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Highlights Odds the leaders of the OPEC 2.0 petro-states will be forced to back up last month's "whatever it takes" declaration - perhaps deepening and extending the 1.8mm b/d production cuts agreed at the end of last year - are not yet overwhelming. All the same, they will continue to increase, if markets do not see sustained draws in visible storage. Our updated supply-demand balances indicate global crude inventories will continue to draw, and that these draws will accelerate. This will keep global storage levels on track to normalize later this year or in 1Q18. We continue to expect Brent to trade to $60/bbl by December, with WTI ~ $2/bbl under that. Energy: Overweight. Our low-risk call spread initiated last week - long Dec/17 $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl WTI calls - is down 18.9%, following continued selling. We are adding to the position with the same Dec/17 strikes in Brent at tonight's close. These are strategic positions. Base Metals: Neutral. SHFE copper inventories fell on the back of increased demand for collateral to support financing deals in China. Tightening credit conditions are beginning to bite as the government pushes deleveraging policies, according to Metal Bulletin. Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold, despite the hawkish rhetoric being thrown around by Fed officials, particularly William Dudley, head of the NY Fed. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 1.1% since it was put on May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chicago and KC winter wheat remain bid, as concerns over drought-induced damage to the crop continue to weigh on markets. Feature Chart of the WeekUpdated Balances Leave Us Bullish Crude Insomuch as such things can ever be "official," crude oil officially entered a bear market - down 20% or more from recent highs - with the unexpected arrival of WTI futures below the lower end of our long-time $45-to-$65/bbl trading range this week.1 The proximate causes of this turn of events are persistently sticky inventory levels - most visible in the high-frequency data from the U.S. - and growing fears increasing Libyan and U.S. shale-oil production will undermine OPEC 2.0's 1.8mm b/d production cuts. We are hard-pressed to see the case for such fears, even though the market is consistently trading in a manner that is more aligned with supply cuts being far less than advertised by OPEC 2.0, or demand slowing considerably more than any agency or data service has yet picked up on. We will never be able to confirm sovereign hedging - e.g., Mexico or Iraq hedging oil-production revenues - until after the fact. However, this cannot be dismissed out of hand. Based on our latest supply-demand analysis, OPEC 2.0 - the coalition lead by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will have removed some 1.4mm b/d of production on average from the market between January 2017 and end-March 2018 vs. peak production in November of last year (Chart of the Week). This will be diluted somewhat by the Libyan and U.S. production gains, but this increased production will not be sufficient to counter the OPEC 2.0 cuts entirely. Global Oil Supply Contracting Sharply Chart 2OECD Storage Draws On Track Against peak production in November 2016, we see just over 1.2mm b/d of crude oil production being cut by OPEC between January and end-March-2018.2 Throw in another 200 - 300k b/d or so from the non-OPEC members of the OPEC 2.0 coalition - mostly Russia - and we get to 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d of production taken off the market in the Jan/17 - Mar/18, interval in our modeling. This will leave the highly visible OECD storage levels being targeted by OPEC 2.0 at ~ 2.70 billion barrels by the end of the year, or some time close to the start of next year (Chart 2). In our modeling, we do not agree with the implied 1.9mm b/d of production cuts that follow from the reported OPEC 2.0 compliance statistics in the press. These reports indicate OPEC 2.0 coalition members are at 106% compliance. This is remarkably high, even if reports of this compliance rely on anonymous sources speaking to reporters following the coalition's technical committee meeting in Vienna earlier this week.3 If the production discipline attested to is true, we will raise our estimate of how quickly inventories will draw this year, and lower our expected global inventory levels for the end of March 2018. As for U.S. crude production, while we do have Dec/17 production 1.1mm b/d over Dec/16, we expect America's contribution to yoy global production growth to be only ~ 340k b/d on average over the course of 2017. The U.S. gains will be driven by shale-oil production, which we expect to grow ~ 410k b/d to 5.2mm b/d this year (Chart 3). Libya's production recently surged to 900k b/d, according to press reports, but, so far this year, it is averaging just under 700k b/d (Chart 4). This is slightly higher than the level we've been modeling in our balances for this year. The 300k b/d yoy increase in Libya's production is impressive, but it does not overwhelm OPEC 2.0's cuts. Even if Libyan production were to average 1mm b/d in 2H17, its net contribution to global production this year would be ~ 840k b/d, an increase of ~ 400k b/d over 2016's levels. We also note that as production and revenue increase the likelihood of renewed violence in Libya also increases.4 Chart 3U.S. Shale-Oil##BR##Growth Could Slow Chart 4Libya's Recover Is Impressive,##BR##But It Won't Reverse OPEC 2.0's Cuts Between them, combined growth in U.S. and Libyan production looks like it will be a touch under 650k b/d yoy (on average). Meanwhile, OPEC 2.0's production cuts - assessed against peak output for 2016 - are on track to exceed targets set at the outset of the agreement last December. Net, on a yoy basis, we expect to register inventory draws of close to 900k b/d this year. This should lead to cumulative draws in global storage levels of at least 400mm bbls by end-March. Demand Remains Strong The EIA revised its liquids demand estimates in its most recent Short-term Energy Outlook (STEO), and now has 2015 global consumption up 300k b/d from previous estimates at 95.4mm b/d, and 2016 consumption up 180k b/d at 96.9mm b/d. Our expected growth in global demand for this year and next is in line with the EIA's average estimate of ~ 1.6mm b/d, which will put 2017 demand at 98.5mm b/d and 2018 at 100.1mm b/d, respectively. Growth this year and next is expected to be slightly higher than last year's level (Chart 5). Once again, we expect EM demand - proxied by non-OECD liquids consumption - to lead global growth this year and next. Concern over apparent slowing in U.S. refined-product demand - particularly gasoline - is, we believe, overdone. Growth this year is being compared to stellar rates last year (Chart 6), which still leaves the level of demand above 20mm b/d. Growth in gasoline demand specifically also has slowed, but, again, this is occurring in a market where the level of demand remains high, pushing toward 10mm b/d, which is a mere 2.5% below record demand set in August of last year (Chart 7). Chart 5Expect Global Demand##BR##To Remain Stout Chart 6The Level Of U.S. Product##BR##Demand Remains High Chart 7U.S. Gasoline Demand##BR##Also Remains Stout 2018 Getting Foggy Uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the oil market next year is growing. The EIA believes markets will tighten in 3Q17, but then get progressively looser going into 2018, apparently disregarding OPEC 2.0's efforts to date, and the high likelihood - in our view - that the coalition will maintain production discipline for the most part (Chart 8). Combined with the robust demand growth BCA and the EIA expect, we get a fairly balanced market next year (Chart of the Week). U.S. shale-oil production, once again, will dictate just how tight markets become next year. Presently, we have average 2018 U.S. shale production in the Big 4 basins - Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara, and the Permian - coming in more than 1mm b/d over 2017 levels. However, the recent sell-off that took WTI into bear-market territory this week could have a profound effect on shale-drilling activity next year, if it persists. Recent econometric work we've done confirms rig counts in the Big 4 plays are highly sensitive to WTI price. A prolonged stretch below $45/bbl could reduce rig counts by as much as 40% next year, especially if private-equity-backed companies cut spending. With hedging levels down, this is not a trivial concern (Chart 9).5 If prices stay depressed for any length of time for whatever reason - an outcome we do not expect - U.S. shale drilling activity could once again plummet. Chart 8EIA Fades OPEC 2.0's Resolve,##BR##BCA Does Not Chart 9Weak Prices Could##BR##Reduce Shale Rig Counts In addition, low prices also increase fiscal stress levels in petro-state revenues. This is of particular concern for KSA and Russia. The former is almost wholly dependent on oil revenues to fund its budgets, and will be looking to IPO its state-owned oil company, Aramco, next year. The latter is heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues, and will be holding an election in mid-March, just ahead of the expiry of the OPEC 2.0 production-cut extensions. The benchmark Russian crude, Urals, trades ~ $1.00 to $1.25/bbl under Brent, and any prolonged excursion into the low-$40s by Brent would stress the state's revenues. This is not our base case, but it is worthwhile considering. This mutual dependence on oil prices to support their respective economies is what compels strong compliance with the OPEC 2.0 production deal. Bottom Line: Our updated balances modeling continues to support our view global oil storage will draw, with OECD inventories likely falling below five-year average levels by year-end or early next year. Self-reported compliance with OPEC 2.0's production-cutting agreement exceeds 100%, implying the coalition is tracking to a 1.9mm b/d reduction in crude-oil output at present. On the demand side, even after upward revisions to 2015 and 2016 demand figures by the U.S. EIA, liquids consumption still is expected to grow on average ~ 1.6mm b/d this year and next. Cuts in production by OPEC 2.0 this year are more than sufficient to offset increases in Libyan and U.S. production, leaving overall production below consumption globally by close to 900k b/d, which will ensure inventories draw. For next year, after storage draws have abated, we expect supply and demand to be roughly balanced. We continue to expect Brent prices to trade to $60/bbl by year-end, and, on that basis, are recommending a long Dec/17 $50/bbl Brent call vs. short a Dec/17 $55/bbl Brent call. Longer term, our central tendency for price remains $55/bbl, with a range of $45 to $65/bbl prevailing most of the time. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 We are using the front-line WTI futures contract, which hit its recent high on Feb. 23 at $54.45/bbl (last price) and traded down to $43.23/bbl on June 20, registering a drop of 20.6%. First-line Brent has yet to fall more than 20% from its recent high of $57.10/bbl on Jan. 6 to $46.02/bbl on June 20 (a 19.4% drop). 2 Measuring against peak production - rather than the October levels referenced by OPEC 2.0 coalition members - is an inherently more conservative way of assessing the effect of the production cuts. 3 Please see "OPEC, non-OPEC compliance with oil cuts hits highest in May: source," published by reuters.com on June 21, 2017. 4 An uptick in Nigerian production also is cited by some observers as a cause for concern vis-à-vis slowing the normalization of global storage levels. However, as Chart 4 illustrates, that country's production remains on either side of 1.5mm b/d, more than 500k b/d below recent steady-state levels. 5 Looking at rig-count sensitivity to prices and rig productivity, we find a 1% increase (decrease) in nearby prices translates into a roughly 70bp increase (decrease) in rig counts, while a 1% increase (decrease) in lagged, deferred WTI futures prices (out to 3 years forward) translates into a 2% change in the same direction. The R2 coefficients of determination for the models we estimated average ~ 0.95. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Special Report Highlights The European Central Bank's ultra-dovish policies have depressed the value of the euro and, by extension, boosted German manufacturing. Germany has diffused its inflationary pressures by outsourcing jobs and production to central Europe. As a result of this and labor shortages, wages in central Europe are rising rapidly, and inflation is accelerating. The Polish and Czech central banks will be forced to hike rates sooner than later. Hungary's central bank will lag behind. Go long the PLN versus the IDR. Stay long the CZK versus the euro and the PLN against the HUF. Feature Inflation in central Europe is picking up and will continue to rise (Chart I-1). The main driver is surging wage growth in central Europe. Considerable acceleration in wage growth, in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic signifies genuine inflationary pressures that could very well spread. Based on this, our primary investment recommendation is to be long the PLN and CZK versus the euro and/or EM currencies. Labor Shortages There is a shortage of labor in the central European manufacturing economies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This partially reflects similar trends in Germany and its increased use of outsourcing to central European countries. Escalating wage growth (Chart I-2) in central European economies denotes widening labor shortages. Chart I-1Inflation Is Rising In CE3 Chart I-2Labor Shortages = Higher Wages Indeed, our proxy for labor shortages - calculated as the number of job vacancies divided by the number of unemployed looking for a job - has surged of late across all central European countries (Chart I-3). The same measure for Germany is at a 27-year high (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B illustrate both components of the ratio: the number of job vacancies has skyrocketed to all-time highs and the number of unemployed people has dropped to multi-decade lows as well. Chart I-3Labor Is Scarce In CE3 And Germany Chart I-4AA Breakdown Of Labor Shortage Proxy Chart I-4BA Breakdown Of Labor Shortage Proxy Importantly, it is not the case that labor shortages are occurring because people are discouraged and giving up on their search for work. The participation rate for all these countries has risen to its highest level since data have been available. In brief, a rising share of the population in these countries is either working or actively looking for a job. (Chart I-5). Finally, their working age population is shrinking (Chart I-6), with Germany being the exception because of immigration inflows (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Labor Participation Rate Is ##br##High In CE3 And Germany... Chart I-6...While Working Age ##br##Population Is Declining In CE3 Robust labor demand has been occurring in central Europe because of the ongoing manufacturing boom in the region. Given central Europe's extensive supply chain linkages to German manufacturing, the artificial cheapness of the euro that the ECB engineered has boosted the German economy and by extension central Europe's manufacturing boom. Germany: A Cheap Currency And Export Boom The ECB's ultra-accommodative policy has suppressed the value of the euro, and caused German exports to mushroom (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-7ECB Policies Have Been ##br##A Boon For German Exports A cheap common European currency has boosted Germany's manufacturing competitiveness and has led to rising demand for German exports. An overflow of manufacturing orders in Germany in turn has led to labor shortages in central Europe via increased German outsourcing. Currency appreciation is the conventional economic adjustment in a country with a flexible exchange rate and an export boom coupled with a large current account surplus. However, this has not occurred in Germany in recent years. This is because of the ECB's ultra-easy policies. The euro has depreciated even as the German and euro area overall current account has mushroomed (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Since the currency has not been allowed to appreciate in nominal terms, the real effective exchange rate will inevitably appreciate via inflation - rising wages initially and broader inflation increases later. In our opinion, the best currency valuation measure is the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. Our basis is that this measure reflects both changes in productivity and wages - i.e. it reflects genuine competitiveness. Chart I-8 demonstrates Germany's real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs in absolute terms compared to other advanced manufacturing competitors like the U.S., Japan, Switzerland and Sweden. Based on this measure, it is clear that Germany continues to enjoy a significant comparative advantage on the manufacturing world stage among advanced manufacturing economies. It is only less competitive versus Japan. Chart I-8Germany Is Very Competitive Based On Real Effective Exchange Rates Bottom Line: The ECB's ultra-dovish policies have depressed the value of the euro and boosted German manufacturing. This has boosted central European manufacturing and demand for labor. Germany Is Passing The Inflation Baton To Central Europe Despite a historic low in the unemployment rate and ongoing