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Highlights Spread Product Valuation: Corporate bond spreads don’t look especially cheap relative to average historical levels. But they are far too elevated for the current phase of the economic cycle. Valuations in other spread products are not nearly as attractive. Investors should remain overweight corporate bonds (both investment grade and junk) within U.S. fixed income portfolios. Corporate Defaults: Slowing corporate profit growth during the next 12 months will cause corporate leverage to flatten-off and will lead to a slightly higher default rate than most baseline forecasts suggest. Junk spreads currently offer adequate compensation for the extra default risk, but that cushion will evaporate quickly if spreads tighten during the next few months. Mexican Sovereign Bonds: Mexico’s USD-denominated sovereign debt is attractively priced relative to similarly-rated U.S. corporate credit. U.S. fixed income investors should take the opportunity to add USD-denominated Mexican bonds to their portfolios. Feature Corporate bonds have been on fire since the start of the year. High-yield excess returns have already made back all of their lost ground from 2018, and investment grade credits are on their way (Chart 1). With the Fed’s rate hike cycle on hold and some signs of credit easing in China, the near-term backdrop is amenable to further spread compression. Especially from current elevated levels. Chart 1Corporate Bonds Having A Good Run In 2019 On the flipside, some indicators of corporate default risk are starting to deteriorate and we can easily envision a more difficult environment for corporate spreads in the second half of this year. Especially if the Fed re-starts rate hikes, as we expect.1 In this week’s report we illustrate the extent of undervaluation in corporate spreads, and also detail our concerns related to budding default risk. We conclude that investors should maintain an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) for now, but be prepared to trim exposure once spreads reach more reasonable levels. Finally, we identify an opportunity in USD-denominated Mexican sovereign bonds. Too Cheap For Phase 2 In our Special Report from mid-December that laid out our key themes for 2019, we described how we split the economic cycle into different phases based on the slope of the yield curve (Chart 2).2 We define the three phases of the cycle as follows: Chart 2Expect To Stay In Phase 2 For Most (If Not All) Of 2019 Phase 1: From the end of the prior recession until the 3-year / 10-year Treasury slope flattens to below 50 bps Phase 2: When the 3/10 slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps Phase 3: From when the 3/10 slope inverts until the start of the next recession Dividing the cycle this way reveals a reliable pattern in corporate bond excess returns versus Treasuries. Excess returns tend to be highest in Phase 1. They tend to be quite low but still positive in Phase 2, and they tend not to turn negative until Phase 3. We argued in December that we are currently in Phase 2 and that we will probably stay there for most, if not all, of 2019. The main reason that excess returns are lower in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 is that corporate bond spreads are much tighter in Phase 2. Most of the cyclical spread compression occurs in Phase 1, in the immediate aftermath of the recession. With that in mind, consider the data presented in Chart 3. The chart shows 12-month breakeven spreads for each corporate bond credit tier as a percentile rank relative to history.3 For example, a percentile rank of 50% means that the breakeven spread has been tighter than its current level half of the time throughout history. Chart 3 also divides the historical data into two samples, showing how breakeven spreads rank relative to the entire history of available data, and also how they rank relative to other Phase 2 periods only. When the full historical sample is considered, only the B-rated and Caa-rated credit tiers have breakeven spreads above their historical medians. However, when we focus exclusively on Phase 2 environments we see that spreads for every credit tier other than Aaa look extremely cheap. Essentially, Chart 3 shows that today’s spread levels are more consistent with periods when the economy is either just exiting or entering a recession. Absent that sort of macro environment, there would appear to be an obvious buying opportunity in corporate bonds. Interestingly, other spread products don’t look nearly as cheap as corporate bonds. Chart 4 shows the same data as Chart 3 but for all non-corporate U.S. spread products with available data prior to 2000. It shows that Agency MBS and Consumer ABS spreads are close to median Phase 2 levels. USD-denominated Sovereign debt looks somewhat cheap. Meanwhile, Domestic Agencies and Supranationals both look expensive. What’s clear is that right now corporate credit offers the most attractive opportunity in U.S. fixed income. Bottom Line: Corporate bond spreads don’t look especially cheap relative to average historical levels. But they are far too elevated for the current phase of the economic cycle. Valuations in other spread products are not nearly as attractive. Investors should remain overweight corporate bonds (both investment grade and junk) within U.S. fixed income portfolios. Default Cycle At A Turning Point?  Another valuation tool in our arsenal is the High-Yield default-adjusted spread. This is the excess spread available in the high-yield index after accounting for expected 12-month default losses. It can also be thought of as the 12-month return earned by the High-Yield index in excess of a position in duration-matched Treasuries, assuming that default losses match expectations and that there are no capital gains (losses) from spread tightening (widening). Expected default losses are calculated using the Moody’s baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of the recovery rate. Combining the Moody’s baseline default rate forecast of 2.4% and our recovery rate forecast of 45% gives expected 12-month default losses of 1.3%. Those expected default losses are then subtracted from the average High-Yield index option-adjusted spread to get a default-adjusted spread of 274 bps. This is slightly above the historical average of 250 bps (Chart 5). In other words, junk investors are currently being compensated at slightly above average levels to bear default risk. Chart 5A Look At The Default-Adjusted Spread Another way to conceptualize the default-adjusted spread is to ask what default rate would have to prevail over the next 12 months for junk investors to earn average historical excess compensation. This spread-implied default rate is denoted by the ‘X’ in the second panel of Chart 5. It is currently 2.8%, slightly above Moody’s baseline expectation. Is The Baseline Default Rate Forecast Reasonable? If we view the Moody’s 2.4% default rate forecast as reasonable, then we should conclude that junk bonds are attractively valued. However, some macro indicators suggest that 2.4% might be too optimistic. Chart 6 shows a model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate based on gross leverage, which we define as total debt over pre-tax profits, and C&I lending standards. Chart 