Global
Highlights Agricultural markets are informationally efficient for the most part, which is to say that at any given time, prices already reflect most public information available to traders, and a lot of private information as well. Even so, we believe markets are underestimating the Fed's resolve in normalizing interest-rate policy next year - particularly when it comes to the number of rate hikes we are likely to see - and thus are underestimating the likelihood of lower grain prices in 2018. Energy: Overweight. Oil markets will emerge from their suspended animation following OPEC 2.0's Vienna meeting today. Our Brent and WTI call spreads in May, July and December 2018 - long $55/bbl calls vs. short $60/bbl calls - are up an average 50.2%. Our long Jul/18 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI trade anticipating steepening backwardation is up 13.3%. Base Metals: Neutral. China's refined zinc imports were up 145% yoy to 61,355 MT in October, based on customs data. Metal Bulletin noted tight domestic supplies accounted for the increase. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is breaking away from its attachment to $1,280/oz., as the USD weakens. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 5.2% since inception May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Neutral. Global financial conditions will become increasingly important to grain prices going forward, a trend we explore below. Feature Record output and ending stocks will ensure that ag markets remain well supplied globally next year. While we see risks as balanced in the upcoming year, and remain neutral ags generally, we believe markets are underestimating the Fed's resolve when it comes to normalizing interest rates, and thus underestimate upside USD potential. This means the likelihood of lower grain prices also is being underestimated. Weather will add volatility to the mix, as well. We believe the fundamentals supporting the assessment of record output and season-ending stocks-to-use ratios are fully reflected in prices. However, financial conditions - particularly USD strength next year - are not being fully priced by markets. This makes grains, in particular, vulnerable to the downside. Financial conditions driving ag markets: Fed policy & real rates: we expect U.S. financial conditions to tighten, and for the Fed to hike rates once more this year, and up to three more times in 2018.1 FX rates: With higher U.S. policy rates next year, the USD is likely to strengthen. This will weaken grain prices generally. Wheat, in particular, is most vulnerable to a strengthening USD and a weakening of the currencies of some of the commodity's top exporters - the European Union, Russia, and Australia. We've narrowed down the fundamental factors to look out for in 2018 as follows: Strong demand amid an extension of supply cuts by the OPEC 2.0 coalition will support oil prices in 2018. Higher energy prices will increase profit-margin pressure in ag markets through input and shipping costs. Weather risks from La Nina threaten to curb yields this winter, especially in Argentina and Brazil, which will add volatility to prices. Policy shifts in Argentina, China, and Brazil will influence farmers' planting decisions in the upcoming crop year. A Look Back At 2017 Chart of the WeekGrains Outperformed Softs This Year As predicted in our 2017 outlook, grains reversed their 2016 underperformance vis-à-vis softs this year, and outperformed them.2 While prices for sugar, coffee, and cotton were up 28%, 8%, and 12% in 2016, they have since declined by 21%, 8%, and 2%, respectively. In fact, sugar - our top ag in 2016 - took the biggest hit this year (Chart of the Week). On the other hand, as a complex, grains currently stand at largely the same level as the beginning of last year. However, there are some idiosyncrasies within the class. The two worst performing grains last year - rice and wheat - have been the strongest performers so far this year. Rice rallied 30% year-to-date (ytd) on the back of tighter supplies, completely reversing its 19% decline in 2016. Similarly, wheat, which lost 13% of its value last year, is up a modest 3% ytd. On the other hand, soybeans surrendered its title as the most profitable grain in 2016. After gaining 14% last year, its fate turned and it fell 3% ytd. Finally, out of the lot, corn is the only ag we cover that has fallen in both years consecutively, by a minor 1.9% in 2016, and an additional 4.4% so far this year. A Recap Of Long Term Trends According to the International Grains Council's November estimates, grains production is projected to come down this crop year. With an increase in consumption, this will ultimately lead to a 5.2% decline in ending stocks - the first drawdown in five years. Despite the year-on-year (y-o-y) decline, grain inventories are expected to stand at their second highest level on record (Table 1). Table 1Grain Production Down While Consumption Inches Higher The decline in expected grain ending stocks is mainly driven by corn, which - despite a large upwards revision to U.S. yields in the most recent WASDE - is expected to experience a 3.6% decline in production. This, together with a boost in consumption, leads to a 13.6% fall in ending stocks - the first drawdown since the 2010/11 crop year. The decline in corn expectations reflects a shift in the planting preferences of some of the major producers. The U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and China are the top soybean and corn exporters - accounting for 78% and 49% of global soybean and corn area harvested in the 2016/17 crop year, respectively. What is significant in the current cycle is that farmers in these countries are moving away from planting corn and towards more soybeans (Chart 2). China, which accounted for 19% of global corn area harvested and 6% of global soybean area harvested in 2016/17, is leading this change. While corn area harvested fell by an average 4.2% in the 2015 and 2016 crop years, soybean area harvested gained 9.8% during that period. Similarly, in Brazil, which accounted for 10% and 28% of global corn and soybean area harvested in 2016/17, respectively, corn area harvested by farmers has been growing at a much slower rate than soybean area harvested, with the former expanding by 16.4% and the latter by 39.6% since 2010/11. Likewise, harvested area in the U.S., which accounted for 18% and 29% of global corn and soybean area harvested, respectively, shrunk by 0.9% in the case of corn, and expanded by 21.3% in the case of soybeans since 2010/11. The exception to this rule is Argentina. Argentine farmland accounted for 3% and 