labor shortages, German wages have not risen by much (Chart I-9). Our hunch is that German companies faced with some labor shortages have been increasing their use of outsourcing. Central European economy's export to Germany have boomed, especially after the euro started depreciating circa 2010 (Chart I-10). Chart I-9German Wage Inflation Is Muted Chart I-10Growing Dependence On ##br##Germany For CE3 Growth Being the lower marginal cost producer in the region, central European economies have benefited from German competitiveness and the cheap euro. Outsourcing is economically justified because German wages are still four times higher than in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. (Chart I-11). Even though Germany's productivity is higher than in central Europe, manufacturing wages adjusted for productivity are still higher than in central European economies (Chart I-12). Therefore, it still makes sense for German businesses to outsource more to lower-cost producers in central Europe. Chart I-11CE3 Wage Bill Is Cheaper ##br##Than That Of Germany... Chart I-12...Even After Adjusting ##br##For Productivity Faced with strong orders as well as a lack of available labor, businesses in central European countries have been competing for labor by raising wages. Unlike in Germany, manufacturing and overall wages in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have recently surged (Chart I-2 on page 3). Wages are rising more so in Hungary and the Czech Republic since they have smaller labor pools compared to Poland. Notably, wage growth has exceeded productivity growth, and unit labor costs have been rising rather rapidly (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Unit Labor Costs Are Rising Rapidly In CE3 Higher unit labor costs amid rising output denote genuine inflationary pressures. Producers faced with rising unit labor costs and shrinking profit margins will attempt to raise prices. Given that income and demand are strong, they will partially succeed - meaning genuine inflationary pressures in central Europe are likely to intensify. Since the beginning of the ECB's accommodative monetary policy, Germany has been able to avoid the fallout of higher wages because it has been able to outsource a portion of its production to other countries, namely central Europe. The problem is that the supply of labor in central Europe is now drying out, so its price will naturally rise. If Germany did not have the labor pool of CE3 available as a resource, German wage inflation would be significantly higher by now because companies would have been forced to employ Germans more rapidly, paying more in labor costs. Bottom Line: Germany has diffused its inflationary pressures by outsourcing jobs and production to central Europe. Overheating In Central Europe Various inflation measures are showing signs that inflation is escalating in CE3. With rising wages and unit labor costs, these trends will continue. Consequently, output gaps in central European economies are closing or have closed, warranting further increases in inflation (Chart I-14). Money and credit growth are booming, which is further facilitating the rise in inflation (Chart I-15). Finally, employment growth is very robust and retail sales are strong (Chart I-16). Chart I-14Inflation Will Remain On An Up Trend In CE3 Chart I-15Money & Credit Will Facilitate Path To Inflation Chart I-16Employment & Retail Sales Growth Is Robust Bottom Line: A cheap euro has supercharged German demand for central European labor at the time when the pool of available labor in CE3 is shrinking. This has generated genuine inflationary pressures in the region. Conclusions And Investment Recommendations 1. The Polish and Czech central banks will hike rates sooner than later. This will boost their currencies. The Hungarian central bank will lag and the HUF will underperform its regional peers. CE3 currencies are set to appreciate, especially the CZK and the PLN: stay long the PLN versus the HUF, and the CZK versus the euro. We recommended going long PLN/HUF and long CZK/EUR on September 28 2016 due to stronger growth and rising inflationary pressures. This week's analysis reinforces our conviction on these trades. In the face of rising inflationary pressures, the Czech National Bank (CNB) and the National Bank of Poland (NBP) will be less reluctant to tighten policy than the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) and the ECB. This will drive the PLN and CZK higher relative to the EUR and HUF. The NBH is unlikely to tighten policy while credit growth is still weak. Given strong political pressure for faster economic growth, our bias is that the NBH is more interested in ending six years of non-existent credit growth rather than containing inflation. The ECB is unlikely to tighten policy either, given the still-poor structural growth outlook among the peripheral European economies. A new currency trade: go long the PLN versus the IDR, while closing our short IDR/long HUF trade with a 9% loss. This is based on our expectations that central European currencies will appreciate versus their EM peers, and the PLN will do better than the HUF. 2. Relative growth trajectory favors Central European economies relative to other EM countries. Such economic outperformance and resulting currency appreciation will be a tailwind to CE3 equity performance versus EM in common currency terms. Continue overweighting CE3 equity markets within the EM benchmark. We recommended equity traders go long CE3 banks / short euro area banks on April 6, 2016. This position has not worked out due to a significant rally in euro area banks since Brexit. However, euro area banks remain less profitable and overleveraged compared to their central European counterparts. As such they will likely underperform in the coming months. 3. In fixed income, we have the following positions: Overweight Hungarian sovereign credit within an EM sovereign credit portfolio. Long Polish and Hungarian 5-year local currency bonds / short South African and Turkish domestic bonds. A new trade: Receive 1-year Hungarian swap rates / Pay 10-year swap rates. As structural inflationary pressures become rampant in the Hungarian economy, the market will start pricing in rate hikes further down the curve, and the yield curve will consequently steepen (Chart I-17). Polish and Czech bonds offer better value relative to bunds as investors stand to gain from currency appreciation as well as an attractive spread. (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Bet On Yield Curve ##br##Steepening In Hungary Chart I-18Polish & Czech Bond Offer Value ##br##Relative To German Bunds Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Special Report Highlights Risk Budgeting: We are introducing a more formal risk measurement element to our model global bond portfolio. This is to identify if our individual views are potentially creating too much volatility, in aggregate, but also as a way to express the conviction of our individual recommendations through allocation of a "risk budget". Tracking Error Of Our Portfolio: We are setting our maximum allowable tracking error, or excess volatility of our portfolio versus our benchmark index, at 100 basis points. Our current tracking error is just under ½ of that limit. We estimate that our highest conviction views at the moment - staying below-benchmark on duration risk, overweighting U.S. corporates, underweighting both U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt - contribute nearly 4/5ths of our overall portfolio tracking error. Feature Last September, we introduced a model portfolio framework to Global Fixed Income Strategy.1 This was done to better communicate our investment research into actionable ideas more in line with the day-to-day decisions and trade-offs made by professional bond managers. We followed that up with the addition of performance measurement tools to more accurately track the returns of our model bond portfolio versus a stated benchmark.2 We are now initiating the final piece of our model bond portfolio framework in this Special Report - introducing a risk management component to identify cumulative exposures and guide the relative sizes of our suggested tilts. Our goal is to translate our individual investment recommendations into the language of a "risk budget", i.e. how much of the desired volatility of the portfolio would we suggest placing into any single trade idea. This will allow our readers to apply our proposed tilts - based on how much conviction (i.e. "risk") we allocate to each position - to their own portfolios which may have different risk limits and return expectations. For example, our current recommendation to overweight U.S. corporate debt, both Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY) represents nearly 1/3 of our estimated total portfolio risk, by far our largest source of potential volatility both in absolute terms and versus our benchmark index (Table 1). Overweighting U.S. corporates, both versus U.S. Treasuries and Euro Area equivalents, is one of our highest conviction trades at the moment. A client who may choose to run a lower risk portfolio can still follow our recommendation by placing enough into U.S. corporates so that 33% of the desired portfolio volatility will come from those positions. Table 1Risk Allocation In Our Model Bond Portfolio In the rest of this Special Report, we will discuss some of the various ways to measure fixed income portfolio risk, apply them to our model portfolio, and introduce some measures to monitor our aggregate portfolio volatility. Going forward, we will closely watch our established metrics and position sizes to ensure that the combination of our individual investment recommendations that we discuss on a week-to-week basis does not create a portfolio that is potentially more volatile than desired. Risk Measurement In Fixed Income Portfolios While investors are typically focused on meeting return targets for their portfolios, the other side of the equation - managing portfolio volatility - is often less stressed. This is especially true during bull markets for any asset class. Investors may become complacent if returns meet or exceed their targets when, in fact, excess returns may have actually been earned through overly risky positions that could have easily not worked in the investors' favor. In the current macro environment, where many financial asset prices are at new highs with stretched valuations and with most of the major global central banks incrementally moving towards less accommodative monetary policy stances, risk management should be even more important for investors. Overly concentrated positioning could now lead to considerable portfolio losses, especially if measuring risk with a metric that is flawed or incomplete, which can lead to a false sense of security. With that in mind, we consider some typical risk measurement metrics used by fixed income investors: Duration: Duration is usually the most popular risk metric for fixed income portfolios as it measures interest rate sensitivity. Duration is defined as the percentage change in a portfolio or asset resulting from a one percentage point change in interest rates. While it provides a solid base understanding of interest rate risk, it does make a simplifying assumption that there is a linear relationship between interest rates and bond prices. Value-At-Risk: Value-At-Risk (VaR) is a statistical technique that measures the loss of an investment, or of an entire portfolio, over a certain period with a given level of confidence. However, there are two considerable flaws with this approach. First, the VaR output suggests a portfolio can lose at least X%, it does not actually indicate how big the potential loss could be. Instead, using a measure such as Historical VaR, if a portfolio has a long enough track record, can better quantify potential losses. Second, VaR is highly susceptible to estimation errors. Certain assumptions on correlations and the normality of return distributions can have a substantial impact on VaR readings. Table 2Value At Risk Of Our Benchmark In Table 2, we show the Historical VaR (HVAR) of our benchmark index, calculating the potential monthly loss using data going back to 2005. On that basis, the worst expected monthly loss for our benchmark is -1.6% (using a 95% confidence interval) and -2.1% (using a 99% confidence interval). Tracking Error: Tracking error measures the volatility of excess returns relative to a certain benchmark. It is a standard risk measure used by a typical "real money" bond manager with a benchmark performance index, like a mutual fund. Tracking error does not offer information on alpha generation (i.e. how much you can expect to beat your benchmark based on your current investments), it simply indicates how much more volatile a portfolio is expected to be versus its benchmark. As our model portfolio returns are measured on a relative basis to our stated bond benchmark index, tracking error is quite appropriate as our main risk metric. A Historical Examination Of Our Portfolio When we first created our model portfolio, we also introduced a benchmark index against which we could measure our performance. Our customized benchmark differs from typical multi-sector measures like the Barclays Global Aggregate Index in that it has a broader scope, including sectors that can have credit ratings below investment grade such as High Yield corporates. The benchmark does, however, exclude smaller regions that we only occasionally discuss such as Sweden, Portugal, Norway and New Zealand. These smaller markets offer comparatively poor liquidity and we want our benchmark to be as investible as possible. Nevertheless, our customized benchmark has been highly correlated to the Barclays Global Aggregate Index over the past decade. As our portfolio has not had a full year of return data, its history is quite limited. Still, in our first performance review conducted two months ago, we indicated that our portfolio had been very closely tracking our customized benchmark. We have since increased our positions in our highest conviction views and our tracking error has risen noticeably and now sits at just over 40bps (Chart 1). Within our model portfolio, we are setting an expected excess return target of 100bps per year. That means that we are setting a goal of beating our benchmark index returns by one full percentage point per year. Given that we are measuring our performance versus currency-hedged benchmarks that are primarily rated investment grade or better, 100bps of annual excess return is a reasonable target. We are also setting a limit where the excess return/tracking error ratio should aim to be equal to 1 each year. This is under the simple assumption that we want an equal amount of return over our benchmark for our expected excess volatility versus our benchmark. On that basis, we are setting our tracking error "limit" at 100bps per year. That suggests that our current tracking error is relatively low. However, correlations between the individual components of our benchmark index have been rising over the past couple of years (Chart 2). Therefore, running a relatively low overall level of risk at a time where diversification among the positions within our portfolio is now harder to achieve, and when the valuations on most government bond and credit markets look rich, is prudent. Chart 1Higher Tracking Error, But Still Well Below Our Target Chart 2Correlations Across Fixed Income Sectors Have Been Rising This is another way that we can control the overall riskiness of our model portfolio. Not only by how much of our risk budget (tracking error) that we want to allocate to each of our recommended positions, but also how big of a risk budget do we want to run at any given point in time. If we see more assets trading at cheap valuations, then we could choose to run a higher tracking error than when most assets look expensive. Bottom Line: We are introducing a more formal risk measurement element to our model global bond portfolio. This is to identify if our individual views are potentially creating too much volatility, in aggregate, but also as a way to express the conviction of our individual recommendations through allocation of a "risk budget". We are setting our maximum allowable tracking error, or excess volatility of our portfolio versus our benchmark index, at 100 basis points. Measuring The Contribution To Risk From Our Market Tilts In our model portfolio, we include a wide range of geographies and sectors from the global fixed income universe. Understanding the risk contribution of each position to the overall portfolio provides a clearer picture as to where our potential risks lie, and by how much. To measure the risk contribution of each of our individual recommendations to our overall portfolio volatility, we used the following formula: wA * E CovAB * wB Where W = the weight of any single asset in our portfolio and COV is the covariance between the asset and other assets in the portfolio. As such, an asset's contribution to risk is a function of its weight in the portfolio and its covariance with the other assets. Importantly, since we are measuring our model portfolio performance in terms of excess returns, we examined each position's contribution to risk relative to the benchmark. All calculations begin in late 2005, when return data is available for all of the assets in our portfolio. The results are summarized in Table 1 on Page 1. Our portfolio tilts are based off of our four highest conviction themes. They include: Stronger global growth led by the U.S. The U.S. economy should expand at a faster