Policy
Highlights Duration: The global bond bear market is still intact, although the "leadership" has passed over to the U.S. where growth is the firmest and inflation expectations are rising the fastest. Maintain an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, focusing underweights in countries that can actually tighten monetary policy this year (U.S., Canada, the euro area). ECB: The ECB has started to take notice of the latest batch of softening euro area economic data. Yet it will take a much more prolonged slowdown for the ECB's medium-term economic forecasts to be proven incorrect, which would alter the likely timetable for a tapering of asset purchases by year-end. Canada: The Bank of Canada has adapted a more cautious tone of late, which seems overly pessimistic given the underlying trends in Canadian growth and inflation. Stay underweight Canadian government bonds. Feature We're Sticking With Our Country Allocations One of our key investment themes for 2018 has been that economic growth, monetary policies and bond yields would be far less correlated between countries than was seen in 2017. This would create cross-country fixed income trading and investment opportunities that were much harder to come by last year. With the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield finally reaching the 3% level last week, that story looks to be playing out. Yields are going up elsewhere, but nothing like what is happening in the U.S., where growth remains firm compared to the string of negative data surprises seen in other countries (Chart of the Week). This theme of divergence can also be seen in the recent actions and comments from central bankers. Officials at the U.S. Federal Reserve have continued to signal, with increasing conviction, that additional rate hikes will be needed later this year (although not at this week's FOMC meeting). This is to be expected given that not only is U.S. growth holding up well (Q1 real GDP growth "only" slowed to an above-potential pace of 2.3%), but both core PCE inflation and the Wages & Salaries component of the Employment Cost Index are accelerating at a marginal pace not seen since the 2008 crisis (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekU.S. Economy Outperforming,##BR##USTs Underperforming Chart 2No Reason For The Fed##BR##To Turn Less Hawkish At the same time, policymakers in other major developed countries have turned somewhat more cautious: The Bank of Japan (BoJ) announced that it will no longer provide a specific date when it expects inflation to reach its target The European Central Bank (ECB) took the highly unusual step of holding a monetary policy meeting last week without actually discussing the monetary policy outlook, according to ECB President Mario Draghi Bank of England (BoE) Governor Mark Carney dampened expectations of a rate hike in May that was nearly fully discounted by markets The Bank of Canada (BoC), which had already delivered several rate hikes when inflation was below its 2% target, chose to keep rates on hold despite inflation finally breaching 2% Sweden's Riksbank pushed out the expected timing of its next rate hike (yet again) to the end of 2018, even with inflation now at target With global growth losing some momentum, it is no surprise that policymakers are trying to not sound too hawkish, which could trigger an unwelcome decline in inflation expectations. Here again, divergences between countries have opened up. Rising oil prices are translating into higher market-based inflation expectations in countries like the U.S. and Canada where growth is still above-potential and leading economic indicators are rising (Chart 3). This is not the case in places like the U.K., Australia and Japan where growth is sluggish, leading indicators are slowing, but with markets still pricing in interest rate increases over the next year (Chart 4). This divergence is a critical underpinning of our current recommended country allocation within government bond markets - overweighting the U.K., Australia and Japan where tighter monetary policy will be difficult to achieve; while underweighting the U.S. and Canada, where rate hikes are still in the cards. Chart 3Shifting Oil/Inflation Correlation... Chart 4...In Countries Where Growth Is Slowing The European Duration Call Gets A Bit Trickier The evidence on the euro area is a bit less conclusive on this front, however. The OECD's leading economic indicator has only dipped modestly from its recent peak, and the correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations has not broken down. Draghi stated in his press conference following last week's policy meeting that the ECB Governing Council was focused on "very important" current euro area economic data that had clearly lost momentum in the first quarter of this year. He noted that there were many one-off factors that could have caused the softer growth (weather, labor strikes, the timing of holidays), but that the slump was very broad-based and hit almost all euro area countries. This makes the next few months of data critical to determine the ECB's next policy move, which could be an announcement of a tapering of its asset purchases when the current program ends in September. From our perspective, the sluggish Q1 euro area economic performance looks to be driven by a major slowing of export growth. Industrial confidence remains at a high level and growth in retail sales volumes has remained stable since the middle of 2017 (Chart 5). Yet the annual growth rate of total euro area exports has slumped to less than 3%, with exports to Asia now contracting on a year-over-year basis (bottom two panels). If the export slump continues in the coming months, this could begin to impact hiring activity across the euro area. A rise in unemployment would definitely change the ECB's calculus in altering its policy stance. At the moment, the Governing Council can look at a steadily declining overall euro area unemployment rate - which is approaching the OECD's estimate of the full employment NAIRU - combined with moderate increases in core HICP inflation, wage growth and inflation expectations, as confirmation that trends are still broadly following the path laid out in its latest economic projections (Chart 6). Chart 5An Export-Led Cooling##BR##Of Euro Area Growth Chart 6ECB Will Not Lift Rates Until##BR##Inflation Expectations Move Back To 2% The ECB has made it clear that it views a tapering of its asset purchases and any subsequent interest rate hikes as separate policy decisions. The hurdle to end the bond purchases is much lower than it is for raising interest rates. On the former, as long as unemployment and inflation continue to evolve along the lines of the ECB's projections, then a full tapering of bond purchases will occur by year-end (with an announcement occurring at either of the June or July ECB meetings). On the latter, it will take inflation expectations (as measured by the 5-year EUR CPI swap, 5-years forward) rising back above 2% for the ECB to feel confident that rate increases will be necessary, as was the case during the mid-2000s tightening cycle and the 2011 mini-cycle (bottom panel). For now, we are maintaining our moderate underweight stance on euro area government debt. Looking ahead, we will be watching the correlation between oil prices denominated in euros and inflation expectations, as well as the development of leading economic indicators in the euro area. If the Q1 growth slump widens into a broader downturn, then the ECB could be forced to revise its economic projections lower and continue with the asset purchases into 2019. While that is not our base case scenario, such a development would force us to reconsider our stance on euro area debt. Bottom Line: The global bond bear market is still intact, although the "leadership" has passed over to the U.S. where growth is the firmest and inflation expectations are rising the fastest. Maintain an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, focusing underweights in countries that can actually tighten monetary policy this year (U.S., Canada, the euro area). In Europe, it will take a much more prolonged slowdown for the ECB's medium-term economic forecasts to be proven incorrect, which would alter the likely timetable for a tapering of asset purchases later this year. Canada: Still On Track For More Hikes This Year The BoC has been sending more cautious signals of late regarding its next policy moves, after delivering 75bps of rate hikes since last summer. Some of this simply reflects a more measured tone taken by other central banks in response to signs of global growth losing some momentum, as discussed earlier. Yet in the case of Canada, it is difficult to make a credible case that the central bank should not continue its rate hiking cycle, particularly with inflation now above the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target band. Upside Risks To Canadian Growth Versus BoC Projections Yes, the Canadian economy has lost some of the rapid upward momentum seen in 2016 and 2017, led mostly by weakness in exports which are now contracting on a year-over-year basis (Chart 7). This was focused in aircraft, transportation equipment, and energy products. The latter is due to poor weather conditions and transportation bottlenecks involved in getting oil out of Alberta rather than a sign of weakening demand for Canadian oil. The BoC did take a more cautious view on exports in the latest set of economic projections presented in the April Monetary Policy Report (MPR). The central bank now expects real exports to be stagnant in 2018, downgrading the expected contribution to real GDP growth to zero from the +0.6 percentage points presented in the January MPR. This was, by far, the biggest downgrade to any of the GDP growth components in the BoC's forecast, and was main reason why the BoC downgraded its overall 2018 real GDP growth projection to 2.0% from 2.2%. Yet at the same time, the BoC actually upgraded its global growth projection to 3.8% from the 3.6% figure in the January MPR. We suspect that the downgrade to the export contribution to expected 2018 growth was the BoC trying to inject some room for error in its growth forecasts for any negative outcome in the current round of NAFTA trade negotiations with the U.S. and Mexico. Otherwise, it makes no sense to have such a large downgrade without becoming more pessimistic on global growth. Our Geopolitical strategists are now much more optimistic that a NAFTA deal will be reached, rather than having the U.S. exit the agreement as President Trump has threatened. If that happens, the BoC's growth projections may end up being too low. We can see a similar level of "excessive cautiousness" with regards to the BoC's assessment of the Canadian labor market and the outlook for consumption. Consumer spending has also cooled off a bit from very robust levels, although an unusually long and harsh winter likely played a large role there, as evidenced by the suspiciously large plunge in retail sales growth (Chart 8). The fundamental underpinnings for Canadian consumption still look solid, though. Chart 7Canadian Economy Holding Up Well,##BR##Despite Weak Exports Chart 8Solid Income Fundamentals##BR##For The Canadian Consumer Consumer confidence remains near cyclical highs. Wage growth currently sits at 3.2% in nominal terms and 1.5% in real terms. The BoC noted in its Spring Business Outlook Survey that wage pressures are increasing due to greater competition in the labor market (3rd panel) and, to a lesser extent, recent minimum wage increases. The BoC noted in the April MPR that wages were growing "somewhat below what would be expected were the economy operating with no excess labor." Yet that argument appears overly pessimistic - the unemployment rate is currently 0.7 percentage points below the OECD's NAIRU estimate, at a time when nominal wages are growing in excess of 3%. Again, there is a greater chance that the BoC will end up surprised by how strong Canadian wage growth will turn out over the next 6-12 months. Even the persistent structural problems of very high Canadian household debt levels and overheated house prices appear less of an issue at the moment. The household debt/GDP ratio has stabilized as growth in mortgage debt has decelerated since mid-2017 - an outcome that can be attributed to rising mortgage rates, tighter lending standards on mortgage lending and poor housing affordability in the major cities (Chart 9). Meanwhile, the supply side of the housing market is finally improving with housing starts now back to pre-recession levels. National house price inflation has cooled from the overheated 15% growth rates to a more "normal" pace around 5%, according to data from Terranet. There will be a long-term day of reckoning for the highly-indebted Canadian homeowner during the next recession. In the near term, however, the combination of rising supply, lower demand and softer house prices suggest that the Canadian housing market is trending in a direction of becoming less imbalanced. The BoC took note of these developments in the April MPR, using much less cautious language in describing the risk to the inflation outlook from household debt and overheated housing markets. The outlook for Canadian business investment also has the potential to give an upside surprise to the BoC. The Spring Business Outlook Survey showed that firms' capital spending intentions remain very strong (Chart 10), a fact confirmed by the robust growth in import volumes of machinery & equipment (middle panel). Finally, the overall financial condition for Canadian companies is in good shape, according to our new Canadian Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) that was introduced last week.1 The CHM correlates strongly with the overall Business Outlook Survey Indicator (bottom panel), which suggests that the cyclical