15% of global corn and soybean area harvested in 2016/17, respectively. Since 2010/11, both corn area harvested as well as soybean area harvested increased by roughly the same level - 1.6 Mn Ha for the former and 1.5 Mn Ha for the latter - representing a 44.4% and 8.6% increase in area harvested for corn and soybeans, respectively. However, this is due to export policies, which in effect, encourage corn production over soybeans. As we discuss below, soybean export tariffs will be phased out in the coming years, likely changing the incentives structure for Argentine farmers. This trend is mirrored in production data, with global soybean output gaining 32% since 2010/11, compared to a 25% increase in global corn production. However, this shift is in large part due to demand patterns which also favor soybeans to corn. Over the same period, global soybean consumption increased by 36%, compared to 24% in the case of corn (Chart 3). Chart 2Farmers Favor Soybeans Over Corn... Chart 3...As Do Consumers In fact, at 28%, global soybean stock-to-use ratios are significantly more elevated than that of corn, which stand at 19%. Furthermore, while soybeans are expected to record a 3.9mm MT surplus by the end of the current crop year, corn is projected to experience a 17.7mm MT deficit. Powell's Fed And Dollar Movements Our modelling of ags reveals that U.S. financial factors are important determinants of agriculture commodity price developments.3 Fed policy decisions and their impact on real rates have a direct effect on ag commodity prices, as well as an indirect effect through the exchange rate channel (Chart 4). Chart 4Fed Policy Drives Ag Markets While U.S. inflation has remained stubbornly low, forcing the Fed to slow down their interest rate normalization process, the anticipation - and eventual acceleration - of the Fed tightening cycle will weigh on ag prices. However, thanks in part to softer-than-expected inflation readings coming out of the U.S. this year, the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) has weakened by 6.8% since the beginning of the year. In terms of the impact of real rates, monetary policy impacts agriculture markets through the following channels: The Fed's interest-rate normalization process will, all else equal, increase borrowing costs for farmers, and discourage investments in general - impacting both agricultural investments as well as outlays in research and development. Tighter credit also leads to a slowdown in growth which - ceteris paribus - depresses consumption and demand for goods and services generally, and agricultural commodities specifically. Finally, real rates have an indirect effect on agricultural commodity prices through its effect on the U.S. dollar. Higher U.S. rates encourage investment in U.S. bonds and entail a strengthening of the U.S. dollar making U.S. exports less competitive vis-à-vis those of its international competitors. Since commodities are priced in U.S. dollars while costs are priced in local currencies, a weakening of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the dollar would increase profitability for farmers selling in international markets. This can incentivize farmers to plant more, despite depressed global ag prices, which increases supply. As our modelling reveals, the net effect is an inverse relationship, whereby easier monetary policy is generally more favorable for agriculture markets. The Fed Will Remain Behind The Inflation Curve Our U.S. Bond Strategy team expects the Fed to remain behind inflation, in which case the USD will remain weak in the beginning of next year. The 2/10 Treasury curve is flat highlighting the market's belief that the Fed will continue with interest rate normalization despite below target levels of inflation.4 Since this would be a huge error on the part of new Chairman Powell, our U.S. bond strategists believe that the Fed will avoid such a policy mistake. Consequently, if inflation does not pick up soon, the Fed will be forced to turn dovish. In any case, U.S. monetary policy will "fall behind the curve." This means that the U.S. dollar will remain weak until inflation starts to tick higher, and the Fed can resume its interest rate normalization process. In fact, our bond strategists find that there is a resemblance between the current cycle and that of the late 1990s where the unemployment rate significantly undershot its natural level before inflation started to accelerate. Thus, they find it significant that most of the indicators that predicted the 1999 increase in inflation are now positive. This reinforces our faith that inflation will soon rebound, allowing the Fed to fall behind the curve and simultaneously hike rates at a pace of one more hike this year, and three more in 2018.5 In terms of the future path of the U.S. dollar, our foreign exchange strategists argue interest rate differentials will be a more significant determinant of dollar dynamics going forward. They expect inflation will start its ascent sometime before the end of 1H2018, which would lift the interest rate curve and the dollar. Our expectation is that inflation will bottom towards the end of this year/beginning of next, giving room for the Fed to proceed with its anticipated rate-hiking cycle, resulting in two to three hikes next year. Markets are pricing one to two rate hikes next year, which means our out-of-consensus rates call could cause the USD to rally far more than what markets have priced in to the USD TWIB. Following a 4.4% appreciation in trade weighted terms in 2016, the U.S. dollar has depreciated by 6.8% so far this year. The U.S. accounts for a larger share of global exports of corn and soybeans than rice and wheat, which means a strengthening of the USD TWIB will likely have a bigger impact on wheat and rice, in which the U.S. faces greater international competition for market share (Table 2). Table 2Wheat & Rice Vulnerable To USD Dynamics This is, in fact, in line with the price behavior that we have observed. Wheat and rice prices fell the most in 2016 as the U.S. dollar appreciated, and have outperformed soybeans and corn so far this year, as the U.S. dollar depreciated. Thus, in the absence of supply shocks that affect a particular grain, changes in the U.S. dollar going forward will have a greater impact on rice and wheat than on corn and soybeans. Keep An Eye On The Brazilian Real Of the major ag exporters, Brazil is most vulnerable to USD depreciation risk. Poor productivity trends have made our foreign exchange strategists single out the Brazilian Real (BRL) as one of the most expensive currencies they track. While they expect the BRL to depreciate