pace in the latter half of the year on the back of a rebound in consumption and strong capital spending, all supported by solid income growth and easy financial conditions. We have expressed this theme through our overweight allocation to U.S. corporate debt. While our U.S. Corporate Health Monitor is flashing that balance sheets are becoming increasingly strained, easy monetary conditions and an expansionary economic backdrop should continue to support excess returns for U.S. corporates. More Fed rate hikes than expected. We expect U.S. economic and corporate profit growth to remain robust due to accommodative monetary conditions, diminishing slack and resilient consumption. As such, the Fed will continue tightening policy by more than what markets are currently pricing in. This theme is expressed through an underweight position in U.S. Treasuries, which accounts for 17% of our volatility versus 24% for that of the benchmark. This wide spread relative to the benchmark is a substantial source of our tracking error, but one that we are comfortable running given our view that U.S. Treasury yields are too low. Chart 3Realized Bond Volatility Has Been Declining Rising tapering risks in Europe. Our expectation is that the European Central Bank (ECB) will be forced to announce a slower pace (tapering) of bond buying starting next year, given the current robust economic expansion in Europe that is rapidly absorbing spare capacity. An ECB taper announcement is expected to lead to rising longer-term global bond yields, mostly via rising term premia. We are expressing that view in our portfolio through our overall underweight interest rate duration stance. Our current portfolio duration is 5.6 years versus our benchmark duration of 7.0 years. That is a large tilt that represents a significant portion of our tracking error, but given our view that U.S. Treasuries also look overvalued, running a large overall duration underweight does correlate to our conviction level. Rising geopolitical risks and banking sector issues in Italy. Geopolitical risks remain elevated leading up to parliamentary elections in 2018, and Italian banks remain undercapitalized with non-performing loans still in an uptrend. Therefore, we are underweight Italian debt, though this is a smaller deviation of portfolio risk versus our benchmark (around 2%), given the smaller size of Italy in our benchmark. Purely looking at geography and sector selection, our four highest conviction views make up almost 80% of the active portfolio risk that we are "running" in our model portfolio. That number may seem high but, as described earlier, our realized portfolio volatility has been quite low (Chart 3). That suggests that there could be some degree of underlying diversification within our recommended portfolio given lower correlations of certain assets to the rest of the portfolio. This is a topic that we will investigate more deeply in future Weekly Reports. Bottom Line: We estimate that our highest conviction views at the moment - staying below-benchmark on duration risk, overweighting U.S. corporates, underweighting both U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt - contribute nearly 4/5ths of our overall portfolio tracking error. Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Introducing Our Recommended Global Fixed Income Portfolio", dated September 20 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "An Initial Look At The Performance Of Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated April 18 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Table 4
Highlights Rising equity prices, low and falling bond yields and stable credit spreads are all consistent with today's low growth and inflation backdrop, where the Fed can take its time raising rates. The FOMC is looking through the inflation shortfall for now and is sticking with its rate hike plan. Lower oil prices are the key driver of plunging market-based inflation expectations. We expect the Fed to begin to trim its balance sheet later this year, and be a modest negative for Treasury prices. The latest readings on the health of household balance sheet from the Fed's flow of funds accounts reinforce our view that the consumer sector will provide solid support for the U.S. economy through 2017; the student loan debt situation is not a source of financial systemic risk. Feature We first outlined our view that U.S. assets were in a policy sweet spot back in September 2016, noting that the monetary policy sweet spot won't end for risk assets until interest rates climb above the equilibrium rate. Nine months later, policy remains in the sweet spot, thanks to a beneficial combination of moderate economic growth, healthy corporate profit growth, stable margins and low inflation. Last week's CPI report was disconcerting, but did reinforce the notion that the Fed can take its time. Thus, when investors ask: "How can equity prices and bond prices both be moving higher?" Our answer is: "Because we are still in the sweet spot." Low And Slow Wins The Day Investors are wondering how the equity market can hold up given that the bond market and the dollar appear to be signaling sluggish economic growth. We look at it another way. Rising equity prices, low and falling bond yields and stable credit spreads are all consistent with today's low growth and inflation backdrop, where the Fed can take its time raising rates. The FOMC reaffirmed its intended path for rates at last week's meeting (see below). If the Fed's modest forecasts for growth and inflation are met, the central bank will raise rates gradually and begin to shrink its balance sheet. The implication for investors is that the recent outperformance of stocks over bonds accompanied by positive correlations between the two can persist for some time. Lessons from the 1950s and 1990s are helpful in illustrating this point. During the 1950s (Chart 1A, the Fed was gradually raising rates, but inflation and long rates remained low. Even as rates edged higher, stocks outperformed bonds, despite a booming economy that was near full employment. In the 1990s, long bond yields fell even as equity prices surged. Inflation was well contained for most of that decade (Chart 1B). Chart 1ABond Yields, Stocks, Inflation And The Fed In The 1950s... Chart 1B...And In The 1990s At what point will bond market become a problem for stocks? Charts 2 and 3 show that low inflation and low rates are both critical to keeping stock and bond yields positively correlated. The 4.25% level on the 10-year Treasury is a critical level to watch based on the historical relationship between Treasury yields and stock-bond correlations. However, the reason for rising bond yields is as important as the level of yields. An increase in long-dated Treasury yields associated with a pickup in real growth is less of a threat to equities than a rise in yields due to an uptick in inflation, because the latter invites a more aggressive Fed tightening cycle. Chart 3 shows that core inflation around or below 2% supports a positive correlation between stock and bond yields. As inflation begins to move from 2 to 3%, the relationship fluctuates, and above 3% there are very few periods of positive correlation. All signs point to a depressed inflation environment over the next year, which is one of the keys to keeping bond yields and stock prices positively correlated. We expect core CPI to move back up to 2% in the medium term, and the Fed agrees. The central bank's latest forecast puts inflation at just 2% for the next two years and in the long run. Bottom Line: Stocks can handle rising bond yields as long as higher yields are driven by better growth and not inflation. With inflation low and bonds yields at 2.15%, we are a long way from where bond yields become a problem for the stock market. FOMC: Sticking With The Roadmap For Now It was a wild ride in the Treasury market last week as bonds first rallied hard on the heels of some data releases, before selling off after the FOMC failed to deliver a fully "dovish hike". May retail sales were decent below the surface. The "control group" measure that feeds into the GDP figures was flat in May, but was revised up to a 0.6% gain in April (Chart 4). The result was a solid 4.3% annualized gain over the past three months. This suggests that, although not booming, consumer spending growth is solid in the second quarter. U.S. household balance sheets are in solid shape, as we highlight below. The FOMC was probably not swayed by this report. The CPI report was another story (Chart 5). The energy component pulled down the headline rate as expected, but the softening of inflation is widespread in the index. The annualized 3-month rate of change in the core rate fell virtually to zero in May. Disinflation can be seen in areas that have little to do with the output gap, such as shelter and medical care. But it is also showing up in other services, a segment of the CPI that is most highly correlated with wage growth and labor market pressure. The sudden broad-based change in direction is difficult to explain and, at a minimum, presents a challenge to the view that the U.S. economy is approaching its non-inflationary limits. Chart 4Consumer Spending##BR##Remains Solid Chart 5Disinflation In Core Services##BR##Is A Challenge To Fed's View Bonds rallied heading into the FOMC meeting on the view that the Fed would deliver a rate hike as promised, but would revise down the "dot plot" or, at a minimum, would play up concerns about the inflation undershoot. In the event, the Fed did neither. Chart 6Labor Market Continues To Tighten The statement acknowledged the disappointing inflation readings, but also revealed a determination to normalize interest rates in the face of a tight labor market. In the press conference, Chair Yellen downplayed the inflation shortfall, pointing to some one-off factors. She stressed that the FOMC makes policy for the "medium term," and should not over-react to short-term wiggles in the data. Given the tight labor market, the Fed Chair argued that the conditions are in place for inflation to move higher. Indeed, the median FOMC forecast for headline and core inflation was revised down for this year only; the outlook for 2018 and 2019 was left unchanged at 2%. Growth was revised up a little for 2017. We agree with the FOMC that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. The underlying trend in wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% today according to our wage tracker, in line with the narrowing of the unemployment gap over the period (Chart 6). The FOMC trimmed its estimate of the full-employment level of unemployment by 0.1 percentage points to 4.6%, but it revised down its forecast for the actual unemployment rate by a larger 0.3 percentage points over the next two years. This means that the projected amount of excess labor demand is now greater than in the March projection. By itself, this should make the FOMC more predisposed to tightening, especially since financial conditions have been easing. That said, the May CPI report was admittedly disconcerting due to the broad-based nature of the disinflationary pulse. This is contrary to Chair Yellen's assertion that the inflation disappointment reflects one-off factors. The May CPI report could be a head-fake, related to normal randomness in the data. But it is not clear why there would be a sudden and widespread moderation of inflation. Inflation Expectations Plunge A large portion of the decline in long-term Treasury yields since March reflected a decline in inflation expectations. The 10-year CPI swap rate has dropped by 35 basis points over the period. BCA's fixed-income strategists point out that the decline in long-term inflation expectations has been widespread across the major countries, irrespective of whether or not actual inflation is trending up or down.1 Given all these diverging signals within the national inflation data, it is odd that there has been such a uniform decline in inflation expectations across the major bond markets. That leads us to look to the oil price decline as the main driver. Weaker energy prices have been part of a broader move lower in commodity prices that is likely related to less reflationary monetary and fiscal policies out of the world's biggest commodity consumer, China. However, our commodity strategists have noted that export and import volumes in the emerging economies accelerated sharply in the first quarter of 2017. Given that there is a strong correlation between trade volumes and oil demand in the emerging markets, this bodes well for a rebound in global oil demand. Combined with the "OPEC 2.0" production cuts, the demand-supply balance in world oil markets is likely to turn positive in the months ahead, which will allow oil prices to return to a range close to $60/bbl by year-end. A move in oil prices back to that level would help arrest the downturn in overall commodity price indices, and stabilize goods CPI inflation in the developed economies in the latter half of 2017. This should also boost global inflation expectations and bond yields, especially since inflation expectations have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. This forecast also applies to the U.S. bond market, although one cannot blame the deceleration in inflation entirely on energy in this case. We expect inflation to move higher in line with the tight labor market, but we may have to change our view if service sector inflation continues to move lower in the next few of months. Balance Sheet News Chart 7Main Risk To Bond Yields Is To The Upside The Fed also provided some details on plans to shrink the balance sheet in terms of the size of the monthly "run off". If the economy evolves as the Fed expects, the balance sheet will start to shrink later this year. Reducing the Fed's balance sheet will be negative for Treasury prices as we argued in the May 22, 2017 Weekly Report, but the impact of this adjustment on its own will be modest. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions get too tight, too quickly (i.e. the term premium would rise, but would be partly offset by a lower expected path for the fed funds rate). Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. The bottom line is that the FOMC is looking-through the inflation shortfall for now and is sticking with its rate hike plan. The evolution of inflation in the coming months will obviously be key. Nonetheless, given that only one more rate hike is expected over the next year, inflation expectations are back to U.S. pre-election levels, and that the 10-year U.S. term premium is well below zero again, it appears that the main risk for bond yields is to the upside (Chart 7). The equity market should benefit in the short-term to the extent that market expectations for a flatter rate hike cycle are driven by lower inflation expectations, rather than a slower growth outlook. If we are correct that inflation expectations will bounce later this year, the associated bond sell-off may present a small headwind for stocks. Nonetheless, we do not believe this will derail the rally in risk assets until inflation has reached the Fed's 2% target, and bond yields and the dollar are significantly higher. The Consumer Comeback Continues The latest readings on the health of household balance sheet from the Fed's flow of funds accounts reinforce our view that the consumer sector will provide solid support for the U.S. economy through 2017 and beyond. Household net worth continues to rise and is well above average at this point in a long expansion (Chart 8). While the total wealth effect for consumer spending is lagging behind prior cycles, it remains supportive. Debt to income ratios are at multi-decade lows. The result of the ongoing balance sheet repair is that FICO scores have hit an all time high (Chart 8, panel 4). The most recent Fed Senior Loan Officer's Survey also suggests that the banking sector is willing to lend to households and that consumers themselves are open to borrowing, although household demand for loans has weakened in recent quarters (Chart 9). Chart 8Support For Consumer Remains In Place Chart 9Senior Loan Officers Survey Still Supportive Consumer spending intentions also remain in an uptrend, and while consumers do not always do what they say, the 10-year high readings on "plans to buy" a house and a car are telling. (Chart 10, panels 1 and 2). Overall measures of consumer confidence also remain at 16 year highs (Chart 10, panel 3). Chart 10Consumers Are In A Good Mood The sturdy labor market, modest wage growth, and low inflation are all factors that support a solid pace of real income growth, adding another support to the spending backdrop (Chart 10, panel 4). Rising rates do not pose a threat to spending for two main reasons, at least in the early stages of the Fed tightening cycle. First, we expect Fed rate hikes to be gradual this year and next, putting only modest upward pressure on longer-dated Treasury yields that anchor consumer loan rates for mortgages, autos, and personal loans. Our colleagues in The Bank Credit Analyst concluded that household interest payment burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, in the next couple of years even if borrowing rates increase immediately by 100bps for today's levels. According to their analysis, it would require a much more significant shock, i.e. 300bps or greater, to move interest payments as a share of GDP back toward historical averages.2 We continue to receive many questions from clients on the risks posed by the rise in student debt levels. The Bank Credit Analyst publication covered the topic in a comprehensive report back in November 2016.3 The key takeaway from that report for investors was that student debt is a modest drag for economic growth, but is not a source of risk for U.S. government finances and does not represent the next subprime crisis. More than half a year later, our conclusions remain the same, though the concern among investors has not abated. A recent report4 by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides some data on student loans through Q1 2017. More specifically, the report noted that student debt levels continued to rise in Q4 2016 and Q1 2017, and that student loan delinquencies remain high by historical standards but moved sideways in recent years. We will continue to monitor the student loan and all other forms of consumer indebtedness as we assess the risks in the U.S. economy. However, the elevated level of student loan delinquencies does not change our overall assessment of the impact of student loans on the economy and the financial system. Student loans are only a mild economic headwind, and do not represent a source of financial systemic risk. Bottom Line: The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. This climate will allow the Fed to raise rates one more time this year and begin to pare its balance sheet. The solid underpinnings for the consumer will sustain corporate earnings growth and, ultimately, higher stock prices. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report "Alternative Facts In The Bond Market," dated June 13, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Global Debt Titanic Collides With Fed Iceberg?," dated February 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Student Loan Blues: Can't Replay What I Borrowed," dated October 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Quarterly Report On Household Debt And Credit", dated May 2017, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2017Q1.pdf
