Financial Markets
Highlights Seasonal environmental restrictions on Chinese aluminum output are due to ease going into spring, which will restore some of the output taken off line when inefficient smelters were shuttered last year. Global demand likely will slow later this year, largely because we expect GDP growth in China, which accounts for more than half of global aluminum consumption, to moderate in 2H18. In addition, expected U.S. tariffs and quotas will limit imports and revive output in that market. This will contribute to the easing of a tight global balance, and take some of the pressure off prices, but we do not expect a significant move lower. We remain neutral. Energy: Overweight. Our long Dec/18 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/18 $70/bbl calls - recommended last week on the back of our updated price forecast - closed with a 3.1% gain on Tuesday. We took profits on our long 4Q19 $55/bbl Brent puts vs. short 4Q19 $50/bbl Brent puts, realizing a 20.7% gain since it was recommended January 18, 2018. Base Metals: Neutral. We are expecting a secular increase in aluminum supplies this year, on the back of Chinese environmental policies and more difficult global trading conditions. Precious Metals: Gold markets awaited Fed Chair Powell's Humphrey-Hawkins testimony beginning Tuesday, as vice chair for financial supervision, Randal Quarles, warned U.S. economic growth could exceed expectations the day before. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Argentina's drought looks like it will stress that country's grain harvests, and tighten markets at the margin. Feature Chart of the WeekAluminum In Large Deficit Last Year Easing of winter supply restrictions in China, as well as tighter controls on U.S. aluminum imports, will dominate the aluminum market in the near term. In both cases, the net effect likely will be an increase in global supply. The latter would also support aluminum's price in the U.S. market - as measured by the U.S. Midwest premium. These events will ease the global physical deficit in aluminum, which last year came in at its widest since 1995 (Chart of the Week). The current tight conditions are driven by Beijing's elimination of overcapacity, which, along with environmental reform policies implemented last year, led to a reduction in China's output. The price dynamics that dominated the aluminum market over the past couple years will shift as a result. This already can be seen in the behavior of prices on the LME and the SHFE: LME prices have been gyrating around $2,200/MT, while SHFE prices have dipped by more than 5% since the beginning of the year. Unwinding China's Supply-Side Policies? At first blush, it may not be apparent China's primary aluminum production sector experienced significant changes last year. After stalling at 1% year-on-year (y/y) growth in 2016, output grew 1.2% y/y in 2017, a sharp deceleration from the 16% y/y average growth rates registered between 2010 and 2015. However, the annual gain masked a 10% y/y increase in output in 1H17, which was almost completely reversed by the negative impacts of China's environmental policies and its efforts to eliminate overcapacity. These policy-led initiatives ultimately caused output to fall 7% y/y in 2H17 (Chart 2). The resulting 1 mm MT of production cuts in the second half of last year reflects China's 2017 supply-side policies. Beijing's strategy is two-fold: Chart 2Sharp Fall In 2H17 Output From China ... Eliminate outdated and unlicensed capacity by forcing it to close. This has removed an estimated 3-4 mm MT of annual capacity. The policy targets capacity lacking proper building and expansion permits, as well as the smelters that do not meet strict environmental standards. However, not all the shutdowns are permanent. Among this shuttered capacity is 2 mm MT of outdated smelter capacity belonging to China Hongqiao, which the company plans to replace with new capacity.1 The other major supply-side policy implemented by Beijing last year is a restriction on smelter activity during the mid-November to mid-March period. As is the case in the steel sector, this winter-curtailment policy seeks to reduce pollution during the smog-prone winter months. Aluminum smelters in the cities targeted in the winter plan were ordered to cut output by ~ 30% during this period. This policy is expected to be an annually recurring event until 2020. However, while 3 mm MT of annualized capacity would have been closed during the winter if the full 30% curtailment target had been met, reports surfaced in mid-December that compliance was low, and suggested only ~ 0.6 mm MT of capacity (just 20% of the goal, or 6% of the curtailment target) had been closed.2 The total aluminum annual capacity affected by both the winter environmental curtailments and capacity-reduction policies implemented last year could potentially reach 7 mm MT. China's total smelting capacity was a reported 40 mm MT in 2016. Lower Chinese Production ... And Consumption On a year-on-year basis, global primary aluminum production has been falling since August. This is, for the most part, true on a month-on-month basis, as well. The 12-month moving average for global aluminum production peaked in July, and has been coming down consistently since then. Although 2017 production came in higher than the previous year, this is due to a ~ 6% y/y increase in the first half, which preceded a ~ 4% y/y decline in output in the second half of the year. These dynamics are driven by China, which accounts for 55% of global primary production. Chinese firms raised primary output in 1H17, which was followed by a sharp contraction in 2H17. Chinese primary aluminum production peaked in June, recording an all-time record of 2.98 mm MT before falling in the subsequent months. On the other hand, primary production from the rest of the world has remained largely unchanged over the past two years, at 26 mm MT. Data from the International Aluminum Institute shows month-on-month production increases in China in December and January; however, output is still lower vs. the same period a year earlier. Chinese production drove global aluminum production higher in the past, but falling output from the world's leading producer now is causing global primary aluminum supply to contract. The impact of China's supply curtailments has been muted by lower demand for the metal (Chart 3). Again, lower consumption has been driven by the top-demand market - China - which typically consumes ~ 55% of the primary metal. Chinese primary consumption and production each came down by more than 1 mm MT y/y in the second half of last year. Falling aluminum demand in China is consistent with a slowdown in Chinese automobile production as well as fixed asset investments in infrastructure and transportation (Chart 4). Furthermore, China's scrap aluminum imports increased in 2H17, reflecting a preference for the secondary metal as the price of primary aluminum increased. Chart 3... Coincided With Falling Chinese Consumption Chart 4Slowdown In Chinese Demand A Divergence In Global Dynamics ... Despite the improved balance in China, the global primary aluminum balance in the rest of the world recorded a large deficit last year - the largest since 1995 (Chart 5). While both consumption and production in China came down by more than 1 mm MT in 2H17, consumption in the rest of the world increased by ~ 0.4 mm MT, even as production remained largely unchanged. This tightened the global market, as more stringent aluminum production policies in China meant that there was no flooding of Chinese aluminum to ease the deficit. In fact, the world excluding China deficit is the largest at least since the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) started collecting data in 1995. ... Is Reflected In Inventory Dynamics This also coincides with rising aluminum stocks on the Shanghai Futures Exchange and falling inventory on the LME. In fact, Chinese aluminum imports have been falling and were down almost 30% y/y in 2H17. At the same time, Chinese net exports picked up slightly (Chart 6). Chart 5Record Aluminum Deficit Outside China Chart 6Chinese Net Exports On The Rise In response to lower output, LME inventories have been falling since 2Q14, and they continued their descent last year, ending 2017 at roughly the same level as mid-2008. On the other hand, stocks at the SHFE have been rising steeply since the beginning of last year and are at record highs (Chart 7). Whether the tight global market fundamentals will persist depends on whether China's outdated capacity cuts prove to be temporary or permanent. Chart 7Dynamics Reflected In Stock Changes U.S. Tariffs And Quotas Would Offset Tight Markets In what appears to be an effort to revive U.S. aluminum and steel production, the U.S. Commerce Department launched an investigation into these domestic industries late last year. Last month, Commerce proposed tariffs and quotas that would impact all aluminum imports with the exception of aluminum scrap and aluminum powders. There appear to be two main objectives of this investigation: 1. Increase capacity utilization in the U.S. aluminum and steel industries; and 2. Penalize China for subsidizing its aluminum sector at the expense of those in other countries. Among the Commerce proposals: 1. A 7.7% tariff on all aluminum imports to the U.S. 2. A 23.6% tariff on all aluminum imports from certain countries, while other countries would be subject to quotas equal to 100% of their 2017 exports to the U.S.3 3. A quota on all aluminum imports from other countries equal to a maximum of 86.7% of their 2017 exports to the U.S. In a memo issued last week, the U.S. Department of Defense expressed its support for the targeted tariffs (option 2 above), as well as a recommendation to postpone action on the aluminum sector. President Trump has until April 19 to make a decision on the aluminum recommendations. While he may not stick to the exact details outlined in the three options, our Geopolitical Strategists expect him to go through with implementing protectionist measures to limit aluminum imports. U.S. production of primary aluminum is at its lowest level since 1951 (Chart 8). To reach the 80% target of smelter capacity utilization envisioned by Commerce, the U.S. will have to add ~ 0.67 mm MT of supply. This represents just ~ 1.16% of world supply in 2016. Imports currently make up 90% of U.S. primary aluminum consumption. Chart 8U.S. Producers Took A Big Hit In fact, even if this amount of aluminum was supplied domestically in the U.S. last year, the world aluminum market would have remained in deficit. Furthermore, this additional supply would pale in comparison to the cuts China has already implemented in its aluminum sector last year. China's primary production in the August to December period last year came in 1.15 mm MT below the same period in 2016. Annual smelter capacity in the U.S. is estimated to be a combined 1.82 mm MT. Of this capacity, Alcoa has 0.34 mm MT of idle capacity, Century Aluminum has 0.27 mm MT, while ARG International's Missouri plant has 0.27 mm MT of idle capacity. U.S. producers have started communicating plans to restart idled capacity. According to Century Aluminum's CEO, the company's eastern Kansas operation, which shuttered more than half of its production, could ramp output at one of its smelters to full capacity of up to 0.27 mm MT by early next year. Similarly, Alcoa has committed to partially restarting production at its Warwick, Indiana, facility, which would bring 0.16 mm MT of capacity online by the second quarter of this year. However, imports are not the sole reason output in the U.S. aluminum sector is falling. High power costs also have contributed, but this is not addressed in the Department of Commerce's report. In any case, we would not be surprised to witness an increase in aluminum imports by U.S. consumers before a final decision is made. If import controls do in fact fall into place, prices in the U.S. - as reflected by the U.S. Midwest transaction premium - will likely increase. Bottom Line: Supply- and demand-side developments, mostly in China, which accounts for more than half of global production and consumption, will combine to ease a global supply deficit this year. Expected U.S. tariffs and quotas will limit imports and revive output in that market. This will take some pressure off prices, but, we do not expect levels to move significantly lower. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "China Hongqiao says to cut 2 mln T/year of outdated aluminum capacity," published on August 2, 2017, available at reuters.com. 2 Please see "Aluminum Under Pressure After China Smog Cutbacks Fall Short," published on December 20, 2017, available at reuters.com. 3 The countries noted are China, Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Fed: The Fed is getting more optimistic on growth and continues to forecast a rebound in inflation. Nevertheless, the March FOMC meeting is probably too soon to expect an upward revision to the Fed's rate hike expectations. Inflation: The headwinds working against inflation are set to fade this year. The core goods and medical care sectors will lead the way, but there are even tentative signs that the deceleration in shelter inflation might start to ease. Spread Product: A survey of investment grade bond sectors shows that municipal bonds, Foreign Agency bonds and Local Authority bonds are all attractively valued relative to corporates. In contrast, USD-denominated Sovereign bonds are expensive. At the upper-end of the credit spectrum, Consumer ABS offer good value but deteriorating credit fundamentals. Feature One byproduct of this year's increase in Treasury yields is that market expectations for the near-term path of Fed rate hikes have converged with the Fed's most recent median projection (Chart 1). At present, the overnight index swap curve is priced for a fed funds rate of 2.19% by the end of this year and 2.54% by the end of 2019. The Fed's most recent median projection calls for a fed funds rate between 2% and 2.25% by the end of 2018, and of 2.75% by the end of 2019.1 Chart 1Market Expectations Have Converged With The Fed Dots This convergence makes the next few Fed meetings particularly interesting. Will the Fed revise up its rate projections, giving the market permission to push short-dated yields even higher? Or will the Fed continue to signal three hikes this year and 2-3 more in 2019, restraining the bear market in short-dated bonds? Fortunately, last week we received a lot of information to help us answer these questions. Several FOMC members made noteworthy public remarks and the Fed released the minutes from the January FOMC meeting. What To Expect From The March FOMC Meeting The Fed's Rosy Growth Outlook The minutes from the January FOMC meeting showed a great deal of optimism about the U.S. recovery, from both the Fed staff and FOMC participants. Chart 2Substantial Stimulus In The Pipeline The minutes noted that the Fed staff submitted stronger economic projections at the January meeting than at previous meeting, noting that: [T]he forecast for real GDP growth was revised up, reflecting a reassessment of the recently enacted tax cuts, along with higher projected paths for equity prices and foreign economic growth and a lower assumed path for the foreign exchange value of the dollar. It's important to note that while these projections include the impact of recent changes to the tax code, they do not include the potential impact from the newly proposed two-year appropriations bill that is poised to pass through Congress in the next few weeks. This bill is significant with large outlays for disaster relief ($45 billion), the military ($165 billion) and non-defense discretionary items ($131 billion), spread over the next two years. Chart 2 demonstrates how much this spending bill and the recent tax cuts have altered the growth outlook. It shows two estimates of fiscal thrust, the initial economic impulse of changes in government tax and spending policies.2 One estimate is the IMF's baseline forecast that was made before the tax legislation was passed. That estimate showed that fiscal policy would have been contractionary this year, trimming about 0.5% from GDP, and only slightly expansionary in 2019. The second estimate, which incorporates both the tax legislation and the proposed spending bill, shows that the fiscal impulse will be +0.8% this year and +1.3% next year. A major turnaround, and the most stimulative fiscal policy since the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. Staying The Course On Inflation At the January FOMC meeting the Fed saw a presentation on the performance of different inflation models, an exercise that is particularly important given that the Fed's traditional