Technology
Dear Client, This is our final publication for the year. We will be back on January 5th. On behalf of the entire Global Investment Strategy team, I would like to wish you a Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and a Prosperous New Year! Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Global bonds have sold off in recent days, but the spread between long-term and short-term Treasury yields remains well below where it was at the start of the year. A flatter Treasury yield curve suggests that the ongoing U.S. business-cycle expansion is getting long in the tooth. Nevertheless, three factors dilute the potentially bearish message from the curve. First, the yield curve has flattened largely because short-term rate expectations have risen thanks to better economic data. Second, both the 10-year/2-year and 10-year/3-month spreads are still above levels that have foreshadowed poor returns for risk assets in the past. This is particularly true for equities. Third, a structurally low term premium has distorted the signal from the yield curve. The U.S. yield curve is likely to steepen over the next six months, before flattening again in the lead-up to a recession in late-2019. We reveal the One Number that will kill bitcoin. Feature A Harbinger Of Recession? The U.S. yield curve has steepened in recent days, but is still much flatter than it was at the start of the year. The 10-year/3-month spread currently stands at 113 bps, down 84 bps year-to-date. The 10-year/2-year spread has fallen from 125 bps to 62 bps. Numerous academic studies have highlighted the importance of the yield curve as a leading indicator of recessions.1 In fact, every U.S. recession over the past 50 years has been preceded by an inverted yield curve (Chart 1). Chart 1An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession The converse has generally been true as well: Most inversions in the yield curve have coincided with a recession. The only two exceptions were in 1967 - when credit conditions tightened and industrial production decelerated, but the U.S. still managed to avoid succumbing to a recession - and in 1998, when the yield curve briefly inverted during the LTCM crisis. Considering that recessions and equity bear markets typically overlap (Chart 2), it is not surprising that investors have begun to fret about what a flatter yield curve may mean for their portfolios. Chart 2Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Don't Worry... Yet Chart 3U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher We would not be as dismissive of a flatter yield curve as Fed Chair Yellen was during her December press conference. Policymakers and investors alike have been too quick to downplay the signal from the yield curve in the past. In 2006, they blamed the "global savings glut" for dragging down long-term yields. In 2000, they argued that the federal government's budget surplus was reducing the supply of long-term bonds. In both cases, the bond market turned out to be seeing something more ominous than they were. That said, there are three reasons why we would discount some of the more bearish interpretations of what a flatter yield curve is telling us. First, the flattening of the yield curve has occurred mainly because of an increase in short-term rate expectations, rather than a decrease in long-term bond yields. The increase in rate expectations has been largely driven by stronger growth data. The economic surprise index has surged far into positive territory and analysts are now scrambling to revise up their 2018 and 2019 U.S. GDP growth projections (Chart 3). The Fed now sees growth of 2.5% in 2018 and an unemployment rate of 3.9% by the end of next year. Back in September, the Fed expected growth of 2.1% and an unemployment rate of 4.1%. Second, our research suggests that the slope of the yield curve only becomes worrisome for the economy when it falls to extremely low levels. This conclusion is reinforced by the New York Fed's Yield Curve Recession Model, which uses the difference between 10-year and 3-month Treasury rates to estimate the probability of a U.S. recession twelve months ahead.2 The model's current recession probability stands at a modest 11% (Chart 4). The last three recessions all began when the implied probability was over 25%. Chart 4NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low Third, the slope of the yield curve is weighed down by a structurally low term premium. The term premium measures the additional return investors can expect to receive by locking in their money in a 10-year Treasury note instead of rolling over a short-term Treasury bill for an entire decade. Historically, the term premium has been positive. Over the past few years, however, it has often been negative - meaning that investors have been willing to pay a premium to take on duration risk. Many commentators have attributed this peculiar state of affairs to central bank asset purchases, which they claim have artificially depressed long-term bond yields. There is some truth to this, but we think there is an even more important reason: Bonds today provide a good hedge against bad economic news. When fears of an economic slowdown mount, equities tend to sell off, while bond prices rise. This differs from the circumstances that existed in the 1970s and 1980s, when bad economic news usually meant higher inflation. To the extent that long-term bonds now serve as insurance policies against recessions, investors are more willing to accept the lower yields that they offer. Empirically, one can see this in the shift of the correlation between equity returns and bond yields. It was strongly negative up until the mid-1990s. Now it is strongly positive (Chart 5). A low term premium implies that the slope of the yield curve should be structurally flatter. That is exactly what we see today. Chart 6 shows that the 10-year/3-month spread would be well above its long-term average if the term premium were removed from the picture. This implies that investors have little to fear from the shape of today's yield curve, at least over the next six-to-twelve months. Chart 5Bond Prices Now Tend To Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Chart 6Stripping Out The Term Premium,##BR##The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Rising Odds Of A Recession In Late-2019 Beyond then, things start to get dicey. The Fed's end-2018 unemployment rate projection of 3.9% is 0.7 percentage points below its long-term estimate of the unemployment rate. This means that at some point in the future, the Fed will need to lift interest rates above their "neutral" level in order to push the unemployment rate up to its equilibrium level. That's a risky gambit. There has never been a case in the post-war era where the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 7). Modern economies are subject to feedback loops. Once economic conditions begin to deteriorate, households cut back on spending. This leads to less hiring and even less spending. Bad economic news begets worse news. Chart 7Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Implications For Equities And Credit A flatter Treasury yield curve suggests that the U.S. business cycle is entering the home stretch. Nevertheless, as we pointed out two weeks ago, the 7th-to-8th innings of business-cycle expansions are often the juiciest for equity investors (Table 1).3 Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Chart 8 shows that the term spread today is still at levels that have signaled positive equity returns in the past. In fact, today's term spread is close to levels that prevailed in the second half of the 1990s, a period that coincided with the greatest bull market in American history. This message is echoed by our forthcoming MacroQuant model, which continues to flag upside risks for stocks over the next 6-to-12 months (Chart 9). Chart 8Current Term Spread Is Still Pointing##BR##To Positive Equity Returns Chart 9MacroQuant Still Positive##BR##On The Stock Market Globally, we favor euro area and Japanese equities (in local-currency terms) in the developed market sphere due to our expectation that the euro and yen will depreciate somewhat next year. Both the euro area and Japan also have greater exposure to cyclical sectors. This fits with our bias towards owning cyclicals over defensive stocks. Today's term spread is a bit more worrying for corporate credit. As our bond strategists have noted, a flatter yield curve is consistent with lower, though still positive, monthly excess returns for high-yield bonds (Chart 10).4 Again, the second half of the 1990s provides a potentially useful template: Despite a sizzling stock market, high-yield spreads actually widened as corporations loaded up on debt (Chart 11). The deterioration in our Corporate Health Monitor over the past five years suggests that a similar dynamic may be afoot (Chart 12). Chart 10Junk Monthly Excess Returns##BR##And The Yield Curve Chart 11Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads##BR##Rose With Stock Prices Chart 12Corporate Health Has##BR##Been Deteriorating Yield Curve Should Steepen Over The Coming Months Of course, much depends on what happens to the yield curve going forward. We suspect that it will flatten again towards the end of next year. However, it is likely to steepen over the next six months. U.S. GDP growth will remain above trend next year, as wages start to rise more briskly and firms boost capital spending to meet rising demand for their products. Fiscal policy should also help. Tax cuts will lift growth by 0.2%-to-0.3% in 2018. Higher disaster relief efforts following the hurricanes and a pending agreement to raise caps on discretionary spending will also translate into increased federal government spending. Investors have largely overlooked this source of fiscal stimulus, but increased spending will contribute almost as much to growth next year as lower taxes. Unfortunately, all this additional growth, coming at a time when the output gap is all but closed, is likely to stoke inflationary pressures. Our Pipeline Inflation Pressure Index has risen sharply since early 2016, while the ISM prices paid index has shot up. The New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge has accelerated to an 11-year high of 3% (Chart 13). Historically, rising inflation expectations have led to a steeper yield curve (Chart 14). The implication is that investors should favor inflation-linked securities over government bonds. Chart 13U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building Chart 14Rising Inflation Expectations Lead To A Steeper Yield Curve The One Number That Will Kill Bitcoin In a normal world, most reasonable people would regard a flatter yield curve and continued weak inflation readings as evidence that fiat money was, if anything, doing too good a job as a store of value. However, nothing is normal or reasonable about bitcoin.5 Chart 15Governments Will Want Their Cut:##BR##U.S. Seigniorage Revenue No one knows when the bitcoin bubble will burst. Only a tiny fraction of the public owns the virtual currency. The value of all bitcoin in circulation represents 0.35% of global GDP. At its peak in 1996, the value of all pyramid scheme assets in Albania amounted to almost half of GDP. Never underestimate the lure of easy money. While we do not know where the price of bitcoin will be ten months from now, we do have a good guess of where it will be ten years from today. And that price is zero, or thereabouts. When the U.S. Treasury issues a $100 bill, it gains the ability to buy $100 of goods and services with it. The government's cost is whatever it pays to print the bill, which is next to nothing. This so-called "seigniorage revenue" is set to reach $100 billion this year (Chart 15). That is the number that will kill bitcoin. There is no way the U.S. government will forsake this revenue in order to make room for bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Not when there are entitlements to pay and gaping budget deficits to finance. A variety of other countries have a love-hate relationship with bitcoin, partly because of their "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" attitude towards the dollar. But that will change when they see their tax bases eroding as more commerce gets done in the anonymous world of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin's days are numbered. The only question is who will be holding the bag when the party ends. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Jonathan H. Wright, "The Yield Curve And Predicting Recessions," FEDs Working Paper No. 2006-7, May 3, 2006; Michael Owyang, "Is the Yield Curve Signaling a Recession?"Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, March 24, 2016; and Arturo Estrella and Mishkin, Frederic S., "The Yield Curve as a Predictor of U.S. Recessions," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York, (2:7), June 1996. 2 Please see "The Yield Curve As A Leading Indicator: Probability of U.S. Recession Charts," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When To Get Out," dated December 8, 2017. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?" dated December 12, 2017. 5 Please see European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Bitcoins And Fractals," dated December 21, 2017; Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?" dated December 12, 2017; Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin's Macro Impact," dated September 15, 2017; and Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Blockchain And Cryptocurrencies," dated May 5, 2017. 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Highlights As bitcoin has developed into a fledgling form of money, the best valuation framework for it is the quantity theory of money. This states that the bitcoin money supply (in dollars) times bitcoin's velocity of circulation = the amount of world GDP carried out in bitcoin. In the short term, excessive herding signals a likely countertrend reversal, and implies that the bitcoin price will retest $12,750 at some point in the next 130 days. In the long term, the wholesale acceptance of cryptocurrencies in the global economy will be deflationary. Feature Bitcoin's near-vertical price ascent to $19,000 has left many commentators crying "bubble!" The problem with this is that you cannot define an asset bubble simply from the behaviour of a price. You need to assess fundamental value, and the extent of deviation above this fundamental value. Conceivably, bitcoin's near-vertical price ascent could be a correction from an "anti-bubble", in which the price was a long way below its fundamental value and rapidly corrected upwards. Which begs the question: what is the best way to assess the fundamental value of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies? Chart of the WeekCryptocurrencies Will Prevent Inflation, Just Like The Gold Standard A Valuation Framework For Bitcoin As bitcoin has developed into a fledgling form of money, one potential valuation framework is the quantity theory of money. This states that the money supply times its velocity of circulation equals nominal GDP. Given that the supply of bitcoin will not exceed an upper limit of 21 million coins, we can say that the bitcoin money supply (in dollars) is the bitcoin price times 21 million. We can then use the quantity theory to deduce: Bitcoin price times 21 million times bitcoin's velocity of circulation = Amount of world GDP carried out in bitcoin. If we additionally assume that bitcoin's velocity is similar to that of the stock of broad fiat money, 1.5, then we can rearrange and simplify the equation to approximately: Bitcoin price = Amount of world GDP carried out in bitcoin divided by 30 million So if the market was discounting that $0.5 trillion of world GDP would be carried out in bitcoin, then its price should be $16,700. Given the purported nefarious uses of cryptocurrencies at the moment, and an estimated size of the world's shadow economy at around $16 trillion, an assumption of $0.5 trillion of bitcoin use in the world economy does not seem