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Special Report Highlights Since AQR rebranded its flagship “Risk Parity” mutual fund late last year, many clients have asked about risk parity and its potential impact on financial markets if interest rates rise. The key to a “risk-based” approach is “risk diversification” and the use of leverage. Like any investment tool, it has its advantages and limitations. “Risk parity” portfolios differ greatly, depending on the choice of assets and the portfolio construction method. There are many ways to construct a risk-based portfolio. We highlight three: fixed weights; variable weights with inverse volatility; and variable weights with optimization. Fixed-weight risk-parity portfolios are not “risk diversified” ex post. Variable-weight risk-parity portfolios constructed using inverse volatility do not guarantee equal risk allocations. “Truly risk-diversified” portfolios constructed using our proprietary optimization algorithm have consistently outperformed those constructed with inverse volatility. Our approach not only achieves better risk diversification, but can also be used as an alpha overlay strategy. Risk parity does not always outperform in the long run, but always outperforms in recessions. Rising yields alone do not necessarily hurt risk parity. The worst environment for risk parity is the combination of rising yields and the underperformance of bonds relative to both cash and stocks – because both leverage and interest-rate movements work against risk parity. Worryingly, the past three years have been like this, similar to the 1949-1969 period when risk parity would not have performed. Feature Beautiful Simulation! Ugly Reality? Ray Dalio’s Bridgewater Associates created in the 1990s “The All Weather Investment Strategy,” which is known as the foundation of the “Risk Parity” movement.1, 2 Both back-testing and real-life performance from Bridgewater show that the “All Weather” portfolio did live up to its purpose as a low-beta, long-term portfolio that weathers through different economic cycles.2 The term “Risk Parity,” however, was coined by Edward Qian in 2005, and Qian even went as far as saying that risk parity is a way to the “New Holy Grail In Investing” – i.e. “upside participation and downside protection.”3 Only after the 2008 financial crisis did risk parity gain real traction, because investors were hungry for alternative tactics after traditional asset allocation approaches all failed miserably. Invesco began offering a risk parity strategy mutual fund in June 2009, and AQR launched its risk parity mutual fund in September 2010. According to the IMF, risk parity funds had AUM of US$150 billion to $175 billion at the end of 2017,4 while Bridgewater estimated in 2016 that there were about US$400 billion AUM dedicated to risk parity strategies globally, of which about US$150 billion was managed by external managers – with Bridgewater accounting for about half of the externally managed assets.2  While most risk parity believers dedicate a portion of their assets to risk parity strategies, some investors have gone in full-heartedly. For example, in 2016, Danish pension fund ATP completed its transition to a risk-based multi-factor approach by adopting a “four-factor building-block portfolio approach” that is “…in part inspired by Bridgewater’s All Weather” yet “owes more to the thinking of investment manager AQR and the academic field of ‘financial economics’ more generally.”5 At the end of 2018, ATP’s risk allocation to the four risk factors – interest-rate factor, inflation factor, equity factor and other factors – is shown in Chart 1.6 On the other hand, in September 2014, the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association board decided to fire its outsourced CIO from Houston-based Salient Partners, who had favored leverage-heavy (up to five times) risk-parity investments and had been given the reins of the US$10 billion pension fund.7 In fact, the growing popularity of risk parity has been accompanied by growing criticism, especially when risk-parity funds did not do well. In December 2018, AQR re-branded its flagship risk-parity mutual fund by dropping “Risk Parity” out of its name and tweaking the strategy for more flexibility after having suffered heavy outflows.8 Even though the change in the US$344 million fund did not reflect a shift in AQR’s views on the merits of risk-parity strategies (which accounted for about US$30 billion out of AQR’s US$226 billion in assets), Cliff Asness, the co-founder of AQR, did write a long blog discussing sticking with factor investing in general. “If sticking with them were easy, the threat of them being ‘arbitraged away’ would indeed be much greater, and nobody would take the other side,” he wrote.9 Chart 2Beautiful Simulation, Ugly Reality It is easy to say “stick with it for the long run,” especially when back-tests show robust results from well-respected asset managers and researchers.10,11,12 Our own simulations also show beautiful results even for the recent period not covered by most published papers (Chart 2, top panel).  In reality, however, publicly available information shows that risk parity funds have encountered some unpleasant underperformance since 2013 compared to conventional global 60/40 stock-bond portfolios (Chart 2, bottom three panels). Seven years of underperformance is a tough pill to swallow for any investor; it is little wonder we have received client requests on this subject more frequently of late. In this Special Report, we attempt not to take sides to argue for or against risk parity strategies. Instead, we focus our efforts on sorting through the jungle of confusing ways that risk-parity portfolios are defined and constructed, and highlight three typical ways used by many risk parity managers. We present simulated results using these different methods and our own proprietary optimization algorithm, aiming to answer the following questions often asked by our clients: What is risk parity?  How is a risk parity portfolio constructed? What are the key differences among the various ways of constructing risk parity portfolios? Is it true that risk parity outperforms in the long run? Is it true that risk parity can outperform even if yields rise? How should asset allocators use risk-parity strategies? Risk Parity Basics There is no widely agreed-upon definition of risk parity, nor on how to construct a risk-parity portfolio. However, the “risk-based” allocation principle is the same, while differences among different managers lie largely in the process of portfolio construction, especially when the number of assets in consideration is more than two – because correlation does not matter when there are just two assets in a risk-based allocation approach. The Risk-Parity Principle: According to Bridgewater: “Risk parity is the means of adjusting the expected risks and returns of assets to make them more comparable.”13 If so, then a “better diversified portfolio” can be created by equally weighting those adjusted assets with low or no correlation with one another. This way, a portfolio with a higher Sharpe ratio can be achieved than would otherwise be possible using the conventional capital-based approach. Then, different degrees of leverage can be used to achieve desirable levels of risk and return. In terms of risk, investors need to consider not only the volatility of a portfolio, but also the risk of large portfolio drawdowns due to wrong assumptions. Since one does not know for sure in advance how each asset will perform, Bridgewater characterizes the investment regimes using growth and inflation, identifying which asset classes do well in each regime and allocating 25% weight in each of the four growth-inflation regimes.14 Despite robust back-test results from asset managers and researchers, risk parity funds have not lived up to their promise since 2013. So, one key to risk parity is to diversify across asset classes that behave differently across different economic regimes such that each asset contributes equally to portfolio risk. In general, equities do well in rising growth and falling inflation regimes, nominal bonds do well in deflationary or recessionary regimes, and commodities do well in rising inflation regimes.  While Bridgewater includes corporate and EM credits and inflation-linked bonds in its universe of asset classes, not all risk-parity strategies include the exact same breadth of assets. For example, it can be argued that corporate and EM credits share more of the “equity factor,” since they have a high degree of sensitivity to rising growth as do equities, while inflation-linked bonds are a hybrid of nominal bonds and inflation. The Risk-Parity Portfolio Construction: There are many different ways to construct a risk-based diversified portfolio. The key differences are: 1) how the weights of assets are determined for the unlevered risk-parity portfolio, and 2) how leverage is determined to reach the desired return/risk profile. Based on these two key aspects, there are generally three different ways to construct a risk-parity portfolio, as shown in Table 1. The one represented by Bridgewater is more qualitative, while the other two are more quantitatively defined. Table 1Risk Parity Implementation Summary When there are only two assets, it is easy to show that all three methods produce exactly the same allocations for the basic risk-parity portfolio without leverage. When there are more than two assets, however, the two approaches represented by Bridgewater15 and AQR16,17 are easy to compute, but the optimization approach based on equal contribution to risk (either in the sense of marginal contribution to risk or contribution to total risk18) has high demand in computing power. Also, it is not true that risk-parity does not need return estimates. Return estimates are not needed to determine a basic risk-parity portfolio, but they are needed to determine leverage when the target is a specific return other than volatility. Does Strategic Risk Parity Outperform In The Long Run? The pioneering “All Weather” fund was launched by Bridgewater in 1996, and has been used as a “strategic asset allocation mix” that is rebalanced to keep “constant” asset weights.19 To try to understand the early thinking behind risk parity, we used Bridgewater’s method to simulate a simple two-factor constant-weight risk-parity portfolio using global stocks20 and global bonds21 in two steps: First, we used monthly return data of stocks and bonds from January 1970 to December 1995 to estimate stock volatility (Vs ) and bond volatility (Vb ). The stock and bond weights in the unlevered risk parity portfolio (RP1) are determined as follows: Wb = Vs / (Vs +Vb), and Ws = 1- Wb......................(1) Depending on the required target, leverage will be applied to RP1. The leverage ratio is simply the target volatility (or return) divided by the volatility (or return) of the unlevered risk parity portfolio. Table 2 shows the simulated results with seven different targets, which appear to support the following claims of risk-parity supporters: A risk parity portfolio is better than a 60/40 portfolio because it achieves a higher Sharpe ratio; Equities and bonds contribute equally to total portfolio risk in a risk-parity portfolio, while a 60/40 portfolio risk is dominated by equities (85% in the stated period); With the use of proper leverage, risk parity achieves higher return with the same volatility or the same return with lower volatility. The statistics in Table 2, however, are based on “in sample” data with “perfect foresight.” In reality, no portfolio manager has the luxury of going back in time to implement any portfolio. Table 2Global Stock-Bond Risk Parity Portfolios (In Sample) So, the second step of our simulation is to test how these portfolios would have performed going forward if they were rebalanced monthly to the same weights as those in December 1995. Table 3 shows the simulated ex post results for the “out of sample” period between January 1996 and March 2019. Table 3Global Stock-Bond Risk Parity Portfolios (Out Of Sample) Comparing Table 3 to Table 2, several observations are worth highlighting: It is not true that assets have similar Sharpe ratios over longer time frames. Bonds generated higher returns with significantly lower volatility, resulting in a Sharpe ratio of 1.05 in the 1996-2019 period, compared to 0.28 between 1970 and 1995. The Sharpe ratios of stocks in both periods were similar. It is true that RP1 (no leverage) is a better portfolio than 60/40, with a higher Sharpe ratio, even though both portfolios’ Sharpe ratios increased due to the improvement in bonds. More impressively, RP2 (with the same return as 60/40) not only generated 30 basis points of annual outperformance compared to 60/40, it achieved such outperformance with significantly lower volatility. And RP4 (with the same volatility as stocks), also sharply outperformed stocks in terms of both return and volatility. So, the simulated risk-parity portfolios constructed using data from 1970 to 1995 have done well ex post. Upon closer examination, however, two issues arise: Table 4Risk Contribution* Comparison First, as shown in Table 4, the risk-parity portfolio constructed using information as of 1995 turned out not to be risk parity in the subsequent period – because only 12% of the portfolio risk came from bonds, compared to the intended 50%. Granted, 88% from stocks is still less concentrated than the 60/40 portfolio which had 99% risk from equities in the same period, but the ex post risk-parity performance violates the very foundation of the risk-parity principle: true risk diversification. Second, as shown in Chart 3, even though risk-parity portfolios have outperformed their reference portfolios since 1970, the outperformance has not been consistent, with long periods of under- and over-performance. The only consistent observation is that risk parity outperforms in recessions, which is not surprising given its consistently large overweight in bonds. Chart 3Does Risk Parity Outperform In The Long Run? Also, it seems that most of the outperformance came from the period after bond yields peaked in September 1981. Risk parity did poorly during the period from 1978 to 1982, when bond yields increased sharply, while it performed slightly better than the reference portfolios between 1970 and 1978, when rates increased gradually. In reality, even strategic asset allocators do not keep weights constant for such long periods of time. How do variable-weight risk-parity strategies do in different interest-rate environments? Do Rising Yields Hurt Risk Parity? To assess how risk-parity portfolios constructed based on different weighting schemes behave in different interest-rate environments, the simulations in this section use U.S. stocks22 and government bonds23 – only because of their long history that includes both secular rising and falling rate environments.  Variable weights are determined based on moving volatility with different lookback windows. Statistically, the shorter the window length and the more frequent the return measured, the more volatile the volatility estimate is. AQR uses both 1-year24,25 and 3-year26 monthly moving windows, while S&P Dow Jones Risk Parity Indexes are based on a 5-15 year period of a monthly moving window.27 The worst combination for risk parity is rising yields and the underperformance of bonds relative to both cash and stocks. Worryingly, the past three years have been like this. Our research shows that a 1-year monthly moving window is too short, even though it produces higher total returns than longer windows. Chart 4A and 4B show the simulated results of three different moving windows – 36 months, 180 months and 360 months – for two risk-parity portfolios. RP1 is leveraged to have the same volatility as a monthly rebalanced 60/40 U.S. stock-bond portfolio, and RP2 is leveraged to have the same volatility as U.S. stocks. The weights calculated using formula (1) change monthly, based on the corresponding moving window. The following observations are true concerning the choices of our lookback period: Chart 4AU.S. Risk Parity* Vs. 60/40 Chart 4BU.S. Risk Parity* Vs. Stocks The longer the lookback period, the more stable the asset weightings and leverage ratios, and vice versa (bottom three panels in Charts 4A and 4B). This is not specific for risk parity, though. Any approach using historical mean-variance-correlation estimates share this feature. The leverage ratio spikes more often when the window length gets shorter, which may be too uncomfortable for some investors. RP2 has equity weight consistently over 60%, no matter what lookback period is used (this is also true for fixed-weight risk parity). In comparison, the less-leveraged RP1 only briefly assigns higher than 60% to equities when the lookback period is very short (panel 4 in 4A and 4B). In terms of absolute performance from March 1933 to March 2019, the shorter the window length, the better the overall full-period total return (panel 1 in 4A and 4B). However, this outperformance comes with much higher leverage ratios, which may be too high for the majority of investors (panel 5 in 4A and 4B).  