6A Simple Model Of The 12-Month Trailing Speculative Grade Default Rate Gross leverage has improved during the past few quarters as profit growth has outpaced corporate debt growth (Chart 6, panel 2). This has acted to push down the fair value reading from our default rate model. On the other hand, commercial & industrial (C&I) lending standards tightened in the fourth quarter of last year (Chart 6, bottom panel). A net tightening in C&I lending standards is consistent with a higher default rate. Overall, the fair value reading from our default rate model is currently 3.5%, above the current 12-month trailing default rate of 2.6%. For the purposes of valuation, where the default rate will be 12 months from now is more important than where it is currently. To get a sense of where the fair value from our model is headed we need forecasts for corporate profit and debt growth. Profit growth will almost certainly moderate from its current lofty levels (Chart 7). Pressures on revenues and expenses both point in that direction. Total business sales and the ISM Manufacturing PMI have both fallen sharply from their recent highs (Chart 7, panel 2), suggesting lower corporate revenue growth going forward. Meanwhile, wages continue to accelerate (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 7Forecasting Profit Growth Using a model based on nominal GDP growth, wage growth, industrial production and the trade-weighted dollar, if we forecast that nominal GDP growth slows to the same rate as wage growth over the next 12 months, then the model predicts that profit growth will fall into the mid-single digits (Chart 7, top panel). This would be more or less consistent with the recent growth rate in corporate debt, meaning that gross leverage would flatten-off and the fair value reading from our default rate model would stabilize near 3.5%. In summary, if profit growth moderates in line with our expectations during the next 12 months, then it is likely that the corporate default rate will be somewhat higher than the current Moody’s forecast of 2.4%, possibly as high as 3.5%. But even a 3.5% default rate would still translate to a default-adjusted junk spread of 211 bps. Positive compensation for default risk, though less than average historical levels. In that case we would still expect solid positive excess returns from junk bonds. However, it will be important to monitor our default-adjusted spread during the next few months. If junk spreads tighten in the near-term, as we anticipate, then the excess compensation for default risk will evaporate quickly. Bottom Line: Slowing corporate profit growth during the next 12 months will cause corporate leverage to flatten-off and will lead to a slightly higher default rate than most baseline forecasts suggest. Junk spreads currently offer adequate compensation for the extra default risk, but that cushion will evaporate quickly if spreads tighten during the next few months. Buy Mexican Bonds While most spread products have benefited from the Fed’s pause, delivering excellent year-to-date returns. We notice that the spreads on Mexico’s USD-denominated sovereign debt have not tightened alongside other comparable credits (Chart 8). This presents an attractive opportunity. Chart 8Mexican Bonds: An Attractive Opportunity When we compare 12-month breakeven spreads between the USD-denominated sovereign debt of different emerging market countries versus the spreads on equivalently-rated U.S. corporate bonds, we see that Mexico has now joined Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Poland as the only countries that offer attractive compensation relative to the U.S. corporate sector (Chart 9). Why has this happened? Our Emerging Markets Strategy service postulates that many investors fear that the new political regime will bring fiscal profligacy, but in fact, the AMLO administration is proving to be less populist and more pragmatic than expected.4 The 2019 budget, for example, targets a primary surplus of 1% of GDP, and envisages a decline in nominal expenditures in 29 out of 56 categories. This commitment to sound fiscal policy should benefit Mexican sovereign bond spreads. More fundamentally, our Emerging Markets strategists note that the Mexican peso is very cheap as measured by the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. This is not surprising given that the peso has been relatively flat versus the dollar during the past two years, despite interest rates being much higher in Mexico than in the U.S. The Mexican 10-year real yield is currently 4.1%, well above real GDP growth which was 2.6% during the past four quarters (Chart 10). Contrast that with the U.S., where the 10-year real yield is a meagre 0.8% versus real GDP growth of 3% during the past four quarters. In other words, interest rate differentials favor a stronger peso, which is positive for USD-denominated sovereign spreads. Chart 10Good Time To Add USD-Denominated Mexican Bonds To A Portfolio Though the Mexican/U.S. interest rate differential remains wide, it is likely to compress going forward. Elevated Mexican interest rates relative to growth signal that monetary policy is restrictive. A fact that is already evident in decelerating Mexican money supply (Chart 10, bottom panel). Meanwhile, low U.S. real yields relative to GDP suggest that further Fed tightening is necessary before U.S. rates are similarly restrictive. Bottom Line: Mexico’s USD-denominated sovereign debt is attractively priced relative to similarly-rated U.S. corporate credit. U.S. fixed income investors should take the opportunity to add USD-denominated Mexican bonds to their portfolios. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caught Offside”, dated February 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3      The 12-month breakeven spread is the spread widening required over the next 12 months for the corporate bond to break even with a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. We use the breakeven spread instead of the average index spread because it takes into account the changing duration of the bond indexes. 4      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting China’s Stimulus”, dated January 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
We upgraded global stocks in December following the post-FOMC meeting selloff. Although our enthusiasm for stocks has waned somewhat given the recent run-up, we continue to see upside for global bourses over the next 12-to-18 months. Admittedly, earnings…
In the February 8th Insight, we highlighted that the broad equity market has been on a journey to nowhere for the past 16 months. Nonetheless, there have been exciting detours of 10-15 percent in both directions, albeit these moves have been short-lived,…
The S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index has typically performed in line with the profitability of its components; the absolute price of inputs and outputs are far less important than the spread between them and here the news is not encouraging. Crack…