excessive. On the other hand, nefarious use might make bitcoin's velocity of circulation a lot higher than conventional money. Which would pull bitcoin's fair price much lower. Suffice to say, the above assumptions are broad-brush and open to challenge. Nevertheless, despite the many caveats, the above framework is probably the most valid for valuing a cryptocurrency once it gains acceptance as a fledgling form of money. Putting Bitcoin Through Fractal Analysis The behaviour of price alone cannot gauge an asset bubble. But the behaviour of price alone can gauge a shortage of liquidity in the asset which implies a potential countertrend reversal. Liquidity is plentiful when the market is split between short-term momentum traders and longer-term value investors. This is because the two herds generally disagree with each other. If the price fluctuates up, the momentum trader wants to buy while the value investor wants to sell; and vice-versa. So the herds trade with each other with plentiful liquidity and little movement in price. This raises an obvious question. Can there really be any value investors in cryptocurrencies? The answer is potentially yes, if these investors believe that cryptocurrency acceptance will increase over time. And if they apply the aforementioned valuation framework from the quantity theory of money. Still, liquidity will periodically evaporate if too many value investors join the short-term momentum herd. Instead of dispassionately investing on the basis of a valuation framework, value investors get lured into participating in a strong rally, and their buy orders add fuel to the rally. A tipping point comes when all the value investors have joined the momentum herd. If a value investor then suddenly reverts to type and puts in a sell order, he will find that there are no buyers left. Liquidity has evaporated, and finding new liquidity might require a substantial reversal in the price to attract a buy order from an ultra-long-term deep value investor. As regular readers know, fractal analysis measures whether the herding behaviour in any financial instrument has reached its tipping point, signalling a likely end of its price trend. Today, the 130-day herding indicator for bitcoin is at a level which has indicated three previous countertrend reversals of at least one fifth of the preceding 130-day move (Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4). Chart I-2Bitcoin: The 130 Day Fractal Dimension Signalled A Reversal In 2015 Chart I-3Bitcoin: The 130 Day Fractal Dimension Signalled Two Reversals In 2017 Chart I-4Bitcoin: The 65 Day Fractal Dimension Also Signalled Two Previous Reversals If this herding indicator signals a fourth countertrend reversal, it implies that the bitcoin price will retest $12,750 at some point in the next 130 days. Are Cryptocurrencies Inflationary Or Deflationary? On the face of it, the emergence of cryptocurrencies sounds inflationary. After all, if the general acceptance of cryptocurrencies for commercial transactions increases, there will be new money supply. And this new money supply will increase the nominal demand for goods and services. However, the truth is more nuanced. Unlike fiat money supply - which can expand without limit - each cryptocurrency has a defined limit to its supply. Although new cryptocurrencies can emerge, there seems to be a limit to the aggregate amount of cryptocurrency supply. The limiting factor is that it takes energy to create cryptocurrency through so-called 'mining'. Miners must compete to validate transactions that occur in a cryptocurrency. The competition takes the form of solving a mathematical problem - for example, finding the prime factors of a very large number. And the computational demands are energy sapping. Furthermore, the computational demands - known as 'proof of work' - get progressively more difficult for each additional new coin mined. Given that the computational resources in the world are finite and growing at a gentle and predictable rate, the implication is that the growth in the total amount of cryptocurrency is also limited. So while the emergence of cryptocurrencies does increase the money supply in the near-term (Chart I-5), a large-scale rejection of fiat money would make it impossible for uncouth policymakers to spike the overall money supply over the longer-term. Chart I-5Cryptocurrencies: Market Cap Is Now Non-Trivial Here's a further thought. Imagine if the proof of work computations, instead of being random mathematical calculations, solved useful problems that expanded the envelope of knowledge. This could boost real productivity, which is ultimately just a function of the stock of human ingenuity. In which case, any increase in money supply would be matched by an increase in potential real output. Interestingly, a recent paper from the Bank of Canada proposes that a wholesale acceptance of cryptocurrencies in the global economy could act as a new gold standard, whose effect would be mildly deflationary1 (Chart of the Week) and Table I-1). We fully agree with the Bank of Canada analysis. Table I-1No Persistent Inflation For 700 Years! The sting in the tail is that the analysis describes prices denominated in cryptocurrency terms. In fiat currency terms, the quantity theory of money implies that prices would rise2 - unless central banks reacted to the emergence of cryptocurrencies by shrinking the supply of fiat money. Would they? Very likely yes. If they didn't, the demise of fiat money would accelerate as people voted with their wallets and switched to superior stores of purchasing power. Nevertheless, we suspect that any central bank response would just delay the inevitable. As Larry Summers puts it: I am much more confident that the world of payments will look very different 20 years from now than I am about how it will look. And with that observation, I am signing off for 2017. I do hope you have enjoyed our provocative and counterintuitive insights this year. In the vast majority of cases, these insights have led to highly profitable investment recommendations. We promise to continue the success in 2018! Early next year, we will also unveil a major enhancement to our proprietary fractal trading strategy. So stay tuned. It just remains for me to wish you all a very enjoyable Festive Season and a prosperous 2018. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper, A Bitcoin Standard: Lessons from the Gold Standard https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/03/staff-working-paper-2016-14/ 2 Please see the Global Investment Strategy Special Report titled "Bitcoin's Macro Impact", dated September 15, 2017 available at gis.bcaresearch.com and Technology Sector Strategy Special Report titled "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?", dated December 12, 2017 available at tech.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* As discussed in the main body of this report, this week's trade is to expect a countertrend reversal in bitcoin. Go short with a profit target at $12750 and stop-loss at $28000. In other trades, long silver has had a strong 1-week bounce while long U.K. personal products / short U.K. food and beverages reached the end of its 65 day maximum holding period and closed with a small profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-6 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Overweighting Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 is just a sector play - you must believe that banks are going to outperform technology. It is categorically not a relative economic growth or relative valuation play. The best expression of euro area economic outperformance - as we believe is likely - is not through mainstream equity indexes. It is through the euro. Could Spain in 2014-17 be Italy in 2018-21? If so, the cleanest play is through Italian bonds: long Italian BTPs versus French OATs. Play the lottery for free: when the price gap between the second and first month VIX future is greater than that between the first month and VIX spot - as it is now - it signals a potentially free