Policy
Highlights So What? Economic stimulus will encourage key nations to pursue their self-interest – keeping geopolitical risk high. Why? The U.S. is still experiencing extraordinary strategic tensions with China and Iran … simultaneously. The Trump-Xi summit at the G20 is unlikely to change the fact that the United States is threatening China with total tariffs and a technology embargo. The U.S. conflict with Iran will be hard to keep under wraps. Expect more fireworks and oil volatility, with a large risk of hostilities as long as the U.S. maintains stringent oil sanctions. All of our GeoRisk indicators are falling except for those of Germany, Turkey and Brazil. This suggests the market is too complacent. Maintain tactical safe-haven positioning. Feature “That’s some catch, that Catch-22,” he observed. “It’s the best there is,” Doc Daneeka agreed. -Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (1961) One would have to be crazy to go to war. Yet a nation has no interest in filling its military’s ranks with lunatics. This is the original “Catch-22,” a conundrum in which the only way to do what is individually rational (avoid war) is to insist on what is collectively irrational (abandon your country). Or the only way to defend your country is to sacrifice yourself. This is the paradox that U.S. President Donald Trump faces having doubled down on his aggressive foreign policy this year: if he backs away from trade war to remove an economic headwind that could hurt his reelection chances, he sacrifices the immense leverage he has built up on behalf of the United States in its strategic rivalry with China. “Surrender” would be a cogent criticism of him on the campaign trail: a weak deal will cast him as a pluto-populist, rather than a real populist – one who pandered to China to give a sop to Wall Street and the farm lobby just like previous presidents, yet left America vulnerable for the long run. Similarly, if President Trump stops enforcing sanctions against Iranian oil exports to reduce the threat of a conflict-induced oil price shock that disrupts his economy, then he reduces the United States’s ability to contain Iran’s nuclear and strategic advances in the wake of the 2015 nuclear deal that he canceled. The low appetite for American involvement in the region will be on full display for the world to see. Iran will have stared down the Great Satan – and won. In both cases, Trump can back down. Or he can try to change the subject. But with weak polling and yet a strong economy, the point is to direct voters’ attention to foreign policy. He could lose touch with his political base at the very moment that the Democrats reconnect with their own. This is not a good recipe for reelection. More important – for investors – why would he admit defeat just as the Federal Reserve is shifting to countenance the interest rate cuts that he insists are necessary to increase his economic ability to drive a hard bargain with China? Why would he throw in the towel as the stock market soars? And if Trump concludes a China deal, and the market rises higher, will he not be emboldened to put more economic pressure on Mexico over border security … or even on Europe over trade? The paradox facing investors is that the shift toward more accommodative monetary policy (and in some cases fiscal policy) extends the business cycle and encourages political leaders to pursue their interests more intently. China is less likely to cave to Trump’s demands as it stimulates. The EU does not need to fear a U.K. crash Brexit if its economy rebounds. This increases rather than decreases the odds of geopolitical risks materializing as negative catalysts for the market. Similarly, if geopolitical risk falls then the need for stimulus falls and the market will be disappointed. The result is still more volatility – at least in the near term. The G20 And 2020 As we go to press the Democratic Party’s primary election debates are underway. The progressive wave on display highlights the overarching takeaway of the debates: the U.S. election is now an active political (and geopolitical) risk to the equity market. A truly positive surprise at the G20 would be a joint statement by Trump and Xi plus some tariff rollback. Whenever Trump’s odds of losing rise, the U.S. domestic economy faces higher odds of extreme policy discontinuity and uncertainty come 2021, with the potential for a populist-progressive agenda – a negative for financials, energy, and probably health care and tech. Yet whenever Trump’s odds of winning rise, the world faces higher odds of an unconstrained Trump second term focusing on foreign and trade policy – a potentially extreme increase in global policy uncertainty – without the fiscal and deregulatory positives of his first term. We still view Trump as the favored candidate in this race (at 55% chance of reelection), given that U.S. underlying domestic demand is holding up and the labor market has not been confirmed to be crumbling beneath the consumer’s feet. Still Chart 1 highlights that Trump’s shift to more aggressive foreign and trade policy this spring has not won him any additional support – his approval rating has been flat since then. And his polling is weak enough in general that we do not assign him as high of odds of reelection as would normally be afforded to a sitting president on the back of a resilient economy. This raises the question of whether the G20 will mark a turning point. Will Trump attempt to deescalate his foreign conflicts? Yes, and this is a tactical opportunity. But we see no final resolution at hand. With China, Trump’s only reason to sign a weak deal would be to stem a stock market collapse. With Iran, Trump is no longer in the driver’s seat but could be forced to react to Iranian provocations. Bottom Line: Trump’s polling has not improved – highlighting the election risk – but weak polling amid a growing economy and monetary easing is not a recipe for capitulating to foreign powers. The Trump-Xi Summit On China the consensus on the G20 has shifted toward expecting an extension of talks and another temporary tariff truce. If a new timetable is agreed, it may be a short-term boon for equities. But we will view it as unconvincing unless it is accompanied with a substantial softening on Huawei or a Trump-Xi joint statement outlining an agreement in principle along with some commitment of U.S. tariff rollback. Otherwise the structural dynamic is the same: Trump is coercing China with economic warfare amid a secular increase in U.S.-China animosity that is a headwind for trade and investment. Table 1 shows that throughout the modern history of U.S.-China presidential-level summits, the Great Recession marked a turning point: since then, bilateral relations have almost always deteriorated in the months after a summit, even if the optics around the summit were positive. Table 1U.S.-China Leaders Summits: A Chronology The last summit in Buenos Aires was no exception, given that the positive aura was ultimately followed by a tariff hike and technology-company blacklistings. Of course, the market rallied for five months in between. Why should this time be the same? First, the structural factors undermining Sino-American trust are worse, not better, with Trump’s latest threats to tech companies. Second, Trump will ultimately resent any decision to extend the negotiations. China’s economy is rebounding, which in the coming months will deprive Trump of much of the leverage he had in H2 2018 and H1 2019. He will be in a weaker position if they convene in three months to try to finalize a deal. Tariff rollback will be more difficult in that context given that China will be in better shape and that tariffs serve as the guarantee that any structural concessions will be implemented. Bottom Line: Our broader view regarding the “end game” of the talks – on the 2020 election horizon – remains that China has no reason to implement structural changes speedily for the United States until Trump can prove his resilience through reelection. Yet President Trump will suffer on the campaign trail if he accepts a deal that lacks structural concessions. Hence we expect further escalation from where we are today, knowing full well that the G20 could produce a temporary period of improvement just as occurred on December 1, 2018. The Iran Showdown Is Far From Over Disapproval of Trump’s handling of China and Iran is lower than his disapproval rating on trade policy and foreign policy overall, suggesting that despite the lack of a benefit to his polling, he does still have leeway to pursue his aggressive policies to a point. A breakdown of these opinions according to key voting blocs – a proxy for Trump’s ability to generate support in Midwestern swing states – illustrates that his political base is approving on the whole (Chart 2). Yet the conflict with Iran threatens Trump with a hard constraint – an oil price shock – that is fundamentally a threat to his reelection. Hence his decision, as we expected, to back away from the brink of war last week (he supposedly canceled air strikes on radar and missile installations at the last minute on June 21). He appears to be trying to control the damage that his policy has already done to the 2015 U.S.