Corporate Bonds
Highlights Chart 1Upside Risks & Uncertainty The evidence of economic acceleration continues to pile up and we maintain our view that bond yields will be higher than current forwards by the end of 2017. In the near-term, however, the bond market has been too quick to discount a more positive growth outlook, especially considering still-elevated levels of economic policy uncertainty. Our cautious optimism is echoed by the readings from our global PMI models and also by the Fed. The minutes from December's FOMC meeting revealed that more participants saw upside risks to growth and inflation than saw downside risks, but also that this improved economic forecast was judged to be more uncertain than any Fed forecast since 2013 (Chart 1). We remain bond bears on a 12-month horizon, but advocate a benchmark duration stance in the near term. A period of flat bond yields is the most likely outcome until elevated uncertainty levels revert to a more normal range (see the global economic policy uncertainty index). Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 82 basis points in December and by 478 basis points in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 6 bps on the month and 42 bps on the year. At 122 bps, the spread is currently well below its historical average (134 bps). Corporate spreads have tightened substantially since last February despite elevated gross leverage (Chart 2).1 As we pointed out in our end-of-year Special Report titled "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017",2 it is very rare for spreads to tighten when leverage is in an uptrend. While a rebound in profit growth will likely cause the uptrend in leverage to abate this year, spreads have already moved to discount a significant reversal. Although valuations are by no means attractive, accelerating economic growth and still-accommodative Fed policy will keep spreads at tight levels during the first half of this year. This sweet spot will persist at least until TIPS breakeven inflation rates return to pre-crisis levels, which would likely presage a hawkish shift in Fed policy. Energy sector debt returned 12.5% in excess of duration-equivalent Treasuries in 2016, compared to excess returns of under 5% for the overall corporate index. Despite this large outperformance, energy credits still appear attractive according to our model (Table 3), and should continue to outperform into the New Year. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation##br## And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector##br## Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Underweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 188 basis points in December and by 1539 basis points in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread narrowed 46 bps on the month and 251 bps on the year. At 383 bps, it is currently 137 bps below its historical average. As we highlighted in our year-end Special Report,3 the uptrend in defaults is likely to reverse this year, mostly due to recovery in the energy sector. However, still-poor corporate health and tightening monetary policy will lead to a resumption of the uptrend in 2018 and beyond. Given the improving default backdrop, we are actively looking to upgrade our allocation to high-yield debt. However, valuations do not present a sufficiently compelling opportunity at the moment. Our estimate of the default-adjusted high-yield spread - the average spread of the junk index less our forecast of 12-month default losses - is below 150 bps (Chart 3). This is close to one standard deviation below the long-run average. Historically, we have found that a default-adjusted spread between 100 bps and 200 bps is consistent with positive 12-month excess returns 65% of the time, but with an average 12-month excess return of close to zero. With the spread in this range, a 90% confidence interval would place 12-month excess returns between -3% and +4%. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in December, but underperformed by 11 bps in 2016. The conventional 30-year MBS yield rose 5 bps in December, completely driven by a 5 bps increase in the rate component. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and option-adjusted spread were both flat on the month. In 2016, the conventional 30-year MBS yield rose 6 bps. This was driven by a 12 bps increase in the rate component that was partially offset by a 9 bps decline in the option-adjusted spread. The option cost increased 3 bps on the year. Our underweight in MBS is predicated upon very low option-adjusted spreads, relative both to history and other comparable spread product (Chart 4). Historically, the option-adjusted spread is correlated with net MBS issuance and eventually we expect rising net issuance to lead the option-adjusted spread wider. Importantly, purchase applications have remained firm in the face of higher mortgage rates even though refinancings have collapsed (bottom panel). Another tail risk for the MBS market is the possibility that the Fed ceases the reinvestment of its mortgage portfolio. While we do not expect this to occur in 2017, with two rate hikes now in the bank the fed funds rate is approaching levels where the Fed might begin to consider it. A new Fed Chair in early 2018 might also be more inclined to wind down the balance sheet. Government Related: Overweight Chart 5Government Related Market Overview The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 27 basis points in December. Foreign Agency and Sovereign bonds outperformed by 84 bps and 83 bps respectively, while Local Authorities outperformed by 22 bps. Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals were a drag on performance during the month, underperforming the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps and 7 bps respectively. The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury benchmark by 150 bps in 2016. The best performing sub-sectors for the year were Sovereigns (outperformed by 322 bps), Local Authorities (outperformed by 286 bps) and Foreign Agencies (outperformed by 258 bps). Domestic Agency bonds outperformed Treasuries by 38 bps, while Supranationals underperformed by 11 bps. Foreign Agency bonds and Local Authority bonds continue to appear attractive relative to U.S. corporate credit, after adjusting for credit rating and duration. We recommend focusing our government related allocation in these two sectors. In contrast, Sovereigns and Supranationals both appear expensive relative to U.S. corporate credit, and we recommend avoiding these sectors. Spreads on Domestic Agency debt have room to tighten in the near-term (Chart 5). Spreads widened to the top of their recent range last month on rumors that the new government could seek to speed up the process of GSE reform. We view these concerns as premature. This week we also remove our recommendation to favor callable agencies over bullets. Bullets have tended to outperform when the 2/5 Treasury slope steepens (bottom panel). We expect the 2/5 curve to be biased steeper in the first half of this year. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 134 basis points in December, but underperformed the index by 103 basis points in 2016 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 8% in December, but increased 13% during 2016. At present the average M/T ratio is 98%, only slightly below its post-crisis average (Chart 6). Although M/T ratios moved higher last year, trends in issuance and fund flows suggest they are still too low. As we noted in our year-end Special Report,4 our tactical model of the M/T yield ratio - based on issuance, fund flows, ratings changes and economic policy uncertainty - pegs current fair value for the average M/T yield ratio at 112%. Further, as was also highlighted in our year-end report, the municipal credit cycle is likely to take a turn for the worse in late 2017, with muni downgrades starting to outpace upgrades. This analysis is based on indicators of state & local government budget health that tend to follow our indicators of corporate sector health with a two year lag. Just last month Moody's downgraded $1.6 billion worth of the City of Dallas' general obligation debt from Aa3 to A1. The downgrade was justified based on the city's poorly funded public safety pension plan. Attention will increasingly turn to underfunded public pensions when state & local government budget health starts to deteriorate later this year. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted higher and flattened in December. The 2/10 slope flattened by 1 basis point on the month and the 5/30 slope flattened 6 bps. For 2016 as a whole, the Treasury curve bear-steepened out to the 10-year maturity. The 2/10 slope steepened 4 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 12 bps. In our year-end Special Report,5 we detailed how the combination of accelerating economic growth and still-accommodative Fed policy will cause the Treasury curve to bear-steepen in the first half of 2017. This steepening will be driven by continued, but gradual, recovery in long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation back to pre-crisis levels (2.4% to 2.5%). Once inflation expectations return to pre-crisis levels, it is possible that the Fed will shift to a monetary policy that is focused more on tamping out inflation than supporting growth. At that point the curve will shift from a bear-steepening to a bear-flattening regime. A steepening curve environment will cause bullet trades to outperform barbells. On top of that, the 5-year bullet is currently extremely cheap on the curve (Chart 7). For these reasons we recommended entering a long 5-year bullet, short 2/10 barbell trade on December 20. This trade has already returned 8 bps since initiation, even though the 2/10 slope has flattened 10 bps during this period. A resumption of curve steepening will cause our long 5-year bullet, short 2/10 barbell trade to perform even better in the months ahead. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 6 basis points in December, and by 331 bps in 2016. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate increased by 1 bp in December and by 41 bps in 2016. At present it sits at 1.96%, still well below the 2.4% to 2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target. As we explained in our year-end Special Report,6 the Fed will be keen to allow TIPS breakevens to rise toward levels more consistent with its inflation target, and will quickly back away from a hawkish policy stance should breakevens fall. But while breakevens will continue to trend higher, the rate of increase should moderate to be more in line with the shallow uptrend in realized inflation. It is difficult for the Fed to drive long-dated inflation expectations higher while it is in the midst of a tightening cycle. For this reason, trends in actual inflation will be a more important determinant of TIPS breakevens than in the past. And while there are indications that the uptrend in realized inflation will persist, notably recent accelerations in wage growth and survey measures of prices paid (Chart 8). There is currently no indication that core and trimmed mean inflation are breaking out to the upside (bottom panel). We remain overweight TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries on the expectation that long-dated breakevens reach the 2.4% to 2.5% range in the second half of 2017, and that core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target by the end of the year. ABS: Maximum Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 17 basis points in December but outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 94 bps in 2016. Aaa-rated ABS underperformed Treasuries by 21 bps in December but outperformed by 75 bps in 2016, while non-Aaa ABS outperformed the benchmark by 13 bps in December and by 257 bps in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened by 11 bps in December, but tightened by 10 bps in 2016. Further, the spread differential between Aaa-rated auto ABS and Aaa-rated credit card ABS narrowed substantially in 2016. The option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated auto loan ABS has tightened by 20 bps since the end of 2015, while the option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated credit card ABS has tightened by 10 bps. We have previously noted that, after adjusting for spread volatility, Aaa-rated auto loan ABS no longer offer an attractive opportunity relative to Aaa-rated credit cards (Chart 9). We continue to favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans, given the low spread differential and divergences in collateral credit quality (bottom panel). As was noted in the Appendix to our year-end Special Report,7 consumer ABS provided better volatility-adjusted excess returns than all fixed income sectors except for Baa-rated corporates and Caa-rated high-yield in 2016. With spreads still elevated relative to other similarly risky fixed income sectors, we expect this risk-adjusted performance to continue. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Agency CMBS: Overweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 40 basis points in December, but outperformed by 117 bps in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS widened 10 bps in December but tightened 6 bps in 2016. Agency CMBS still offer 50 bps of option-adjusted spread. This is similar to what is offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS (51 bps) and greater than what is offered by conventional 30-year MBS (26 bps) for a similar amount of spread volatility. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in December, but outperformed by 313 bps in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 7 bps in December but tightened 48 bps in 2016. It has recently moved well below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). Rising CMBS delinquency rates and tightening commercial real estate lending standards make us cautious on non-agency CMBS. This caution has only intensified now that spreads are at their tightest levels since prior to the financial crisis. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Global PMI Model The current reading from our 2-factor Global PMI model (which includes the global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.31% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also incorporates the global economic policy uncertainty index, places fair value at 2.02%. The lower fair value is the result of a large spike in the global economic policy uncertainty index in November that barely reversed in December (bottom panel). Large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in other economic indicators tend to mean revert fairly quickly. So we would be inclined to view the fair value reading from our 2-factor model as more indicative of true fair value at the moment. However, unusually high uncertainty is one reason we are reluctant to adopt a below benchmark duration stance for the time being even though we expect yields to be higher in 12 months. At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.37% For further details on our Global PMI models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Monetary Conditions And Rate Expectations The BCA Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) combines changes in the fed funds rate with changes in the trade-weighted dollar using a 10:1 ratio. Historically, economic downturns have been preceded by a break in this index above its equilibrium level - calculated using the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of potential GDP growth (Chart 12). With the MCI having just reached this estimate of equilibrium, the shaded region in Chart 13 shows the expected path of the federal funds rate assuming that the MCI remains at its equilibrium level. The upper-end of the shaded region corresponds to a scenario where the trade-weighted dollar depreciates by 2% per year and the lower-end of the shaded region corresponds to a scenario where the dollar appreciates by 2% per year. The thick line through the middle of the region corresponds to a flat dollar. Chart 12Monetary Conditions Vs. Equilibrium Chart 13Fed Funds Rate Scenarios As can be seen in Chart 13, both the market and Fed are discounting a move in the MCI above its equilibrium level. This would be consistent with behavior witnessed in past cycles when the MCI broke above its equilibrium level several years before the next recession. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com 1 Defined as total debt divided by EBITD. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Highlights The U.S. dollar will continue to appreciate while the RMB will depreciate further. This is a bad omen for EM risk assets, commodities, and global late cyclical equity sectors. Gold often leads oil and copper prices. Investors should heed the current downbeat message from gold. EM credit spreads have become detached from fundamentals and are unreasonably tight. Continue overweighting the Indian bourse within an EM equity portfolio. A new equity trade: long Indian software stocks / short the EM overall index. Feature There are several major discrepancies in financial markets that in our view are unsustainable. 1. The gap between EM equity breadth, USD, RMB and EM share prices One way to measure equity market breadth is to compare performance of equal-weighted versus market cap-weighted stock price indexes. Based on this measure, EM stock market breadth has been deteriorating. Poor breadth often heralds a major selloff (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Poor EM Equity Breadth Heralds A Major Selloff Remarkably, the same measure for the U.S. stock market shows improving breadth. The relative performance of equally-weighted EM stocks against U.S. equity indexes - a measure of breadth in relative performance - can also be a reliable marker for the relative performance of market cap-weighted indexes. It has plummeted to a new low pointing to new lows in EM versus U.S. relative share prices. In addition, a surging U.S. dollar has historically meant lower EM share prices (Chart I-2). We doubt this time is different. Finally, EM risk assets have decoupled from the RMB/USD exchange rate as well. The RMB has been depreciating and China's domestic corporate and government bond yields have spiked. As a result, the on-shore bond prices in RMB terms have plummeted (Chart I-3). Chart I-2A Rising U.S. Dollar Is ##br##A Bad Omen For EM Chart I-3China's On-Shore Corporate Bond##br## Prices Have Crashed Experiencing considerable losses on their favorite financial investment of the past year, bonds, Chinese investors, as well as households and companies, could opt to switch into U.S. dollars. The stampede into the U.S. dollar could start as early as January when the annual US$ 50,000 quota per person becomes available. It is hard to see what the government will do to preclude this rush and massive flight towards U.S. dollars. In China, households' and corporates' RMB deposits in the banking system amount to RMB 122 tn or US$17.5 tn. Hence, the PBoC's foreign exchange reserves including gold at US$ 3.2 tn are only equal to 18.5% of these deposits at the current exchange rate. Bottom Line: The U.S. dollar will appreciate and the RMB will depreciate. This is a bad omen for EM share prices and other risk assets. 2. Oil and copper prices deviating from gold prices Historically, when gold and oil prices have diverged, gold in most cases has proven more forward looking, with oil prices ultimately converging toward gold prices. Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B illustrate past episodes of gold and oil decoupling (in the 1980, 1990s and 2008), each of which were resolved via oil prices gravitating toward gold prices. Chart I-4AGold Led Oil Prices Chart I-4BGold Led Oil Prices In short, if history is any guide, the current gap between gold and oil prices will likely close via lower oil prices (Chart I-5, top panel). The same holds true for the recent divergence between gold and copper prices (Chart 5, bottom panel). We identified four historical periods when gold and copper prices diverged. In each case, it was copper prices that amended their trajectory and aligned with the direction of gold prices (Chart I-6A and 6B). Chart I-5Divergence Between Oil, Copper And Gold Chart I-6AGold Led Copper Prices Too Chart I-6BGold Led Copper Prices Too In sum, historically there have been a number of episodes when gold has led both oil and copper prices. Investors should heed the current downbeat message from gold. Chart I-7China: Dichotomies The underlying rationale could be that gold responds to monetary/liquidity conditions (gold is very sensitive to U.S. TIPS (real) yields) while oil and copper are more sensitive to growth conditions. Tightening in monetary/liquidity conditions often precedes a growth relapse. This could be the reason why gold has led oil and copper prices on several occasions in the past. 3. Dichotomies in China's industrial economy There are two types of dichotomies underway within China's industrial economy: The first is between industrial activity and industrial commodities prices. Commodities prices have surged, but the pace of manufacturing production has not improved at all (Chart I-7). There have been major discrepancies among various segments of China's industrial economy, with utilities surging and the technology sector remaining robust, and many others stagnating. The decoupling between industrial activity and industrial commodities prices can be explained by financial speculation and supply cutbacks. The former is unsustainable, while the latter is reversing as the government is gradually lifting restrictions on supply for coal and steel. The second is between the private- and state-owned parts of the industrial sector. The state-owned segment has experienced a meaningful improvement in output, while private companies in the industrial sector have seen their output growth weaken, albeit the growth rate is higher than in the SOE sector. (Chart I-7, bottom panel). As China's fiscal and credit impulses wane,1 activity in the state-owned industrial segment will relapse anew. 4. EM credit spreads diverging from EM currencies and credit fundamentals EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads (credit markets) are once again proving very resilient, despite the renewed selloff in EM currencies (Chart I-8). EM credit markets have defied deteriorating EM credit fundamentals in the past several years. Below we identify several divergences and anomalies within the EM credit space that give us confidence that EM credit markets have become detached from fundamentals, and that their risk-reward profile is poor. Chart I-8EM Credit Markets And EM Currencies:##br## A Widening Dichotomy Chart I-9EM Corporate Financial Health:##br## Not Much Improvement The EM Corporate Financial Health (CFH) Indicator has stabilized, but remains at a very depressed level (Chart I-9, top panel). This amelioration is largely due to the profit margin component. The other three components have not improved (Chart I-9, second panel). The valuation model based on the EM CFH indicator shows that EM corporate spreads are far too tight (Chart I-10). Chart I-10EM Corporate Bonds Are Expensive The strong performance of EM credit markets in recent years has been justified by the persistence of low bond yields in developed markets (DM). Yet the latest spike in DM bond yields has so far not caused EM credit spreads to widen. We expect U.S./DM government bond yields to rise further, and the U.S. dollar to continue to strengthen. This, along with potential broad-based declines in commodities prices, should lead to material widening in EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads in early 2017. With respect to unsustainable discrepancies, the case in point is Brazil. The country's sovereign and corporate spreads have tightened a lot this year, even though economic activity continues to shrink. The country has had numerous boom-bust cycles in the past 100 years, yet this depression is the worst on record. In fact, the nation's economic growth and public debt dynamics are worse than at any time during the past 20 years. Yet, at 300 basis points, sovereign spreads are well below the 1000-2500 basis point trading range that prevailed in the second half of 1990s and early 2000s (Chart I-11). Remarkably, the economy's pace of contraction has lately intensified (Chart I-12). This will likely worsen government revenues and lead to further widening in the fiscal deficit - making debt dynamics unsustainable. Another absurd credit market divergence is between China's sovereign CDS and Chinese offshore corporate spreads. Sovereign CDS spreads have been widening, but corporate credit spreads remain very tight (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Brazil: Dichotomy Between Sovereign ##br##Spreads And Fundamentals Chart I-12Brazil's Economy: ##br##No Improvement At All Chart I-13Chinese Sovereign CDS And ##br##Off-Shore Corporate Spreads Yet there is much more risk in Chinese corporates than in government debt. The corporate sector commands record leverage of 165% of national GDP, while public debt stands at 46% of GDP. Besides, the central government in China will always have immediate access to domestic or foreign debt markets, while some corporations could lose access to financing if creditors question their creditworthiness and decide to tighten credit. There is no rational case to support the rise in sovereign CDS when corporate spreads are tame. The only feasible explanation is that investors - who are invested in Chinese corporate bonds, and are not interested in selling them - are buying sovereign CDS to tactically hedge their credit exposure. If and when market sentiment sours sufficiently, and credit spread widening is perceived durable and lasting, real money will sell corporate bonds, resulting in a major spike in corporate spreads. 