lottery ticket. Feature Don't Play The Euro Area Economy Through The Stock Market The fallacy of division is a logical fallacy. It occurs when somebody falsely infers that what is true for the whole is also true for the parts that make up the whole. For example, somebody might see that their computer screen appears purple, and infer that the pixels that make up the screen are also purple. In fact, pixels are never purple. They are either red or blue. The fallacy of division is that the property of the whole - purpleness - does not translate to the property of the parts - redness or blueness. Chart of the WeekEuro Area Vs. U.S. Equities Is Just A Sector Play: Banks Vs. Technology The fallacy of division also affects investors. Since global equities are a play on the global economy, some investors infer that major equity indexes such as the Eurostoxx50 are relative plays on their regional economies. In fact, this is a fallacy of division: the property of the equity market as a global aggregate does not translate to the relative property of an equity market as a regional or national part. Through the past three years, the euro area economy has comfortably outperformed the U.S. economy1 (Chart I-2). Yet the Eurostoxx50 has substantially underperformed the S&P500 (Chart I-3). Why? Because the Eurostoxx50 has a major 14% weighting to banks and a minor 7% weighting to technology. The S&P500 is the mirror image; a minor 7% weighting to banks and a major 24% weighting to technology. Chart I-2The Euro Area Economy ##br##Has Outperformed... Chart I-3...But The Eurostoxx50 ##br##Has Underperformed Hence, for the Eurostoxx50 the distinguishing property is 'bank'; for the S&P500 it is 'technology'. And as banks have underperformed technology, the Eurostoxx50 has underperformed the S&P500. This large difference in sector exposure also means that a head-to-head comparison of equity market valuation is misleading. The euro area, trading on a forward price to earnings (PE) multiple of 15, appears considerably cheaper than the U.S., trading on a forward PE of 19. But this head-to-head difference just reflects the forward PEs of banks at 11 and technology at 19. As banks will likely generate less long-term growth than technology, banks are rightfully cheaper than technology and the Eurostoxx50 is rightfully cheaper than the S&P500. Some people suggest sector-adjusting stock market valuations to allow for the sector biases. The problem is that this suggestion cannot avoid the inescapable end-result. The bank-heavy Eurostoxx50 versus the tech-heavy S&P500 relative performance will still depend on banks versus technology (Chart of the Week). Remarkably, this overarching driver is captured in just the three largest euro area banks versus the three largest U.S. tech stocks. This means that relative performance simply reduces to whether Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING outperform Apple, Microsoft and Google,2 or vice-versa (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Eurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 Reduces To: Santander, BNP & ING Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google Everything else is largely irrelevant. Hence, the counterintuitive conclusion is that overweight Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 is actually a sector play. You must hold the view that banks are going to outperform technology. At the moment, we are agnostic on this view. The best expression of euro area economic outperformance - as we believe is likely - is not through mainstream equity indexes. It is through bond yield spread compression and through exchange rates. Our preferred expression is structurally long EUR/USD. Could Spain In 2014-17 Be Italy In 2018-21? In 2013, Spain seemed to be on its knees. The economy had slumped by almost 10%, unemployment stood at 27%, and the stock of bank loans which were non-performing exceeded 13%. Doomsayers abounded. Standard and Poor's downgraded Spain's sovereign credit rating to BBB-, one notch above junk, and esteemed Wall Street strategists predicted the unemployment rate would remain above 25% for the rest of the decade. But the esteemed strategists were completely wrong. Through 2014-17, Spanish real GDP per head has grown by almost 15% (Chart I-5) - making it one of the top performing developed economies; unemployment has plunged by 10% (Chart I-6); and non-performing loans have declined sharply. What suddenly transformed Spain from zero to hero? The answer is that Spain recapitalised its banks. Chart I-5Through 2014-17 Spanish Real GDP ##br##Per Head Is Up Almost 15%... Chart I-6...And Unemployment##br## Is Down 10% After a financial crisis, the golden rule of recovery is to repair the banking system as soon as possible. In the aftermath of housing-related banking crises in 2008, the U.S. and U.K. quickly recapitalised their damaged banking systems; Ireland followed a couple of years later; Spain waited until 2013. But in each case, the economies rebounded very strongly as soon as the banks' aggressive deleveraging ended. Which brings us to Italy. Many people claim that Italy's long-standing economic underperformance is due to deep-seated structural problems. We do not dispute that such problems exist, but they cannot be the main cause of the economic underperformance. After all, through 1999-2007, Italian real GDP per head performed more or less in line with the U.S., Canada and France (Chart I-7), even without a private sector credit boom which the other economies had. Italy's underperformance really started after the 2008 financial crisis. And the most plausible explanation is that its dysfunctional banking system has been left broken for so long. Italy has procrastinated because its government is more indebted than other sovereigns and its banking problems have not caused an outright crisis - yet. But now policymakers in Rome, Brussels and Frankfurt realise that a hamstrung economy carries risks of a populist backlash against the European project. Finally, Italian banks' equity capital is rising, their solvency is improving and the share of non-performing loans appears to have peaked at the same level as in Spain in 2013 (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Through 1999-2007 Italy Performed In##br## Line With Other Major Economies Chart I-8Spanish NPLs Peaked In 2013, ##br##Italian NPLs Are Peaking Now So could Spain in 2014-17 be Italy in 2018-21? Once again, doomsayers abound and the counterintuitive thought could pay off. The cleanest way to play this is through Italian bonds: long Italian BTPs versus French OATs. Play The Lottery For Free As everybody knows, playing the lottery is not a good investment strategy. Most of the time your Lotto ticket brings zero reward, though occasionally you do win a prize. In fact, the U.K. National Lottery has said that the expected win per £1 played averages £0.47. Meaning the long-term return on this strategy is -53%. In the financial markets, the equivalent of a Lotto ticket is to buy volatility. In practice, this means buying a future on a volatility index such as the VIX. The problem is that the VIX futures curve usually slopes upwards. So if the curve doesn't change, a future bought above the spot price loses value when it expires at the spot price (Chart I-9). The upshot is that most of the time, the future 'rolls down the curve', and you lose money, though occasionally when volatility spikes you win. But counterintuitively, sometimes you can play the lottery for free. Look at the VIX futures curve: when the price gap between the second and first month is greater than that between the first month and spot - as it is now (Chart I-10) - it signals a potentially free lottery ticket. Chart I-9VIX Futures "Roll Down The Curve" Chart I-10Spotting A Free Lottery Ticket Under these circumstances, the strategy is to go long the first month future and short the second month future. If the futures curve stays broadly as it is - and both futures contracts roll down the curve - the loss on the first month long position will be made up by the gain on the second month short position. Effectively, the combined position becomes costless. Yet this potentially costless position is still playing the lottery. Because if volatility does spike, the volatility futures curve tends to invert sharply (go into backwardation). Hence, the gain on the first month long position substantially outweighs the loss on the second month short position. Now might be a good time to play the lottery for free. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 On a real GDP per capita basis. 2 Listed as Alphabet. Fractal Trading Model* Silver's 65-day fractal dimension is at a level which has previously indicated four tradeable trend reversals. Go long silver with a profit target / stop-loss of 4.5% In other trades, we are pleased to report that short basic materials versus market and short copper / long tin both hit their respective profit targets. This leaves us with six open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Growth in the Taiwanese economy has trended sideways this year, but a budding turnaround in weak domestic demand suggests that growth should improve in 2018. The appreciation of the TWD from its 2016 low reflects investor inflows rather than bullish fundamentals. The risk of a protectionist backlash means that monetary authorities are reluctant to intervene aggressively to limit the rise. We recommend that investors stick with our existing long MSCI China / short Taiwan trade, for now. A breakout in relative Taiwanese tech sector performance coupled with a weakening TWD would likely be a sufficient basis to close the trade at a healthy profit. Feature We last wrote about Taiwan in February of this year,1 when the risk of protectionist action from the Trump administration loomed large. While there have been no negative trade actions levied against Taiwan this year, macro factors, particularly the strength of the currency, continue to argue for an underweight stance within the greater China bourses (China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). Our long MSCI China / short Taiwan trade has generated an impressive 19% return since its inception in February. The trade has become significantly overbought, but we recommend that investors stick with it, for now. A material easing in pressure on Taiwan's trade-weighted exchange rate appears to be the most likely catalyst to close the trade and to upgrade Taiwan within a portfolio of greater China equities. The Taiwanese Economy In 2017: What Has Changed? Real GDP growth in Taiwan has generally trended sideways in 2017, decelerating in the first half of the year and then recovering in the third quarter (Chart 1). While these fluctuations in its growth profile have been somewhat muted, overall GDP growth has masked a sizeable divergence between domestic demand and export growth. Taiwan is a highly trade-oriented economy, with exports of goods & services accounting for nearly 65% for its GDP, and a recent acceleration in real export volume has positively contributed to overall growth. Over 50% of Taiwan's exports are tech-based, and Chart 1 panel 2 highlights the close link between global semiconductor sales (which have risen sharply over the past year) and Taiwanese nominal exports. But as Chart 1 panel 3 shows, growth in real domestic demand has fallen back into contractionary territory, driven largely by a sharp decline in gross fixed capital formation. This decline in investment is somewhat surprising, given the close historical relationship between Taiwan's real exports and investment (Chart 2, panel 1). But the sharp drop may have been a lagged response to the export shock that occurred during the synchronized global growth slowdown in 2015, as it led to a non-trivial accumulation of inventory (Chart 2, panel 2). The recent acceleration of export growth and a renewed draw in inventories suggests that the severe pullback in investment is likely to reverse in the coming year. Chart 1A Divergence Between Domestic Demand##br## And Exports Chart 2Investment Likely To Rebound Over ##br##The Coming Year The evolution of Taiwanese capital goods imports is likely to provide an important confirming signal about the trend in real investment, given the close historical correlation between the two series. For now, the growth in capital goods imports is rebounding from negative territory (Chart 3), which is consistent with the view that investment is set to recover. Finally, while real consumer spending growth also decelerated in the first half of the year, the acceleration in Q3 has brought consumption back to its 5-year moving average. More importantly, Chart 4 highlights that the consumer confidence index in Taiwan is closely correlated with real spending, with the former heralding a rise in the latter over the coming months. Chart 3Capital Goods Signal An Investment Recovery Chart 4Consumption Also Set To Improve Bottom Line: Growth in the Taiwanese economy has trended sideways this year, but a budding turnaround in weak domestic demand suggests that growth should improve in 2018. The Taiwanese Dollar: Driven By Flows, Not Fundamentals Taiwanese stock prices have underperformed Greater China bourses since the beginning of the year (Chart 5), despite the recent improvement in real export growth and signs of an impending improvement in domestic demand. To us, this underperformance has been largely caused by the strength in the Taiwanese currency. The Taiwanese dollar has appreciated since early-2016, both against the U.S. dollar and in trade-weighted terms (Chart 6). Although the currency retreated from May to August of this year, it has since resumed its uptrend and currently stands between 8-9% higher than last year's low in trade-weighted terms. Chart 5Significant Underperformance Of ##br##Taiwan Vs Greater China Chart 6Material Currency Appreciation##br## Since Early-2016 Crucially, Chart 7 highlights that the rise in the TWD cannot be explained by relative monetary policy or by an improvement in the terms of trade. The chart shows how the USD/TWD began to decouple from the relative 2-year swap rate spread in early-2016, and how the trend in Taiwan's export price index has been negatively correlated with the trade-weighted exchange rate. The best explanation for the recent strength in Taiwan's currency appears to be a surge in capital inflows oriented towards Taiwan's equity market (Chart 8). Foreign ownership of Taiwanese stocks has increased significantly over the past few years and is currently at a record high of 43%. Given that Taiwan's equity market is enormously tech-focused, it appears that global investors have been attracted to Taiwanese stocks as part of a play on the global tech rally. As we will discuss below, this has become somewhat of a self-defeating strategy, at least in terms of Taiwan's relative performance vs Greater China bourses. While it is possible that monetary authorities will attempt to combat the appreciation of the Taiwanese dollar, Chart 9 highlights that there is little room to maneuver. First, Taiwan's policy rate of 1.375% is already extremely low, and is only 12.5 bps above the level that prevailed during the worst of the global financial crisis. Second, panels 2 and 3 suggests that while past central bank intervention was successful at depreciating the TWD, monetary authorities also seem reluctant to allow Taiwan to be labeled as a currency manipulator. Our proxy for central bank intervention is the rolling 3-month average daily depreciation in TWD/USD in the first 30 minutes of aftermarket trading, a period that the central bank has historically used to intervene in the foreign exchange market. The chart shows that periods of intervention have been associated with a subsequent decline in TWD/USD, but that intervention durably ended once Taiwan was added to the U.S. Treasury's watch list of potential currency manipulators (first vertical line). Taiwan was removed from the watch list in October of this year (second vertical line), after central bank intervention ceased. Chart 7Currency Strength Not Supported ##br##By