Europe
The Eurozone Flash Composite PMI declined one point to 49.4 in September, but nonetheless managed to outperform expectations marginally. The outperformance of the Composite index reflected the 0.7-point increase in the Manufacturing PMI to 54.4, when it was…
We noted in an Insight earlier this week that the performance of UK equities this year has been especially bad, in part due to the heavy tech underweight of the UK equity market. When analyzing regional equity performance, there are several approaches that…
The various inflation indicators for the UK in September were a mixed bag. While Core CPI inflation hit expectations of 1.3% annually, the monthly headline CPI print hit 0.4%, below expectations of 0.5%. The most positive element came from the PPI release.…
Highlights Long-term investors should seek companies and sectors that facilitate and support a new way of doing things: specifically, a way of life and business that is more de-centralised and de-urbanised… …and a way of life in which we live, work, and interact more online, remotely, and digitally. The long-term winners will be technology, biotechnology, healthcare, and communications: the growth defensives. The long-term losers will be banks, oil and gas, and resources: the value cyclicals. The European stock market’s substantial underweighting to the growth defensives will weigh on its relative performance, both in the short term and in the long term. Fractal trade: Overweight the US 30-year T-bond versus the French 30-year OAT. Also, we have closed our tactical underweight to equities versus bonds. Feature Chart of the WeekYield Chasers Get A Rude Awakening As Dividends Collapse For the world’s yield chasers, 2020 has been a rude awakening. What seemed to be safe and attractive dividend yields have vanished into smoke, as blue-chip company after blue-chip company has slashed its dividend. To name just a few, HSBC has cut its dividend to zero for the first time ever; Barclays has cut its dividend to zero for the first time since 2009; and Royal Dutch Shell has slashed its dividend by 34 percent, taking it back to where it was in 2009. More generally, the high-yielding sectors have slashed their dividends: the world oil and gas sector by 60 percent (Chart of the Week) and the world bank sector by 33 percent (Chart I-2). The basic resources sector has cut its dividend by a more modest 15 percent, but the dividend now stands at the same level as it was in 2009 (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Dividend Cuts From High-Yielding Banks... Chart I-3...And High-Yielding Resource Companies In contrast, the low-yielding technology and healthcare sectors have managed to grow their dividends consistently over the past decades, and then maintain the dividends during the current crisis (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Dividend Growth And Continuity From ##br##Low-Yielding Healthcare... Chart I-5…And Low-Yielding ##br##Tech The world’s yield chasers have had a rude awakening because they often confuse yield with return. One reason for this confusion is that for cash and for high-quality government bonds held to redemption, yield and return are broadly the same.1 But for an equity, yield and return are not the same. As we have seen with the oil and gas sector and banks, an equity could start with a seemingly safe and attractive dividend yield yet end up generating a deeply negative return.2 The lesson is that long-term investors should never search for yield, they should always search for return. Mental Accounting Bias, And The Irrational Search For Yield The confusion between yield and return is not just an issue of semantics. It is a well-known phenomenon in behavioural finance known as mental accounting bias.3 This psychological bias describes the tendency to group financial gains and losses into separate mental accounts or buckets. This causes people to treat money differently according to the bucket that the money occupies. One version of this bias is a distinction between the return that an investment provides from yield and that which it provides from capital appreciation. The distinction between yield and capital appreciation is irrational. Assuming an equal tax treatment, the money that comes from yield and the money that comes from capital appreciation is perfectly fungible. Yet psychologically, the distinction is very stark. Behavioural finance postulates that because of fears about self-control, some people tend to categorize an investment’s yield as spending money, and its capital as saving money. Long-term investors should never search for yield, they should always search for return. Hence, those people who want their assets to generate spending money – say, retirees – have an irrational bias towards investments that generate yield. Whereas those people that are saving for the long term have a bias towards investments that generate capital growth. To reiterate, these biases are completely irrational. Under normal circumstances, the irrational biases are not a problem because there are enough investments available for both buckets. But in today’s world of zero and negative interest rates, the assets that would normally generate the safe income for the spending bucket – cash and government bonds – are no longer doing so (Chart I-6). In the ensuing ‘search for yield’, income focussed investors have flocked to the dwindling number of investments that appear to generate the required income, such as high-yielding equities. But in irrationally focussing on yield rather than on expected return, the world’s yield chasers have lost a lot of money. Chart I-6Equities Are The Only Yield-Generating Mainstream Asset-Class The Halo Effect, And The Shattered Halo The matter