lack of realized inflation is weighing on Euro Area inflation expectations and creating some potential credibility problems for the ECB. As we have discussed in earlier Weekly Reports, inflation expectations in much of the developed economies seem to follow an "adaptive" process, where expectations are formed in lagged response to actual inflation.1 If central banks are fully credible in their ability to use monetary policy to fight inflation (and demand) shortfalls, then those forward-looking expectations should eventually gravitate towards the central bank inflation target. However, if there is a large and persistent shock to realized inflation, then inflation expectations can deviate from the central bank target for an extended period. Using a 5-year moving average of realized headline CPI inflation as a proxy for inflation expectations is a reasonably good (albeit simple) approximation of this adaptive process (Chart 4). The current 60-month moving average for Euro Area headline inflation is 0.6%, not far from the 5-year Euro Area CPI swap rate of 0.9%. However, if the ECB's inflation forecasts for the next two years come to fruition (1.2% in 2017, 1.6% in 2018), then the 5-year moving average will continue to decline, as those higher inflation figures would not offset the sharp fall in inflation witnessed over the past few years. Chart 3Excess Capacity Holding Inflation Down Chart 4Inflation Expectations Will Stay Low Simply put, the ECB's current projections are not consistent with inflation expectations hitting the 2% target by 2018, and likely even beyond that. The ECB will be presenting new projections in December, but it would take a significant upgrade of their growth and inflation forecasts to "move the needle" on longer-term inflation expectations. Perhaps a move away from fiscal austerity across the Euro Area could trigger an upgrade on growth expectations, as that would imply a faster pace of growth and a more rapidly narrowing output gap. However, while the topic of greater fiscal spending has been heating up in the halls of governments in Washington, London and Tokyo, there has been little sign that Euro Area governments are about to open the fiscal spigots anytime soon (and certainly not before elections in Germany and France in 2017). Chart 5European Banks Getting More Cautious? ECB Still Needs To Support Loan Growth The state of Euro Area banks, and what it means for future lending activity, is another factor for the ECB to consider before contemplating any move to a less-accommodative monetary policy. The current growth rates of money and credit are showing no signs of significant deceleration (Chart 5). The latest ECB Euro Area bank lending survey, released last week, did show a modest decline in the net number of banks reporting easier lending standards to businesses, as well as a reduction in the number of banks reporting increasing loan demand from firms. The ongoing hit to European bank profitability from the current negative interest rate environment could be playing a role in the banks moving to a less easy environment for lending. As can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 5, there is a reliable leading relationship between Euro Area bank equity prices and the growth in bank lending to businesses. The downturn in Euro Area bank stocks in 2016, which has been driven by declining profit expectations, could pose a risk to credit growth in the months ahead. According to a special question asked within the ECB's bank lending survey, a net 82% of respondents reported that the ECB's negative deposit rate has damaged banks' net interest income over the past six months.2 In that same survey, a net 12% of banks reported a boost to loan demand from the ECB's negative interest rate policy, and a net 15% of banks reported that the additional liquidity provided by the ECB bond purchases went towards extending loans to businesses. So while negative interest rates may be hurting bank profit margins, the impact of the ECB's QE is helping offset that to some degree by providing banks with capital gains on their bond portfolios that can be used to finance lending. So without any sign that inflation will soon approach the ECB's target, thus requiring a potential tapering of QE or even a move away from negative interest rates, the prudent course for the ECB to take to support Euro Area credit demand, and economic growth, is to continue with the QE program beyond the March 2017 expiration date. That will require some changes to the ECB's rules of the program, but, in the end, these are only self-imposed constraints. Bottom Line: Euro Area inflation will likely remain below the ECB 2% target over the next few years due to persistent excess capacity in Europe. The ECB will signal this at the December monetary policy meeting, providing the justification to extend their quantitative easing asset purchase program beyond the current March 2017 expiration date. The ECB Has Some Policy Options To Avoid A Taper Tantrum Core European bond yields