Highlights Stay tactically overweight to equities for the time being. Close the overweight to industrial commodities versus equities. The financials, basic resources, and industrials equity sectors can continue to outperform for a few months longer. EM can also continue to outperform DM for a few months longer. Overweight Germany’s DAX versus German bunds. The second half of the year is going to be much tougher than the first half. Feature Chart of the WeekPessimism Was Overdone: The Classical Cyclicals And EM Are Rebounding Locked In An Intimate Embrace Last week, we highlighted a frustrating truth: for the past 16 months the broad equity market has been on a journey to nowhere. Yet the journey has been far from boring. There have been exciting detours of 10-15 percent in both directions, albeit these moves have been short-lived, lasting no more than three months at a time. The same truth applies to the broad bond market: for the past sixteen months the global long bond yield – defined here as the average of the yields on the 30-year German bund yield and 30-year T-bond – has also ended up going nowhere. On this journey too, there have been exciting detours of up to 50 basis points in both directions, but these moves have also lasted no more than three months before retracing. It follows that for the past 16 months, the strategic allocation to equities, bonds and cash has had zero impact on investment performance, but the tactical allocation to the asset classes has had a huge impact. Yet here’s the thing: the sharp tactical moves in the bond market and in the stock market have been intimately embraced. When the global long bond yield has approached the top of its range, it has catalysed a sharp sell-off in equities; and when the bond yield has approached the bottom of its range, it has catalysed a sharp rally in equities (Chart I-2). In fact, over the past 16 months, asset allocation has boiled down to a very simple trading rule based on the global long bond yield: above 2.2 percent, sell equities; below 1.95 percent, buy equities. Today, the yield stands at 1.85 percent, suggesting a tactically overweight stance to equities. Chart I-2The Sharp Tactical Moves In The Bond Market And Stock Market Are Intimately Connected The Persistent Trends Are In Sectors Some investors cannot shift their portfolios quickly enough to exploit the tactical opportunities in the markets. They need trends that persist for at least six months to a year. The good news is that these more persistent trends do exist, but to find them you have to look at equity sectors, and specifically the classically cyclical sectors (Chart of the Week). The financials and basic resources sectors were in strong relative downtrends through most of 2018; but for the last four months these classically cyclical sectors have flipped into very clear uptrends (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). The same is true for industrials, albeit the end of the downtrend has happened more recently (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Financials Are Rebounding Chart I-4Basic Resources Are Rebounding Chart I-5Industrials Are Rebounding For the avoidance of doubt, technology is not a classically cyclical sector because the sales of technology products – particularly to consumers – are relatively insensitive to short-term fluctuations in the economy. In fact, the relative performance of technology is an almost perfect mirror-image of financials (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Technology Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical Neither is the chemicals sector a classical cyclical. Given that raw material prices are an input cost for chemical manufacturers, the chemicals sector can underperform when raw material prices are rising in a cyclical up-oscillation (Chart I-7). It follows that the three true classically cyclical sectors are: financials, basic resources and industrials. Chart I-7The Chemicals Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical What if your investment process does not allow you to invest in sectors and benefit from their well-defined and longer trends? The good news is that you can play these same trends through regional and country stock market indexes. We refer readers to previous reports for the details, but the crucial message is that regional and country relative performances stem from nothing more than the stock markets’ defining sector skews combined with sector relative performances.1 This revelation of what truly drives regional and country relative performance is bittersweet. It is sweet because it simplifies an investment process that can be very complicated. But it is also bitter because it highlights that the investment industry is still replete with unnecessary layers of complexity. Still, just to drive home the point, we would like the charts to do the talking. The relative performance of financials, the relative performance of Italy’s MIB, and the relative performance of Emerging Markets (EM) versus Developed Markets (DM) are all effectively one and the same story (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8One And The Same Story: Financials And Italy... Chart I-9...And Financials And EM Versus DM What Are The Markets Telling Us, And Do We Agree? Another very common question we get is: what is our forecast for economic growth and profits growth? For example, two questions on everyone’s lips right now are: can Germany avoid a technical recession, and what is our forecast for Germany’s growth from here? These are indeed important questions, but for investors they are not the most important questions. Financial markets are a discounting mechanism. So for investors, the most important question should always be: what is discounted in the current market price, and is that too optimistic or too pessimistic? Over-optimism and over-pessimism on the economy are especially important for the classically cyclical sectors because their profits have a very high operational gearing to their sales: a small change in the sales outcome has a huge impact on the profit outcome and, therefore, the price.  If the price is discounting a booming economy and what actually transpires is that the economy grows modestly, then a seemingly benign outcome of respectable growth will paradoxically cause the price to slump. Conversely, if the price is discounting a very pessimistic outcome and what actually transpires is anything better than the ultra-pessimism, then even a bad outcome will paradoxically cause the price to soar. In this regard, the recent underperformance of Germany’s DAX versus German bunds is at an extreme not far from that during the euro sovereign debt crisis in 2011-12 (Chart I-10). So the important question for investors is: will the actual economic outcome transpire to be as extreme as that? Our answer is that the extreme underperformance of the DAX versus bunds is discounting an overly pessimistic outcome, and on that basis the correct stance is to be overweight the DAX versus bunds.   