5. Divergence between global late cyclicals and the U.S. dollar Another area where we detect that financial markets have lately become overly optimistic is in global late cyclicals - materials, machinery and energy stocks. Typically, the absolute share prices in these sectors correlate with the U.S. dollar exchange rate but they have lately diverged (Chart I-14). Furthermore, global machinery stocks in general, and Caterpillar's share price in particular, have lately staged significant gains, while their EPS and sales continue to plunge (Chart I-15). Notably, Caterpillar's sales have not improved, even on a rate-of-change basis. Chart I-14Global Late Cyclicals And The U.S. Dollar: ##br##Unsustainable Decoupling Chart I-15Global Machinery Sales And##br## Profits Continue Plunging EM including China capital spending in real terms is as large as the U.S. and EU capital spending combined (Chart I-16). If the EM and China capex cycle does not post a recovery, which is our baseline view, it will be hard for global late cyclical stocks to continue rallying based solely on the positive outlook for U.S. infrastructure spending and potential U.S. tax reforms. In short, global late cyclicals such as machinery, materials and energy stocks that performed quite well in 2016 are vulnerable to a major pullback as EM/Chinese capital spending disappoints on the back of credit growth deceleration. Notably, these global equity sectors have reached a major technical resistance that will likely become a ceiling for their share prices (Chart I-17). Chart I-16EM/China's Capex Is As Large As ##br##U.S. And Euro Area Combined Chart I-17Global Late Cyclicals Are ##br##Facing Technical Resistance 6. Decoupling between the South African rand and precious metals prices The South African rand's recent resilience - despite the considerable drop in precious metal prices - is unprecedented (Chart I-18, top panel). Similarly, the rand has also decoupled from the exchange rate of another major metals producer: Australia (Chart I-18, bottom panel). We cannot think of any reason why these discrepancies can or should persist. Rising global bond yields and a broadening selloff in commodities prices should hurt the rand. In fact, the trade-weighted rand is facing a major technical resistance (Chart I-19) and will likely relapse sooner than later. Chart I-18Rand, AUD And ##br##Precious Metals Chart I-19Trade-Weighted Rand Is ##br##Facing Technical Resistance We reiterate our structural short position in the rand versus the U.S. dollar, and on October 12, 2016 initiated a short ZAR / long MXN trade. Traders should consider putting on these trades. Investment Strategy Chart I-20EM Relative Equity Performance ##br##Is Heading To New Lows Emerging markets share prices and currencies have been doing poorly since October, despite U.S. equity shares breaking out to new highs. In fact, almost all relative outperformance has been wiped out (Chart I-20). BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team expects further declines in EM share prices and currencies, as well as a selloff in domestic bonds and a widening of sovereign and corporate spreads. Absolute return investors should stay put, while asset allocators should maintain underweight positions in EM risk assets within respective global portfolios. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com India: Demonetization And Opportunities In Equities On November 8, India launched a demonetization program with the goal of removing the two most used banknotes - the 500 INR and 1000 INR banknotes - from circulation. Both banknotes accounted for roughly 85% of currency in circulation, which itself accounts for 13% of India's broad money supply. Moreover, almost 90%2 of retail transactions in India are cash-reliant. While around INR 13 trillion of notes (US$ 190 billion) have been deposited in the banking system as of December 10, only INR 5 trillion of new notes have been issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). India is unlikely to turn cashless overnight. According to a Harvard Business Review article,3 less than 10% of Indians have ever used non-cash payment instruments. Likewise, less than 2% of Indians have used a cellular phone to receive a payment. This implies cash shortages could persist for a while and will have a significant impact on short-term economic activity. There are numerous reports that layoffs and business shutdowns have ensued in several industries, particularly in the informal economy (Chart II-1). The service sector PMI already dipped below 50 in November and the manufacturing PMI fell as well (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Very Weak Employment Outlook Chart II-2Indian PMIs Are Sinking Having boomed over the past year, motorcycle sales growth is now waning. Similarly, passenger and commercial vehicle sales - that have been anemic - will now dip. However, the consumption slowdown should not continue beyond the next couple of months. As more currency is supplied by the RBI, economic activity will rebound - particularly household spending. Pent-up demand will be unleashed as money circulation is restored. Nevertheless, investment expenditures are the key factors for improving productivity and, hence, as non-inflationary growth potential. Capital spending had been anemic in India well before the demonetization program was announced (Chart II-3). The reason for such lackluster investment expenditure lies in the fact that past investment projects taken on by highly leveraged Indian conglomerates have delivered poor performance. This translated into ever rising non-performing loans (NPLs) at state banks. Without debt restructuring and public bank recapitalization, a new capex cycle is unlikely in India. Consistently, credit to large industries is now contracting (Chart II-4) and foreign lending to Indian companies is declining. Chart II-3Indian Capex Is Anemic Chart II-4Banks Prefer Consumers We expect the demonetization program to hurt capital spending only mildly in the coming months, but do not expect a material bounce in investment afterward, unlike the one slated for household consumption. Indian share prices have more downside in absolute terms, as the market is still expensive and growth is slumping. Nevertheless, India will likely outperform the EM equity benchmark going forward (Chart II-5). Chart II-5Indian Share Prices: A Tapering Wedge The rationale for our overweight on Indian equities within the EM stock universe is due to the nation's much better macro fundamentals relative to those in many other EM. In particular, deleveraging and NPL write-offs are more advanced, the current account deficit is small, and India will benefit from potentially lower commodities prices. Within the Indian bourse, we recommend overweighting software stocks that will benefit from a revival in advanced economies' growth and a weaker currency. Besides, Indian software stocks are not exposed to the currently weak domestic consumption cycle and in fact might benefit from the push toward digitalization in banking. Bottom Line: Indian consumption will weaken in the coming three months or so, but will rebound thereafter. The capex cycle is weak and will remain subdued. Continue overweighting the Indian bourse within an EM equity portfolio. A new equity recommendation: long Indian software stocks / short the EM overall index. Ayman Kawtharani, Research Analyst aymank@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Key EM Issues Going Into 2017," dated December 14, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Chakravorti, B., Mazzotta, B., Bijapurkar, R., Shukla, R., Ramesha, K., Bapat, D., &Roy, D. (2013). The cost of cash in India. Institute of Business in the Global Context, Fletcher School, Tufts University. 3 Chakravorti, B. (2016, December 14). India's Botched War on Cash. Retrieved from https://hbr.org Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Dear Clients, Please note that this will be our final Weekly Report for the year. We will resume our regular publishing schedule on January 3, 2017. The U.S. Investment Strategy team wishes you a restful holiday season and a prosperous New Year. Chart 1Trump + Yellen Recent bond market moves are soft echoes of the 1994 bond bear market, when investors suddenly began to price in a much less benign outlook for the Fed. There are mitigating factors that mean the current bond selloff will not be as violent. But the normalization of policy rates is no longer a challenge for the distant future. This process was always going to be fraught with risk, given the unprecedented amount of accommodation (conventional and unconventional) employed after the Great Recession. Even a mild version of 1994 could undermine equity returns. Indeed, the risk is that investors have pulled forward profit growth expectations due to anticipated fiscal stimulus (that may disappoint) at a time when domestic monetary conditions are tightening. Feature It was no surprise that the FOMC raised the Fed funds rate by 25bps at last week's meeting. But investors were caught off-guard by the move higher in the Fed's "dot" forecast. Instead of two more hikes next year, the Fed now expects to raise rates three times. Moreover, the Fed inched up its estimate of the terminal interest rate to 3.0% from 2.875%. These revisions to the path of interest rates did not occur with any material changes to the Fed's economic projections. During the post-meeting press conference, Fed Chair Janet Yellen downplayed the "dot" revisions, by noting that the median projections moved due to changes by only some Fed participants. But despite Yellen's soothing remarks, the financial markets did not interpret the revisions to be minor. The dollar strengthened by nearly 2%, and 10-year bond yields spiked by 20bps (Chart 1). These market moves are soft echoes of the 1994 bond bear market - when investors suddenly began to price in a much less benign outlook for the Fed. Investors will note that in that cycle, the Fed's extended on hold period in 1993 had lulled bond investors into a false sense of complacency; investors were almost completely caught off-guard when tightening began in early February 1994 (Chart 2 and Chart 3). At the end of 1993, the market projected that the 3-month rate, the 10-year and the 30-year yield would be 4.3%, 6.2% and 6.5%, respectively, by the end of 1994. The actual yields at the end of 1994 turned out to be more than 130 basis points higher at 5.6%, 7.8% and 7.85%. From the trough in yields in September 1993 to the peak in November 1994, the Treasury index lost 5%. High-grade spread product, such as Agencies, MBS and investment-grade corporate bonds also suffered losses. The S&P 500 fell by about 9% in early 1994. Economic improvement was the main factor for the re-pricing of the Fed funds rate in 1994 (Chart 4). In the first half of the year, the unemployment rate