is made worse by a second phenomenon in behavioural finance known as the halo effect. This is the tendency to worship – place a halo – on someone or something based on some narrow criteria. For a company, the narrow criteria can mean its dividend history. The dividend is one of the few financial metrics over which the company has substantial control, giving it totemic significance with the company’s investors. Investors place a halo on companies with dividend continuity, a lengthy absence of a dividend cut. The distinction between yield and capital appreciation is irrational. However, if the company cuts its dividend, even slightly, then the halo shatters. Given this stigma, companies try very hard not to cut the dividend until it is unavoidable. But when they do cut, they usually cut big, and for an extended period – because the halo is shattered anyway (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7When Firms Cut Their Dividends, They Usually Cut Big... Chart I-8...And For An Extended ##br##Period Realising this, investors flip the company from saint to sinner, meaning that they demand a higher cost of capital. The upshot is that even after the dividend cut, the stock can suffer a prolonged period of underperformance. Low Yield To Deliver High Return To repeat, long-term investors should never search for yield, they should always search for return. Today, this search for return boils down to two questions: Which companies will be able to grow or, at the very least, maintain their dividends in the post-pandemic world? What is the likely direction of bond yields, and specifically the long-duration T-bond yield, given its pivotal role in setting the discount rate on all investments? To the first question, the winning companies will be the ones that facilitate and support a new way of doing things: specifically, a way of life and business that is more de-centralised and de-urbanised. And one in which the way we live, work, and interact – both socially and economically – is more remote, online, and digital. The pandemic is the accelerant, and not the cause, of the structural shift in our way of life. Crucially, this means that when a credible treatment for Covid-19 eventually arrives, it will not reverse the major changes that our way of life is now undergoing. To the second question, the Federal Reserve’s recent strategic review has made its reaction function blatantly asymmetric, especially to the labour market. The central bank has told us that it will be thick-skinned to reflationary shocks or lower unemployment, but trigger-happy to the slightest further deflationary shock or higher unemployment. The pandemic is the accelerant, and not the cause, of the structural shift in our way of life. Hence, when the slightest further deflationary shock comes – and sooner or later it will – the Fed will either follow the Bank of England in a volte-face about adding negative interest rate policy into its toolbox. Or more likely, the Fed will follow the Bank of Japan in formally implementing yield curve control. Either way, US long-duration bond yields will eventually converge with those in the UK and Japan at zero. The result of our two answers is that long-term investors should seek companies that can thrive off the major changes in the way we live, work, and interact; and investors should seek companies with long-duration cashflows that benefit most from a further compression in the long-duration T-bond yield. In combination, the long-term winners will be technology, biotechnology, healthcare, and communications: the growth defensives (Chart I-9). And the long-term losers will be banks, oil and gas, and resources: the value cyclicals (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Growth Defensives Are The Long-Term Winners Chart I-10Value Cyclicals Are The Long-Term##br## Losers For the European stock market, the unfortunate consequence is that its substantial underweighting to the growth defensives sectors will weigh on its relative performance, both in the short term and in the long term. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is to go long the US 30-year T-bond versus the French 30-year OAT. Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 3.2 percent. The tactical underweight to equities versus bonds (short DAX versus 10-year T-bond) reached the end of its holding period. Although it closed in slight loss, the fractal signal correctly identified that the majority of the strong rally in the DAX was over by mid-July after which the DAX has traded broadly sideways. The countertrend move in the Italian BTP’s rally versus the German bund did not materialise, so this trade was closed at its stop-loss. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 57 percent. Chart I-1130-Year Govt. Bonds: US Vs. France When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Assuming no reinvestment risk on the bond’s income. 2 This is because unlike the government bond, the equity does not generate a predetermined stream of cash flows. 3 See Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
It is in fashion to talk about the collapse of Italian yields to record lows, but one of the key investment implications of this move is often overlooked: it makes Italian banks attractive relative to lenders in other nations. The fall in yields, especially…
The UK’s RICS House Price Balance indicator surged to 61% in September, handily beating expectations of a decline to 40% from 44%. A strong RICS argues in favor of an acceleration in UK house price gains, which creates a powerful tailwind for household's net…
When looking at multiples like the price-to-book or price-to-earnings ratios, it is easy to paint the S&P 500 as exceptionally expensive compared to other major equity markets. However, the picture becomes murkier if we take into account growth expectations.…