Chart I-10Overly Pessimistic: The DAX Versus Bunds Turning to the classical cyclicals, these sectors have rebounded because their embedded assumptions for growth reached peak pessimism in October. Since then, the pessimism has abated at the margin because of improving short-term impulses from Chinese stimulus, lower global bond yields, and sharply lower energy prices. Given that positive (and negative) impulse phases reliably tend to last for six to eight months, our expectation is that this tailwind for the classical cyclical sectors – financials, basic resources, and industrials – can continue for a few months longer. Which means that the outperformance of EM versus DM can also continue for a few months longer. In terms of asset allocation, long industrial commodities versus equities worked very powerfully at the end of last year, but the relative merits of the two asset classes are now more evenly balanced. Hence, we are now closing this position in profit. Finally, our major concern is for later in the year when the aforementioned improving short-term impulses will inevitably fade, and even potentially reverse. Bear in mind that the impulses arise from the short-term changes in credit flows, bond yields, and the oil price. It follows that to recreate these positive impulses for later in the year, bond yields and/or the oil price have to keep falling. This is not our base case, so enjoy the positive impulses while they last! As the year progresses the investment environment is going to get much tougher. Fractal Trading System* The sharp underperformance of the Nikkei 225 versus the Hang Seng is at the limit of tight liquidity that has signaled all of the recent trend reversals in this relative position. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to go long the Nikkei 225 versus the Hang Seng. Set a profit target of 4.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. We now have seven open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnote 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Oil, Banks, And Bonds: The Oddities Of 2018”, dated November 29, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years. Despite the neutral CMI reading, in response to the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers, we downgraded small caps…
For S&P financials, the divergence between the upward thrust of our CMI and the depressed level of our valuation indicator (VI) has reached stunning levels, the former accelerating into pre-GFC territory and the latter falling to two standard deviations below…
Key Portfolio Highlights The S&P 500 has started 2019 with a bang as dovish cooing from the Fed has proven a tonic for equities. While we have not entirely retraced the path to the early-autumn highs, our strategy of staying cyclically exposed, based on our view of an absence of a recession in 2019, has proven a profitable one as investor capitulation reached extreme levels (Charts 1 & 2). Chart 1CapitulationChart 2Selling Is Exhausted Importantly, risk premia have been deflating as the end-of-year spike in volatility has subsided and junk spreads have narrowed from the fear-induced heights in December (Chart 3). Chart 3Risk Premia Renormalization Nevertheless, in order for the reflex rebound since the late-December lows to morph into a durable rally, the macro/policy backdrop has to turn from a headwind to a tailwind. We are closely monitoring three potential positive catalysts: A definitively more dovish Fed, which would help restrain the greenback A continuation of the earnings juggernaut A positive U.S./China trade resolution With respect to the first of these, the S&P 500 convulsed following the December 19 Fed meeting and suffered a cathartic 450 point peak-to-trough fall two months ago. The Fed likely made a policy error, and Fed Chair Powell’s resolve is getting tested as has happened with every Chair since Volcker (Charts 4 & 5). Chart 4Powell's Resolve Getting Tested Chart 5Fed Policy Mistake The rising odds of a pause in the Fed tightening cycle, at least for the first half of the year, will likely serve as a welcome respite for equities. Our second catalyst has been gaining steam through the Q4 earnings season which has seen continuation of the double-digit earnings growth of the prior three quarters. Our earnings model points to a moderation of earnings growth in the year to come, in line with sell-side expectations (Chart 6). Our 2019 year-end target remains 3,000 for the SPX, based on $181 2020 EPS and a 16.5x multiple.1 This represents a 6% EPS CAGR, assuming 2018 EPS ends near $162. Chart 6EPS Growth > 0 In Chart 7, we show that financials, health care and industrials are responsible for 61% of the SPX’s expected profit growth in 2019 while technology’s contribution has fallen to a mere 7.2%. While the risk of disappointment encompases financials, health care and industrials, there are high odds that tech surprises to the upside as it has borne the brunt of recent negative earnings revisions (Charts 8 & 9). Chart 8Earnings Revisions... Chart 9...Really Weigh On Tech Lastly, the negativity surrounding the slowdown in China is likely fully reflected in the market (Chart 10), implying an opportunity for a break out should a positive resolution to the U.S./China trade spat be delivered. China’s reflation efforts suggests that the Chinese authorities remain committed to injecting liquidity into their economy (Chart 11). Chart 10China Slowdown Baked In The Cake Chart 11Reflating Away Already, the PBOC balance sheet, with over $5.5tn in assets, is expanding anew. Empirical evidence suggests that SPX momentum and the ebb and flow of the PBOC balance sheet are joined at the hip, and the current message is positive (Chart 12). All of these underlie our style preferences for cyclicals over defensives2 and international large caps over domestically-geared small caps. Chart 12Heed The PBoC Message Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com S&P Financials (Overweight) The divergence between the directions for our CMI and valuation indicator (VI) for S&P financials has reached stunning levels, with the former accelerating into pre-GFC territory and the latter falling to two standard deviations below fair value. Our technical indicator (TI) is sending a relatively neutral message, though this does not diminish the most bullish signal in our cyclical indicator’s history (Chart 13). Chart 13S&P Financials (Overweight) The ongoing strength of the U.S. economy is the driver of such a positive indicator, particularly with respect to the key S&P banks sub index. Our total loans & leases growth model and BCA’s C&I loan growth model (second & bottom panels, Chart 14) are in positive territory. The latter is significant given that C&I loans are the single biggest credit category in bank loan books. Importantly, C&I loans have gone vertical recently topping the 10.5% growth mark despite softening capex intentions and CEO confidence. Further, multi-decade highs in consumer confidence are offsetting the Fed’s tightening cycle and suggest that consumer loans, another key lending category, will also gain traction (third panel, Chart 14). In the context of the generationally high employment rate, the implied lower defaults should drive amplified profit improvement from this credit growth. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. Chart 14Loan Growth Drives Profits S&P Industrials (Overweight) The still-solid domestic footing has maintained our industrials CMI close to its cyclical highs, which are also some of the most bullish in the history of the indicator. However, stock prices have not responded accordingly and our VI has descended mildly from neutral to undervalued. Our TI sends a much more definitive message and stands at a full standard deviation into oversold territory (Chart 15). Chart 1515. S&P Industrials (Overweight) While their cyclical peers S&P financials are almost exclusively a domestic play, S&P industrials have been weighed down by trade flare ups for most of the past year (bottom panel, Chart 16). Accordingly, much of the benefit of positive domestic capex indicators and the more tangible capital goods orders maintaining a supportive trajectory has failed to show up in relative EPS growth (second & third panels, Chart 16), though the latter has recently hooked much higher. Chart 16Industrial Earnings Growth Has Recovered S&P Materials (Overweight) Our materials CMI has made a turn, rising off its lowest level in 20 years. This has coincided with our VI bouncing off its cyclical low, though it remains in undervalued territory. The signal is shared by our TI which has only recently recovered from a full standard deviation into the oversold zone, a level that has historically presaged S&P materials rallies (Chart 17). Chart 17S&P Materials (Overweight) When we upgraded the S&P materials sector to overweight earlier this year, we noted that China macro dominates the direction of U.S. materials stocks. On the monetary front, the Chinese monetary easing cycle continues unabated and the near 150bps year-over-year drop in the 10-year Chinese Treasury yield will soon start to bear fruit (yield change shown inverted and advanced, bottom panel, Chart 18). The renminbi also moves in lockstep with relative share prices. The apparent de-escalation in the U.S./China trade tensions has boosted the CNY/USD and is signaling that a playable reflation trade is in the offing in the S&P materials sector (top panel, Chart 18). Chart 18Chinese Data Drives Materials Performance S&P Energy (Overweight) Our energy CMI has moved horizontally for the past six quarters, though this followed a snap-back recovery from the extremely depressed levels of 2016 and 2017. Meanwhile both our VI and TI have descended steeply into buying territory with the former approaching two standard deviations below fair value (Chart 19). Chart 19S&P Energy (Overweight) As with the CMI, the relative share price ratio for the S&P energy index has moved laterally since our mid-summer 2017 upgrade to overweight. Interestingly, the integrated oil & gas energy subindex neither kept up with the steep oil price advance until the end of September, nor with the recent drubbing in crude oil prices (top panel, Chart 20). Put differently, oil majors never discounted sustainably higher oil prices, and are also refraining from extrapolating recent oil prices weakness far into the future. Chart 2020. The Stage Is Set For A Recovery In Crude Prices Nevertheless, the roughly 30% per annum growth in U.S. crude oil production is unsustainable and, were production to remain near all-time highs and move sideways in 2019, then the growth rate would fall back to the zero line. Such a paring back in the growth rate would likely balance the oil market and pave the way for an oil price recovery (oil production shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 20). This echoes BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service, which continues to forecast higher oil prices into 2019, a forecast which should set the stage for a sustainable rebound next year in S&P energy profits, the opposite of what analysts currently expect (Chart 7). S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) An improving macro environment is reflected in our consumer staples CMI that has vaulted higher in recent months. However, the strong recent relative outperformance has also shown up in our VI which, though still in undervalued territory, has recovered significantly. Our TI has fully recovered and now sends a neutral message (Chart 21). Chart 21S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) The surging S&P household products sector has been carrying the S&P consumer staples index on its back as solid pricing efforts have been dragging results and forward guidance higher. While household product sales have been enjoying a multi-year growth phase (second panel, Chart 22), it has largely been driven by volumes. However, the recent resurgence in pricing power (third panel, Chart 22) has given volume gains an added kick, pushing sales further. Meanwhile, exports have continued their two-year ascent despite the tough currency environment and the upshot is that relative EPS growth will likely remain upbeat (bottom panel, Chart 22). In light of challenged EM consumer spending growth, this signal is very encouraging. Chart 22Household Products Is Carrying Staples S&P Health Care (Neutral) Our health care CMI has been treading water recently. Further, a recovery in pharma stocks has taken our VI from undervalued to a neutral position, while our TI sends a distinctly bearish message as health care stocks have been overbought (Chart 23). Chart 23S&P Health Care (Neutral) Healthcare stocks have outperformed in the back half of 2018. Recently a merger mania that has swept through the pharma and biotech spaces has underpinned relative share prices. The last three months have seen an explosion of deals, including the largest biopharma deal ever (Bristol-Myers Squibb buying Celgene for approximately $90 billion) with other global deals falling not too far behind (Takeda buying Shire for $62 billion mid-last year). Such exuberance has clearly confirmed that merger premia are alive and well in the S&P pharma index. It is not merely rising premia that have taken pharma higher either. Pricing power has entered the early innings of a recovery (top panel, Chart 24) while the key export channel points to increasingly bright days ahead (second panel, Chart 24). However, the rise of regulatory pressure from the Trump administration may cause better pricing to prove fleeting. Chart 24Merger Mania In Pharma Further, pharma’s consolidation phase has come at a cost to sector leverage ratios that have dramatically expanded (bottom panel, Chart 24). Such profligacy may come to haunt the sector should the pricing power recovery falter. S&P Technology (Neutral) Our technology CMI has been moving laterally for the better part of the last three years, though the S&P technology index has ignored the macro headwinds and soared higher over that time. Our VI remains on the overvalued side of neutral, despite the recent tech selloff while our TI has been retrenching into oversold territory (Chart 25). Chart 25S&P Technology (Neutral) Until the end of last year, we maintained a barbell portfolio within the sector by recommending an overweight position in the late-cyclical and capex-driven technology hardware, storage & peripherals and software indexes while recommending an underweight position in the early-cyclical semi and semi equipment indexes. However, we recently upgraded the niche semi equipment to overweight for three reasons. First, trade policy uncertainty has dealt a blow to this tech subindex. Not only are 90% of sales foreign sourced, but a large chunk is also China-related sales. Second, emerging market financial indicators are showing some signs of life, underscoring that semi equipment demand may turn out to be marginally less grim than currently anticipated (second panel, Chart 26). Third, long term semi equipment EPS growth estimates have recently collapsed to a level far below the broad market, indicating that the sell side has thrown in the towel on this