Fundamentals Chart 8Equity-Oriented Capital Inflows##br## Are Pushing Up The TWD Chart 9Little Room For Policy ##br##To Push Down The Exchange Rate Bottom Line: The appreciation of the TWD from its 2016 low reflects investor inflows rather than bullish fundamentals. While there is scope for further central bank intervention to help depreciate the currency, the risk of a protectionist backlash means that monetary authorities are reluctant to act. The Relative Outlook For Taiwanese Equities Table 1 presents a simple performance attribution analysis for Taiwan's year-to-date stock returns relative to Greater China bourses,2 in an attempt to answer the following question: Has Taiwan underperformed because it is underweight sectors that have outperformed, or because its highly-weighted sectors underperformed? To test this question we calculate a "hypothetical" return for the Taiwanese stock market, which shows what would have occurred if Taiwan's tech and ex-tech sectors had earned the benchmark return instead of their own. Table 1Taiwan's Poor Performance This Year Is Due To Its Tech Sector The table clearly shows that Taiwan would have substantially outperformed Greater China in this hypothetical scenario, underscoring that its sector weighting is not the source of the underperformance. While both Taiwan's tech and ex-tech indexes underperformed those of Greater China, it is apparent that most of the gap in performance can be linked to Taiwan's tech sector. Tech accounts for roughly 60% of Taiwan's equity market capitalization, and the sector significantly underperformed Greater China tech this year. Chart 10 highlights that Taiwan's tech sector underperformance is significantly explained by the rise in Taiwan's trade-weighted currency. Panels 2 & 3 of the chart shows Taiwan's rolling 1-year tech sector beta and alpha vs Greater China tech, both compared with the (inverted) year-over-year percent change in the trade-weighted exchange rate. Here, we define alpha using Jensen's measure, which is the difference between Taiwan's tech sector price return and what would have been expected given its beta and Greater China's tech sector performance. The chart clearly shows that the sharp rise in Taiwan's trade-weighted exchange rate caused both a decline in Taiwan's tech sector beta (from a historical average of about 1) as well as a significantly negative alpha over the past year. Chart 10, in combination with the currency-driven downtrend in Taiwan's export prices shown in Chart 7, suggests that Taiwan's equity market has suffered in relative terms due to the outsized appreciation in its currency. This is somewhat ironic, as we noted above that the currency appreciation itself appears to be caused by capital inflow oriented towards Taiwan's tech sector, meaning that global investors have inadvertently contributed to Taiwan's equity market underperformance relative to Greater China bourses. Looking forward, there are cross-currents affecting the outlook for Taiwanese stock prices. Chart 11 shows that technical conditions and relative valuation argue against maintaining an underweight stance; Taiwanese stocks are heavily oversold vs Greater China, and have de-rated in relative terms since the beginning of the year. Taiwanese tech in particular is quite cheap in relative terms. In addition, panel 1 of Chart 10 suggests that Taiwanese tech (in relative terms) may have undershot the appreciation in the currency. Chart 10Taiwan's Tech Underperformance Is Explained By Currency Appreciation Chart 11Taiwan Vs China: Oversold, And Cheaper Than Usual However, Taiwan's tech sector is mostly made up of the semiconductors & semiconductor equipment industry group, and there are signs that the growth rate in global semiconductor sales is in the process of peaking. Chart 12 illustrates the close correlation between the growth of global semi sales and Taiwan's absolute 12-month forward earnings per share, with the recent gap likely having occurred due to the currency impact noted above. The chart suggests that earnings expectations for Taiwan are highly unlikely to accelerate if semi sales growth slows, meaning that Taiwanese stocks, particularly the tech sector, currently lack a catalyst to re-rate. Chart12Taiwan Is Lacking A Re-Rating Catalyst From our perspective, a lasting depreciation in the currency appears to be the most likely catalyst for a re-rating, as it would increase the odds that the relationship shown in Chart 10 would durably recouple. Until then, any exogenous rebound in relative tech sector performance is likely to be met with a self-limiting TWD appreciation. Bottom Line: We recommend that investors, for now, stick with our existing long MSCI China / short Taiwan trade. However, a breakout in relative Taiwanese tech sector performance coupled with a weakening TWD would likely cause us to close the trade, and upgrade Taiwanese stocks to at least neutral within a greater China equity portfolio. Stay tuned. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Assistant linx@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Taiwan's 'Trump' Risk", dated February 2, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 We use MSCI's Golden Dragon index to represent Greater China, which includes China investable, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese stocks. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights The growth momentum of China's recent mini-cycle has peaked, but the ongoing slowdown is likely to continue to remain benign in nature. A return to 2015-like conditions is not the most likely outcome over the coming year. Chinese policymakers are likely to increase their focus on reform efforts next year, but the pace will have to be modulated to avoid a repeat of the significant slowdown that occurred in 2014/2015. The risk of a policy mistake is a key theme to watch for 2018. Chinese ex-tech stocks have room to re-rate next year in a benign slowdown scenario. Investors should stay overweight Chinese investable equities vs EM and global stocks. Feature BCA recently published its special year end Outlook report for 2018,1 which described the macro themes that are likely to drive global financial markets over the coming year. In this week's China Investment Strategy report we expand on the Outlook, by reviewing our three key themes for China over the coming year. Key Theme # 1: A Benign End To China's Recent Mini-Cycle We presented our case that the cyclical slowdown of the Chinese economy will likely be benign in our October 12 Weekly Report. Chart 1 presents a stylized view of the Chinese economy over the past three years that was published in that report, which illustrated our framework of how cyclical growth conditions have evolved over this "mini-cycle". It also highlighted three possible scenarios for the coming 6-12 months, and noted that our bet was on scenario 2: A re-acceleration of the economy and a continuation of the V-shaped rebound profile A benign, controlled deceleration and settling of growth into the "stable" growth range, and An uncontrolled and sharp deceleration in the economy that threatens a return to the conditions that prevailed in early-2015 (or worse) Chart 1A Stylized View Of China's Recent "Mini-Cycle" Since we presented this framework, incoming evidence has been consistent with our call. Chart 2 shows that the Li Keqiang index has now decisively rolled over, but that economic conditions remain well away from their mid-2015 lows. We sketched out the basis for our benign slowdown view in our October 12 piece, but we followed up more formally in a two-part report that addressed the main factors arguing against a return to 2015-like conditions.2 Our view is grounded in the perspective that economic conditions in 2015 were not "normal", and we showed in these reports how a sharp slowdown in the economy was caused by an extremely weak external demand environment and overly tight monetary policy. On the trade front, Chart 3 highlights how Chinese export growth is likely to moderate over the coming several months, which argues