declined 0.5% (from 6.6% to 6.1%) and monthly average payrolls were above 320,000! As the economy gained self-feeding momentum, the Fed steadily hiked interest rates, causing Treasuries and spread product to buckle. In fact, inflation did not go up but bond yields kept rising and the U.S. economy remained robust. The Mexican financial crisis in late 1994/early 1995, directly stemming from Fed tightening, marked the end of the Treasury bear and Fed restraint. Chart 21993 Complacency, 1994 Panic Chart 3Bond Market Is Still Behind Chart 41994 Economic Acceleration Fueled The Bond Bear All of this bears some resemblance to current conditions, albeit the level of growth today is much lower. Like early 1994, the economy now appears on the cusp of full employment (Chart 5). Most forecasters (including BCA) expect that growth will shift to an above-trend pace for at least a few quarters. And indeed, the debate has already shifted from deflation to the potential for inflation. To be sure, as we wrote last week, it takes a long time to change a prevailing mindset about inflation or deflation and it is unlikely that the Fed will find itself in a position to aggressively tighten against an inflation breakout over the next twelve months. But if GDP growth bucks the pattern of recent years in which first quarter growth disappointed expectations, then bond investors could begin to look for the exits more fervently. What is different this cycle than in 1994? For one thing, the Fed's communication strategy has drastically changed. Since 2012, the Fed has been publishing the "dot plot," a set of FOMC projections for inflation, GDP and the projected policy path. These projections serve as forward guidance about policy intent and in theory, should help smooth out any changes in market participants' expectations about the Fed's policy path and reduce the likelihood of overshoots in expectations. In addition, it seems likely that bonds are now more concentrated in "strong hands." One of the major concerns in 1994 was that retail investors, i.e. the household sector, piled into bonds at precisely the wrong time: throughout the 1980s, bond returns only marginally trailed that of equities and with far less volatility, lulling retail investors into believe bonds couldn't lose them money. Today, according to the BIS,2 around 40% of U.S. Treasuries are owned by the Federal Reserve and the foreign official sector. In addition, the BIS also posits that it is possible that pension funds (the third largest holders of Treasuries) and insurance companies may even benefit from rising rates in the medium term, as a normalized yield environment would allow them to more easily meet promised returns. This composition of ownership, in particular the Fed and foreign official investors - who are non-profit seeking entities, will not be forced to sell into a bear market. Chart 5On The Cusp Of Full Employment True, corporate bonds are now more heavily concentrated in the hands of private investors who seek yield and total return. The prospective price volatility of these securities may be much higher than an entire generation of fixed income investors' experience has taught them to expect. Finally, the U.S. dollar traded sideways from 1990-1993, and fell throughout 1994, which is very different from today. Currently, the policy feedback loop limits the degree to which the Fed can ultimately raise interest rates. This loop has been in place since last year: each hawkish move from the Fed has been met by a sharp upward adjustment in the trade-weighted dollar and a selloff in equities and credit spreads. Tighter-than-expected financial conditions have then forced the Fed to lower its outlook for future economic growth and adopt a more dovish policy stance. A more dovish Fed then caused financial conditions to ease and the dollar to fall, and this easing eventually emboldened Fed policymakers to move in a more hawkish direction. The loop then repeats. The reason this loop has been in place is because U.S. monetary policy is so far in advance of other central banks. Overall, there are mitigating factors that suggest that the current bond selloff will not be as violent as 1994. But the normalization of policy rates is no longer a challenge for the distant future. As expectations of economic growth improve, a re-pricing of Fed interest rate hike expectations will persist. This process was always going to be fraught with risk, given the unprecedented amount of accommodation (conventional and unconventional) employed after the Great Recession. We expect that bond selloffs over the next year will happen in fits and starts, as the feedback loop from the bond market and dollar to policy decisions repeats. The move in Treasury yields since mid-November has proceeded too quickly relative to the improvement in economic fundamentals and will pause in the near term to prevent financial conditions from exerting an excessive drag on growth. However, we believe short duration positions will make money on a 2-3 year horizon. How Will Equities Cope? Apart from the 1994 episode, there have been three other major Fed tightening cycles since 1985 (Chart 6). In each case, the 10-year Treasury suffered an almost 10% or more annual loss, either following or just before short-term rates began their ascent. Investors underestimated the pace and extent of rate hikes every time and equity prices also faltered, at least temporarily. This was the case even when the Fed telegraphed a modest and steady 25 basis point-per-meeting pace of rate hikes from 2003 to 2006. The point is that even a mild version of 1994 could undermine equity returns. Indeed, the risk is that investors have pulled forward profit growth expectations due to anticipated fiscal stimulus (that may disappoint) at a time when domestic monetary conditions are tightening. Earnings-per-share growth is significantly lower today than in 1993, and the gap between trailing earnings growth and 12-month forward expectations is wide. This suggests that there is a greater risk of earnings disappointment than was the case in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, valuation is poor (Chart 6, bottom panel). Still, we concede that sentiment and technical indicators continue to favor near-term equity gains (Chart 7). Neither our technical nor our intermediate indicator is signalling danger (although both have rolled over). Only our monetary indicator is flashing a warning. The risk is that the longer the uptrend in stocks continues without interruption, the greater the payback will be should economic performance disappoint. Chart 6Fed Re-Entry Is Historically Tough Chart 7An Expensive And Risky Rally Animal Spirits Revival? In our view, the most notable development for the U.S. economy in recent weeks has been the impressive swing in confidence since the election in November. If sustained, the rise in confidence could propel growth to an above-trend pace as "animal spirits" are unleashed. We take this possibility seriously, since depressed confidence in the outlook was an important force capping the upside in growth earlier in the recovery. Nonetheless, this is not our base case, since we continue to believe that it is perilous to focus solely on the positive aspects of Trump's political agenda, while ignoring the more negative ones. This phenomenon seems to be borne out in the NFIB survey data. Although still low relative to past recoveries, optimism among small business owners improved drastically last month, according to the NFIB survey (Chart 8). The improvement was broad-based, showing gain in sales expectations, expansion plans and hiring intentions. But as the NFIB's chief economist pointed out, this surge in optimism is mainly due to businesses reacting favorably to Trump's platform of tax cuts and less regulation. In any case, the recent improvement in consumer confidence has not noticeably translated to improved consumer spending yet. Nominal retail sales eked out a tiny 0.1% m/m gain in November and the October data were revised lower. As we highlighted in a previous report, massive price discounting continues to be a factor pushing down nominal spending. Indeed, despite the potential for an upturn in inflation on the back of unconfirmed Trump policies, the current pricing environment remains tough. Core CPI rose only 0.2% in November, and the annual growth rate - at 2.1% - is lower than at the start of the year. Our diffusion index is below 50, meaning that more sub-components of the CPI are decelerating than accelerating (Chart 9). Chart 8Optimism Returning Chart 9Consumers Are Confident, Will They Spend? The overall message is that economic data continue to display a "two steps forward, one step backward" pattern. We expect growth momentum to gradually build and the economy can grow above trend next year. However, even once the output gap closes, it can take a long time for inflation pressures to build and for inflation expectations to move higher. Ultimately, this dynamic means that the Fed will have the scope to proceed slowly. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 This week's report is greatly inspired by our Special Report, "Reincarnation And Bond Vigilantes," February 5, 2013. 2 "A Paradigm Shift In Markets?," Bank For International Settlements (BIS), December 11, 2016 http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1612a.htm Appendix Monthly Asset Allocation Model Update Our Asset Allocation (AA) model provides an objective assessment of the outlook for relative returns across equities, Treasuries and cash. It combines valuation, cyclical, monetary and technical indicators. The model was constructed as a capital preservation tool, and has historically outperformed the benchmark in large part by avoiding major equity bear markets. Please note that our official cyclical asset allocation recommendations deviate at times from the model's recommendation. The model is just one input to our decision process. The model's recommended weightings for the major asset classes are unchanged: neutral equity exposure at 60% (benchmark 60%), slightly overweight Treasury allocation at 40% (benchmark 30%) and underweight cash at 0% (benchmark 10%). The diffusion index of the three components for The Equity Model remained neutral and in line with our benchmark portfolio recommendation for equities. The technical component retained its "buy" signal, with some improvements in the momentum and breadth & trend indicators. The monetary component, though less bullish for equities as it continued to weaken somewhat, is still in favorable territory for equities. However, on the cyclical front, the earnings-driven component continues to warrant caution as real operating earnings are at a significant distance from positive economic expectations. Earnings momentum has also further deteriorated, based on an earnings diffusion index which compares nominal earnings growth relative to four economic and monetary variables such as oil prices (WTI), ISM Inventories, 10-year Treasury yields and 3-month T-bill rates. Our qualitative stance for the allocation of Treasuries in balanced portfolios is neutral (since November 7, 2016) in contrast to the slightly overweight recommendation from our quantitative model. However the "buy signals" of the cyclical and technical components of the bond model have weakened, nearing critical levels which would surrender the preference for Treasuries in the near term. Chart 10Portfolio Total Returns Chart 11Current Model Recommendations Note: The asset allocation model is not necessarily consistent with the weighting recommendations of the Cyclical Investment Stance. For further information, please see our Special Report "Presenting Our U.S. Asset Allocation Model", February 6, 2009.