expectations-augmented Phillips curve model was not able to explain why prices decelerated last year. The staff concluded that while the prediction errors from Phillips curve-style models have been larger in recent years than during the 2001-07 period, they were not completely out of line with history. This synchs up with our own analysis. We re-created the Fed's expectations-augmented Phillips curve model using details from a speech given by Janet Yellen in 2015 (Chart 3).3 That model certainly shows a large prediction error in 2017, but one that is not inconsistent with past errors. The message is that 2017 was not an outlier in terms of the Fed's ability to forecast inflation, but rather that inflation is quite often difficult to forecast. The Fed staff did provide a couple reasons for why inflation lagged the model's predictions last year: [S]tructural changes in the price setting for some items, such as medical care, and the effects of idiosyncratic price shocks, such as the unusual drop in prices of wireless telephone services. And also forecast that inflation would reverse course in 2018: [C]ore PCE prices were forecast to rise notably faster in 2018, importantly reflecting both the expected waning of transitory factors that held down 12-month inflation measures in 2017 as well as the projected further tightening in resource utilization. We agree with this assessment. In fact, both CPI and PCE inflation measures have formed tentative troughs in the past few months and should see further near-term upside from both the core goods and medical care components (Chart 4). Core goods inflation has still not caught up with accelerating import prices (Chart 4, panel 2) and the PPI data show a recent large jump in health-care prices (Chart 4, panel 3). Chart 3The Fed's Inflation Model Chart 4Inflation Headwinds Will Fade On medical care, research from the San Francisco Fed has shown that a major reason for lower inflation in recent years has been the slower growth of Medicare payments to physicians and hospitals as mandated by the Affordable Care Act. But these payments are also forecast to grow 2% this year, much higher than the 0.6% growth seen last year and the 0.9% growth seen in 2016.4 It is even possible that the deceleration in shelter inflation could moderate in the months ahead, given the renewed decline in the rental vacancy rate (Chart 4, panel 4). Meanwhile, we continue to expect that stronger wage growth will eventually pressure core services inflation (excluding shelter and medical care) higher (Chart 4, bottom panel). But What Are They Saying? Even though the minutes conveyed a decidedly optimistic tone with regards to both growth and inflation, Fed speakers were much more cautious last week. Philadelphia Fed President Patrick Harker said that "based on the relatively strong economy, but the continued stubbornness of inflation, I've penciled in two hikes for 2018." Atlanta Fed President Raphael Bostic said he is "comfortable continuing with a slow removal of policy accommodation" but also that "that doesn't necessarily mean as many as three or four moves per year." St. Louis Fed President James Bullard also said that 100 basis points of rate hikes in 2018 "seems like a lot." At the very least it appears that upward revisions to GDP growth forecasts are not sufficient for these three members to revise their rate projections higher. But these three members also already projected shallower paths for rate hikes than the median FOMC member (Table 1). Table 1Composition Of The FOMC More important is whether FOMC members whose projections are consistent with the median - those with a "neutral" policy bias in Table 1 - are inclined to get more hawkish. One of those members is San Francisco Fed President John Williams who said last week that "it makes sense to think about three or four rate increases in 2018." Chart 5Still Not Back To Target At the moment, the median Fed projection calls for three rate hikes in 2018, and that median will only move higher in March if four out of the six members who currently forecast three hikes this year decide to increase their dots. Given the cautious tone struck by most Fed speakers last week, we think the odds of an upward revision to the Fed's 2018 rate hike forecasts at the March meeting are low. Bottom Line: The Fed is getting more optimistic on growth and continues to forecast a rebound in inflation. Nevertheless, the March FOMC meeting is probably too soon to expect an upward revision to the Fed's rate hike expectations. Our own assessment is that the headwinds working against inflation are set to fade this year and that 3-4 Fed rate hikes are likely. In either case, bond yields are still biased higher given that they are still not priced for an eventual return of inflation to the Fed's target (Chart 5). Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Searching For Late-Cycle Value In Spread Product As we have noted repeatedly in recent reports, we anticipate that we will start to de-risk the spread product side of our U.S. bond portfolio sometime in 2018, possibly quite soon depending on the future path of inflation.5 So this week we perform a survey of investment grade spread product sectors, with an eye towards identifying sectors that look attractively valued and also present a low risk of spread widening. Our primary tool for identifying value is the 12-month breakeven spread. The 12-month breakeven spread is the basis point spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for a sector to earn zero excess returns versus a duration-equivalent position in Treasury yields.6 Table 2 shows the 12-month breakeven spread for each sector split by credit rating. Table 212-Month Breakeven Spreads By Credit Rating The first thing we notice is the attractive spreads offered by municipal bonds after adjusting for the tax advantage. In fact, for investors exposed to the top marginal tax rate, the 12-month breakeven spread on a Aaa-rated municipal bond exceeds the spread offered by a Baa-rated corporate bond. We have previously noted that when the tax-adjusted spread on a 10-year Aaa-rated municipal bond exceeds the spread offered by the duration-matched investment grade corporate bond index, it has historically been a signal that the credit cycle is very late. We are not seeing this signal yet, but it is getting very close (Chart 6). The second observation that jumps out is that USD-denominated Sovereign debt is not attractive compared to U.S. corporate debt. This is true across the entire investment grade credit spectrum. Further, Chart 7 shows that Sovereign bonds typically exhibit greater excess return volatility than U.S. corporate bonds. Chart 6Positive Muni/Corporate Spreads##br## Are A Late-Cycle Indicator Chart 712-Month Breakeven Spread Versus ##br##Excess Return Volatility We anticipate getting an opportunity to shift out of corporate bonds and into Sovereign debt at some point during the next 12 months, but expect some poor performance from Sovereign bonds first. A quicker expected pace of Fed rate hikes has historically coincided with Sovereign bond underperformance (Chart 8), and if that plays out while growth outside the U.S. starts to moderate - a risk that has been flagged by both our leading indicators for the Chinese economy and the performance of EM/JPY currency carry trades - then this would further exacerbate the underperformance of Sovereign bonds by putting upward pressure on the U.S. dollar.7 A third observation from Table 2 is that Foreign Agency bonds look very attractive, and Chart 7 also shows that the sector has historically exhibited quite low volatility. Foreign state-owned energy companies make up a large portion of the Foreign Agency index, and this sector's performance closely tracks the price of oil (Chart 9). With our commodity strategists now calling for average 2018 crude oil prices of $74/bbl and $70/bbl for Brent and WTI respectively, the Foreign Agency sector should stay well supported.8 Local Authority bonds are also attractively valued, though to a lesser extent than Foreign Agencies, and also tend to exhibit relatively low excess return volatility. We continue to recommend an overweight position in this sector that is comprised principally of taxable municipal debt and USD-denominated Canadian provincial bonds. Chart 8Underweight Sovereigns Chart 9Overweight Foreign Agencies Finally, we notice that credit card and auto loan backed Consumer ABS offer very attractive spreads and relatively low volatility. While we retain a neutral allocation to Consumer ABS, we note that credit trends are starting to shift against the sector. Bank are now tightening lending standards on both credit cards and auto loans, and the delinquency rate has made a cyclical bottom (Chart 10). Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS also offer an attractive breakeven spread, though this sector has historically been much more volatile. Here too we see that banks are tightening lending standards, but the tightening has moderated in recent quarters. If this continues then delinquencies could start to roll over and property prices could start to accelerate (Chart 11). We remain underweight non-agency CMBS for now, but note the tentative improvement in credit quality. Chart 10Neutral Consumer ABS Chart 11A Nascent Improvement In Credit Quality Bottom Line: A survey of investment grade bond sectors shows that municipal bonds, Foreign Agency bonds and Local Authority bonds are all attractively valued relative to corporates. In contrast, USD-denominated Sovereign bonds are expensive. At the upper-end of the credit spectrum, Consumer ABS offer good value but deteriorating credit fundamentals. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 We exclude the forecast provided by the St. Louis Fed President as an outlier and calculate the median from the remaining forecasts. 2 The fiscal thrust is defined as the change in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, expressed as a percentage of GDP. 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 4 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2017/november/contribution-to-low-pce-inflation-from-healthcare/ 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On The MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 We calculate the 12-month breakeven spread as the average index option-adjusted spread divided by the average index duration. We ignore the impact of convexity. 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices", dated February 22, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights The combined U.S. current account and fiscal deficits are set to rise as Trump's profligacy and higher interest rates kick in. In and of itself, this does not spell doom for the dollar. The Fed's response to the twin deficit is what will ultimately set the path for the greenback. Stimulus hitting an economy at full employment raises the likelihood that the Fed will not stand idly by. The dollar's momentum is not deteriorating anymore, global growth could hit a soft patch, and U.S. hedged yields might regain some composure versus European hedged yields. These factors are likely to precipitate a dollar rebound. The durability of this rebound remains an unknown. An opportunity to go short EUR/SEK has emerged. Feature When it comes to the U.S. dollar, the story of the day has become the twin deficits. It is now presented as the key factor that will drag the dollar lower over the course of the cycle. We do agree there are plenty of reasons to be concerned with the long-term outlook for the dollar. However, we remain unconvinced whether the twin deficits really are the much-vaunted "boogey man" that will haunt the greenback. In fact, we would argue that while they are a handicap for the dollar, the role of the Federal Reserve, global growth and hedging costs take precedence over the evil twins. The Twin Deficit Will Widen We take no offence with the assertion that the twin deficits are set to increase. According to the work of Mark McClellan, who writes The Bank Credit Analyst, the U.S. fiscal deficit is set to increase to 5.5% of GDP over the course of the next two years. U.S. President Donald Trump's tax cuts and the recent spending agreement will undeniably contribute to this.1 The current account deficit is also set to widen. Chart I-1 shows our estimate for the path of the current account. We anticipate it to move to -3.4% of GDP by late 2018 or early 2019. This is a noteworthy deterioration, but one that only brings the U.S. current account to a level last experienced in 2009. One contributor is obviously the trade balance. The Bank Credit Analyst estimates that the impact of the combined fiscal measures announced will reach 0.3% of GDP in 2018. The biggest source of deterioration will not come from trade: it will come from a fall in the net primary income balance of the U.S., which currently stands at 1.1% of GDP. Essentially, higher interest rates in the U.S. means that foreigners will receive greater income from the U.S. Based on the current level of the median long-term interest rate forecasts by the FOMC's participants, my colleague Ryan Swift estimates that a move in 10-year Treasury yields to 3.5% is likely by year end.2 Based on our estimate, this will push down the primary income balance to 0.4% of GDP. It is important to acknowledge that this forecast for the current account is likely to prove to be a worst-case scenario. To begin with, the trade balance could continue to be buffeted by the fact that U.S. energy production keeps expanding, which is slowly but surely moving the U.S. toward a positive energy trade balance (Chart I-2). Moreover, periods of weakness in the USD have been followed by improvements in the U.S. primary income balance. This is because while payments made by the U.S. to foreigners are mostly in the form of interest, 55% of U.S. income receipts are earnings on FDIs. If we add dividends received on foreign equity holdings, this share rises to 80% of U.S. gross primary income. Thus, if the dollar weakens, U.S. receipts benefit from a translation effect as corporations convert their foreign earnings back into U.S. dollars at more beneficial exchange rates. Chart I-1Higher U.S. Rates ##br##Will Hurt The Current Account Chart I-2U.S. Shale Oil Production Will Prevent Too Great A Deterioration In The Trade Balance But do twin deficits even matter? We would argue, it depends. Bottom Line: The U.S. twin deficits are set to increase. The U.S. fiscal deficit will move to 5.5% of GDP and the current account to -3.4% of GDP as interest owed to foreigners is set to increase. Twin Deficit, So What? It is one thing to anticipate a widening of the twin deficits, but does history suggest that twin deficits have an impact on the dollar? Here, the empirical evidence is rather mixed. As Chart I-3 illustrates, there has been no obvious link between twin deficits and the dollar. In fact, Arthur Budaghyan highlighted in BCA's Emerging Market Strategy service the following phases:3 1970s: no discernable relationship; First half of the 1980s: Substantial widening of twin deficits, but a massive dollar bull market materialized; 1985 to 1993: no reliable relationship between twin deficits and the dollar; 1994 to 2001: The dollar did rally as twin deficits narrowed on the back of the fiscal balance moving from roughly -4% of GDP to 2% of GDP; 2001 to 2011: dollar weakened as twin deficits grew deeper; 2011 to 2016: When twin deficits narrowed considerably, the dollar was stable, but when they stopped improving, the dollar rallied 25%. Chart I-3In My Time Of Dying? Let us focus on the growing twin deficits episodes. As it turns out, the missing link between twin deficits and the dollar is Fed policy. A widening in twin deficits is normally associated with a strong economy. Profligate government spending can boost domestic demand, and because imports have a high elasticity to domestic demand, a widening current account also tends to come alongside robust growth. The Volcker Fed played a high-wire act from 1979 to 1982, plunging the U.S. into a vicious double-dip recession in order to bring realized and expected inflation back to earth after the 1970s. Volcker was not about to let former President Ronald Reagan's stimulus boost growth to the point of lifting inflation expectations again, undoing all the Fed's previous good work. He elected to increase real rates sharply, which was the key factor behind the dollar's strength. The 2001 to 2011 experience needs to be broken down in parts. From 2001 to 2003, the twin deficits were expanding thanks to former President George Bush's wars and tax cuts. Yet the Fed did not play the same counterweight as it did in the mid-1980s. Instead, it kept cutting rates all the way until 2003 as then-Chairman Alan Greenspan was worried