have been depressed by the ECB's QE program, which have acted to push down both the future expected path of interest rates and the term premium (Chart 6). This has helped anchor real bond yields in negative territory, even with inflation expectations at such low levels. But any signs of potential slowing of the pace of QE buying could quickly unwind this effect, which makes the ECB's next steps so critical for the path of global bond yields. In Chart 7, we show the level and growth rate for the ECB's monetary base, along with five potential future scenarios: The ECB ends their QE program in March 2017, as currently planned; The ECB extends QE for six months to September 2017, at the current pace of €80bn in bond buying per month; The ECB extends QE program for twelve months to March 2018, at a pace of €80bn per month; The ECB extends QE to September 2017, but reduces the pace of purchases to €60bn per month; The ECB extends QE to March 2018, but cuts to €60bn per month. Chart 6ECB QE Still Holding Down Yields Chart 7ECB Needs To Keep The Monetary Base Growing As can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 7, the growth rate of the ECB's monetary base (and the asset side of their balance sheet) will decelerate sharply in 2017 & 2018 if the ECB does end the QE program as scheduled next March. Extending the program, however, does push out the rapid deceleration phase for monetary base into 2018. This is of critical importance for the Euro Area bond market, as both the outright level and term premium component of German Bund yields have been broadly correlated with the growth rate of the monetary base (Chart 8). In other words, extending the ECB QE program into the future is most important to prevent a "taper tantrum" in European bonds, by signalling to the markets that the ECB wishes to maintain low interest rates for longer. The ECB could even announce a reduction in the pace of purchases, along with an extension, and bond yields should remain well-behaved. This will also help prevent an unwanted appreciation of the Euro, the value of which currently reflects the far easier monetary stance in Europe (Chart 9). Chart 8An ECB Taper Would Be Bad For Bunds Chart 9An Easy-For-Longer ECB Will Weigh On The Euro Given the persistent debates within the ECB (and between the ECB and some Euro Area governments) about the long-run merits of QE, the combination of both an extension and reduction in QE purchases could be the compromise option that satisfies all parties. Alternatively, the ECB could choose to maintain the pace of bond purchases but alter the selection rules governing the program. Given the recent concerns in bond markets that the ECB is "running out of bonds to buy", changing the rules of the QE program is a sensible way for the central bank to free itself from the self-imposed shackles on its bond purchases. There are three options that the ECB can consider: Moving away from strictly allocating the bond purchases according to the ECB "capital key", which essentially weights the bond purchases by the size of each economy; Raising the issuer limits on QE, which limits the ECB to holding no more than 33% of any single issuer or individual bond issue; Reducing the current yield floor on QE, which prevents the ECB from buying any bonds with yields below the ECB deposit rate, which is currently -0.4%; We think option 1 is the least likely to occur, as this would imply buying a greater share of countries with more problematic debt profiles, like Italy or Portugal. There is little chance of such a strategy being well received by the governments in Berlin and Brussels, and the ECB would likely wish to avoid a major political confrontation by allowing larger deviations from the capital key Option 2 is an easier solution to implement. The 33% issuer constraint was always an arbitrary level that was aimed more at bonds with so-called "collective action clauses", where a majority of bondholders can force a decision on all bondholders in the event of a debt restructuring. It is understandable why the ECB would not want to become to decision-making counterparty in the event of a future messy bond restructuring in Europe. However, the ECB's ownership percentages within each Euro Area country are nowhere near the 33% limit at the moment (Chart 10) and, at the current pace and composition of buying, that 33% limit will not even be reached for Germany anytime soon.3 There is room for the ECB to raise the issuer limits, as it has already done for some other parts of its asset purchase programs, like bonds issued by European Union supranationals.4 Chart 10ECB Holdings Are Far From The 33% Issuer Limit Chart 11Lowering The Yield Floor For QE Makes Sense Option 3 is the most binding constraint of all on the ECB purchases, as very large shares of the European government bond market are now trading below the ECB's -0.4% deposit rate (Chart 11). In the case of Germany, nearly 70% of all QE-eligible debt is trading below the ECB's yield floor, which has raised investor concerns