Recommendation Allocation Highlights Growth was picking up before the election of President Trump. His election merely accelerates the rotation from monetary to fiscal policy. This is likely to cause yields to rise, the Fed to tighten and the dollar to strengthen further. That will be negative for bonds, commodities and emerging market assets, and equivocal for equities. Short term, markets have overshot and a correction is likely. But the 12-month picture (higher growth and inflation) suggests risk assets such as equities will outperform. Our recommendations mostly have cyclical tilts. We are overweight credit versus government bonds, underweight duration and, in equity sectors, overweight energy, industrials and IT (and healthcare for structural reasons). Among alts, we prefer real estate and private equity over hedge funds and structured products. We limit beta through overweights (in common currency terms) on U.S. equities versus Europe and emerging markets. We also have a (currency-hedged) overweight on Japanese stocks. Feature Overview A Shift To Reflation The next 12 months are likely to see stronger economic growth, particularly in the U.S., and higher inflation. That will probably lead to higher long-term interest rates, the Fed hiking two or three times in 2017, and further dollar strength. The consequences should be bad for bonds, but mixed for equities - which would benefit from a better earnings outlook, but might see multiples fall because of a higher discount rate. The election of Donald Trump merely accelerates the rotation from monetary policy to fiscal policy that had been emerging globally since the summer. Trump's fiscal plans are still somewhat vague,1 but the OECD estimates they will add 0.4 percentage points to U.S. GDP growth in 2017 and 0.8 points in 2018, and 0.1 and 0.3 points to global growth. Growth was already accelerating before the U.S. presidential election. Global leading indicators have picked up noticeably (Chart 1), and the Q3 U.S. earnings season surprised significantly on the upside, with EPS growth of 3% (versus a pre-results expectation of -2%) - the first YoY growth in 18 months (Chart 2). Chart 1Global Growth Picking Up Chart 2U.S. Earnings Growing Again The problem with the shift to fiscal, then, is that it comes at a time when slack in U.S. economy has already largely disappeared. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the output gap is now only -1.5%, which means it is likely to turn positive in 2017 (Chart 3). Unemployment, at 4.6%, is below NAIRU2 (Chart 4). Historically, the output gap turning positive has sown the seeds of the next recession a couple of years later, as the Fed tightens policy to choke off inflation. Chart 3Output Gap Will Close In 2017 Chart 4Will This Trigger Inflation Pressures? As the Fed signaled at its meeting on December 14, it is likely to raise rates two or three times more in 2017. But we don't see it getting any more hawkish than that. Janet Yellen has made it clear that she will not preempt Trump's fiscal stimulus but rather wait to see it passed by Congress. The market is probably about right in pricing in an 80% probability of two rate hikes in 2017, and a 50% probability of three. With the Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker rising 3.9% YoY and commodity prices (especially energy) starting to add to headline inflation, the Fed clearly wants to head off inflation before it sets in. We do not agree with the argument that the Fed will deliberately allow a "high-pressure economy." The result is likely to be higher long-term rates. The 10-year U.S. yield has already moved a long way (up 100 BP since July), and our model suggests fair value currently is around 2.3% (Chart 5). Short term, then, a correction is quite possible (and would be accompanied by moves in other assets that have overshot since November 9). But stronger global growth and an appreciating dollar over the next 12 months could easily push fair value up to 3% or beyond. The relationship between nominal GDP growth (which is likely to be 4.5-5% in 2017, compared to 2.7% in 1H 2016) and long-term rates implies a rise to a similar level (Chart 6). Accordingly, we recommend investors to be underweight duration and prefer TIPs over nominal bonds. Chart 5U.S. 10-Year At Fair Value Chart 6Rise In Nominal GDP Could Push It Up To 3% Global equities, on a risk-adjusted basis, performed roughly in line with sovereign bonds in 2016 - producing a total return of 9.2%, compared to 3.3% for bonds (though global high yield did even better, up 15.1%). If our analysis above is correct, the return on global sovereign bonds over the next 12 months is likely to be close to zero. Chart 7Will Investors Reverse The Move##br## from Equities To Bonds? The outlook for equities is not unclouded. Higher rates could dampen growth (note, for example, that 30-year fixed-rate mortgages in the U.S. have risen over the past two months from 3.4% to 4.2%, close to the 10-year average of 4.6%). The U.S. earnings recovery will be capped by the stronger dollar.3 And a series of Fed hikes may lower the PE multiple, already quite elevated by historical standards. Erratic behavior by President Trump and the more market-unfriendly of his policies could raise the risk premium. But we think it likely that equities will produce a decent positive return in this environment. Portfolio rebalancing should help. Since the Global Financial Crisis investors have steadily shifted allocations from equities into bonds (Chart 7). They are likely to reverse that over the coming quarters if bond yields continue to trend up. Accordingly, we moved overweight equities versus bonds in our last Monthly Portfolio Update.4 Our recommended portfolio has mostly pro-cyclical tilts: we are overweight credit versus government bonds, overweight most cyclical equity sectors, and have a preference for risk alternative assets such as real estate and private equity. But our portfolio approach is to pick the best spots for taking risk in order to make a required return. We, therefore, balance this pro-cyclicality by some lower beta stances: we prefer investment grade debt over high yield, and U.S. and Japanese equities over Europe and emerging markets. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking What Will Trump Do? Trump made several speeches in September with details of his tax plan. He promised to (1) simplify personal income tax, cutting seven brackets to three, with 12%, 25% and 33% tax rates; (2) cut the headline corporate tax rate to 15% (from 35%); and (3) levy a 10% tax on the $3 trillion of corporate retained earnings held offshore. He was less specific on infrastructure spending, but Wilbur Ross, the incoming Commerce Secretary, mentioned $550 billion, principally financed through public-private partnerships. The Tax Policy Center estimates the total cost of the tax plan at $6 trillion (with three-quarters from the business tax cut). But it is not clear how much will be offset by reduced deductions. Incoming Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, for example, said that upper class taxpayers will get no absolute tax cut. TPC estimates the tax plan alone will increase federal debt to GDP by 25 percentage points over the next 10 years (Chart 8). The OECD, assuming stimulus of 0.75% of GDP in 2017 and 1.75% in 2018, estimates that this will raise U.S. GDP growth by 0.4 percentage points next year and by 0.8 points in 2018, with positive knock-on effects on the rest of the world (Chart 9). While there are questions on the timing (and how far Trump will go with trade and immigration measures), BCA's geopolitical strategists sees few constraints on getting these plans passed.5 Republications in Congress like tax cuts (and will compromise on the public spending element) and it is wrong to assume that Republican administrations reduce the fiscal deficit - historically the opposite is true (Chart 10). Chart 8Massive Increase In Debt Chart 9GDP Impact Of U.S. Fiscal Stimulus Chart 10A Lot of Stimulus, And Extra Debt Implications for markets? Short term positive for growth and inflation; longer-term a worry because of crowding out from the increased government debt. How Will The Strong USD Impact Global Earnings? We have a strong U.S. dollar view and also favor U.S. equities over the euro area and emerging markets. Some clients question our logic because conceptually a strong USD should benefit earnings growth in the non-U.S. markets, and therefore non-U.S. equities should outperform. Chart 11USD Impact On Global Earnings Currency is just one of the factors that we consider when we make country allocation decisions, and our weights are expressed in USD terms unhedged. We will hedge a currency only when we have very high conviction, such as our current Japan overweight with a yen hedge, which is based on our belief that the BOJ will pursue more unconventional policies to stimulate the economy. This is undoubtedly yen bearish but positive for Japanese stocks. As shown in Chart 11, a stronger USD has tended to weaken U.S. earnings growth (panel 1). However, what matters to country allocation is relative earnings growth. Panels 3 and 5 show that in local currency terms, earnings growth in emerging markets and the euro area did not always outpace that in the U.S. when their currencies depreciated against the USD. In fact, when their currencies appreciated, earnings growth in USD terms tended to outpace that in the U.S. (panels 2 and 4), suggesting that the translation impact plays a very important role. This is consistent with what we have found for relative equity market returns (see Global Equity section on page 13). Currency affects revenues and costs in different proportions. If both revenues and costs are in same currency, then only net profit is affected by the currency. But, since many companies manage their forex exposure, at the aggregate level the currency impact will always be "weaker than it should be". What Is The Outlook For Brexit And The Pound? The U.K. shocked the world on 24 June 2016 with its vote to leave the European Union. However, the process and terms of exit are yet to be finalized pending the Supreme Court's decision on the role of parliament in invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. Depending on this decision, there is a spectrum of possible outcomes for the U.K./EU relationship. At the two ends of the spectrum are: 1) a hard Brexit - complete separation from the EU, in which case the pound will plunge further; 2) a soft Brexit - with a few features of the current relationship retained, in which case the pound will rally. Chart 12What's Up Brexit? The fall in the nominal effective exchange rate to a 200-year low (Chart 12) is a clear indication of the potential serious long-term damage. With the nation's dependence on foreign direct investment (FDI) to finance its large current account deficit (close to 6% of GDP), more populist policies and increased regulation will hurt corporate profitability, making local assets less profitable to foreigners. The pound is currently caught up in a vicious circle of more depreciation, leading to higher inflation expectations and depressed real rates, which adds further selling pressure. This is the likely path of the pound in the case of a hard Brexit. For U.K. equities, under a hard Brexit that adds downward pressure to the pound, investors should favor firms with global revenues (FTSE 100) and underweight firms exposed more to domestic business and a potential recession (FTSE 250). The opposite holds true in the case of a soft Brexit. Investors should also underweight U.K. REITs because of cyclical and structural factors that will affect commercial real estate. In the case of a hard Brexit, structural long-term impacts to the British economy include: 1) a decline in the financial sector - the EU will introduce regulations that will force euro-denominated transactions out of London; 2) a slowdown in FDI - the U.K. will cease to be a platform for global companies to access the EU, triggering a long-term decline in foreign inflows; 3) weaker growth - with EU immigration into the U.K. expected to fall by 90,000 to 150,000 per year, estimates.6 point to a 3.4% to 5.4% drop in per capita GDP by the year 2030. What Industry Group Tilts Do You Recommend? In October 2015, we advocated that, because long-term returns for major asset classes would fall short of ingrained expectations, investors should increase alpha by diving down into the Industry Group level.7 How have these trades fared, and which would we still recommend? Long Household And Personal Products / Short Energy. We closed the trade for a profit of 12.2% in Q12016. This has proven to be quite timely as oil prices, and Energy stocks along with it, have rallied substantially since. Long Insurance / Short Banks. The early gains from this