improvement in the financial health of Canadian companies will support capital spending in the coming quarters - especially if the uncertainty over the NAFTA negotiations fades away. Chart 9A Better Supply/Demand Balance##BR##In Canadian Housing? Chart 10Canadian Capex##BR##Is In Good Shape The BoC Will Be Surprised By Canadian Inflation, Too Chart 11Inflation Now Above The BoC's 2% Target With the economy likely to continue expanding at an above-potential pace in the next 6-12 months, the current uptrend in inflation is should continue. Headline CPI inflation is already above the 2% target and core inflation is right at target (Chart 11). The BoC is forecasting that CPI inflation will only remain modestly above 2% until the end of 2018, and will return back to 2% in 2019. Yet there is essentially no spare capacity left in the Canadian economy, based on output gap estimates of both the BoC and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The BoC has slightly revised its projection for the Q1 2018 output gap, leaving it somewhat wider than the previous forecasts due to positive revisions of potential GDP growth (now 1.8% from 1.6% in the January MPR, based on a faster pace of trend labor productivity). These are small changes, however, and real GDP growth is likely to be faster than the BoC is projecting in 2018. Market-based inflation expectations have been steadily rising along with the increase in global energy prices (bottom panel), and we continue to expect inflation breakevens to widen over the balance of 2018. BoC Will Not Disappoint Market Expectations On Rate Hikes The markets are currently discounting a similar pace of rate hikes in Canada and the U.S. over the next year, according to pricing in the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) markets (Chart 12). The BoC's estimate of the neutral policy rate is between 2.5% and 3.5%, which is well above the current policy rate of 1.25%. The OIS market is discounting 75bps of hikes over the twelve months, which would take the policy rate to 2% - still a below-neutral, accommodative level for an economy that is already at full employment and where inflation has risen back to the BoC's target. We expect the BoC to continue to follow its typical pattern of following moves by the Fed with a lag. This is a sensible strategy given how exposed Canadian growth is to U.S. growth through exports, and also given how responsive the Canadian dollar is to the expected rate differentials between the U.S. and Canada. Given our view that the Fed will deliver at least another 50bps of rate hikes over the course of 2018, with the potential for more if inflation continues to accelerate without any growth slowdown, the BoC will likely deliver on the rate hikes currently discounted by markets. This is the main reason why we are maintaining our underweight stance on Canadian Government bonds (bottom panel). The BoC has a much higher potential to actually hike rates by at least as much as the market is expecting, which is not the case in every other developed market country except the U.S., where we are also underweight. This week, however, we are stopping ourselves out of our recommended Tactical Overlay trade in the Canadian BAX interest rate futures curve (long the Dec/18 contract versus the June/18 contract). We introduced that trade back in January, positioning for more rapid BoC rate hikes in the latter half of 2018 that would flatten the BAX futures curve. The recent dovish turn by the BoC has resulted in a steepening of the BAX futures curve, however, and we are stopping ourselves out at a modest loss of -0.12% (Chart 13). Chart 12Stay Underweight##BR##Canadian Government Debt Chart 13We Are Stopped Out Of##BR##Our BAX Futures Curve Trade Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada has adapted a more cautious tone of late, which seems overly pessimistic given the underlying trends in Canadian growth and inflation. Stay underweight Canadian government bonds. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "BCA Corporate Health Monitor Chartbook: Growth Is Papering Over The Cracks", dated April 24, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Both the euro's undervaluation and the euro area's massive trade surplus constitute disequilibria, which cannot persist in the long term. Hence, the trade-weighted euro will structurally appreciate... ...and euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos. Banks are not a sector to buy and hold for the long term, but rather a sector to own for periodic cyclical rallies. We anticipate the next such cyclical opportunity will arise later this year. Feature Yanis Varoufakis, the former Finance Minister of Greece, recently highlighted EU institutions' obsession with protecting their credibility at all costs. Once set on a course, EU institutions tend to suffer a blinkered tunnel-vision. A big fan of Shakespeare, Varoufakis likened this resistance to change course - no matter the repercussions - to Lady Macbeth's declaration that "what's done cannot be undone."1 As Mario Draghi prepares to take the stage again, we recall the final line of his last performance on March 8 as an echo of Lady Macbeth. Asked to justify the ECB's obsession with the 2 per cent inflation point-target, Draghi declared that "there are serious costs about changing course on credibility". We fully understand the ECB's desire to protect its credibility. The trouble is that it is set on a course that is incredibly difficult to accomplish: a single mandate to sustain a 2 per cent inflation point-target, based on a consumer price basket that omits one of the largest items of household expenditure - housing itself. Chart of the WeekAs The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters Euro Area Inflation Is Running Higher Than The HICP Suggests Homeowners will testify that the cost of maintaining their homes constitutes one of their largest expenses. Which makes the omission of this cost from the euro area Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) completely ludicrous. Using the experience of U.S. inflation which does include owner occupiers' housing costs, we estimate that a price basket that correctly included home maintenance costs would outperform the HICP by an average of 0.5 percentage points a year (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Including Owner Occupiers' Housing Costs ##br##Adds 0.5% To Inflation Recognizing this error, the U.K.'s Office For National Statistics recently changed its main inflation index from the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) to the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), acknowledging that "the costs of housing services associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's home are an important component of household expenditure that are not included in the CPI... Therefore the CPIH is the most comprehensive measure of inflation." We expect the BoE's target for 2 per cent inflation to switch eventually to the CPIH too, albeit it remains the CPI for the time being. However, a 1 to 3 per cent 'variation band' around the CPI inflation target does give the BoE considerable breathing space. By comparison, the ECB's target for 2 per cent inflation excluding owner occupiers' housing costs and excluding a variation band gives it a significantly more difficult task than its peer central banks. The crucial point is that the ECB's ultra-loose policy is to a large extent a function of a tunnel-vision pursuit of an HICP inflation rate which significantly understates true inflation. As true inflation is higher than suggested, it means that true real interest rates are lower than suggested. And as currency markets feel true real interest rate differentials - rather than those derived from the faultily constructed HICP - it means that markets have undervalued the euro. This has resulted in an over-competitive euro area, and a massive trade surplus (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Euro Area Trade Surplus Is A Mirror-Image ##br##Of The Undervalued Euro Both the currency undervaluation and the associated trade surplus constitute disequilibria, which cannot persist in the long term. We have no strong conviction for the very near term move in the euro, but there are two longer term implications: the trade-weighted euro will structurally appreciate by about 10%; and euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos (Chart of the Week). Japanese Lessons For Europeans: The Homework A few weeks ago in Japanese Lessons For Europeans we made some counterintuitive observations about Japan's post-bubble economic experience.2 Most notably, we showed that on a real GDP per head basis, Japan has outperformed every other major economy over the past twenty years. Our finding was based on real GDP divided by working age (15-64) population because we wanted to capture real productivity gains - which rely mainly on the productive population. The counterintuitive finding elicited a couple of questions. One question was whether the result changes if we were to divide by the total population rather than the working age population. The answer is, not really. Dividing by total population, Japan would no longer be top of the leader board, but the broad result would still hold. Japan has performed impressively, and we fail to see the so-called 'lost decades' (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Japan Has Performed Impressively On ##br##Real GDP Per Working Age Population... Chart I-5...And Real GDP Per##br## Total Population Still, some people pointed out that Japan's public indebtedness now equals 210% of its GDP, up from 120% at the start of the century. So a second question was whether Japan's impressive performance is entirely due to its fiscal largesse. The answer is, not exactly. What matters is the change in total indebtedness - public plus private. As a share of GDP, public indebtedness is up by 90% but private indebtedness is down by 40%. So total indebtedness is up by 50% of GDP, considerably less than the increases elsewhere in the developed world. For example, over the same period, the U.K.'s total indebtedness is up by 100% of GDP. Moreover, even the level of Japan's total indebtedness as a share of GDP - at 370% - is not that different to other major economies. In Belgium, it is 340%; in France it is 305%; in Canada it is approaching 300% (Charts I-6-Chart I-17). Chart I-6Japan: Total Debt Up From 315% ##br##To 370% Of GDP Chart I-7U.S.: Total Debt Up From 185% ##br##To 250% Of GDP Chart I-8Canada: Total Debt Up From 225%##br## To 290% Of GDP Chart I-9Australia: Total Debt Up From 150% ##br##To 235% Of GDP Chart I-10U.K.: Total Debt Up From 180%##br## To 280% Of GDP Chart I-11Switzerland: Total Debt Up From 245%##br## To 270% Of GDP Chart I-12Germany: Total Debt Down From 185%##br## To 180% Of GDP Chart I-13France: Total Debt Up From 190%##br## To 305% Of GDP Chart I-14Italy: Total Debt Up From 195%##br## To 265% Of GDP Chart I-15Spain: Total Debt Up From 165% ##br##To 270% Of GDP Chart I-16Belgium: Total Debt Up From 260% ##br## To 340% Of GDP Chart I-17Sweden: Total Debt Up From 210% ##br##To 275% Of GDP Public Sector Leveraging Must Counterbalance Private Sector Deleveraging People who take on debt tend to be young, while those who pay down debt tend to be older. As population pyramids in developed economies shift to older cohorts, there are fewer people who wish to take on debt and more people who wish to pay it down. Specifically, the 50-70 age cohort tends to use pre-retirement income and retirement lump-sum payments to extinguish any outstanding mortgage debts. Consider an older person with an income of €1000 who wishes to pay down €100 of debt. It follows that the person will spend €900. Ordinarily, the banking sector will then reallocate the paid-down €100 to, say, a younger person who wants to borrow it. When the borrower spends the €100, aggregate expenditure totals €1000, which equals the original income. And all is well and good. However, in a world where there is an excess of people who wish to pay down debt versus those that wish to borrow, it might not be possible to reallocate the paid-down €100 to a new borrower in the private sector, even with interest rates at ultra-low levels. In this case, the only way to prevent a contraction in expenditure - a recession - is if the government steps in to borrow and spend the aforementioned €100 to keep the economy's expenditures at €1000. Moreover, because the private sector is paying down debt, what seems to be fiscal largesse does not lead to crowding out, inflation, or surging interest rates. The above illustration describes the structural situation in many developed economies at the moment. And it explains why we should not look at the evolution of indebtedness in the public sector and the private sector separately, but rather in combination. This is another important Japanese lesson for Europeans. A final observation is that if the private sector is deleveraging, private indebtedness as a share of GDP tends to drift lower. This necessarily means that banks total assets' are growing slower than overall sales in the economy. As banks' asset growth is their main driver of long-term profit growth, it also means that banks struggle to outperform the market on a sustained basis. This has been the experience in Japan since 1990 and in the euro area since 2008 (Chart I-18). Chart I-18When The Private Sector Pays Down Debt, Banks Structurally Underperform With private indebtedness declining as a share of GDP in many major economies, we conclude that banks are not a sector to buy and hold for the long term, but rather a sector to own for periodic cyclical rallies. We anticipate the next such cyclical opportunity will arise later this year. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 From Yanis Varoufakis's 2018 Rose Shakespeare Lecture. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Japanese Lessons For Europeans" April 5, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* It was a mixed week for our trades. Long USD/ZAR is approaching the end of its 3 month maximum holding period comfortably in profit. Against this, the recent intense volatility in the metals market closed the pair-trade long lead/short nickel at its stop-loss. We are not initiating any new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-19 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Corporate Bonds & The Yield Curve: Corporate bond excess returns fall sharply once the yield curve flattens to below 50 basis points, though they typically remain positive until the yield curve inverts. Interestingly, excess returns for equities relative to Treasuries exhibit the opposite pattern. Corporate Bonds & Leverage: The outlook for top-line corporate revenue growth is strong, but employee compensation costs will also rise this year. We are doubtful that corporate profit growth will keep pace with debt growth for the remainder of year, meaning that leverage is likely to rise. Rising leverage will be a signal to reduce exposure to corporate bonds. Bond Map: We perform a back-test to assess the effectiveness of the Bond Map framework for sector allocation that was introduced in last week's report. Feature It's been a while, but last week's bond market performance was reminiscent of an old fashioned risk-on phase. The 10-year Treasury yield reached its highest level since early 2014, causing a temporary halt in the yield curve's flattening trend. Spread product also responded to investor optimism, and returns from the investment grade corporate bond index now lag the duration-equivalent Treasury index by only 52 basis points year-to-date, up from a mid-March trough of -94 bps (Chart 1). High-Yield index returns also rebounded, and that index is now outpacing Treasuries by +150 bps so far this year. Chart 1Corporate Credit: Annual Excess Returns But for corporate bond investors, now is not the time for complacency. Out of the criteria we use to signal turns in the credit cycle, we are progressively checking more and more off our list.1 Spreads are already tight relative to history and corporate debt levels are already high. That much has been true for some time. Next up, we await a more restrictive monetary policy and a more severe slow-down in corporate profit growth to below the pace of corporate debt growth. Both of those conditions also need to be met before corporate defaults start to occur and spreads start to widen materially. In this week's report we consider each of those two conditions in turn, noting the triggers that will need to be hit for us to downgrade our current overweight allocation to corporate bonds. Condition 1: Restrictive Monetary Policy Chart 2Monetary Policy Not Yet Restrictive On the monetary policy front, we expect that monetary conditions will turn restrictive in the not-to-distant future (Chart 2). For the time being, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates are still below levels that are consistent with the Fed achieving its 2% inflation target. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 2.17% and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is 2.24%. But once both of those rates reach a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, they will be consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations and the Fed will have one less reason to stay cautious. We will start paring exposure to corporate bonds once both the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate cross above the 2.3% threshold. The re-anchoring of inflation expectations will also impart further upside to nominal Treasury yields, and we therefore maintain our below-benchmark duration stance and continue to follow the road-map laid out in our February report detailing the two-stage Treasury bear market.2 Another traditional signal of restrictive monetary policy is a flat or inverted yield curve (Chart 2, panel 2). Intuitively, a very flat yield curve tells us that the market expects very few (if any) Fed rate hikes in the future. An inverted yield curve tells us that the market actually anticipates rate cuts. While the yield curve is not yet close to inverting, it is approaching levels that are consistent with much lower (and often negative) excess returns for both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds, as is discussed below. A third indicator of the stance of monetary policy is simply the spread between the real federal funds rate and an estimate of its equilibrium level - the level consistent with neither an accommodative nor a restrictive policy stance (Chart 2, bottom panel). While the fact that the real fed funds rate is currently quite close to the popular Laubach-Williams estimate of its equilibrium level certainly reinforces our view that policy is almost restrictive, the large degree of uncertainty inherent in this sort of estimate leads us to prefer the market signals from the slope of the yield curve and TIPS breakeven inflation rates when forming an investment strategy. The Yield Curve And Corporate Bond Returns To assess the importance of the yield curve as a predictor of turns in the credit cycle, we split each cycle going back to the mid-1970s into regimes based on the yield curve slope. We then calculate excess returns during each phase for both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds, as well as the stock-to-bond total return ratio. We use the 3/10 yield curve slope instead of the more often quoted 2/10 slope because it allows for the inclusion of more historical data. This decision did not materially impact the results of our analysis. Chart 3 shows how we divided each cycle into three phases: Chart 3Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Phase 1 runs from the end of the previous NBER-defined recession until the slope crosses below 50 bps. Phase 2 runs from the time that the slope crosses below 50 bps until it crosses below zero. Phase 3 runs from the time that the yield curve first inverts to the start of the next recession. Notice that we do not include recessionary periods in our analysis, usually the periods with the worst excess corporate bond returns. The results of our analysis are shown in Table 1, and the first obvious result is that corporate bond excess returns are much higher in Phase 1 than in Phase 2, although Phase 2 returns are usually still positive.3 Negative excess returns occur more often than not in Phase 3, after the yield curve has inverted. Table 1Risk Asset Performance In Different Yield Curve Regimes The biggest exception to the above observations is that Phase 2 High-Yield returns actually exceeded Phase 1 High-Yield returns in the 2001-07 cycle. In our view, this exception results from the fact that corporate profit growth was well above corporate debt growth in 2005, and did not really decline until 2007, shortly after the yield curve inverted. In contrast, Phase 2 returns were exceptionally weak in the prolonged period between 1994 and 2000. In this instance, corporate profit growth actually fell below corporate debt growth in 1998, well before the yield curve inverted in 2000. This reinforces that both the stance of monetary policy and the trend in corporate leverage matter for corporate bond returns. The latter is discussed in the next section of this report. Another interesting result shown in Table 1 is that the pattern of stock market excess returns over Treasuries is the mirror image of the pattern in corporate bond excess returns. The stock market tends to perform better in Phase 2 than in Phase 1, and often even performs well in Phase 3 after the yield curve has inverted. This means that multi-asset investors should consider paring exposure to corporate bonds relative to Treasuries before they think of reducing exposure to the stock market. Bottom Line: Restrictive monetary policy is one condition that must be met before we reduce exposure to corporate bonds in our recommended portfolio. The first indication of this will likely be the re-anchoring of long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates in a range between 2.3% and 2.5%. We will start paring exposure to corporate bonds when that occurs. The slope of the yield curve is already at levels that are consistent with very low excess returns. Though we demonstrate that an inverted yield curve is historically linked to even lower returns. Conviction that the yield curve is about to invert will be another trigger to further reduce corporate bond exposure in the future. Condition 2: Rising Leverage The second condition that will cause us to take even more credit risk off the table is when gross leverage for the nonfinancial corporate sector - calculated as total debt over pre-tax profits - enters an uptrend. Chart 4 shows that periods of spread widening almost always coincide with rising gross leverage, or put differently, periods when the rate of debt growth exceeds the rate of profit growth. Profit growth has kept pace with debt growth during the past few quarters, causing leverage to flatten-off and allowing corporate spreads to narrow. Going forward, the outlook for top-line corporate revenue growth (a.k.a. net value added) remains favorable, owing to an ISM index that is well above the 50 boom/bust line and still climbing (Chart 5). But on the expense side of the ledger, employee compensation - the largest expense for the corporate sector - is also poised to increase in the months ahead. Unit labor costs jumped sharply in the fourth quarter of 2017 (Chart 5, panel 2), and with the unemployment rate at 4.1% and the economy still adding jobs at a robust pace - nonfarm payrolls have increased by an average of +211k during the past six months - a further acceleration in employee compensation is likely this year. Chart 4Corporate Leverage Has Flattened Off Chart 5Wage Growth Will Hamper Profits The key question then becomes whether corporations will be able to offset rising compensation costs by lifting prices. This remains uncertain, but early indications are not favorable. Our Profit Margin Proxy - the growth in the corporate sector's implicit selling price deflator relative to the growth in unit labor costs - does an excellent job tracking pre-tax profits (Chart 5, bottom panel). At the moment, this indicator signals that profit growth will moderate in the coming quarters. Bottom Line: The outlook for top-line corporate revenue growth is strong, but employee compensation costs will also rise this year. We are doubtful that corporate profit growth will keep pace with debt growth for the remainder of year. A decline in the rate of profit growth to below the rate of corporate debt growth will be another signal to reduce exposure to corporate bonds. The Bond Map Back-Test Last week we introduced the BCA Bond Map, a graphical depiction of the current risk/reward trade-off on offer from the different sectors of the U.S. bond market.4 To summarize, in our excess return Bond Map we plot the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps of excess return on the vertical axis, and the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus Treasuries on the horizontal axis (Chart 6). The diagram is then split into four quadrants based on the location of the Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate index, which we have modified to also include junk bonds. The upper-left quadrant, which we label "Best Bets", contains those sectors that offer less risk and greater excess return potential than the benchmark. The upper-right quadrant, which we label "Exciting", contains those sectors that offer higher risk than the benchmark but also higher potential returns. The bottom-left ("Boring") quadrant contains those sectors with low risk of losses but also low probability of gains, and the bottom-right ("Avoid") quadrant contains those sectors with higher risk than the benchmark and lower expected returns. As can be seen in Chart 6, the current excess return Bond Map shows that Local Authorities, Foreign Agencies and investment grade corporate bonds offer the best combination of risk and expected return. No sectors currently plot in the "Avoid" quadrant. Chart 6Excess Return Bond Map (As Of April 20, 2018) This week, we publish the results of a back-test of the real time performance of our Bond Map. To do this we produced the Bond Map at the beginning of each calendar year starting in 2006 and then calculated average excess returns for each quadrant. For example, if three sectors were in the "Best Bets" quadrant at the beginning of the year, we calculated 12-month excess returns for each sector and then averaged them together to get an excess return for "Best Bets" sectors that year.5 Table 2 shows the average and standard deviation of calendar year excess returns for each quadrant, using a sample that spans from 2006-2017. As would be expected, the "Exciting" quadrant displays the highest average excess return, but also the highest standard deviation. Conversely, the "Boring" quadrant delivers the lowest average return and the lowest risk. The performance of the "Best Bets" quadrant is somewhere in between, delivering a greater average return than the "Boring" quadrant with less risk than the "Exciting" quadrant. Although the Sharpe Ratio for the "Best Bets" quadrant turns out to be worse than the Sharpe ratio for both the "Exciting" and "Boring" quadrants. This provides some support for the investment strategy of favoring either the "Exciting" or "Boring" quadrants depending on your assessment of the macro environment. The "Avoid" quadrant actually delivered negative excess returns on average, with elevated risk. Table 2Excess Return Bond Map Track Record (2006-2017) For comparison we also show the average and standard deviation of excess returns for the Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate index, augmented with High-Yield. The benchmark delivered excess returns only slightly greater than the "Boring" quadrant, with significantly more risk. The total return version of the Bond Map is shown in Chart 7. This is identical to the excess return Bond Map, except it shows the number of days of average increase/decrease in yields for each sector to lose/earn 5% total return. We perform the identical back-test as with the excess return map, and display the results in Table 3. Chart 7Total Return Bond Map (As Of April 20, 2018) Table 3Total Return Bond Map Track Record (2006-2017) Here we see the interesting result that the average total returns are higher in the "Best Bets" quadrant than in the "Exciting" quadrant, but strangely the "Best Bets" quadrant also delivered greater volatility. The "Boring" quadrant delivered the best Sharpe Ratio, while the "Avoid" sector delivered both lower average returns and greater volatility than the "Boring" quadrant. For comparison, the average total returns for the Aggregate index (plus High-Yield) were lower than the total returns from any of the four quadrants, but also with less volatility. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 We define the "turn" in the credit cycle as when corporate defaults start to occur and corporate spreads enter a sustained widening phase. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For the Phase 1 period in Cycle 2 we use an interval of June 1983 to July 1988 because High-Yield excess returns are only available starting in June 1983. In reality, the Phase 1 period should have started when the prior recession ended in December 1982. Using the correct interval (starting in December 1982) investment grade corporate bond excess returns are +131 bps and the stock-to-bond ratio returns are +5.19%, both annualized. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Back To Basics", dated April 17, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 We started our back-test sample in 2006 even though our sector data goes back to 2000. Because our bond map relies on historical estimates of spread/yield volatility, we wanted a sample of at least five years of data before starting the test. With each passing year more back-data is incorporated into our spread/yield volatility estimates, which should improve the Bond Map's accuracy over time. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Our indicators suggest that investors should be especially cautious in the next month or two. April's Beige Book supports our view that higher inflation will lead to at least three more Fed rate hikes this year. However, the nation's trade policy is a concern for businesses. BCA's Bankers' Beige Book is booming. The Q1 earnings reporting season is off to a strong start, with both EPS and revenue growth exceeding consensus expectations at the start of April. Feature U.S. equity prices may struggle in the next few months. BCA's base case is that global growth will stabilize at an above-trend pace. Fiscal policy is a tailwind and global monetary policy remains easy, although several central banks are removing some of the accommodation. Moreover, the Fed sees only moderate risks to financial stability at home and abroad, its latest Beige Book is upbeat amid concerns over trade and labor shortages, and the Q1 earnings season is off to a strong start. BCA's Bankers' Beige Book for Q1 is booming. Nonetheless, BCA's Global Investment Strategy's MacroQuant model1 suggests that equities will struggle in the short-term. In our Bank Credit Analyst publication, the Equity Scorecard (Chart 1) and its Bear Market Checklist (Table 1) are both flashing red.2 The U.S.-China trade spat will linger for several more months and trade protectionism remains a risk. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service notes that the stock market will likely seesaw during the summer as confusion grows amidst the upcoming geopolitical event risk (Table 2).3 Markets could also dip on Iran-U.S. tensions, an escalation of the conflict in Syria and a Russia-West confrontation. Indeed, sanctions on Russia are already pushing some base metal prices higher. Moreover, oil prices are more susceptible to supply disruptions given the tightness of global oil markets (Chart 2). BCA views any spike in oil prices as a tax on U.S. consumers. Chart 1Equity Scorecard: Flashing Red Table 1Exit Checklist Table 2Protectionism: Upcoming Dates To Watch Chart 2Oil Markets Are Tight Bottom Line: The 12-month cyclical outlook is still reasonably positive for risk assets such as stocks. Nonetheless, the near-term is fraught with risk. Our indicators suggest that investors should be especially cautious in the next month or two. Focus On Financial Stability Chart 3FOMC Is Closely Monitoring##BR##Financial Stability BCA views financial stability as a third mandate4 for the Fed, along with low and stable inflation, and full employment. Financial stability was not discussed at the FOMC's March 20-21 meeting, despite the spike in financial market volatility in early February. At the prior meeting in January, Fed staff continued to characterize financial vulnerabilities of the U.S. financial system as moderate on balance, but they declined to provide an assessment of foreign financial stability (Chart 3). However, in November 2017, Fed staff highlighted specific vulnerabilities in various foreign economies, including weak banks, heavy indebtedness in the corporate and/or household sector, rising property prices, overhangs of sovereign debt and significant susceptibility to various political developments. The Fed does not provide a financial stability grade at every meeting. Fed staff described financial conditions as moderate in September and December 2013, and then again in April 2014. The next assessment was only in January 2016 but since then, it has upped its discussions. Fed staff provided an assessment of financial stability in 8 of its 16 subsequent meetings. FOMC participants debated the issue at all but 1 of its 8 meetings in 2017, and in 13 of the 16 since April 2016. Fed Chair Jay Powell has followed his predecessor's lead in highlighting financial stability. Former Chair Janet Yellen elevated the topic during her tenure, leading discussions or staff briefings in 26 of the 32 meetings she presided over. The February 2018 edition of the Fed's semiannual Monetary Policy Report (MPR),5 which was the first one in Powell's tenure, has a full section devoted to financial stability. The report characterized the vulnerabilities of the financial system as moderate. Every MPR since July 2013 has provided an update on financial stability. Powell addressed financial stability in a June 2017 speech when he was a Fed governor and also reviewed the concern at his Senate confirmation hearing in November 2017. Moreover, in March's post-FOMC news conference, Powell answered a question about market bubbles by detailing the FOMC's approach to financial stability, and reiterated that financial vulnerabilities were "moderate." The San Francisco Fed noted that a more restrictive monetary policy could pose risks to financial stability.6 A surprise tightening can pressure U.S. bank balance sheets via higher market leverage. Moreover, a higher fed funds rate often leads to an expansion of assets held by money market funds (MMFs) (Chart 4). It concluded that during the 2007-2009 crisis, funding problems for MMFs spread across to the financial system and infected the real economy. In October 2016, the SEC introduced reforms aimed at targeting instability in the MMF sector. Still, the FOMC will closely watch MMF flows as the tightening cycle continues. Chart 4Money Market Funds And The Fed Funds Rate Bottom Line: BCA expects the Fed to remain vigilant about financial stability, but this means that rates will increase only gradually despite below-target inflation. The central bank must find the optimal pace to encourage employment and stable prices while guarding against financial excesses developing if policy stays too loose for too long. Beige Book Highlights The Beige Book released last week ahead of the FOMC's May 1-2 meeting suggested that uncertainty surrounding U.S. trade policy was an important headwind in March and early April. The Fed's business and banking contacts mentioned either tariffs or trade policy 44 times in the Beige Book; there were only 3 mentions in the March edition. Moreover, uncertainty came up nine times in April (Chart 5, panel 5) and eight were related to trade policy. There were just two mentions of the word in the March Beige Book. BCA's view is that trade-related uncertainty will persist through at least mid-year.7 Chart 5Latest Beige Book Supports##BR##The Fed's View On Rates, Inflation and Economy BCA's quantitative approach8 to the Beige Book's qualitative data continues to point to underlying strength in the U.S. economy, a tighter labor market and higher inflation. Moreover, references to a stronger dollar have disappeared from the Beige Book. Chart 5, panel 1 shows that at 55% in April, BCA's Beige Book Monitor dipped to its lowest level since November 2017 when doubts over the tax bill weighed on business sentiment. The number of "weak" words in the Beige Book remained near four-year lows; the number of strong words returned to last summer's hurricane levels. The tax bill was noted five times in the latest Beige Book, down from 15 in March and 12 in January. The legislation was cast in a positive light in five of six mentions. Based on minimal references to a robust dollar in the past seven Beige Books, the greenback should not be an issue for corporate profits in Q1 2018. The handful of references sharply contrasts with 2015 and early 2016 when there were surges in Beige Book comments (Chart 5, panel 4). The last time that seven consecutive Beige Books had so few remarks about a strong dollar was in late 2014. BCA's stance is that the dollar will move modestly higher in 2018. The disagreement on inflation between the Beige Book and the Bureau of Labor Statistics widened in April's Beige Book (Chart 5, panel 3). The number of inflation words in the Beige Book rose to a nine-month peak in April, nearly matching the cycle high hit in July 2017. Core PCE also increased in early 2018. However, in the past year, inflation measured by the PCE deflator and CPI failed to match the escalation in inflation references. In the past, increased remarks about inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may soon turn up. April's Beige Book continued to highlight labor shortages, especially among skilled workers in key areas of the economy. Several contacts noted trouble finding moderately skilled workers in the manufacturing sector. Additionally, a lack of truck drivers, IT and software employees, and construction workers were often cited. Table 3 shows industries with labor shortages. In the year ended March 2018, the gain in average hourly earnings in most of the industries was faster than average. Moreover, in nearly all these categories, labor market conditions are currently the tightest since before the onset of the 2007-2009 recession. More details can be found in a recent Fed study on labor shortages in the manufacturing sector.9 BCA's Beige Book Commercial Real Estate (CRE) Monitor10 remains in a downtrend (Chart 6). The Fed has highlighted valuation concerns in CRE and BCA's Global Investment Strategy service recently stated that the sector is increasingly vulnerable.11 Table 3Labor "Shortages" Identified##BR##In The Beige Book Chart 6Beige Book Commercial##BR##Real Estate Monitor Bottom Line: April's Beige Book supports our view that higher inflation will lead to at least three more Fed rate hikes by the end of the year. Labor shortages may be spreading from highly skilled to moderately skilled workers. The nation's tax policy still gets high marks from the business community, but ongoing concerns over trade policy will restrain growth. Bankers' Beige Book Booming Chart 7Bankers' Beige Book BCA's Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book12 for Q1 2018 highlights several positive trends in the financial sector. All five banks were uniformly upbeat about loan growth, although there was some unease about commercial real estate loans. Chart 7 shows key banking-related variables cited in the Bank Lending Beige Book. Appendix Table 1 shows the Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book for Q1 2018. Several bank executives noted that Q1 was a seasonally weak time for loan growth. Comments on the credit quality of the banks' loan and credit card portfolios were equally positive. Bank managements highlighted how higher rates have improved their net interest margins in Q1 and noted that further Fed rate hikes would benefit operations. Moreover, our panel of bank CFOs and CEOs cited the positive impact of the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act on their businesses via better loan growth, stronger capital market activity and more capital spending. Several noted that their corporate clients are also experiencing benefits from the tax bill. Bottom Line: The banking system is humming. Lenders are ready to extend credit to businesses and consumers to boost the economy despite higher rates. The tax bill continues to be a positive for banks and their corporate clients. BCA's U.S. Equity strategists recommend an overweight position in the S&P 500's financial sector, with a high conviction overweight on banks.13 Strong Start The Q1 reporting season is off to a strong start, with both EPS and revenue growth exceeding consensus expectations at the start of April. We previewed the S&P 500's Q1 2018 earnings earlier this month.14 Just under 15% of companies have reported results thus far, with 77% beating consensus EPS projections, which is well above the long-term average of 69%. Furthermore, 75% posted Q4 revenues over