-Iran equilibrium. Trump has insisted he does not want war, has ruled out large deployments of boots on the ground, and has suggested twice this week that his only focus in trying to get Iran back into negotiations is nuclear weapons. This implies a watering down of negotiation demands to downplay Iran’s militant proxies in the region – it is a retreat from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s more sweeping 12 demands on Iran and a sign of Trump’s unwillingness to get embroiled in a regional conflict with a highly likely adverse economic blowback. The Iran confrontation is not over yet – policy-induced oil price volatility will continue. This retreat lacks substance if Trump does not at least secretly relax enforcement of the oil sanctions. Trump’s latest sanctions and reported cyberattacks are a sideshow in the context of an attempted oil embargo that could destabilize Iran’s entire economy (Charts 3 and 4). Similarly, Iran’s downing of a U.S. drone pales in comparison to the tanker attacks in Hormuz that threatened global oil shipments. What matters to investors is the oil: whether Iran is given breathing space or whether it is forced to escalate the conflict to try to win that breathing space. Chart 4Iran’s Rial Depreciated Sharply The latest data suggest that Iran’s exports have fallen to 300,000 barrels per day, a roughly 90% drop from 2018, when Trump walked away from the Iran deal. If this remains the case in the wake of the brinkmanship last week then it is clear that Iran is backed into a corner and could continue to snarl and snap at the U.S. and its regional allies, though it may pause after the tanker attacks. Chart 5More Oil Volatility To Come Tehran also has an incentive to dial up its nuclear program and activate its regional militant proxies in order to build up leverage for any future negotiation. It can continue to refuse entering into negotiations with Trump in order to embarrass him – and it can wait until Trump’s approach is validated by reelection before changing this stance. After all, judging by the first Democratic primary debate, biding time is the best strategy – the Democratic candidates want to restore the 2015 deal and a new Democratic administration would have to plead with Iran, even to get terms less demanding than those in 2015. Other players can also trigger an escalation even if Presidents Trump and Rouhani decide to take a breather in their conflict (which they have not clearly decided to do). The Houthi rebels based in Yemen have launched another missile at Abha airport in Saudi Arabia since Trump’s near-attack on Iran, an action that is provocative, easily replicable, and not necessarily directly under Tehran’s control. Meanwhile OPEC is still dragging its feet on oil production to compensate for the Iranian losses, implying that the cartel will react to price rises rather than preempt them. The Saudis could use production or other means to stoke conflict. Bottom Line: Given our view on the trade war, which dampens global oil demand, we expect still more policy-induced volatility (Chart 5). We do not see oil as a one-way bet … at least not until China’s shift to greater stimulus becomes unmistakable. North Korea: The Hiccup Is Over Chart 6China Ostensibly Enforces North Korean Sanctions The single clearest reason to expect progress between the U.S. and China at the G20 is the fact that North Korea is getting back onto the diplomatic track. North Korea has consistently been shown to be part of the Trump-Xi negotiations, unlike Taiwan, the South China Sea, Xinjiang, and other points of disagreement. General Secretary Xi Jinping took his first trip to the North on June 20 – the first for a Chinese leader since 2005 – and emphasized the need for historic change, denuclearization, and economic development. Xi is pushing Kim to open up and reform the economy in exchange for a lasting peace process – an approach that is consistent with China’s past policy but also potentially complementary with Trump’s offer of industrialization in exchange for denuclearization. President Trump and Kim Jong Un have exchanged “beautiful” letters this month and re-entered into backchannel discussions. Trump’s visit to South Korea after the G20 will enable him and President Moon Jae-In to coordinate for a possible third summit between Trump and Kim. Progress on North Korea fits our view that the failed summit in Hanoi was merely a setback and that the diplomatic track is robust. Trump’s display of a credible military threat along with Chinese sanctions enforcement (Chart 6) has set in motion a significant process on the peninsula that we largely expect to succeed and go farther than the consensus expects. It is a long-term positive for the Korean peninsula’s economy. It is also a positive factor in the U.S.-China engagement based on China’s interest in ultimately avoiding war and removing U.S. troops from the peninsula. From an investment point of view, an end to a brief hiatus in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy is a very poor substitute for concrete signs of U.S.-China progress on the tech front or opening market access. There has been nothing substantial on these key issues since Trump hiked the tariff rate in May. As a result, it is perfectly possible for the G20 to be a “success” on North Korea but, like the Buenos Aires summit on December 1, for markets to sell the news (Chart 7). Chart 7The Last Trade Truce Didn't Stop The Selloff Chart 8China Needs A Final Deal To Solve This Problem Bottom Line: North Korea is not a basis in itself for tariff rollback, but only as part of a much more extensive U.S.-China agreement. And a final agreement is needed to improve China’s key trade indicators on a lasting basis, such as new export orders and manufacturing employment, which are suffering amid the trade war. We expect economic policy uncertainty to remain elevated given our pessimistic view of U.S.-China trade relations (Chart 8). What About Japan, The G20 Host? Japan faces underrated domestic political risk as Prime Minister Abe Shinzo approaches a critical period in his long premiership, after which he will almost certainly be rendered a “lame duck,” likely by the time of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. The question is when will this process begin and what will the market impact be? If Abe loses his supermajority in the July House of Councillors election, then it could begin as early as next month. This is a real risk – because a two-thirds majority is always a tall order – but it is not extreme. Abe’s polling is historically remarkable (Chart 9). The Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner Komeito are also holding strong and remain miles away from competing parties (Chart 10). The economy is also holding up relatively well – real wages and incomes have improved under Abe’s watch (Chart 11). However, the recent global manufacturing slowdown and this year’s impending hike to the consumption tax in October from 8% to 10% are killing consumer confidence. Chart 10Japan's Ruling Coalition Is Strong The collapse in consumer confidence is a contrary indicator to the political opinion polling. The mixed picture suggests that after the election Abe could still backtrack on the tax hike, although it would require driving through surprise legislation. He can pull this off in light of global trade tensions and his main objective of passing a popular referendum to revise the constitution and remilitarize the country. Chart 11Japanese Wages Up, But Consumer Confidence Diving We would not be surprised if Japan secured a trade deal with the U.S. prior to China. Because Abe and the United States need to enhance their alliance, we continue to downplay the risk of a U.S.