about deflation. U.S. real rates did not experience the necessary lift required to fight the negative impact of the twin deficits on the dollar. From 2003 to 2007, the twin deficits were in fact narrowing, real rates were trendless and the dollar was experiencing mild depreciation. During that time frame, global growth was extremely robust, China was growing at a double-digit pace and EM economies were booming. Money was flowing toward these destinations. From 2007 to mid-2008, while the twin deficits continued to narrow, the dollar plunged. The sharp fall in real rates as the Fed engaged in aggressive rate cutting explains this apparent inconsistency. From the second half of 2008 to 2009, the dollar surged, despite a further widening of the twin deficits. Real rates rebounded as inflation expectations melted, and risk aversion prompted investors to seek the safety of the global reserve asset and the global reserve currency - Treasurys and the greenback, respectively. From 2009 to the middle of 2011, the twin deficits stabilized, real rates stabilized, and the dollar stabilized as well, but nonetheless experienced wild gyrations as the global economy kept experiencing aftershocks from the great financial crisis. Neither the twin deficits nor real rates were offering a clear path forward, thus the dollar was also mixed. Bottom Line: A close look at various episodes of twin deficits in the U.S. pushes us toward one conclusion: if twin deficits are expanding but the Fed is trying to tighten policy and real rates are rising, the dollar ignores the twin deficits and, in fact, manages to rise. If, however, the twin deficits expand, and real rates do not experience enough upside to counterbalance this development, the dollar weakens. This means one thing for the coming years: Forecasting twin deficits is not sufficient to predict a dollar bear market. Instead, we also need a view on the Fed and the outlook for real rates. So Where Will The Dollar Go In 2018? We expect there could be some upward pressure on the Fed's dots as the year progresses. The reason is rather straightforward. The U.S. economy will receive a very large shot in the arm this year and next. Mark's calculations show that the fiscal thrust in 2018 and 2019 will morph from -0.4% of GDP to 0.8% of GDP, and from 0.3% of GDP to 1.3% of GDP, respectively (Chart I-4). While currently the fiscal thrust is expected to become a large negative in 2020, that year is an election year. There is a non-trivial probability that the fiscal cliff anticipated that year may in fact be postponed: it is not in the interest of the Republicans or Democrats to be blamed for a slowing economy in a year where Americans are hitting the voting booths! This stimulus is not happening in a vacuum either: it is materializing in an environment where the labor market seems to be at full employment, where capacity utilization is tight, and where financial conditions remain easy (Chart I-5). Stimulating when the economy is at full capacity is likely to lift prices more than it will boost real economic activity. The Fed is fully aware of this risk. Chart I-4Much Stimulus ##br##In The Pipeline Chart I-5Could Fiscal Stimulus Be Inflationary With This Backdrop?##br## We Think So However, it remains possible that the Fed will err on the side of caution and wait until the impact of the stimulus measures on the economy become more evident before sending a more hawkish message to the markets. Chart I-6Twin Deficits Narratives ##br##Look Like Ex-Post Explanations If the Fed elects to be proactive and adjusts its message regarding the future path of policy before the impact of the stimulus becomes evident, the dollar could rise as it would put upward pressure on U.S. real rates. If, however, the Fed elects to be reactive and wait until the economy responds to the stimulus package with higher wage growth and inflation, then the dollar could weaken as real rates experience little upside and the twin deficits exact their toll. BCA is currently conducting research to assess which path is more likely. In the meanwhile, there other factors to consider. First, as we highlighted three weeks ago, since 2011, spikes in the number of mentions of the twin deficits in media have historically been associated with temporary rebounds in the dollar following periods of USD weakness (Chart I-6).4 The twin deficits seem to come to the forefront of investors' minds as an ex-post explanation for previous weak-dollar periods. Second, our dollar capitulation index is not only at oversold levels, but the indicator has formed a positive divergence with the trade-weighted dollar's exchange rate (Chart I-7). Technically, this increases the probability of a meaningful rebound in the USD. Chart I-7A Positive Technical Development For The Greenback Third, global growth is showing signs of weakening. We have already highlighted that rollovers in the performance of EM carry trades such as the one we have been experiencing for a few months now have been very reliable leading indicators of activity slowdowns over the past 20 years.5 Korea exports are also ebbing. As Chart I-8 illustrates, when Korean exports weaken, this tends to be associated with weakness in highly pro-cyclical financial variables like EM equities, EM bonds, AUD/USD or AUD/JPY. When a slowdown in global growth materializes, especially when it does so as the U.S. economy is set to accelerate, it tends to be associated with a stronger dollar. Fourth, the super-charged strength in the euro versus the USD since the second quarter of 2017 happened as European hedged yields overtook U.S. hedged yields. Chart I-9 takes the example of a Japan-based investor. We pick Japan as an illustration because Japan is the largest creditor nation in the world, and extra-low domestic yields, Japanese investors continue to exhibit heightened yield-seeking behaviors. When the gap between European bond yields hedged into yen and U.S. bond yields hedged into yen became more negative, the euro was depreciating. Once this gap started to narrow, the euro stabilized. Once European bond yields hedged into yen became greater than U.S. bond yields hedged into yen, the euro took off. Chart I-8Growth Sensitive Assets May Be At Risk Chart I-9Are Hedged Yields The Culprit Behind The Dollar's Weakness? We expect these gaps in hedged yields to move back in the U.S.'s favor. The U.S. yield curve has some scope to begin to steepen a bit, especially as U.S. growth accelerates. Additionally, a big component of the underperformance of U.S. hedged yields has been associated with a widening of the LIBOR spread and the cross-currency basis swap spreads (Chart I-10). As we anticipated, the introduction of tax rules favoring repatriations of foreign earnings by U.S. corporations is having this effect.6 U.S. firms hold their offshore earnings in high-quality securities like bank papers or Treasurys. These securities are a vital supply of dollars in the Eurodollar market - the offshore USD market - as they are high-quality collateral that can be used to secure many transactions. As the market in December began to discount the impact of the tax changes, FRA-OIS spreads and basis swap spreads began to widen. This increased the cost of hedging U.S. bonds. Chart I-10Will The Increase In Treasurys Issuance ##br##Pull Back Down The Cost Of Hedging U.S. Assets? But here's one overlooked but potentially friendly outcome of the twin deficits. By increasing its current account deficit, the U.S. economy will begin to supply more USDs to Eurodollar markets, providing a relief valve to the collateral-starved offshore USD-funding markets. Moreover, because the fiscal deficit is set to mushroom, and because after many debt-ceiling debacles the Treasury's cash reserves are low, the Treasury is likely to start issuing a lot more T-Notes and T-Bills, which will also provide a source of high-quality collaterals in the system, especially as the Fed is not buying those bonds anymore. The stress in the funding market may begin to recede and hedged U.S. yields may begin to rise relative to the rest of the world. Bottom Line: While the twin deficit could become a negative for the USD, it is not yet clear that this will indeed be the case. Instead, we need to keep in mind that the U.S. government is injecting a large amount of stimulus in an economy running at full capacity. This could be inflationary. The Fed's response will dictate the USD's path. If the Fed is proactive, the USD will experience an upswing. If the Fed is reactive and waits to guide real rates higher, the dollar could remain weak. In the meanwhile, other forces are pointing toward a rebound in the dollar. The greenback is oversold and unloved; momentum indicators are forming positive divergences, raising the odds of a rebound; global growth is set to slow; and U.S. hedged yields are likely to move back in favor of the dollar. Will EUR/SEK Break Above 10? The recent inflation miss in Sweden has raised some concerns, with EUR/SEK hovering around the critical 10 level, and NOK/SEK breaking above the 1.03 handle. Headline consumer prices rose only 1.6% annually in January, while contracting by 0.8% in monthly terms. The official inflation measure tracked by the Riksbank - the CPIF - fell to 1.7% per annum. This move away from the inflation target has market participants questioning the Riksbank's willingness and ability to normalize policy this year. However, the underlying picture is not that negative. The most recent inflation figure was greatly impacted by the seasonality of Swedish CPI. As Chart I-11 shows, January tends to be a very weak number for Swedish inflation. The February data is likely to rebound significantly. Additionally, our model further highlights that based on both international and domestic factors, Swedish inflation should rise in the coming months, putting CPI much closer to the Riksbank's objective (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Seasonal Pattern In Swedish CPI Chart I-12Swedish Inflation Is Set To Rebound Reassuringly, Swedish inflation expectations have not subsided, suggesting market participants are fading the latest weak reading. As the bottom panel of Chart I-13 illustrates, CPI swap rates are still holding steady. On the macro front, consumers continue to be a source of durable strength. Real consumption is growing at a 3% annual rate, and Swedish consumer confidence is still elevated (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Swedish Inflation Expectations Are Stable Chart I-14The Swedish Consumer Is Still Spending Essentially, the Riksbank's extremely easy monetary policy may not have yet generated inflation in the prices of consumer goods and services, but it has generated huge debt and asset price inflation. The clearest symptom of this is Sweden's non-financial private debt, which now stands at a stunning 240% of GDP, only surpassed by Switzerland and Norway among the G10 economies. These developments imply that the positive Swedish output gap will expand further, and that inflationary pressures will only become more entrenched. Thus, we continue to anticipate a rate hike by the Riksbank this year. This is very much a consensus call. However, where we diverge from consensus is that while futures are pricing in approximately 85 basis points of interest rate hikes by March 2020, we think the scope to lift rates is greater. We also see a higher probability of hikes over that time frame than the Riksbank's own forecast. In other words, we anticipate that the Riksbank's rate forecasts will be revised to the upside. This is because inflationary pressures are growing greater and the economy is very strong. Thus, the Swedish central bank is falling behind the curve and will have to play catch up as soon as inflation moves back closer to target. This will most likely happen over the coming 12 months. As a result, selling EUR/SEK at current levels seems an interesting trade with an attractive entry point. As Chart I-15 illustrates, EUR/SEK only traded above this level during the great financial crisis. It did not manage to punch above this level during the Nordic financial crises of the early 1990s, nor did it during the 1997-'98 crisis - or directly after the September 11 attacks. Chart I-15The Line In The Sand Moreover, EUR/SEK currently trades 7.5% above its purchasing power parity equilibrium. The gap between Sweden's and the euro area's basic balance of payments is very large. While Sweden's stands at 5.1% of GDP, the euro area's is near zero. This reinforces the message that the EUR/SEK is very expensive: when the cross appreciates too much, Swedish assets become much more attractive to foreigners relative to European assets. These long-term flows end up boosting the relative basis balance in favor of Sweden. This is exactly what is happening today (Chart I-16). Chart I-16Expensive EUR/SEK Makes Swedish Assets Attractive From a tactical perspective, EUR/SEK also looks vulnerable. Various short-term momentum measures such as the 14-day RSI or the 13-week rate of change are diverging from actual prices. Additionally, EUR/SEK risk reversals - i.e. the implied volatility of calls versus the implied volatility of puts on this cross - have spiked up. This is true even after controlling for the rise in implied volatility that has affected the option market. It seems to suggest that investors that would have been buying EUR/SEK have already placed their bets. The marginal player is likely to now bet in the other direction. This trade is not without risks. First, a move above 10.1 could be mechanically followed by a sharp rally as stops are hit and momentum traders force the cross higher. Second, Swedish PMIs have been rolling over for six months, but so have the preliminary releases of Europe PMIs this week. What is more concerning is the weakness in Asian manufacturing production that is behind the sharp slowdown in Korean exports. This is worrisome because historically, the Swedish economy has been very sensitive to EM shocks. However, only 2008 was able to push EUR/SEK above 10. Even if EM slows, we are not anticipating a shock as large as what occurred in 2015, let alone in 2008. Moreover, while we anticipate Swedish inflation to surprise to the upside, we equally expect euro area inflation to exhibit much more limited gains. Bottom Line: Sweden's inflation report came in well below expectations, which prompted a sharp rally in EUR/SEK to near 10. However, this level has been an important resistance since the early 1990s, only breached during the great financial crisis. We are betting on it not being breached this time around. The Swedish economy is strong, and inflation is set to pick up again. As a result, we think the Riksbank will be forced to lift its interest rate forecast as time passes. Moreover, EUR/SEK is expensive, and flows are currently very much in favor of Sweden. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant HaarisA@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, dated February 29, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On the MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM Local Bonds and U.S. Twin Deficits", dated February 21, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Euro's Tricky Spot", dated February 2, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Reports, "Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades", dated December 1, 2017, and "Canaries In the Coal Mine Alert 2: More on EM Carry Trades And Global Growth", dated December 15, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "It's Not My Cross To Bear", dated October 27, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar U.S. data was mixed: Markit PMIs beat expectations ; Existing home sales, however, grew by less than expected at 5.38 million, a 3.2% contraction form the previous month; Continuing jobless claims outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.875 million; Initial jobless claims also outperformed with 222,000. In the meeting's minutes, FOMC members were quite positive on growth and their rhetoric suggest they intend to follow up on the current set of dot plots. Subsequently, equities sold off, the 10-year yield climbed to 2.954%, bringing them close to BCA's fair value estimate. Due to these developments, the dollar's descent seems to be taking a breather for now, and it may even experience a rebound in the coming weeks. Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Euro The tone of European data has been deteriorating: German PMIs underperformed expectations, with services coming in at 55.3, and manufacturing, at 60.3; European PMIs also underperformed anticipations with manufacturing coming in at 58.5 and services at 56.7; The Current Situation section of the ZEW Survey was also weaker than expected; German IFO underperformed expectations, with the Business Climate measure coming in at 115.4, and the Expectations measure also dropping to 105.4. The euro weakened substantially this week on poor data and a hawkish Fed, even if it managed to eke out a rebound on Thursday. We have recently published on the risks to global growth, and the weak European PMIs seem like a consequence of these developments. We expect the euro's bull market to pause until global growth picks back up. Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 The Yen Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Imports yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 7.9%. It also declined significantly from the previous 14.9% pace . Moreover, Nikkei Manufacturing PMI underperformed expectations, coming in at 54. It also declined from 54.8 in the previous month, However, exports yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 12.2%. It also increased from its 9.3% pace the previous month. USD/JPY has rallied by roughly 1.5% since last week. Overall, we expect that the current volatile environment will provide strength to the yen to the point that a level of 100 for USD/JPY is plausible. However, on a long term basis the yen is likely to be weak against the U.S. dollar, as the BoJ will fight tooth and nail to prevent a strengthening yen from hampering inflation. Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Report Links: The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now - February 16, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 British Pound Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: The ILO Unemployment rate surprised negatively, coming in at 4.4%. It also increased form 4.3% the previous month. Moreover, retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel annual growth also underperformed, coming in at 1.6% and 1.5% respectively. However, average hourly earnings yearly growth excluding bonus outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5% GBP/USD has depreciated by nearly 1.6% this week. There are currently 45 basis points of hikes by the BoE priced into the next 12-months. We believe that there is not much more upside beyond this, given that the end of the pound's collapse will weigh on inflation. Moreover, recent data has shown that although inflation is high, the economy rests on a shaky foundation. We continue to expect the pound to fall on a trade-weighted basis as well. Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Australian Dollar Data out of Australia was mixed: The Westpac Leading Index stayed steady at -0.2%; Wage growth beat expectations, growing at a 0.6% quarterly rate, and 2.1% annual rate; Construction work done slowed down severely, contacting by -19.4%, greatly surpassing the expected 10% contraction. It should also be noted that much of the wage growth was driven by the growth in public sector wages, which grew by 2.4% as opposed to the 1.9% growth experienced by the private sector. RBA members highlighted the risks created by lower than expected wage growth: weaker household consumption as a below-target inflation. The RBA is therefore likely to stay put this year, and the AUD will underperform its G10 peers. Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 New Zealand Dollar The kiwi has fallen by roughly 1% this week, in part due to dollar rebound in the greenback. Nevertheless, AUD/NZD has declined by 0.6%, and is now down almost 3% during the year, thanks to dairy prices surging by more than 13% in 2018. Overall, we expect that the NZD will outperform the AUD, given that the consumer sector in China should outperform the industrial sector, as the Chinese authorities are cracking on overcapacity. With this being said, NZD/JPY will probably see downside, as the current volatility in markets will weigh on this cross. Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Canadian Dollar Canadian data was weak: Wholesale sales contracted by 0.5% at a monthly pace; Retail sales contracted by 0.8%, underperforming expectations; Core retail sales, excluding autos, contracted by 1.8%. The CAD weakened against all currencies this week. However, even if it may not increase much against the U.S. dollar, the case for a stronger CAD against other major currencies is still firm as the BoC is likely to hike interest rates more than most central banks year. Additionally, stronger U.S. growth should support the health of the Canadian export sector. Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swiss Franc Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: The trade balance underperformed expectation on January, coming in at CHF1.324 billion. It also declined from last month's value of CHF3.374 billion. However, industrial production yearly growth increased from last month, coming in at a stunning 19.6% pace. EUR/CHF has been relatively flat this week. Overall we believe that the franc can only rally against the euro on episodes of rising global volatility, given that the SNB will fight against any appreciation of the franc that could hurt the little progress that has been made in achieving their inflation target. Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Norwegian Krone USD/NOK has rallied by roughly 1.3% on the back of a stronger dollar. Overall, we believe that the krone should be the best performer amongst the commodity currencies, as the economic situation has improved substantially, with the Labour Survey improving last month. This will help the Norges Bank to tighten monetary policy more than the market currently expects. Investors who want to take advantage of these developments should short CAD/NOK as an oil-neutral bet. More audacious traders could short AUD/NOK or NZD/NOK as well. Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swedish Krona Swedish inflation dropped by more than expected: in monthly terms, inflation contracted by 0.8%, while in annual terms it grew by only 1.6%, less than the expected 1.8%. However, this monthly contraction was in line with the seasonal pattern historically witnessed in Swedish inflation, which also tells us that inflation is likely to pick up again in the following months. EUR/SEK hit 10, an historically very strong overhead resistance, indicating that markets may be unnerved by the Riksbank's unwillingness or inability to tighten policy. While the OIS curve is pricing in 80 bps of hikes in the next two years, we believe that the Riksbank will hike more than that, as inflation will come back to Sweden with a vengeance. Not only is the economy firing on all fronts, but the currency is also very cheap. The SEK is likely to strengthen this year. Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights This past week, oil ministers from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - OPEC 2.0's putative leaders - separately indicated increased comfort with higher prices over the next year or so.1 This suggests they are converging on a common production-management strategy, which accommodates KSA's need for higher prices over the short term to support the IPO of Saudi Aramco, and Russia's longer term desire to avoid reaching price levels where U.S. shale-oil production is massively incentivized to expand. We believe OPEC 2.0's production cuts will be extended to year-end, given signaling by Khalid Al-Falih, KSA's energy minister. As a result, we expect Brent and WTI crude oil prices to average $74 and $70/bbl this year, respectively (Chart Of The Week). These expectations are up from our previous estimates of $67 and $63/bbl, which were premised on curtailed production slowly being returned to market beginning in July. For next year, the extended cuts could lift Brent and WTI to $67 and $64/bbl, up from our previous expectations of $55 and $53/bbl, respectively. Extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts will accelerate OECD inventory draws, which have been faster than expected. Higher prices caused by maintaining the cuts will lift U.S. shale production more than our earlier estimates. Backwardations in both Brent and WTI forward curves will remain steep in this regime, muting the impact of Fed policy on oil prices. Energy: Overweight. We are getting long Dec/18 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/18 $70/bbl calls on the back of our updated price forecast. We also are taking profits on our long 4Q19 $55/bbl Brent puts vs. short 4Q19 $50/bbl Brent puts, which were up 27.4% as of Tuesday's close. Base Metals: Neutral. The U.S. Commerce Department proposed "Section 232" tariffs and quotas on U.S. aluminum and steel imports, following national security reviews. President Trump has until mid-April to respond, and we expect him to go through with one of the three proposed options. Precious Metals: Gold remains range-bound around $1,350/oz, as markets wrestle with the likely evolution of the Fed's rate-hiking regimen. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA economists project grain and soybean prices to slowly rise over the next 10 years, according to agriculture.com. Feature Chart Of The WeekBCA Lifts Oil Price Forecasts Over the past week, comments from Saudi and Russian oil ministers indicate they are more comfortable with maintaining OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018, which, along with strong global demand growth, raises the odds Brent crude oil prices will exceed $70/bbl this year, and possibly next. Whether this is the result of the Saudi's need for higher prices to support the Aramco IPO, or it reflects an assessment by OPEC 2.0's leaders that the world economy can absorb higher prices without damaging demand over the short term is not clear. Markets have yet to receive what we could consider definitive forward guidance from OPEC 2.0 leadership, indicating that recent signaling could be foreshadowing the coalition's new policy. We are raising the odds that it is, and are moving our Brent and WTI forecasts higher for this year and next. Lifting 2018 Brent, WTI Forecasts To $74 And $70/bbl Maintaining OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 will lift average Brent and WTI crude oil prices to $74 and $70/bbl, respectively, this year, based on our updated supply-demand balances modeling (Chart Of The Week). This is not definitive OPEC 2.0 policy guidance: KSA's and Russia's oil ministers indicated they expect such an outcome in separate statements, and not, as has been the case with previous announcements, at a joint press conference.2 We are assuming the odds strongly favor such an outcome, and give an 80% weight to it. The remaining 20% reflects our previous expectation that OPEC 2.0's production cuts would cease at end-June, and curtailed volumes would slowly be restored over 2H18. Resolving this in favor of the former expectation would lift our price expectations to $76 and $73/bbl for Brent and WTI this year, and $70 and $68/bbl next year. These expectations are up from our previous estimates of $67 and $63/bbl for Brent and WTI prices this year, which were premised on curtailed OPEC 2.0 production slowly returning to market beginning in July, and a subsequent OECD inventory rebuilding. By maintaining production cuts to year-end, supply-demand balances remain tighter, which keeps inventories drawing for a longer period of time (Chart 2). Higher inventories would have increased the sensitivity of oil prices to the USD, which we showed in research on February 8th 2018. With OPEC 2.0's production cuts maintained throughout the year, OECD inventories will be more depleted by year-end (Chart 3). Extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 would result in an additional 130mm bbls reduction to OECD inventories versus our prior modeling. This means Brent and WTI forward curves will be more backwardated than they would have been had the barrels taken off the market at the beginning of 2017 been slowly restored starting in July of this year, as we earlier expected. Chart 2Fundamental Balances Remain In Deficit Longer Chart 3Maintaining Production Cuts Depletes Inventories Even More A steeper backwardation in oil forward curves - i.e., the front of the curve trades premium to the deferred contracts - reduces the USD effects on oil, all else equal. In other words, supply-demand fundamentals dominate the evolution of oil prices when forward curves are more backwardated, and the influence of financial variables -the USD in particular - is muted.3 For next year, we assume the volumes cut by OPEC 2.0 are slowly restored to the market over 1H19, lifting Brent and WTI to $67 and $64/bbl on average, up from our previous expectations of $55 and $53/bbl, respectively.4 Higher Shale Output, Strong Global Demand We expect U.S. shale production increases by 1.15mm b/d from December 2017 to December 2018, and another 1.3-1.4mm b/d during calendar 2019. This dominates non-OPEC production growth this year and next (Chart 4, top panel). Due to the supply response of the shales to higher prices in 2018, global production levels would see a net increase from March 2019 and beyond. Our assumption OPEC 2.0 production cuts will be maintained through 2018 puts our OPEC production assessment 0.14mm b/d below U.S. EIA's estimates (Chart 4, bottom panel). On the demand side, we continue to expect non-OECD (EM) growth to push global oil consumption up by 1.7mm b/d this year and 1.6mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 5). Non-OECD demand is expected to account for 1.24mm b/d and 1.21mm b/d of this growth in 2018 and 2019, respectively (Table 1). Chart 4U.S. Shales Dominate Non-OPEC Supply Growth Chart 5Non-OECD Demand Growth Continues Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Aramco IPO Driving OPEC 2.0's Short-Term Agenda In previous research, we noted what appeared to be a relatively minor divergence between the goals of KSA and Russia when it comes to the level prices each would prefer over the short term. Recent press reports - unattributed, of course - suggest Saudi Aramco officials prefer a Brent price closer to $70/bbl further along the forward curve (two years out) to support their upcoming IPO.5 This obviously would bolster Aramco's oil-export revenues - some 7mm b/d of its 10mm b/d of production are exported - and income, which shareholders would welcome. However, until this past week, Russia's energy minister, Alexander Novak, was signaling a range of $50 to $60/bbl works better for his constituents, i.e., shareholder-owned Russian oil companies. Novak recently amended his range to $50 to $70/bbl for Brent.6 These positions are not irreconcilable. One is shorter term (2 years forward) and the other is longer term, attempting to balance competitive threats over a longer horizon - e.g., from U.S. shale-oil producers, electric vehicles, etc. This most recent indication the leadership of OPEC 2.0 is comfortable with higher prices over the short term is an indication - at least to us - that these issues are being dealt with in a way that allows markets to incorporate forward guidance into pricing of crude oil over the next two years. Beyond that, however, markets will need to hear an articulated strategy containing a post-Aramco IPO view of the world, so that capital can be efficiently allocated. KSA and Russia are in a global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI), and having a fully articulated strategy re how they will manage their production in fast-changing markets - where, for example, shale-oil approaches becoming a "just-in-time" supply option - will be critical. Signing a formal alliance by year-end would support this, but that, too, will require a level of cooperation that runs deeper than what OPEC 2.0 has so far demonstrated, impressive though it may be. Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0 leadership is signalling production cuts will be maintained for the entire year, not, as we expected, left to expire at end-June with curtailed barrels slowly returned to the market over 2H18. While this does not appear to be official policy of the producer coalition yet, we are revising our price expectations in line with tighter markets this year, lower OECD inventories and continued backwardation in Brent and WTI forward curves. OPEC 2.0's shorter-term agenda, driven by KSA's IPO of Saudi Aramco, and its longer-term agenda - maintaining oil's competitive edge and accommodating U.S. shale-oil production (but not too much) - appear to be getting reconciled. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for OPEC/non-OPEC coalition led by KSA and Russia, has removed some 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d of oil production from the market beginning in 2017. 2 Please see, "Brent crude settles flat, U.S. oil up on short covering," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018, in which KSA's oil minister Khalid Al-Falih indicated OPEC would maintain production cuts throughout 2018. See also, "On the air of the TV channel 'Russia 24' Alexander Novak summed up the participation in the work of the Russian investment forum 'Sochi-2018,'" published by Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation on February 15th 2018. Lastly, please see "Saudi Arabia Is Taking a Harder Line on Oil Prices," published by bloomberg.com on February 19th 2018. 3 We discuss this in "OPEC 2.0 vs. The Fed," which was published on February 8th 2018 by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 These expectations are highly conditional. Toward the end of this year, KSA and Russia are indicating the OPEC 2.0 coalition will become a more formal organization, with members signing a long-term alliance. Among other things, OPEC 2.0 members would be expected to build buffer stocks to address any sudden supply outages, in order to maintain orderly markets. Please see "Oil producers to draft long-term alliance deal by end-2018: UAE minister," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018. 5 Please see "For timing of Aramco IPO, watch forward oil price curve," published by reuters.com on February 19th 2018. 6 Please see reference in footnote 3 and "Russia's Novak says current oil price is acceptable," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2018 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2017