against the re-acceleration scenario described above. Since mid-2011, Chinese export growth has lagged what most economic indicators would have predicted, and we noted in part I of our 2015 vs today comparison that this can be traced largely to two factors: a decline in global import intensity and, to a lesser extent, a decline in China's export "market share". Chart 2An Economic Slowdown In China##br## Is Now Underway Chart 3Chinese Export Growth Likely To##br## Converge To Global IP Growth Our analysis in that report suggested that China's 2018 export growth will converge to that of global industrial production, which implies a modest deceleration in the months ahead. Still, export growth of +4% would be a far cry from the significant contraction of exports that occurred in late-2015 / early-2016, which is consistent with a benign growth slowdown. On the monetary policy front, we showed how a monetary conditions approach captured the tightness of China's policy stance from 2012 to early-2015, which led to a material decline in China's industrial sector (Chart 4). Our Special Report last week further supported the view that monetary conditions matter enormously for China's economy; out of 40 macro data series that we tested to reliably predict the Chinese business cycle, only measures of money & credit passed our criteria.3 An aggregate indicator of these 6 series has a similar profile to the Bloomberg Monetary Conditions Index that we have shown in the past (Chart 4, panel 2), and neither suggests that a sharp further slowdown in China's economy is imminent. We will be watching these indicators closely in 2018 for signs of a more aggressive decline than we currently expect. Recently, some investors have pointed to a sharp rise in China's corporate bond yields as a sign that the monetary policy stance is, in fact, tighter than a standard monetary conditions approach would imply. Indeed, China's 5-year AA corporate bond yield has risen 230 bps since late-October 2016, from 3.6% to 5.9%, with most of this rise having occurred due to a rise in government bond yields. Corporate bond spreads have also risen, but relative to spreads on similarly-rated U.S. credit, the rise appears to reflect a rebound from extremely low levels late last year and is not (yet) symptomatic of major concerns over defaults (Chart 5). Chart 4The Ongoing Slowdown Is Likely ##br##To Be Benign Chart 5China's Corporate Bond Spreads ##br##Do Not Yet Look Onerous We are not complacent of the potential risk posed by rising corporate bond yields, and a further significant rise in 2018 could change our view that a benign economic slowdown is the most likely outcome. But for now, the fact that the stock of corporate bond issuance accounts for only 10% of ex-equity social financing suggests that the rise in yields this year is not likely to have an outsized impact on the economy in 2018, beyond the impact that monetary tightening has had on overall average interest rates (which, for now, is material but has not returned rates back to their 2015 levels). Chart 6The Rise In CPI Will Likely Soon Peak Finally, the 85 bps rise in Chinese core consumer price inflation that has occurred over the past year has also fed investor concerns that monetary policy will become even tighter next year. To us, this risk is probably overblown, given that demand-driven inflation lags growth (which has clearly peaked). Chart 6 shows the year-over-year change in Chinese core CPI vs that of the Li Keqiang index, and clearly suggests that the acceleration in core prices is likely to soon abate. Poor communication from the PBOC means that it is not clear how prominently core inflation features into the central bank's reaction function, but given that tighter monetary conditions have already caused a peak in both house prices and growth momentum, we doubt that policymakers will see the recent rise in consumer prices as a basis to aggressively tighten further. Bottom Line: The growth momentum of China's recent mini-cycle has peaked, but a return to 2015-like conditions is not the most likely outcome over the coming year. Key Theme # 2: Monitoring The Pace Of Renewed Structural Reforms We have written several reports concerning China's 19th Communist Party Congress over the past three months, both in the lead-up to the event and as a post-mortem.4 The Congress was significant because it likely heralds stepped-up reform efforts in 2018 and beyond. By "reforms", our Geopolitical Strategy team specifically means deleveraging in the financial sector accompanied by a more intense anti-corruption campaign focused on the shadow-banking sector, as well as ongoing restructuring in the industrial sector. Table 1 presents our geopolitical team's assessment of the likely reform scenarios and probabilities over the coming year. It should be clearly noted that the "reform reboot" scenario as described in Table 1 is likely negative for emerging market equities and other plays on China's industrial sector (such as industrial metals). Table 1Post-Party Congress Scenarios And Probabilities We agree that the "status quo" scenario of no significant reforms is highly unlikely given that President Xi has succeeded in amassing tremendous political capital and that he has an agenda for reform. But the intensity of reforms pursued over the coming year will have to be closely monitored by policymakers, to avoid a repeat of the significant slowdown that occurred in 2014/2015. As such, the view of BCA's China Investment Strategy service is that the reform efforts over the coming year will be structured at a pace that is sufficient to avoid a meaningful deceleration in China's industrial sector and is conducive to the outperformance of Chinese ex-technology stocks. However, the potential for a brisk pace of reforms to cause a more acute decline in industrial activity in 2018 is a risk to our view that China's ongoing economic slowdown is likely to be benign and controlled. We presented our framework for monitoring this risk in our November 16 Weekly Report,5 specifically our BCA China Reform Monitor (Chart 7). The monitor is calculated as an equally-weighted average of four "winner" sectors that outperformed the investable benchmark in the month following the Party Congress relative to an equally-weighted average of the remaining seven sectors. Significant underperformance of "loser" sectors could become a headwind for broad MSCI China outperformance (especially ex-tech), and we will be watching in 2018 for signs that our monitor is rising largely due to outright declines in the denominator. Chart 7Our Reform Monitor Will Help Us Judge ##br##Whether The Pace Of Reforms Becomes Too Burdensome For now, there is no indication that reform risk is affecting the performance of the MSCI China index. Panel 2 of Chart 7 highlights that recent movements in our Reform Monitor have been driven by the "winner" sectors, with the recent selloff largely reflecting a modest correction in global technology stocks sparked by the passage of the U.S. Senate's tax reform plan.6 But we will be watching the monitor closely in 2018, and will adjust it as needed in reaction to additional reform announcements over the coming months. Finally, next year's reform announcements will be highly significant not just because of the "what", but also the "how". It is difficult to see how China's leadership can aggressively pare back heavy-polluting industry and deleverage the financial sector without destabilizing the economy in the near term, but their goal to significantly raise China's per capita GDP and escape the "middle income trap" over the long-term is equally nebulous. We have noted in previous reports that a country's income level is fundamentally determined by its productivity, which is in turn determined by the level and sophistication of its capital stock. Chart 8 shows a clear positive correlation between a country's per capita output, a measure of productivity, and its per capita capital stock. In general, industrialized countries enjoy much higher levels of per capita capital stock than