In recent weeks, we have repeatedly warned that since March, the dollar had fallen too quickly and risked staging a countertrend bounce. As a corollary, the euro was expected to undergo a temporary correction that could see it revisit the 1.14-1.15 zone.…
Highlights Misunderstanding 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its short-term mortality rate. In fact, the danger of Covid-19 is its long-term mortality and morbidity rate. Misunderstanding 2: The government-imposed lockdown causes the pandemic recession. In fact, the pandemic causes the pandemic recession. Misunderstanding 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is output. In fact, the pandemic’s main economic casualty is employment. Misunderstanding 4: The pandemic is a temporary shock to the way we live, work, and interact. In fact, the pandemic is accelerating long-term shifts in the way we live, work, and interact. Misunderstanding 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe apart. In fact, the pandemic is pulling Europe together. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Pandemic Is Pulling Europe Together Covid-19 is a novel disease. And living through a pandemic is a novel experience for most of us. The result is that many things are not fully understood. In this report, we pull together five major misunderstandings about the Covid-19 pandemic. Or at least, five topics on which we disagree with the mainstream narratives. Misunderstanding 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its short-term mortality rate. Truth 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its long-term mortality and morbidity rate. Some people argue that the danger of Covid-19 is overstated. The mortality rate seems low, especially in the new waves of the pandemic. These people argue that we should just let the pandemic rip to achieve so-called ‘herd immunity’. Yet this focus on the low immediate mortality rate misunderstands the true danger (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Focussing On Covid-19’s Low Immediate Mortality Rate Misunderstands The Danger The true danger might come from the long-term impact on mortality and morbidity. A good analogy is a non-lethal dose of radiation. It won’t kill you straightaway, and you might not even feel any immediate ill effects, but the exposure does irreparable long-term harm. Unlike other diseases, Covid-19 appears to have long-term sequelae. Unlike other diseases, Covid-19 appears to have long-term sequelae. It can permanently damage your respiratory, vascular, and metabolic systems. As The Lancet points out:1 “Weeks and months after the onset of Covid-19, people continue to suffer. 78 of 100 patients in an observational cohort study who had recovered from Covid-19 had abnormal findings on cardiovascular MRI and 36 reported dyspnoea and unusual fatigue… these patients are not only those recovering from the severe form of the acute disease, but also those who had mild and moderate disease. Long-term sequelae of Covid-19 are unknown… Other concerns are rising: does it cause diabetes, or other metabolic disorders? Will patients develop interstitial lung disease? We owe good answers on the long-term consequences of the disease to our patients and healthcare providers.” Until we know these answers, letting the pandemic rip to achieve herd-immunity is a very dangerous misunderstanding. Misunderstanding 2: The government-imposed lockdown causes the pandemic recession. Truth 2: The pandemic causes the pandemic recession. A pandemic is a classic complex adaptive system, in which there is constant feedback from millions of individual human actions to the pandemic, and from the pandemic to millions of individual human actions. It is this complex adaptive behaviour that generates a pandemic’s classic waves of infection, as well as its recessions. In response to an escalating pandemic, our instinct for self-preservation makes us go into our shells. In response to an escalating pandemic, our instinct for self-preservation makes us go into our shells. We shun crowds and public places, with the result that so-called ‘social consumption’ collapses. The misunderstanding is that the government-imposed lockdown causes the collapse in social consumption. In fact, this is a classic confusion between correlation and causation. The true cause of the recession is that the escalating pandemic is making millions of people go into their shells. But to the extent that an escalating pandemic also leads to an escalating lockdown, many people confuse the correlated lockdown with the underlying cause, the escalating pandemic. As we have previously pointed out, Sweden imposed no lockdown, while its neighbour Denmark imposed the most extreme lockdown in Europe. If it was the government-imposed lockdown that caused the recession, then the economy of no-lockdown Sweden should have fared much better than that of lockdown Denmark. In fact, based on the rise in unemployment rates, no-lockdown Sweden performed worse than lockdown Denmark (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3No-Lockdown Sweden Performed No Better... Chart I-4...Than Lockdown Denmark Misunderstanding 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is output. Truth 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is employment. The widespread use of physical distancing and face masks restricts any activity that requires the use of your mouth and nose in proximity to others. These activities are concentrated in three highly labour-intensive sectors: hospitality, retail, and transport. Using the US as a template, hospitality, retail, and transport