over a one- to two-year horizon, the current strength in EM asset prices means that the BRL is likely to remain at its current level in the near term. However, given that the BRL provides an high carry, it will likely move sideways until U.S. interest rate expectations adjust to a rebound in inflation - which we expect toward the end of this year, or beginning of next. Brazil is a major ag producer - making up 45%, 44%, 27%, 23% and 12% share of the global export pies for soybeans, sugar, coffee, corn and cotton, respectively. Thus, a weaker BRL vis-à-vis the USD is a major downside risk to these commodity prices. Downside FX Risks Will Keep Wheat Prices Depressed Chart 5Downside FX Risks For Wheat Exporters In addition to the risks from an overvalued BRL, our foreign exchange strategists have highlighted the EUR, RUB, and AUD as currencies that are at risk of falling back to their fair value in the near term. Given that these regions are major wheat exporters, this would weigh on the grain's price as exports increase (Chart 5).6 On the back of expectations that the European Central Bank will adopt a significantly less aggressive monetary policy than the Fed, our foreign exchange strategists expect the EUR to weaken toward the end of the year and beginning of next. Given that Europe is a major wheat exporter - making up ~20% of global exports - a weaker EUR would make European wheat more attractive, weighing on prices in 2018. The currencies of other major exporters could be drawn in different directions in the near term. Our FX strategists see the Russian Rouble (RUB) as overvalued and at risk of weakening when U.S. inflation starts accelerating late this year or early next. However, higher oil prices would push up the ruble's fair value, correcting some of its overvaluation. As with the EUR, the wheat market is most vulnerable to a weaker RUB since Russia accounts for 14% of global wheat exports. Likewise, Australia - another major wheat exporter which accounts for 10% of world exports - has been identified as having an expensive currency. It is at risk of a depreciation over the next 24 months, but could rally if iron ore markets turn higher. Some Additional (Potential) Fundamental Forces Among the news and noise in the ags sphere, we see higher oil prices and La Nina as the most significant near-term risks to current supply/demand dynamics. Longer term, shifting policies in China, Argentina, and Brazil will become more relevant in determining the trajectory of ag markets. Our Out-Of-Consensus Call On Oil Is Bullish For Ags Chart 6Higher Energy Prices Upside Risk We expect oil prices will tread higher next year - averaging $65/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI - on the back of stronger demand and an extension of the OPEC 2.0 coalition's supply restrictions.7 This will support ag commodity prices. Higher oil prices affect ags by increasing input costs and global shipping prices. In addition, the supply of ocean-going transport for grains is tight. The Baltic Dry index, a measure of the global cost of shipping dry goods, and has been on the uptrend this year, as freight costs have more than doubled since mid-February, mostly on the back of a slowdown in shipping transportation supply (Chart 6). La Nina: A Literal Tailwind? Against a backdrop of falling stocks-to-use ratios in the corn and soybean markets, weather will add volatility to prices into 1H2018. In the near term La Nina, which is predicted to continue through the 2017-18 Northern Hemisphere winter, threatens to curb agricultural output. This phenomenon affects weather and rainfall, causing floods and droughts, by cooling the Pacific Ocean. Australia's Bureau of Meteorology recently pegged the chance of a La Nina at 70%, expecting it to last from December to at least February. However, this season's La Nina is forecast to be weak and weather conditions are expected to neutralize in 1Q2018.8 In the case of ags, the greatest threat from La Nina is the risk of droughts in Brazil and Argentina which could hurt the regions soybean, corn, sugar, and cotton harvests. Furthermore, excess rainfall in Australia and Colombia threaten wheat, cotton, and sugar yields in the former and coffee output in the latter. Furthermore, the weather phenomenon raises chances of a potential drought in the U.S. Midwest.9 However, it is noteworthy that by the time La Nina hits, much of the harvest in the Northern Hemisphere will have been completed. So the main risk will be to harvests in the Southern Hemisphere. Gradualismo In Argentina, Stockpiling In China, And Ethanol In Brazil 1. Since taking office late 2015, Argentine President Mauricio Macri has reversed his predecessor's unfavorable agricultural policies - allowing the Argentine peso to float, and eliminating export taxes on wheat and corn. Marci's Gradualismo reforms have been successful - incentivizing plantings and leading to record harvests (Chart 7). While a 30% export tax remains on soybeans - Argentina's main cash crop - it is down from 35% under the presidency of Macri's predecessor. Further cuts to soybean export taxes have been delayed in order to finance the country's fiscal deficit, however they are expected to resume next year with a 0.5pp reduction/month for the next two years. This would stimulate soybean plantings, if it materializes. Argentine farmers produce 18% of global soybean output, and account for 9% of global soybean exports. The change in export policy, as it unfolds, will thus weigh on soybean prices as Argentine farmers increase their soybean acreage in the coming crop years. 2. Although we will likely get more clarity regarding Chinese ag policies with the release of China's Number 1 Central document - which for the past 14 years has focused on agriculture - in February, we expect Beijing to continue incentivizing soybean farming over corn. China's soybean inventory levels stand significantly lower than its notoriously massive stocks of corn, wheat, and cotton (Chart 8). Chart 7Argentine Reforms Will Raise Soybean Exports Chart 8China's Soybean Stocks Are Relatively Low As such, China's top corn producing province - Heilongjian - cut the subsidy for corn farmers by 13 percent this year. Farmers there now receive 8.90 yuan/hectare of corn, down from the 10.26 yuan/hectare they received last year. This compares with subsidies for soybean farmers which at 11.56 yuan/hectare is much higher. According to the China National Grain and Oils Information Center, corn acreage in Heilongjiang is down 9.3 percent in 2016/17. However, with corn prices in China increasing, the higher subsidy for soybeans may not be sufficient. Nonetheless, according