In terms of relative performance versus the corresponding reference portfolio, longer window options have not done well overall. Only the shorter window option produced a marginally better relative performance for the full 86-year period (panel 2 in 4A and 4B). However, there are three stages of relative performance: a secular underperformance period from 1950 to 1970, a secular outperformance window from 2000 to July 2016, and a cyclical under- / over-performance period from 1970 to 1999. For the 36-month window, which has a longer history dating back to 1933, it also has a long period of outperformance from 1933 to 1949, as shown in Chart 5. Chart 5Does A Rising Bond Yield Hurt Risk Parity? Risk parity has a heavy weighting in bonds. It is natural to think that underperformance occurs only when rates rise, and vice versa. As shown in Table 5, however, this is true only for three periods. Risk-parity portfolios outperformed from March 1933 to July 1941, and from January 2000 to July 2016 when rates dropped (Table 5 rows 1 and 6). They underperformed from January 1950 to December 1969 when yields rose (row 3). Table 5What Drives Risk Parity Performance? What is puzzling is how risk parity performed in the following three periods: From August 1941 to December 1949, when rates rose slightly yet risk parity outperformed significantly (row 2); From January 1970 to September 1981, when interest rates rose even more than the previous period from 1949 to 1969, but risk parity did not underperform significantly (row 4); From October 1981 to December 1999, when yields dropped more than 900 basis points, yet risk parity did not outperform at all (row 5). Other than interest rates, what are the other forces driving risk parity performance?  A closer examination of Table 5 reveals that the direction of interest-rate movements alone does not fully explain the performance of risk parity relative to its reference portfolio. It is the reason why rates rise or fall, combined with how assets react to those reasons, that determine how risk parity performs. This makes sense because risk parity not only overweights bonds in general, but uses leverage. The worst combination for risk parity is when interest rates rise such that bonds underperform both cash and stocks, as in the period from January 1950 to December 1969 (Table 5 row 3) – because leverage and interest-rate movements both worked against risk parity. This may not sound very encouraging for risk parity going forward, because the current period from July 2016 to March 2019, albeit very short in length, has so far shared similar characteristics to the period from 1949 to 1969 in terms of annualized excess return of stocks and bonds as well as relative performance between stocks and bonds. Table 5 also shows that during the hyper-inflationary period from 1970 to 1981, both stocks and bonds underperformed cash, which also underperformed inflation. Even though risk-parity portfolios performed in line with their reference portfolios, this period was actually the worst for investors because real returns were negative for all three assets. The key to risk parity is to diversify across asset classes that behave differently across different economic regimes such that each asset contributes equally to portfolio risk. So how does diversification across asset classes and geographic regions impact risk parity performance? How To Achieve True Risk Diversification? Commodities outperformed inflation during the hyper-inflationary period from 1970 to 1981. Intuitively, adding commodities to the asset mix would have been beneficial for that period. How about other periods? To assess the impact, we add commodities28 to our two-factor U.S. risk parity and two-factor global risk-parity portfolios to simulate three-factor risk-parity portfolios with two different lookback periods (36 months and 180 months) and three different volatility targets (10%, 12% and 15%). The weight of each asset for the unlevered risk parity portfolio is calculated using the inverse of the volatility (V) of each asset: Wi = (1/Vi) / ((1/Vs +1/Vb +1/Vc)...................(2) Where i stands for s (stocks), b (bonds) and c (commodities). The volatility of the unlevered risk-parity portfolio (URP) in each window period is then calculated as Vurp and the leverage ratio is calculated as Vtarget / Vurp. Chart 6A and 6B compare how the addition of commodities to the asset universe changes the performance of risk parity. For a longer history of performance, we show the simulations with the 36-month moving window. Chart 6ACommodity Impact On U.S. Risk Parity Chart 6BCommodity Impact On Global Risk Parity Overall the addition of commodities has performed in line with the two-asset risk parity portfolios. However, the three-factor risk parity portfolio did significantly outperform the two-factor portfolio before 1990. After more than a decade of ups and downs, relative performance made a strong rebound during the GFC, only to give up all the gains in the next seven years (Charts 6A and 6B, panel 1), coinciding with a sharp change in commodities-stocks correlations (panel 5). A “truly risk-diversified” portfolio constructed using our proprietary optimization algorithm outperforms consistently a risk-parity portfolio based on inverse of volatility. Chart 7Risk Contributions It is worth noting that diversification across asset classes and geographies is not exclusive to risk parity. It is a well-accepted practice in the asset management industry. Panel 4 in both 6A and 6B show that a 50/40/10 stock-bond-commodity portfolio also outperforms or underperforms a 60/40 equity-bond portfolio in line with the movement of relative asset performance. Risk parity, however, amplifies the upside by using leverage and slightly limits downside risk by allocating risk in a more diversified fashion (Chart 7). Chart 7 shows that a conventional portfolio, despite a 50% weight in equities, is dominated by equity risk, while the risk-parity portfolio has much less concentrated risk allocations.  However, the three assets in the risk-parity portfolio do not have an equal share of risk contribution. Why? Because we constructed the risk-parity portfolio using the inverse of volatility according to formula (2). It assigns a higher weight to a lower volatility asset, but does not guarantee equal allocation of risk. How will a more precisely equal risk allocation improve risk-parity performance? We ran another simulation using the same three global assets and a 180-month moving window. However, asset weights were optimized using a proprietary optimization procedure such that each asset contributed equally to total portfolio risk. Chart 8, shows that the optimized risk-parity portfolios have outperformed those constructed by using formula (2), i.e. inverse volatility. Impressively, the outperformances are consistent through time in terms of both returns and Sharpe Ratios (panels 1 and 2). The optimized risk contributions are equally distributed (panel 4) as intended. By contrast, when the weights were constructed using inverse volatility, each asset's contribution to total risk varied considerably (panel 3). This makes sense because the optimization procedure takes into consideration not only volatility but also correlations between assets. Correlation between stocks and bonds, and correlation between stocks and commodities, have both gone through significant changes over time, especially since 2006 when the directions reversed. (Chart 9, panel 5). Consequently, on an unlevered basis, ex ante volatility of the optimized portfolio has turned lower since 2006, resulting in a higher Sharpe ratio (Chart 9, panels 3 and 4). Chart 8True Risk Diversification Works Better Chart 9Why Does True Risk Diversification Work Better?   Even though the returns of the two unlevered portfolios are similar, the optimized portfolio’s lower volatility permits a higher leverage ratio at any given target portfolio volatility, which in turn drives much better returns of the leveraged portfolios (panels 1 and 2). The bottom line is that a “truly risk-diversified” portfolio constructed using our proprietary optimization algorithm does produce better results than a risk-parity portfolio constructed using less risk-diversified approaches, such as the inverse of volatility. It does require more computing power, but this will become much less an issue with technological advancement. Our finding can also be used as a pure alpha overlay strategy. The implementation, though, is out of the scope of this report. Conclusions The key features of a “risk-based” approach is “risk diversification” and the use of leverage. The risk parity approach is one of many investment tools. Like any other investment tool, it has its advantages and limitations. Because of choices in the universe of assets and also portfolio construction methods, not all “risk parity” portfolios are equal. Investors should apply rigorous due diligence before choosing a risk-parity manager. Based on our simulations, we find: Risk parity outperforms in recessions due to its large allocation to bonds. The direction of interest-rate movements alone does not fully determine how risk parity performs. The worst environment for risk parity is the combination of rising yields and the underperformance of bonds relative to both cash and stocks – because both leverage and interest-rate movements work against risk parity. Worryingly, the past three years have been like this, similar to the 1949-1969 period when risk parity would not have performed. Fixed-weight risk-parity portfolios are not truly risk diversified ex post. An inverse volatility approach generates less concentrated risk allocation, but not necessarily equal risk contribution. Risk-parity portfolios constructed with shorter lookback periods outperform those with longer lookback periods if historical volatility estimates are used. Risk-parity portfolios constructed using our proprietary optimization algorithm that truly allocates risks equally to all assets, consistently outperform those constructed using approximation, such as inverse volatility. This finding not only proves that “true risk diversification” works, it can also be used as an alpha overlay strategy for asset allocators.   Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Bridgewater Associates, “The All Weather Story” 2      Bridgewater Associates, “Our Thoughts about Risk Parity and All Weather,” Daily Observations, September 16, 2016. 3      Edward E. Qian, “Risk Parity Fundamentals,” CRC Press, 2016. 4      Sergei Antoshin, Fabio Cortes, Will Kerry and Thomas Piontek, “Volatilities Strike Back,” IMF Blog, dated May 3, 2018. 5      Rachel Fixsen, ”ATP: Rebalancing the risk diet,” IPE Magazine, July/August 2016. 6      “Annual Announcement of Financial Statements 2018,” ATP Group. 7      Jeff Macdonald, “Pension board to consider firing CIO,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, September 18, 2014.   8      Miles Weiss, “AQR Strips ‘Risk Parity’ Name From Mutual Fund After Redemptions,” Bloomberg, December 7, 2018. 9      Cliff Asness, “Liquid Alt Ragnarök?” AQR Alternative Investing, September 7, 2018. 10     Bridgewater Associates, “Our Thoughts about Risk Parity and All Weather,” Daily Observations, September 16, 2016. 11     Edward E. Qian, “Risk Parity Fundamentals,” CRC Press, 2016. 12     Clifford S. Asness, Andrea Frazzini, and Lasse H. Pedersen, “Leverage Aversion and Risk Parity,” Financial Analyst Journal, Jan/Feb 2012. 13    Bridgewater Associates, “Our Thoughts about Risk Parity and All Weather,” Daily Observations, September 16, 2016. 14     Bridgewater Associates, “The All Weather Story” 15     Bridgewater Associates, “The All Weather Story” 16     Clifford S. Asness, Andrea Frazzini, and Lasse H. Pedersen, “Leverage Aversion and Risk Parity,” Financial Analyst Journal, Jan/Feb 2012. 17     Brian Hurst, Bryan Johnson, Yao Hua Ooi, “Understanding Risk Parity,” AQR, Fall 2010. 18     Edward E. Qian, “Risk Parity Fundamentals,” CRC Press, 2016. 19     Bridgewater Associates, “Our Thoughts about Risk Parity and All Weather,” Daily Observations, September 16, 2016. 20       MSCI All Country World Total Return Index in U.S. dollars, unhedged, from December 1987 to now. For back history, we used the MSCI World from December 1969. Prior to December 1969 we used the S&P 500. 21     Bloomberg Barclays (BB) Global Aggregate hedged total return in U.S. dollar from January 1990 to the present. For back history, we used the BB Global Treasury hedged total return in U.S. dollar from January 198, the BB U.S. aggregate total return from January 1976, and the BB U.S. Treasury total return from December 1972. Prior to December 1972 we used our own calculations based on U.S. 10-year government bond yield. 22     MSCI U.S. Total Return Index from December 1969 to the present. Back history was the S&P 500 Total Return Index. 23     Bloomberg Barclays (BB) U.S. Treasury Total Return Index from December 1972. Back history was calculated based on U.S. 10-year government bond yield. 24     Brian Hurst, Bryan Johnson, Yao Hua Ooi, “Understanding Risk Parity,” AQR, Fall 2010. 25     Brian Hurst, Michael, Yao Hua Ooi, “Can Risk Parity Outperform If Yields Rise?,” AQR, July 2013. 26     Clifford S. Asness, Andrea Frazzini, and Lasse H. Pedersen, “Leverage Aversion and Risk Parity,” Financial Analyst Journal, Jan/Feb 2012. 27     https://eu.spindices.com/indices/strategy/sp-risk-parity-index-12-target-volatility-tr 28     GSCI Commodities Total Return Index from December 1969, before which the total return index of the Bloomberg Commodities Index was used.  
Special Report Highlights Portfolio rebalancing is the process of realigning portfolio weights back to their strategic allocations. Frequent rebalancing is essentially a counter-cyclical, or value, strategy. In effect, investors buy low and sell high. Infrequent rebalancing is a momentum-factor investing strategy. Maximizing risk-adjusted return is the reason investors should rebalance, not maximizing return per se. We find that calendar, deviation, or a combination of both methods of rebalancing, can all improve risk-adjusted return compared to a non-rebalanced portfolio. Feature What Do We Mean By Rebalancing? The first step of portfolio construction is strategic asset allocation. Simply put, it is determining a set of asset weights that best suits the investor’s return target, risk appetite, capabilities, and other considerations. Once a portfolio is constructed, divergent returns among asset classes cause the weights of the portfolio to shift. Portfolio rebalancing is therefore, the process of realigning portfolio weights back to their strategic allocations. Chart 1Rebalancing Can Imply Style Rebalancing is a means of reducing portfolio risk rather than increasing returns, and is necessary to maintain the desired risk exposure over time. Frequent rebalancing can be viewed as value investing: a style in which investors “buy low and sell high” (Chart 1). Given the mean-reverting nature of asset performance, buying the undervalued asset and selling the overvalued should imply that future returns would be higher than past returns. Through this process, investors are hoping to obtain a “rebalancing premium”. It is crucial to recognize that rebalancing works best at inflection points. Hence, that premium is gained when the rebalancing frequency is similar to the frequency of the mean-reversion feature of assets. Rebalancing also allows a portfolio to be consistent with the investor’s risk appetite in order to avoid a particular asset class dominating. However, this is easier said than done. An investor’s intuition usually acts in the opposite direction, pushing him or her to follow momentum rather than cut back the weight of a “winning” asset. The question that this Special Report aims to answer is not whether investors should rebalance or not, but rather what kind of rebalancing they should do. We discuss three different conventional rebalancing methods that investors can use, illustrating the risk-return characteristics of a simple two-asset-class (60% equity/40% bonds) portfolio since 1973. In doing so, we rebalance the portfolio back to its 60/40 strategic weights. Rebalancing is a means of reducing portfolio risk rather than increasing returns, and is necessary to maintain the desired risk exposure over time. It is important to note that rebalancing is no free lunch. Costs vary depending on the method used. Costs include trading and transaction costs, operational costs (trade lags, labor, and time to monitor the portfolio), and tax costs (capital gains on appreciated assets). In this paper, we do not consider the operational and tax costs (as they differ from investor to investor). Rather, we examine portfolio returns given: (1) zero trading costs, and (2) a variable cost of 10 bps dependent on trade size. Additionally, frequent rebalancing can introduce “negative convexity”, a return profile in which large divergences in asset performance exceed the rebalancing premiums investors obtain.1 Throughout our explanations, we show two tables for each method: Table A illustrates the returns given zero costs, while Table B illustrates the returns given the variable costs. It is key to note however that there is no one-size-fits-all rebalancing method. The important thing to realize is that rebalancing, done correctly, must find an optimal balance between cost minimization and managing portfolio risk. As a benchmark, we examine how an unbalanced portfolio, which we will refer to as a “drift portfolio”, comprised of 60% equities and 40% bonds in 1973, would have evolved over the past 46 years. Given that equities outperform bonds over the long run due to their riskier nature, the drift portfolio ends with an 86% allocation to equities, and a maximum allocation of 87% over the period (Chart 2). Chart 3Broken Equity/Bond Correlation   Before describing how each methodology performed, we need to highlight a key point in understanding the results that follow: the equity/bond correlation underwent a step-change around 1998. Between 