that the ECB will soon be unable to buy enough German debt at the current pace of purchases. However, that yield floor constraint is completely arbitrary - there is nothing stopping the ECB from buying bonds trading at a yield below the deposit rate, other than (we suspect) a desire to impose some sort of price discipline on the QE buying to make the ECB appear more credible with its purchases. Chart 12The QE Yield Floor Can Be Changed If the ECB decided to lower the yield floor below the current -0.4% deposit rate, this would open up a greater share of the core European bond markets to QE buying (Chart 12). This would also change the current market narrative that the ECB will soon run out of German bonds to buy. In the end, the most likely path the ECB will take following its December re-assessment of its QE program is a combination of lowering the yield floor on QE bond purchases below -0.4% and raising the issuer limits above 33%. There appears to be plenty of leeway for the ECB to alter their purchases, but without necessarily reducing the monthly pace of buying. Combined with an extension of the end-date of the QE program beyond March, this should alleviate any concerns that the ECB will soon hit a wall with its asset purchases. Bottom Line: The constraints imposed on the ECB's bond purchases are self-imposed, and can be easily altered in the event of potential "shortages" of available debt for the QE program. Fears of a potential taper of ECB buying because of those constraints are overstated. Investment Implications: Move To An Above-Benchmark Stance On Core European Bonds With the ECB having no need to end its QE program early, the case for moving to an overweight stance on core Europe is a strong one. As we noted in our last Weekly Report, favoring bond markets of countries with the lowest inflation rates is a logical investment strategy in the current environment of a modest cyclical upturn in global growth and inflation.5 That justifies our current below-benchmark recommendation on U.S. and U.K. government debt, as both realized inflation and expected inflation are rising in both countries. That leaves the Euro Area and Japan as possible candidates to move to above-benchmark weightings, given their defensive properties as low-beta bond markets. Although with the Bank of Japan now pegging the Japanese government bond (JGB) yield curve with a 10-year yield at 0%, we do not see a compelling investment case for overweighting JGBs as a defensive trade. If an investor wants safety at a 0% yield - with no chance of a capital gain from a decline in yields - than owning T-bills, or even gold, is just as viable as owning JGBs. We recently upgraded Japan to neutral in our recommended portfolio allocation, and we see no reason to move from that. Thus, core European bonds stand out as the candidate to upgrade as a defensive trade during the current bond bear phase, which we expect will continue until at least December when the Fed is expected to deliver another rate hike in the U.S. We see a case for moving to above-benchmark for both Germany and France, but especially so in the latter. The beta of bond returns between France and both the U.S. (Chart 13) & U.S.(Chart 14) is very low, making French bonds a good market to favor at the expense of U.S. Treasuries and U.K. Gilts in currency-hedged bond portfolios. Chart 13French Bonds Are Low Beta To USTs... Chart 14...And To U.K. Gilts Bottom Line: Move to an above-benchmark stance on core European government debt, which are a low-beta safe haven in the current environment of a cyclical rise in global bond yields. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Why Are Global Inflation Expectations Still So Low", dated March 1, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The Q4 2016 ECB Euro Area Bank Lending Survey can be found at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/blssurvey_201610.pdf. 3 Please note that the denominator in the percentages shown in Chart 10 include only bonds with maturities that are eligible for ECB QE purchases, omitting bonds that will mature in less than 2 year and more than 30 years. 4 For more details on that change to the supranational issuer limits, please see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp-qa.en.html. 