to a report by the Brazilian state Mato Grosso's official news agency, over the next five years the Chinese commodities trader COFCO intends to almost double its soybean imports from the Brazilian grains state. This means that China's demand for soybeans will drive the market in the near term as they look to buildup soybean reserves and bring down their corn stocks.10 Chart 9Higher Oil Prices Incentivize Ethanol Over Sugar 3. Ethanol Demand will raise the opportunity costs of bringing sugar and corn to market. In addition to the direct effect of higher oil prices on ag commodities in general, our forecast of increasing prices will pressure sugar prices indirectly through the ethanol channel in Brazil. Since July, Brazil's state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, has shifted its pricing policy allowing gasoline and diesel prices to follow those of international oil markets. As a result, the gasoline-ethanol price gap is widening.11 This will revive demand for the biofuel, which will cause mills to divert sugarcane away from the sweetener in favor of producing more ethanol (Chart 9). In fact, according to UNICA - the Brazilian sugarcane industry association - mills in the country's center-south region - from which 90% of Brazil's sugar output is derived - are favoring ethanol production over sugar. Data for the first half of October shows that 46.5% of sugarcane was diverted to producing sugar, down from 49.6% in the same period last year. However, in the near term, increased production from the EU amid their scrapping of domestic sugar production quotas will likely keep the global market in balance.12 Global sugar supply is forecast to remain strong on the back of supplies from Thailand, Europe and India. There are reports that ethanol producers in Brazil are evaluating the adoption of "corn-cane flex" ethanol plants.13 However this is a longer run risk which would increase demand for corn, and reduce demand for sugar. Bottom Line: Financial conditions will drive ag prices in 2018. The Fed's resolve to normalize interest rates - more so than markets expect - will keep a lid on prices. This will offset risks from higher energy prices. Nonetheless, some weather induced volatility is likely into 1Q2018. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 In fact, our Global Investment Strategists expect the Fed to hike rates in December 2017, and again four more times in 2018. Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "A Timeline For the Next Five Years: Part I," dated November 24, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "2017 Commodity Outlook: Grains & Softs," dated December 22, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 A 1% move in the USD TWI is associated with a 1.4% change in the CCI Grains & Oilseed Index, in the opposite direction. Similarly, a 1pp move in 5-year real rates is associated with a 18% change in the CCI Grains & Oilseed Index, in the opposite direction. The adjusted R2 is 0.84. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary titled "Into The Fire," dated November 7, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve," dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models," dated September 15, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Oil Balances Continue To Point To Higher Prices," dated November 23, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 El Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) alternates between warm ("El Nino") and cool ("La Nina") phases, impacting global precipitation and temperatures. These episodes are identified by looking at temperatures in the "Nino region 3.4" whereby readings of at least 0.5 degrees Celsius above or below seasonal average for several months would qualify as an El Nino or La Nina. 9 La Nina is often associated with wet conditions in eastern Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Asia. It usually leads to increased rainfall in northeastern Brazil, Colombia, and other northern parts of South America, and drier than normal conditions in Uruguay, parts of Argentina, coastal Ecuador and northwestern Peru. The effect on the U.S. and Canada tends to be milder since they are located further away from the heart of ENSO, on the other hand it has the greatest impact on countries around the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 10 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Ags in 2017/18: Move To Neutral," dated October 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 11 Flex-fuel vehicles in Brazil means that ethanol demand is not constrained by a "blending wall". Thus ethanol is a substitute for gasoline- rather than a complement to, as in the U.S. 12 France, Belgium, Germany and Poland reportedly have the capacity to ramp up sugar beet production. 13 Please see "Brazil mills eye corn-cane flex plant to extend production cycle," dated November 7, 2017, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q17 Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights When it meets in Vienna at the end of this month, OPEC 2.0 will look through the pipeline leaks in South Dakota, which are expected to take some 500k b/d of Canadian crude shipments to the U.S. off the market until repairs are done at the end of November. While this will provide an unexpected assist in draining U.S. inventories, it truly is a transitory event (no pun intended). The larger issue for prices is gauging market expectations going into the OPEC 2.0 meeting at the end of this month. We believe the market is giving high odds to the coalition extending its 1.8mm b/d production cut to cover all of 2018 at its Vienna meeting. This is without doubt the result of the synchronized messaging coming from the leaders of OPEC 2.0, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. Based on our balances models, an extension of the cuts to end-June - our base case - will draw OECD stocks down below their five-year average by mid-2018 (Chart of the Week). An executed extension to end-December 2018 would produce even sharper draws. This leaves the only material risk to prices a failure to extend the cuts on Nov. 30, or a reduction in the cuts themselves. Of the two, a failure to extend the cuts is the only material downside risk we see going into the Vienna meetings. Should OPEC 2.0 fail to extend its production cuts at month-end, and cause the markets to sell, we would view it as a buying opportunity: a Mar/18 expiry runs counter to OPEC 2.0's strategy. Energy: Overweight. Our Brent and WTI call spreads in May, July and December 2018 - long $55/bbl calls vs. short $60/bbl calls - are up an average 41.4%, since they were recommended in September and October. Our long Jul/18 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI trade initiated November 2, 2017 in expectation of steepening backwardation is up 27.7%. Base Metals: Neutral. A weaker USD is providing a tailwind for copper, which is up ~ 2% over the past week. Our U.S. Bond Strategy desk expects the Fed to remain behind the inflation curve, which will translate into lower real rates and continue to support base metals.