1975 and 1998, the correlation between equities and bonds averaged about 0.4. However, declining inflation expectations led to a reversal of this relationship. Since 1998, the equity/bond correlation averaged -0.3 (Chart 3, top panel). It is key to note however that there is no one-size-fits-all rebalancing method. The important thing to realize is that rebalancing, done correctly, must find an optimal balance between cost minimization and managing portfolio risk. How does this affect the results? A positive correlation between equities and bonds means that asset-class returns moved together, reducing the advantages of rebalancing. Therefore, between the start of our sample period, 1973, and 1998, rebalanced portfolios only slightly outperformed a non-rebalanced portfolio. It is crucial to recognize that rebalancing portfolios should continue to be most advantageous during times when asset returns exhibit negative correlation. Portfolio Rebalancing can take place in different ways2 (Table 1). Table 1Conventional Methods Of Rebalancing Rebalancing Methodologies Time-Only Rebalancing The most common rebalancing methodology used by investors is on a simple calendar basis. A survey conducted by the Financial Planning Association showed that 48%, 36%, and 14% of financial planners rebalance quarterly, annually, and monthly respectively; 1% of respondents said they rebalanced based on a client’s request.3 This form of rebalancing involves bringing the asset-class weights back to the agreed-upon benchmark at the end of a specified period. Periods can range from daily (which is rare) to multiple years. Several academic papers and practitioners call for investors to rebalance at least annually. For the purpose of this report, we look at monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, annual, and bi-annual rebalancing.4 Rebalancing not only increases return at the margin, but also reduces portfolio risk and hence improves risk-adjusted returns. The risk-adjusted return increases as the rebalancing frequency decreases. Bi-annual rebalancing had a risk-adjusted return of 1.016 versus 0.895 for a non-rebalanced portfolio and 0.985 for a monthly-rebalanced portfolio over our entire sample period (Tables 2A and 2B). All calendar-rebalancing dates outperformed a non-rebalanced portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis due to lower volatility. The same results persist even when costs are factored in. Rebalancing too frequently not only increased costs, but also limited upside potential. That is noticeable from the number of rebalancing events for a monthly-rebalanced portfolio versus an annually or a bi-annually rebalanced portfolio. Unsurprisingly, we found that all rebalanced portfolios on average underperformed the drift portfolio during equity bull markets, and outperformed in the period leading up to recessions and equity corrections (Chart 4). Given that stocks peak on average six to 12 months before a recession, the higher weighting in bonds at the start of a correction explains the outperformance of a frequently rebalanced portfolio versus a drift portfolio during recessions and equity market corrections. To put this into context, the drift portfolio’s equity weight at the time of the S&P 500’s peak in the dot-com bubble was 84%, versus an average of 61% across the rebalanced portfolios. Similarly, at the peak before the latest market selloff starting on October 3, 2018, the drift portfolio had an 87% equity allocation versus a 61% average allocation for the frequently rebalanced portfolios. Chart 5 shows that rebalancing reduces downside risk relative to a drift portfolio during downturns and recessions. Chart 4Calendar Rebalancing: Relative Performance Chart 5Calendar Rebalancing: Lower Drawdown Threshold-Only Rebalancing Threshold rebalancing allows asset-class weights to be readjusted back to their target weights once they deviate away by a certain percentage. This can be set in terms of either a percentage-point or a percent deviation. Given that, in this paper, we illustrate our findings using just a two-asset class portfolio with relatively large weights in each asset, percentage-point deviations are more appropriate. However, percent deviations should be used when a certain asset class has only a small weight within a portfolio, for example, a 20% deviation away from the 5% target weight of an asset class. A key benefit of threshold-only rebalancing over calendar rebalancing in a multi-asset portfolio is lower transaction costs. Unlike calendar-only rebalancing where all asset classes are brought back to target weights, only the assets that have moved away from benchmark by the set deviation have to be bought and sold. For example, in a five-asset class portfolio, it could be the case that only the best and worst performers have hit their thresholds and have to be adjusted, whereas the other asset classes do not. Tables 3A and 3B show the risk-return characteristics of rebalanced portfolios based on 1, 5, 10, and 20 percentage-point deviations. Similarly to calendar rebalancing, the wider the threshold, the better the risk-adjusted return. The rebalanced portfolio with a 20-percentage point threshold outperforms all other deviations on both a return and risk-adjusted basis. All rebalanced portfolios led to better risk-adjusted returns than the drift portfolio, even after costs are factored in. Also similar to calendar rebalancing, threshold deviation rebalancing also outperforms during recessions and market corrections (Charts 6 & 7). Chart 6Threshold Rebalancing: Relative Performance Chart 7Threshold Rebalancing: Lower Drawdown The table also illustrates that picking the right threshold is crucial. A threshold set too wide will miss all turning-points and hence turn into a drift portfolio. Whereas, thresholds set too narrow will produce only a small improvement in return at the expense of more rebalancing events, and therefore higher costs. Time-And-Threshold Rebalancing A time-and-threshold rebalancing combines the merits of both strategies. The portfolio is rebalanced only when an asset class has deviated from its target allocation by a set threshold on the date of rebalancing. Assuming, for example, monthly rebalancing with a 10% deviation, a portfolio would be rebalanced on the next monthly date only if it had deviated by more than 10 percentage points. Otherwise, the portfolio would not be rebalanced. This implies that two decisions have to be made: a threshold band and a rebalancing frequency. We present the results of this method in a slightly different way. In this case, we show each metric (annualized return (Tables 4A & 5A), annualized volatility (Tables 4B & 5B) and risk-adjusted return (Tables 4C & 5C)) separately under assumptions of both zero costs and variable costs.   The highest risk-adjusted return of 1.023 was achieved with quarterly rebalancing and a 20 percentage point deviation. This resulted in only three rebalancing events throughout the 46-year period. However, this was not as good as simply relying on a 20 percentage point threshold deviation. Investors wanting to keep a tighter control over their portfolio could use a tighter band with a more frequent rebalancing. As noted earlier, rebalancing is a way to maximize risk-adjusted return rather than maximize return. To simply maximize return, annual rebalancing with a 10-percentage point threshold, which had an annualized return of 9.80%, would be the best combination. However, that came at the expense of high volatility and a higher average equity allocation. Having fewer rebalancing events does not necessarily mean lower costs. In fact, we noted that the fewer the rebalancing events, the higher the annualized cost per trade5 (Tables 6 and 7). Given that our variable cost was dependent on trade size, a rebalancing method that relied on wider bands would incur higher costs per trade relative to narrower bands. Table 6Time-And-Threshold Rebalancing: Rebalancing Events Table 7Time-And-Threshold Rebalancing: Cost Per Trade (Bps) Beyond The Conventional Methods New rebalancing strategies have evolved that rely on different metrics. These include timing rebalancing events using tracking error or risk deviation, absolute momentum, or analyzing the stage of the economic cycle. A recent paper published by Northern Trust discussed the merits of risk-based tracking-error rebalancing as a superior method to traditional strategies. The paper concluded that risk-based tracking had outperformed most other rebalancing strategies while requiring fewer rebalancing events. Within the core strategies mentioned, several adjustments could be made to obtain better results from rebalancing events. Some argue that rebalancing back to a tolerance band, rather than to the precise allocation target, could improve risk-adjusted returns. That band is usually set at half of the deviation threshold band, but can vary at the investor’s discretion. Given costs that vary based on trade size, it might be cheaper for an investor to use tolerance bands. However, relying on such a method can easily rack up costs if the investor is going against momentum prior to its end, since relying on tolerance bands would require more frequent rebalancing. Bottom Line Rebalancing is a means of maximizing risk-adjusted return, rather than increasing absolute return. Rebalancing is no free lunch. Investors must take various associated costs into account before considering how and when to rebalance. The added benefit of rebalancing might seem small in annualized returns. However, on average, rebalancing led to an annualized decrease in volatility in excess of 1% over the 46-year period. It might be best for investors to use a time-and-threshold rebalancing to find a balance between cost minimization and maximizing risk-adjusted returns. Amr Hanafy, Research Associate amrh@bcaresearch.com   1 Nick Granger, Douglas Greenig, Campbell Harvey, Sandy Rattray, David Zou, "The Unexpected Costs of Rebalancing And How To Address Them," AHL Partners LLP, July 2014. 2 Colleen Janconetti, Francis Kinniry Jr., Yan Zilbering, "Best Practices For Portfolio Rebalancing," Vanguard, July 2010. 3 Financial Planning Association, Longboard, and Journal Of Financial Planning, “2017 Trends In Investing,” www.onefpa.org. 4 We assumed that monthly rebalancing occurs on the first trading day of every month, quarterly rebalancing occurs on the first trading day of January, April, July, afn_4nd October, semiannual rebalancing on the first trading day of January and July, and annual rebalancing on the first trading day of the year. 5 Calculated as the difference in annualized return between 10 bps cost assumptions and 0 cost assumption multiplied by the number of years within the sample period divided by the number of trades.  
Special Report Highlights Investors are currently too pessimistic on Europe’s growth prospects. In fact, European growth will soon bottom. European growth and inflation are also set to improve relative to the U.S. This should give investors an opportunity to reassess the long-term outlook for European Central Bank policy relative to the Fed. Global growth dynamics are also moving in an increasingly dollar-bearish direction, which should create a tailwind for the euro. Based on the pricing of European assets relative to the U.S., there is scope to see more capital flows into the euro area, implying that more euro buying is forthcoming. The entire European currency complex is a buy relative to the dollar; while the NOK, the SEK, and even the GBP could outperform the euro, the CHF will underperform. EUR/JPY also has upside. Feature The case to sell the euro is easy to make. European growth has been very poor: PMIs, industrial production and even German exports are all pointing to a contraction in output; and economic surprises are testing levels recorded during the euro area crisis. Most importantly, this economic retrenchment is particularly sharp when compared to the U.S., which suggests that real interest rate differentials should continue to hurt EUR/USD (Chart 1). Chart 1Selling The Euro Seems So Easy... The problem with this narrative is that investors are already well aware of Europe’s woes. Could Europe instead recover and the euro rebound against the dollar? After all, in the past, when investor pessimism towards Europe experienced as pronounced a dip as the one just witnessed, EUR/USD invariably rebounded soon after (Chart 2). Chart 2...But Maybe We Should Look The Other Way In this piece, we explore what could go right for the euro, and argue that the euro is indeed attractive at current levels. European Growth Has Hit A Nadir It is safe to say that the euro area is in a funk today: European real GDP growth dipped to a 1.1% annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2018, while industrial production has plunged by 3.9% on a year-on-year basis. But the markets warned us this would happen: The euro has fallen 9% from its February 2018 top, German bund yields are again flirting with the 0.1% level and European banks plunged by more than 40% between January and December last year. Going forward, for European yields to remain as depressed as they are, for the euro to fall again by a similar margin, or for domestic plays to suffer large declines, European growth will have to slow even further. We are not expecting such a scenario. Instead, we expect European growth to recover significantly this year. First, when it comes to Germany, the locomotive of Europe, the shock from the implementation of the new WLTP auto emission standards is passing: Automobile production is stabilizing, capex is accelerating and inventories have been pared down. Moreover, the slowdown in foreign demand has already percolated through the domestic economy, as domestic manufacturing orders are already experiencing one of their sharpest declines since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart 3, top panel). Chart 3European Growth Is Set To Rebound Another source of optimism comes from the credit market. As the middle panel of Chart 3 illustrates, the European 12-month credit impulse has begun to bottom. This points to stronger euro area-wide domestic demand. Moreover, the Chinese credit and fiscal impulse is also bottoming, suggesting the drag from foreign demand could be dissipating (Chart 3, bottom panel). When looking at other specific trouble spots, Italy first springs to mind. In our view, the most recent deceleration in Italy was mainly a consequence of the tightening in financial conditions that resulted from the surge in Italian yields following the budget standoff between Rome and Brussels. However, the Lega Nord / Five Star Movement coalition has folded and is more or less acquiescing to the EU’s demands. Moreover, the rising probability that the European Central Bank will continue to provide long-term liquidity to the eurozone banking system via some form of new LTRO should diminish the funding risk to the Italian banking system, and thus, the risks to Rome’s fiscal sustainability. This implies that the decline in Italian borrowing costs could deepen (Chart 4), further easing Italian financial conditions and improving the growth outlook in the euro area’s third-largest economy. Chart 4Easing Financial Conditions In Italy France, too, has had its fair share of problems, though it is interesting that its industrial sector is not suffering as much as Germany’s, as highlighted by a French manufacturing PMI above the 50 boom/bust line. Instead, the French service sector is the one contracting (Chart 5). This bifurcation is likely to be a byproduct of the gilets jaunes protests that have lasted since November 2018 and affected retail trade. However, the intensity of the protests is declining and the French population is getting used to this. As a result, we are seeing a rebound in French household confidence, which implies that consumption, the main engine of French growth, is likely to perk up. Chart 5Fade The Gilets Jaunes, Paris In Spring Is Beautiful Finally, euro area fiscal policy is set to be loosened this year, with the fiscal thrust moving from 0.05% of GDP to 0.4% of GDP (Chart 6). The response of French President Emmanuel Macron to the gilets jaunes protests could even make the fiscal policy support slightly bigger this year. Chart 6Positive Fiscal Thrust In 2019 Ultimately, this combination of factors suggests that the large dip in European industrial production is likely to prove transitory, and that European activity will revert back toward the levels implied by the Belgian Business Confidence Index, which has historically been a good leading indicator of European growth (Chart 7). Chart 7European IP To Follow Brussels' Mood Bottom Line: The deterioration in European growth has captured the imagination of investors. However, the performance of European assets last year forewarned that growth would decelerate meaningfully. What matters now is how growth will evolve. Developments from Germany, France, Italy, the credit channel and the fiscal front all suggest that European activity will perk up soon. It’s All Relative While getting a sense of European growth is important when making a call on EUR/USD, economic trends must also be considered relative to the U.S. Surprisingly, despite notorious European growth underperformance, rays of hope are emerging. A major structural negative for EUR/USD has abated: The European debt crisis is behind us, and the aggregate European banking sector has been getting healthier, albeit slowly. This means that the euro area credit growth is not declining anymore against that of the U.S. This is a very long-term force that dictates multi-year cycles