-Japan trade war. Bloomberg recently reported that President Trump was threatening to downgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance, with a particular grievance over the ever-controversial issue of the relocation of troops on Okinawa. We view this as a transparent Trumpian negotiating tactic that has no applicability – indeed, American military and diplomatic officials quickly rejected the report. We do see a non-trivial risk that Trump’s rhetoric or actions will hurt Japanese equities at some point this year, either as Trump approaches his desired August deadline for a Japan trade deal or if negotiations drag on until closer to his decision about Section 232 tariffs on auto imports on November 14. But our base case is that there will be either no punitive measures or only a short time span before Abe succeeds in negotiating them away. We would not be surprised if the Japanese secured a deal prior to any China deal as a way for the Trump administration to try to pressure China and prove that it can get deals done. This can be done because it could be a thinly modified bilateral renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which had the U.S. and Japan at its center. Bottom Line: Given the combination of the upper house election, the tax hike and its possible consequences, a looming constitutional referendum which poses risks to Abe, and the ongoing external threat of trade war and China tensions, we continue to see risk-off sentiment driving Japanese and global investors to hold then yen. We maintain our long JPY/USD recommendation. The risk to this view is that Bank of Japan chief Haruhiko Kuroda follows other central banks and makes a surprisingly dovish move, but this is not warranted at the moment and is not the base case of our Foreign Exchange Strategy. GeoRisk Indicators Update: June 28, 2019 Our GeoRisk indicators are sending a highly complacent message given the above views on China and Iran. All of our risk measures, other than our German, Turkish, and Brazilian indicators, are signaling a decrease geopolitical tensions. Investors should nonetheless remain cautious: Our German indicator, which has proven to be a good measure of U.S.-EU trade tensions, has increased over the first half of June (Chart 12). We expect Germany to continue to be subject to risk because of Trump’s desire to pivot to European trade negotiations in the wake of any China deal. The auto tariff decision was pushed off until November. We assign a 45% subjective probability to auto tariffs on the EU if Trump seals a final China deal. The reason it is not our base case is because of a lack of congressional, corporate, or public support for a trade war with Europe as opposed to China or Mexico, which touch on larger issues of national interest (security, immigration). There is perhaps a 10% probability that Trump could impose car tariffs prior to securing a China deal. Chart 12U.S.-EU Trade Tensions Hit Germany Chart 13German Greens Overtaking Christian Democrats! Germany is also an outlier because it is experiencing an increase in domestic political uncertainty. Social Democrat leader Andrea Nahles’ resignation on June 2 opened the door to a leadership contest among the SPD’s membership. This will begin next week and conclude on October 26, or possibly in December. The result will have consequences for the survivability of Merkel’s Grand Coalition – in case the SPD drops out of it entirely. Both Merkel and her party have been losing support in recent months – for the first time in history the Greens have gained the leading position in the polls (Chart 13). If the coalition falls apart and Merkel cannot put another one together with the Greens and Free Democrats, she may be forced to resign ahead of her scheduled 2021 exit date. The implication of the events with Trump and Merkel is that Germany faces higher political risk this year, particularly in Q4 if tariff threats and coalition strains coincide. Meanwhile, Brazilian pension reform has been delayed due to an inevitable breakdown in the ability to pass major legislation without providing adequate pork barrel spending. As for the rest of Europe, since European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s dovish signal on June 18, all of our European risk indicators have dropped off. Markets rallied on the news of the ECB’s preparedness to launch another round of bond-buying monetary stimulus if needed, easing tensions in the region. Italian bond spreads plummeted, for instance. The Korean and Taiwanese GeoRisk indicators, our proxies for the U.S.-China trade war, are indicating a decrease in risk as the two sides moved to contain the spike in tensions in May. While Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin notes that the deal was 90% complete in May before the breakdown, there is little evidence yet that any of the sticking points have been removed over the past two weeks. These indicators can continue to improve on the back of any short-term trade truce at the G20. The Russian risk indicator has been hovering in the same range for the past two months. We expect this to break out on the back of increasing mutual threats between the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. has recently agreed to send an additional 1000 rotating troops to Poland, a move that Russia obviously deems aggressive. The Russian upper chamber has also unanimously supported President Putin’s decree to suspend the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, in the wake of the U.S. decision to do so. This would open the door to developing and deploying 500-5500 km range land-based and ballistic missiles. According to the deputy foreign minister, any U.S. missile deployment in Europe will lead to a crisis on the level of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Russia has also sided with Iran in the latest U.S.-Iran tension escalation, denouncing U.S. plans to send an additional 1000 troops to the Middle East and claiming that the shot-down U.S. drone was indeed in Iranian airspace. We anticipate the Russian risk indicator to go up as we expect Russia to retaliate in some way to Poland and to take actions to encourage the U.S. to get entangled deeper into the Iranian imbroglio, which is ultimately a drain on the U.S. and a useful distraction that Russia can exploit. In Turkey, both domestic and foreign tensions are rising. First, the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral election delivered a big defeat for Turkey’s President Erdogan on his home turf. Opposition representative Ekrem Imamoglu defeated former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim for a second time this year on June 23 – increasing his margin of victory to 9.2% from 0.2% in March. This was a stinging rebuke to Erdogan and his entire political system. It also reinforces the fact that Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not as popular as Erdogan himself, frequently falling short of the 50% line in the popular vote for elections not associated directly with Erdogan (Chart 14). This trend combined with his personal rebuke in the power base of Istanbul will leave him even more insecure and unpredictable. Second, the G20 summit is the last occasion for Erdogan and Trump to meet personally before the July 31 deadline on Erdogan’s planned purchase of S-400 missile defenses from Russia. Erdogan has a chance to delay the purchase as he contemplates cabinet and policy changes in the wake of this major domestic defeat. Yet if Erdogan does not back down or delay, the U.S. will remove Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and may also impose sanctions over this purchase and possibly also Iranian trade. The result will hit the lira and add to Turkey’s economic woes. Geopolitically, it will create a wedge within NATO that Russia could exploit, creating more opportunities for market-negative surprises in this area. Finally, we expect our U.K. risk indicator to perk up, as the odds of a no-deal Brexit are rising. Boris Johnson will likely assume Conservative Party leadership and the party is moving closer to attempting a no-deal exit. We assign a 21% probability to this kind of Brexit, up from our previous estimate of 14%. It is more likely that Johnson will get a deal similar to Theresa May’s deal passed or that he will be forced to extend negotiations beyond October. Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com France: GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
The zero bound constraint remains a formidable threat. It does make sense to try to raise inflation expectations in order to allow real rates to fall deeper into negative territory in the event that a recession occurs. The sharp drop in market-based inflation…