expectations, exceeding the long-term average of 56%. The surprise factor for Q1 stands at 5% for EPS and 2% for sales. Both readings are right at the average surprise recorded in the past five years. The surprise figures are even more impressive given that analysts bumped up their Q1 assessments in 10 of 11 sectors between the start of 2018 and the beginning of the Q1 reporting season. Analysts' estimates typically move lower as a quarter unfolds, which has the effect of lowering the bar for results. Table 4S&P 500: Q1 2018 Results* We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning in mid-2018. Nonetheless, initial results imply that Q1 will be another quarter of margin expansion. Average earnings growth (Q1 2018 versus Q1 2017) is stout at 19% with revenue growth at 8%. However, on a four-quarter basis, U.S. margins fell slightly in the fourth quarter. Still, they remain at a high level on the back of decent corporate pricing power. Strength in earnings and revenues is broadly based (Table 4). Earnings per share rose in Q1 2018 versus Q1 2017 in all 11 sectors. EPS results are particularly robust in energy (71%), financials (29%), materials (27%) and technology (24%). The energy, materials and technology sectors likewise all experienced substantial sales gains (14%, 12% and 14% respectively). Excluding energy, S&P 500 profits in Q1 2018 versus Q1 2017 are still vigorous at 18%. Our U.S. Equity Strategy service introduced profit models for the S&P 500's sectors in January.15 Optimistic managements have raised the bar significantly for 2018 results in the past few months (Chart 8). On October 1, 2017, before the GOP introduced the tax bill, the bottom-up estimate for the S&P 500's 2018 EPS growth stood at 11%. As of April 19, 2018, the estimate is 20%. Moreover, the upward revisions are widespread. Calendar year 2018 EPS growth rate estimates in 10 of 11 sectors are higher today than at the start of October 2017. Chart 8The Bar Is High For 2018 EPS; Focus Should Shift To 2019 Soon While the ebullience is due to the tax bill, solid global growth, a steeper yield curve and higher energy prices are also responsible. The tax bill lowered the corporate tax rate for 2018 and the repatriation holiday provides firms with excess cash. As noted in the previous section, U.S. trade policy is a concern in several industries. Table 5 reports the Q4 2017 profit and sales performance of globally - and domestically - oriented firms (Q1 data will be available later this quarter). At year-end, domestic firms' earnings and revenue surprise outpaced that of global industries. However, global firms saw more robust sales and EPS growth than companies with sales mainly from domestic sources. Analysts expect EPS growth to slow considerably in 2019 from the anticipated 2018 clip, which matches BCA's view (Chart 9). However, unlike estimates for 2017 and 2018, we anticipate that EPS estimates for 2019 will move lower throughout 2018 and 2019, ahead of a recession in early 2020. Table 52017 Q4 Earnings##BR##Breakdown Chart 9Strong S&P 500 EPS Growth Ahead,##BR##Will Start To Slow Soon Bottom Line: EPS growth is expected to peak at over 20% later this year (4-quarter moving total basis using S&P 500 data). Growth is expected to decelerate thereafter since we have factored in a modest margin squeeze as U.S. wage growth picks up (Chart 9). The incorporation of the fiscal stimulus lifted the U.S. EPS growth profile relative to our previous forecast. Nonetheless, BCA believes that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for the equity market. The Tax Cut and Job Act raised expectations for 2018 in most sectors and so far, corporate managements have exceeded the lofty projections. However, it may be more difficult to maintain in the second half of 2018. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Is China Headed For A Minsky Moment?," dated April 13, 2018. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, dated February, 2018. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Expect Volatility... Of Volatility," dated April 11, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate," July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/2018-02-mpr-summary.htm 6 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2018/february/monetary-policy-cycles-and-financial-stability/ 7 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Demands On China," April 4, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues," April 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 9 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/evaluating-labor-shortages-in-manufacturing-20180309.htm 10 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Summer Stress Out", dated July 3, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Tantalizing Trades - Four Months On", dated January 19, 2018. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Commitments," January 20, 2014. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "High Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Policy Peril," dated April 9, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "White Paper: Introducing Our U.S. Equity Sector Earnings Models," January 16, 2018. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Appendix: Bankers Beige Book
Dear Client, Alongside this week's report we are also sending you a fascinating short Special Report written by Jennifer Lacombe of our Global ETF Strategy sister service. The report, which demonstrates the use of ETF flows as a leading indicator of FX trends, points to downside for the EUR/USD and GBP/USD this year. I trust you find the piece informative. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights A debate over slack is raging within the ECB. We tend to side with President Draghi, and believe there is more labor market slack in the euro area than suggested by the OECD's measures. Arguing in favor of this case is the presence of hidden labor market slack, the paucity of wage gains, even in Germany, and the potential for NAIRU to decline in many large economies. With global and European growth slowing, this will limit how hawkish the ECB can be in the short term, and thus limits the euro's gains in 2018. However, on a long-term basis, the presence of slack today argues that the euro area's potential GDP is higher than if there were no slack, and therefore policy rates and the euro have more long-term upside. Feature The recent release of the European Central Bank's account of its March policy meeting was very revealing. The ECB is currently torn between two camps: one believing there is little slack in the euro area labor market, and the other, led by ECB President Mario Draghi and chief economist Peter Praet, arguing that the continent's job market is still replete with excess capacity. This debate has enormous implications for the path of the euro. If there is no slack left in the euro area, this would point to an immediate need for higher rates and a higher euro, but it would also suggest the scope for the terminal policy rate in Europe to rise is limited. The long-term upside in the euro would therefore also be small. If there is still a large amount of slack in the euro area labor market, this implies that policy rates do not have much scope to rise over the next 18 months, and that the euro will find it difficult to appreciate much over this time frame. However, it also suggests that the potential growth rate of the euro area is higher than would otherwise be the case and that terminal policy rates can rise more in the long-run - implying that on a long-term basis the euro still has meaningful upside. We side in the latter camp. Chart I-1No Slack In Europe? Hidden Labor Market Slack... The question of slack in the euro area has been ignited by a simple reality: both the OECD's measure of the European output gap and the difference between the official unemployment rate and the equilibrium unemployment rate calculated by the OECD (NAIRU) are close to zero (Chart I-1). This observation would vindicate the desire of some ECB members to increase rates sooner than later, since the absence of an unemployment gap should lead to both higher wages and higher inflation. But before making too prompt a judgment, the U.S.'s recent experience is illuminating. Only now that the unemployment rate is 0.5% below NAIRU are U.S. wages and core inflation showing some signs of life (Chart I-2). In the U.S., we observed that while the headline unemployment rate has been consistent with accelerating wages as early as in 2015, discouraged workers back then represented 0.4% of the working age population, and were in fact willing participants in the job market. Only now that this number has fallen back to 0.27% - levels associated with full-employment in the previous business cycle - are employment costs perking up. There is little reason to believe that the eurozone economy is very different from the U.S. in this respect. In fact, the euro area suffered a double-dip recession, the second leg of which ended only in 2013, suggesting Europe suffered a severe enough shock to also fall victim to the symptoms of hidden labor market slack. A simple comparison helps illustrates that Europe is likely to still be experiencing labor market slack. Chart I-3 shows various measures of total and hidden labor market slack in the U.S. and the euro area. To begin with, despite a sharp rise in the female participation rate, the euro area's employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers is not only well below the level that currently prevails in the U.S., it is also below its 2008 peak by a greater extent than is the case on the other side of the Atlantic. This suggests there is greater total labor market slack in Europe than in the U.S. Additionally, discouraged workers and long-term unemployment remain much closer to post-crisis highs in the euro area than in the U.S. In the latter, these ratios have mostly normalized close to levels consistent with full employment. Chart I-2The U.S. Experience WIth##br## Hidden Labor Market Slack Chart I-3The Euro Area Still Has ##br##Plenty Hidden Slack Looking at some euro area-specific variables also dispels the idea that the European job market is near full employment and about to generate inflation: The ECB's labor underutilization measure1 still shows a high level of slack, especially in the European periphery (Chart I-4). Another problem for Europe is irregular work contracts. Europe, like Japan, is plagued with a dual labor market. On one hand, permanent employees are still protected by generous employment laws. On the other hand, employees under temporary work contracts are not. In Japan, this same disparity has been blamed for keeping wages down, as temporary employees are often willing to switch to positions offering the protection of regular job contracts for no wage increases. These workers are a form of hidden labor-market slack. Temporary employment in Europe remains at elevated levels, and contract work represents a record share of employment in Italy and France (Chart I-5), suggesting the same disease present in Japan also lingers in vast swaths of the European economy. Chart I-4The ECB's Metrics Also Show ##br##Elevated Labor Underutilization Chart I-5A Dual Labor Market Weighs ##br##On Wage Growth Labor reforms could also be creating labor market slack in Europe. As Chart I-6 shows, after Germany implemented its Hartz IV labor reforms in 2004, NAIRU collapsed. Spain, which has implemented equally draconian measures, could also witness its own equilibrium unemployment rate trend sharply lower over the coming years (Chart I-6, bottom panel). In France, timid reforms were implemented during the Hollande presidency, but President Macron is pushing an agenda of deep job market reforms. While Italy remains a laggard and its current political miasma offers little hope, the reality remains that much of Europe could also be experiencing a decline in NAIRU like Germany did last decade. Even Germany shows limited signs of an overheating labor market, despite an unemployment rate of 5.3%, the lowest reading ever in re-unified Germany: not only have German wages been unable to advance at a faster pace than the experience of the past 15 years, recent quarters have seen a slowdown in wage growth (Chart I-7). The presence of slack in the rest of Europe therefore appears to be limiting wage pressures even in that booming economy. Chart I-6The Impact Of Labor Reforms##br## On Full Employment Chart I-7No Wage Growth##br## In Germany Bottom Line: The euro area is likely to be under the same spell as the U.S. was a few years ago. Traditional metrics portend a labor market at full employment, but broader measures in fact highlight that there is still plentiful slack. Additionally, the implementation of labor market reforms in key European economies in recent years could imply that Europe's NAIRU is lower than the OECD's estimate and may further decline in coming years. ... And Slowing Global Growth It is one thing for Europe to be experiencing hidden labor market slack, but if growth is set to accelerate further, this would mean that this slack could nonetheless dissipate fast enough to allow for a more hawkish ECB in the short run. However, this is not the case. The European economy is very sensitive to global growth gyrations, and signs are accumulating that the global synchronized boom is petering out. As we have already highlighted, the diffusion index of the OECD global leading economic indicator has plummeted well below the boom/bust line, pointing to a sharp slowdown in the LEI itself (Chart I-8, top panel). EM carry trades have been underperforming, which normally leads a slowdown in global industrial activity (Chart I-8, middle panel). Additionally, Japanese export growth is decelerating sharply (Chart I-8, bottom panel). In a previous report we attributed major responsibility for this