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The rally in the S&P restaurants index has run its course and a profit recovery is fully discounted. Lock in profits and downgrade to neutral. Intensified inter-industry competition, the onslaught of online retailers and a rebounding U.S. economy are stiff headwinds for hypermarket stocks. Sell positions down to neutral. Recent Changes S&P Restaurants - Downgrade to neutral, booking profits of 11%. S&P Hypermarkets - Downgrade to neutral. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 remained resilient in the face of the fourth Fed interest rate hike and the drubbing in the tech sector. The latter is notable given that a select few stocks have contributed roughly one quarter of the overall market's gains this year, and signals that money is not leaving equities en masse, but is merely rotating into other sectors. This suggests that consolidation rather than correction is the main watchword. Our view remains that stocks are in a sweet spot: a lack of inflation pressures has kept long-term interest rates at bay, despite decent economic momentum and rising corporate profits. The latter have been driven by impressive corporate pricing power gains (see Chart 1 from last week's Weekly Report), creating an ideal equity market scenario whereby the business sector can grow profits without any corresponding consumer price inflation pressures. Investors are likely to extrapolate this goldilocks equity scenario for a while longer, given that our Reflation Gauge (RG), a combination of oil prices, Treasury yields and the U.S. dollar, has exploded to the highest level since 2010 and just shy of all-time highs. The RG leads both the U.S. economic surprise index and equity sentiment (Chart 1). If economic activity begins to reaccelerate, as we expect and irrespective of tax reform success, the window is open for additional equity market gains. Meanwhile, the mini sector rotation that commenced two weeks ago is a healthy development and may not be a precursor to a more vicious and widespread correction. In recent Weekly Reports, we have shown that our Equity Market Internal Dynamics Indicator was signaling that upward momentum in the broad market was well supported by the character of market participation (see Chart 2 from the May 15th Weekly Report). Chart 1Coiled Spring Chart 2Healthy Rotation Chart 2 shows that lately the small/large ratio has sprung back to life. Growth/value stalled near the previous all-time peak, and capital has flowed out of frothy tech stocks and into the cheaper and more economic-sensitive financials sector. Against a backdrop of a budding rebound in domestic economic data, this recent market rotation is likely to stay intact. That view is corroborated by the collapse in correlations among stocks and overall assets. The CBOE's implied correlation index has fallen to fresh cyclical lows, which suggests that investors have become increasingly discerning and that earnings fundamentals/valuations should become the primary drivers of stock market returns. Keep in mind that empirical evidence shows that receding stock correlations also underpin the broad equity market (top & bottom panels, Chart 2). All of these fluctuations signal that the broad equity market is more likely to build a base before it resumes its advance to new cyclical highs, rather than suffer an imminent and major correction. As such, we continue to slowly and deliberately recalibrate our portfolio away from its previously heavy bias toward defensives. This week we make two consumer-related shifts. Restaurants: Beware Of Heartburn One quarter ago we posited that the consolidation phase in the broad consumer discretionary sector restored value and created an attractive entry point. Washed out technicals and an upswing in industry earnings fundamentals supported our thesis (Chart 3). An upgrade in the S&P restaurants sub-index to overweight provided an attractive way to execute that thesis. This view has largely played out, as restaurant shares have bested the market by double digits since March 20th. Is there any more upside left to this impressive quarterly relative return? We doubt it. While we remain constructive on the overall consumer discretionary sector (Chart 4), we recommend crystalizing gains of 11% in the S&P restaurants index and downshifting to neutral. Chart 3Stay ##br##The Course... Chart 4...As Our Consumer Drag ##br## Indicator Is Flashing Green Q1 industry conference calls revealed that improved store traffic and better offerings boosted same-store sales, and relative share prices followed suit from a technically depressed level. That caused sell side analysts to modestly lift relative EPS forecasts, but a valuation re-rating still explains the bulk of the stock price surge (Chart 5). We are reluctant to pay a 40% premium to the broad market on a 12-month forward P/E basis. The National Restaurant Association's Restaurant Performance Index fell to the boom/bust 100 line and downside momentum has accelerated (second panel, Chart 5). Worrisomely, the Current Situation Index (not shown) of the same survey was in the contraction zone for "the sixth time in the last seven months". Similarly, the Expectations Index also decelerated, heralding an uncertain dining outlook. Indeed, demand for away from home dining is on the decline in absolute terms and compared with overall retail sales and consumption (middle panel, Chart 6). This suggests that the first quarter increase in store traffic may not be sustainable (top panel, Chart 6). The recent spike in restaurant construction expenditures will further dilute same-store sales growth opportunities (bottom panel, Chart 6). Chart 5Too Expensive Chart 6Do Not Overstay Your Welcome Leading indicators of profit margins have also eroded. An uptick in commodity input costs and 8% growth in the industry's wage bill, stand in marked contrast with anemic industry pricing power. Our restaurants profit margin gauge captures all of these forces and warns that a squeeze looms (Chart 7). Nevertheless, it is not all bad news. The improvement in consumer finances should counterbalance some of the casual dining industry's deficient demand hiccups. Rising household net worth makes consumers feel wealthier, and therefore increases their marginal propensity to spend. Importantly, the $15-$35K income cohort also expects a sizable boost to their take home pay, according to the latest Conference Board survey data (not shown). Importantly, the earnings headwind from foreign sales exposure has likely morphed into a profit tailwind. U.S. dollar softness is not only evident against G10 currencies, but also emerging market (EM) FX rates (Chart 8). In addition, healthy EM domestic demand is the mirror image of fickle U.S. final demand. EM central banks are easing monetary policy - whereas the Fed hiked for a fourth time this cycle last week - in order to rekindle EM consumer spending/growth. As a result, EM restaurant sales should improve (Chart 8). Chart 7Rising Input Costs ##br##Are Eating Into Margins Chart 8Export ##br## Relief Valve In sum, the playable rally in the S&P restaurants index has run its course and a profit recovery is fully priced in frothy valuations. The V-shaped rebound in share prices has outpaced fundamental improvements, and a consolidation/corrective phase is inevitable. Bottom Line: While we remain overweight the S&P consumer discretionary sector, we recommend booking profits of 11% in the S&P restaurants index (MCD, SBUX, YUM, DRI, CMG), and moving to a benchmark allocation. Time To Downgrade Hypermarkets While investors have shed anything retail related year-to-date (YTD), big box retailers have been a positive exception. In fact, the S&P hypermarkets index has been a stalwart performer YTD, outshining both the broad consumer staples universe and the overall market. Is this impressive run-up sustainable? The short answer is no. Three main headwinds suggest that some caution is warranted now that index outperformance has eliminated the previous valuation appeal: soft pricing power likely further aggravated by new German competitors expanding in/entering the U.S. market, the ongoing assault from online retailers and the improving U.S. economy, especially consumer spending. These factors imply that profit margins will remain under chronic pressure, but concerns could become more acute on a cyclical basis. Consumer goods import prices have surged in recent months (Chart 9), and the depreciating U.S. dollar is likely to sustain this uptrend. Cutthroat competition means that retailers will likely absorb these rising costs, to the detriment of profit margins. While food prices are making an effort to exit the deflation zone, ALDI and Lidl, two deep-pocketed German competitors are entering the U.S. retail scene, reportedly with massive expansion plans. Tesco, Sainsbury's and ASDA in the U.K., Carrefour in Europe and Woolworth's and Coles in Australia continue to feel the wrath of German retailers. Consequently, it would be dangerous to extrapolate the nascent improvement in retail food CPI. All of this is likely to sustain the profit margin squeeze (Chart 9). Further, the online retail onslaught will continue to escalate. The Amazon juggernaut appears unstoppable. The latest news that it will take over Whole Foods Market confirms that even grocery sales are now seriously on its radar screen. Chart 10 shows that non-store retail sales continue to grow at a much faster pace than traditional retailers. The greater the market share gains for online retailers, the larger the downward pressure on hypermarkets relative profitability (relative retail sales shown inverted, second panel, Chart 10). Chart 9Margin Pressures Chart 10Beware Online Retailers' Onslaught Under such a tough operating backdrop we are reluctant to pay a premium valuation for this safe haven sector. Worrisomely, soft revenue growth argues against a further a valuation re-rating (Chart 11). Finally, macro forces required to spur better revenue no longer exist. The U.S. economy has entered a self-reinforcing recovery. While personal consumption expenditures have underwhelmed of late, buoyant job certainty and a vibrant housing market are boosting consumer confidence. Before long, consumers should loosen their purse strings and indulge anew. Historically, a lively consumer spending backdrop has been inversely correlated with relative share prices (PCE is shown inverted, Chart 12). Similarly, Federal tax coffers have started to refill following a one year hiatus (bottom panel, Chart 12). The implication is that incomes and profits are expanding, boosting the incentive for consumers to "trade up" and shop at higher ticket stores. Nevertheless, some partial offsets exist. The lower income consumer is the industry's main clientele and low interest rates, low gasoline prices and soaring income confidence for this consumer cohort should cushion store traffic woes (third panel, Chart 13). Chart 11Derating ##br## Warning Chart 12Improving Economy = ##br## Bad Omen For Hypermarkets Chart 13Positive ##br##Offsets Meanwhile, the overall retail sales price deflator has tentatively troughed, albeit it continues to deflate. Given the high volume nature of the hypermarket industry, any small positive change in pricing power tends to have a meaningful impact on sales growth (second panel, Chart 13). Multi-year highs in overall income growth signals that on average consumers will have more disposable income. The bottom panel of Chart 13 shows that income growth has been a reliable indicator for hypermarket EPS. Adding it up, this is an opportune time to book modest profits and downgrade exposure in the S&P hypermarkets index to neutral. Intensified inter-industry competition, the onslaught of online retailers and a rebounding U.S. economy argue against extrapolating recent optimism far into the future. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P hypermarkets index to a benchmark allocation (WMT, COST). Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Highlights The Federal Reserve stuck to its guns, which lifted the U.S. dollar despite a disastrous CPI report. We agree with the Fed's assessment and expect U.S. inflation to pick up, clearing the way for higher interest rates and a stronger dollar. With three dissenters voting in favor of higher rates, the Bank of England meeting delivered a hawkish surprise. However, the inflation surge will continue to weigh on consumer spending, limiting the capacity of the BoE to increase rates. Stay short cable, but use any rally in EUR/GBP above 0.88 to short this cross. The Canadian economy is strong, and the CAD should perform well on its crosses. However, USD/CAD downside is limited. Go short EUR/SEK. Feature This week was replete with central bank meetings, most crucially the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, which provided much-needed color on the near-term future direction of global monetary policy. While the BoE does face a serious rise in inflation, it is still focused on the risks to U.K. growth. In contrast, the Fed mostly ignored the disastrous inflation report released the morning before its policy announcement and kept its focus on the underlying strength in the U.S. economy. We believe both institutions are pursuing the appropriate strategy for their respective economies. The Fed: Straight Ahead Fed Chair Janet Yellen and her gang increased the fed funds rate by 25 basis points to 1-1.25% and pre-announced the parameters around the reduction in the Fed's balance sheet size. On the balance sheet front, the Fed removed any doubt that it will begin reducing its asset holdings this year. Additionally, the Fed provided its new set of forecasts for growth, inflation, unemployment, and interest rates. While it increased its growth forecast for 2017 to 2.2% from 2.1%, it curtailed its core PCE deflator forecast for 2017 by 0.3 percentage points to 1.6%. However, in line with its conviction that the soft patch in inflation is temporary, it kept its 2018 and 2019 core PCE forecasts at 2%. The Fed did also acknowledge that the equilibrium unemployment rate was lower than it believed in March, decreasing its long-term estimate by 0.1% to 4.6%. However, despite recognizing that NAIRU has fallen, the Fed still thinks the labor market is tight. It proceeded to curtail its unemployment rate forecasts by 0.2% in 2017 to 4.3%, and by 0.3% in 2018 and 2019 to 4.2%. Congruent with these forecasts, the Fed did not adjust its intended path for interest rates. It still expects to hike rates once more in 2017, and three more times in both 2018 and 2019. As a result of these policy changes and the intentions associated with the new set of forecasts, the dollar recouped its CPI report-induced decline, and gold suffered. Most interestingly, the market seems to believe that the Fed is entering the realm of policy mistakes as the 2-10-year yield curve flattened considerably, and inflation expectations plunged to their lowest levels since November 4, 2016 (Chart I-1). But is the Fed really making a mistake? We do not think so. Simply put, we agree with the Fed that underlying economic momentum in the U.S. is real, and that both wage growth and inflation will turn the corner this summer. To begin with, our composite capacity utilization gauge, based on both industrial capacity and labor market utilization, is now fully into "no slack" territory. Historically, this has given the Fed the green light to increase interest rates. There is no mystery behind this relationship: when this indicator is above the zero line, inflation pressures emerge and wage growth accelerates (Chart I-2). This time is unlikely to prove different. Chart I-1A Policy ##br##Mistake? Chart I-2Conditions In