Highlights When it comes to policy easing, the euro area 5-year yield at -0.15 percent is running out of road, while the U.S. 5-year yield is still at the dizzying heights of 1.8 percent. Hence, the ECB is likely to come out the loser in any ‘battle of the doves’ with the Federal Reserve. German bunds will continue to underperform U.S. T-bonds Take profits in the overweighting to Spanish Bonos and Portuguese bonds. Equity investors should go underweight European industrials and switch to the less economically-sensitive and price-sensitive healthcare sector. Feature The German 5-year bund yield recently plunged to -0.7 percent – significantly below even the -0.25 percent yield on the Japanese 5-year government bond (JGB) (Chart of the Week). This has left many people scratching their heads and wondering: is the bond market signalling that Europe is on the cusp of a vicious deflationary vortex? Chart I-1Bund Yield, How Low Can You Go? The answer is, not necessarily. The head-to-head comparison of the yields on German bunds and JGBs is misleading, because the German bund yield includes a significant discount for the possibility of currency redenomination to a new ‘super deutschmark’ (Chart I-2) while the JGB yield does not, and cannot, have such a redenomination discount given that the yen cannot break up. Chart I-2The German 5-Year Bund Yield Carries A Redenomination Discount Why The German Bund Yield Can Go Deeply Negative The German bund yield can drop to deeply negative levels, even when the policy interest rate is, and expected to remain, close to zero. This is because a negative yield on the German bund is rational if investors anticipate an equal and opposite currency gain in the event that the euro broke up. A negative yield on the German bund is rational if investors anticipate an equal and opposite currency gain. For example, if you were certain that the bund was going to deliver you deutschmarks worth 20 percent more than euros, you would accept a symmetrically negative yield near -20 percent; if you were sure of a 10 percent redenomination gain, you would accept a yield near -10 percent; and even if you expected a relatively low one-in-twenty likelihood of the 10 percent redenomination gain, this would equate to an expected gain of 0.5 percent, so you would accept a negative yield near -0.5 percent.1 Hence, an individual euro area bond yield is made up of three components: The interest rate term-structure. The likely size and direction of a currency redenomination. The likelihood of such a currency redenomination event. Chart I-3The Euro Area Term-Structure Is Much Lower Than In The U.S., But Not Quite As Low As In Japan By contrast, the yield on the JGB, U.S. T-bond and U.K. gilt is made up of just the first component, the interest rate term-structure. So, unlike the JGB, T-bond, or gilt, we cannot get information about the euro area’s interest rate term-structure from the German bund yield – or any other euro area bond yield – by itself. Fortunately, we can derive the euro area interest rate term-structure from the average euro area bond yield because, at the aggregate level, the expected currency redenomination must sum to zero.2 Understanding the components of the German 5-year bund yield enables us to decompose its current -0.7 percent yield into two parts: -0.15 percent is from the interest rate term-structure – which is low but not quite as low as Japan (Chart I-3) – while the lion’s share, -0.55 percent, is from the redenomination discount. A Strategy For Bonds Turning to the decline in the yield through the past nine months, the lion’s share has not come from a widening redenomination discount. It has come from a collapse in the global interest rate term-structure, during which the redenomination discount has actually narrowed by 0.2 percent. One important consequence is that German bunds have underperformed their peers as their yield shortfall versus both U.S. T-bonds and Italian BTPs has narrowed (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Can the trend continue? Chart I-4The German 5-Year Bund's Yield Shortfall Has Narrowed Versus Both U.S. T-Bonds And Italian BTPs Chart I-5The German 10-Year Bund's Yield Shortfall Has Narrowed Versus Both U.S. T-Bonds And Italian BTPs The answer is yes. When it comes to policy easing, the euro area 5-year yield at -0.15 percent is running out of road, compared with the U.S. 5-year yield at the dizzying heights of 1.8 percent. Put bluntly, from these levels of yields the ECB is likely to come out the loser in any ‘battle of the doves’ with the Federal Reserve and bunds will underperform T-bonds – exactly as we witnessed last week. Meanwhile, as absolute yields have declined euro redenomination (break-up) risk has actually diminished (Chart I-6). This makes perfect sense because solvency is an absolute concept, and the solvency of fragile Italian banks has improved in line with the higher capital values of their Italian BTP holdings. Many euro area ‘periphery’ yield spreads have already compressed to wafer-thin levels. That said, many euro area ‘periphery’ yield spreads have already compressed to wafer-thin levels. Hence, we are pleased to report that our overweighting to Spanish Bonos (versus French OATS) is now up 10 percent while our long-standing overweighting to Portuguese bonds is up 50 percent. Given that most of the yield spread compression for Spain and Portugal is now over, we are closing these positions and taking the healthy profits (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Euro Break-Up Risk Has Diminished Recently Chart I-7For Spain, Most Of The Yield Spread Compression Has Already Happened Where President Trump Is Right About Europe President Trump and the ECB might be like chalk and cheese, but they do agree on one thing. The ECB’s own analysis – available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats – shows that the trade-weighted euro needs to appreciate by at least 10 percent to cancel the euro area’s competitive advantage versus its major trading partners including the United States (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Euro Needs To Appreciate By 10 Percent To Cancel The Euro Area’s ##br##Over-Competitiveness Even more controversially, the central bank’s own analysis shows that the ECB itself is to blame for the euro area’s significant competitive advantage. Prior to the ECB’s extreme and unprecedented policy easing, the euro area’s competitiveness was exactly in line with its trading partners. The ECB does not explicitly target the exchange rate, but it is fully aware that extremely accommodative monetary policy, and especially relative monetary policy, will boost the euro area’s competitiveness and thereby create trade imbalances. On this point, President Trump is spot on (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Relative Monetary Policy Has Created The Huge Trade Imbalance Between The Euro Area And The U.S. Even if the ECB feels justified in its policy, it is now running out of road. To reiterate, in the coming months the ECB is likely to come out second best in any ‘battle of the doves’ with the Federal Reserve. Any resulting yield spread compression between the euro area and U.S. will lift the euro and start to correct the euro area’s massive trade surplus with the U.S. The euro needs to appreciate by 10 percent to cancel the euro area’s competitive advantage. Another development is that the up-oscillation in growth that has benefited the euro area, and world, economy over the past two or three quarters is about to end and flip into a down-oscillation. We will expand on this crucial issue in next week’s report, so don’t miss it! Putting this all together, euro area firms exporting price-elastic discretionary goods and services are likely to get hurt. For the second half of the year, equity investors should go underweight European industrials and switch to the less economically-sensitive and price-sensitive healthcare sector. Finally, following the dovish surprises from central banks in recent weeks, our short 30:60:10 portfolio of equities, bonds and oil reached its 3 percent technical stop-loss. However, we are maintaining the short portfolio for the time being, in the belief that a continued synchronized rally across all asset-classes is now harder to deliver. Fractal Trading System* Supporting the fundamental argument in the main body of the report, the fractal trading system highlights that the 6-month outperformance of euro area industrials is now technically extended and vulnerable to a trend-reversal. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to short euro area industrials versus the market. The tickers are EXH4 versus EXSA, and the profit target is 2 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short bitcoin reached its stop-loss and is now closed. The other trades are all in profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10Euro Area Industrials Vs. Market The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The numbers quoted are for a simplified example. Consider a zero-coupon German bund redeeming at 100 a year from now. If the interest rate was zero, then you would pay 100 for it today, meaning the bund yield would be zero. But if you were certain that the bund would redeem not in euros, but in deutschmarks which would appreciate 20 percent versus the euro, you would pay 120 for the bund, meaning it would yield -17 percent. If the certain redenomination was a 10 percent appreciation, you would pay 110, and the yield would be -9 percent. But if this 10 percent redenomination was uncertain with a probability of 5 percent, your expected gain would be 0.5, you would pay 100.5, and the yield would be -0.5 percent. 