niche sector (third panel, Chart 26). Chart 26A Bottom In Semi Equipment Overall, and despite our more bullish view on semi equipment, we continue to recommend a neutral weighting in S&P technology. S&P Utilities (Underweight) Our utilities CMI has recovered recently, bouncing off its 25-year low, driven by the modest easing in interest rates, (Chart 27). This has also manifested in a recovery in the S&P utilities index as this fixed income proxy has reacted to the recent fall in Treasury yields (change in yields shown inverted, top panel, Chart 28) and jump in natural gas prices. Further, utilities are typically seen as a domestic defensive play and the recent trade troubles have made utilities soar in a flight to safety. Chart 27S&P Utilities (Underweight) We think the tailwinds lifting utilities are transitory and likely to shift to headwinds. First, one of our key themes for the back half of the year is rising interest rates; a move higher in yields will have a predictably negative impact on these high-dividend paying equities. Second, a flight to safety looks fleeting; the ISM manufacturing new orders index usually moves inversely in lock step with utilities and the most recent message is negative for the S&P utilities index (ISM manufacturing new orders index shown inverted, second panel, Chart 28). Meanwhile, S&P utilities earnings estimates have continued to trail the broad market, having taken a significant step down this year (third panel, Chart 28). Chart 28Rising Rates In Late-2019 Will Be A Headwind For Utilities Our VI and TI share this bearish message as the VI is deeply overvalued and the TI is in overbought territory (Chart 27). S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Our real estate CMI has recently started to turn up, though this is off the near decade-low set last year and remains deeply depressed relative to history (Chart 29). This is principally the result of the backup in interest rates since late last year and the lift they have given to the sector, which has been a relative outperformer over the past six months (top panel, Chart 30). Much like the S&P utilities sector in the previous section, and in the context of BCA’s higher interest rate view, we continue to avoid this sector. Chart 29S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Along with the modest reprieve in borrowing rates, multi family construction continues unabated (second panel, Chart 30), likely driven by all-time highs in CRE prices (third panel, Chart 30). In the absence of an outright contraction in construction, recent weakening in occupancy (bottom panel, Chart 30) will likely prove deflationary to rents, and thus profit prospects. Chart 30Falling Occupancy Will Hurt REIT Profits Our VI suggests that REITs are modestly overvalued, though the recent outperformance has driven our TI to an overbought condition (Chart 29). S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Our consumer discretionary CMI has ticked up recently, pushed higher by resiliency in consumer data. However, the S&P consumer discretionary index has clearly responded, pushing against 40-year highs relative to the S&P 500 and taking our VI to two standard deviations above fair value (Chart 31). Much of this should be attributed to Amazon (roughly 30% of the S&P consumer discretionary index) and their exceptional 12% outperformance relative to the broad market over the past year. Chart 31S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) While we have an underweight recommendation on the S&P consumer discretionary index, we have varying intra-segment preferences, highlighted by the recent inception of a pair trade going long homebuilders and short home improvement retailers (HIR). Housing starts and building permits are extremely sensitive to interest rates, depend on first time home buyers and move in lockstep with the homeownership rate. Currently, interest rates are easing, the homeownership rate is coming out of its GFC funk and first time home buyers are slated to make a comeback this spring selling season. This is a boon for homebuilders at the expense of HIR (top & middle panels, Chart 32). Further, the price of lumber is a key determinant of relative profitability: lumber represents an input cost to homebuilders whereas it is an important selling item in Big Box building & supply retailers that make a set margin on it. The recent drubbing in lumber prices should ease margin pressures on homebuilders but eat into HIR profits (momentum in lumber prices shown inverted and advanced in bottom panel, Chart 32). Chart 32Long Homebuilders / Short Home Improvement Retailers S&P Communication Services (Underweight) As the newly-minted communication services has little more than four months of existence, we do not have adequate history to create a cyclical macro indicator. However, we have created Chart 33 with a number of valuation indicators, though we caution that they too are less reliable than the other indicators presented in the preceding pages, owing to a dearth of history. Chart 33S&P Communication Services (Underweight) Rather, we refer readers to our still-fresh initiation of coverage on the sector3 and look forward to being able to deliver something more substantive in the future. Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years (Chart 34). Despite the neutral CMI reading, we downgraded small caps in the middle of last year,4 and moved to a large cap preference, based on the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers (bottom panel, Chart 35). This size bias remains a high conviction call for 2019. Chart 34Favor Large Vs. Small Caps Macro data too has turned against small caps. Recent NFIB surveys have shown that small business optimism has continued to fall through the end of the year, albeit from a very high level (top panel, Chart 35). This has coincided with the continued slide of small cap stocks relative to their large cap peers. Chart 35Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem Further, the percentage of small businesses with planned labor compensation increases continues to set new all-time highs and deviates substantially from the national trend (second panel, Chart 35). This divergence becomes more worrying when plotted against those same firms increasing prices (third panel, Chart 35), which has trailed for some time and recently flattened. The inference is that margin pressure is intensifying and likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In the context of the absence of small cap balance sheet discipline during the past five years, ongoing large cap outperformance seems ever more likely. Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “ Catharsis,” dated January 14, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “ Don't Fight The PBoC,” dated February 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, “New Lines Of Communication,” dated October 1, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, “Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem,” dated May 10, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
We often rely on our Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM) to gauge if a currency is cheap or not. The above chart compares the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking of G-10 currencies to their deviation from their ITTM. Countries at the bottom left offer…