developing economies, leading to much higher productivity, income, and living standards. Therefore, the process of industrialization is fundamentally a process of accumulation of capital stock through investment. As shown in Chart 9, despite some remarkable achievements, the productivity level of the average Chinese worker is still just a fraction of the level in more advanced countries. Conventional economics would suggest that if China wishes to keep progressing on the productivity and income ladder, that it should remain on the path of growing the capital stock through savings and investment. If, however, it abandons its current growth model and "rebalances" towards a consumption-driven one, the risk that the country will stagnate and fail to advance beyond the "middle income trap" looms large. Chart 8Productivity Is Positively Correlated ##br##With Capital Stock Chart 9China's Catchup Process ##br## Has A Lot Further To Run Chart 10 makes this point from a different perspective. At root, China's leadership is describing the desire to rapidly transition towards an economy with a much higher level of tertiary industry (services) as a share of GDP, but the U.S. experience suggests that this is a long process that is not investment-oriented. The chart shows the evolution of U.S. investment in private services excluding real estate as a share of total private fixed assets since 1947, when the U.S. had only a slightly higher level of real per capita GDP than China today. It has taken almost 70 years for the share of private services ex real estate to rise by 16 percentage points in the U.S., and it has yet to account for the majority of private fixed investment.7 Services activity/investment also typically requires a highly educated workforce as an input, and rate of China's post-secondary educational attainment appears to be too low to fit the bill (Chart 11). In short, crucial details about China's reform plan should hopefully emerge in 2018, which are likely to have both near-term and multi-year implications. Bottom Line: Chinese policymakers are likely to increase their focus on reform efforts next year, but the pace will have to be modulated to avoid a repeat of the significant slowdown that occurred in 2014/2015. The risk of a policy mistake is a key theme to watch for 2018. Chart 10China Cannot Easily Replace 'Hard' Investment Chart 11China's Workforce Is Not Well Equipped To Transition To Services Key Theme # 3: The Relative Re-Rating Of Chinese Investable Ex-Tech Stocks Over the past several years, this publication argued strongly that the valuation discount applied to Chinese equities was unjustified. For the investable benchmark, the past two years of material outperformance vs emerging market and global stocks has removed a significant portion of this discount, and we noted in our August 31 Weekly Report that Chinese equities are no longer "exceptionally cheap".8 However, a good portion of this revaluation has been isolated to the tech sector. Chart 12 shows that while the 12-month forward P/E ratio for Chinese tech stocks is 70% higher than the global average, ex-tech shares still trade at a 37% relative discount. Chart 13 echoes this conclusion by showing the ex-tech price-to-book ratio for every country in MSCI's All Country World index; by this metric China's ex-tech cheapness currently ranks in the 85th percentile, behind only Israel, Colombia, Italy, Jordan, Korea, Russia, and Greece. Chart 12China: Expensive Tech, Extremely Cheap Ex-Tech Chart 13China's Ex-Tech P/B Ratio Among The Lowest In The World Charts 12 and 13 are weighted simply by the remaining market capitalization in each country's market after excluding the technology sector, meaning that the deep discount applied to Chinese banks wields a disproportionate influence (financials would make up 40% of China's MSCI ex-tech "index", if one officially existed). Although we agree that the magnitude of the rise in debt over the past several years warrants somewhat of a P/B discount, we would argue that the risk is more earnings and dilution-related rather than solvency-related. It is highly unlikely that the Chinese government would allow large banks to fail outright in the event of a serious financial crisis, but the potential for a rise in provisioning and significant new capital raising suggests that the risk premium for these stocks should be somewhat higher than what would otherwise be normal. Chart 14China's Banks Can Re-Rate ##br##In A Benign Slowdown Scenario Still, either the Chinese bank risk premium is excessive, or the banking sectors of several major DM countries are significantly overvalued. For example, Chinese investable banks trade at a P/B ratio of 0.8, but Canadian, Australian, and Swedish banks trade at an average P/B ratio of 1.7. If the concern over credit excesses is the source of the higher risk premium applied to Chinese banks, Chart 14 suggests that there is a major inconsistency in pricing; an equally-weighted average of Canadian, Australian, and Swedish private sector debt-to-GDP is higher than that of China's, at 214% vs 211% as of Q2 this year. Our bet is the former: In a world where outsized returns are scarce and U.S. equities are overvalued, a benign growth deceleration and a modulated pace of reforms favor a lessening of the substantial valuation discount currently applied to China's investable ex-tech stocks. Barring a more pronounced slowdown in China's economy than we currently expect, investors should stay overweight the MSCI China investable index in 2018, within both an emerging markets and global equity portfolio. Bottom Line: Chinese ex-tech stocks have room to re-rate in a benign slowdown scenario. Investors should stay overweight Chinese investable stocks in 2018. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part I): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, and "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part II): Monetary Policy", dated November 9, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer", dated September 14, 2017, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech", dated October 18, 2017, and BCA Special Report "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?", dated November 2, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress", dated November 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 The Senate bill that was passed this week unexpectedly retained 20% alternative minimum tax (AMT) for corporations, which would disproportionately impact U.S. technology companies. Indications currently suggest that the final tax cut bill to be approved by both houses of Congress will repeal the AMT. 7 In 2016, real estate investment accounted for roughly 29% of total private investment in fixed assets, and the sum of primary and secondary industry (agriculture, mining, utilities, construction, and manufacturing) accounted for about 28%. 8 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations", dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Semiconductor stocks in general and semi equipment in particular have gone parabolic over the last year, prompting us to add the S&P semi equipment index on our speculative high-conviction underweight list earlier this week. The move looks prescient as the index, as of publishing, has fallen by more than 9% this week. A global M&A frenzy and the bitcoin/ICO mania (bottom panel) have pushed chip equipment stocks to the stratosphere. In absolute terms this index is near the tech bubble peak, and relative share prices are following close behind (top panel). Worrisomely five year EPS growth forecasts recently surpassed the 25% mark, an all-time high. Both the tech sector's (in 2000) and the biotech index's (2001 and 2014) long term growth estimates hit a wall near such breakneck pace (second panel). This indefinite profit euphoria is unwarranted and we would lean against it. Accordingly, we are reiterate our speculative high-conviction underweight recommendation; see Monday's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SEEQ-AMAT, LRCX, KLC.