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Return Of The Bond Vigilantes", dated October 18, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Duration: Treasury yields will continue to rise as a December Fed rate hike is priced in. A surge in bullish dollar sentiment between now and December would cause us to back away from our below-benchmark duration stance. Spread Product: Maintain a neutral allocation to spread product, favoring convexity over credit risk. A surge in bullish dollar sentiment between now and December would cause us to downgrade spread product relative to Treasuries. TIPS: The increased sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to core inflation argues for a continued overweight position in TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries. Sovereign Debt: Continue to favor U.S. corporate credit over USD-denominated sovereign government debt within a neutral allocation to spread product. Feature About one month ago, we outlined how we expected our investment strategy to evolve over the remainder of this year and into 2017.1 Our continued expectation that the Fed will lift rates in December leads us to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and a neutral allocation to spread product2 until a December rate hike has been fully discounted by the market. Chart 1Dollar Sentiment: A Key Indicator Beyond December, our investment strategy will depend largely on how the dollar responds to an upward re-rating of rate expectations. Strong dollar appreciation would likely cause us to reverse our below-benchmark duration stance and become even more cautious on spread product. Conversely, a tame dollar could mean that the sell-off in bonds and rally in spreads have further to run. The dollar has appreciated by close to +2% since early September and bullish sentiment toward the dollar has also edged higher (Chart 1). However, so far the increases appear muted compared to the rapid dollar appreciation that occurred in the run-up to last December's rate hike. The reason we care about the dollar is that a stronger currency represents a tightening of financial conditions that acts to depress expectations of future economic growth. This can spell trouble for risk assets and also lower the market-implied odds of future rate hikes. For example, spread product was performing well last year until rate hike expectations started to move higher in late October. As the market began to anticipate a December Fed rate hike, it did not take long for the combination of higher rate expectations and increasingly bullish dollar sentiment to weigh on risk assets (Chart 2). The Market Vane survey of bullish sentiment toward the dollar surged above 80% last December, and this tightening of financial conditions is what prompted the sell-off in spread product and sharp decline in Treasury yields that kicked off 2016. Chart 2More Bullish Dollar Sentiment Is A Risk For Spread Product With last year's example in mind, the relevant question for current investment strategy is: How much dollar appreciation can the market tolerate before Treasury yields reverse their uptrend and credit spreads start to widen? To answer that question we make an assessment of U.S. and global growth relative to this time last year. All else equal, if U.S. growth is improved compared to last year, then it should require a greater dollar appreciation to have a similar impact on yields and spreads. Relatedly, if the growth outlook outside of the U.S. is improved, then it would mean that the dollar's reaction to rising U.S. rate expectations might not be as strong. On this note, there is some evidence pointing toward a more resilient U.S. and global economy than at this time last year. In the U.S., our preferred leading indicators suggest that growth contributions from capital spending, housing, net exports, government spending and inventories should all move higher in the coming quarters (Chart 3). This should act to offset a likely moderation in consumer spending growth (Chart 4). All in all, the domestic U.S. growth outlook appears similar to - if not slightly better than - what was seen at this time last year. There is more cause for optimism in the global growth indicators. The aggregate global PMI and LEI are tracking close to levels seen last year, but rising diffusion indexes suggest that further increases are likely (Chart 5). Already, manufacturing PMIs in all the major economic blocs have entered clear uptrends (Chart 5, bottom two panels). This suggests that the global growth outlook is actually much brighter than at this time last year, and improved diffusion indexes suggest that the global recovery has also become more synchronized. Chart 3U.S. Growth Outlook Improving... Chart 4...Outside Of Consumer Spending Chart 5Global Growth On The Upswing The implication of a U.S. economic outlook that is broadly similar to last year and an improved outlook for global growth is that the U.S. dollar may not react as strongly to rising Fed rate hike expectations in 2016 as it did in 2015. If this turns out to be the case, then the performance of spread product should also be more resilient and the uptrend in Treasury yields is less likely to reverse. Bottom Line: We continue to track the dollar and dollar sentiment closely to inform our near-term investment strategy. While dollar sentiment has edged higher, it has not yet reached the elevated levels seen last year. A more synchronized global growth recovery makes such a spike in bullish dollar sentiment less likely this time around. What Is A High Pressure Economy? Chart 6What A "High Pressure Economy" Looks Like Fed Chair Janet Yellen introduced a new buzzword to the market two weeks ago when she suggested in a speech3 that "it might be possible