Special Report Highlights The Fed’s role is commonly misunderstood, even by sophisticated investors: It seeks to lean against the business cycle, not eliminate it entirely. The idea of the “Fed put” has gone too far: The Fed is indifferent to mundane market moves; it only cares about big swings that could have a material impact on the economy. Investors hoping for an at-the-money put to indemnify them against potential losses will be sorely disappointed. The dual mandate is alive and well: Monetary policy may be better situated to defending price stability than promoting full employment, but the employment mandate was a key catalyst for lower-for-longer rates, and the negative unemployment gap better explains the current tightening cycle than still sluggish inflation prints. The Fed’s propensity to lean against the cycle means that economic strength will prove self-limiting while the expansion is in its latter stages: Risk assets can rally while the Fed’s on hold and economic data are robust, but the stronger the data, the harder the Fed will ultimately have to clamp down. Feature The ranks of BCA researchers include quite a few people who’ve done graduate work in Economics. The modern BCA was initially seeded with Bank of Canada alumni, and the current head of the Bank of Canada, Stephen Poloz, is a BCA alumnus. BCA’s tagline is Independent Investment Research Since 1949, however, not Independent Economic Research. We care about the future direction of the economy only insofar as it informs our expectations for the future direction of financial markets. Financial markets have lately been hypersensitive to all things Fed-related. That helps to make a macro researcher feel wanted, but the Fed fixation has gone so far that the tail is now wagging the dog. In this Special Report, we take a step back to look at the Fed’s role in relation to the business cycle. It is the first in a series of Fed-themed Special Reports in which we attempt to place the Fed’s actions in a market context. The next installment will dig into the link between wage gains and consumer price inflation, and we plan a multi-part series, in collaboration with our fixed-income strategists, on the ins and outs of QE and what investors might expect from its reversal. What The Fed Does Not Do Exhibit A of what the Fed does not do can be found in last week’s Barron’s, where the economics column was headlined, “Can the Fed Stave Off the Next Recession?” Despite popular misconceptions, the Fed’s job is not to prevent recessions, or even to delay their onset. It’s a subtle distinction, but the Fed’s job vis-à-vis the business cycle is to mitigate the effects of recessions so as to maximize long-run economic output. That entails the extraordinary measures the Fed undertook in the wake of the crisis, to prevent dire cyclical swings from metastasizing into permanent economic losses (hysteresis, in economics argot), and reining in boom excesses, which often amounts to inducing a recession before excesses grow larger and potentially more harmful. The Fed also does not act to shield investors from losses. Talk of a “Fed put” initially arose the day after 1987’s Black Monday, with a seemingly innocuous press release: The Federal Reserve, consistent with its responsibilities as the Nation’s central bank, affirmed today its readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system. Those 30 words, signaling the Fed’s willingness to fulfill its function as the lender of last resort in the wake of a specific event with the potential to spark a crisis, have now had a half-life of 30 years and counting. The enduring notion of the Fed put may also have been helped along by the district banks’ efforts to keep the system functioning in the days after Black Monday. New York Fed president Corrigan twisted lenders’ arms to keep credit flowing so the crash would not infect the banking system and the real economy.1 The Chicago Fed didn’t let the letter of the law keep it from “help[ing to] engineer a solution” when one of the biggest derivatives market participants “ran short of cash.2” The statement, and the vigorous offstage exertions, marked a watershed in terms of the Fed’s public profile. Before Alan Greenspan, monetary policy actions were regarded as something akin to state secrets. Wall Street firms employed “Fed watchers,” who were charged with studying the tea leaves to determine if the Fed had adjusted policy. As late as January 1990, the Bank Credit Analyst could devote an entire Special Report to the question, “Has the Federal Reserve Eased?” We push back against the widespread Fed-put notion that the Fed will do its best to ward off, or mitigate, run-of-the-mill market downdrafts. It is a subtle distinction to be sure, but it’s more accurate to say the Fed attempts to ward off, or mitigate, market crises. With the credit crisis following closely on the heels of the dot-com bust, the Fed-put concept got legs, but stretching the idea to the fourth-quarter selloff is misguided. The Fed simply reacted to a tightening of financial conditions that lessened the need for additional near-term hikes (Chart 1). Straight-talking Jay Powell put it well at the press conference following the January FOMC meeting: Chart 1An Extreme Swing [W]hen there are changes [in financial conditions,] and those changes are sustained for a period of time, then they become important for us because they have important macroeconomic implications. So we don’t react to … most things that happen in the financial markets. But when we see a sustained change in financial conditions, then that’s something that has to play into our thinking. In fact, our policy works through changing financial conditions so it’s sort of the essence of what we do. Bottom Line: The Fed does not try to prevent recessions, which are a natural counterpoint to expansions. It simply tries to lean against cyclical extremes with the goal of increasing long-run output. Investors and the media overrate the “Fed put.” The Fed only leans against outsized market swings with the potential to destabilize the broader economy. The Fed’s Dual Mandate As directed by the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, and subsequently adjusted by common understanding, the Fed has a dual mandate to promote price stability and full employment. In line with the price stability mandate, the Fed has set a 2% annual target for its preferred inflation measure, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). The PCE price index has persistently undershot the Fed’s target since the crisis (Chart 2), and in an attempt to raise inflation expectations and persuade the public that it will enforce the minimum speed as well as the speed limit, the Fed has lately stressed that its inflation target is “symmetric,” indicating that it is equally concerned about undershoots and overshoots. Chart 2Mandate 1: Price Stability Full employment is more difficult to quantify because it varies over time and is not directly observable. It is best described with reference to the natural rate of unemployment (“u-star,” or, “u*”) that accrues from structural factors independent of the cycle. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that u-star is currently 4.6%, similar to the FOMC’s 4.5% median estimate. Since the introduction of the dual mandate, the unemployment rate has only occasionally fallen below u-star (Chart 3, bottom panel). Those occasions have all eventually ended in recessions and (typically) lengthy stretches of excess unemployment.3 Chart 3Mandate 2: Full Employment The Fed’s Reaction Function Inflation and unemployment don’t matter all that much to markets in themselves; their import instead derives from the way they affect Fed policy. The Fed’s theoretical inflation reaction is straightforward; it moves to cut off above-target inflation on the grounds that unstable prices hold output below potential by undermining economic actors’ ability to plan confidently for the future. The Fed would be expected to react similarly to long-term inflation expectations that go beyond its comfort zone. The empirical record generally supports the theory: from the late ‘80s to the late ‘90s, when inflation had come off the boil, but was still well above today’s 2% target, the Fed hiked rates when core inflation accelerated (’87 through early ’89, and ’94 through mid-’95, Chart 4). Once core PCE inflation regularly fell below the 2% target, the Fed has hiked when both series have turned up and core CPI has exceeded 2% (early ’97, mid-’99, and mid-’04), and when both series accelerated but were still well below 2% (December 2015).4 Over the last 30 years, the fed funds rate’s relationship with the Cleveland Fed’s long-term inflation expectations series has been even stronger than its relationship with measured inflation (Chart 5). Chart 4When Core Price Indexes Rise, The Fed Hikes   Chart 5Managing Expectations The Fed’s unemployment reaction is less clear, as befitting the uncertain relationship between monetary policy and employment.5 Ever since the dual mandate became law, however, the Fed has hiked rates every time the unemployment rate has fallen below the estimated natural rate of unemployment (Chart 6, bottom panel). Viewed in conjunction with core inflation measures (Chart 6, top panel), the reaction function becomes clearer: when the unemployment gap is negative, and inflation is above 2%, the Fed hikes. The holistic reaction function is consistent with the Phillips Curve argument that inflation and unemployment are inversely related (Chart 7). Delving into the controversy around the Phillips Curve is beyond the scope of this survey, but the practical takeaway for investors is that the Fed still generally subscribes to the Phillips Curve relationship, and can therefore be expected to hike when unemployment falls below its natural rate. Chart 6Accelerating Inflation + Negative Unemployment Gap = Rate Hikes   The Limits Of Monetary Policy We have repeatedly made the point that monetary policy is a blunt instrument that works with long and variable lags. Combined with a dual mandate that focuses on lagging indicators like inflation and the unemployment rate, the Fed is almost certainly condemned to leaning too hard against the cycle at both the bottom and the top. Responding to delayed feedback, it is likely to provide too much accommodation after the economy has already troughed and to clamp down too hard after it’s already peaked. That said, central bankers must be doing something right. Recessions have become shallower and less frequent as the business cycle has become much more stable than it was in the 60 years before World War I (Chart 8). Inflation has been docile ever since the Volcker Fed brought it to heel. The U.S. economy’s post-crisis outperformance versus its developed-world peers owes a great deal to the Fed’s and other domestic regulators’ willingness to act swiftly, boldly and creatively to counteract the effects of the crisis. Chart 8The U.S. Economic Ride Has Gotten Much Smoother Investment Implications We continue to believe that unnecessary fiscal stimulus, by artificially boosting aggregate demand above the economy’s capacity to satisfy it, will eventually produce inflation. We further believe that an extremely tight labor market will generate upward wage pressure. Though possible, it is not our base case that firms will boost productive capacity sufficient to meet a temporary pickup in demand. It is also not our base case that labor force participation will increase enough to prevent additional hiring from pushing year-over-year compensation gains to 3% and beyond. Inflation pressures have been slower to emerge than we expected, but when they eventually appear, the Fed can be counted upon to attempt to contain them. Once it does, Treasuries will suffer, especially at longer maturities. The economy eventually will, as well, and equities and spread product will perform poorly in the ensuing recession. However, the Fed’s newfound commitment to patience, and inflation’s delay in pressuring the Fed to abandon it, is likely to push out our projected outcomes. The delay will ultimately make the overshoots larger. The Treasury selloff will be worse because yields will stay lower for longer while the Fed remains on the sidelines, and they will rise more than they otherwise would because the Fed will have to drive rates higher to combat inflation that’s been afforded more time to germinate. Spread product and equities will presumably post larger gains while the Fed pauses, and the economy builds up more momentum than it otherwise would, followed by larger losses when the Fed ultimately has to get more aggressive. Economic strength at this point of the cycle is self-limiting, but the limit now appears to be a little further away than we previously estimated. We maintain our recommended positioning – overweight equities and spread product, significantly underweight Treasuries, and equal-weight cash – with the caveats that volatility is likely to be elevated in the latter stage of the cycle and that trade tensions remain a meaningful threat. Generalizing beyond the current cycle, monetary policy settings matter a great deal for relative asset-class returns. The Fed’s predictable reaction to the business cycle should be incorporated into the asset-allocation decision process.   Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Greenspan, Alan. The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, Penguin (New York): 2007, p.108. Greenspan disavowed knowledge of the details, but suggested that Corrigan, “the Fed’s chief enforcer,” “bit off a few earlobes” while encouraging bankers to keep in mind that, “‘if you shut off credit to a customer just because you’re a little nervous about him, but with no concrete reason, he’s going to remember that’.” 2 Greenspan, p. 110. 3 The u* series shown in Chart 3 is a retrospective estimate. Research cited by Chairman Powell in his 2018 Jackson Hole address suggests that faulty real-time estimates of u* are a potential source of policy errors. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/powell20180824a…, accessed February 6, 2019. 4 The Fed targets the headline PCE price index series, but we show the core PCE price index because it is a robust predictor of the headline series. 5 According to a St. Louis Fed blog post intended to explain everyday economic concepts, “the links between monetary policy and employment are weak and inexact.” https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2018/august/federal-reserve-dual-mandate, accessed February 4, 2019.