trade reversed in Q2 as long yields have risen rapidly, leading to yield curve steepening. However, our cyclical view is still intact. Relative performance is still holding its relationship with the yield curve (Chart 13). Historically, Fed tightening has almost always led to bear flattening. We expect the same in this cycle, which should lead to Insurance outperformance. Long Health Care Equipment / Short Materials. This trade generated early returns but has since underperformed as Materials bounced back sharply. Nevertheless, we remain bearish on commodities and EM-related plays, viewing this rise in Materials stocks as more of a technical bounce from oversold valuations (Chart 14). Commodities remain in a secular bear market. On health care, we maintain our structural bullish outlook given aging demographics, increased spending on health care and attractive valuations. Short Retail / Global Broad. We initiated trade in January after the Fed initiated liftoff. Consumer Discretionary stocks collapsed after, and this trade has provided a gain of 2.01%. We maintain this view as the recent hike and 2017 hikes will continue to dampen Retail performance (Chart 15). Additionally, Retail has only declined slightly while other Consumer Discretionary stocks have falling drastically, suggesting downside potential from convergence. Chart 13Flatter Yield Curve Is Bullish Chart 14An Oversold Bounce Chart 15Policy Tightening = Underperformance Global Economy Overview: The macro picture looks fairly healthy, with growth picking up in developed economies and China, though not in most emerging markets. The weak patch from late 2015 through the first half of 2016, with global industrial and profits recessions, appears to be over. The biggest threat to growth now is excessive dollar strength, which would slow U.S. exports and harm emerging markets. U.S.: U.S. growth was surprising on the upside (Chart 16) even before the election. Q2 real GDP growth came in at 3.2% and the Fed's Nowcasting models indicate 2.6-2.7% in Q4. After rogue weak ISMs in August, the manufacturing indicator has recovered to 53.2 and the non-manufacturing ISM to 57.2. However, growth continues to be driven mainly by consumption, with capex as yet showing few signs of recovery. A key question is whether a Trump stimulus will be enough to reignite "animal spirits" and push corporates to invest more. Euro Area: Eurozone growth has also been surprisingly robust. PMIs for manufacturing and services in November came in at 53.7 and 53.8 respectively; the manufacturing PMI has been accelerating all year. This is consistent with the ECB's forecasts for GDP growth of 1.7% for both this year and next. However, risk in the banking system could derail this growth. Credit growth, highly correlated with economic activity, has picked up to 1.8% YOY but could slow if banks turn cautious. Japan: Production data has reacted somewhat to Chinese stimulus, with IP growth positive (Chart 17) for the past three months and the Leading Economic Index inching higher since April. But the strength of the yen until recently and disappointing inflation performance (core CPI -0.4% YOY) have depressed exports and consumer sentiment. The effectiveness of the BoJ's 0% yield cap on 10-year government bonds, which has weakened the yen by 14% in two months, should trigger a mild acceleration of growth in coming quarters. Chart 16U.S. Economy Surprising ##br##On The Upside Chart 17Growth Picks Up In##br## Most DMs And China Emerging Markets: China has continued to see positive effects from its reflation of early 2016, with the manufacturing PMI close to a two-year high. The effects of the stimulus will last a few more months, but the authorities have reined back now and the currency is appreciating against its trade basket. The picture is less bright in other emerging markets, as central banks struggle with weak growth and depreciating currencies. Credit growth is slowing almost everywhere (most notably Turkey and Brazil) which threatens a further slowdown in growth in 2017. Interest rates: Inflation expectations have risen sharply in the U.S. following the election, but less so in the eurozone and Japan. They may rise further - pushing U.S. bond yields close to 3% - if the Trump administration implements a fiscal stimulus anywhere close to that hinted at. This could, in turn, push the Fed to raise rates at least twice more in 2017. The ECB has announced a reduction in its asset purchases starting in April 2017, too, but the Bank of Japan will allow inflation to overshoot before tightening. Chart 18Earnings Bottoming But##br## Valuation Stretched Global Equities Cautiously Optimistic: Global markets have embraced the "hoped for" pro-growth and inflationary policies from the new U.S. administration since Trump's win on November 8. In the latest GAA Monthly Update published on November 30,8 we raised our recommendation for global equities relative to bonds to overweight from neutral on a 6-12 month investment horizon. However, the call was driven more by underweighting bonds than by overweighting equities, given the elevated equity valuations and declining profit margins.(Chart 18) The hoped-for U.S. pro-growth policies would, if well implemented, be positive for earnings growth, but the "perceived" earnings boost has not yet shown up in analysts' earnings revisions (panel 3). In fact, only three sectors (Financials, Technology and Energy) currently have positive earnings revisions, because analysts had already been raising forward earnings estimates since early 2016. According to I/B/E/S data as of November 2016, about 80% of sectors are forecast to have positive 12-month forward earnings growth, while only about 20% have positive 12-month trailing earnings growth (panel 3). Within global equities, we continue to favor developed markets over emerging market on the grounds that most EMs are at an early stage of a multi-year deleveraging.9 We also favor the U.S. over the euro area (see more details on the next page). The Japan overweight (currency hedged) is an overwrite of our quant model: we believe that the BoJ will pursue increasingly unconventional monetary policy measures over the coming 12 months. The quant model (in USD and unhedged) has suggested a large underweight in Japan but has gradually reduced the underweight over the past two months. Our global sector positioning is more pro-cyclical than our more defensively-oriented country allocations. In line with our asset class call, we upgrade Financials to neutral and downgrade Utilities to underweight, and continue to overweight Energy, Technology, Industrials, and Healthcare while underweighting Telecom, Consumer Discretionary and Consumer Staples. Country Allocation: Still Favor U.S. Over Euro Area GAA's portfolio approach is to take risk where it is likely to be best rewarded. Having taken risk at the asset class level (overweight equities vs. bonds), at the global equity sector level with a pro-cyclical tilt, and at the bond class level with credit and inflation tilts, we believe it's appropriate to maintain our more defensive equity tilt at the country level by being market weight in euro area equities on an unhedged USD basis while maintaining a large overweight in the U.S. Chart 19Uninspiring profit Outlook It's true that the euro area PMI has been improving. Relative to the U.S., however, the euro area's cyclical improvement, driven by policy support, has lost momentum. It's hard to envision what would reverse this declining growth momentum, suggesting European earnings growth will remain at a disadvantage to the U.S. (Chart 19, panel 1) It's also true that the underperformance of eurozone equities versus the U.S. has reached an historical extreme in both local and common currency terms, and that euro equities are trading at significant discount to the U.S. But Europe has always traded at a discount, and the current discount is only slightly lower than its historical average. Our work has shown that valuation works well only when it is at extremes, which is not the case currently. Conceptually, a weak euro should boost euro area equity performance at least in local currency terms, yet empirical evidence does not strongly support such a claim: the severe underperformance since 2007 has been accompanied by a 43% drop in the euro versus the USD (Chart 19 panel 2). In fact, in USD terms, the euro area tended to outperform the U.S. when the euro was strong (panel 3), suggesting that currency translation plays a more dominant role in relative performance. Our currency house view is that the euro will depreciate further against the USD, given divergences in monetary and fiscal policy between the two regions. As such, we recommend clients to continue to favor U.S. equities versus the euro area, but not be underweight Europe given that it is technically extremely oversold. Sector Allocation: Upgrade Financials To Neutral Our sector quant model shifted global Financials to overweight in December from underweight, largely driven by the momentum factor. We agree with the direction of the quant model as the interest rate environment has changed (Chart 20, panel 1) and valuation remains very attractive (panels 2), but we are willing to upgrade the sector only to market weight due to our concern on banks in the euro area and emerging markets. Within the neutral stance in the sector, we still prefer U.S. and Japanese Financials to eurozone and emerging market ones. Despite the poor performance of the Financials sector relative to the global benchmark, U.S. and Japanese financials have consistently outperformed eurozone financials, driven by better relative earnings without any valuation expansion (panel 3). U.S. banks have largely repaired their balance sheets since the Great Recession, and the "promised" deregulation by the new U.S. administration will probably help U.S. banks. In the euro area, however, banks, especially in Italy, are still plagued with bad loans (panel 4). We will watch banking stress in the region very closely for signs of contagion (panel 5) The upgrade of financials is mainly financed by downgrading the bond proxy Utilities to underweight from neutral, in line with our asset class view underweighting fixed income. Chart 20Global Financials: Regional Divergence Chart 21Global Equities: No Style Bet Smart Beta Update: No Style Bet In a Special Report on Smart Beta published on July 8 2016,10 we showed that it is very hard to time style shifts and that an equal-weighted composite of the five most enduring factors (size, value, quality, minimum volatility and momentum) outperforms the broad market consistently on a risk-adjusted basis. Year-to-date, the composite has performed in line with the broad market, but over the past three months there have been sharp reversals in the performance of the different factors, with Min Vol, Quality and Momentum sharply underperforming Value and Size (Chart 21 panel 1). We showed that historically the Value/Growth tilt has been coincident with the Cyclical/Defensive sector tilt (panel 3). Panel 2 also demonstrates that the Min Vol strategy's relative performance can also be well explained by the Defensives/Cyclicals sector tilt. Sector composition matters. Compared to Growth, Value is now overweight Financials by 25.6%, Utilities by 13.2%, Energy by 8.3% and Materials by 2.5%, while underweight Tech by 23%, Healthcare by 12.7%, and Consumer Discretionary by 10%. REITs is in pure Growth, while Utilities and Telecom are in pure Value, and Energy has very little representation in Growth. In our global sector allocation, we favor Tech, REITs, Energy, and Healthcare, while underweight Utilities, Consumer Discretionary and Telecoms, and neutral on Financials and Materials. As such, maintaining a neutral stance on Value vs. Growth is consistent with our sector positioning. Government Bonds Maintain slight underweight duration. After 35 years, the secular bull market in government bonds is over. Even with Treasury yields skyrocketing since the Trump victory, the path of least resistance for yields is upward (Chart 22). Yields should grind higher slowly as inflation rises and growth indicators continue to improve. Bullish sentiment has dropped considerably, but there is further downside potential. Additionally, fiscal stimulus from Japan