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold continues to trade on either side of $1,280/oz, hardly budging following the upheaval in KSA. U.S. financial conditions - particularly a weaker USD - are driving gold. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 4.2% since inception May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Neutral. Updated projections of record-high yields from U.S. corn farmers is behind the upward revision to 2017/2018 corn ending stocks in the November WASDE. This led to a massive increase - by 7.56mm MT - in U.S. corn output, which was partially offset by an increase in expected world demand and a downward adjustment to global beginning stocks. Corn prices were down more than 3% in the week following the revisions, but have since regained 2.5%. Feature Markets appear to be pricing in an extension of OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 when the producer group meets in Vienna at the end of the month around OPEC's regularly scheduled meeting. Our updated balances suggest a sharp sell-off triggered by market disappointment in OPEC 2.0 would represent a buying opportunity, particularly in 2H18. We continue to expect Brent to average $65/bbl next year in our base case (OPEC 2.0 cuts extended to end-June), with WTI trading $2/bbl under that. An extension of OPEC 2.0's cuts to end-December could lift our 2018 Brent forecast as much as $5/bbl, although the Brent-WTI spread likely would widen to $4 to $5/bbl, if this occurs. We do not believe additional cuts are in the offing. Nor do we expect an even-more-dramatic announcement of cuts being extended beyond 2018. We are deliberately keeping our base case more conservative than the apparent market expectation of an extension to end-2018. This suggests markets will be disappointed with anything less than an extension of the OPEC 2.0 cuts to end-June. Given our balances modeling, we believe any disappointment in the market's expectation that leads to a sell-off would represent a buying opportunity, since a Mar/18 expiry – the current terminus of the OPEC 2.0 production cuts, defeats the coalition's strategy of reducing OECD inventories. Under our base case, inventories draw to their five-year average levels by mid-year 2018 (Chart of the Week). In our updated balances model, we have a 100k b/d downward revision in expected U.S. oil-shale output for 2018 tightening the supply side for next year. The U.S. EIA has repeatedly revised its historical estimated shale production lower in recent months, and late-2017 rig counts have deteriorated slightly, which have shifted our historical production curve lower as well. On the demand side, we expect growth of ~ 1.65mm b/d on average in 2017 - 18. These assumptions give an upward bias to our 2018 price forecasts for Brent and WTI crude oil (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekSupply-Demand Balances##BR##Point Toward Tight Markets Chart 2Balances Are Tightening,##BR##Giving An Upward Bias To Prices Inventory Draw Could Be Sharper Chart 3Extending OPEC 2.0 Cuts To End-December##BR##Will Result In Sharper Draws An extension of the OPEC 2.0 cuts to end-Dec/18 would translate to a deeper storage draw than our end-June base case expectation (Chart 3). The Keystone pipeline leaks referenced above also provide an unanticipated assist in drawing down inventories, by temporarily removing ~ 500k b/d from the market in the 2H of November. While we have modeled price-induced additions to U.S. shale-oil output next year in our base case, an extension of OPEC 2.0's cuts to end-December likely will accelerate this production increase as additional production is added in 2H18. This will tend to temper price hikes, but not arrest them, given the differential storage draws we expect of 127 mm bbls. As we have noted, an extension of the OPEC 2.0 production cuts to the end of 2018 could lift Brent and WTI prices by as much as $5/bbl. However, given the still-insufficient pipeline take-away in the U.S. shale basins, we would expect higher production would widen the Brent - WTI price spread to $4 to $5/bbl next year. Practically, if the extension of the production cuts pushes Brent to $70/bbl, we're more inclined to expect WTI prices to average ~ $65/bbl next year. EM Continues To Lead Growth In Oil Demand EM oil demand strength continues to be the dominant feature of the oil market this year, and, we expect, into next year. We are modeling a 1.13mm b/d and 1.22mm b/d increase in EM demand this year and next, respectively. This accounts for 75% and 77% percent of global growth in 2017 and 2018 (Table 1). DM demand, which we proxy with OECD oil consumption, is expected to average 47.5mm b/d over the two-year interval, an average gain of 490k b/d over the interval, vs. 1.18 mm b/d gain in EM oil demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) China and India account for slightly more than one-third of the 52mm b/d of consumption we are modeling for non-OECD demand over this period, and ~50% of the non-OECD demand growth from 2016 to 2018. The indicators we use to confirm or refute the demand trends we see - EM imports and global PMIs - continue to support the global-growth theme we've noted throughout the year, particularly in the EM markets (Charts 4 and 5). Chart 4EM Trade Volumes Remain Strong,##BR##Supporting The Global Growth Hypothesis Chart 5Global Manufacturing Activity##BR##Remains Robust Continue Watching The Fed EM oil demand and import volumes are highly dependent on Fed policy, which is of particular concern now, because the U.S. central bank is trying to carry out its rate-normalization policy (Chart 6). Still, as our colleagues on the U.S. Bond Strategy desk note, "To avoid policy failure the Fed must allow inflation to reach its 2% target before the onset of the next recession. This means it will soon fall behind the inflation curve." This will be bullish for trade, since as we've shown in the past, U.S. monetary policy has a huge effect on trade.2 For the near term - into 1H18 - fundamentals will dominate the evolution of price: Supply, demand and inventories will matter more than U.S. monetary policy effects on the USD and real