2 Effectively, we can think of the euro as the sum of its strong and weak ‘component’ currencies. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights A rare market trifecta – propelled by investors seeking safe-haven assets, inflation hedges in the wake of the Fed’s dovish turn this past week, and portfolio diversification – will continue to keep gold well bid. It would only be natural for gold to have an episode of profit taking in the short term, following its 6.4% jump from ~ $1,340/oz beginning in mid-June. That said, we would use any profit-taking episode to get long gold, following its decisive break through resistance at $1,365/oz to a six-year high of $1,423.44/oz in New York spot trading on Tuesday, according to Bloomberg. The next significant resistance we see is at $1,790/oz. Energy: Overweight. Iran’s oil exports have fallen to ~ 300k b/d so far in June, according to Refinitiv Eikon, a data provider owned by Blackrock and Thomson Reuters. In mid-2018, exports exceeded 2.5mm b/d. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) re-assured markets its spare capacity allows it to meet customer demand. Separately, the U.S. EIA reported commercial crude oil inventories in the fell 12.8mm bbl, during the week ended June 21, 2019. This likely reflects the end of the longer-than-usual refinery turn-around season in the U.S. Base Metals: Neutral. Reduced copper concentrate supplies on the back of strike action at Codelco’s Chuquicamata mine in Chile have clobbered the Fastmarkets MB Asia – Pacific treatment and refining index, which stood at $53.50/MT June 21, its lowest level since 2013. A low index level indicates tight physical supplies. We are taking profits on our long September $3.00/lb COMEX copper calls vs. short September $3.30/lb COMEX copper calls at tonight's close. The position was up 192% at Tuesday's close. Precious Metals: Neutral. Markets await a possible re-start of Sino – U.S. trade talks at this weekend’s meeting in Osaka between presidents Xi and Trump at the G20. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA Crop Progress again showed corn planting behind schedule, clocking in at 96% vs. 100% on average this time of year. Corn emergence also is behind schedule, at 89% vs. an average 99% at this time of year. Only 56% of the crop was reported to be in good or excellent condition, vs. 77% last year at this time. We expect corn to remain well bid. Feature The three main drivers of gold demand – safe-haven buying, inflation hedging and portfolio diversification – will continue to sustain the metal’s powerful rally. Safe-haven demand propelled gold toward long-term resistance at $1,365/oz in mid-June, as the U.S. – Iran showdown in the Persian Gulf intensified. As U.S. messaging becomes more internally inconsistent – particularly the resolve of America to continue to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz – uncertainty as to how the showdown will resolve increases. In response to recent attacks on commercial oil-product tankers near the Strait of Hormuz – where close to 20% of the world’s oil supply transits daily – the U.S. has deployed close to 30,000 military personnel to the Persian Gulf region, the highest level of sailors deployed anywhere in the world. However, President Trump has said he is willing to leave the U.S.’s resolve to defend freedom of navigation through the Strait “a question mark.”1 This will continue to keep a safe-haven bid under gold, until markets receive clarity on the U.S.’s commitment to its historical role, and resolution in one form or another on the showdown in the Gulf. Fed’s Dovish Turn Bullish For Gold As unnerving to markets as the showdown in the Gulf is, it was the Fed’s unexpectedly dovish turn this past week that really turbo-charged gold prices, pushing them through $1,400/oz. Although inflation does not appear to be a huge risk to the U.S. economy, we do expect the U.S. CPI to move higher in 2H19. With the U.S. economy remaining at or close to full employment, investors realized the “insurance cut” telegraphed by the U.S. central bank for next month’s Board of Governors meeting stands a very good chance of finally goosing inflation higher, and re-anchoring inflation expectations later this year, which have been moving lower since 2H18 (Chart of the Week). Indeed, as Peter Berezin notes, “The fact that market-based inflation expectations have dropped sharply since last autumn has clearly influenced the Fed’s thinking.”2 The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge (UIG) already is registering a build-up in U.S. inflationary pressures (Chart 2). Although inflation does not appear to be a huge risk to the U.S. economy, we do expect the U.S. CPI to move higher in 2H19, something we believe investors already are embedding in gold prices. Chart of the WeekThe Fed Wants Inflation Expectations Higher Chart 2Underlying Inflation Trends Indicate Higher U.S. Inflation USD Weakness Will Support Gold Chart 3Weaker USD Will Boost Gold Prices The Fed’s more accommodative policy also will push the broad USD trade-weighted index (TWI) lower, which will be bullish for gold as well (Chart 3). U.S. CPI and the broad USD TWI are two of the strongest explanatory variables for gold prices we have found in our modeling, along with real U.S. interest rates.3 Expect Profit-Taking Technically, the sharp rally in gold prices over the short term is pushing gold prices toward “overbought” territory, which is why we are expecting a round of profit-taking in the near term (Chart 4). Our Gold Composite Indicator moved up half a standard deviation since the start of the year, thanks to the above-mentioned trifecta. This move took the metal from a neutral position at the beginning of the year into a relatively mild overbought level. With the sharp rally over the past two weeks, gold now appears to be mildly overbought.4 Gold’s price performance is outstripping our equity risk-premium indicator, which measures the difference between the S&P 500 earnings yield (i.e., the inverse of the forward price/earnings ratio) and real 10-year U.S. Treasury yields (Chart 5). This is not unexpected, and may be something of a catch-up following the strong gains put up by the equity index relative to gold last year. Chart 4Short-Term Profit-Taking Likely In Gold Market Chart 5Gold Price Gain Outstrips Equity Risk Premium Gold’s price performance is outstripping our equity risk-premium indicator. Bottom Line: Gold prices to remain well supported by a rare market trifecta – investors seeking safe-haven assets, inflation hedges following the Fed’s dovish turn this past week, and portfolio diversification. We are expecting a round of profit taking in gold over the short term. We would use these brief selloffs to get long gold. The next significant resistance we see is at $1,790/oz. Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the June 20, 2019 Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Supply – Demand Balances Consistent With Higher Oil Prices" – particularly the section entitled “Will The U.S. Defend Gulf Sea Lanes?” beginning on p. 3. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. See also More U.S. Navy Personnel Deployed to Middle East Than Anywhere Else published by usni.org June 24, 2019. 2 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Gentle Jay," for BCA Research’s appraisal of last week Fed board of governors meeting. Published June 21, 2019. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. In it, our Chief Global Investment strategist Peter Berezin notes, “Right now, rising inflation is not much of a risk. However, the Fed’s dovish turn almost guarantees that the U.S. economy will overheat.” See also “The Fed’s Got Your Back,” published by BCA Research’s U.S. Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy June 25, 2019. It is available at usbs.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 We have found inflation and U.S. financial variables – particularly the USD broad trade-weighted index, and real U.S. interest rates – are the chief variables explaining gold prices. Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold,” published by October 12, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Our Gold Composite Indicator combines sentiment, speculative-position levels, relative strength, and momentum gauges to characterize overbought and oversold conditions. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
Historically, when the Fed has cut rates, it has done so multiple times. Thus, it is not surprising that the market currently sees a 96% chance of two or more rate cuts this year and a 68% chance of three or more cuts. The entire futures curve is pointing to…