in the EUR/USD. As Chart 8 shows, it will be difficult for EUR/USD to move below 1.10 so long as the broad trend in the relative credit growth does not weaken anew. Chart 8Credit Dynamics Suggest That The Worst Is Over For EUR/USD More immediately, the euro area leading economic indicator relative to the U.S. is forming a bottom (Chart 9). Since the U.S. is not benefiting from as large a fiscal boost as in 2018, and financial as well as monetary conditions have tightened there relative to Europe, this suggests the improvement in the euro area relative LEI could continue this year. Chart 9Bottoming European LEI Versus U.S. Relative labor market slack is also evolving in a euro-friendly fashion. From 2013 to 2018, the euro area suffered from greater labor market slack than the U.S., courtesy of a double-dip recession and generally more-moribund growth. However, thanks to a 4.2-percentage-point fall in the European unemployment rate since 2013 to 7.9%, the euro area unemployment gap has not only closed, it is also below that of the U.S. Historically, when the U.S. unemployment gap leapfrogs that of Europe, EUR/USD tends to appreciate (Chart 10). Chart 10Less Slack Leads To A Stronger EUR/USD Relative slack does not only have value in itself, it also matters for relative inflation trends, which have been a crucial determinant of EUR/USD. As Chart 11 illustrates, EUR/USD tends to follow how euro area core CPI evolves relative to the U.S. After sharply falling last year, European relative core inflation is trying to rebound, which at a minimum suggests that EUR/USD has limited downside. Moreover, EUR/USD has correlated positively with German market-based inflation expectations (Chart 11, bottom panel). This suggests that actual relative inflation as well as euro area inflation expectations play a key role in determining perceptions among investors of how ECB policy will evolve relative to the Federal Reserve. Chart 11EUR/USD Trades Off Of Inflation Dynamics The recent euro decline has matched the decline in inflation expectations. However, inflation expectations have been much weaker than implied by the level of wage growth in Europe (Chart 12). This suggests that European inflation breakevens have scope to improve, a positive for the euro. Moreover, European wage growth is not only picking up steam in isolation, it is also rising relative to the U.S., which highlights that European inflation should not just stabilize vis-à-vis the U.S., but also accelerate. Chart 12European Wages Point To Rising Inflation Expectations This case is made even more saliently by looking at relative financial conditions. Due to the tightening in U.S. financial conditions compared to the euro area, European headline and core inflation is set to accelerate relative to the U.S. (Chart 13). Again, this reinforces the case that maybe the euro has upside this year. Chart 13Relative Euro Area Inflation Will Rise Thanks To Easier FCI Ultimately, for the euro to rise, investors will have to begin pricing in some switch in policy spreads between the ECB and the Fed. In the past, we showed that short-term policy expectations are important, but long-term ones can be even more relevant, especially when a central bank is well along the path of lifting rates, as the Fed is, while the other remains at maximum accommodation, like the ECB is today.1  Currently, investors expect euro area short rates to be only 0.5% 5-years from now (Chart 14, top panel). The spread between the eurozone and U.S. 5-year forward 1-month OIS rates remains near all-time lows, which explains the weakness in the euro. Now that European policy is much more accommodative than the U.S.’s, there’s scope for investors to upgrade the path of long-term euro area rates relative to the U.S. This would be bullish for the euro (Chart 14, bottom panel). Recovering relative credit flows and improving relative slack and inflation dynamics could catalyze this change. Chart 14The ECB Is Never Raising Rates Bottom Line: To make the euro an attractive buy, European growth and inflation conditions cannot just increase, they need to improve relative to the U.S. Since long-term interest rate expectations are very depressed in Europe relative to the U.S., a small improvement in the relative growth profile could be enough to catalyze a repricing of the ECB vis-à-vis the Fed, creating a powerful tailwind behind the euro. Nothing Happens In A Vacuum Ultimately, exchange rates, like other prices in the economy, do not only respond to domestic determinants but are also influenced by much larger, global forces. This is because those global trends percolate through domestic economies, resulting in changing relative expected returns that drive money across borders, leading to currency movements. In the case of the euro, global growth matters a lot, because European growth is much more sensitive to global economic fluctuations than U.S. growth is. This is particularly true if shocks emanate from emerging markets (Chart 15). Today, global cyclical variables are increasingly pointing toward an end to the global growth slowdown. A stabilization and reacceleration in global activity would support the euro. First, Chinese monetary conditions have begun to ease, which historically tends to be linked with improvements in European growth relative to the U.S. (Chart 16). Questions remain surrounding this point: How durable will the rebound in Chinese credit be? By how much will Chinese policymakers nurture this bounce? And will this jump be large enough to lift economic activity in the Middle Kingdom? Nonetheless, a reflationary wind from China has begun to blow, and since investors have already discounted much bad news out of Europe, only small improvements could turn the euro around.   Chart 16If China Is Really Stimulating, Europe Will Rip A Greater Dividend Second, as Chart 17 shows, our Nowcast for global industrial activity has decisively stepped down. Yet, the countercyclical dollar has been flat since October 2018. Historically, the performance of EM carry trades funded in yen tends to lead global growth. Currently the performance of these strategies is stabilizing. If EM carry trades funded in yen can rally further, this will spell trouble for the greenback, helping the euro – the anti-dollar – in the process. Chart 17An Early Positive For Global Growth Third, EUR/USD tends to correlate with the relative performance of global cyclical equities (Chart 18). The stabilization in these sectors since 2015 suggests it will be difficult for the euro to fall further from current levels. In fact, if EM carry trades can rebound more, cyclicals have additional scope to outperform, and the euro could rally. Chart 18Cyclical Stocks Pointing To No Real Downside In EUR/USD Fourth, the prospects for the semiconductor sector are improving. Demand for semis is highly pro-cyclical, and the U.S. Chip Stock Timing Model developed by our U.S. Equity Strategy service colleagues is currently sending a bullish signal.2 Since such developments link to improving global growth prospects, they are also associated with a stronger EUR/USD (Chart 19). This is also consistent with a generally weaker dollar and stronger Asian currencies. Chart 19The Outlook For Semiconductors Point Toward A Stronger Euro And A Weaker Dollar Finally, the breakout in copper prices, the stabilization in the CRB Raw Industrials Index and the rally in gold prices all support an improving global growth outlook that could lift EUR/USD. Bottom Line: Various indicators, such as Chinese monetary conditions, EM carry trades, semiconductor demand determinants and commodity prices are suggesting that global growth may soon bottom. Such a development should hurt the countercyclical dollar, amounting to a macro tailwind for EUR/USD. The Bad News Is Priced In Ultimately, the capacity of EUR/USD to rally rests on how much investors upgrade their outlook for Europe. It is therefore crucial to get a sense of exactly how uninspiring Europe currently is to global market participants. There is no better gauge of relative economic pessimism than the price of euro area financial assets relative to U.S. ones. Essentially, money talks. On this front, markets already seem to have internalized the known bad news from Europe, and there is scope for a contrarian rally in the euro, especially if, as we expect, European economic activity improves. First, on a 12-month forward P/E ratio basis, euro area equities are trading at the kind of deep discount to U.S. stocks normally symptomatic of a trough in relative sentiment toward Europe. Such a discount is often followed by a rally in EUR/USD (Chart 20). Chart 20Stock Valuations: Investors Do Not Like Europe Second, retailers’ equities can often give a more focused assessment of how investors perceive the comparative outlook for domestic demand between two nations. Currently, euro area retailers trade at a 16-year low versus their U.S. counterparts (Chart 21). Investors are therefore much more ebullient about the prospects for U.S. domestic demand than in Europe. Interestingly, the euro’s gyrations since 2016 have tracked the direction of the relative performance of retailers but have diverged in terms of levels. This suggests some underlying support for the currency. Chart 21Can European Domestic Demand Really Validate Such Pessimistic Expectations? Third, the relative stock-to-bond ratio also often provides a good read on investors’ comparative economic euphoria/pessimism towards two nations. In 2018, the annual performance of the euro area stock-to-bond ratio relative to the U.S. collapsed to levels not recorded since the euro area crisis was at its apex (Chart 22). This further confirms that investors were massively depressed on European growth prospects relative to the U.S. While this indicator is rebounding, it is still in negative territory, implying that market participants still have room to upgrade their assessment of the euro area relative to the U.S. Historically, this kind of setup has been associated with a rebound in the EUR/USD. Chart 22The Stock-To-Bond Ratio Points To Some Upside Potential Fourth, European net earnings revisions relative to the U.S. have also hit bombed-out levels and are in the process of improving. Since earnings are tightly linked to global growth and reflect the same information that informs capital flows into a country (Chart 23), sell-side analysts becoming more positive on Europe at the margin could indicate that investors are in the process of re-assessing whether to buy European assets. A decision to do so would support EUR/USD. Chart 23When The Sell-Side Move From Deeply To Mildly Bearish, EUR/USD Rallies Bottom Line: Financial market pricing suggests that investors are displaying deep pessimism toward the euro area’s relative growth prospects. The euro could be a contrarian buy. Most importantly, there are early signs that this growth pricing is starting to move in favor of Europe. If our economic view on Europe and global growth is correct, this trend has further to go, implying that more capital could move into Europe, creating a potent tailwind for EUR/USD. What Else? Three additional factors need to be considered: Currency valuations, balance-of-payment dynamics, and technicals. First, while it is not as cheap as it once was, the real trade-weighted euro is still trading below its historical average (Chart 24). Purchasing-power considerations can rarely be used as a timing tool, but our confidence in the euro’s upside would be greatly dented if the euro were a very expensive currency. It is not even mildly pricey. Chart 24Euro Valuations: No Headwinds There Second, balance-of-payment considerations have become increasingly euro-positive. The euro area runs a current account surplus of 3.3% of GDP, and despite large FDI outflows – a natural consequence of being a savings-rich economy – the basic balance of payments remains in surplus. Moreover, as fixed-income outflows have been dissipating, the aggregate portfolio flows into Europe have also been improving (Chart 25). The end of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Program should solidify this trend. Chart 25The Euro Area Balance Of Payments Is Increasingly Favorable Finally, technical oscillators are behaving increasingly well. As Chart 26 shows, not only does our Intermediate-Term Indicator remains oversold, but also, it is has begun to form a positive divergence with the price of EUR/USD. If the economic outlook is becoming more bullish, such a technical setup can often be translated into significant gains. Chart 26EUR/USD: Oversold And A Positive Divergence Is Forming Bottom Line: The euro’s valuation is not as attractive as it once was, but it remains cheap. Moreover, the euro area’s balance-of-payment dynamics and the EUR/USD’s technical setup both suggest the timing is increasingly ripe to buy the euro against the dollar. Investment Conclusions A trough in European growth, improving growth and inflation prospects relative to the U.S., green shoots for global growth and deep pessimism toward Europe relative to the U.S. all argue that the timing is right to bet on a euro rebound. At this point, the durability of the euro rebound remains unclear. Investors are under-appreciating the ability of the Fed to raise rates this year, which could help the dollar. On the other hand, they seem even more sanguine toward the ECB ever lifting rates. Ultimately, the capacity of the euro to rebound on a long-term basis against the dollar will be constrained by global growth. This means that China will continue to play a center-stage role for this crucial FX pair. At this point, it is unclear how determined Chinese policymakers are to reflate their economy. Thus, we recommend investors monitor Chinese policy to gauge how long to stay in the euro. For the time being, enough pieces are falling into place to warrant buying EUR/USD for three to six months. However, if the Chinese credit impulse can continue on its recent rebound, the durability of a euro rally could be extended, implying that the euro may be in the process of forming a long-term bottom against the dollar. A strengthening euro should support the entire European currency complex against the dollar. In fact, the NOK, the SEK and the GBP may even outperform the EUR. The NOK is being boosted by rising oil prices, a more hawkish central bank, better valuations and an even healthier balance of payments. The SEK is also supported by a Riksbank that is slightly more hawkish than the ECB, and better valuations; it also benefits from a Swedish economy that is even more pro-cyclical than the euro area’s. The GBP also benefits from a greater valuation discount than the euro, and political developments in the U.K. are beginning to move toward a more clear-cut positive outcome on the Brexit front.3 The countercyclical and expensive CHF will prove the European laggard. Finally, EUR/JPY is also set to continue its rebound that began on January 4th. In fact, it may be one of the best vehicles to express a euro-bullish view because it is less sensitive to what the Fed does than EUR/USD is. Rising bond yields are an unmitigated positive for EUR/JPY, and BCA firmly believes that U.S. Treasury yields have upside, whether or not the Fed goes back to lifting rates. The Fed will mostly impact whether it is the real or inflation component that lifts Treasury yields. Bottom Line: The entire European currency complex is set to rise along with the euro against the greenback. In fact, the NOK, the SEK and the GBP are likely to outperform the euro, while the CHF should underperform. EUR/JPY may in fact offer the best risk-adjusted returns to play a euro rebound. While it is clear that at this moment that buying the euro makes sense, the principal risk lies around how long this rally will last. We are increasingly convinced that the euro has made a low for the cycle and that its long-term outlook is looking increasingly bright.  Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the EUR/USD: Focus On The Western Shores Of The Atlantic section of the Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades”, dated December 1, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Reflationary Or Recessionary”, dated February 25, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Why A Catastrophic No-Deal Might Be Good… For The EU”, dated February 28, 2019, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years. Despite the neutral CMI reading, in response to the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers, we downgraded small caps…
For S&P financials, the divergence between the upward thrust of our CMI and the depressed level of our valuation indicator (VI) has reached stunning levels, the former accelerating into pre-GFC territory and the latter falling to two standard deviations below…