rates. Nonetheless, should the hawks in the Fed carry the day, we would expect a strengthening of the USD, which, all else equal, would act as a headwind to oil prices next year. For the time being, a weaker USD is reinforcing stronger prices brought about by tighter fundamentals, particularly in the Brent market (Chart 7). Chart 6Continue Watching The Fed Chart 7A Weaker USD Provides A Slight Tailwind Bottom Line: Markets are expecting OPEC 2.0 to extend its 1.8mm b/d production cut to end-2018. We are deliberately using a more conservative extension to end-June in our balances modeling, which produce 2018 Brent and WTI prices forecasts of $65/bbl and $63/bbl. An executed extension of the OPEC 2.0 cuts to end-December 2018 likely would add as much as $5/bbl to Brent prices, and perhaps $2/bbl to WTI prices, which would widen the Brent - WTI spread to $4 to $5/bbl on average next year. Fundamentals will continue to dominate the evolution of prices into 2018 - supply growth (falling), demand growth (rising), and inventories (falling) will drive prices. For the moment a weaker USD is supportive for commodities generally, particularly oil and copper. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve," published October 24, 2017, by BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy. It is available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see footnote 1 above. U.S. monetary policy effects on EM oil demand and trade volumes, and the feedback loop back to the key indicators used by the Fed, have been a recurrent theme in our research. Please see, e.g., "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil," published June 8, 2017, by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Our line of research recently found support in IMF research published earlier this month; please see "Global Trade and the Dollar," published by the IMF November 13, 2017. The IMF research is available at http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/11/13/Global-Trade-and-the-Dollar-45336?cid=em-COM-123-36197 Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q17 Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights The cyclical bull market in stocks will last until the end of next year. That said, global equities have become increasingly vulnerable to a correction, so fast-money investors should consider putting on a tactical hedge spanning the next few weeks. The passage of tax legislation in the U.S. will face many hurdles, and this is likely to ruffle markets in the near term. We ultimately expect Congress to pass a bill early next year. While lower corporate tax rates will be a boon for Wall Street, the gains to Main Street will be a lot more muted. A higher after-tax rate of return on equity will encourage capital inflows into the U.S. This will bid up the value of the dollar, depressing exports in the process. Over the long haul, a larger budget deficit will soak up private-sector savings that could otherwise have been used to finance investment spending. This will lead to less capital accumulation, and eventually a lower standard of living. Feature Rising Odds Of A Stock Market Correction We remain cyclically bullish on global equities based on the expectation that global growth will stay strong over the next 12 months, which should support corporate earnings. Nevertheless, the recent price action in credit markets is disconcerting. Yesterday's relief rally notwithstanding, junk bonds have been selling off in recent weeks, as have EM credit and currencies (Chart 1). We have found that credit trends generally lead the stock market. This raises the risk of an equity correction. The fact that the bull/bear ratio has reached a 30-year high in the weekly Investors Intelligence Sentiment survey (Chart 2), and that the most recent BofA Merrill Lynch Survey shows that a record share of fund managers are overweight risk assets, only add to our worries. Chart 1Junk Bond Selloff Raises ##br##Risks Of An Equity Correction Chart 2Equity Bullish Sentiment:##br## Getting Stretched Doubts about the ability of Republicans in Congress to push through tax cuts further muddle the picture. We continue to expect a tax bill to be signed into law early next year, but the intention of President Trump and Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell to include a provision in the bill to rescind the individual mandate to purchase health insurance could greatly complicate this task. Moreover, as we discuss in greater detail below, the economic benefits of the tax legislation are likely to be muted, even if equity prices do rise on the back of lower corporate tax rates. This will make selling the merits of the tax plan to the American people all the more difficult. With all this in mind, we are putting on a short S&P 500 trade recommendation. We are targeting a gain of 5% and putting in a stop-loss of 2%. We will close this trade before the end of the year, so this should be seen as a purely tactical decision appropriate for fast-money investors only. Fiscal Policy Was Tightened Too Early ... Global bond yields plummeted during the Great Recession, but then quickly recovered. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield hit 3.95% in June 2009, while the German bund yield reached 3.72% that same month. Today, output gaps are much smaller globally than they were seven years ago, yet bond yields are substantially lower (Chart 3). Chart 3ASmaller Output Gaps... Chart 3B...But Lower Bond Yields Many theories have been offered to account for this seemingly paradoxical turn of events. Was it QE? Maybe the Phillips curve broke down? Perhaps investors have steadily revised down their estimate of the neutral rate of interest? One can make compelling arguments in support of all these explanations. However, there is one reason that has received relatively little attention: fiscal policy. Chart 4 shows that fiscal policy was tightened by an average of 4.1% of GDP in the G20 economies between 2010 and 2015. This happened despite the fact that unemployment was still quite high. One could make a half-plausible case that fiscal austerity was necessary in southern Europe, where one country after another was being attacked by the bond vigilantes (although even there, the failure of the ECB to act as a lender of last resort to European sovereigns greatly exacerbated the problem). It is harder to justify the shift towards austerity in countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. which were able to issue debt in their own currencies; or to explain why Germany felt the need to tighten fiscal policy when its structural primary balance was already in