Highlights Fed: The Fed will cut rates in July, and possibly once more this year. This extra stimulus will help boost global growth in the second half of 2019. Credit: With inflation expectations low, the Fed will not risk upsetting financial markets by striking a hawkish tone. This will be a boon for corporate bonds. We no longer advocate a cautious near-term allocation to corporate credit. Spreads have likely peaked. Duration: The economic environment bears a greater resemblance to prior mid-cycle slowdowns than to prior pre-recession periods. As such, the Fed will not deliver more than the 89 basis points of rate cuts that are already discounted for the next 12 months. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Feature More Houdini Than Bullwinkle When Fed Chair Jay Powell reached into his hat at last week’s FOMC meeting, most – including us – thought he might emerge looking like Bullwinkle the cartoon moose.1 Instead, he pulled a rabbit, delivering a dovish surprise to markets that already expected a lot. The yield curve was discounting 80 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months heading into last Wednesday’s announcement. Then, the Fed’s statement and Powell’s press conference pushed our 12-month discounter all the way down to -94 bps (Chart 1). The 10-year Treasury yield also dropped 8 bps post-FOMC, while the 2-year yield fell a whopping 14 bps. The Fed will go to great lengths to signal that monetary conditions remain accommodative. The Fed communicated its dovish pivot through both the post-meeting statement and its interest rate projections. In the post-meeting statement, the Fed replaced its pledge to be “patient” with a promise to “act as appropriate to sustain the expansion”. A re-phrasing that is clearly designed to signal a rate cut in July. FOMC participants also revised their interest rate projections sharply lower (Chart 2). In March, 11 out of 17 participants expected the Fed to stay on hold for the balance of 2019, while 4 participants called for one rate hike and 2 called for two rate hikes. Now, 8 out of 17 participants continue to expect a steady fed funds rate, but 7 are calling for two rate cuts this year. Only one participant is still looking for a 2019 hike. Chart 1A Dovish Magic Show Chart 2Dots Revised Lower In his press conference, Chair Powell explicitly linked the Fed’s dovish pivot to “trade developments” and “concerns about global growth”. Bond investors will undoubtedly heed this message, and Treasury yields will be extra sensitive to any trade-related news that comes out of this weekend’s G20 summit, as well as to any fluctuations in the global growth data (see section titled “No PMI Recovery Yet” below). Ultimately, our baseline expectation is that there will be enough progress in trade negotiations at the G20 summit to keep the U.S. from imposing a further $300 billion in tariffs on Chinese imports. However, an all-encompassing deal, which rolls back existing tariffs, is not in the cards. Table 1Fed Funds Futures: What's Priced In? But even such a muddle-though scenario, when combined with a Fed rate cut in July and continued credit easing out of China, will be sufficient to support global growth in the second half of this year. This will prevent the Fed from delivering the 79 bps of rate cuts that are priced-in for between now and next February (Table 1). We remain short the February 2020 fed funds futures contract. And Now Here’s Something We Hope You’ll Really Like Our main takeaway from the FOMC meeting is that the Fed will go to great lengths to signal that monetary conditions remain accommodative. We posited back in March that the new battleground for monetary policy is between inflation expectations and financial conditions.2 That is, the Fed will only move to a restrictive policy stance in response to above-target inflation expectations or “bubbly” financial asset prices. While the Fed’s reflationary efforts will cause corporate bond spreads to tighten in the coming months, they will not immediately translate into a higher 10-year Treasury yield. At present, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain well below target levels and financial markets are far from “bubbly” (Chart 3): The Financial Conditions component of our Fed Monitor is close to neutral (Chart 3, panel 2). The S&P 500 12-month forward P/E ratio has rebounded this year, but is not close to the highs seen in late-2017/early-2018 (Chart 3, panel 3). The GZ measure of the excess premium in corporate bond spreads after accounting for expected default losses is low, but above where it traded throughout most of the 2000s (Chart 3, bottom panel). The upshot is that the Fed will continue to act as a tailwind for risk assets, and we therefore remove our prior recommendation to stay cautious on credit spreads in the near-term. It is now likely that credit spreads have peaked, a message confirmed by our list of “peak credit spread” indicators (Chart 4): Chart 3No Rush For Fed To Tighten Chart 4Credit Spreads Have Likely Peaked The price of gold has decisively broken-out to the upside, a sign that the market views monetary policy as reflationary (Chart 4, panel 2). Such a breakout has preceded the last two peaks in corporate bond spreads. The dollar’s uptrend has abated, signaling that the market views U.S. monetary policy as less out of step with the rest of the world (Chart 4, panel 3). Global industrial mining stocks have rebounded (Chart 4, panel 4). The CRB Raw Industrials index is the sole holdout (Chart 4, bottom panel). A rebound in this index would confirm our intuition that credit spreads have peaked. Chart 5Waiting For Improving Global Growth While the Fed’s reflationary efforts will cause corporate bond spreads to tighten in the coming months, they will not immediately translate into a higher 10-year Treasury yield. The ratio between the CRB Raw Industrials index and Gold correlates very tightly with the 10-year yield, and it continues to plummet (Chart 5). The CRB/Gold ratio will only rise when gains in the CRB index start to outpace gains in Gold. In other words, the Fed’s reflationary policy stance needs to translate into an improving global growth outlook. This could take a few months, though we ultimately continue to think that Treasury yields will be higher on a 6-12 month horizon. As explained in the next section, as long as the U.S. economy avoids recession, mid-cycle rate cuts tend to be followed by higher Treasury yields. A History Of Rate Cuts Part 2 In last week’s report we looked at every Fed rate cut since 1995 and showed how the 10-year Treasury yield reacted during the subsequent 21-day, 65-day, 130-day and 261-day periods.3 Our main conclusion was that the 10-year Treasury yield tended to rise following mid-cycle rate cuts, such as those that occurred in 1995-98 and 2003, and decline following rate cuts that led into a U.S. recession. For reference, we have attached last week’s analysis as an Appendix to this report, along with a new table showing how the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master index performed relative to cash following each post-1995 rate cut. The 2/10 Treasury slope tends to steepen quite sharply in the immediate aftermath of a mid-cycle rate cut, before starting to flatten after a few months have passed. This week, we delve a little deeper and look at the market’s interest rate expectations around each prior cut, and also at how the 2/10 Treasury slope responded in each case. Rate Expectations At The Time Of Fed Rate Cuts Table 2 shows the 12-month change in the fed funds rate that the market was discounting prior to each Fed rate cut announcement since 1995. It also shows the actual change in the fed funds rate that occurred over the subsequent 12-month period, and the difference between what occurred and what was expected – the 12-month fed funds surprise. Table 2A History Of Rate Cuts: Rate Expectations According to our Golden Rule of Bond Investing, a dovish surprise (actual change < expectations) should coincide with a falling 10-year Treasury yield, and a hawkish surprise (actual change > expectations) should coincide with a rising 10-year yield.4 The table shows that this indeed occurred in 26 out of 29 episodes. As was the case last week, the mid-1990s rate cuts immediately capture our attention. We have previously noted the resemblance between today’s economic environment and that of the mid-1990s.5 It’s interesting that the market is currently priced for a similar number of rate cuts as at that time. Once again, we expect those expectations will be disappointed. The Global Manufacturing PMI is the measure of global growth that lines up best with the 10-year Treasury yield. Yield Curve: Steeper Now = Flatter Later Another interesting trend is that the 2/10 Treasury slope steepened dramatically in the run-up to, and following, last week’s FOMC meeting. It is now back up to 29 bps after having troughed at 11 bps near the end of last year (Chart 6). It is also worth noting that the 2/10 Treasury slope has yet