Key Portfolio Highlights The S&P 500 has started 2019 with a bang as dovish cooing from the Fed has proven a tonic for equities. While we have not entirely retraced the path to the early-autumn highs, our strategy of staying cyclically exposed, based on our view of an absence of a recession in 2019, has proven a profitable one as investor capitulation reached extreme levels (Charts 1 & 2). Chart 1CapitulationChart 2Selling Is Exhausted Importantly, risk premia have been deflating as the end-of-year spike in volatility has subsided and junk spreads have narrowed from the fear-induced heights in December (Chart 3). Chart 3Risk Premia Renormalization Nevertheless, in order for the reflex rebound since the late-December lows to morph into a durable rally, the macro/policy backdrop has to turn from a headwind to a tailwind. We are closely monitoring three potential positive catalysts: A definitively more dovish Fed, which would help restrain the greenback A continuation of the earnings juggernaut A positive U.S./China trade resolution With respect to the first of these, the S&P 500 convulsed following the December 19 Fed meeting and suffered a cathartic 450 point peak-to-trough fall two months ago. The Fed likely made a policy error, and Fed Chair Powell’s resolve is getting tested as has happened with every Chair since Volcker (Charts 4 & 5). Chart 4Powell's Resolve Getting Tested Chart 5Fed Policy Mistake The rising odds of a pause in the Fed tightening cycle, at least for the first half of the year, will likely serve as a welcome respite for equities. Our second catalyst has been gaining steam through the Q4 earnings season which has seen continuation of the double-digit earnings growth of the prior three quarters. Our earnings model points to a moderation of earnings growth in the year to come, in line with sell-side expectations (Chart 6). Our 2019 year-end target remains 3,000 for the SPX, based on $181 2020 EPS and a 16.5x multiple.1 This represents a 6% EPS CAGR, assuming 2018 EPS ends near $162. Chart 6EPS Growth > 0 In Chart 7, we show that financials, health care and industrials are responsible for 61% of the SPX’s expected profit growth in 2019 while technology’s contribution has fallen to a mere 7.2%. While the risk of disappointment encompases financials, health care and industrials, there are high odds that tech surprises to the upside as it has borne the brunt of recent negative earnings revisions (Charts 8 & 9). Chart 8Earnings Revisions... Chart 9...Really Weigh On Tech Lastly, the negativity surrounding the slowdown in China is likely fully reflected in the market (Chart 10), implying an opportunity for a break out should a positive resolution to the U.S./China trade spat be delivered. China’s reflation efforts suggests that the Chinese authorities remain committed to injecting liquidity into their economy (Chart 11). Chart 10China Slowdown Baked In The Cake Chart 11Reflating Away Already, the PBOC balance sheet, with over $5.5tn in assets, is expanding anew. Empirical evidence suggests that SPX momentum and the ebb and flow of the PBOC balance sheet are joined at the hip, and the current message is positive (Chart 12). All of these underlie our style preferences for cyclicals over defensives2 and international large caps over domestically-geared small caps. Chart 12Heed The PBoC Message Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com S&P Financials (Overweight) The divergence between the directions for our CMI and valuation indicator (VI) for S&P financials has reached stunning levels, with the former accelerating into pre-GFC territory and the latter falling to two standard deviations below fair value. Our technical indicator (TI) is sending a relatively neutral message, though this does not diminish the most bullish signal in our cyclical indicator’s history (Chart 13). Chart 13S&P Financials (Overweight) The ongoing strength of the U.S. economy is the driver of such a positive indicator, particularly with respect to the key S&P banks sub index. Our total loans & leases growth model and BCA’s C&I loan growth model (second & bottom panels, Chart 14) are in positive territory. The latter is significant given that C&I loans are the single biggest credit category in bank loan books. Importantly, C&I loans have gone vertical recently topping the 10.5% growth mark despite softening capex intentions and CEO confidence. Further, multi-decade highs in consumer confidence are offsetting the Fed’s tightening cycle and suggest that consumer loans, another key lending category, will also gain traction (third panel, Chart 14). In the context of the generationally high employment rate, the implied lower defaults should drive amplified profit improvement from this credit growth. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. Chart 14Loan Growth Drives Profits S&P Industrials (Overweight) The still-solid domestic footing has maintained our industrials CMI close to its cyclical highs, which are also some of the most bullish in the history of the indicator. However, stock prices have not responded accordingly and our VI has descended mildly from neutral to undervalued. Our TI sends a much more definitive message and stands at a full standard deviation into oversold territory (Chart 15). Chart 1515. S&P Industrials (Overweight) While their cyclical peers S&P financials are almost exclusively a domestic play, S&P industrials have been weighed down by trade flare ups for most of the past year (bottom panel, Chart 16). Accordingly, much of the benefit of positive domestic capex indicators and the more tangible capital goods orders maintaining a supportive trajectory has failed to show up in relative EPS growth (second & third panels, Chart 16), though the latter has recently hooked much higher. Chart 16Industrial Earnings Growth Has Recovered S&P Materials (Overweight) Our materials CMI has made a turn, rising off its lowest level in 20 years. This has coincided with our VI bouncing off its cyclical low, though it remains in undervalued territory. The signal is shared by our TI which has only recently recovered from a full standard deviation into the oversold zone, a level that has historically presaged S&P materials rallies (Chart 17). Chart 17S&P Materials (Overweight) When we upgraded the S&P materials sector to overweight earlier this year, we noted that China macro dominates the direction of U.S. materials stocks. On the monetary front, the Chinese monetary easing cycle continues unabated and the near 150bps year-over-year drop in the 10-year Chinese Treasury yield will soon start to bear fruit (yield change shown inverted and advanced, bottom panel, Chart 18). The renminbi also moves in lockstep with relative share prices. The apparent de-escalation in the U.S./China trade tensions has boosted the CNY/USD and is signaling that a playable reflation trade is in the offing in the S&P materials sector (top panel, Chart 18). Chart 18Chinese Data Drives Materials Performance S&P Energy (Overweight) Our energy CMI has moved horizontally for the past six quarters, though this followed a snap-back recovery from the extremely depressed levels of 2016 and 2017. Meanwhile both our VI and TI have descended steeply into buying territory with the former approaching two standard deviations below fair value (Chart 19). Chart 19S&P Energy (Overweight) As with the CMI, the relative share price ratio for the S&P energy index has moved laterally since our mid-summer 2017 upgrade to overweight. Interestingly, the integrated oil & gas energy subindex neither kept up with the steep oil price advance until the end of September, nor with the recent drubbing in crude oil prices (top panel, Chart 20). Put differently, oil majors never discounted sustainably higher oil prices, and are also refraining from extrapolating recent oil prices weakness far into the future. Chart 2020. The Stage Is Set For A Recovery In Crude Prices Nevertheless, the roughly 30% per annum growth in U.S. crude oil production is unsustainable and, were production to remain near all-time highs and move sideways in 2019, then the growth rate would fall back to the zero line. Such a paring back in the growth rate would likely balance the oil market and pave the way for an oil price recovery (oil production shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 20). This echoes BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service, which continues to forecast higher oil prices into 2019, a forecast which should set the stage for a sustainable rebound next year in S&P energy profits, the opposite of what analysts currently expect (Chart 7). S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) An improving macro environment is reflected in our consumer staples CMI that has vaulted higher in recent months. However, the strong recent relative outperformance has also shown up in our VI which, though still in undervalued territory, has recovered significantly. Our TI has fully recovered and now sends a neutral message (Chart 21). Chart 21S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) The surging S&P household products sector has been carrying the S&P consumer staples index on its back as solid pricing efforts have been dragging results and forward guidance higher. While household product sales have been enjoying a multi-year growth phase (second panel, Chart 22), it has largely been driven by volumes. However, the recent resurgence in pricing power (third panel, Chart 22) has given volume gains an added kick, pushing sales further. Meanwhile, exports have continued their two-year ascent despite the tough currency environment and the upshot is that relative EPS growth will likely remain upbeat (bottom panel, Chart 22). In light of challenged EM consumer spending growth, this signal is very encouraging. Chart 22Household Products Is Carrying Staples S&P Health Care (Neutral) Our health care CMI has been treading water recently. Further, a recovery in pharma stocks has taken our VI from undervalued to a neutral position, while our TI sends a distinctly bearish message as health care stocks have been overbought (Chart 23). Chart 23S&P Health Care (Neutral) Healthcare stocks have outperformed in the back half of 2018. Recently a merger mania that has swept through the pharma and biotech spaces has underpinned relative share prices. The last three months have seen an explosion of deals, including the largest biopharma deal ever (Bristol-Myers Squibb buying Celgene for approximately $90 billion) with other global deals falling not too far behind (Takeda buying Shire for $62 billion mid-last year). Such exuberance has clearly confirmed that merger premia are alive and well in the S&P pharma index. It is not merely rising premia that have taken pharma higher either. Pricing power has entered the early innings of a recovery (top panel, Chart 24) while the key export channel points to increasingly bright days ahead (second panel, Chart 24). However, the rise of regulatory pressure from the Trump administration may cause better pricing to prove fleeting. Chart 24Merger Mania In Pharma Further, pharma’s consolidation phase has come at a cost to sector leverage ratios that have dramatically expanded (bottom panel, Chart 24). Such profligacy may come to haunt the sector should the pricing power recovery falter. S&P Technology (Neutral) Our technology CMI has been moving laterally for the better part of the last three years, though the S&P technology index has ignored the macro headwinds and soared higher over that time. Our VI remains on the overvalued side of neutral, despite the recent tech selloff while our TI has been retrenching into oversold territory (Chart 25). Chart 25S&P Technology (Neutral) Until the end of last year, we maintained a barbell portfolio within the sector by recommending an overweight position in the late-cyclical and capex-driven technology hardware, storage & peripherals and software indexes while recommending an underweight position in the early-cyclical semi and semi equipment indexes. However, we recently upgraded the niche semi equipment to overweight for three reasons. First, trade policy uncertainty has dealt a blow to this tech subindex. Not only are 90% of sales foreign sourced, but a large chunk is also China-related sales. Second, emerging market financial indicators are showing some signs of life, underscoring that semi equipment demand may turn out to be marginally less grim than currently anticipated (second panel, Chart 26). Third, long term semi equipment EPS growth estimates have recently collapsed to a level far below the broad market, indicating that the sell side has thrown in the towel on this niche sector (third panel, Chart 26). Chart 26A Bottom In Semi Equipment Overall, and despite our more bullish view on semi equipment, we continue to recommend a neutral weighting in S&P technology. S&P Utilities (Underweight) Our utilities CMI has recovered recently, bouncing off its 25-year low, driven by the modest easing in interest rates, (Chart 27). This has also manifested in a recovery in the S&P utilities index as this fixed income proxy has reacted to the recent fall in Treasury yields (change in yields shown inverted, top panel, Chart 28) and jump in natural gas prices. Further, utilities are typically seen as a domestic defensive play and the recent trade troubles have made utilities soar in a flight to safety. Chart 27S&P Utilities (Underweight) We think the tailwinds lifting utilities are transitory and likely to shift to headwinds. First, one of our key themes for the back half of the year is rising interest rates; a move higher in yields will have a predictably negative impact on these high-dividend paying equities. Second, a flight to safety looks fleeting; the ISM manufacturing new orders index usually moves inversely in lock step with utilities and the most recent message is negative for the S&P utilities index (ISM manufacturing new orders index shown inverted, second panel, Chart 28). Meanwhile, S&P utilities earnings estimates have continued to trail the broad market, having taken a significant step down this year (third panel, Chart 28). Chart 28Rising Rates In Late-2019 Will Be A Headwind For Utilities Our VI and TI share this bearish message as the VI is deeply overvalued and the TI is in overbought territory (Chart 27). S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Our real estate CMI has recently started to turn up, though this is off the near decade-low set last year and remains deeply depressed relative to history (Chart 29). This is principally the result of the backup in interest rates since late last year and the lift they have given to the sector, which has been a relative outperformer over the past six months (top panel, Chart 30). Much like the S&P utilities sector in the previous section, and in the context of BCA’s higher interest rate view, we continue to avoid this sector. Chart 29S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Along with the modest reprieve in borrowing rates, multi family construction continues unabated (second panel, Chart 30), likely driven by all-time highs in CRE prices (third panel, Chart 30). In the absence of an outright contraction in construction, recent weakening in occupancy (bottom panel, Chart 30) will likely prove deflationary to rents, and thus profit prospects. Chart 30Falling Occupancy Will Hurt REIT Profits Our VI suggests that REITs are modestly overvalued, though the recent outperformance has driven our TI to an overbought condition (Chart 29). S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Our consumer discretionary CMI has ticked up recently, pushed higher by resiliency in consumer data. However, the S&P consumer discretionary index has clearly responded, pushing against 40-year highs relative to the S&P 500 and taking our VI to two standard deviations above fair value (Chart 31). Much of this should be attributed to Amazon (roughly 30% of the S&P consumer discretionary index) and their exceptional 12% outperformance relative to the broad market over the past year. Chart 31S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) While we have an underweight recommendation on the S&P consumer discretionary index, we have varying intra-segment preferences, highlighted by the recent inception of a pair trade going long homebuilders and short home improvement retailers (HIR). Housing starts and building permits are extremely sensitive to interest rates, depend on first time home buyers and move in lockstep with the homeownership rate. Currently, interest rates are easing, the homeownership rate is coming out of its GFC funk and first time home buyers are slated to make a comeback this spring selling season. This is a boon for homebuilders at the expense of HIR (top & middle panels, Chart 32). Further, the price of lumber is a key determinant of relative profitability: lumber represents an input cost to homebuilders whereas it is an important selling item in Big Box building & supply retailers that make a set margin on it. The recent drubbing in lumber prices should ease margin pressures on homebuilders but eat into HIR profits (momentum in lumber prices shown inverted and advanced in bottom panel, Chart 32). Chart 32Long Homebuilders / Short Home Improvement Retailers S&P Communication Services (Underweight) As the newly-minted communication services has little more than four months of existence, we do not have adequate history to create a cyclical macro indicator. However, we have created Chart 33 with a number of valuation indicators, though we caution that they too are less reliable than the other indicators presented in the preceding pages, owing to a dearth of history. Chart 33S&P Communication Services (Underweight) Rather, we refer readers to our still-fresh initiation of coverage on the sector3 and look forward to being able to deliver something more substantive in the future. Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years (Chart 34). Despite the neutral CMI reading, we downgraded small caps in the middle of last year,4 and moved to a large cap preference, based on the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers (bottom panel, Chart 35). This size bias remains a high conviction call for 2019. Chart 34Favor Large Vs. Small Caps Macro data too has turned against small caps. Recent NFIB surveys have shown that small business optimism has continued to fall through the end of the year, albeit from a very high level (top panel, Chart 35). This has coincided with the continued slide of small cap stocks relative to their large cap peers. Chart 35Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem Further, the percentage of small businesses with planned labor compensation increases continues to set new all-time highs and deviates substantially from the national trend (second panel, Chart 35). This divergence becomes more worrying when plotted against those same firms increasing prices (third panel, Chart 35), which has trailed for some time and recently flattened. The inference is that margin pressure is intensifying and likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In the context of the absence of small cap balance sheet discipline during the past five years, ongoing large cap outperformance seems ever more likely. Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “ Catharsis,” dated January 14, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “ Don't Fight The PBoC,” dated February 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, “New Lines Of Communication,” dated October 1, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, “Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem,” dated May 10, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Despite a stellar Q3 earnings print, the S&P 500 had a terrible October as EPS continues to do the hard work in lifting the market (Chart 1). Chart 1EPS Doing The Heavy Lifting We bought the dip,1 consistent with our view of deploying longer term oriented capital were a 10% pullback to occur, given our view of no recession for the next 9 to 12 months.2 Financials and industrials should lead the next leg up and we believe a rotation into these beaten up stocks is going to materialize in the coming months. On the flip side, as volatility is making a comeback and the fed is on a path to lift rates to 3% by June of next year, fixed income proxies and consumer discretionary stocks should be avoided and a preference for large caps over small caps should be maintained (Chart 2). Chart 2The Return Of Vol May Spoil The Party Further, a valuation reset has taken hold, pushed by the surprising rise of the equity risk premium over the course of the past two years, representing a surge in negative sentiment from investors, despite the usually tight inverse correlation with the ISM, the core sentiment indicator of the manufacturing economy (Chart 3). Chart 3ERP And The Economy Are Inversely Correlated Nevertheless, while everyone is focusing on the euphoric above trend growth of the U.S. economy, a risk lurking beneath the surface is a domestic economic soft patch.3 We have likely stolen demand from the future and brought consumption forward especially with the stock market related fiscal easing that is front loaded to 2018 and less so for next year. On that front our Economic Impulse Indicator is warning that the U.S. economy cannot grow at such a pace, unless a bipartisan divide can be crossed to deliver enough firepower to rekindle GDP growth (Chart 4). Chart 4Economic Impulse Yellow Flag Further, at least part of the blame for higher volatility rests with increasing trade uncertainty as the Trump administration has pursued an aggressive trade policy. Still, the evidence so far indicates that any trade weakness has been borne disproportionately by the rest of the world, to the U.S.' benefit (Charts 5 & 6). Chart 5U.S. Is Winning The Trade War Chart 6U.S. Has The Upper Hand We remain cognizant of a few key risks to our sanguine U.S. equity view. Principal among these is the rising U.S. dollar and its eventual infiltration into S&P 500 earnings, which has thus far been muted (Chart 7). Chart 7Watch The U.S. Dollar Further, a softening housing market bodes ill for U.S. economic growth. This is the first time since the GFC that residential investment's contribution to real GDP growth turned negative for three consecutive quarters (Chart 8). Chart 8Peak Housing Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, "Time To Bargain Hunt," dated October 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "The "FIT" Market," dated October 9, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Critical Reset," dated October 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. S&P Financials (Overweight) Unchanged from its trajectory when we updated our cyclical indicators earlier this year, the S&P financials CMI has continued to accelerate. A historically low unemployment rate, combined with unusually resilient economic growth, underpin the surge in the CMI to its highest levels post-GFC. Further goosing the indicator, particularly with respect to the core banks sub-sector, is the recent rise in Treasury yields and a modest steepening in the yield curve both of which bode well for bank profits. However, financials have not responded to this exceptionally bullish data the way we expected, with worries over future loan growth fully offsetting the positive backdrop; financials have been falling throughout 2018. Still, inflation is threatening to rise (albeit gradually) and a selloff looms in the bond market. We highlighted earlier this fall that sectors who benefit from rising interest rates while serving as inflation hedges should outperform against this backdrop. Cue the return of S&P financials. As shown in Chart 10, the S&P financials index has shown a historically strong positive correlation with interest rates and inflation expectations and we expect the recent divergence to be closed via a catch-up in the former. As noted above, bearishness has reigned in 2018 and the result has been a steep fall in our valuation indicator (VI) to more than one standard deviation below normal while our technical indicator (TI) is deep in oversold territory. Chart 9S&P Financials (Overweight) Chart 10Financials Are Trailing Rates S&P Industrials (Overweight) S&P industrials, much like their cyclical brethren S&P financials, benefit from higher interest rates and also serve as hedges against rising inflation. As we have noted in recent research, industrials are levered to the commodity cycle and thus represent an indirect inflation hedge. This hedge only becomes problematic when industrials stocks are unable to pass these rising commodity costs through to the consumer. As shown in Chart 12, pricing power is not yet an issue for these deep cyclicals. Given the positive macro backdrop for S&P industrials, the CMI has risen to new cyclical highs. Despite the forgoing, fears over trade wars and tariff-driven higher input costs, combined with slowing global demand for capital goods, have weighed on the index. The result is that S&P industrials remain deeply oversold on a technical basis while hovering around the neutral line from a valuation perspective. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. Chart 11S&P Industrials (Overweight) Cjart 12Resilient Industrials Pricing Power S&P Energy (Overweight, High-Conviction) Our energy CMI has moved horizontally since our last update of the cyclical macro indicators. However, this followed a snap-back recovery from the extremely depressed levels of 2016 and 2017. Nevertheless, the S&P energy index has moved sideways in line with the CMI. Energy stocks have significantly trailed crude oil prices since the latter broke out roughly a year ago (Chart 14). Disbelief in the longevity of the increase in oil prices is the likely culprit weighing on the index, along with a bottleneck-induced steep shale oil price discount to WTI. There are high odds that a catch up phase looms, especially if BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service's view of a looming oil price spike materializes, and we reiterate our overweight recommendation. Our VI has been hovering at one standard deviation below fair value, while our TI trending into oversold territory. Chart 13S&P Energy (Overweight, High-Conviction) Chart 14Crude Prices Are Still Leading The Way S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Unchanged from our previous update, our consumer staples CMI has moved sideways, near a depressed level. However, share prices have finally been staging the recovery we have anticipated for several years on the back of firm consumer data, solid sector profitability and an overall cyclical rotation into staples. Despite the recent outperformance, both from an earnings and market perspective, consumer staples remain a deeply unloved sector. With respect to the former, earnings growth has outstripped the market's reaction by a wide margin. This is reflected on our VI which only recently rose from one standard deviation below fair value while our TI has only just begun a retreat from oversold territory. Staples' share of retail sales have arrested their steep declines from 2014-2016, which we view as a precursor to a rebound in weak industry sales (top panel, Chart 16). Exports of consumer staples have already been staging a comeback, despite the strengthening of the U.S. dollar which has historically presaged a relative earnings outperformance (middle panel, Chart 16). Considering the already-strong industry return on equity, any relative earnings gains should result in a valuation rerating (third panel, Chart 16). We reiterate our outperform rating on this cyclically defensive index. Chart 15S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Chart 16Staples Are Making A Comback S&P Health Care (Neutral) In a mid-summer report , we upgraded the S&P pharma and biotech indexes to neutral which, considering their ~50% weight of the S&P health care index, took our overall recommendation on S&P health care to neutral. In the report, we proffered five reasons why the S&P pharma and biotech indexes were set for a rebound following their precipitous decline from 2016 onwards. These were: firming operating metrics, late cycle dynamics, likelihood of pricing power regulatory relief, the rising U.S. dollar and investor and analyst capitulation. Our timing has proved prescient as the S&P pharma index has been dramatically outperforming since the upgrade (top panel, Chart 18). With respect to pharma's operating metrics, our pharma productivity proxy (industrial production / employment) has been soaring, implying that earnings should surge (second panel, Chart 18). This seems particularly likely as the pace of improvement in drug shipments exceeds inventory growth by a fairly wide margin (third and bottom panels, Chart 18). Despite the upbeat backdrop for pharma, our health care CMI has declined modestly, though remains at a neutral level relative to history. Further, the pharma recovery has taken our VI from undervalued to a neutral position, a reading which is echoed by our TI. Chart 17S&P Health Care (Neutral) Chart 18Pharma Strength Is Lifting Health Care S&P Technology (Neutral) The stratospheric rise of tech profits, particularly in the past two years, have done most of the heavy lifting in pulling the S&P 500's profit margin ever higher (second panel, Chart 20) as well as pushing the index itself to new all-time highs in September. The San Francisco Fed's tech pulse index - an index of coincident indicators of technology sector activity - suggests more profit growth is in the offing (third panel, Chart 20), an intimation repeated by our technology CMI. However, we remain cognizant of three material risks to bullishness in tech. First, the tech sector garners 60% of its revenues from abroad and thus the appreciating U.S. dollar is a significant profit headwind (bottom panel, Chart 20). Second, a rising U.S. inflation backdrop along with the related looming selloff in the bond market should knock the wind out of the tech sector's sails. Third, leading indicators of emerging Asian demand are souring rapidly and were the trade war to re-escalate, EM economic data would retrench further. Lastly, neither our VI nor our TI send particularly compelling messages, as both are on the expensive side of neutral, despite the recent tech selloff. We sustain a barbell portfolio within the sector by recommending an overweight position in the late-cyclical and capex-driven technology hardware, storage & peripherals and software indexes while recommending an underweight position in the early-cyclical semi and semi equipment indexes. Chart 19S&P Technology (Neutral) Chart 20Tech Is King But Beware The U.S. Dollar S&P Materials (Neutral) Our materials CMI has recently plumbed new lows, a result of tightening monetary policy and the accompanying selloff in the bond market. As a reminder, the heavyweight chemicals component of the materials index typically sees earnings (and hence stock prices) underperform as real interest rates are moving higher. Despite this negative backdrop, chemicals fundamentals have remained surprisingly resilient. Pricing power has stayed in its multi-year uptrend (second panel, Chart 22) while productivity gains have accelerated, coinciding with an erosion of sell-side bearishness (third panel, Chart 22). Still, chemical production has clearly rolled over (bottom panel, Chart 22) which could lead to a quick reversal of the gains in our productivity proxy and a faltering in rebounding EPS estimates. Combined with BCA's view of rising real interest rates for the next year, this is enough to keep us on the fence. Our VI too shows a neutral reading, though our TI has declined steeply into an oversold position. Chart 21S&P Materials (Neutral) Chart 22Fundamentals In Chemicals Have Improved S&P Utilities (Underweight) Our utilities CMI is at a 25-year low, driven down by the ongoing backup in interest rates. Such a move is predictable, given that utilities stocks are the closest to perfect fixed income proxies in the equity space. The S&P utilities sector has been enjoying a relative resurgence recently, driven by spiking natural gas prices and a supportive electricity demand backdrop from a roaring economy (ISM survey shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 24) and, more than anything, a general market retreat into safe haven assets. We recently trimmed our exposure to the sector from neutral to underweight because the S&P utilities sector was yielding 3.5% and the competing risk free asset was near 3.2% and investors would prefer to shed, at the margin, riskier high-yielding equities and park the proceeds in U.S. Treasurys (top panel, Chart 24). Since the run up in S&P utilities without a corresponding decline in Treasury yields, that spread has narrowed. Neither our VI nor our TI send compelling messages as both are in neutral territory, though our bearish thesis on utilities has less to do with their valuation relative to themselves or other equities than to bonds. Chart 23S&P Utilities (Underweight) Chart 24Utilities Should Still Be Avoided S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Our real estate CMI has reversed a recent recovery to set a new decade low; the only time it has shown a lower reading was during the Great Financial Crisis. Excluding the inflating of the property bubble in advance of the GFC, REITs have had a very tight inverse correlation with UST yields; the resulting downward pressure on the S&P REITs index is thus very predictable (top panel, Chart 26). Much like the S&P utilities sector in the previous section, and in the context of BCA's higher interest rate view, we continue to avoid this sector. The rate-driven downward pressure could be overlooked if all was well on an operating basis but this is not the case. Non-residential construction continues to rise (albeit more slowly than last year) in the face of higher borrowing rates (second panel, Chart 26). Further, demand looks slack as occupancy rates clearly crested at the beginning of last year (bottom panel, Chart 26). As well, on the residential front, multi-family housing starts remain elevated which should prove deflationary to rents. Our VI suggests that REITs are fairly valued, which is somewhat surprising given the negative backdrop, while our TI echoes a neutral view. Chart 25S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Chart 26A Bearish Backdrop For REITs S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) While we remain constructive on financials that benefit from higher rates, we continue to recommend investors avoid the consumer discretionary sector - the other early cyclical - that suffers when interest rates rise. The second panel of Chart 28 depicts this inverse correlation consumer discretionary equities have with interest rates, especially the fed funds rate. Most discretionary equites are levered off of floating rates and thus any increase in the fed funds rates gets reflected immediately in banks' prime lending rate. Also, most consumer debt is floating rate debt and thus tighter monetary conditions, at the margin, dampen consumer debt uptake and as a knock off on effect, weigh on discretionary consumer outlays. Not only are higher interest rates anchoring consumer discretionary stocks but rising energy prices are also dealing a blow to this sector. We show our Consumer Drag Indicator (CDI, comprising mortgage rates and energy prices) in the bottom panel of Chart 28. Historically, our CDI has been an excellent leading indicator of relative share price momentum. Currently, the message is clear: the sinking CDI signals that a bear market in consumer discretionary stocks has likely commenced. All of this is captured by our CMI which has been sinking since the beginning of the year. Meanwhile, our VI has broken out to nearly its highest level ever which we believe is largely a function of the decreasing diversification of the S&P consumer discretionary index as AMZN now represents more than 30% of its market value following the redistribution of the media indexed to the new S&P communication services index. Our TI has been falling from overbought territory recently and now sends a neutral message. Chart 27S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Chart 28Higher Rates Spell Declines For Consumer Discretionary S&P Communication Services (Underweight) As the newly-minted communication services has little more than a month of existence, we do not have adequate history to create a cyclical macro indicator. However, we have created Chart 29 below with a number of valuation indicators, though we caution that they too are less reliable than the other indicators presented in the preceding pages, owing to a dearth of history. Rather, we refer readers to our still-fresh initiation of coverage on the sector and look forward to being able to deliver something more substantive in the future. Chart 29S&P Communication Services (Underweight) Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years. Despite the neutral CMI reading, we downgraded small caps earlier this year , and moved to a large cap preference, based on the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers (top and second panels, Chart 31). We expect the divergence in leverage and stock price to be rationalized as it usually has: via a fall in the latter. Considering the dramatic valuation gap that has opened between large and small caps, particularly on a Shiller P/E (or cyclically adjusted P/E, CAPE) basis (bottom panel, Chart 31), no space remains for any small cap profit mishaps. Our VI is trending towards small caps being undervalued, though without conviction while our TI is hovering in the neutral zone. Chart 30Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Chart 31Too Much Debt And High Valuations Should Hurt Small Caps