to reverse the adverse supply-side effects [of the financial crisis] by temporarily running a 'high-pressure economy' with robust aggregate demand and a tight labor market." Some investors took this to mean that the Fed would be increasingly tolerant of inflation overshooting its 2% target. We think this interpretation is incorrect, although we do think that Yellen's description of a "high pressure economy" provides a lot of information about the Fed's reaction function. More than anything, Yellen's speech was a response to recent trends in the labor market. The downtrend in the unemployment rate started to abate late last year, even though the economy has continued to add jobs at an average pace of just under +200k per month. A sharp rebound in the labor force participation rate has prevented the unemployment rate from falling, despite robust job growth (Chart 6). It is this dynamic that Yellen refers to when she talks about a "high pressure economy". Essentially, her theory suggests that, despite the low unemployment rate, the economy might be able to continue to add jobs without inflation spiking higher. Put differently, the unemployment rate might be less useful as an input to the Fed's forecast of future inflation than in past cycles. The key implication for investors is that if the Fed doesn't trust the unemployment rate to provide a signal about future inflation, then it is forced to rely on the actual inflation data for guidance. In our view, core PCE and core CPI inflation are now the two most important inputs to the Fed's reaction function. On that note, while last week's September core CPI release was soft, both core CPI and core PCE remain in uptrends that began in early 2015. Further, diffusion indexes suggest that these uptrends will persist (Chart 7). The Fed's increased focus on core inflation also has implications for our TIPS call. The sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to realized core inflation has shifted higher since the Great Recession (Chart 8). In our view, this has occurred because of how the zero-lower-bound on interest rates has constrained the Fed's ability to influence investor expectations. Chart 7The Inflation Uptrend Is Intact Chart 8TIPS Breakevens & Core Inflation When the fed funds rate was well above the zero-lower-bound, investors could reasonably assume that the Fed would act to offset any temporary price shocks. As such, long-maturity TIPS breakevens remained in a relatively narrow range and were mostly influenced by perceptions about the stance of Fed policy. In a zero-lower-bound world, investors can reasonably question whether the Fed has the ability to offset a deflationary price shock. As such, inflation expectations are increasingly driven by the actual inflation data rather than the Fed. With the Fed and the market both increasingly taking their cues from the actual inflation data, it means that the Fed will likely remain sufficiently accommodative for core PCE to return to target and also that TIPS breakevens will move higher alongside the trend in realized inflation. Bottom Line: The increased sensitivity of TIPS breakevens to core inflation argues for a continued overweight position in TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries. Sovereign Credit: A Dollar Story Chart 9Sovereign Debt & The Dollar As noted above, in the current environment the path of the U.S. dollar takes on increased importance for our entire portfolio strategy. However, there is one sector of the fixed income market where the dollar is always paramount - USD-denominated sovereign debt. Specifically, we refer to the Barclays Sovereign index which consists of the U.S. dollar denominated debt of foreign governments, mostly emerging markets.4 In the long-run, the performance of sovereign debt relative to equivalently-rated and duration-matched U.S. corporate credit tends to track movements in the dollar and bullish sentiment toward the dollar (Chart 9). When the dollar appreciates it makes USD-denominated debt more expensive to service from the perspective of a foreign issuer, and therefore causes sovereign debt to underperform domestic alternatives. As stated above, we do not anticipate a near-term spike in the dollar, like what was witnessed near the end of last year. However, given that the Fed is much further along in its tightening cycle than other major central banks, the long-run bull market in the U.S. dollar should remain intact. This will continue to be a major headwind for sovereign debt. Further, the recent performance of sovereign debt relative to U.S. credit has bucked its traditional correlations with the dollar. Notice that the beta between sovereign excess returns and the dollar has moved into positive territory (Chart 9, bottom two panels). Historically, the correlation does not remain at these levels for long and sovereign debt should underperform as the more typical negative correlation is re-established. At present, there is not even an attractive valuation argument for sovereign debt relative to U.S. credit. The spread differential between the Sovereign index and an equivalently-rated, duration-matched U.S. credit index is well below zero (Chart 10), and only the USD-debt of Hungary, South Africa, Colombia and Uruguay offer spreads that appear attractive relative to the U.S. Credit index (Chart 11). Chart 10No Spread Pick-Up In Sovereigns Chart 11USD-Denominated Sovereign Debt By Issuing Country Bottom Line: Continue to favor U.S. corporate credit over USD-denominated sovereign government debt within a neutral allocation to spread product. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching", dated September 13, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 We favor negatively convex assets (MBS) over credit within a neutral allocation to spread product, on the view that negatively convex assets will outperform as yields head higher in advance of a December rate hike. In anticipation of a December Fed rate hike we are also maintain a short position in the December 2017 Eurodollar futures contract as well as positions in 2/10 and 10/30 curve flatteners. The three trades have returned: +20bps, -23bps and +4bps respectively. 3 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20161014a.htm 4 The largest issuers in the Barclays Sovereign Index are: Mexico (22%), Philippines (14%) and Colombia (11%). Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Our protector portfolio is a combination of assets that have a low or negative correlation with equities that give investors some downside protection. Replacing cash and/or Treasuries with our protector portfolio in 60-30-10 or 60-40 benchmark portfolios would have produced superior returns since 2011. We continue to advocate allocating investments to our protector portfolio in the near term as it represents an effective hedge against immediate risks such as a negative market reaction to the upcoming elections and/or disappointing third quarter profits. Feature Both equities and bonds are under pressure, as a higher likelihood of a December interest rate hike is beginning to be priced in at the same time as nervousness about Q3 earnings results has intensified. This confluence of factors - less liquidity and earnings disappointment - has been the central argument of our defensive portfolio stance for some time: any handoff from liquidity to growth would be shaky, and potentially premature. Indeed, as we wrote in the September 26 Weekly Report, liquidity conditions will largely remain favorable for risk assets for some time because even with a December rate hike, interest rates are well below equilibrium, i.e. are not restrictive. However, equity investors will suffer through bouts of earnings disappointments, similar to the chronic disappointment in GDP growth. As we show in Chart 1, throughout the economic recovery, expectations for economic growth have been revised lower and are only now finally in line with what we expect is close to reality. As highlighted in last week's report, investors' expectations about earnings are most likely to undergo the same fate because profit margins will remain a lasting headwind: investors have not yet adjusted to this new reality (Chart 2). That will hold equity gains to low single digits, at best. Chart 1Years Of One-Way (Down) Revisions Chart 2Earnings Set To Disappoint? Overall, our view is that the economic backdrop is stable as there are low odds of a recession-inducing monetary tightening occurring, and we do not see any other negative shocks that are concerning enough to trigger a recession. Still, above and beyond our worry about profit disappointments, many client queries are currently focused on U.S. election risks. On September 26, we warned of market volatility leading up to the election, since investors may continue to assign too low odds of a Trump Presidential win. However, we would expect markets to quickly recover - at least until Trump reveals his true policy colors. We took a page from the market reaction to Brexit as a possible guideline to the outcome of Trump winning the election, i.e. the election is ultimately won by a non-status quo candidate. Investors will recall that the post-vote U.K. equity market reaction to Brexit was short-lived but savage. However, the uncertainty around the upheaval of institutions and structures in the euro area and the U.K. are far greater than the election of a non-conformist U.S. President within an institutionally sound system with checks and balances. All of that said, we recognize that we could be wrong and that the U.S. election has taken over the pole position on investors' list of concerns. More specifically, investors are worried about negative financial market fallout from a Trump win.1 So, how should investors hedge the downside risk of these election results? And for that matter, what about other near-term risks? Protector Portfolio Explained This publication has been advocating for some time that investors hold some portion of their capital in a protector portfolio (currently a combination