slowdown to monetary, fiscal and regulatory tightening in China. Europe is not immune to this malaise. European exports growth and foreign orders are all slowing sharply, but interestingly domestic factors are also at play. As the top panel of Chart I-9 illustrates, the European credit impulse is now contracting, suggesting domestic demand is set to slow. In fact, this has already begun as the growth of German domestic manufacturing orders is in negative territory (Chart 9, bottom panel). Chart I-8Global Growth Is Slowing Clouds##br## Hanging Over Global Growth Chart I-9Euro Area Domestic##br## Growth Is Flagging No matter the source, the end result for Europe is the same: the torrid pace of European growth is set to slow, not accelerate. Not only have European economic surprises fallen precipitously (Chart I-10, top panel), but the Ifo survey - a key bellwether of German activity - has also peaked. Moreover, the Sentix survey points to a sharp slowdown in the manufacturing PMIs (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Because there is slack in the European economy and growth is set to slow, there is a good reason for the Draghi-led ECB to remain very cautious in the coming quarters before sounding hawkish. As a result, the euro faces strong headwinds over the next six months or so, especially as the Federal Reserve faces milder handicaps than the ECB: U.S. economic slack has dissipated and U.S. inflation is rising. These inflationary pressures could even intensify thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump's late-cycle fiscal stimulus. Relative growth dynamics also support the dollar this year as euro area industrial production is already lagging behind the U.S. (Chart I-11). This trend is set to continue for the coming quarters because the U.S. economy is less exposed to a global growth slowdown and U.S. households' are experiencing sharply accelerating disposable income growth, a support for domestic demand. Chart I-10Weakening European ##br##Growth Outlook Chart I-11European Growth Will ##br##Underperform The U.S. Further Bottom Line: Not only is there still slack in the euro area labor market, global growth is showing signs of a slowdown. This is likely to have a deleterious impact on European growth as the eurozone credit impulse is already contracting. As a result, European growth is likely to lag that of the U.S., an economy where there is no more slack, and where inflation is perking up. This combination represents a potent headwind for the euro over the next six months or so. The Euro Cyclical Bull Market Is Far From Over The combination of slowing global growth and labor market slack in the euro area suggests the euro may depreciate by six to eight cents over the next six months, but it does not sound the death knell of the euro's cyclical rally. To the contrary, the presence of slack in Europe suggests the euro still has significant cyclical upside. Historically, the euro performs well when the U.S. business cycle enters the last two years of expansion (Chart I-12). This is because European growth begins to outperform U.S. growth in the late stages of the economic cycle, allowing investors to upgrade their assessment of the path of long-term monetary policy in the euro area relative to the U.S. This time an additional impetus could emerge. If there is more slack in the euro area than traditional unemployment metrics imply, the euro area's potential GDP is also higher than these traditional metrics would submit - i.e. trend growth in Europe could be higher than once thought. The impact of labor market reforms in France and Spain further bolster this possibility. A consequence of a higher trend growth rate would also be a higher than originally assessed level for euro area neutral interest rates, or the so-called r-star. The European five-year forward 1-month OIS could therefore have significant upside from current levels (Chart I-13, top panel). This would also imply that expected rates in Europe have room to increase versus the U.S., lifting the euro in the process (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12The Euro Rallies Late##br## In The Business Cycle Chart I-13European Slack Today Means ##br##Higher Rates Tomorrow Bottom Line: The presence of slack in Europe suggests that its potential GDP is higher than once thought. Hence, Europe could still have a few more years of robust growth in front of her. The following paradox ensues: if the presence of slack limits the upside for European interest rates today, it also suggests that European policy rates can rise much more in the future than if there was no slack today. Therefore, while this limits the capacity of the euro to rise further this year, the euro cyclical bull market has much more upside than if there was no slack in Europe today. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 This underutilization measure is based on the number of unemployed and underemployed, those available to work but not seeking a job and those seeking a job but not available for one. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was decent: Retail sales ex. Autos increased at a 0.2% monthly pace, in line with expectations; Housing starts and building permits both beat expectations, coming in at 1.319 million and 1.354 million, respectively; Industrial production grew by 0.5% at a monthly pace, beating expectations; Capacity utilization also increased to 78%; Continuing and initial jobless claims both came out higher than expected; U.S. data continues to generally beat expectations, especially when contrasted with European data, representing a sharp reversal from last year's environment. The yield curve has flattened which has weighed on the greenback preventing the USD from rallying despite an outperforming U.S. economy. Report Links: U.S. Twin Deficits: Is The Dollar Doomed? - April 13, 2018 More Than Just Trade Wars - April 6, 2018 Do Not Get Flat-Footed By Politics - March 30, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 European data has been disappointing: German Wholesale price index increased by only 1.2%, less than the expected 1.5%; European industrial production grew at a 2.9% yearly pace, less than expectations of 3.8%; The ZEW Economic Sentiment and Current Situation Survey for Germany disappointed; European headline inflation disappointed, coming in at 1.3%, while core was in line with expectations of 1%. Signs of a slowdown are now emerging in European data, however the euro has yet to follow. The euro area's leading economic indicator is rolling over, suggesting that cyclical factors could drag the euro down in the coming months. The waning of inflationary pressures across the euro area is likely prompt a dovish tone in upcoming ECB communications, which will induce a downward revision in rate expectations by investors. Report Links: More Than Just Trade Wars - April 6, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been negative: Exports yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.1%. Moreover, imports yearly growth also surprised to the downside, coming in at -0.6%. Finally industrial production yearly growth also disappointed, coming in at 1.6%. USD/JPY has remained relatively flat this week. Overall, we expect that the yen will continue to appreciate, as global geopolitical risks are on the rise and a potential slowdown in China's growth could will likely lead to a pick-up in FX market volatility. On the other hand, the yen remains at risk in the long term, given that economic data continues to underperform due to the strong yen and Japan's great exposure to global growth. This means that the BoJ will have to keep policy easy in order to support the economy. Report Links: The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now - February 16, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Headline inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5%. Moreover, core inflation also surprised negatively, coming in at 2.3%. Retail prices yearly growth also underperformed, coming in at 3.3%. However, the ILO unemployment rate surprised positively, coming in at 4.2%. After being up nearly 1.4% this week, GBP/USD fell more than a percentage point following the disappointing inflation numbers. Overall, the data follows our prediction from a couple of weeks ago: inflation in the U.K. is set to decline substantially despite a tightening labor market. This is because inflation in the U.K. is mainly driven by previous currency movements. Therefore, given the steep appreciation of the pound since 2017, prices will likely fall, causing the hawkishly-priced BOE to tighten less than expected, hurting the pound in the process. Report Links: Do Not Get Flat-Footed By Politics - March 30, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The Aussie has traded in a wave pattern against the greenback since the beginning of 2016. This week, AUD once again rebounded off the trough of the wave, catalyzed by higher prices in the metals space. Recent announcements by Anglo-Australian group BHP Billiton about curtailing production forecasts provided a boost to iron ore prices. This was coupled with the PBOC's decision to cut banks' reserve requirements which is raising the specter of a potential reflation wave in China. While, for now, external factors are proving to be positive for the Antipodean economy and its currency, the domestic story remains the same: labor market slack, high debt loads, and not enough wage inflation. Recent employment figures confirm this reality: employment grew by only 4,900, driven by a decline in full-time employment of 19,900. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: The food price index month-on-month growth came in at 1%. Meanwhile, headline inflation came in at 1.1%, in line with expectations. NZD/USD has fallen by nearly 1.3% this week. Overall, we expect that the NZD will suffer in the current environment of rising volatility and geopolitical risks. Moreover, on a long term basis, the kiwi continues to be at risk, given that the new populist government is set to decrease immigration and implement a dual mandate for the RBNZ; both factors would lower the real neutral rate. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 This year's disappointing first quarter GDP growth of 1.7% QoQ growth was regarded as an important factor in the BoC's decision this week to hold interest rates unchanged. The statement recognized the weaker housing market and flailing exports as the two culprits in this development. Bank officials denoted the tight capacity utilization as a constraint to further export growth, stating that growth will not be sufficient "to recover the ground lost during recent quarters". While this was an overall dovish policy statement, the Bank still continues to see robust growth going forward, revising their 2019 growth forecast from 1.6% to 2.1%. Importantly, this revision widened the output gap as the potential growth rate was revised higher. In terms of monetary policy, investors still predict two more rate hikes this year, bringing the benchmark rate to 1.75%, which is still below the Bank's estimated neutral rate of 2.5% - 3.5%. This means that if NAFTA is not abrogated in any major way - our base case scenario for the current negotiations - there is still plenty of upside for Canadian rates, and therefore, the CAD. Report Links: More Than Just Trade Wars - April 6, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF has gone up by 1% this week. Overall, we continue to believe that the franc will continue to depreciate on a cyclical basis, given that Swiss inflationary pressures remain too weak and economic activity is still highly dependent on the easy monetary conditions brought about by the weak franc and low rates. Therefore, the SNB will remain very dovishly enclined in order to keep an appreciating franc from hurting the economy. Moreover, the Swiss franc continues to be expensive, putting further downward pressure on this currency. On a tactical basis however, this cross could have some downside in an environment of rising volatility and rising geopolitical risk. Report Links: The SNB Doesn't Want Switzerland To Become Japan - March 23, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has been relatively flat this week. We continue to be negative on the krone against the U.S. dollar, even in an environment of rising oil prices. This is because this cross is more correlated to real rate differential than it is to crude. Therefore, in an environment where the Fed hikes more than expected, real rates should move in favor of the U.S., helping USD/NOK in the process. That being said, the krone will likely outperform other commodity currencies like the AUD, as oil has a relatively lower beta than industrial metals to global growth and Chinese economic activity. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 A slight economic slowdown is still being felt in the Scandinavian economy. As leading economic indicators in both Sweden and the euro area roll over, disinflationary winds continue to batter Swedish shores. As a result, EUR/SEK continues to trade at lofty levels, especially as global investors remain nervous about the risks of a global trade war. The Swedish yield curve has flattened 53 bps since January highs, which is one of the most severe moves in the G-10. It seems that Stefan Ingves' extreme dovishness is again being taken seriously by investors, especially as core CPI is at a mere 1.5%, despite CPIF clocking in at 2%. This core measure and global reflation will need to pick up for Ingves to change his view. While the SEK is cheap, and thus have limited downside from current levels, this economic backdrop suggests it is still risky for short-term investors to buy the SEK. Long-term players, however, should use current weaknesses as a buying opportunity. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The global economy is slowing. However, growth should stabilize at an above-trend pace over the next few months, as fiscal policy turns more stimulative and interest rates remain in accommodative territory. President Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda. Fortunately, Trump appears willing to cut a deal on trade, even if it is on terms that are not nearly as favorable to the U.S. as he might have touted. The recently renegotiated South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is a case in point. We remain cyclically overweight global equities, but acknowledge that valuations are stretched and the near-term market environment could remain challenging until leading economic indicators improve. Feature Global Equities: Near-Term Outlook Is Still Hazy We published a note on February 2nd entitled "Take Out Some Insurance" warning investors that the stock market had become highly vulnerable to a correction.1 The VIX spike began the next day. Although volatility has fallen and equities have rebounded so far in April, we are reluctant to sound the all-clear. The near-term signal from the beta version of our MacroQuant model has improved a bit but remains in bearish territory, as it has for over two months now (Chart 1). Chart 1MacroQuant Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted The model is highly sensitive to changes in growth. Starting early this year, it began to detect a weakening in a variety of leading economic indicators in the U.S. and, to an even greater degree, abroad. Most notably, global PMIs and the German IFO have dipped, Korean and Taiwanese exports have decelerated, Japanese machinery orders have fallen, and the Baltic Dry Index has swooned by 36% from its December high (Chart 2). The model also noted an increase in inflationary pressures, suggesting that monetary policy would likely end up moving in a less accommodative direction. The emergence of stagflationary concerns came at a time when bullish stock market sentiment stood at very elevated levels (Chart 3). Our empirical work has shown that equities perform worst when sentiment is deteriorating from bullish levels and perform best when sentiment is improving from bearish levels (Chart 4). Chart 2Growth Has Peaked Chart 3Stock Market Sentiment Was Very ##br##Bullish Earlier This Year Chart 4Swings In Sentiment And ##br##Stock Market Returns Waiting For The Economic Data To Stabilize The good news is that the drop in equity prices has caused sentiment to return to more normal levels. The bad news is that the activity data has continued to disappoint at the margin, as evidenced by the weakness in economic surprise indices and various "nowcasts" of real-time growth (Chart 5). Ultimately, we expect global growth to stabilize at an above-trend pace over the coming months, which should allow equities to grind higher. Monetary policy is still quite accommodative. The yield on the JP Morgan Global Bond Index has averaged 1.88% since the end of the Great Recession (Chart 6). We do not know where the "neutral" level of bond yields has been over this period. However, we do know that unemployment in the major economies has been falling, which suggests that monetary policy has been in expansionary territory. Despite the move away from quantitative easing by many central banks, the yield on the JP Morgan Global Bond Index is only 1.53% today. This implies a fortiori that bond yields today are well below restrictive levels. The conclusion is further strengthened if one assumes, as seems highly plausible, that the neutral bond yield has risen over the past few years, as deleveraging headwinds have abated and fiscal policy has turned more stimulative (Chart 7). Chart 5Unexpected Slowdown In Growth Chart 6Interest Rates Are Off Their Bottom, ##br##But Are Not Restrictive Chart 7Fiscal Policy Will Be Stimulative ##br##This Year And Next The Protectionism Bugbear Global growth has not been the only thing on investors' minds. The specter of a trade war has also loomed large. It is true that the standard early-19th century Ricardian model that first-year economics students learn predicts very small welfare losses from increased protectionism.2 The model, however, makes highly antiquated assumptions about how trade works. Trade today bears little resemblance to the world in which David Ricardo lived - the one where England exchanged cloth for Portuguese wine (the example Ricardo used to illustrate his famous principle of comparative advantage). Chart 8Trade In Intermediate Goods Dominates To an increasingly large extent, countries do not really trade with one another anymore. One can even go as far as to say that different companies do not really trade with each other in the way they once did. A growing share of international trade is between affiliates of the same companies. Trade these days is dominated by intermediate goods (Chart 8). The exchange of goods and services takes place within the context of a massive global supply chain, where such phrases as "outsourcing," "vertical integration" and "just-in-time inventory management" have entered the popular vernacular. This arrangement has many advantages, but it also harbors numerous fragilities. A small fire at a factory in Japan that manufactured 60 percent of the epoxy resin used in chip casings led to a major spike in RAM prices in 1993. Flooding in Thailand in 2011 wreaked havoc on the global auto industry.3 The global supply chain is highly vulnerable to even small shocks. Now imagine an across-the-board trade war. Equities represent a claim on the existing capital stock, not the capital stock that might emerge after a trade war has been fought. A trade war would result in a lot of stranded capital. It is not surprising that investors are worried. Trump's Dubious Trade Doctrine The psychology of a trade war today is not that dissimilar to that of an actual war among the great powers. It would be immensely damaging if it were to happen, but because everyone knows it would be so damaging, it is less likely to occur. How then should one interpret President Trump's tweet that "Trade wars are good, and easy to win?" One possibility is that he is bluffing. The U.S. exported only $131 billion in goods to China last year, which is less than the $150 billion in Chinese imports that Trump has already targeted for tariffs. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. Unfortunately, there is also a less charitable interpretation, as revealed by the second part of Trump's tweet, where he said, "When we are down $100 billion with a certain country and they get cute, don't trade anymore - we win big. It's easy!" Trump seems to equate countries with companies: Exports are revenues and imports are costs. If a country is exporting less than it is importing, it must be losing money. This is deeply flawed reasoning. I run a trade deficit with the place where I eat lunch, but I don't go around complaining that they are ripping me off. One would think that Trump - whose businesses routinely spent more than they earned, accumulating debt in the process - would understand this. But apparently not. As we discussed two weeks ago, the U.S. runs a trade deficit mainly because its deep and open financial markets, along with a relatively high neutral rate of interest, make it an attractive destination for foreign capital.4 If a country runs a capital account surplus with the rest of the world - meaning that it sells more assets to foreigners than it buys from foreigners - it will necessarily run a current account deficit. Trump's Macro Policy Colliding With His Trade Policy In this respect, President Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda. By definition, the current account balance is the difference between what a country saves and what it invests. The U.S. fiscal position is set to deteriorate over the coming years, even if the unemployment rate continues to fall - an unprecedented occurrence (Chart 9). A bigger budget deficit will drain national savings. Chart 9The U.S. Budget Deficit Is Set To Widen Even If The Unemployment Rate Continues To Decline Meanwhile, an overheated economy will cause capital spending to rise as firms run out of low-cost workers. If Trump succeeds in boosting infrastructure spending, aggregate U.S. investment will rise even more. The current account deficit is highly likely to widen in this environment. A Temporary Reprieve? Chart 10Trump's Protectionist Agenda Is A ##br##Popular One Among Republican Voters The prospect of a wider trade deficit means that Trump's protectionist wrath will not go quietly into the night. It may, however, go into remission for a little while. Trump's approval rating has managed to rise over the past few months because his protectionist agenda is popular with a large segment of the population (Chart 10). However, if the problems on Wall Street begin to show up on Main Street - as is likely to happen if stocks resume their decline - Trump will change his tune. This is especially true if a trade war threatens to hurt U.S. agricultural interests. Rural areas have been a key source of support for Trump's populist rhetoric. Trump has shown a willingness to cut a deal on trade even if the negotiated outcome falls well short of his bluster. Consider the agreement between the U.S. and Korea in late March to amend their existing trade pact. Trump had called the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement an "unacceptable, horrible deal" and a "job killer." After the agreement was renegotiated, the President described it as a "wonderful deal with a wonderful ally." What did Trump get that was so wonderful? The Koreans agreed to double the ceiling on the number of U.S. automobiles that can be exported to Korea without having to meet the country's tough environmental standards to 50,000. The problem is that the U.S. only shipped 11,000 autos to Korea last year, so the original quota was nowhere close to binding. The Koreans also agreed to reduce steel exports to the U.S. to about 70% of the average level of the past three years in exchange for a permanent exemption from Trump's 25% steel tariff. That may sound like a major concession, but keep in mind that only 12% of Korea's steel exports go to the United States. Korea also re-exports steel from other countries. These re-exports can be curtailed without causing major damage to Korea's steel industry. The shares of Korea's largest publicly-listed steel companies jumped by 1.7% on the first trading day after news of the deal broke, eclipsing the 0.8% rise in the KOSPI index. Investment Conclusions The global economy is going through a soft patch and this could weigh on stocks in the near term. However, if trade frictions fade into the background and global growth stabilizes over the coming months, as we expect will be the case, global equities should rally to fresh cycle highs. Granted, we are in the late stages of the business-cycle expansion. U.S. interest rates are likely to move into restrictive territory in the second half of 2019. Given the usual lags between changes in monetary policy and the real economy, this would place the next recession in 2020. By then, barring any fresh stimulus, the U.S. fiscal impulse will have dropped below zero. It is the change in the fiscal impulse that matters for growth. If growth has already slowed to a trend-like pace by late 2019 due to a shortage of workers, the economy could easily stall out in 2020. Given the still-dominant role played by U.S. financial markets, a recession in the U.S. would quickly be transmitted to the rest of the world. Stocks will peak before the next recession starts, but if history is any guide, this will only happen six months or so before the economic downturn begins (Table 1). This suggests that the equity bull market still has another 12-to-18 months of life left. The extent to which investors may wish to participate in any blow-off rally this year is a matter of personal preference. As was the case in the late 1990s, long-term expected returns have fallen to fairly low levels. A comparison between the Shiller P/E ratio and subsequent 10-year returns over the past century suggests that the S&P 500 will deliver a total nominal annualized return of only 4% during the next decade (Chart 11). A composite valuation measure incorporating both the trailing and forward P/E ratio, price-to-book, price-to-cash flow, price-to-sales, market cap-to-GDP, dividend yield, and Tobin's Q shows only modestly higher expected returns for stock markets outside the U.S. (Appendix A). Table 1Cyclically, It Is Too Soon To Get Out... Chart 11...But Long-Term Investors, Take Note As such, while we recommend overweighting global equities over a 12-month horizon, we would not fault long-term investors for taking some money off the table now. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018. 2 Roughly speaking, the Ricardian model predicts that the welfare loss from protectionism will be one-half times the average percentage-point increase in tariffs times the change in the import-to-GDP ratio. Imports are about 15% of U.S. GDP. Consider a 10 percent across-the-board increase in tariffs. Assuming a price elasticity of import demand of 4, this would reduce trade by 1-0.96^10=0.33 (i.e., 33%), which would take the import-to-GDP ratio down from 15% to 10%. As such, the welfare loss would be 0.5*0.1*(15%-10%)=0.25%, or just one quarter of one percent of GDP. 3 James Coates, "Real Chip Shortage Or Just A Panic, Crunch Is Likely To Boost Pc Prices," Chicago Tribune, dated August 6, 1993. "Thailand Floods Disrupt Production And Supply Chains," BBC.com, dated October 13, 2011; Ploy Ten Kate, and Chang-Ran Kim, "Thai Floods batter Global Electronics, Auto Supply Chains," Reuters.com, dated October 28, 2011. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S.