Highlights The euro is cheap. To cease being cheap, EUR/USD needs to approach 1.35. Euro area bonds are expensive. To cease being expensive, the yield spread between the euro area and U.S. long bond needs to compress from -135 bps to -40 bps. Never pick mainstream stock markets on the basis of seeming cheapness. Sector effects, step changes in sector valuations and currency effects make relative valuations very difficult to interpret. Always pick mainstream stock markets on the basis of the sector and currency biases you wish to express. Overweight Denmark's OMX and Ireland's ISEQ on a 6-9 month horizon. Feature A very common question we get asked is: are European investments attractively priced compared to those elsewhere in the world? To which the current answers are: yes for the euro currency; no for euro area government bonds; and highly unlikely for the aggregate European stock market. That said, we can still identify individual European stock markets that are well placed to outperform major equity indexes, including the S&P500, over the coming 6-9 months. Chart of the WeekWhen Healthcare Outperforms, Denmark's OMX Outperforms The S&P 500 The Euro Is Cheap... Says The ECB We can confidently claim that the euro is cheap because the ECB's own indicators say so.1 According to the ECB, the euro needs to appreciate at least 7% to cancel the euro area's over-competitiveness versus its top 19 trading partners. In terms of EUR/USD this translates to 1.32. Admittedly, 1.32 encapsulates a spectrum of fair values for the individual euro area economies: 1.45 for Germany; around 1.30 for France, Spain and Netherlands; and around 1.20 for Italy (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The Euro Needs To Appreciate 7% To Cancel The Euro Area's Over-Competitiveness The ECB indicators also assume that the euro began its life close to fair value. This seems plausible. Twenty years ago, the euro area's constituent economies were broadly in internal balance and had a lot in common. Remarkably, Germany and Italy scored identically on total debt as a share of GDP as well as on exports as a share of GDP. Furthermore, euro area trade was in external balance, and the bloc's real competitiveness versus its major trading partners was exactly in line with its long-term average. After its birth, the euro first became extremely undervalued in the dot com bubble, then extremely overvalued in the global credit boom, and most recently, extremely undervalued again. Seen in this bigger picture, the euro's current ascent is just a recovery from an extreme undervaluation, an argument that even Mario Draghi made at the last ECB press conference: "Movements in the exchange rate, to the extent that it is justified by the strengthening of the economy, is part of nature." At what level would EUR/USD cease to be cheap? Based on the average of the ECB's three competitiveness indicators, EUR/USD needs to approach 1.35. Euro Area Bonds Are Expensive The yield spread between the euro area and U.S. long bond stands at an extreme -135 bps.2 This compares with an average -40 bps through the twenty year life of the euro - indicating that euro area government bonds are very expensive relative to U.S. T-bonds. Over the completion of this cycle, this yield spread is highly likely to compress to its long-term average of -40 bps, given that the yield spread just tracks relative real GDP per head - which is itself mean-reverting (Chart I-3). Interestingly, the euro area versus U.S. annual inflation differential has also averaged -40 bps (Chart I-4), so the real interest rate differential has averaged zero. This means that the so-called 'neutral' (or mid-cycle) real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. have been identical through the past twenty years. Growth in real GDP per head has also been identical (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Euro Area-U.S.: Average Interest ##br##Rate Differential = -40bps Chart I-4Euro Area-U.S.: Average Inflation ##br##Differential = -40bps Chart I-5The Euro Area And U.S. Have Generated##br## Identical Growth Per Head The past twenty years provide a good template for what the future holds, at least in relative terms if not in absolute terms. This is because 1999-2018 captures multiple manias and crises, some centred in Europe, some in the U.S. With no difference in neutral real rates over the past two decades, is there any reason to expect the future neutral rate to be meaningfully lower in the euro area compared to the U.S.? Our starting assumption has to be no. This assumption would be at risk if the existential threat to the euro resurfaced. Looking at the political calendar, the immediate concern might be the Italian election on March 4. Specifically, the anti-establishment Five Star Movement and Northern League could poll well enough to hold some sway in the next government and ruffle the markets. However, while both the Five Star Movement and Northern League have agendas that are unashamedly disruptive, anti-establishment and anti-austerity, neither party is standing on an anti-euro platform. Unless there is a major change in emphasis, the Italian election should not pose an existential threat to the euro. Our central expectation is that the euro area versus U.S. yield spread has the scope to compress substantially from its current -135 bps. In other words, euro area government bonds are very expensive relative to U.S. T-bonds. Never Pick Stock Markets On The Basis Of Seeming Cheapness Compared with currencies and bonds, stock markets are much less connected with their domestic economies. Mainstream stock markets are eclectic collections of multinational companies, with each stock market possessing its own unique fingerprint of sector and industry skews. Therefore, a head-to-head comparison of European stock market valuations either with each other or with non-European stock markets is a meaningless and potentially dangerous exercise. Two sectors with vastly different structural growth prospects - say, Financials and Personal Products (Chart I-6) - must necessarily trade on vastly different valuations. So the sector with the lower valuation is not necessarily the cheaper sector. By extension, a stock market with a lower valuation because of its sector fingerprint is not necessarily a cheaper stock market. Chart I-6Two Sectors With Vastly Different Growth Prospects Will Trade On Vastly Different Valuations Some people suggest comparing a valuation with its own history, and assessing how many 'standard deviations' it is above or below its norm. The problem with this standard deviation approach is that it assumes 'stationarity' - meaning, no step changes in a sector's valuation through time. Unfortunately, sector valuations can and do undergo major step changes when they enter a vastly different economic climate. For example, the structural outlook for bank profits undergoes a step change when a debt super-cycle ends. Therefore, comparing a bank valuation after a debt super-cycle with the valuation during a debt super-cycle is like comparing an apple with an orange. Another issue for stock markets that contain multinational companies is the so-called 'currency translation effect'. A multinational company will intentionally diversify its sales and profits across multiple major currencies - say, euros, dollars and yen - but of course its primary stock market listing will be in just one currency - say, euros. So when the other currencies weaken versus the euro, the company's profit growth (quoted in its home currency of euros) will necessarily weaken too. If investors anticipate this effect - because they see that the euro is structurally cheap today - they might downgrade the stock market's profit growth expectations. Thereby, they will also downgrade the stock market's valuation. Pulling together these complexities of sector effects, step changes in sector valuations and currency effects, we offer some very strong advice: picking stock markets on the basis of relative valuation is a wrong and very dangerous way to invest. The correct and safe way to invest is to pick stock markets on the basis of the sector and currency biases you wish to express (Chart I-7). This brings us to one of the major advantages of investing in Europe. The plethora of stock markets - each with their own unique fingerprint of sector and industry skews - means that there are always European bourses worth overweighting, whatever your economic outlook. Right now, two of our sector recommendations are to overweight Healthcare and to underweight Energy. Please review our report Beware The Great Moderation 2.0 for the underlying thesis, which we will not repeat here.3 If these sector recommendations pan out as we expect, Denmark's OMX is highly likely to outperform the S&P500 given the OMX's substantial overweighting to Healthcare (Chart of the Week). Likewise, Ireland's ISEQ is highly likely to outperform the S&P500 given the ISEQ's substantial underweighting to Energy via its large exposure to budget airline Ryanair (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Eurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 Is Just 3 Banks Vs.##br## 3 Tech Stocks! Chart I-8When Energy Underperforms, Ireland's ##br##ISEQ Outperforms The S&P 500 Overweight Denmark's OMX And Ireland's ISEQ. A final salutary observation illustrates the importance of the sector approach to picking stock markets. As a result of favourable sector biases - overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy - a 50:50 combination of Denmark and Ireland has kept pace with the S&P500 over the past 20 years, while the Eurostoxx50 has been left a very long way behind (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Sector Biases Helped Denmark's OMX And Ireland's ISEQ, But Hindered The Eurostoxx 50 Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats. The ECB calculates three Harmonised Competitiveness Indicators for the euro area versus its top 19 trading partners based on unit labour costs (ULCs), GDP deflators, and consumer price indices (CPIs), with the latest readings referring to Q3 2017 for ULCs and GDP deflators and January 2018 for CPIs. Updating these for the euro's move to February 20 2018, the three indicators suggest that the trade-weighted euro is still undervalued by 7%, 12% and 7% respectively. 2 Calculated from the over 10-year government bond yield: euro area average, weighted by sovereign issue size, less U.S. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Beware The Great Moderation 2.0' published on February 1, 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* This week our fractal model has produced a very interesting finding. The 130-day fractal dimension for the U.S. 10-year T-bond is approaching a level which has consistently signalled a technical inflection point. This suggests that the recent sell-off in bonds might be close to running its course. We are not putting on a countertrend position yet, but expect to do so within the next few weeks. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights The call on EM local bonds boils down to the outlook for EM exchange rates. Forthcoming EM currency depreciation will halt the rally in local bonds. EM currencies positively correlate with commodities prices but not with domestic real interest rates. Widening U.S. twin deficits are not a reason to be long EM currencies. There has historically been no consistent relationship between the U.S. exchange rate and America's twin deficits in general, or its fiscal balance, in particular. For investors who have to be invested in EM domestic bonds, our recommended overweights are Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. Feature The stampede into EM local currency bonds has persisted even amid recent jitters in global equity markets. Notably, surging U.S./DM bond yields have failed to cause a spike in EM local yields, despite past positive correlations (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Will EM Domestic Bond Yields Continue Defying Rising U.S. Treasury Yields? The main reason is the resilience of EM currencies. The latter have not sold off even during the recent correction in global share prices. In high-yielding EM domestic bond markets, total returns are substantially affected by exchange rates. Not only do U.S. dollar total returns on local bonds suffer when EM currencies depreciate, but also weaker EM exchange rates cause spikes in domestic bond yields (Chart I-2). Consequently, the call on EM local bonds, especially in high-yielding markets, boils down to the outlook for EM exchange rates. Chart I-2EM Currencies Drive EM Local Yields We are negative on EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar and the euro. The basis for our view is two-fold: Strong growth in the U.S. and higher U.S. bond yields should be supportive of the greenback vis-à-vis EM currencies; the same applies to euro area growth and the euro against EM exchange rates; Weaker growth in China should weigh on commodities prices and, in turn, on EM currencies. So far, this view has not played out. In fact, negative sentiment on the U.S. dollar has recently been amplified by concerns about America's widening fiscal and current account deficits. In fact, one might argue that EM local bonds stand to benefit from the potential widening in U.S. twin deficits and the flight out of the U.S. dollar. We address the issue of U.S. twin deficits first. Twin Deficits And The U.S. Dollar... The recent narrative that the dollar typically depreciates during periods of widening twin deficits is not supported by historical evidence. We are not suggesting that twin deficits lead to currency appreciation. Our argument is that twin deficits have historically coincided with both appreciation and depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Chart I-3 exhibits the relationship between the U.S. dollar and the fiscal and current account balances. It appears that there is no consistent relationship between the fiscal and current account balances and the exchange rate. Chart I-3No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Twin Deficits And Dollar To produce a quantitative measure of the twin deficits, we sum up both the fiscal and current account balances. Chart I-4 demonstrates the relationship between the latter measure and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. This analysis encompasses the entire history of the floating U.S. dollar since 1971. Chart I-4Combination Of U.S. Twin Deficits And Real Bond Yields Better Explain Dollar The vertical lines denote the tax cuts under former U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and 1986, and under former U.S. President George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003. As can be seen from Chart I-4, there is no stable relationship between the twin deficits and the greenback. In the 1970s, there was no consistent relationship at all; In the first half of the 1980s, the twin deficits widened substantially, but the dollar rallied dramatically. The tailwind behind the rally was tightening monetary policy and rising/high real U.S. interest rates; From 1985 through 1993, there was no consistent relationship between America's twin deficits and the currency; From 1994 until 2001, the greenback appreciated as the twin deficits narrowed, particularly the fiscal deficit; From 2001 through 2011, the dollar was in a bear market as the twin deficits expanded; From 