of TIPS, gold and the U.S. dollar). The goal is to find assets with a low or negative correlation to U.S. equities and offer a measure of protection against a steep selloff in stocks. As Chart 3 shows, a portfolio of 60/30/10, where 10% is placed in the protector portfolio, would have outperformed a traditional 60/30/10 allocation in which the 10% is held in straight cash since 2011 (in a ZIRP world). A 60/40 allocation where 40% is placed in the protector portfolio also beats a 60/40 stock/Treasury allocation since 2011. Chart 3Protector Portfolio Enhances Performance ##br## Since 2011 Chart 4Protector Components Are ##br## Negatively Correlated With S&P 500 The three assets included in our protector portfolio were chosen with specific risks in mind: USD: As the main global reserve currency, the U.S. dollar benefits when global risk aversion is on the rise. Admittedly, when fears have emanated from U.S. soil, the dollar has performed less well compared to other safe-haven assets, such as the Swiss franc and/or Swiss bonds. Nonetheless, for U.S. investors, investing in one's home currency can provide a natural hedge/advantage. In Chart 4, we show the one-year correlation between USD and S&P 500 equity returns. Since 2009, the correlation has been negative and the implication is that by holding USD, investors are already implicitly defensive. Gold: Gold traditionally does well in times of extreme geopolitical uncertainty and also as a hedge against inflation. More recently, gold has done less well as a hedge because the negative correlation between equity prices and gold broke down from 2011 until earlier this year (Chart 4). Gold has once again become negatively correlated with equity prices and we believe it will be an effective safe-haven asset should inflation become a concern. TIPS: Both 10-year TIPS and nominal Treasuries are negatively correlated with U.S. equity returns and both provide some measure of insurance in risk-off periods/phases of economic disappointment. Nonetheless, we prefer TIPS at the moment since they offer a measure of protection against a back-up in inflation expectations (also Chart 4). In sum, our protector portfolio is a combination of assets that are uncorrelated enough with equities to give investors some protection against a range of downside risks. Protector Portfolio: But Beware Buy And Hold Chart 5Protector Buy And Hold Will Not Work As Chart 2 has shown, our protector portfolio has outperformed both a 60-30-10 and 60-40 portfolio in recent years. However, longer -term performance has been less outstanding (Chart 5). Indeed, adding a constant proportion of safe-haven assets to a balanced portfolio over an extended period underperforms the balanced portfolio benchmark for long stretches of time: there are non-negligible costs associated with holding safe-haven assets over prolonged periods. The bottom line is that timing plays a critical part in investing in safe-haven assets. Owning a fixed share of protector portfolio assets over long horizons will not beat a traditional buy and hold strategy, although superior returns over cash offer a compelling case in a NIRP world. We continue to recommend that investors hedge against downside risk in the form of the protector portfolio - or simply by choosing the safe haven that most closely corresponds as a hedge to the specific risk at hand. However, it is important to know that safe-haven assets fall in and out of favor through time and the protector portfolio will at some point no longer be justified, and/or its components will need to be adjusted. For example, only after 2000 did Treasuries start providing a good hedge against equity corrections. The contrary is true for gold - it acted as one of the most secure investments during corrections until that time, but then became correlated with S&P 500 total returns from 2012-early 2016. That said, gold's coefficient has turned negative again, and it should be viewed as an all-weather safe haven, especially if deflation risks begin to dissipate. The Most Relevant Safe Haven In Case Of A Policy Mistake Chart 6Fed Policy Mistake? Buy Protector Portfolio As we wrote above, our base investment case is that the prospect of less liquidity and the risk of an earnings disappointment mean that investors should keep a defensive portfolio stance and be prepared for pullbacks in equities in the single digits. However, the Minutes of the latest FOMC meeting highlight that a fairly low threshold has been set for a December interest rate rise. If financial market participants interpret incoming economic information more bearishly than the Fed, then a December rate hike risks being perceived by investors as a policy mistake. Under this scenario, risk assets could be set for a much greater fall, buoying the case for further portfolio insurance. Which safe havens will outperform? We take our cue from the market reaction to the December, 2015 rate hike. In that episode, equity prices fell 12%. The protector portfolio in its current configuration2 increased 