Special Report Dear Client, I had the pleasure of participating in the Affin Hwang Capital conference in Kuala Lumpur on November 8th. In addition to sharing my views on today's macro environment, I discussed BCA's recent successes in developing quant-based solutions for bottom-up stock picking and market timing. I have transcribed my remarks on the latter topic below. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature The Arithmetic Of Active Management Every active investor wants to outperform the market. Unfortunately, just like everyone cannot be above-average in height, beauty, or intelligence, not every investor can outperform their benchmark. I think very few people in the audience would dispute this assertion. What could be more surprising to some of you is the following claim, which is that active investors as a group will always underperform the market. I say this not because I have any ill will towards active investors. I'm an active investor myself. I say this simply because it is a mathematical tautology. As Bill Sharpe has emphasized, the market return is simply the weighted average of the returns that passive and active investors earn before fees.1 The passive return must, by definition, equal the market return. This necessarily implies that the average active return must also equal the market return. Since active investors incur higher costs than passive investors, the former group will always underperform the latter group on average. That's the bad news. The good news is that not all active investors are the same. Some are better than others, and while it is not easy, it is possible to isolate certain strategies that active managers employ that help them outperform the market. Before I discuss these strategies, let me make a generic point, which is that most so-called active investors are not particularly active. In fact, according to one academic paper, the fraction of truly active investors - those whose returns deviate significantly from the market benchmark - shrank from 60% in 1980 to less than 20% in 2009 (Chart 1). In contrast to active investors whose portfolio returns broadly mimic the market's, genuinely active investors typically outperform their benchmarks (Chart 2).2 Chart 1How Active Are Active Investors? Chart 2Active Stock Pickers Outperform What are successful active investors doing to beat their benchmark? Well, first of all, let me tell you what they are not doing: They are not taking on more risk. Don't Bet On Beta Chart 3 shows that there is no clear relationship between a stock's beta and its expected return.3 To those familiar with the CAPM model, this may be surprising. The CAPM model predicts that higher-beta stocks will earn superior returns because they are riskier. High-beta stocks outperform the market when the market is going up, but underperform the market when it is going down. Since the market tends to go up more often than it goes down, the expected return to high-beta stocks should exceed the expected return to low-beta stocks. Chart 3Don't Bet On Beta As I will discuss, the reason this theoretical prediction is refuted by the empirical evidence is because the market is rife with inefficiencies. What is more, these inefficiencies reflect pervasive institutional and behavioral biases that are engrained within the market's very own DNA. Active managers who understand these biases can exploit them to outperform their benchmarks. Let me start with the former: institutional biases. The investment industry often encourages a "heads I win, tails you lose" mentality: If a fund manager takes on a lot of risk and gets lucky, he or she will be well remunerated; if the manager is unlucky, he or she may have to look for a new job, but the primary losers will be the clients of the fund. Such an incentive structure encourages managers to take on excessive risk by purchasing, among other things, high-beta stocks. This bids up the price of these stocks to the point where they no longer offer enough additional return to compensate for their higher risk. Size And Value If buying high-beta stocks simply adds more risk without generating more reward, what types of stocks do outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis? Much of the early academic literature focused on two factors: size and value. Historically, it has been the case that small caps and value stocks have outperformed large caps and growth stocks. Some academics have offered risk-based explanations for the size and value effects. Personally, I find these explanations unconvincing, especially in the case of value stocks. The main problem with risk-based arguments is that they fail to convincingly identify the nature of the risk that investors who purchase value stocks are being compensated for. It is certainly not market risk - value stocks tend to be low beta (Chart 4). Revealingly, companies that do face greater existential risks - those that have high levels of debt relative to equity, for example - tend to underperform the market.4 This is exactly the opposite of what risk-based arguments would predict. Chart 4Value Tends To Outperform Growth When The Stock Market Is Falling The presence of market inefficiencies provides a more compelling explanation for why small caps and value stocks outperform. Consider two companies, identical in every way except that one has a lower market capitalization than the other. Since the only difference between the two companies is the price of their shares, the "cheaper" company will generate higher returns for shareholders over the long haul. The cheaper, smaller capitalization company will also initially trade at a lower price-to-earnings and price-to-book ratio. In other words, it will look more like a small cap value stock. Thus, it is not necessary to invoke complex, risk-based explanations for why small caps and value stock outperform. It is exactly what one would expect if markets are not perfectly efficient. Ignore The Analysts? Of course, some stocks are cheap for a reason. How can we distinguish between hidden gems and fool's gold? Wall Street is populated with thousands of analysts paid to make that determination. But are they any good? For the most part, the answer is no. Chart 5 shows analysts' published earnings forecasts versus realized earnings growth. Analysts have had some success at predicting earnings growth over a one-to-two year horizon, but are almost useless over a five-year horizon.5 In fact, large cap companies favoured by analysts tend to underperform companies that analysts pan. Chart 5A Mug's Game There are two exceptions to this rule. The first applies to small caps. Since many smaller companies are not widely followed, analysts that do follow them often add significant value. Unlike their large cap brethren, small cap stocks with buy recommendations tend to outperform stocks with sell recommendations. Second, changes in analyst recommendations do predict returns. Stocks that have recently been upgraded tend to outperform those that have recently been downgraded.6 Insiders And Short Interest How about insiders? Here, the data suggests that insiders know what they are doing. The shares of companies with a lot of insider buying tend to rise more than those that have experienced insider selling. Short interest also predicts returns. Heavily-shorted companies tend to underperform companies that have attracted few short sellers. Combining data on insider activity and short interest can help supercharge returns. Chart 6 shows the highest returns are earned when insiders are buying and short interest is decreasing.7 The worst-performing stocks end up belonging to companies where insiders are heavy sellers and short interest has risen over the prior 12 months. Chart 6Prefer Stocks Where Insiders Are Buying And Short Interest Is Falling Mo' Money What about technical analysis? The academic literature on this topic is a mixed bag, with some studies deeming it useless and others suggesting it can be useful in certain situations. For most technical indicators, the noise-to-signal ratio is very high. Nevertheless, some technical indicators are worth following. Momentum is one of them (Chart 7). Over short-term horizons of about one month, mean reversion prevails - stocks that did well over the prior month tend to do poorly during the subsequent month. In contrast, over medium-term horizons of about 12 months, return continuation is the name of the game - stocks that have done well over the last 12 months tend to do well during the subsequent month. Interestingly, at very long time horizons of three-to-five years, mean reversion takes over again: Stocks that have done well over the last five years tend to do poorly over the subsequent month. The implication is that the best stocks are those that have underperformed the market over the past one month and over the past three years, but have outperformed the market over the past 12 months. Chart 7The Three Phases Of Momentum Putting aside the short-term reversal effect which, in practice, is hard to exploit due to trading costs, what are the drivers of the medium-term return continuation effect and the longer-term return reversal effect? I think three factors explain the medium-term return continuation effect. The first is institutional inertia. A large money manager cannot instantly jump in and out of a position. It may take many months to build a position to its desired size and just as much time to liquidate it. Persistent buying and selling generates momentum in equity returns. The second factor is imperfect information. A lot of the return continuation effect occurs around the time of earnings reports. If a company reports better-than-expected earnings, its stock goes up. As others hear about and process the good news, the stock usually continues to advance over the subsequent days. The third factor is behavioral biases. People tend to be quite eager to lock in gains but are usually reluctant to realize losses. When a company reports good news, investors are too quick to sell. This premature selling prevents the stock price from rising to its fair value instantaneously. During the time it takes the stock to reach fair value, the share price displays upward momentum. Conversely, when the company reports bad news, investors avoid taking losses, hoping instead that some miracle will bail them out. The lack of willing sellers prevents the stock from falling to its fair value immediately. In the time it takes investors to come to terms with the fact that a miracle is not forthcoming, the share price displays downward momentum. What about the longer-term return-reversal effect? Ironically, it is probably a function of the medium-term return continuation effect. Upward momentum attracts interest from trend-following investors. People who sold too early or never got in from the beginning kick themselves and look for the slightest dip to buy. All this buying interest eventually pushes the stock price above its fair value, setting the stage for a prolonged period of subpar returns. Anomalies Abound Let me briefly mention a few other factors that predict equity returns. Share turnover is one of them. Investors often presume that high turnover is intrinsically a good thing. Terms such as "healthy volume" abound. The truth is that companies with low rates of share turnover actually outperform the market, all things equal.8 Part of this outperformance reflects a liquidity premium. Part of it may also simply reflect the fact that undervalued companies often hide in the shadows of the market, away from the spotlight. There are also balance sheet and earnings quality factors that are worth highlighting. I already mentioned that companies with high debt-to-equity ratios tend to underperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis. It is also true that companies with high accruals - firms that fail to convert most of their earnings into cash flow - underperform the market. More surprisingly, companies whose assets have been growing very quickly also tend to underperform the market. Such asset growth often ends up reflecting empire building rather than prudent corporate management. Relatedly, a significant dispersion in analyst earnings estimates is often a red flag.9 Companies with something good to say usually say it. Companies that do not have much good to say often clam up, leading to greater uncertainty about their earnings prospects. When analysts have little visibility on what earnings a company is poised to deliver, be careful. Picking Stocks With ETS I have discussed a variety of factors that help predict the performance of individual stocks. There are dozens of others that I could have mentioned but did not. Clearly, successful bottom-up investing requires that one sort through a lot of information. What one would like is a system that distills all this information into a single score that ranks stocks from best to worst. The ideal system should dynamically adjust factor weightings to account for the fact that there is momentum in factor returns. For example, if value stocks have recently been doing well, they are likely to continue to do well. At BCA Research, we have constructed our Equity Trading Strategy (ETS) to do just that.10 Chart 8 shows the backtested returns of the ETS model. As you can see, they are quite impressive. Chart 8ETS Model Back Tested Performance To Date I have been personally trading a variant of the ETS model for the past 18 years and once wrote a blog chronicling the journey.11 I have added a line in the chart that shows my own personal performance on a pre-tax basis inclusive of brokerage commissions and other trading costs. I typically hold about 30 to 50 stocks. Except in very rare cases, I don't let any single stock exceed five percent of my portfolio. I normally hold a cash cushion of about 10%-to-15%, although occasionally, as in late 2008/early 2009, I have bought stocks on margin. I have lost a lot of money shorting stocks, so I rarely do it. I am not sure how lucky I have been over the years or how scalable my results are - I generally invest only in small cap companies that most money managers would not touch. But it does give you a sense of what is possible with this system. Market Timing With MacroQuant Of course, stock selection is only one half of a successful investment formula. The other half is market-timing - knowing when to scale back or increase exposure to the stock market. That's where our soon-to-be-released MacroQuant model comes in. The model uses over 100 variables on the economy, financial and monetary conditions, sentiment, and valuations to predict the direction of the stock market. Chart 9 shows the back-tested performance of the model. Chart 9MacroQuant* Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted What is MacroQuant saying today? The signal from the model moved into bearish territory in the lead up to October's correction and continues to flag downside risks to stocks. This is mainly because the leading economic data has softened outside the United States, and more recently, in the U.S. itself. Financial conditions have also tightened on the back of rising bond yields, wider credit spreads, and a stronger dollar. Sentiment enters our model in both level and directional terms. We have found that the best configuration for stocks is when sentiment is bearish but improving while the worst configuration is when sentiment is bullish but deteriorating. Going into October, sentiment began to slip from very bullish levels, which was a warning sign for stocks. Valuations have improved over the past month, but still remain somewhat stretched by historic standards. We do not believe that we are at the beginning of a bear market in stocks. However, our model does suggest that the correction may have further to run. With that, let me conclude my formal remarks, and open it up to questions. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 William F. Sharpe, "The Arithmetic of Active Management," The Financial Analysts Journal 47:1 (January/February 1991): 7-9. 2 Antti Petajisto, "Active Share And Mutual Fund Performance," Financial Analysts Journal 69:4 (July/August 2013): 73-93. 3 Andrea Frazzini And Lasse Heje Pedersen, "Betting Against Beta," Journal Of Financial Economics 111:1 (January 2014): 1-25. 4 John Y. Campbell, Jens Hilscher, and Jan Szilagy, "In Search Of Distress Risk," The Journal of Finance 63:6, (December 2008): 2899-2939. 5 Louis K. C. Chan, Jason Karceski, And Josef Lakonishok, "The Level And Persistence Of Growth Rates," The Journal Of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2003): 643-684. 6 Ireneus Stanislawek, "Are Stock Recomemndations Useful?"1741 Asset Management Ltd Research Note Series, (IV 2012). 7 Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, And H. Nejat Seyhun, "Do Short Sellers Trade On Private Information Or False Information?"Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.53, 3 (2018): 997-1023. 8 Vinay T. Datar, Naik Y. Narayan, and Robert Radcliffe, "Liquidity And Stock Returns: An Alternative Test," Journal of Financial Markets 1:2, (1998): pp. 203-219; and Charles M.C. Lee and Bhaskaran Swaminathan, "Price Momentum And Trading Volume," The Journal of Finance 55:5, (October 2000): 2017-2069. 9 David Veenman and Patrick Verwijmeren, "Earnings Expectations And The Dispersion Anomaly," (January 2015). 10 Please see Global Investment Strategy and Equity Trading Strategy Special Report, "Introducing ETS: A Top-Down Approach To Bottom-Up Stock Picking," dated December 3, 2015. 11 My now-defunct blog, stockcoach.blogspot.com, discussed my real-time trading progress between 2004 and 2007. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Overbought technicals, pricey valuations, decelerating global growth, declining capex, rising indebtedness and softening operating metrics argue for hopping off the S&P railroads index. Rising refined product stocks, ebbing gasoline demand, and excessive analyst profit optimism underscore that more pain lies ahead for refiners. Recent Changes Book profits of 15% in the S&P railroads index and downgrade to neutral today. TABLE 1 FEATURE Equities continue to digest the recent healthy pullback, and should remain range-bound before building a base in order to resume their bull market run. As we highlighted in our October 9thWeekly Report, "stock market crash-prone October is upon us, and thus a pick-up in volatility would not come as a surprise".1 Simply put, the difference between perception and reality propagates as volatility. Volatility has indeed come roaring back. There are high odds that vol will settle at a higher level, and bouts of volatility will be more frequent. The most important determinant of vol is interest rates, as we first highlighted on March 5th this year.2 For almost a decade, the Fed kept the fed funds rate close to zero in order to suppress volatility. QE and excess liquidity injections into the financial system and in the economy also aided in bringing down volatility across assets classes. Now this process is working in reverse. Not only is the Fed tightening monetary policy by increasing the fed funds rate, but it is also allowing maturing bonds to fall off its balance sheet (what some market participants have defined as quantitative tightening). In other words, as the Fed is mopping up excess liquidity, volatility is making a comeback (Chart 1). Chart 1VIX The Comeback Kid A relatively flat yield curve also points to higher volatility in the months ahead. This relationship is intuitive, given that a flat curve signals that the cycle is long in the tooth and a recession may be approaching. While both of these interest rate relationships with vol have a long lead time, the message is clear: investors should get accustomed to higher volatility at this stage of the cycle (yield curve shown on inverted scale, Chart 2). Chart 2Yield Curve And Vol Joined At The Hip Following up from last week, our Economic Impulse Indicator (EII) caught the attention of a number of our clients, igniting a healthy exchange. One criticism is that this Indicator has had some big misses in the past. This is true, but the recent history (since mid-1990s) has enjoyed an extremely high correlation. Importantly, if we show SPX profits as an impulse, the fit with the EII increases considerably (bottom panel, Chart 3). In addition, the EII moves in lockstep with the impulse of S&P 500 momentum (second panel, Chart 3). Chart 3Economic Impulse Yellow Flag Nevertheless, our worry remains intact and the risk of modest economic disappointment sometime early next year is rising (Chart 4). On that front, another indicator that continues to show signs of stress is the credit card chargeoff rate of U.S. commercial banks, excluding the 100 largest outfits. According to the Fed, both delinquencies and chargeoffs are near recessionary levels, a message large banks do not corroborate, at least not yet (Chart 5). Chart 4Economic Growth Trouble Chart 5Watch Credit Quality True, we do not think the consumer is at the cusp of retrenching as a tight labor market and rising wage inflation should boost disposable income, but rising interest rates are a clear headwind. Importantly, the fact that regional banks are sniffing out some credit quality trouble is disconcerting especially given the recent anecdote of commercial real estate (CRE) chargeoffs at Bank OZK, a regional bank that epitomizes the CRE excesses of the current cycle. We will continue to monitor our Indicators for further evidence of deteriorating credit quality. While all these risks are worrisome, and a surge in the U.S. dollar is a key EPS risk for 2019, last Friday we triggered our "buy the dip" strategy for long-term oriented capital that we have been touting recently - as the SPX hit the 10% drawdown mark since the late-September peak - predicated on BCA's view of no recession in the coming 12 months.3 In fact, none of the boxes in the three signposts we track to call the end of the cycle have been checked yet (please refer to last week's report for a recap).4 In addition, the multiple has reset significantly lower (down 20% from the cyclical peak set in January) flirting with the late-2015/early-2016 lows (Chart 6), leaving the onus on EPS to do the heavy lifting. Chart 6Wholesale Liquidation Should Bring Out Bargain Hunters On that front, Q3 earnings season has been solid, despite the input cost inflation worries that MMM and CAT rekindled recently (please look forward to reading next week's pricing power update where we gauge if the U.S. corporate sector will be in a position to pass on input cost inflation down the supply chain or to the consumer). This week we downgrade a transportation sub-group that has been on fire, and update our view on an energy index we continue to dislike. Time To Get Off The Rails We have been riding the rails juggernaut for roughly 16 months, but the time has come to get off board. Chart 7 shows that technical conditions are overbought and relative valuations are pricey, hovering near previous extremes as investors are extrapolating good times far into the future. Such euphoric readings have historically been synonymous with a high relative performance mark for this key transportation sub-index and are a cause for concern. Chart 7Overvalued And Overbought We do not want to overstay our welcome on the S&P rails index for a number of reasons. First, its is quite perplexing why this capital intensive industry has been cutting capex as the rest of the non-financial corporate sector has been growing gross fixed capital formation at near double-digit rates (second panel, Chart 8). Chart 8Capex Blues Adding insult to injury, railroad CEOs have been changing the capital structure of their respective firms by borrowing extensively in order to retire equity (in order to satisfy shareholders) and thus artificially massaging EPS higher. Going through the recent history of the constituents' financial statements is worrying. Net debt-to-EBITDA is up 75% since early-2015 near 2.2x and higher than the overall market, largely driven by rising indebtedness (Chart 8). Taken together, lack of investment and a higher debt burden are painting a grim backdrop, especially if cash flow growth suffers a mishap. Second, the global manufacturing outlook has downshifted on the back of Trump's trade rhetoric and China's larger than anticipated slowdown. Tack on our souring margin proxy and relative EPS euphoria resting mostly on equity retirement is under attack (second panel, Chart 9). Chart 9Warning Signals... Third, two of our key industry Indicators have suddenly turned south. Our Railroad Indicator has dropped into the contraction zone and our Rail Shipment Diffusion Indicator has fallen off a cliff lately (Chart 10). The implication is that rail freight demand is likely on the verge of cresting. Chart 10...Abound... Fourth, industry operating metrics are deteriorating, at the margin. Intermodal rail shipments have rolled over. In fact, toppy consumer confidence alongside decreasing traffic at the Port of Los Angeles signal that the path of least resistance is lower for this key rail freight category, comprising 50% of total carloads (Chart 11). In addition, coal shipments are moribund, despite the recent slingshot recovery in natural gas prices that should have enticed utilities to switch out of nat gas and into coal for electricity generation (not shown). Chart 11...Even In Intermodel... However, there are some positive offsets that prevent us from turning outright bearish on the S&P rails index. This transportation sub group is an oligopoly and is in the driver's seat with regard to pricing power (middle panel, Chart 12). In other words, it has the ability to pass rising diesel costs through to its clients as a fuel surcharge. Alternative modes of transportation like air freight and trucking are available, at least for some rail categories, but the switching costs are typically prohibitive and the relative price advantages few and far between. Chart 12...But There Are Offsets Further, rail pricing power is a key input to our railroad EPS model and the message from our model is that EPS have more upside, at least until Q1/2019. Thus, we refrain from swinging all the way to a below benchmark allocation. Adding it up, overbought technicals, pricey valuations, declining capex rising indebtedness and softening operating metrics argue for hopping off the rails. Bottom Line: Lock in gains of 15% since inception in the S&P rails index and downgrade to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU. Refiners Crack Under Pressure Pure-play refiners remain our sole underweight within the energy space, and despite recent M&A activity, they have trailed the broad market by 9% since the early-July inception. More downside looms, and we continue to recommend a below benchmark allocation in the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index. We remain puzzled with sell-side analysts' extreme long-term EPS euphoria in this niche energy space. Historically, when an index catapults to a 25%/annum 5-year forward EPS growth rate, it is time to run for cover: the tech sector in the late 1990s, biotech stocks in the early-2000s and in 2014 and, most recently, semi equipment stocks in late-2017 all painfully demonstrate that stocks hit a wall when profit euphoria is so elevated (bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 13Too Good To Be True Refiners are currently trading at a 45%/annum long-term EPS growth rate. While at first we thought base effects were the culprit, a closer inspection reveals that those effects were filtered out late last year and the recent increase in expected growth rate from 20% to north of 45% defies logic (middle panel, Chart 13). We expect a sharp revision to a rate below the broad market in the coming months, as refining stocks also continue to correct lower. There are a few reasons why we anticipate such a gravitational pull back down to earth. Refined product consumption is falling and that exerts a downward pull on refining profitability. This letdown in demand is materializing at a time when gasoline inventories are rising at a high mid-single digit rate (gasoline inventories shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 14). Chart 14Bearish Supply Demand Backdrop Not only have light vehicle sales crested, but also vehicle miles driven are flirting with the contraction zone, weighing heavily on gasoline demand prospects (second panel, Chart 15). Chart 15No Valuation Cushion Ultimately, pricing discovery resolves any supply/demand imbalances and most evidence currently points to at least an easing in crack spreads. Chart 16 highlights that crude oil inventories are trailing the buildup in refined products stocks and that is pressuring refining margins. Chart 16Mixed Signals... The implication is that refining industry profits will underwhelm, which will catch investors and analysts by surprise given their near and long-term optimistic EPS assessment. If our weak profit backdrop pans out, then a lack of a valuation cushion suggests that relative share prices will likely suffer a significant drawdown (bottom panel, Chart 15). Nevertheless, there are two related positive offsets. And, if they were to persist then our bearish view on refiners would be offside. The widening Brent-WTI crude oil spread suggests that crack spreads could reverse course if it stays stubbornly elevated. This wide oil price differential has pushed refining net exports close to all-time highs and represents a profit relief valve as the energy space has, up to now, escaped the trade wars unscathed (Chart 17). Chart 17...On Crack Spreads Netting it out, rising refined product stocks, softening gasoline demand, and excessive analyst profit optimism underscore that more pain lies ahead for refiners. Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5OILR - PSX, VLO, MPC and HFC. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, "The "FIT" Market" dated October 9, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 10 Reasons We Still Like Banks" dated March 5, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight, "Time To Bargain Hunt" dated October 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, "Icarus Moment?" dated October 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Special Report As promised in early September, this is the third installment of our four part Indicators series. In this Special Report, we follow a similar script to Part II but instead of sectors, we now cover the S&P 500, non-financial equities, cyclicals/defensives, small/large and growth/value, and document the most important Indicators in the same four broad categories (where applicable): earnings, financial statement reported data, valuations and technicals. Once again this is by no means exhaustive, but contains a plethora of Indicators we deem significant in aiding us in our decision making process of setting/changing a view on the overall market, cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent, and size and style preference. As a reminder, the charts in this Special Report are also available through BCA's Analytics platform for seamless continual updates. Finally, we are still aiming before the end of 2018, to conclude our Indicators series with Part IV that would feature our most sought after Macro Indicators per the eleven GICS1 S&P 500 sectors, along with value/growth, small/large and cyclicals/defensives. We trust you will find this comprehensive Indicator chartbook useful and insightful. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Dulce Cruz, Senior Analyst dulce@bcaresearch.com S&P 500 Chart 1S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 2S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 3S&P 500: ROE And Its Components Chart 4S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 5S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 6S&P 500: Valuation Indicators Chart 7S&P 500: Technical Indicators Non-Financial Broad Market Chart 8U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: ROE And Its Components Chart 9U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 10U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 11U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Valuation Indicators Chart 12U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Technical Indicators S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives Chart 13Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Chart 14Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Chart 15Cyclicals Vs Defensives: ROE And Its Components Chart 16Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 17Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 18Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Valuation Indicators Chart 19Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Technical Indicators S&P 600 Vs. S&P 500 Chart 20S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 21S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 22S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Valuation Indicators Chart 23S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs. Value Chart 24S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Earnings Indicators Chart 25S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Earnings Indicators Chart 26S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Valuation Indicators Chart 27S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Technical Indicators Table 1S&P 500 Growth/S&P 500 Value Sector Comparison Table Table 2S&P 600/S&P 500 Sector Comparison Table