-China Trade Spat: Is R-Star To Blame?" dated April 6, 2018. APPENDIX A Chart 1Long-Term Real Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Our analysis is often focused on China, commodities prices and Asia's business cycle. The key points of these discussions are applicable to the majority of EM countries and their financial markets. Yet, there are some countries that are not exposed to China, commodities or global trade. India and Turkey are two prominent examples from the EM space that fall into this category. This week we re-visit our analysis on these economies and their financial markets. Feature India: Inflation Holds The Key Indian government bonds sold off sharply over the past eight months, with the yield gap widening significantly relative to EM local currency bonds (Chart I-1, top panel). During this time, the country's stock market has been underperforming the EM benchmark notably (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Rising Indian inflation was a main culprit behind the selloff. However, the most recent print for headline CPI was down (Chart I-2). Diminished inflation worries have recently led to a modest drop in bond yields. Chart I-1India Relative To EM: Bonds And Stocks Chart I-2Indian Inflation Has Accelerated The key question for investors is if inflation will rise or stay tame. This, by extension, will determine whether Indian stocks will outperform their EM counterparts. Risks: Inflation, Fiscal Balance And Bond Yields Odds point to upside inflation surprises ahead, and a potential rise in bond yields: The supply side of the economy has been stagnant. Chart I-3 illustrates that Indian consumption has been outpacing investments since 2012, creating a significant accumulated gap. Capex is now picking up (Chart I-4, top panel) but the fact that past investment was low means that the output gap could become positive sooner than later. Chart I-3Consumption Is Outpacing Investments Chart I-4Timid Pick Up In Capex Crucially, in order for the capex rebound to be robust and sufficient to expand the economy's productive capacity, Indian commercial banks need to finance corporate investments aggressively. The bottom panel of Chart I-4 shows that this is not yet the case. On the fiscal front, the Indian central government released a mildly expansionary 2018-2019 budget, and is pushing for fiscal consolidation beyond 2019. Importantly, this was the last budget announcement of the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition before the 2019 general elections. It therefore entails a 10% increase in government expenditures. Growing government expenditures are often inflationary in India; hence a 10% rise in government spending could boost inflation modestly (Chart I-5). Additionally, there are also non-trivial risks that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government might end up spending beyond the official budget announcement in order to appease voters in the run-up to the 2019 general elections. The risks of overspending extend to state governments as well. The latter plan to raise their employees' housing rental allowances (HRA). Depending on the magnitude and timing of these increases, inflation could accelerate significantly and have spillover effects. Turning to bond yields, excess demand for credit by borrowers against a restricted supply of financing by banks is also creating a ripe environment for higher bond yields: The combined Indian central and state fiscal deficit is very wide, signaling strong demand for credit by the government (Chart I-6, top panel). Yet broad money creation by banks has generally been weak (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Indian Government ##br##Expenditure Is Inflationary Chart I-6Large General Fiscal Deficit ##br##Amid Slow Money Creation Chart I-7 illustrates that the combined central and state government fiscal deficit plus the annual change in the total broad stock of money is negative. This signals that new money creation might be insufficient. Commercial banks' holdings of government bonds is also falling (Chart I-8, top panel). Indian banks are at the margin beginning to turn their focus to private sector lending (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7Insufficient New Funding ##br##For The Economy Chart I-8Indian Commercial Banks Are Shifting ##br##Focus To The Private Sector This is expected as commercial banks' holdings of government bonds have reached 29% of total deposits, which is significantly above the minimum required Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) of 19.5%. Given the ongoing improvement in private sector growth and hence demand for credit, Indian banks are now more inclined to augment their loan portfolios. Non-bank financial corporations such as insurance companies could offset banks' lower demand for government securities, but the former are not as large players as banks to make a meaningful impact. They own only 24% of government bonds compared to the banks' 42% ownership. Mutual funds and other non-bank finance corporations' ownership of government bonds is even smaller than that of insurance companies. Chart I-9India's Cyclical Profile Bottom Line: Upside risks to government spending, the budget balance and inflation will likely keep upward pressure on domestic bond yields. That amid high equity valuations might lead to lower share prices in absolute terms. India Can Still Outperform The EM Benchmark While Indian government bonds could sell off and stocks could fall in absolute terms, India is in a better position relative to its EM counterparts. Our view remains that we will see a material slowdown in Chinese growth this year - which is negative for commodities prices and EM economies. This scenario will be beneficial for India at the margin relative to other EM bourses. Importantly, Indian economic activity is gaining upward momentum: Overall loan growth has picked up meaningfully, and consumer loan growth in particular is accelerating at a double-digit pace (Chart I-9, top panel). Motorcycle sales have resumed their upward trend (Chart I-9, panel 2). Commercial vehicle sales are now accelerating robustly (Chart I-9, panel 2) and manufacturing production has picked up noticeably (Chart I-9, panel 3). Bottom Line: We recommend investors keep an overweight position in Indian equities versus the EM benchmark. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkish Markets Are In Freefall The lira has been in freefall and local bond yields have spiked (Chart II-1) following the Turkish government's announcement that it wants to stimulate growth even further by implementing a new investment incentive package worth $34 billion, or 5% of GDP. Our view is that the recent lira depreciation as well as the selloff in stocks and bonds have further room to go. Stay short/underweight Turkish risk assets. The Turkish economy is clearly overheating and inflation has broken out into double digit territory (Chart II-2). This comes as no surprise, given high and accelerating wage growth together with stagnant productivity gains (Chart II-3, top panel). Unit labor costs are surging in both manufacturing and services sectors (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Demand is booming, as such firms will likely succeed in hiking selling prices further, reinforcing the wage-inflation spiral. Chart II-1Turkey: Currency Is Falling And ##br##Bond Yields Are Rising Chart II-2Turkey: Genuine Inflation Breakout Chart II-3Turkey: Wage Growth Is Too High Most alarmingly, Turkish policymakers are doing the opposite of what is currently needed - instead of tightening, they have been easing policy: On the fiscal side, government expenditures excluding interest payments have accelerated significantly (Chart II-4). On the monetary policy side, Turkey's banking system has been relying on enormous amounts of liquidity provisions by the central bank (Chart II-5, top panel) to sustain its ongoing credit boom and hence economic growth. Chart II-4Turkey: Fiscal Policy Is Easing Chart II-5Turkey: Monetary Policy Is Too Accommodative On the whole, the central bank's net liquidity injections into the banking system continue to increase rapidly. The nature of the central bank's reserves provisions to commercial banks has shifted away from open market operations and more towards direct lending to banks (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Yet, the essence remains the same: to provide liquidity to banks so that the latter can continue expanding their balance sheets. Adding all the liquidity facilities - the intraday, overnight and late window facilities - the Central Bank of Turkey's (CBT) outstanding funding to banks is TRY 90 billion, or 3% of GDP, abnormally elevated on a historical basis. All this entails that monetary policy is too loose. Consistently, even though local currency bank loan growth has moderated, it still stands at 18% (Chart II-6). With the newly announced government stimulus plan, bank loan growth will likely accelerate from an already high level. As debt levels rise, so are debt servicing costs (Chart II-7). Notably, debt (both domestic/local currency and external debt) servicing costs will continue to escalate as the currency plunges. The reason is that Turkish private sector external debt stands at 40% of GDP, with 13% of GDP being short-term, the highest among EM countries. Currency depreciation will make external debt more expensive to service. Chart II-6Turkey: Rampant Credit Growth Chart II-7Higher Debt Servicing Costs Lastly, the Turkish authorities are expanding the Credit Guarantee Fund, what we would call the "free money" program. The aim of this fund is to incentivize banks to lend more, making the government essentially assume credit risk on loans extended to small and medium enterprises. Under this scheme, the government is effectively giving a green light to flood the economy with more money/credit. This will only heighten inflationary pressures and lead to much more currency devaluation. So far, the scheme has been responsible for the creation of TRY 250 billion, or 8% of GDP worth of new credit. The new tranche of this program announced in January of this year entails another TRY 55 billion. While smaller than the previous tranche, it is still significant at 1.8% of GDP. Fiscal and monetary policies are overly simulative and the country's twin deficits - both fiscal and current account - are widening (Chart II-8). The current account deficit now exceeds 6% of GDP. With foreign holdings of equities and government bonds already at historic highs (Chart II-9), it is questionable whether Turkey has the capacity to attract more capital inflows to finance a widening current account deficit on a sustainable basis. Chart II-8Turkey: Large Twin Deficits Chart II-9Turkey: Foreign Holdings Of ##br##Stocks And Bonds Are Large Remarkably, despite extremely strong exports due to robust growth in the euro area, the current account deficit in Turkey has been unable to narrow at all. This confirms the excessive domestic demand boom. Chart II-10The Turkish Lira Is Not Cheap Even after undergoing large nominal depreciation, Chart II-10 demonstrates that the Turkish lira is still not cheap, according to unit labor cost-based real effective exchange rate, which in our opinion is the best valuation measure for currencies. With wage and general inflation in the double digits and escalating, it will take much more nominal deprecation for the lira to become cheap. At this point, the Turkish authorities are clearly over-stimulating growth while disregarding inflation. The current policy stance will all but ensure that the lira depreciates much further. Excessive money creation is extremely bearish for the local currency. To put the amount of outstanding money into perspective and gauge exchange rate risk, one can compute the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to broad money (local currency money supply). Chart II-11 illustrates that the current net level of foreign exchange reserves (excluding banks' foreign currency deposits at the central bank) including gold currently stands at US$30 billion, which is equivalent to a mere 11% of broad local currency money M3. The ratio for other EM countries is considerably higher (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Turkey: Central Bank FX ##br##Reserves Level Is Inadequate Chart II-12Foreign Exchange Reserves Adequacy In EM Given the inflationary backdrop and the risk of further currency depreciation, interest rates will have to rise. With time this will inevitably trigger another upward non-performing loan (NPL) cycle. Banks are very under-provisioned for non-performing loans (NPLs). Even worse, banks have been reducing the ratio of NPL provisions to total loans in order to book strong profits. NPLs and NPL provisions are set to rise substantially, and banks' equity will be considerably eroded as a result. Lastly, as Chart II-13 demonstrates, rising interest rates are bearish for bank share prices. Investment Implications The government is doubling down on pro-growth policies and is disregarding inflation. Hence, inflation will spiral out of control and the central bank will fall even more behind the curve. This is extremely bearish for the lira. We are reiterating our short position on the lira. We remain short the lira versus the U.S. dollar, but the lira will likely also continue to plummet versus the euro as well. As such, we are also reiterating our underweight/short stance on Turkish stocks in general, and banks in particular (Chart II-14). Chart II-13Turkey: Higher Interest Rates ##br##Will Hurt Bank Stocks Chart II-14Stay Short/Underweight Turkish Stocks A weaker lira will undermine returns for foreign investors on Turkish domestic bonds and assures widening sovereign and corporate credit spreads. Dedicated EM fixed income and credit portfolios should continue to underweight Turkey within their respective EM universes. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