Place For Higher##br## Inflation And Rates Supporting this assessment, many indicators show that the recent slowdown in wage growth will prove a temporary phenomenon. First, the spread between the Conference Board's "jobs plentiful" and "jobs hard to get" series still points to accelerating average hourly earnings (Chart I-3). Second, the labor market is likely to remain healthy. True, the fastest pace of job creation is behind us, a key symptom that labor market slack is vanishing, but some of our favorite employment indicators - such as Janet Yellen's labor market condition index and the NFIB job openings and hiring plans subcomponents - have picked up again (Chart I-4). In an environment of little slack, this might not translate into impressive nonfarm payroll numbers, but most likely faster wage growth. Chart I-3Wages Will Pick Up Chart I-4Yes, The Labor Market Is Healthy Third, capex intentions are still perky. Historically, capex intentions have tightly correlated with wages, and even the recent softness in wages was forecast by these intentions. This is simply because capex tends to require labor. When corporate investment materializes as worries about the durability of final demand hits cyclical lows, this is generally an environment that requires bidding up the price of labor - i.e. wages. This is precisely the current economic backdrop (Chart I-5). While the slowdown in bank credit to enterprises has caused many commentators to worry about the outlook for capex, we do not share these concerns. For one, although businesses may not have been tapping bank loans in Q1, they have been aggressively borrowing in the bond market (Chart I-6, top panel). Moreover, credit standards are now easing anew, and small firms are reporting little difficulty in accessing credit (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Good Outlook For Growth And Wages Chart I-6I Need Credit; No Problem! With respect to consumption, weren't retail sales on the soft side as well? Here again, we need to step back. Real retail sales continue to grow at a healthy 4.2% annual pace; meanwhile, the so-called control group - which affects GDP computations - was flat in May, but the April number was revised to 0.6% month-on-month, suggesting real consumption will be robust in Q2. In fact, federal income tax withholdings, a good proxy for household income growth, is also accelerating, further supporting consumption (Chart I-7). Overall, we agree with the Fed that the economy is on its way to escaping from its recent soft patch and that wage growth will accelerate. Ryan Swift, who writes our sister U.S. Bond Strategy service, has also recently argued that the U.S. Philips curve remains alive and well, and that wages and inflation will thus pick up again.1 Our own work does highlight the potential for not just wage growth but core CPI to also perk up. U.S. real business sales have been very strong of late, which historically has been a good leading indicator of core inflation (Chart I-8, top panel). Labor market dynamics tell a similar story. Our unemployment diffusion index is also a good leader of core CPI, and after a soft patch is now pointing to firming underlying inflation (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7Real Consumption Will Trudge Along Chart I-8Inflation Soft Patch Will End Therefore, we expect the recent negative inflation surprise in the U.S. to reverse. Moreover, inflation surprises in the U.S. are also likely to beat those of the euro area. To a very large extent, Europe's positive inflation surprise, especially relative to the U.S., reflected the 2014 collapse in the euro. The recent stability in the euro since March 2015 further reinforces that the boost to European relative monetary conditions is dissipating, and that European inflation surprise will not outpace the U.S. going forward (Chart I-9). Chart I-9U.S. Inflation Surprises ##br##Will Pick Up Versus Europe's Chart I-10Diverging Policy ##br##Expectations This is very important, as these relative inflation surprise dynamics have been the key factor underpinning divergent expectations behind ECB policy and the Fed's path. While investors have increasingly brought forward the ECB's first hike, they have aggressively curtailed the number of hikes expected in the U.S. over the next two years (Chart I-10). If, as we expect, relative inflation surprises do once again move in favor of the U.S., this gap will disappear, supporting the dollar in the process. Bottom Line: The Fed is right to stay the course. The economy continues to display momentum, and the inflation soft patch should soon dissipate. Moreover, U.S. economic surprises are bottoming. As such, we expect market expectations for inflation and interest rates to move back toward the Fed's forecast, lifting the U.S. dollar in the process. BoE Dissenters Grab The Headlines, But... The poor BoE is in an infinitely more tenuous situation than the Fed. Core inflation continues to pick up, but economic uncertainty is also on the rise. This dichotomy is most pronounced when it comes to wages. At 2.6%, core inflation is now outpacing wage growth, thus real income levels are contracting (Chart I-11). This is problematic because at 65% of GDP, the U.K. is an economy fundamentally driven by consumer spending. As Chart I-12 illustrates, when inflation picks up and puts downward pressure on real wages, consumption sags. Therein lies the BoE's conundrum. Chart I-11U.K.: Inflation Everywhere, But Not In Wages Chart I-12The BOE's Dilemma Despite the three dissenters who voted in favor of a hike this week, we expect the BoE to continue to favor not lifting rates, leaving its accommodation in place.2 Household inflation expectations remain well moored, but a further relapse in growth could prompt a widening of the output gap and produce entrenched deflationary expectations down the line - something BoE Governor Mark Carney and his colleagues want to avoid at all costs. Chart I-13U.K. FDI At Risk Some investors have been wondering out loud about the likelihood of a "soft Brexit" coming back on the agenda, arguing that it would support the pound. Remaining in the common market is, after all, an unmitigated positive for the U.K. But to be part of the common market, the U.K. also has to adopt the sacrosanct freedom of movement of people. We remain unconvinced that the British will budge on this point. Brexit was first and foremost a rejection of neo-liberal ideals that have been perceived as detrimental to the British middle class. And no point has been and continues to be more contentious than immigration. With the EU absolutely unwilling to dilute freedom of movement, access to the common market for the U.K. remains a distant dream. Moreover, with the British median voter switching to the left, a topic discussed in last Friday's Geopolitical Strategy Service Special Report on the election, British politics are likely to become less business friendly.3 Compounding this issue, U.K. industrial production is flat on an annual basis, bucking the global improvement seen last year and implying that the falling pound has not boosted competitiveness in the U.K. manufacturing sector. Together these forces suggest that the recent upsurge in FDI inflows into the U.K. could reverse in coming quarters (Chart I-13), a big problem for a country with a current account deficit of more than 4% of GDP and deeply negative real rates. Ultimately, the pound is cheap, trading at a one-sigma discount to its fair value. This means the market is well aware of the negatives that are weighing on sterling. Thus, the risks to GBP are well balanced. As a result, we expect GBP/USD to finish the year toward 1.2 because of our expectation of USD strength. EUR/GBP has limited upside, and rises above 0.88 should be used to build short positions. Bottom Line: The BoE decision was in line with expectations, but the market was nonetheless surprised by the fact that three MPC members dissented and voted for a rate hike. Sure, British inflation is on the rise, but this is hurting household real incomes, and thus consumption. These dynamics limit the upside risk to policy rates. We think that GBP could weaken against the USD; we would use moves above 0.88 to short EUR/GBP. The Bank Of Canada Volte Face Despite a 5% fall in oil prices this week, the CAD has appreciated 1.2% against the USD. Behind this impressive move has been Monday's speech by Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins, in which she hinted that the Bank of Canada's next move will be a hike, coming sooner than investors have been anticipating. The BoC assessed that the negative impact of the fall in oil prices in 2014-'15 has passed, and that domestic strength in the Canadian economy has become self-sustaining. With the output gap expected to close in Q2 2018, the logical path for policy is tighter. Do the indicators warrant such a view? Yes: Canadian employment is quite strong, growing at a 1.8% annual pace. Unemployment too has fallen substantially. Capacity utilization is elevated in the manufacturing sector, thanks to a decade of low corporate investment. If our assessment of the U.S. capex cycle is correct, Canadian goods exports should pick up, adding to capacity and inflationary pressures in the country (Chart I-14). Our Canadian economic diffusion index - based on retail trade, manufacturing sales, building permits, and employment data in the 10 provinces - has sharply accelerated, pointing to a continued rise in GDP growth. Canadian LEIs and PMIs are all strong. Canadian house prices continue to forge ahead, growing at a 14% annual rate, which will additionally support Canadian consumption. This picture highlights that the BoC does have room to adjust its forward guidance, especially if the Fed stays on its desired path. Today, not only are investors the most short CAD since early 2007, but the loonie is cheap relative to real rate differentials (Chart I-15). As a result of these distortions, CAD could respond very positively to continued reaffirmation by the BoC that policy may become tighter. Chart I-14O Canada Chart I-15CAD At A Discount To Rates Practically, due to our broad bullish outlook on the USD, we find the most interesting way to play CAD strength is through its various crosses. Thus, we remain short EUR/CAD, short AUD/CAD, and long CAD/NOK. Bottom Line: The Canadian economy has escaped its funk. True, the long-term risks associated with the housing bubble will ultimately come home to roost. However, in the short term, the BoC is finding room to lift its forward guidance. As a result, CAD is likely to move higher on non-USD crosses. EUR/SEK Is A Short EUR/SEK should weaken in the coming quarters. To begin with, EUR/SEK is trading at a 7% premium against its PPP fair value. Additionally, the real trade-weighted SEK stands at a one-sigma discount to its long-term fundamental fair value, which further highlights the SEK's upside potential versus the euro, the main trading counterparty of Sweden (Chart I-16). Valuations are not enough to motivate a position. Economics need to join the ball. Today, the Swedish output gap is positive while that of Europe remains negative. Unsurprisingly, Swedish core inflation has overtaken that of the euro area (Chart I-17). Moreover, while we have argued at length why euro area core inflation is likely to disappoint going forward,4 pressure on Swedish resources is such that Swedish core inflation is likely to display additional upside (Chart I-18). Chart I-16SEK Is Cheap Chart I-17Swedish Core Inflation Is Outpacing Europe's Chart I-18Swedish Core Inflation Will Rise Further This means there will be attractive relative policy dynamics between the Riksbank and the ECB in the coming months. If the ECB has to tighten policy, the Riksbank has an even better case to be hawkish. If, however, the global economic environment prevents the ECB from tightening and forces it toward an easing bias, these global deflationary pressures should prove more muted in Sweden. Thus, we expect that Swedish policy will tighten relative to the ECB's, despite the economic and inflation environment. Chart I-19CPI Expectations Differential Will Push ##br##Policy Toward A Lower EUR/SEK Additionally, inflation expectations are pointing toward a lower EUR/SEK. The recent Swedish Prospera inflation survey showed that economic agents are expecting a pickup in inflation. As a result, market-based inflation expectations in Sweden have outperformed those in Germany, pointing to a lower EUR/SEK (Chart I-19). Essentially, this reflects potential changes in the relative direction of policy between the two currencies. The big risk to this view is that Stefan Ingves, the Riksbank governor, continues to be one of the most dovish policy makers in the world. However, his term ends on January 1, 2018, and unless he is renewed for another six years, his words and desires will increasingly lose their ability to affect markets. Bottom Line: The Swedish economy is increasingly moving closer to an inflationary environment. This cannot yet be said about the euro area. With inflation expectations sharply moving up in Sweden versus the euro zone, investors should begin betting against EUR/SEK. Housekeeping We are closing our short USD/JPY trade this week at a 4.2% profit. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 3, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Moreover, one of the dissenters was Kristin Forbes, who was attending her last meeting as a member of the MPC. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled, "U.K. Election: The Median Voter Has Spoken", dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "ECB: All About China?", dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Chairwoman Janet Yellen has halted the dollar selloff for now, with the DXY finally seeing some upside. Following the press conference, the greenback sits 1.2% above the lows seen prior to the Fed policy meeting. We share the view of the Fed and the expect markets to converge over time toward the Fed's forecasts. Additionally, Yellen confirmed that there is still one more hike on the table this year. We believe the market continues to underprice these factors, concentrating too much on what amounts to a temporary soft patch. As we have said in the past, these factors will continue to widen rate differentials between the U.S. and its G10 counterparts. Report Links: Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion - June 2, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR/USD dropped on the news of a weak trade balance figure of EUR 19.6 bn, below the expected EUR 27.2 bn. Generally, EUR/USD has remained reasonably static as euro weakness was muted by equal dollar weakness, but recent Fed hawkishness has broken this trend. Draghi's hawkishness is tepid at best and the Fed hiking rates this Wednesday, as well as Yellen reiterating that another hike will be seen later this year will continue to help U.S. policy anticipations relative to Europe. As a result, rate differentials are likely to widen, and the euro to soften. The little appreciation in the euro earlier this week, was a result the following positives: German ZEW Survey's Current Situation went up to 88, beating expectations of 85; Euro Area ZEW Survey's Current Situation also went up to 37.7 from 35.1. Report Links: Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been negative: Domestic corporate goods prices grew by 2.1% YoY, against expectations of 2.2%. Machinery orders yearly growth came in at 2.7%, underperforming expectations by a wide margin. Industrial production yearly growth stayed flat at 5.7%. Ultimately, economic activity in Japan will largely depend on the currency. With the yen appreciating for most of 2017, it will be difficult for the Japanese economy to improve sustainably. At this point, we are closing our USD/JPY trade, as the correction in the U.S. dollar has run its course. Meanwhile, we remain bearish on NZD/JPY, as the rising dollar and the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions will deliver a formidable one-two punch to risk assets, and thus weigh on this cross. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Industrial Production contracted by 0.8% on a YoY basis, underperforming expectations. Manufacturing production yearly growth stayed flat, also underperforming. Meanwhile, both core and headline inflation came in above expectations, at 2.6% and 2.9% respectively. Yesterday the BoE came in more hawkish than expected, as Ian McCafferty and Michael Saunders joined Kristin Forbes voting and dissented in favor offor a hike. Meanwhile, in their monetary policy summary the BoE stated that inflation will stay above target for an "extended period". Following the report, EUR/GBP plunged by about 0.8%. We are now not positive on the pound, as core inflation is now outpacing wage growth, a development that should weigh on demand due to the decline in real income. This development could cause GBP/USD and EUR/GBP to reach 1.2 and 0.92 respectively to reach 1.2 by year end, but any move in EUR/GBP above 0.88 should be used to short this cross. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Data out of Australia was mixed this week: National Australia Bank's Business Confidence declined to 7 from 13; Westpac Consumer Confidence fell to -1.8% from -1.1%; However, the unemployment rate dropped to 5.5%, with full-time employment growing by 52,100, and part-time employment shrinking by 10,100. Most of the movement in the AUD was dominated by the employment data, seeing a broad-based increase versus other G10 currencies. While oil prices kept the CAD and NOK at bay, Chinese industrial production and retail sales increased at a 6.5% and 10.7% annual rate, respectively. Iron ore and copper, commodities important to Australia, however, saw little action, but coal saw a slight upside. The above dynamics resulted in the AUD outperforming other currencies versus the USD, and EUR/AUD weakened massively. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: Electronic card retail sales grew by 5.2% year-on-year, increasing from 4.2% the month before. However, the current account deficit came in at 3.1% of GDP against expectations of 2.7%. Meanwhile, yearly GDP growth came in at 2.5%, underperforming expectations. The kiwi rallied this week as expectations of a dovish fed weighed on the dollar, although most of these gains vanished following the FOMC press conference. We continue to be positive on the NZD relative to the AUD, given that the kiwi economy is in much better footing than the Australian one. However, upside for NZD/USD is limited, as this cross has reached highly overbought levels. Furthermore, the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions will become a headwind for a sustainable rally in the NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The downside in oil continues as EIA crude oil stocks decreased by 1.661 million barrels, less than the expected 2.739 million. AUD/CAD and NZD/CAD rallied on the news, while CAD/NOK levelled off. In the commodity space, we remain most positive on the Canadian economy. While oil prices are a hurdle, business and consumer confidence, as well as PMIs remain robust, and the BoC expects the output gap to close in Q2 2018. Our Commodity and Energy Strategy team continues to believe that OPEC cuts and increased oil demand will eventually curtail inventories. We therefore expect our short AUD/CAD trade to prove profitable as markets begin to digest these developments. While the CAD looks good on its crosses, the resumption of the dollar bull market will limit the USD/CAD's downside. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Yesterday, in their monetary policy statement, the SNB reasserted its dovish bias, pledging to keep its extremely accommodative monetary policy in the years to come. Their inflation outlook changed little, upgrading the near term slightly while downgrading the longer term outlook. It is important to consider that when the SNB states that they expect that inflation will reach only 1.5% by the first quarter of 2020, they do so assuming the LIBOR rate stays at -0.75%. Meanwhile, they also signaled that they will stay active intervening in the currency market, with SNB president Thomas Jordan reiterating that the Franc “remains significantly overvalued”. We had previously stated that the implied floor put under EUR/CHF by the SNB could be removed by the end of this year. However, this scenario now seems unlikely, given the strong commitment by the SNB to remain accommodative. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Following a sell-off for most of the beginning of the week, USD/NOK has rebounded sharply, following the FOMC interest rate decision. Furthermore, the disappointing draw in oil inventories also contributed to the surge in USD/NOK. We continue to be bearish on the NOK, given that inflation is still receding in Norway. Recent data supports this, with core inflation and producer prices falling from anewApril. Furthermore, any surge in the U.S. dollar will provide a tailwind to USD/NOK given that this cross is highly sensitive to the dollar. Another cross where we are positioned towe use to take advantage of gain from Norway's economic weakness difficulties is CAD/NOK. The Canadian economy is on ain much stronger footing than the Norwegian one, and the rally in the dollar has historically been a tailwind for this cross. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Sweden's economy is developing as expected, with headline inflation reading at the expected level of 1.7%, with a 0.1% monthly increase. Although inflation decreased from the previous 1.9% reading, the Riksbank's Resource Utilization Indicator - historically, a reliable indicator for core inflation - continues to point up, indicating that core inflation will accelerate further. We are putting on a short EUR/SEK trade on the basis of long-term valuations being in the favor of the krona. With a closed output gap, Sweden's economy is more advanced in its business cycle than the euro area', which points to a further bifurcation in inflation rates between the two. These factors will also warrant a quicker removal of policy support from the Riksbank than the ECB. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Investors have soured on hedge funds, withdrawing US$ 70 billion net last year. This is unsurprising because hedge funds have greatly underperformed global equities since the Global Financial Crisis, and have struggled to achieve a return of even cash plus 4% because of low volatility and high cross-asset correlation. But hedge funds still have a place in a balanced multi-asset portfolio. They have a good track record of outperforming equities in recessions. We favor macro funds as a recession hedge. This strategy has outperformed even bonds in the past three recessions, and is the only hedge fund class with positive skew and low kurtosis. Outside of a recession, we favor event-driven funds for their lower-beta equity exposure and idiosyncratic return profile. Feature The hedge fund industry has received a considerable amount of bad press over the past couple of years due to its poor performance and high fees. Since 2010, the average annual return from hedge funds has been just 4%, while global equities have returned almost 9% a year. Fees have been trimmed back from the traditional 2/20, but still average 1.5% of assets and 17% of performance.1 As a result, investors last year withdrew a net US$ 70.1 billion from hedge funds, the first year ever of net withdrawals, apart from the Global Financial Crisis years of 2008-9 (Feature Chart). According to a survey by Preqin, 84%2 of investors cited unfavorable terms and conditions as the reason for withdrawing their money. But are investors right to have turned sour on hedge funds? Does the asset class no longer have a place in a diversified multi-asset portfolio? Can hedge funds still provide a useful hedge against the sharp drawdown in risk assets likely in the next recession? As so often, the general picture obscures the details. Hedge funds invest using wildly different strategies. In this report, we analyze the historical risk and return characteristics of different categories of hedge funds, and test their resilience during historical recessions and equity bear markets. We also examine the characteristics of each main hedge fund strategy individually, and asses its usefulness in asset allocation. Our conclusions are that, in general, hedge funds represent an expensive way to generate a return that in recent times has failed to beat a target of cash plus 4%. Hedge funds suffer from style drift (tending to take on increasing risk as an equity bull market continues), and therefore do not always provide acceptable returns in downturns. Moreover, manager selection is difficult, especially for smaller funds without the manpower or expertise to handle it well. However, we find that: Event-driven funds (for example, activist and M&A arbitrage strategies) do have a good long-term track record of generating alpha; Macro funds have historically provided attractive downside protection in recessions. Investors, therefore, should not abandon their allocations in hedge funds. In a world where valuations for most asset classes (equities, bonds, private equity, real estate etc.) are stretched, and where the probability of a global recession in the next two to three years is relatively high, a thoughtful and well-scaled investment in hedge funds still makes sense. A note on the data we used in this report. All the hedge fund returns are based on the equally-weighted monthly indices (HFRI)3 produced by Hedge Fund Research, Inc. Funds included in these indices must (1) report returns net of all fees, and (2) have at least $50 million under management or have been actively trading for at least 12 months. HFR makes significant efforts to avoid survivor bias. When a fund is removed from the index, the performance remains in the index until the point of liquidation or when the manager requests removal from the database. HFR makes stringent efforts to receive data of a fund's performance right up until the point of liquidation. Likewise, when a new fund is added to the index, its performance up to that date does not affect the historical performance of the index. Finally, if a non-liquidated fund does not report to the HFR database for three consecutive months, the fund is subject to removal from the HFRI, but its historical data remains. Analyzing Historical Returns Hedge funds have produced an impressive return of 10.1% a year since 1990, when reliable data starts. This compares to 6.9% for global equities and 6.2% for global bonds over the same period (Table 1). But all of this outperformance came before 2010. Over the past seven years, hedge funds have returned only 4% a year, compared to 8.5% for equities and 3.8% for bonds. Table 1Risk And Return Analysis There has clearly been a structural decline in hedge fund returns over time. Each five-year period since 1990 has seen a lower return than the previous five years, and the trend decline in returns is seen across all the major categories of hedge fund strategy (Table 2 and Chart 2). This is probably because the rapid growth in the hedge fund industry caused arbitrage opportunities to dry up and because, as individual funds got larger, they had less flexibility to invest. Table 2Risk And Return Analysis - By Period Chart 2Structural Or Cyclical? Hedge funds are supposed to be vehicles that "hedge" downside risk in periods of market stress and so can consequently generate a consistent return in excess of the risk-free rate. As one would expect, their performance, therefore, tends to be closer to that of bonds than of equities and, unsurprisingly, they have a close correlation with the performance of bonds over equities (Chart 3). But they have struggled in recent years to beat even their generally accepted benchmark of Libor + 4% (Chart 2 panel 1). Chart 3Are Hedge Funds Just 2/20 Bonds? From a risk perspective, all hedge fund strategies have a volatility somewhere between that of equities and bonds. Hedge fund return distribution is non-normal. Three of the four hedge fund strategies have exhibited negative skew, i.e. a higher-than-normal probability of negative returns. However, relative value is the only strategy with a large excess kurtosis, meaning that investors should expect extreme returns in periods of market stress. Macro has been the only strategy with a positive skew and a lower excess kurtosis than global equities. What Happened In Recessions? Hedge funds are, in theory, designed to give positive returns even during recessions and equity bear markets. Indeed they did so during the recessions of July 1990-March 1991 and March-November 2000. But, with the exception of global macro funds, they failed dismally to achieve a positive return in the December 2007-June 2009 recession (Table 3). Note, however, that all categories of hedge funds did outperform equities in the most recent recession. Table 3Recession Performance Global macro has clearly been the best hedge fund strategy at giving downside protection during recessions. It was the only category to outperform bonds during all three recessions in our analysis (Chart 4). The strategy's global cross-asset mandate and extensive use of derivatives enables it to achieve an option-like return distribution. Its nimbleness at switching exposures depending on the macro environment is clear from its sharp change of correlation with bonds and equities between recessions and expansions (Chart 5). This phenomenon is also seen to a lesser extent for event-driven and relative-value strategies. On the other hand, equity-hedge strategies have rising correlations with equities during recessions, mainly because of their net long bias. The cause of each equity bear market also has an impact on which hedge fund strategies perform the best (Chart 6). For example, relative-value strategies did well in the 1990-91 bear market, which was not accompanied by a deep economic recession. Conversely, event-driven funds severely underperformed during the 2007-2009 bear market because M&A deal activity dried up. Accordingly, investors looking to preserve capital in the next equity bear market need to pick a strategy after careful consideration of the likely cause of the next turndown. Hedge Fund Strategies Hedge funds encompass a wide range of investment styles, with managers using a myriad of different strategies to try to generate alpha. Below, we analyze the four main hedge fund strategies, explain the dynamics of their sub-categories and the relative attractions of their styles, and draw some conclusions about which are likely to be most appropriate in which environments. We also touch on whether using a fund of funds ever makes sense. Equity Hedge This strategy (Table 4) takes a long-short approach in equities, working under dedicated mandates with regard to capitalization, style and sector. The core strength of the group is superior bottom-up stock-picking coupled with long-short systematic risk hedging. Alpha generation is greater in less efficient, segmented markets with barriers to the free flow of information. Relative performance of this category (Chart 7) tends to be strongest when: There is significant dispersion of performance between sectors and stocks, giving hedge funds increasing opportunities for long-short trades; Value stocks outperform, since many long-short funds tend to be long cheap stocks and short expensive ones; Small caps outperform large caps. Many relative-value funds focus their long positions in smaller firms and their short positions in larger ones since small-cap stocks are less covered by sell-side analysts, resulting in more pricing inefficiencies. As a result of these biases and their generally net long positions, long-short equity hedge funds tend to have the strongest correlations with global equity markets and to perform worst in equity bear markets. Table 4Equity Hedge Strategies Chart 7Equity Hedge: High Beta Equity Exposure Event Driven This strategy (Table 5) pursues more opportunistic mandates and its returns are usually contingent on the successful completion of a specific corporate event. These funds tend to have a shorter investment horizon and use hedging techniques to isolate the event's impact on returns by reducing systematic risk. Alpha generation is dependent on the manager's ability to predict the outcome of corporate events. Activist and distressed funds focus more on value creation through operational turnarounds and hence have a longer investment period. The health of the M&A market (Chart 8) is the single biggest factor determining relative performance versus the hedge fund composite since it dictates exit valuations for most of the sub-strategies. We do not expect a recession until 2019 at the earliest, so deal volumes are likely to remain buoyant, which should help merger arbitrage funds generate good returns. Table 5Event Driven Strategies Chart 8Event Driven: Dependent On M&A Health The strategy also has a close correlation with credit spreads. This is partly because M&A deals tend to increase as the cost of funding the acquisition declines in an economic expansion. But it is also because distressed and restructuring funds have become more prominent over the years and their performance is linked to improving credit conditions. Macro This group (Table 6) utilizes a wide range of strategies taking exposure to movements in macroeconomic factors and their impact on asset classes. These funds tend to use leverage extensively and also dynamic risk-management techniques. Macro funds try to structure tactical positions to anticipate inflection points, and have a track record of generating significant outperformance in periods of stress. This means that this category has low kurtosis and skew, and has proved to be the best strategy for downside protection in recessions. Apart from in recessions, macro funds tend to outperform (Chart 9) only in times of credit-market stress (high-yield spread widening). But their recession-hedging properties are attractive, as seen by their negative correlation with equities and positive correlation with bonds during downturns. These tactical shifts in correlation led it to be the best strategy in three out of past four equity bear markets. Table 6Macro Strategies Chart 9Macro: Best Recession Hedge We generally prefer systematic rules-based funds over actively managed discretionary funds, as systematic funds offer better downside protection in recessions. However, systematic funds tend to underperform in trendless sideways-moving markets. Relative Value This group (Table 7) predominantly takes long/short positions in the rates and credit space. Most of the trades are arbitrage driven and depend on long-run mean reversion, thereby profiting from short-term deviations from fair value. Individual trades tend to have small profits, and so managers rely on leverage to magnify returns. With leverage comes the potential for extreme swings, as seen in this strategy's extremely high kurtosis. A famous example is the failure of Long Term Capital Management,4 which, at its peak, had an AUM of US$ 125 billion but just US$ 5 billion in equity capital. During 1995 and 1996 