10%. The bulk of the appreciation was due to a strong run in gold prices (surely helped in part by massive woes in China) and TIPS (Chart 6). We believe that this basket of assets would once again offer an important buffer against equity losses associated with a policy mistake. The Most Relevant Safe Haven For A Trump Win If a Trump win triggers a correction in risk assets, we would expect the U.S. dollar to rally due to Trump policy uncertainty and heightened geopolitical risk. We noted above that USD does not always rally when a stress event occurs on U.S. soil. However, in the past several weeks, the performance of the dollar as well as Treasury yields has been linked to Trump's probability of winning the election. Whenever the odds of a Trump presidency rise, these risk-off assets have appreciated. And The Most Relevant Lessons From The Election Cycle This month's Geopolitical Strategy Special Report 3 provides a final forecast and implications for the elections. As we note above, we agree that a Trump win is a red herring in terms of the key issues investors face. But we also agree with our geopolitical strategists that there are several important lessons from the election cycle that may have long term ramifications for investors. Below, we highlight the most relevant for financial market participants: The median voter has moved to the left on economic policy. Trump's victory over an army of seasoned, relatively orthodox GOP contenders in the primary exposed the fact that the party's grassroots voters no longer care deeply about fiscal austerity and no longer wish to tolerate the corporate incentive for importing cheap labor. Similarly, demographic trends favoring millennials and minorities (who tend to vote left on economic policies), portends a shift by which the GOP attempts to capture left-leaning voters. Fiscal conservatism (and social conservatism, for that matter) will have less to show by way of official party machinery. The 2016 election campaign has amplified the notion that the news media works in narratives. These narratives work as a filter that preempts and distorts the presentation and, to some extent, reception of facts. This phenomenon was influential in Trump's rise - the first "Twitter" candidacy - as well as his recent decline. Investors cannot be too wary of what the mainstream press or financial "smart money" says about any particular political trend or event. It is essential to separate the wheat from the chaff by using empirics and looking at macro and structural factors to identify the constraints rather than the preferences of candidates or politicians. U.S. Economy: Neither Hot Nor Cold The NFIB survey of small business survey ranks as one of our preferred indicators of U.S. business confidence. The employment related indicators serve as a key input into our payroll model; questions about the pricing environment often provide a good leading/coincident gauge about inflation trends, and; as Chart 7 shows, the labor cost versus pricing series provides an excellent leading indicator for the profit margin outlook. The latter remains in a downtrend, reinforcing our message that profit margins will remain a headwind to earnings growth for still some time. Overall, small business optimism has been generally flat this year, after peaking in late 2014. It is somewhat discouraging that "demand" as a most important problem is no longer falling. Consumption has been one of the more robust areas of growth in the past several years and we expect consumption to continue to outshine other areas of the economy. However, even here, the data should be monitored closely. Chart 7Small Business Concerns (Part 1) Chart 8Small Business Concerns (Part 2) Retail sales (excluding gasoline and autos) growth has been slowing throughout 2016 and September data did not buck this trend (Chart 8). Results among retailers varied substantially, with growth strongest at building supply stores, sporting goods stores, vehicle dealers and furniture stores. Laggards include electronics and appliance stores - segments that are still under siege from falling prices. The bottom line is that in aggregate, consumption is holding up reasonably well and should continue to do so, as long as employment gains and modest wage growth remain intact. Stay tuned. Lenka Martinek Vice President, U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Our Geopolitical Strategy service concurs that a Trump win is a red herring, i.e. is unlikely to occur and is a distraction from more relevant issues. For more insight, please see Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report "King Dollar: The Agent Of Righteous Retribution", dated October, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 At the time, the protector portfolio performed slightly less well, as 30-year government bonds were used instead of TIPS. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "U.S. Election: Final Forecast & Implications", dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Market Calls