to invert this cycle. Such an inversion has occurred prior to every U.S. recession since at least 1960. Table 3 shows how the 2/10 Treasury slope has responded to Fed rate cuts in the past, and it reveals an interesting pattern. The slope tends to steepen quite sharply in the immediate aftermath of a mid-cycle rate cut, before starting to flatten after a few months have passed. The 2003 episode is a prime example. The 2/10 slope steepened by 62 bps in the month following the rate cut, but a year later it was 14 bps below where it started. Chart 6The Fed Steepens The Curve Table 3A History Of Rate Cuts: 2/10 Treasury Slope In contrast, the 2/10 steepening that immediately follows a “pre-recession” rate cut tends to be milder, but the steepening then accelerates as time passes and the Fed eases further. The observed yield curve patterns line up well with theory. We would expect rapid curve steepening immediately following a mid-cycle rate cut, as the market prices in a quick return to tighter policy settings. Then, the curve should eventually flatten as the Fed reverses its initial cuts. In contrast, a rate cut that precedes a recession should not lead to much initial steepening, because the market would not be expecting a quick recovery. The steepening would then accelerate as more rate cuts are eventually delivered. The fact that the 2/10 slope has steepened a lot in recent weeks is another datapoint in favor of “mid-cycle” rather than “pre-recession” market behavior. No PMI Recovery Yet We remain confident that the combination of a July Fed rate cut and Chinese credit stimulus will put a floor under global growth in the second half of the year. However, no such global growth rebound is yet evident in the crucial manufacturing PMI data. The Global Manufacturing PMI is the measure of global growth that lines up best with the 10-year Treasury yield, and it remains in a free-fall, even breaking below the 50 boom/bust line in May (Chart 7). Flash PMI data paint an equally dim picture for June: The Euro Area Manufacturing PMI is expected to tick up in June, but only to 47.8 from 47.7 in May (Chart 7, panel 2). The U.S. Manufacturing PMI is expected to fall to 50.1 in June, from 50.5 in May (Chart 7, panel 3). The Japanese Manufacturing PMI is expected to fall to 49.5 in June, from 49.8 in May (Chart 7, bottom panel). There is no Flash PMI data for China, but the Chinese index stood at 50.2 in May, only a hair above the 50 boom/bust line. On the bright side, financial markets are starting to price-in the beginnings of a reflation trade. Gold is rallying strongly, as we noted above, and an index of high-beta currency pairs (RUB/USD, ZAR/USD and BRL/USD) is off its lows. Both of these moves signal that the policy backdrop is becoming more supportive, and both have led upswings in the Global Manufacturing PMI in the past (Chart 8). Chart 7No Rebound In Sight Yet... Chart 8...But Financial Markets Are Already Looking Ahead Bottom Line: Treasury yields will probably need to see a rebound in the Global Manufacturing PMI before moving higher, but a few reflationary indicators suggest that such a rebound will occur in the second half of the year. Stay tuned. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Appendix Table 4A History Of Rate Cuts: 10-Year Treasury Yield Table 5A History Of Rate Cuts: Treasury Excess Returns Footnotes 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kx3sOqW5zj4 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The New Battleground For Monetary Policy”, dated March 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Track Records”, dated June 18, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Tracking The Mid-1990s”, dated June 11, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
In absolute terms, Thai financial markets are leveraged to global trade and will sell off if global growth deteriorates further. But Thai equities, credit, currency and domestic bonds will continue outperforming their EM peers because of the following…
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Melting inflation expectations, widening relative indebtedness, expensive adjusted relative valuations, high odds of a further drop in relative profit margins and the high-octane small cap status all signal that large caps continue to have the upper hand versus small caps. Modest deterioration in credit quality, weakening prospects for loan growth and falling inflation expectations, compel us to put the S&P bank index on downgrade alert. Recent Changes We got stopped out on the long S&P managed health care/short S&P semis trade on June 10 for a gain of 10% since inception. We got stopped out on the long S&P homebuilders/short S&P home improvement retailers trade on June 14 for a gain of 10% since inception. Table 1 Feature Equities surged to all-time highs last week, as investors cheered the Fed’s dovish stance and increasing likelihood of a late-July interest rate cut. The addiction to low interest rates and global dependence on QE are evident and simultaneously very worrisome signs. We are nervous that the U.S. economy is in a soft-patch, thus vulnerable to a shock (maybe sustained trade hawkishness is the negative catalyst) that can tilt the economy in recession. The risk/reward tradeoff on the overall equity market remains to the downside on a cyclical (3-12 month) time horizon as we first posited two weeks ago (this is U.S. Equity Strategy’s view and is going against BCA’s cyclically constructive equity market House View). In fact, using the NY Fed’s probability of a recession in the coming 12 months data series signals that there’s ample downside for stocks from current levels (recession probability shown inverted, Chart 1).1 We heed this message and reiterate our cautious equity market stance. Chart 1Watch Out Down Below Importantly, drilling deeper with regard to the excesses we are witnessing this cycle, Chart 2 is instructive and an unintended consequence of QE and zero interest rate policy. In previous research we highlighted the cumulative equity buybacks corporations have completed this cycle near the $5tn mark. Chart 2Financial Engineering What is worrying is that this “accomplishment” has come about at a great cost: a massive change in the capital structure of the firm. In other words, all of the buybacks are reflected in debt origination from the non-financial business sector (using the Fed’s flow of funds data), confirming our claim that the excesses this cycle are not in the financial or household sectors, but rather in the non-financial business sector (please refer to Chart 4A from the June 10 Weekly Report). One likely trigger of a jumpstart to a default cycle, other than a U.S./China trade dispute re-escalation, is dwindling demand. On that front, we are bemused on how much weight market participants place on the Fed’s shoulders bailing out the economy and the stock market. Chart 3 is a vivid reminder of this narrative. On the one side of the seesaw is the mighty Fed with its forecast interest rate cuts and on the other a slew of slipping indicators. Our sense is that these eighteen indicators will more than offset the Fed’s about-to-commence easing cycle and eventually tilt the U.S. economy in recession, especially if the Sino-American trade talks falter. S&P 500 quarterly earnings are contracting on a year-over-year basis and the semi down-cycle points to additional profit pain for the rest of the year (top panel, Chart 4). On the trade front, exports are below the zero line and imports are flirting with the boom/bust line (second panel, Chart 4). Overall rail freight, including intermodal (retail segment) freight is plunging and so is the CASS freight shipments index at a time when the broad commodity complex is also deflating (third & bottom panels, Chart 4). The latest Q2 update of CEO confidence was disconcerting, weighing on the broad equity market’s prospects (top panel, Chart 5). Non-residential capital outlays have petered out and private construction is sinking like a stone. In fact, the latter have never contracted at such a steep rate during expansions over the past five decades (second panel, Chart 5). Real residential investment has clocked its fifth consecutive quarter of negative growth during an expansion, for the first time since the mid-1950s. Single family housing starts and permits are contracting (third panel, Chart 5). Chart 4Cracks… Chart 5…Are… Light vehicle sales are ailing (bottom panel, Chart 5) and the latest senior loan officer survey continued to show that there is feeble demand for credit across nearly all the categories the Fed tracks (bottom panel, Chart 6). Non-farm payrolls fell to 75K on a month-over-month basis last month and layoff announcements are gaining steam signaling that the labor market, a notoriously lagging indicator, is also showing some signs of strain (layoffs shown