contribute 12 percent of economic output, but employ 25 percent of all workers (Table I-1). If the pandemic forces these sectors to operate one third below full capacity, the economy will lose a tolerable 4 percent of output. But it will lose a devastating 8.3 percent of jobs. And on less optimistic assumptions, the job destruction could rise to well over 10 percent. Table I-1Sectors Hurt By Social Distancing Employ 25% Of All Workers Conversely, sectors which are unaffected by physical distancing and face masks make a much bigger contribution to economic output relative to employment. Financial activities generate 19 percent of economic output, but just 6 percent of jobs. Information technology generates 5 percent of output, but just 2 percent of jobs. Sectors hurt by social distancing employ 25 percent of all workers. Hence, the main economic casualty of the pandemic is not output. The main casualty is employment (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Worse, as employment suffers much more than output, the pandemic is devastating low-paid jobs. Chart I-5The Main Economic Casualty Of The Pandemic Is Employment… Chart I-6…Not ##br##Output Misunderstanding 4: The pandemic is a temporary shock to the way we live, work, and interact. Truth 4: The pandemic is accelerating long-term shifts in the way we live, work, and interact. The pandemic appears to have crystallised many shifts in consumer and business behaviour: for example, de-urbanisation, the shift from offline to online retailing, the shift from office working to remote working, and the shift from business travel to virtual meetings. In fact, these shifts were already in motion well before the pandemic hit (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7The Pandemic Is Accelerating The Structural Shifts To De-Urbanisation… Chart I-8…And Online ##br##Shopping If the pandemic suddenly ended tomorrow, would people flock back to full-time office work in city centres? Would they flock back to bricks and mortar retailers? Would they return to the same intensity of long-haul business travel? We think not, because the shifts from these activities are not temporary. They are structural. The pandemic is devastating low-paid jobs. The pandemic has accelerated the hollowing out of labour-intensive industries such as bricks and mortar retailing, city centre cafes, bars and restaurants, and commercial travel. Combined with the ongoing threat to jobs from AI, this hollowing out process is blighting the job prospects of a generation, creating large numbers of underemployed and unemployed workers. Misunderstanding 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe apart. Truth 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe together. Let’s end on a positive note. The pandemic has allowed Europe to smash two major taboos: explicit fiscal transfers across countries, and the large-scale issuance of common EU bonds. The EU recovery plan also starts discussions on how the EU can ‘increase its own resources’. Which is to say, raise its own taxes. 2020 might turn out to be the most important year for European integration. The EU’s €750 billion ‘Next Generation’ recovery plan comprises €390 billion of grants whose main beneficiaries will be Italy and Spain – and these grants will be funded by common EU issuance. In breaking the long-standing taboos of fiscal transfers and common issuance, Next Generation constitutes a giant step towards European integration. Specifically, Italy’s net grant entitlement is likely to outweigh its contributions to the EU’s 2021-27 budget cycle. Thereby, Italy will flip from a net contributor to a net recipient of EU funds. The willingness to flip the sign of Italy’s contribution marks a sea-change in the EU’s attitude on fiscal solidarity, whose long-term significance should not be underestimated. 2020 might turn out to be the most important year for European integration. The irony is that it took a global pandemic to achieve it. Investment Conclusions The huge and growing slack in labour markets means that zero and negative interest rate policy will become a permanent feature of our lives. Hence, the relatively higher yielding 30-year US T-bond remains an effective hedge against stock market dislocations, as it did in March. Equity sectors whose profits can thrive off the shifts in the way we live, work, and interact, will outperform – specifically, technology, biotechnology, healthcare, and communications. Thereby, stock markets with an overweighting to these sectors will also outperform. The devastation of low-paying jobs means that bank credit growth is set to remain structurally weak or even non-existent. As such, banks should be bought for tactical countertrend moves (as now), but not for the long term. The yield spreads on euro area ‘periphery’ bonds over Germany and France will continue to tighten, and ultimately reach zero (Chart of the Week and Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Pandemic Is Pulling Europe Together Fractal Trading System* Within the EM universe, the strong outperformance of India versus Czech Republic is vulnerable to a countertrend sell-off. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short MSCI India versus MSCI Czech Republic. The profit target and symmetrical stop-loss is set at 8 percent. Chart I-10MSCI: India Vs. Czech Republic In other trades, long USD/PLN achieved its 4 percent profit target, and short AUD/CHF reached the end of its holding period in profit. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 57 percent. When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see The Lancet, Long-term consequences of Covid-19: research needs, September 1, 2020. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