surplus. In Japan's case, the 2.9% of GDP in fiscal tightening that occurred between 2013 and the 2015 was a key reason why Abenomics failed to push the country out of deflation. Faced with the reality of what was happening on the fiscal front, central banks had no choice but to step in. They did so by slashing interest rates, in some cases pushing them into negative territory. They also engaged in massive asset purchases. The tsunami of easy money helped to keep economies afloat. But in many countries, slower government debt growth was replaced by faster private-sector debt growth (Chart 5). Debt continued to rise. It just did so in a different form. Chart 4Fiscal Belt-Tightening##br## In 2010-2015 Chart 5Private Debt Growth Picked Up##br## Amid Slowing Government Debt Growth ... And Is Now Being Eased Too Late The good news is that governments are abandoning their obsession with fiscal austerity. The bad news is that they are doing it at a time when fiscal easing is no longer warranted. Standard economic theory suggests that governments should run budget deficits when unemployment is high, and surpluses when it is low. In the U.S., the unemployment rate stands at 4.1%, 0.6 percentage points below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. And yet, President Trump and the Republicans in Congress are pushing for massive tax cuts which, according to the CBO, would add $1.7 trillion to federal debt over the next ten years, while pushing up the debt-to-GDP ratio by an extra six percentage points to 97% (Chart 6). Limited Supply-Side Benefits Proponents of the legislation argue that lower tax rates will spur growth by so much that they will pay for themselves. This is highly unlikely. Chart 7 shows that major tax cuts in the past have always led to a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, whereas tax hikes have led to a deceleration, or even outright decline, in the debt ratio. Even the much lauded 1981 Reagan tax cuts had to be partially rolled back in 1982 after the budget deficit widened sharply. Chart 6More Red Ink Chart 7Do Tax Cuts Pay For Themselves? The growth-enhancing effects of lower tax rates are likely to be smaller at present than they were in the early 1980s. The Reagan tax cuts were introduced when the economy was in the doldrums and government debt levels were much lower than they are today. Cross-border ownership of foreign assets has also increased tremendously since the Reagan era. Foreigners now own more than $10 trillion of U.S. equities, or close to 35% of the total, up from 10% in the early 1980s (Chart 8). This implies that a corporate tax cut would not only represent a massive windfall for foreigners - a bizarre outcome for a self-professed nationalist president - but would mean that a smaller share of capital gains taxes will make their way into the coffers of the U.S. Treasury. Personal income tax cuts are also likely to generate much less bang for the buck. Most empirical studies suggest that lower personal tax rates increase labor supply largely by boosting female labor participation.1 The prime-age female labor participation rate in the U.S. today is 11 points higher than it was in 1980, which limits the scope for further gains. Moreover, when Ronald Reagan cut taxes in 1981, the top personal tax rate stood at 70% (Chart 9). At such a high rate, a one percentage-point cut in the top rate increases take-home pay by 3.3% (1/30). Today, the top rate stands at 39.6%, so a one-point cut would raise after-tax income by only 1.6% (1/60.4). Thus, the incentive effect from cutting the top marginal tax rate is only half of what it was back then. And, of course, the lower the tax rate, the less incremental revenue the government gets from every additional dollar of income. A reasonable estimate is that the revenue offset from tax cuts today would be only one-quarter of whatever modest amount it was in the early 1980s. Chart 8Growing Share Of U.S. Equities##br## Is Held By Foreigners Chart 9Lower Bang For The Buck From##br## Cutting Individual Tax Rates Tax Cuts Versus Tax Reform This is not to say that tax reform is undesirable. Statutory corporate tax rates in the U.S. are quite high, but effective rates are very low, given the myriad deductions and tax-sheltering strategies (Chart 10). The combination of base-broadening and lower statutory rates would make the economy more efficient. In this respect, the set of reforms unveiled by Paul Ryan earlier this year actually had a lot going for it. Unfortunately, the half-measures in both the House and Senate bills run the risk of making the current system even worse. For example, the proposed transition from the current system where U.S. companies are taxed on their worldwide profits to one where they are taxed only on the profits they earn in the U.S. is likely to increase the incentive to use accounting gimmicks to shift more taxable income to low-tax jurisdictions abroad.2 The new "pass through" tax rate of 25% would also provide passive business owners, who are currently subject to the top marginal tax rate, with a massive tax break. Chart 10Statutory Vs. Effective Corporate Tax Rates: Please Mind The Gap In theory, full business investment expensing is a good idea, but the economic impact is likely to be modest. Companies pay less tax upfront when they can write off the value of capital expenditures immediately, but incur higher taxes in the future due to the absence of any further depreciation expenses. When interest rates are low, as they are today, the present value gain from shifting tax liabilities around in this way is bound to be small. This, along with the fact that companies can already write off a large share of capital purchases under current law in the first few years after they are made, will limit the benefits of the proposal. The full expensing of capital purchases also expires after five years under the Republican plan. This could cause companies to pull forward capital spending simply to game the tax code. Such a policy could be justified if the economy were depressed, but that is not the case today. The Tax Foundation, a free-market think tank that a number of left-leaning economists have accused of overstating the benefits of tax cuts, estimates that temporary expensing would raise the level of real GDP by only 0.18% after a decade, compared to 1.6% in the case of permanent expensing.3 From Populism To Pluto-Populism Chart 11This Is Not Populism Martin Wolf has aptly referred to Donald Trump as a "pluto-populist" - someone who talks like a champion of the poor and middle class to his adoring supporters, but actually pushes for policies that mainly benefit the