inverted, third panel, Chart 6). The latest update of the U.S. Equity Strategy’s corporate pricing power gauge is contracting (please look forward to reading a more in-depth analysis on our quarterly update on July 2) following down the path of the market’s dwindling inflation expectations. Finally, the yield curve remains inverted (top and second panels, Chart 6). Chart 6…Forming Chart 7The “Hope" RallyAdding it all up, we deem that the equity market remains divorced from the economic reality and too much faith is placed on the Fed’s shoulders to save the day. Thus, we refrain from positioning the portfolio on “three hopes”: first that the Fed will engineer a soft landing, second that the U.S./China trade tussle will get resolved swiftly, and finally that the Chinese authorities will inject massive amounts of liquidity and reflate their economy (Chart 7). This week we are putting a key financials sub-sector on downgrade alert and update our view on the size bias. Large Cap Refuge While small caps shielded investors from the U.S./China trade dispute that heated up in 2018 (owing to their domestic focus), this year small caps have failed to live up to their trade war-proof expectations and have lagged their large cap brethren by the widest of margins. In fact, the relative share price ratio sits at multi-year lows giving back all the gains since the Trump election, and then some (Chart 8). Chart 8Stick With A Large Cap Bias As a reminder, our large cap preference has netted our portfolio 14% gains since the May 10 2018 cyclical inception and this size bias is also up 9% since our high-conviction call inclusion in early December 2018. Five key reasons underpin our large/mega cap preference in the size bias. Bearishness toward small vs. large caps has been pervasive raising the question: does it still pay to prefer large caps to small caps? The short answer is yes. Five key reasons underpin our large/mega cap preference in the size bias. First, melting inflation expectations have been positively correlated with the relative share price ratio, and the current message is to expect more downside (Chart 8). While the SPX has a higher energy weight than the S&P 600, financials and industrials dominate small cap indexes and likely explain the tight positive correlation with inflation expectations (Table 2). Table 2S&P 600/S&P 500 Sector Comparison Table Second, relative indebtedness has been widening. Debt saddled small caps have been issuing debt at an accelerating pace at a time when cash flow growth has not been forthcoming. Small cap net debt-to-EBITDA is now almost three times as high as large cap net debt-to-EBITDA. Investors have finally realized that rising indebtedness is worrisome, especially at the late stages of the business cycle, and that is why small caps have failed to insulate investors from the re-escalating trade dispute (top & middle panels, Chart 9). Third, a large number of small cap companies (100 in the S&P 600 and 600 in the Russell 2000) have no forward EPS. Very few S&P 500 companies have negative projected profits. Thus, while, relative valuations have been receding, the relative forward P/E trading at par is masking the relative value proposition of the indexes. Were the S&P or Russell to adjust for this, small caps would trade at a significant forward P/E premium to large caps (bottom panel, Chart 9). Chart 9Mind The Debt Gap Fourth, a small cap margin squeeze has been underway since the 2012 cyclical peak and the relative margin outlook is even grimmer. Simply put, small business labor costs are rising at a faster clip than overall wage inflation, warning that small cap profit margins have further to fall compared with large caps margins (Chart 10). Finally, small cap stocks are higher beta stocks and typically rise when volatility gets suppressed. As such, they also tend to outperform large caps when emerging markets outperform the SPX and vice versa. Tack on the recent yield curve inversion, and the odds are high that the size bias has entered a prolonged period of sustained small cap underperformance. Netting it all out, melting inflation expectations, widening relative indebtedness, expensive adjusted relative valuations, high odds of a further drop in relative profit margins and the high-octane small cap status all signal that large caps continue to have the upper hand versus small caps (Chart 11). Chart 10Relative Margin Trouble Chart 11Shay Away From Small Caps Bottom Line: Small cap underperformance has staying power. Continue to prefer large/mega caps to their small cap brethren. Put Banks On Downgrade Alert In the context of de-risking our portfolio we are taking the step and adding the S&P banks index on our downgrade watch list. The Fed’s signal of a cut in the upcoming July meeting steepened the yield curve last week. While the yield curve has put in higher lows in the past eight months, relative bank performance has been facing stiff resistance and has failed to follow the yield curve’s lead (Chart 12). One of the reasons for the Fed’s dovishness is melting inflation expectations. The latter are joined at the hip with relative bank performance and signal that downside risks are rising especially if the Fed fails to arrest the lower anchoring of inflation expectations (Chart 13). Chart 12Banks Are Not Participating Chart 13Melting Inflation Expectations Are Anchoring Banks With regard to credit demand, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey remained subdued confirming the anemic reading from our Economic Impulse Indicator (a second derivative gauge of six parts of the U.S. economy, bottom panel, Chart 14). Lack of credit demand translates into lack of credit growth, despite the fact that bankers are, for the most part, willing extenders of credit. U.S. Equity Strategy’s overall loans & leases growth model has crested (second panel, Chart 15). Chart 14Anemic Loan Demand… Chart 15…Will Weigh On Loan Origination Similarly, the recent softness in a number of manufacturing surveys signal that C&I loan growth in particular – the largest credit category in bank loan books – is at risk of flirting with the contraction zone (third panel, Chart 15). Worrisomely, not only is the overall U.S. credit impulse contracting, but also U.S. Equity Strategy’s bank credit diffusion index is collapsing (second panel, Chart 16). Such broad breadth of loan growth deterioration warns that loan growth and thus bank earnings are at risk of underwhelming still optimistic sell-side analysts’ expectations (not shown). On the credit quality front there are now two loan categories that are starting to show some modest signs of stress. Credit card net chargeoffs and non-current loans are spiking and now C&I delinquent loans have ticked up for the first time since the manufacturing recession (third & bottom panel, Chart 16). Our bank EPS growth model does an excellent job in capturing all these forces and signals that bank EPS euphoria is misplaced (bottom panel, Chart 15). Nevertheless, despite these softening bank sector drivers there are four significant offsets. First the drubbing in the 10-year yield has been reflected nearly one-to-one on the 30-year fixed mortgage rate and the recent surge in mortgage applications signals that residential real estate loans (second largest bank loan category) may reaccelerate in the back half of the year (top panel, Chart 17). Chart 16Deteriorating Credit Quality Chart 17Some Significant… Second, while there have been credit card and C&I loan credit quality issues, as a percentage of total loans they just ticked higher and remain near cyclical lows, at a time when banks have been putting more money aside to cover for these potential loan losses (bottom panel, Chart 17). Third, bank source of funding remains very cheap as depositors have not been enjoying higher short term interest rates, at least not at the big money center banks. In other words, banks have not been passing higher interest rates to depositors sustaining relatively high NIMs (not shown). Finally, banks are one of the few sectors with pent up equity buyback demand. The upcoming release of the Fed’s stress test will likely continue to allow banks to pursue shareholder friendly activities, that they have been deprived from for so long, and raise dividend payments and increase share buybacks (Chart 18). Chart 18…Offsets In sum, melting inflation expectations, modest deterioration in credit quality, and weakening prospects for loan growth compel us to put the S&P bank index on downgrade alert. Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P banks index, but have put it on downgrade alert and are looking for an opportunity to downgrade to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – WFC, JPM, BaAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT, SIVB, FRC. Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