2011 until 2016, the shrinking-to-stable twin deficits were accompanied by a U.S. dollar rally. Bottom Line: We infer from these charts that there has historically been no stable relationship between the U.S. exchange rate and America's twin deficits in general, or its fiscal balance, in particular. ... And A Missing Variable: Interest Rates Twin deficits are often associated with rising inflation. In fact, a widening current account deficit can mask hidden price pressures. In particular, an economy that over-consumes - consumes more than it produces - can satisfy its demand via imports without exerting pressure on the economy's domestic productive capacity. Booming imports will lead to a widening trade deficit rather than higher consumer price inflation. Hence, in an open economy, over-consumption can lead to a widening current account deficit, rather than rising inflation. A currency is likely to plunge amid widening twin deficits if the central bank is behind the inflation curve. In such a case, the low real interest rates would undermine the value of the exchange rate. If the central bank, however, embarks on monetary tightening that is adequate, the currency can in fact strengthen amid growing twin deficits. In this scenario, rising real interest rates would support the currency. With respect to the U.S. dollar today, its future trajectory depends on the Fed, and the market's perception of its policy stance. If the market discerns that the Fed is behind the curve, the greenback will plummet. By contrast, if the market reckons that the Fed policy response is appropriate, and U.S. real interest rates are sufficiently high/rising, the dollar could in fact appreciate amid widening twin deficits. Specifically, the U.S. dollar was in a major bull market in the early 1980s, with Reagan's tax cuts in 1981 and the ensuing widening of the country's twin deficits doing little to thwart the dollar bull market (Chart I-4). In turn, the Bush tax cuts in 2001 and 2003 were followed by a major dollar bear market. The main culprit between these two and other episodes was probably real interest rates. U.S. real interest rates/bond yields rose between 1981 and 1985, generating an enormous dollar rally. In the decade of the 2000s, by contrast, U.S. real interest rates fell and that coincided with a major bear market in the greenback (Chart I-4). Overall, the combination of U.S. twin deficits and real bond yields together, help better explain U.S. dollar dynamics than twin deficits alone. We agree that America's twin deficits will widen materially. That said, odds are that the Fed commits to further rate hikes and that U.S. bond yields continue to rise. In fact, not only are U.S. inflation breakeven yields climbing, but TIPS (real) yields have also spiked significantly. Rising real yields, which in our opinion have more upside, should support the U.S. dollar. As a final point, if the Fed falls behind the curve and the dollar continues to tumble, the markets could begin to fear a material rise in U.S. inflationary pressures. That scenario would actually resemble market dynamics that prevailed before the 1987 stock market crash. Although this is a negative scenario for the U.S. currency and is, by default, bullish for EM exchange rates and their local bonds, this is not ultimately an optimistic scenario for global risk assets. Bottom Line: Twin deficits are not solely sufficient to produce a currency bear market. Twin deficits accompanied by a central bank that is behind the inflation curve - i.e., combined with low/falling real interest rates - are what generate sufficient conditions for currency depreciation. EM Currencies And Commodities Many EM exchange rates - such as those in Latin America, as well as South African, Russian, Malaysian and Indonesian currencies - are primarily driven by commodities prices. Not surprisingly, the underlying currency index of the EM local bond benchmark index (the JPM GBI index) - which excludes China, India, Korea and Taiwan - positively correlates with commodities prices (Chart I-5). Hence, getting commodities prices right is of paramount importance to the majority of high-yielding EM local bonds. We have the following observations: First, investors' net long positions in both oil and copper are extremely elevated (Chart I-6). The last datapoint is as of February 16. Any rebound in the U.S. dollar or mounting concerns about China's growth could produce a meaningful drop in commodities prices as investors rush to close their long positions. Second, we maintain that China's intake of commodities is bound to decelerate, as decelerating credit growth and local governments' budget constraints lead to curtailment of infrastructure and property investment (Chart I-7). Chart I-5EM Currencies Positively Correlate ##br##With Commodities Prices Chart I-6Investors Are Very Long##br## Copper And Oil Chart I-7Slowdown In ##br##China's Capex Strong growth in the U.S. and EU will not offset the decline in China's intake of raw materials (excluding oil). China accounts for 50% of global demand for industrial metals. America's consumption of industrial metals is about 6-7 times smaller. For crude oil, China's share of global consumption is 14% compared with 20% and 15% for the U.S. and EU, respectively. We do not expect outright contraction in China's crude imports or consumption. The point is that when financial markets begin to price in weaker mainland growth or the U.S. dollar rebounds, oil prices will retreat as investors reduce their record high net long positions. Finally, even though EM twin deficits have ameliorated in recent years, they remain wide (Chart I-8). In turn, the majority of these countries have been financing their deficits by volatile foreign portfolio flows, as FDIs into EM remain largely depressed. If commodities prices relapse and EM currencies depreciate, there will be a period of reversal in foreign portfolio inflows into EM. While EM real local bonds yields are reasonably high, they are unlikely to prevent outflows if the U.S. dollar rallies. In the past, neither high absolute EM real yields nor their wide spreads over U.S. TIPS prevented EM currency depreciation (Chart I-9). Chart I-8AEM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated ##br##But Are Still Wide Chart I-8BEM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated ##br##But Are Still Wide Chart I-9EM Local Real Yields Do Not ##br##Drive Their Currencies EM Local Bonds: Country Allocation Strategy Chart I-10 attempts to identify pockets of value in EM domestic bonds. It exhibits the sum of current account and fiscal balances on the X axis, and domestic bond yields deflated by headline inflation on the Y axis. Chart I-10Identifying Pockets Of Value In EM Domestic Bonds Markets in the upper-right corner should be favored as they offer high real yields and maintain healthy fiscal and current account balances. Bond markets in the lower-left corner should be underweighted. They have low inflation-adjusted yields and large current account and fiscal deficits. Based on these metrics as well as fundamental analysis, our recommended country allocation for EM domestic bond portfolios has been and remains: Overweights: Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. Neutral: Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Hungary, Chile and Colombia. Underweights: Turkey, South Africa and Malaysia. The below elaborates on Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Russia Fiscal and monetary policies are extremely tight. While they are curtailing the economic recovery, they are very friendly for creditors. Interest rates deflated by both headline and core consumer price inflation are at their highest on record, government spending is lackluster, and the new fiscal rule has replenished the country's foreign currency reserves (Chart I-11). Besides, the government's budget assumption for oil prices is very conservative - in the low-$40s per barrel for this year and 2019. Commercial banks have been increasing provisions, even though the NPL ratio is falling. In fact, Russia is well advanced in terms of both corporate and household deleveraging as well as banking system adjustment. On the whole, having experienced two large recessions in the past 10 years and having pursued extremely orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, Russian markets have become much more insulated from negative external shocks than many of their peers. In brief, Russian financial markets have become low-beta markets,1 and they will outperform their EM peers in a selloff even if oil prices slide. Brazil Brazilian local bonds offer the highest inflation-adjusted yields. However, unlike Russia, Brazil has untenable public debt dynamics, and its politics remain a wild card. The public debt-to-GDP ratio is 16% in Russia and 80% in Brazil. The fiscal deficit in Brazil stands at a whopping 8% of GDP, and interest payments on public debt are equal to 6% of GDP. Without major fiscal reforms, Brazil's public debt will continue to surge and will likely reach almost 100% of GDP by the end of 2020. High real interest rates are not only holding back the recovery but are also making public debt dynamics unsustainable. Chart I-12 illustrates that nominal GDP growth is well below local government bond yields. Chart I-11Continue Favoring ##br##Russian Local Bonds Chart I-12Brazil: Borrowing Costs Are Dreadful ##br##For Public Debt Dynamics Brazil needs either much higher nominal growth or major fiscal tightening to stem the surge in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The necessary fiscal reforms - social security restructuring or primary budget surpluses - are not politically feasible right now. Meanwhile, materially higher nominal growth can be achieved only if interest rates are brought down quickly and drastically and the currency is devalued meaningfully. Hence, the primary risk to Brazilian local bonds is the exchange rate. The currency is at risk from potentially lower commodities prices on the external side, and continuous public debt deterioration, debt monetization or drastic interest rate cuts on the domestic side. Remarkably, Chart I-13 demonstrates that historically real interest rates in Brazil do not explain fluctuations in the real. The currency, rather, positively correlates with commodities prices (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Brazil: No Relationship Between##br## Real Yields And Currency Chart I-14The Brazilian Real And ##br##Commodities Prices It is possible that policymakers find an optimal balance between these adjustment paths, and financial markets continue to rally. However, with the current government lacking any political capital and great uncertainty surrounding the October presidential elections; the outlook is very risky, We recommend a neutral allocation to Brazilian local bonds for EM domestic bond portfolios. South Africa The South African rand and fixed-income markets have surged in the wake of Cyril Ramaphosa's win of the ANC leadership elections and his taking over of the presidency from Jacob Zuma. This has been devastating to our short rand and underweight local bonds positions. Chart I-15The South African Rand And Metals Prices There is no doubt that President Ramaphosa will adopt some market-friendly policies. This will constitute a major change from Zuma's handling of the economy in the past nine years. Yet the outlook for the rand is also contingent on global markets. If commodities prices do not relapse and EM risk assets generally perform well, the rand will continue strengthening, and local bond yields will decline further. However, if metals prices begin to drop and EM currencies sell off, it will be hard for the South African currency to rally further (Chart I-15). While we acknowledge the potential for positive political announcements and actions from the new political leadership, the main drivers of the rand, in our opinion, remain the trends in the U.S. dollar and commodities prices. Some investors might be tempted to compare South Africa to Brazil in terms of political headwinds turning into tailwinds. From a political vantage point, it is a fair comparison. Nevertheless, investors should put Brazil's rally into perspective. If commodities prices did not rise in 2016-2017, the Brazilian real would not have rallied. In brief, external tailwinds are as - if not more - important for EM high-yielding currencies than domestic political developments. Positive political developments are magnified amid a benign external backdrop. Conversely, in a negative external environment, positive political transformations can have limited impact on the direction of financial markets. To reflect the potential for a positive political change and forthcoming orthodox macro policies, we are closing our bet on yield curve steepening in South Africa. This position was stipulated by unorthodox macro policies of the previous government. This trade has been flat since its initiation on June 28, 2017. Weighing pros and cons, we are reluctant to upgrade the South African rand and its fixed-income market at the moment because of our negative view on metals prices and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. Investment Conclusions The broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is at record oversold levels (Chart I-16). Given the forthcoming U.S. fiscal stimulus, the Fed will likely lift its dots and the greenback will rebound. This is bearish for EM currencies, especially if China's growth slows and commodities prices roll over, as we expect. EM exchange rate depreciation will halt the rally in local bonds, especially in high-yielding markets. Foreign holdings of EM local bonds are elevated (Table I-1). Hence, risks of unwinding of some positions are not trivial. Chart I-16The U.S. Dollar Is Due For A Rally Table I-1Foreign Ownership Of EM Local Bonds Is High Nevertheless, as we have argued in the past, EM local bonds offer great diversification benefits to all type of portfolios, as their correlations with many asset classes are low. For domestic bond investors who have to be invested, our recommended overweights are Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. As to the sovereign and corporate credit markets, asset allocators should compare these with U.S. corporate credit. Consistent with our negative view on EM currencies and equities vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts, we recommend favoring U.S. corporates versus EM sovereign and corporate credit. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Russia: Entering A Lower-Beta Paradigm," dated March 8, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Stage 1: The first stage of the bond bear market is being driven by a re-anchoring of inflation expectations. This stage will be complete when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our target range of 2.3% to 2.5%. Stage 2: How high Treasury yields rise in Stage 2 of the bond bear market will be determined by expectations for the terminal fed funds rate. Assuming a 3% terminal rate, we would expect the 10-year Treasury yield to peak somewhere between 3.08% and 3.59%. Risks: If our model suggests that economic surprises are likely to turn negative at a time when we also see extended net short bond positioning, then that would likely present an opportunity to tactically increase portfolio duration even though the cyclical bond bear market would remain intact. The risk of a growth slowdown emanating from China or other emerging markets also bears monitoring. Feature Some degree of calm returned to financial markets last week. The S&P 500 bounced back above 2700 and the VIX fell back below 20. Corporate bond spreads also tightened somewhat - the average High-Yield index spread tightened from 369 bps to 341 bps and the investment grade spread tightened from 95 bps to 93 bps - but the factors we are monitoring to determine the end of the credit cycle continue to send warning signs (Chart 1). We view the recent turmoil as markets adjusting to a Fed that must now become less responsive to financial conditions because inflationary pressures are mounting. As we discussed in last week's report, this dynamic is best explained using our Fed Policy Loop.1 It follows from our Fed Policy Loop analysis that we should track measures of inflation and inflation expectations and start taking credit risk off the table as these indicators rise. In that regard, neither TIPS breakeven inflation rates nor commodity prices - an indicator of pipeline inflation pressure - corrected much in the past few weeks (Chart 1, bottom panel). This suggests that the end of the credit cycle is approaching. We reiterate our view that it will soon be time to scale back the credit risk in our recommended portfolio. We will likely begin this process once both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach a range between 2.3% and 2.5%. We discuss the intuition behind this target range in the section titled "A Fair Value For TIPS Breakevens" below. Currently, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate sits at 2.09% and the 5-year/5-year forward rate is 2.18%. Unlike credit spreads, the sell-off in Treasuries did not abate at all last week. Volatility also returned to the rates market, coinciding with a steeper yield curve (Chart 2). We are not nearly as anxious to increase the duration of our recommended portfolio as we are to scale back on credit risk, and believe that Treasury yields still have considerable cyclical upside. Chart 1No Correction In Breakevens Chart 2No Correction In Bond Yields In this week's report we discuss how we see the Treasury bear market proceeding in two stages, and also start the process of thinking about how high the 10-year Treasury yield can get before the next recession hits. We also highlight several near-term risks that could temporarily derail the cyclical bond bear market. The Two-Stage Treasury Bear Market. Stage 1: Re-Anchoring Of Inflation Expectations For some time it has been our view that the economic recovery is unlikely to end before inflation returns to the Fed's 2% target. This is simply because when inflation is very low the Fed has an incentive to keep policy accommodative, and restrictive monetary policy is typically a pre-condition for recession. It therefore struck us as odd that as recently as June 2017 the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate was only 1.66%, well below levels consistent with the Fed's target. It was as though the market expected that inflation would never move higher no matter how long the Fed maintained an easy policy stance. That notion always seemed far-fetched, and this is why the first stage of the cyclical bond bear market was always likely to be driven by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations. This is the stage we are in currently, and indeed it is almost complete. We will deem that inflation expectations have become re-anchored (and the first stage of the cyclical bond bear market is complete) when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our target range of 2.3% to 2.5%. This means that, assuming unchanged real yields, the nominal 10-year Treasury yield has another 21 bps to 41 bps of upside in Stage 1. A Fair Value For TIPS Breakevens To arrive at our fair value target for the inflation compensation embedded in the 10-year Treasury yield, we looked back to the last period when inflation was well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. This occurred between July 2004 and June 2008. We note that during this timeframe the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate spent 56% of its time between 2.3% and 2.5%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate spent 73% of its time in that range (Chart 3).2 The 2.3% to 2.5% range therefore seems like a good starting point, but we must also consider whether something has changed since the mid-2000s that might lead to a different fair value range today. One possible difference would be if the spread between CPI and PCE inflation changed significantly. The Fed targets 2% PCE inflation, but TIPS are linked to CPI inflation. CPI inflation was somewhat higher than PCE inflation in the mid-2000s, and this is one reason why TIPS breakevens were somewhat higher than 2% throughout that period. At present, we observe that the spread between CPI and PCE inflation is only slightly above where it was in the mid-2000s (Chart 4), and note that it will probably trend lower in the coming months. Chart 3TIPS Breakevens When Inflation Is ##br##Anchored (July 2004 to June 2008) Chart 4CPI Versus ##br##PCE The two biggest reasons for divergences between PCE and CPI inflation are: The different treatment of medical care inflation in the two indexes. CPI includes only out-of-pocket medical care expenses. PCE includes spending by the government on a person's behalf. The greater weight of shelter in CPI. Lately, the difference in medical care inflation between the two indexes has narrowed considerably and our models suggest that shelter inflation will continue to moderate in the months ahead (Chart 4, bottom 2 panels). This suggests that the spread between CPI and PCE inflation will continue to tighten. If the spread were to fall much below its average level from the mid-2000s, then we would revise our target range for TIPS breakevens down accordingly. The second reason why the fair value range for TIPS breakevens might be different than it was in the mid-2000s is if the inflation risk premium has undergone a structural shift. The compensation for inflation priced into bond yields can be split into (i) an expectation for future inflation and (ii) a risk premium to compensate investors for the uncertainty in that expectation. Other factors, such as changes in the post-crisis regulatory environment that impact the attractiveness of TIPS as an investment vehicle, could also potentially cause a structural shift in the inflation risk premium. We addressed this possibility in a report last year, but so far we see no conclusive evidence that such a structural shift has occurred.3 Indeed, the fact that breakevens have risen back close to their pre-crisis range in recent months suggests that the inflation risk premium is probably not structurally lower. Bottom Line: The first stage of the bond bear market is being driven by a re-anchoring of inflation expectations. This stage will be complete when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our target range of 2.3% to 2.5%. The nominal 10-year Treasury yield has another 21 bps to 41 bps of upside before this phase of the bear market is complete. The Two-Stage Treasury Bear Market. Stage 2: Fed Rate Hikes & The Terminal Rate Debate Once inflation expectations are re-anchored the cyclical bond bear market will shift into Stage 2. With no further upside in the cost of inflation protection the emphasis in this stage will be on the path of real yields. The main question will be: How high will the Fed have to lift the real interest rate to contain inflationary pressures? Or alternatively: What is the terminal fed funds rate in this cycle? The answers to the above questions will ultimately determine how high the real 10-year Treasury yield can rise, and provide us with an end-of-cycle target for the nominal 10-year yield. Anchoring Around The Fed's Projections Chart 5Stage 2 Is All About The Terminal Rate At the moment, most FOMC participants estimate the terminal fed funds rate to be in the range of 2.75% to 3%. This may or may not be proven correct, but at least for now the market is likely to anchor around that expectation. In other words, the only way we will find out if that projection is too low is if the fed funds rate is lifted close to the 2.75% to 3% range but inflation continues to rise and economic growth shows no signs of slowing. With the fed funds rate still at 1.42%, we are at least four rate hikes away from that range. This means that any potential upward revisions to the Fed's terminal rate projections are more likely a story for late-2018 or early-2019. Notice in Chart 5 that the Fed has responded to falling inflation by lowering its median projected terminal fed funds rate, but has been more hesitant to increase its projection in response to rising inflation. This means the Fed could wait until inflation is much closer to its target before making any significant upward revisions to its terminal rate projection. The market would likely react more quickly than the Fed, but not by much. Notice that the decline in the 5-year/5-year forward overnight index swap rate was more or less coincident with the downward revisions to the Fed's projected terminal rate between 2014 and 2016 (Chart 5, bottom panel). Our view is that the market will anchor around the Fed's terminal rate projections for at least the next six months. With that in mind, we can make some back-of-the-envelope calculations for how high the 10-year Treasury yield will get before the end of the cycle. To do this we consider that the nominal 10-year yield consists of four components: Inflation expectations Inflation risk premium Real rate expectations Real risk premium Our target range of 2.3% to 2.5% for the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate encompasses both the inflation expectations and inflation risk premium components. If we then assume a terminal fed funds rate of 3%, we get a real rate expectation of 1% (we subtract the Fed's 2% inflation target). This means that even if we assume no real risk premium, we get a conservative estimate for the end-of-cycle level of the nominal 10-year Treasury yield of 3.3% to 3.5%. Turning To The Models As a check on our back-of-the-envelope calculations we created simple fair value models for both the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields (Chart 6). Both models have three independent variables: The fed funds rate Our 12-month fed funds discounter (to capture expectations for future changes in the fed funds rate) The MOVE index of implied interest rate volatility (as a proxy for the term premium) These models allow us to input various scenarios for the expected path of rate hikes and implied volatility, and then come up with appropriate fair value targets for the 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields. The results from various scenarios are shown in Table 1. Chart 6Treasury Yield Models Table 1End-Of-Cycle Treasury Yield Projections Under Different Scenarios For example, let's assume that the terminal fed funds rate is 3%. Let's also assume that the Fed delivers four rate hikes this year and the market moves to expect another two rate hikes in 2019. That would mean the market is pricing-in a fed funds rate of 2.92% by the end of 2019 - very close to a 3% terminal rate assumption. If we further assume that implied rate volatility stays flat at its current level, then our model gives us a target of 3.59% for the 10-year Treasury yield. This would seem like a reasonable end-of-cycle target for the 10-year Treasury yield in an environment with a 3% terminal fed funds rate. Table 1 also demonstrates the importance of interest rate volatility. If we assume the exact same scenario for rate hikes but also allow the MOVE index to return to its recent lows, then our end-of-cycle target for the 10-year Treasury yield falls to 3.08%. Conversely, if we allow the MOVE index to rise to its historical average, the target for the 10-year yield rises to 4.25%. As we discussed in last week's report, interest rate volatility is more likely to fall than rise between now and the end of the cycle.4 This is due to the strong correlation between interest rate volatility and the slope of the yield curve. As the Fed tightens and the curve flattens, implied volatility tends to decline. In fact, because of its strong correlation with the slope of the yield curve, any scenario where implied rate volatility increases significantly would coincide with an environment where the terminal fed funds rate is being revised higher. If 3% turns out to be a reasonable estimate for the terminal fed funds rate, then implied rate volatility is much more likely to fall than rise. All in all, if we assume that the fed funds rate will only return to 3% before the next recession, then we should expect the 10-year Treasury yield to eventually settle into a range between 3.08% and 3.59% by the end of the second stage of the cyclical bond bear market. We plan to explore whether 3% is a reasonable expectation for the terminal fed funds rate in future reports. Bottom Line: How high Treasury yields rise in Stage 2 of the bond bear market will be determined by how expectations for the terminal fed funds rate evolve. If, for now, we assume that the Fed's 3% terminal rate projection is roughly correct, then the 10-year Treasury yield will peak somewhere between 3.08% and 3.59%. Three Risks To The Bond Bear Market It is important to point out that the two-stage cyclical bond bear market described above may not play out un-interrupted. In this section we highlight three potential risks that could cause us to, at least temporarily, increase the duration of our recommended portfolio. Risk 1: Positioning One risk that could flare up in the near-term is that short positioning in the Treasury market has ramped up significantly in recent weeks. Since the financial crisis, net short positions in 10-year Treasury futures have often coincided with a lower 10-year Treasury yield three months later (Chart 7). Similarly, we have also seen positioning in oil futures become extremely net long (Chart 7, bottom panel). In a recent report we analyzed the strong correlation between oil prices and TIPS breakeven inflation rates and concluded that the correlation would likely persist throughout Stage 1 of the bond bear market.5 A significant relapse in oil prices would very likely filter through to lower bond yields. Chart 7Risk 1 = Positioning Risk 2: Unrealistic Expectations Much like how consensus is forming around short bond positions, consensus economic expectations are also being revised higher. This is what happens when the economic data surprise positively for a significant period of time. Expectations eventually ratchet up and then become too optimistic for the data to surpass. It is this dynamic that causes the Economic Surprise Index to be mean reverting (Chart 8). In previous reports we have shown that months with negative data surprises tend to coincide with falling Treasury yields, and vice-versa.6 While negative data surprises are not an imminent risk - a simple auto-regressive model of the Economic Surprise Index shows we should expect an index reading of +15 in one month's time - the surprise index will eventually move below zero and this will likely coincide with at least some pull-back in bond yields. Risk 3: Global Growth Slowdown A third risk to the cyclical bond bear market is that we see a relapse in global growth that derails the economic recovery before Treasury yields reach our target range. At the moment our 2-factor Treasury model - based on Global Manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment toward the dollar - still posits a fair value 10-year Treasury yield of 3.01% (Chart 9), but a significant growth scare emanating from outside the U.S. would cause both the Global PMI to fall and bullish sentiment toward the dollar to rise. Both of those factors are bullish for U.S. bonds. Chart 8Risk 2 = Economic Surprises Chart 9Risk 3 = China/EM Slowdown For now there is no strong signal that global growth is about to slow, but some trends in China and other emerging markets bear monitoring. Our Foreign Exchange strategists' Carry Canary Indicator tracks the performance of EM / JPY carry trades.7 These trades go short the Japanese Yen and long an emerging market currency with a high interest rate (Brazilian Real, Russian Ruble or South African Rand), and as such they are highly geared to a positive global growth back-drop. Historically, a deterioration in the performance of these carry trades has often coincided with a slowdown in global growth and we notice that the outperformance of these trades has moderated in recent weeks (Chart 9, panel 2). Further, we have also seen some coincident and leading indicators of Chinese economic activity start to roll over (Chart 9, bottom 2 panels). The slowdown appears relatively benign for now but could eventually morph into a significant global event. This could occur if the growth deterioration accelerates and infects the Global PMI, or if Chinese policymakers react too strongly to slowing growth and engineer a sharp depreciation of the currency (as in August 2015). The latter scenario would impart increased bullish sentiment to the U.S. dollar and cause U.S. bond yields to fall. Both risks seem low at the moment, but are still worth monitoring during the next few months. Bottom Line: If our model suggests that economic surprises are likely to turn negative at a time when we also see extended net short bond positioning, then that would likely present an opportunity to tactically increase portfolio duration even though the cyclical bond bear market would remain intact. The risk of a growth slowdown emanating from China or other emerging markets also bears monitoring. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On The MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Percentages calculated using daily values. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Breakevens Ever Recover?", dated April 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On The MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "It's Still All About Inflation", dated January 16, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades", dated December 1, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Synchronized global capex growth and higher interest rates are two key themes that will continue to dominate this year. Three high-conviction calls are levered to the former theme and two to the latter. A special situation completes our sextet. Reinstate the S&P construction machinery & heavy truck index to the high-conviction overweight list. We also reiterate our high-conviction underweight call in the newcomer S&P telecom services sector. Recent Changes S&P Construction Machinery & Heavy Truck - Add back to high-conviction overweight list. Table 1 Feature Chart 1Market Bounced Smartly Equities regained their footing last week, as volatility took a breather. There are high odds that the technical, mostly-sentiment driven, pullback that we have been flagging since January 22nd is nearly over, as the market smartly bounced off the 200-day moving average (top panel, Chart 1).1 A consolidation/absorption phase is looming and, according to our "buy the dip" cycle-on-cycle analysis, a retest of the recent lows is likely before the market gets out of the woods (please refer to Chart 1 from last week's publication). While inflation expectations, crude oil prices and financial conditions are all tightly linked with and weighing on the S&P 500 (second and third panels, Chart 1), a number of tactical high-frequency financial market indicators suggest that the cyclical SPX bull market remains intact. First, SPX e-mini futures positioning is an excellent leading indicator of market momentum, and the current message is positive (net speculative positions are advanced by 40 weeks, Chart 2). Second, bond market internal dynamics suggest that this mini "risk off" episode is an isolated one and not a precursor to a real tremor. The high yield bond ETF outperformed the long dated Treasury bond ETF (bottom panel, Chart 3). It would be unprecedented for an equity market downdraft to morph into a fully blown bear market without junk bonds sinking compared with the ultimate risk free asset. Even when adjusted for its lower duration, the high yield bond ETF remained resilient versus the 3-7 year Treasury bond ETF (top panel, Chart 3). Chart 2Futures Positioning... Chart 3...Junk Bonds... Third, the calmness in the TED spread corroborates the message from the bond market. Were a systemic risk to materialize, the TED spread should have widened and not come in as it did in the past two weeks (Chart 4). Put differently, quiet interbank markets are a healthy sign. Chart 4...And TED Spread All Flashing Green Finally, relative valuations have corrected not only on an absolute basis (please refer to the bottom panel of Chart 2A from last week's Report), but also controlled for equity market volatility. In fact, Chart 5 shows that both the VIX-adjusted Shiller P/E and the 12-month forward P/E have returned to the neutral zone. Meanwhile, two key macro indicators we track are also flashing green. Chart 6 shows momentum in money velocity or how fast "one unit of currency is used to purchase domestically-produced goods and services".2 Historically, velocity of M2 money stock has been positively correlated with stock market momentum. The recent spike in this indicator suggests that the longevity of the business cycle remains intact, and investors with a cyclical (9-12 month) investment horizon should start "buying the dip", as we suggested on February 8th.3 Another yield curve-type macro indicator confirms this buoyant business cycle message: real GDP growth is easily outpacing real interest rates, as per the 10-year TIPS market (Chart 7). In other words, real rates are not yet restrictive enough to choke off GDP growth, despite the recent 35bps increase. Were this spread to plunge below the zero line, it would predict recession. Thus, the recent widening underscores that recession is not imminent. Chart 5Valuations Return To Earth Chart 6Money Velocity... Chart 7...And Yield Curve Emit Bullish Signal Under such a backdrop, the upshot is that earnings will remain upbeat in 2018 and continue to underpin equity prices. This week we revisit our 2018 high-conviction call list and reinstate one sector to the overweight column. Chart 8Both Themes Remains Intact The Themes Two key BCA themes formed the cornerstone of our 2018 high conviction call list: Synchronized global capex upcycle Higher interest rates Last autumn, we started to articulate the synchronized global capital spending macro theme4 that, despite still flying under the radar, will likely dominate this year. Both advanced and emerging economies are simultaneously expanding gross fixed capital formation (middle panel, Chart 8). As a result, we reiterate our cyclical over defensive portfolio bent,5 and continue to tie three high-conviction overweight calls to this theme. Similarly, late last year we started to highlight BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy view of a higher 10-year yield on the back of rising inflation expectations for 2018 (bottom panel, Chart 8). Back in late-November we posited that if BCA's constructive crude oil view pans out then inflation and rates may get an added boost. Two high-conviction calls remain levered to this theme. Finally, a special situation rounds up our call this year. But before we update the call list and make a small tweak, a quick housekeeping note is in order. Taking The Tally Early this year, we added trailing stops to our high-conviction call list as a risk management tool. The goal was to help protect profits as a number of our calls were showing outsized gains for such a short time span. Our tactically souring view of the overall market also compelled us to introduce this risk management metric. As a result of the recent careening in the SPX, half of our calls got stopped out with lofty double digit gains since inception a mere two and a half months ago. Namely, our speculative underweights in the S&P semi equipment and S&P homebuilders registered gains of 20% and 10%, respectively. The high-conviction underweight in the S&P utilities sector got called at an 18% gain, and our high-conviction overweight call in the S&P construction machinery & heavy truck (CMHT) index got stopped out at the 10% mark. (Please refer to page 15 for the closed trades table). Last week we added the S&P telecom services sector as a high-conviction underweight replacing the S&P utilities sector, and now that the worst is likely behind us, we are reinstating the S&P CMHT index to the high-conviction overweight list. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Construction Machinery & Heavy Truck (Overweight, Capex Theme) The capex upcycle is underpinning machinery stocks. Not only are expectations for overall capital outlays as good as they get (Chart 9), but there are also tentative signs that even the previously moribund mining and oil & gas complexes will be capex upcycle participants. While we are not calling for a return to the previous cycle's peak, even a modest renormalization of capital spending plans in these two key machinery client segments would rekindle industry sales growth. Recent news of oil majors accelerating their capex plans is a step in the right direction. This machinery end-demand improvement is not only a U.S. phenomenon, but also a global one. The middle panel of Chart 9 shows Caterpillar's global machinery sales to dealers hitting a decade high. Tack on the drubbing in the U.S. dollar and related commodity price inflation and the ingredients are in place for a global machinery export boom. While most of the countries we track enjoy a sizable rebound in machinery orders, Japan's machine tools orders have surged to an all-time high confirming that machinery global end demand is brisk (bottom panel, Chart 9). Finally, our machinery EPS model is firing on all cylinders, underscoring that the earnings-led recovery has more running room (fourth panel, Chart 9). Reinstate the S&P CMHT index to the high-conviction overweight list. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CSTF - CAT, CMI, PCAR. Energy (Overweight, Capex Theme) The S&P energy sector is a key beneficiary of our synchronized global capex theme. The Dallas Fed manufacturing outlook survey is firing on all cylinders and, given the importance of oil to the state of Texas, it serves as an excellent gauge for oil activity. Importantly, the capital expenditures part of the survey hit its highest level in a decade, and capex intentions in the coming six months are also probing multi-year highs. The overall message is that the budding recovery in energy capital budgets will likely gain steam (second panel, Chart 10). Following the late-2015/early-2016 drubbing in oil prices, energy projects ground to a halt and only now are green shoots appearing (middle panel, Chart 10). Recent news that Exxon Mobil would bump domestic capital spending up to $50bn over the next five years is encouraging. New projects/investments comprise 70% of this figure. OECD oil stocks are receding steadily and so are U.S. crude oil inventories. OPEC 2.0 remains in place and will likely balance the oil market by continuing to constrain supply. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service is still penciling in higher oil prices for 2018. On the demand side, emerging markets/Chinese demand is the key determinant of overall oil demand, and the news on this front is encouraging and consistent with BCA's synchronized global growth theme: following the recent lull, non-OECD demand is growing anew by roughly 1.5mn bbl/day. The upshot is that S&P energy relative revenues will climb out of the recent trough (bottom panel, Chart 10). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ENRS - XLE: US. Chart 9Construction Machinery & Heavy Truck ##br##(Overweight, Capex Theme) Chart 10Energy (Overweight, Capex Theme) Software (Overweight, Capex Theme) The S&P software index is another clear capex upcycle beneficiary. If software commands a larger slice of the overall capital spending pie as we expect, then industry profits should enjoy a healthy rebound (second panel, Chart 11). Small business sector plans to expand keep on hitting fresh recovery highs, underscoring that software related outlays will likely follow them higher. Rebounding bank loan growth also corroborates the upbeat spending message and signals that businesses are beginning to loosen their purse strings (Chart 11). Reviving animal spirits suggest that demand for software upgrades will stay elevated. CEO confidence is pushing decade highs (middle panel, Chart 11). Such ebullience is positive for a pickup in software outlays. It has also rekindled software M&A activity, and pushed take out premia higher. Meanwhile, the structural pull from the proliferation of cloud computing and software-as-a-service has served as a catalyst to raise the profile of this more defensive and mature tech sub-sector. Tax reform is another bonus for this group that benefits from cash repatriation, which will likely result in increased shareholder friendly activities. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT-MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, ATVI, INTU, EA, ADSK, RHT, SYMC, SNPS, ANSS, CDNS, CTXS, CA. Banks (Overweight, Higher Interest Rates Theme) The S&P banks index remains a core overweight portfolio holding and there are high odds of additional relative gains in the coming quarters beyond the current 10% relative return mark since the November 27th, 2017 inception. All three key drivers of bank profits, namely price of credit, loan growth and credit quality, are simultaneously moving in the right direction. On the price front, BCA expects the 10-year yield will continue to rise more quickly than is discounted in the forward curve. Our U.S. bond strategists think that inflation expectations have more room to run, likely pushing the 10-year Treasury yield close to 3.25% (top panel, Chart 12). C&I and consumer loans, two large credit categories, are both forecast to reaccelerate in the coming months. The ISM remains squarely above the 50 boom/bust line and consumer confidence is still buoyant. Our credit growth model captures these positive forces and is sending an unambiguously positive message for loan reacceleration in the coming months (third panel, Chart 12). Finally, credit quality remains pristine despite some pockets of weakness in auto loans (especially subprime) and credit card debt. At this stage of the cycle, with a closed unemployment gap, NPLs will remain muted. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX - WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT. Chart 11Software (Overweight, Capex Theme) Chart 12Banks (Overweight, Higher Interest Rates Theme) Telecom Services (Underweight, Higher Interest Rates Theme) We downgraded the S&P telecom services index to underweight and added it to the high-conviction underweight list last week, filling the void left by the S&P utilities sector.6 Three main reasons are behind our dislike for this fixed income proxy sector: BCA's 2018 rising interest rate theme, both our Cyclical Macro Indicator (CMI) and our sales model send a distress signal, and a profit margin squeeze is looming. The top panel of Chart 13 shows that high dividend yielding telecom services stocks and the 10-year yield are nearly perfectly inversely correlated. In fact, telecom services stocks are prime beneficiaries of disinflation/deflation and vice versa. BCA's bond market view remains that the 10-year yield will continue to rise likely piercing through 3% and weigh heavily on this fixed income proxied sector. Our CMI has melted and relative consumer outlays on telecom services have also taken a nosedive (second & third panels, Chart 13), warning that revenue growth will be hard to come by for telecom carriers. In fact, while nearly all of the GICS1 sectors have come out of the top line growth lull of late-2015/early-2016, telecom services sales growth has relapsed. Worrisomely, our S&P telecom services revenue growth model remains deep in contractionary territory, waving a red flag (bottom panel, Chart 13). Finally, still steeply deflating selling prices are a major headwind for the sector's top and bottom line growth prospects and coupled with a still expanding wage bill, suggest that a profit margin squeeze is looming. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: VZ, T, CTL. Pharmaceuticals (Underweight, Special Situation) Weak pricing power fundamentals, a soft spending backdrop, a depreciating U.S. dollar and deteriorating industry operating metrics will sustain downward pressure on pharma stocks. Industry selling prices remain soft (Chart 14). In the context of a bloated industry workforce, the profit margin outlook darkens significantly. If the Trump administration also manages to clamp down on the secular growth of pharma selling price inflation, as we expect, then industry margins will remain under chronic downward pressure. Our dual synchronized global economic and capex growth themes bode ill for this safe haven index. Nondiscretionary health care outlays jump in times of duress and underwhelm during expansions. Currently, the elevated ISM manufacturing index is signaling that pharma profits will underwhelm in the coming months as the most cyclical parts of the economy flex their muscles (the ISM survey is shown inverted, second panel, Chart 14). A depreciating currency is also synonymous with pharma profit sickness (bottom panel, Chart 14). While pharma exports should at least provide some top line growth relief during depreciating U.S. dollar phases, they are still contracting (middle panel, Chart 14), warning that global pharma demand is ill. Finally, even on the operating metric front, the outlook is dark. Pharma industrial production is nil and our productivity proxy remains muted, warning that the valuation derating phase is far from over. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PHAR - JNJ, PFE, MRK, BMY, AGN, LLY, ZTS, MYL, PRGO. Chart 13Telecom Services ##br##(Underweight, Higher Interest Rates Theme) Chart 14Pharmaceuticals ##br##(Underweight, Special Situation) 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Too Good To Be True?" dated January 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M2V 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight, "Buy The Dip," dated February 8, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Invincible," dated November 6, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives," dated October 16, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Manic Depressive?" dated February 12, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth. Stay neutral small over large caps (downgrade alert).