returns averaged 40% a year after fees. But, in the Asian financial crisis and the Russian default of 1997-1998, assets shrank to less than $1 billion in a matter of months. Relative-value funds have outperformed the hedge fund composite since the Global Financial Crisis largely as a result of low interest rates, which have reduced the cost of gearing up their positions (Chart 10). A rise in interest rates would represent a major headwind for this strategy. Table 7Relative Value Strategies Chart 10Relative Value: Rising Rates Are A Headwind Equity and interest rate volatility are also bad for relative-value fixed-income funds. Spikes in volatility render risk management models less effective. Additionally, relative value funds have exposures to the corporate credit space within their convertible arbitrage and corporate arbitrage sub-strategies. Hence, this group tends to underperform when high-yield spreads widen. Funds Of Funds Chart 11FOFs: Underperforming All The Way This group has seen a secular decline in AUM from USD$ 1.2 trillion to US$ 340 billion over the past 10 years.5 Returns have been poor relative to hedge funds as a whole (Chart 11), mainly because of their double layer of fees. However, funds of funds continue to have some attractions for smaller investors that are unable to meet minimum subscriptions for hedge funds or do not have the ability to handle their own manager selection. Funds of funds typically charge 1-1.5% on top of the underlying hedge funds' fees (and sometimes also a 10% performance fee). However they can often use their size to negotiate with hedge funds for a better deal on fees and innovative fee structures: for example, a larger proportion of the fee based on performance coupled with a high hurdle rate. This way they can partly reduce the aggregate fee burden (Chart 11, Panel 3). For larger investors such as pension plans and university endowments there is a choice between using a fund of funds and running their own in-house multi-strategy program. If we assume that the average fund of funds charges 1% in management fees, an investor looking to allocate $100 million should prefer to do this via a fund of funds if the cost of running an in-house program would be more than $1 million a year. Investment Implications In theory, given their focus on absolute return, hedge funds should underperform somewhat in an expansion and outperform significantly in a recession. They will tend to perform relatively poorly when volatility is low and cross-asset correlations high, as has been the case over the past eight years. However, as intervention by global central banks fades over the coming years - and with the risk of a recession on the horizon - volatility is likely to mean-revert closer to historical averages, which should create more opportunities for alpha. The hedge fund industry could come into its own again. But picking the right managers and strategy is crucial. There is a large dispersion between the performance of top and bottom decile hedge fund managers: in 2016, for example, top-decile funds made an average return of +32.7%, bottom-decile managers -15.5%.6 Intra-correlation between hedge fund strategies has recently fallen to a new low (Chart 12), so it is also important to choose the right strategy. Investors should have a preference for smaller hedge funds. These can be more nimble, allowing them to liquidate assets more readily in a downturn, and to have easier access to smaller, more inefficiently priced markets. They are likely to continue their recent outperformance (Chart 13) in an environment more dependent on security selection. We have two broad strategy recommendations contingent on the market environment (Chart 14): In a recession. Overweight macro funds, given their track record of impressive downside protection in recessions and equity bear markets. Now should be an attractive entry point given that the group has underperformed the hedge fund composite by 35% since the financial crisis. Over the cycle. Overweight event-driven funds, which have historically been an effective equity play with idiosyncratic exposures and lower beta risk. Deal activity is likely to remain strong thanks to companies' large cash balances and, for U.S. companies, prospective corporate tax reforms which will allow them to repatriate retained earnings held overseas. Chart 12Strategy Picking Is Crucial Chart 14Overweight Event Driven And Macro Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com 1 Source: Hedge Fund Research. 2 Source: Preqin Investor Outlook: Alternative Assets H1 2017. 3 Source: HFRI Hedge Fund Indices, Defined Formulaic Methodology. 4 Source: http://www.investmentreview.com/print-archives/winter-1999/the-story-of-long-term-capital-management-752/ 5 Source: BarclayHedge. 6 Source: Hedge Fund Research.
Highlights Our "fair value" models incorporate prevailing domestic risk-free interest rates and long-term earnings, which provide an assessment on market valuation levels from a historical perspective. Hong Kong and Chinese A shares are substantially "undervalued" compared with their respective "fair values," while Taiwanese and Chinese investable stocks are roughly "fairly valued" according to our models. The PBoC will continue to enforce deleveraging in the financial sector through liquidity tightening. However, without genuine inflation pressures and any sign of economic overheating, the "deleveraging" process is likely to remain gradual, and its impact on growth will continue to be closely monitored by the authorities. Feature Investors have become increasingly concerned about the rapid expansion of U.S. equity multiples. By some measures, the market appears frothy by historical standards. The forward price-to-earnings ratio for U.S. stocks currently stands at about 18 times, and the cyclically adjusted PE (CAPE), or the Shiller PE for U.S. stocks, is over 26 times - both of which are substantially higher than historical norms (Chart 1). The red-hot performance and elevated valuation levels of the U.S. tech sector has brought back memories of the Internet mania of the late 1990s, which in part triggered a mini-meltdown in the NASDAQ last Friday. Beyond Valuation Indicators Compared with American bourses, other major markets are more reasonably valued, particularly emerging markets, including stocks in the greater China region. EM stocks are trading at about 13 times forward earnings, compared with 18 times for the U.S. (Chart 2). Similarly, forward PE ratios for Taiwan, Chinese A shares and Chinese investable stocks are all at around 13 times, and 16 times for Hong Kong. In addition, our calculations show that CAPEs for Taiwan and Chinese domestic A shares are both about 18 times, 12 times for Hong Kong stocks and a mere 8 times for investable Chinese shares, compared with over 26 times for the U.S. market. Chart 1U.S. Stocks: Valuation Looks Stretched Chart 2Greater China Markets Are Much Cheaper While these valuation indicators are useful to identify potential value plays globally, they do have limitations from a historical perspective. Stocks, as an asset class, compete with other assets, and therefore, the valuation levels of competing asset classes need to be taken into consideration. More specifically, inflation, monetary policy and interest rates determine the "risk free" discount factor for valuing equities. Historically the fed funds rate has been a defining factor for U.S. stock multiples. The famed "Fed model" argues that forward earnings yields should track 10-year Treasury yields (Chart 3). On both accounts, U.S. stocks do not look exceptionally expensive, considering exceedingly low interest rates. In fact, U.S. stocks' earnings yields have diverged with "risk free" rates since the Global Financial Crisis. This offers a glimmer of hope that U.S. stocks are not immediately vulnerable, even if interest rates continue to rise, unless higher rates tilt the U.S. economy into recession, which in turn leads to a major contraction in equity earnings. A Fair Value Assessment This week we incorporate interest rates into the valuation matrix for Greater China markets. Our "fair value" models incorporate prevailing domestic risk-free interest rates and long-term earnings, providing an assessment on market valuation levels from a historical perspective. Our models suggest that Hong Kong and Chinese A shares are substantially "undervalued" compared with their respective "fair values," while Taiwan and Chinese investable stocks are roughly "fairly valued." Hong Kong The Hong Kong market is currently standing at one standard deviation below its long-term "fair value," underscoring more upside potential in prices (Chart 4). In fact, the current reading matches that of the early 1980s, which marked the beginning of a dramatic bull market that lasted several decades, despite some sharp pullbacks. This comparison of course does not take into consideration that the Hong Kong market graduated from an electrifying developing market with excessive gains and risks into a developed one, and therefore a "fair-value" assessment based on historical norms could be misleading. Overall, Hong Kong stocks appear cheap, but a replay of a mega bull market is not realistic. Chart 3U.S. Stocks Do Not Appear Expensive ##br##Considering Interest Rate Chart 4Hong Kong Stocks Are Deeply Undervalued ##br##Compared With 'Fair Value' Taiwan Taiwanese stocks currently are almost exactly "fairly valued," according to our model (Chart 5). Our indicator has been hovering around current levels in recent years, despite price gains, due to improved earnings and more importantly, lower interest rates. Taiwanese local government bond yields are the lowest among the Greater China economies, and therefore our fair-value assessment of Taiwanese stocks' can change quickly if interest rates rise. Overall, Taiwanese stocks do not appear particularly appealing from a valuation perspective, especially compared with other bourses in the region. Chinese Investable Shares Chinese investable shares, although still deeply undervalued by most conventional valuation yardsticks, are now roughly "fairly valued" according to our model (Chart 6). In fact, this asset class was deeply undervalued in the early 2000s, followed by parabolic price moves that transformed into a feverish mania in 2007, but they have not been unduly cheap by this matrix in recent years. We suspect this is likely due to the high earnings volatility of this asset class, attributable to its heavy concentration in highly cyclical sectors such as energy and materials. Furthermore, investor sentiment on Chinese investable stocks swings dramatically, pushing their valuation indicators routinely to overshoot or undershoot extremes. Currently, investors are still skeptical on China's macro profile, and Chinese investable shares are likely under-owned by investors. We continue to expect this asset class to be positively re-rated, but the current situation does not appear too extreme compared with historical episodes. Chart 5Taiwanese Stocks Are Roughly 'Fairly Valued' Chart 6Chinese Investable Shares Are No Longer 'Undervalued' Chinese A shares Chart 7Chinese A Shares Appear Deeply Undervalued The Chinese domestic market, however, scores surprisingly high on our "fair value" assessment. The broad A-share index is well below its historical "fair value" level, and has in fact continued to improve (i.e. fall deeper into undervalued territory) since last year along with rising stock prices and a sharp spike in local bond yields (Chart 7). Although A shares historically have rarely been cheap in a global comparison, this asset class is now well below its historical average valuation levels, underscoring room for mean reversion. Moreover, Chinese local government bond yields are the highest among the Greater China economies. Any decline in bond yields will make A shares more attractive to local investors. In short, Taiwanese stocks appear to be the least attractive in our "fair value" assessment, both compared with other bourses in the region and from their own historical perspective. Hong Kong stock valuations look appealing. We continue to favor H shares over A shares to play the Chinese reflation cycle, but the tide could soon shift. A shares are still trading at a premium compared to their H-share counterparts, but the A-H premium has shrunk to 25% from 45% early last year. We will be looking for an opportunity to lift our bullish rating on A shares at the expense of H shares in the coming weeks. Stay tuned. A Word On Macro Numbers And The PBoC Most of China's macro numbers for May released on Wednesday have come in largely as expected. Taken together, the macro data confirm that the economic momentum has softened, but growth remains stable, as growth rates of capital spending, industrial production and retail sales have remained largely unchanged. A more disconcerting development is the continued decline in broad money growth, which decelerated from 10.5% in April to 9.6% in May, a new record low, underscoring continued pressure from the authorities to enforce financial deleveraging, which could further inflict downward pressure on the economy. The saving grace, however, is that bank loan growth remains stable, which means that the slowdown is mainly due to a contraction in off-balance sheet "shadow banking" activity. Meanwhile, broad money growth currently is well below the official target, which reduces the odds of further escalation in tightening measures. Furthermore, inflationary pressure is muted. While headline consumer price inflation (CPI) did pick up slightly to 1.5% in May compared with 1.2% in April, it is still exceedingly low (Chart 8). Moreover, the recent sharp decline in food prices in the wholesale market suggests that food CPI will come in much weaker next month, which will lead to a further decline in headline CPI, likely to below 1%, a further departure from the official CPI estimate (Chart 9). Chart 8Chinese Food Inflation Will Drop Sharply Chart 9Headline Inflation Is Chronically Below Official Estimate As this report goes to press, the Fed has just announced a 25 basis point rate hike, a widely anticipated move. As far as China is concerned, domestic factors are the top priority for the PBoC's decision-making considerations. On this front, there is no reason for the central bank to hasten its tightening. For now, we expect the PBoC will continue to enforce deleveraging in the financial sector through liquidity tightening. However, without genuine inflation pressures and any sign of economic overheating, the "deleveraging" process is likely to remain gradual, and its impact on growth will continue to be closely monitored by the authorities. As such, there is no case at the moment for monetary overkill that could risk major growth disappointments. We will follow up on these issues in the coming weeks. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights The U.K. and EU may get a technical divorce, but the underlying economic and financial relationship may not end up changing dramatically - which is good news for the pound in the long term. Our 6-12 month preference for currencies is euro first, pound second, dollar third. The euro area economy will perform at least in line with the U.S. economy through 2017, so the T-bond/German bund yield spread will continue to compress. Long euro area retailers, short U.S. retailers has catch-up potential. The focussed stock pair-trade would be long Hornbach (Germany), short Home Depot (U.S.) Feature Brexit Will Become A Fake Divorce Theresa May's stinging reversal at the ballot box last Thursday has left some people wondering: will Brexit actually happen? The answer is very likely yes, but this is no longer the right question to ask. Jeremy Corbyn's resurgent Labour Party, the Scottish National Party, the Liberal Democrats and pro-European Conservatives now form a parliamentary majority which proposes that a non-EU U.K. negotiates tariff-free access to the single market and customs union.1 In such an arrangement, the U.K. and EU would be technically divorced. But economically and financially, the relationship would not be so different to being married. In effect, Brexit would become a fake divorce. Unfortunately, there is a flipside. The U.K. would be unable to reclaim swathes of sovereignty over its borders and its law. This is because the tariff-free movement of goods, services and capital is, in theory, indivisible from the free movement of people. Furthermore, EU law would transcend national law in the regulation and policing of the single market's so-called 'four freedoms'. Admittedly, the four freedoms are an unachieved - and arguably unachievable - ideal. But they are an aspiration which EU policymakers do not want Brexit to threaten. Angela Merkel recently put it in very strong terms: "Cherry-picking (from the four freedoms) would have disastrous consequences for the other 27 member countries... Tariff-free access to the single market can only be possible on the conditions of respecting the four basic freedoms. Otherwise one has to talk about limits to access" Hence, Brexit reduces to a trade-off between the extent of tariff-free access to the European single market that the U.K. wants to keep, and the extent of national sovereignty it is willing to concede (Chart of the Week). Economically and financially, it is largely irrelevant whether the U.K. gets tariff-free access to the single market via a bespoke free-trade arrangement or via membership of an off-the-shelf structure like EFTA or the EEA.2 The much bigger question is: in order to keep most of its tariff-free access to the single market, will the U.K. now downgrade