and further rate hikes from the Fed will provide considerable tailwinds. Overweight TIPS vs. Treasuries. Despite still being below the Fed's target, with headline and core CPI readings of 1.6% and 2.2% respectively, U.S. inflation has clearly bottomed for the cycle (Chart 23). This continued rise is a result of cost-push inflation driven by faster wage growth. Trump's increased spending and protectionist trade policies are both inflationary. As real GDP growth should remain around 2% annualized and the labor market continues to tighten, this effect will only intensify. Valuations have become less attractive but very gradual Fed hikes will not be enough to derail the upward momentum in consumer prices. Overweight JGBs. The BoJ has ramped up its commitment to exceeding 2% inflation by expanding its monetary base and locking in 10-year sovereign yields at zero percent. Additionally, the end of the structural decline in interest rates suggests global bonds will perform poorly going forward. During global bond bear markets, low-beta Japanese government debt has typically outperformed (Chart 24). This will likely hold true again as global growth improves and Japanese authorities increase fiscal stimulus while maintaining their cap on bond yields. Chart 22Maintain Slight Underweight Duration Chart 23Inflation Uptrend Intact Chart 24Overweight JGBs Corporate Bonds The BCA Corporate Health Monitor remains deeply in "Deteriorating Health" territory, indicating weakness within corporate balance sheets (Chart 25). Over the last quarter, the rate of deterioration actually slowed, with all six ratios improving slightly. Nevertheless, the trend toward weaker corporate health has been firmly established over the past eleven quarters. This is consistent with the very late stages of past credit cycles. Maintain overweight to Investment Grade debt. In the absence of a recession, spread product will usually outperform. U.S. growth should accelerate in 2017, with consumer confidence being resilient, fiscal spending expected to increase, and the drag from inventories unwinding. Monetary conditions are still accommodative and the potential sell-off from the rate hike should be milder than it was in December 2015 (Chart 26). Additionally, credit has historically outperformed in the early stages of the Fed tightening cycle. However, there are two key risks to our view. The end of the structural decline in interest rates presents a substantial headwind to investment grade performance. Since 1973, median and average returns were slightly negative during months where long-term yields rose. During the blow-off in yields in the late 1970s, corporate debt performed very poorly. However, yields had reached very high levels. Secondly, valuations are unattractive, with OAS spreads at their lowest in about one and a half years (Chart 27). Chart 25Balance Sheets Deteriorating Chart 26Still Accommodative Chart 27Expensive Valuations Commodities Secular Perspective: Bearish We reiterate our negative long-term outlook on the commodity complex on the back of a structural downward shift in global demand led primarily by China's transition to a services-driven economy. With this slack in demand, global excess capacity has sent deflationary impulses across the globe, limiting upside in commodity prices.11 Chart 28OPEC To The Rescue Cyclical Perspective: Neutral A divergent outlook for energy and base metals gives us a neutral view for aggregate commodities over the cyclical horizon (Chart 28). Last month's OPEC deal supports our long-standing argument of increasing cuts in oil supply, which will support energy prices. However, metal markets suffer from excess supply. A stronger U.S. dollar will continue to be a major headwind over the coming months. Energy: OPEC's agreement to cut production by 1.2 mb/d has spurred a rally in the crude oil price, as prospects for tighter market conditions next year become the base case. However, with the likelihood that the dollar will strengthen further in coming months, oil will need more favorable fundamentals to rise substantially in price from here. Base Metals: The U.S. dollar has much greater explanatory power12 than Chinese demand in price formation for base metals. The recent rally in base metals is overdone with metals prices decoupling from the dollar; we expect a correction in the near-term driven by further dollar strength. Metal markets remain oversupplied as seen by rising iron ore and copper inventories. We remain bearish on industrial and base metals. Precious Metals: Gold, after decoupling from forward inflation expectations in H1 2016 - rising while inflation expectations were weak - has converged back in line with the long-term inflation gauge. Our expectation of higher inflation, coupled with rising geopolitical uncertainties, remain the two key positives for the gold price. However, our forecast of U.S. dollar appreciation will limit upside potential for the precious metal. Currencies Key Themes: USD: Much of the post-Trump rally in the dollar can be explained by the sharp rally in U.S. bond yields (Chart 29). We expect more upside in U.S. real rates relative to non-U.S. rates, driven by the U.S.'s narrower output gap and the stronger position of its household sector. As labor market slack continues to lessen and wage pressures rise, the Fed will be careful not to fall behind the curve; this will add upward pressure to the dollar. Chart 29Dollar Continues It's Dominance Euro: Since the euro area continues to have a wider output gap than the U.S., the euro will face additional downward pressure on the back of diverging monetary policy. As the slack diminishes, the ECB will respond appropriately - we believe the euro has less downside versus the dollar than does the yen. Yen: Although the Japanese economy is nearing fully employment, the Abe administration continues to talk about additional stimulus. As inflation expectations struggle to find a firm footing despite the stimulus, the BOJ is explicitly aiming to stay behind the curve. Additionally, with the BOJ pegging the 10-year government bond yield at 0% for the foreseeable future, we expect further downward pressure on the currency. EM: We expect more tumult for this group as rising real rates have been negative for EM assets in this cycle. EM spreads have widened in response to rising DM yields which has led to more restrictive local financial conditions. The recovery in commodity prices has been unable to provide any relief to EM currencies - a clear sign of continued weak fundamentals (rising debt, excess capacity and low productivity). Commodity currencies will face more downside driven by their tight correlation with EM equities (0.82) and with EM spreads. Alternatives Overweight private equity / underweight hedge funds. Global growth is fairly stable and has the potential to surprise on the upside. In the absence of a recession, private equity typically outperforms as the illiquidity premium should provide a considerable boost to returns. Hedge funds, on the other hand, have displayed a negative correlation with global growth. Historically, they have outperformed private equity only during recessions or periods of high credit market stress (Chart 30). Overweight direct real estate / underweight commodity futures. Commercial real estate (CRE) assets are in a "goldilocks" scenario: Growth is sufficient to generate sustainable tenant demand without triggering a new supply cycle. Favor Industrials for its income potential and Retail given resilient consumer spending. Overweight trophy markets, as demand remains robust given multiple macro risks. Commodities have bounced, but remain in a secular bear market caused by a supply glut and exacerbated by a market-share war (Chart 31). Overweight farmland & timberland / underweight structured products. The trajectory of Fed policy, the run-up in equity prices and the weak earnings backdrop have increased the importance of volatility reduction. Favor farmland & timberland. Substantial portfolio diversification benefits, resulting from low correlations with traditional assets, coupled with a positive skew, make these assets highly attractive. As the most bond-like alternative, structured products tend to outperform during recessions, which is not our base case (Chart 32). Chart 30PE: Tied To Real Growth Chart 31Commodities: A Secular Bear Market Chart 32Structured Products Outperform In Recessions Risks To Our View Our main scenario is for stronger growth, higher inflation and an appreciating dollar in 2017, leading to equities outperforming bonds. Where could this go wrong? Growth stagnates. U.S. growth could fail to pick up as expected: the stronger dollar will hurt profits, which might lead to companies cutting back on hiring; higher interest rates could affect the housing market and consumer discretionary spending; companies may fail to increase capex, given their low capacity utilization ratio (Chart 33). In Europe, systemic banking problems could push down credit growth which is closely correlated to economic growth. Emerging markets might see credit events caused by the stronger dollar and weaker commodities prices. Political risks. An unconventional new U.S. President raises uncertainty. How much will Trump emphasize his more market-unfriendly policies, such as tougher immigration control, tariffs on Chinese and Mexican imports, and interference in companies' decisions on where to build plants? His more confrontational foreign policy stance risks geopolitical blow-ups. Elections in France, the Netherland and Germany in 2017 could produce populist government. The Policy Uncertainty Index currently is high and this historically has been bad for equities (Chart 34). Chart 33Maybe Companies Won't Increase Capex Chart 34Policy Uncertainty Is High Synchronized global growth. If the growth acceleration were not limited to the U.S. but were to spread, this might mean that the dollar would depreciate, particularly as it is already above fair value (Chart 35). In this environment, given their inverse correlation with the dollar (Chart 36), commodity prices and EM assets might rise, invalidating our underweight positions. Chart 35Dollar Already Above##br## Fair Value Chart 36How Would EM And Commodities Move##br## If USD Weakens? 1 We discuss them in the "What Our Clients Are Asking," section of this Quarterly Portfolio Outlook. 2 Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment - the level of unemployment below which inflation tends to rise. 3 Please see "How Will The Strong USD Impact Global Earnings," in the What Our Clients Are Asking section of this Quarterly Portfolio Outlook. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation, "Monthly Portfolio Update: The Meaning of Trump," dated November 30, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency", dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 According to National Institute of Economic Research.com. 7 Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report, "Asset Allocation In A Low-Return World, Part IV: Industry Groups," dated October 25, 2015, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Global Asset Allocation,"Monthly Portfolio Update," dated November 30, 2016 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report,"Refreshing Our Long-Term Themes," dated December 5, 2016 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report, "Is Smart Beta A Useful Tool In Global Asset Allocation?," dated July 8, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 11,12 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Refreshing Our Long-Term Themes," dated December 5, 2016 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation
Highlights Duration: An easing of financial conditions is likely necessary for recent improvements in U.S. economic growth to continue. As such, the uptrend in Treasury yields will pause in the near-term before resuming early next year. Corporate Bonds: The macro back-drop is turning marginally more positive for corporate spreads. C&I lending standards are no longer tightening and bank stocks have rallied significantly. Corporate Bonds: Spreads are too tight at the moment, even for an improving economic environment. Remain neutral (3 out of 5) on investment grade and underweight (2 out of 5) on high-yield for now. We are actively looking to add exposure to corporate credit from more attractive levels. Feature There is no question that the U.S. economy is on a firm footing heading into the New Year. Third quarter real GDP growth came in at a robust 3.2%, and the Atlanta and New York Fed tracking models currently forecast fourth quarter growth of 2.6% and 2.7%, respectively. This represents a marked acceleration from the average growth rate of 1.1% witnessed during the first two quarters of 2016. Forward-looking survey data are also pointing in the right direction. The ISM non-manufacturing survey reached 57.2 in November, its highest level since October 2015, while the expectations component of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey reached 88.9 in December, its highest level since January 2015 (Chart 1). The question for bond investors is how much of this good news is already reflected in Treasury yields. Higher Treasury yields and a stronger dollar have already led to a material tightening in some broad indexes of financial conditions, enough to exert a meaningful drag on U.S. growth (Chart 2). In fact, according to the Fed's FRB/US model, the recent interest rate and dollar moves could be expected to shave 1% from GDP over the next eight quarters. Chart 1Economic Tailwinds Chart 2Financial Conditions Must Ease The natural conclusion is that while some upside in Treasury yields is justified by an improving economic outlook, the bond selloff has proceeded too quickly and must pause in the near-term to prevent financial conditions from exerting an excessive drag on growth. Sentiment and positioning indicators also confirm that the uptrend in yields appears stretched (Chart 2, bottom two panels). As such, last week we tactically shifted our recommended portfolio duration allocation from 'below benchmark' to 'at benchmark'.1 We expect Treasury yields will grind higher next year, reaching a range of 2.8% to 3% by the end of 2017, but the selloff will proceed more gradually, in line with the acceleration in economic growth. A More Uncertain World The premise that the bond selloff has proceeded too quickly is confirmed by our Global PMI models of the 10-year Treasury yield. We track two versions of our Global PMI model. One is a 2-factor model based only on the Global PMI index and a survey of bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar. The intuition behind this model is that improving global growth contributes to a higher fair value Treasury yield. However, for a given level of global growth, increasingly bullish dollar sentiment applies downward pressure to yields. This is because a stronger dollar represents a tightening of monetary conditions, so that all else equal, a stronger dollar means we should expect fewer Fed rate hikes. The current fair value reading from this 2-factor model is 2.26%, meaning that the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.49% appears somewhat cheap (Chart 3). The second version of our Global PMI model is a 3-factor model which adds the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPUI) as a third independent variable. All else equal, an increase in uncertainty about the economic outlook should depress the term premium in long-dated Treasury yields. The data appear to back-up this assertion, as the EPUI is negatively correlated with the 10-year Treasury yield over time. With the addition of the EPUI, our 3-factor model explains 84% of the variation in the 10-year Treasury yield since 2010, compared to 80% from our 2-factor model. The EPUI spiked last month, and as such, this version of the model suggests that fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield is only 1.82% (Chart 4). Chart 32-Factor Global PMI Model Chart 43-Factor Global PMI Model There are probably good reasons to overlook last month's spike in policy uncertainty. For one, the EPUI, created by Baker, Bloom and Davis,2 is largely constructed from algorithms that scan newspaper articles for keywords. They do not attempt to distinguish between economic news with bond-bearish or bond-bullish implications. Second, we have found that large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in economic growth tend to mean-revert fairly quickly. This past summer's Brexit vote being a prime example. As a counterpoint, however, the negative correlation between the EPUI and the 10-year Treasury yield is quite robust (Chart 5), and historically, incidents of spiking policy uncertainty and rising Treasury yields have been few and far between. Since 1991, there have been 42 instances when the monthly increase in the EPUI exceeded one standard deviation. In those 42 months, the 10-year Treasury yield increased only 36% of the time, with last month's 53 basis point rise being by far the largest on record. We tend to view the reading from the 2-factor model as the more reasonable assessment of fair value in the current environment. But the spike in policy uncertainty does underscore why we should view the recent bond selloff skeptically. The recent selloff has, to a large extent, been predicated upon promises of fiscal stimulus that have yet to be delivered, from a President-elect who has shown himself to be highly unpredictable. In this environment, near-term caution is clearly warranted. Of course, this week the market's focus will at least temporarily turn away from fiscal policy and toward the Fed. We expect that the Fed will announce a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate tomorrow, but also that participants' interest rate projections will not change meaningfully. The FOMC will likely be much slower to react to promises of fiscal stimulus than the market. With the Fed's projected near-term path for interest rates already mostly discounted by the market (Chart 6), we could see a "dovish hike" from the Fed tomorrow coinciding with the near-term top in Treasury yields. Chart 5Economic Policy Uncertainty & Treasury Yields Chart 6A "Dovish Hike" Is In The Price Bottom Line: An easing of financial conditions is likely necessary for recent improvements in U.S. economic growth to continue. As such, the uptrend in Treasury yields will pause in the near-term before resuming early next year. A More Favorable Environment For Credit We frequently point to three main indicators that we use to assess the current stage of the credit cycle: Our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) Monetary conditions relative to equilibrium C&I bank lending standards In a report3 published earlier this year we found that the performance of bank stocks relative to the overall market is another useful indicator (Chart 7). While the credit cycle is still very much in its late stages, recently, our indicators have been sending marginally more positive signals. The CHM remains deep in 'deteriorating health' territory and non-financial corporate balance sheets continue to lever-up aggressively. However, the indicator did inch slightly closer to 'improving health' territory in the third quarter due to an improvement in all six of its components (Chart 8). Make no mistake, trends in corporate balance sheet leverage are not supportive for corporate spreads. In fact, as we will explore in a future report, the recent divergence between rising leverage and tightening spreads is nearly unprecedented during the past 40 years. But at the margin, recent trends are less worrisome. Chart 7Credit Cycle Indicators Chart 8Corporate Health Monitor Components Box1: Corporate Health Monitor Components The BCA Corporate Health Monitor is a normalized composite of six financial ratios, calculated for the non-financial corporate sector as a whole. These six ratios are defined as follows: Profit Margins: After-tax cash flow as a percent of corporate sales Return on Capital: After-tax earnings plus interest expense, as a percent of capital stock Debt Coverage: After-tax cash flow less capital expenditures, as a percent of all interest bearing debt Interest Coverage: EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortization) divided by the sum of interest expense and dividends Leverage: Total debt as a percent of market value of equity Liquidity: Working Capital, excluding inventories, as a percent of market value of assets Second, although monetary conditions appear very close to our estimate of equilibrium, the recent steepening of the yield curve suggests that the market is revising its estimate of monetary equilibrium higher, leading to a de-facto easing of monetary conditions. In the long-run, with the Fed in the midst of a hiking cycle, this sort of easing is unlikely to persist. But, as we argued in a recent report,4 the bear steepening curve environment could continue in the first half of next year as the Fed is slow to respond to an improving economy. Third, C&I bank lending standards have fallen back to unchanged after having tightened for four consecutive quarters. This likely reflects less stress in the energy sector now that oil prices have rebounded. Fourth, bank stocks have rallied strongly alongside the steepening yield curve. To the extent that higher bank stock prices reflect lower future commercial loan delinquencies, then this trend should be viewed positively from the perspective of credit investors. To test the idea that bank stock performance might help us trade the corporate bond market, we take a look at the past six credit cycles, going back to 1975 (Chart 9). The bottom panel of Chart 9 shows the percent drawdown in relative bank equity performance from its peak during the most recent credit cycle. We define credit cycles as the periods between when the CHM crosses into 'improving health' territory. For example, we define the most recent credit cycle as beginning when the CHM fell into 'improving health' territory in 2002 and ending when it fell into 'improving health' territory in 2009. Shaded regions in Chart 9 show periods when the CHM is in 'deteriorating health' territory. Chart 9Bank Equity Drawdown & Corporate Bond Performance If we construct a trading strategy using the CHM alone, we can get fairly good results. We find that investment grade corporate bonds underperform duration-equivalent Treasury securities in 3 out of 6 instances, over a 12-month investment horizon, following the time when the CHM first crosses into deteriorating health territory, for an average excess return of -1.2% (Table 1). Table 1Corporate Bond Trading Rules: 12-Month Investment Horizon However, we find that this result can be improved if we also incorporate bank stock price performance. If we were to only reduce corporate bond exposure when the CHM was in deteriorating health territory and after the drawdown in bank equities exceeded 20%, then the position is still profitable in 3 out of 6 instances, but for a more negative average return of -1.9%. Further, if we were to wait for the drawdown in bank equities to surpass 30%, then the hit rate on our position improves to 3 out of 5 and the average return falls to -4.6%. We find similar results if we use a 6-month investment horizon (Table 2). In the current cycle, the drawdown in bank stocks breached 25% in February but has since reversed course, and it has not yet reached the 30% threshold. Our analysis suggests that corporate bond underperformance tends to persist for some time even after the drawdown in bank stocks exceeds 30%. Table 2Corporate Bond Trading Rules: 6-Month Investment Horizon Chart 10Corporate Spreads Are Too Low Bottom Line: The macro back-drop is turning marginally more positive for corporate spreads. We remain neutral (3 out of 5) on investment grade and underweight (2 out of 5) on high-yield for now, due to poor starting valuation (Chart 10). But we are looking for an opportunity to upgrade from more attractive spread levels in the next couple of months. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Too Far Too Fast, But The Bond Bear Is Still Intact", dated December 6, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For further details on the construction of this index please see www.policyuncertainty.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Lighten Up On Duration", dated February 16, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Toward A Cyclical Sweet Spot?", dated November 22, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