its plans to "take back full control" of its borders and law? Following last Thursday's stunning election result - and its impact on parliamentary composition (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3) - the answer seems to be yes. The U.K. and EU may get a technical divorce, but the underlying economic and financial relationship might not end up changing dramatically. Euro First, Pound Second, Dollar Third Avoiding a dramatic change in the U.K./EU economic and financial relationship reduces the risk of a major disruption to the U.K. economy and the need for further emergency easing from the Bank of England. Thereby, it is good news for the pound in the long term. That said, our 6-12 month preference for currencies is euro first, pound second, dollar third. The crucial point is that currencies and bond market relative performance depends front and centre on the evolution of relative interest rate expectations. In turn, the evolution of relative interest rate expectations must ultimately follow relative economic performance, as evidenced in hard data such as GDP growth, inflation and job creation. Over a period of a few months, central banks can look through hard data on the basis that the data is noisy or "transient". But over periods of 6 months and longer, the noisy and transient excuse wears thin. Central banks' strong commitment to data-dependency means that their actions and/or words must follow the hard data. No ifs, buts or maybes. Hence, relative interest rate expectations ultimately follow relative economic performance (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). We are unashamedly republishing these two charts from last week because they prove the point so powerfully. Based on the latest PMIs which capture current economic sentiment, and on 6-month credit impulses which lead activity, euro area hard data will continue to perform at least in line with those in the U.S. (Chart I-6). In which case, relative interest rate expectations will continue to converge, the T-bond/German bund yield spread will continue to compress, and euro/dollar will ultimately drift higher. Chart I-4Relative Interest Rate Expectations Must Follow ##br##Relative Economic Performance Chart I-5Relative Bond Yields Must Follow Relative##br## Economic Performance Chart I-6Only A Modest Decline In The Euro Area ##br##6-Month Credit Impulse The Eurostoxx50 Is Not A Play On The Euro Area Economy. So What Is? Does it follow that the Eurostoxx50 equity index will outperform? Not necessarily. Unlike for currencies, interest rates and bond yields, the connection between relative economic performance and relative equity market performance is weak, or even non-existent. Note that the Eurostoxx50 has underperformed the S&P500 this year even though the euro area economy has outperformed. Chart I-7The Global Growth Pause ##br##Has Hurt Cyclicals The reason is that the over-arching driver of an equity market's relative performance is its skew to dominant international sectors and international stocks. The Eurostoxx50 has a higher exposure to the global growth cycle via its dominant weighting in Financials and Resources; conversely the S&P500 has a higher exposure to the less globally-sensitive Technology and Healthcare sectors. The defining sector skew has penalised the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500 because globally-sensitive cyclicals have strongly underperformed in a very clear global growth pause. Furthermore, the ever-reliable global 6-month credit impulse strongly suggests that the global growth pause will persist through the summer (Chart I-7). This begs the question: is there a way for equity investors to play the resilient performance of the euro area economy? The answer is yes. But before explaining how, a quick note of caution. An aggregate small cap equity index is not a good way to play a domestic economy. This is because the dominant characteristic of small cap stocks - in aggregate - is their very high beta. Hence, rather than a strong play on the domestic economy, investors are effectively buying highly leveraged exposure to market direction. Great when markets are rising, but painful when they are falling, irrespective of how the domestic economy is faring. Instead, a good equity play on relative economic performance is the relative performance of retailers (Chart I-8). Drilling down further, the relative performance of home improvement retailers is an even purer play (Chart I-9) - given that household spending on home improvement is closely tied to the domestic economic cycle. Chart I-8Retailers Are A Good Play On Relative ##br##Economic Performance Chart I-9Euro Area Home Improvement Retailers ##br##Can Now Ourperform Those In The U.S. On the expectation that the euro area economy will perform at least in line with the U.S. economy,3 the equity market play would be long euro area retailers, short U.S. retailers. In particular, long euro area home improvement retailers, short U.S. home improvement retailers has a lot of catch-up potential. And the focussed stock pair-trade would be long Hornbach (Germany), short Home Depot (U.S.) Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In simple terms, the single market defines the zone of tariff-free trade for European countries with each other. Whereas the customs union defines the zone of a single set of rules and tariffs for European countries to trade with the rest of the world. Membership of the customs union allows goods and services that enter from the rest of the world to then move around Europe unhindered. 2 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is a free trade area consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway participate in the EU single market through their membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). Whereas Switzerland participates through a set of bilateral agreements with the EU. 3 Based on growth in real GDP per head. Fractal Trading Model* Long nickel / short tin hit its 6.5% profit target and is now closed. This week's trade is to switch to long nickel / short palladium with a 10% profit target. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart I-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart I-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart I-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart I-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights The sharp downturn in oil prices triggered last week by an unexpected jump in weekly U.S. oil inventories, along with word Mexico's finance ministry had begun soliciting offers for its 2018 oil-revenue hedge, will be reversed by strong fundamentals in the next few weeks. On the data side, we believe markets simply over-reacted to high-frequency U.S. statistics. Taking a slightly broader view of the data suggests the trend in U.S. oil markets is continued tightening, as the northern hemisphere enters the summer driving season. Globally, we expect the OPEC 2.0 production-cut extension and continued strong EM demand to lead to a normalization of global storage levels by end-2017. We continue to expect Brent to trade to $60/bbl in 4Q17, with WTI trailing by ~ $2/bbl. Energy: Overweight. We were stopped out of our long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI and Brent spreads by last week's sell-off. We continue to favor long front-to-back exposure, but will wait to re-establish these positions. We will, however, take a lower-risk position consistent with our view and get long Dec/17 $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl WTI calls at tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper's brief rally stalled, taking front-month COMEX prices below $2.60/lb this week. The IMF's upgrade of China's growth prospects likely will support copper prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. Spot gold's chart has formed a bullish inverted head-and-shoulders pattern, which could take prices into a gap that opened in the continuation chart at $1,292/oz in the aftermath of November 2016's price plunge. We remain long spot gold. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's WASDE report did little to temper expectations for another record harvest - or something close enough to it. Even so, given recent U.S. Midwest weather, we would close any shorts. Feature This past week in the oil markets amply demonstrates that the old adage "One week does not a trend make" is more honored in the breach than in the observance. Events we view as transitory - the unexpected 3.3mm bbl jump in weekly U.S. crude-oil inventories, along with news Mexico's finance ministry began lining up offers on crude-oil put options for its 2018 revenue hedge - conspired to shave close to 6% from Brent prices in less than a week. From just over $51/bbl at the beginning of the month, when the Mexican finance ministry reportedly began soliciting offers on crude-oil put options, to the end of last week, Brent prices had fallen ~ $3/bbl. Front-month Brent continued to languish around that level as we went to press.1 Stronger fundamental data, particularly from the U.S., where last week's inventory shock hammered prices, will reverse these transitory effects going into 2H17. Chart of the WeekU.S. Refinery Runs At Record Levels U.S. Fundamental Strength Will Reverse Weak Crude Prices Third-quarter refining - typically a high-activity period in the U.S. - is opening on a very strong note: U.S. refining runs are at record highs, with net crude inputs posting a four-week average 17.3mm b/d run rate at June 2, 2017 (Chart of the Week). U.S. demand is reviving and now is back over 20mm b/d (Chart 2). We expect low product prices, particularly for gasoline, to boost demand going into the summer driving season. In addition, surging refined-product exports, particularly into Latin American markets, will keep U.S. refiners' appetite for crude high, allowing storage levels to drain (Chart 3). Note the end-2016/early-2017 surge and the ongoing strength in product exports year to date - exports are seasonally strong, even if they dipped a bit. The resumption in export growth after a short-lived downturn will continue to pull total crude and product net imports down in the U.S. (Chart 4). Chart 2U.S. Product Demand Back##BR##Over 20mm b/d Chart 3U.S. Product Exports##BR##Are Surging Chart 4U.S. Crude And Product Export Growth##BR##Continues To Lower Net Import Levels On the supply side, U.S. crude-oil production is up sharply after bottoming yoy with a decline of ~ 850k b/d last September, and stood at ~9.20mm b/d at the beginning of June, based on monthly production data from the EIA (Chart 5). This is up 330k b/d yoy. Much of this is being consumed domestically, but export volumes continue to increase, after hitting a recent high of close to 1mm b/d on a four-week-moving-average basis in March (Chart 6). Given the reception U.S. light crude is receiving in Asian markets, we expect continued growth, which will support the build-out of export-related facilities along the Gulf. Chart 5U.S. Crude Production Is Recovering Smartly ... Chart 6... And U.S. Crude Exports Are Surging Strong product demand and exports will allow crude inventories to continue to draw in the U.S. (Chart 7), particularly in the critically important Cushing storage market, where the NYMEX WTI futures contract delivers (Chart 8). Note that using 4-week-moving-average data shows yoy crude and product storage levels down an average 2.4mm bbl/week over the past eight weeks even with the unexpected surge in stocks reported last week. Cushing storage has become increasingly integrated with U.S. Gulf storage, which supports the strong refining activity there. Chart 7Strong Demand And Exports Allow##BR##U.S. Crude And Product Stocks To Draw Chart 8Cushing Crude Storage##BR##Continues To Draw Mexico's Revenue Hedge Is A Transitory Event Earlier this month, Mexico's Ministry of Finance reportedly began soliciting market-makers for offers on put options, signalling its annual revenue hedge will be forthcoming in the not-too-distant future. Reportedly, the finance ministry began lining up offer indications at the beginning of June, and by the end of last week the news was on the wire services.2 By purchasing puts, the finance ministry secures the right - but not the obligation - to sell oil at the strike price of the options. This puts a floor on the revenue realized by the ministry, since, if oil prices move higher next year, they will be able to sell into the market at the higher market-clearing price. However, if prices go below the strike price of the options, the market-makers - typically banks and, last year, for the first time, the trading arm of a major oil company - have to pay the difference between the puts' strike price and the market price. These hedges paid out $6.4 billion in 2015 and $2.7 billion last year, according to Bloomberg. The Mexican finance ministry's program, which can hedge up to 300mm bbl worth of production revenue, will keep markets leery for a couple of weeks. This is because the market-makers writing the puts for Mexico's ministry of finance will soak up available liquidity by hitting bids across the WTI, Brent, and refined products futures and swaps forward curves. The market-makers typically try to trade out of the exposure they've taken on by providing the hedge to the ministry, because, at the end of the day, they do not want to be made long oil if the options go into the money. This is what would happen if oil prices were to fall below the strike price of the puts purchased by the ministry, when the options approach their monthly expiry dates and their value is determined. To hedge themselves against this potential risk, the market-makers will sell volumes into the futures and swaps markets that are determined by the output of an option-pricing model. The lower prices go, the more they sell forward, and vice versa. More than likely, market-makers will be selling into rallies, so, at least while this hedge is moving through the market, any rally likely to be short-lived, as market-makers hedge themselves. However, once this activity is out of the way and refinery demand for crude kicks into high gear, we expect the physical reality of crude and product draws to take prices higher and backwardate WTI and Brent curves later this year. As an aside, we would expect lower prices will accelerate the draws at the margin, as we approach the peak of the northern hemisphere's summer driving season, as noted above. Strong Demand, Lower Supply Will Draw Stocks And Lift Prices Chart 9OPEC Really Is Cutting ~1.0mm b/d##BR##For More Than 400 Days The extension of OPEC 2.0's production cuts to the end of 1Q18 means that - for more than 400 days from January 2017 to March 2018 - OPEC producers with the ability to hold production at relatively high levels, and to even increase it, will have removed more than 1mm b/d from global flows (Chart 9). This will be supplemented by some 300k b/d of cuts from Russia and sundry non-OPEC producers.3 On the demand side, we continue to expect robust growth, given the behavior of EM global trade volumes and non-OECD oil demand strength, led by continued growth in China and India (Chart 10).4 We will be updating our balances next week, but we see no reason to lower our expectation that global demand will grow by more than 1.5mm b/d this year, especially following the IMF's upgrade of China's expected GDP growth this year to 6.7% from 6.6% on the back of "policy support, especially expansionary credit and public investment."5 This is the third upward revision to China's GDP growth made by the Fund this year. We continue to expect lower supply and robust demand this year and into early 2018 to draw visible inventories down to more normal levels (Chart 11), lift prices and backwardate the Brent and WTI forward curves. Given our analysis, we expect Brent to trade to $60/bbl later this year, with WTI trailing it by ~ $2/bbl. Chart 11... And Inventories Will Normalize Bottom Line: Markets appear to have extrapolated the weekly data into a trend that would reverse - or at least materially slow - the normalization of inventories, despite the extension of OPEC 2.0's 1.8mm b/d production cuts to the end of 1Q18, and continued strength in EM oil demand, which is driven by continued strength in China's and India's economies. Net, we believe Mexico's revenue hedge and the one-week surge in U.S. inventories are transitory events, which will be reversed in the weeks ahead. Despite being stopped out of our long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 Brent and WTI recommendations following last week's sell-off we still are inclined to keep this exposure. However, we will wait for the market to process Mexico's revenue hedge and to work through the IEA's subdued 2017 demand forecast before re-establishing these positions. In the meantime, we will take a lower-risk position consistent with our view and get long Dec/17 $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl WTI calls at tonight's close. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Mexico Said to Take First Steps in Annual Oil Hedging Program," published by bloomberg.com on June 9, 2017. 2 Please see footnote 1. 3 Please see the BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories", published June 1, 2017, for an in-depth analysis of OPEC 2.0's production cuts. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil," published June 8, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "IMF Staff Completes 2017 Article IV Mission to China," published June 14, 2017, on the IMF's website imf.org. 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