wealthiest Americans.4 Many of the proposals in the Republican tax bills - including the abolition of the Alternative Minimum Tax, the phase-out of the estate tax, and the aforementioned reduction in the business pass-through tax - would further skew the distribution of income towards the rich (Chart 11). Indeed, the benefits for the wealthy grow over time under the proposed plans, even as those for the middle class dissipate, eventually reaching the point where the average middle-class household ends up paying more taxes under the House plan than they do now (Chart 12).5 And no, one cannot say that this outcome is simply the inevitable consequence of the fact that the rich pay most of the taxes. Once regressive taxes such as the payroll tax and state and local taxes are included in the tally, the rich pay about the same share of their income in taxes as the middle class (Chart 13). To make matters worse, the Republican tax bill would trigger $25 billion in Medicare cuts and $111 billion in cuts to other government programs under current PAYGO rules. More pain for middle-class voters. Donald Trump was quick to throw Ed Gillespie under the bus after he failed to win the governor's race in Virginia, tweeting that Gillespie "did not embrace me or what I stand for." But the truth is Trump has not embraced Trumpism either. We were widely scorned in the early days of the primary season for saying that Trump would secure the Republican nomination, and mocked again in 2016 for predicting that he would win the presidential election. At this point, however, the odds are high that the Republicans will lose the House next November and Trump will fail to get re-elected in 2020. Chart 12Middle-Class Tax Cuts Will Morph Into Tax Hikes Chart 13U.S. Taxation Not Very Progressive Investment Conclusions U.S. equities are overbought and ripe for a correction. As is almost always the case, lower stock prices in the U.S. will negatively impact global bourses. Fortunately, the selloff is likely to be short-lived, with strong global growth and rising earnings powering stocks into 2018. The passage of tax legislation in the U.S. will face many hurdles, and this is likely to ruffle markets in the near term. Nevertheless, we expect Congress to pass a bill early next year. While lower corporate tax rates will be a boon for Wall Street, the gains to Main Street will be a lot more muted. A higher after-tax rate of return on equity will encourage capital inflows into the U.S. This will bid up the value of the dollar, depressing exports in the process. Over the long haul, a wider budget deficit will soak up private-sector savings that could otherwise have been used to finance investment spending. This will lead to less capital accumulation, and eventually a lower standard of living. Chart 14Inflation Higher In Countries Lacking Independent Central Banks Higher government debt levels will also increase the temptation to inflate away debt. As we discussed a few weeks ago, rising political polarization is affecting every facet of society, with the NFL just being the latest example.6 It is hard to believe that the Fed will remain above the fray. History suggests that the loss of central bank independence is often associated with higher inflation (Chart 14). Such may be America's fate as well. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Robert K. Triest, "The Effect Of Income Taxation On Labor Supply In The United States," The Journal of Human Resources, Special Issue on Taxation and Labor Supply in Industrial Countries, 25:3 (Summer 1990); and Costas Meghir and David Phillips, "Labour Supply And Taxes," IZA Discussion Paper No. 3405 (March 2008). 2 Both the House and Senate versions of the tax bill have a number of provisions to limit the ability of corporations to shift profits abroad, but at present, it is unclear how effective these measures will be. 3 Please see "Economic and Budgetary Impact of Temporary Expensing," Tax Foundation, dated October 4, 2017. 4 Martin Wolf, "Donald Trump Embodies How Great Republics Meet Their End," Financial Times, March 1, 2016. 5 This mainly occurs because the "Family Flexibility Credit" expires after 2022. The expanded Child Tax Credit is also not indexed to inflation under the House plan, implying that its value to tax filers will go down over time. In addition, the repeal of the individual mandate would cause fewer lower-income earners to buy health insurance, leading them to forego the tax subsidies that they would otherwise receive. 6 Please see , "Three Demographic Megatrends," dated October 27, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking and should decelerate through 2018. Synchronous global growth remains in place in 2017 and will persist into 2018, providing a tailwind for U.S. growth, equity markets and, ultimately, inflation. The labor market continues to tighten, which suggests that wage pressures should accelerate soon. Is another "Great Moderation" at hand? Feature Uncertainty around the GOP tax plan led to a weaker dollar last week, but U.S. equities and Treasuries were little changed. The tax plan could fail if enough Republican voters turn against it. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team notes1 that as long as President Trump remains more popular with Republican voters than his Republican peers in Congress, he will be able to force the tax plan through both the Senate and the House. Moreover, we could even see some Democrats in the Senate supporting these tax changes. Ahead of the OPEC meeting on November 30, the weaker dollar along with the ongoing political turmoil boosted oil prices. Closer to home, corporate profits for Q3 2017 and guidance for Q4 2017 and beyond remains supportive for risk assets, although BCA expects S&P 500 earnings growth to peak in the next couple of quarters on a 4-quarter moving average basis. Global growth remains supportive for S&P 500, U.S. economic growth, and ultimately, higher inflation. Meanwhile, investors are still asking when price and wage inflation will turn higher toward the Fed's 2% forecast. BCA's answer: Be patient. In the final section of this week's report, we examine whether the recent period of low economic and financial market volatility will persist and herald a return to the Great Moderation. Q3 Earnings Season: Margins Still Expanding EPS and sales growth in Q3 ran well ahead of consensus expectations as forecasted in our October 2 preview. Moreover, the counter-trend rally in profit margins is still in place. Over 90% of companies have reported results so far, with 72% beating consensus EPS projections, just above the long-term average of 69%. Furthermore, 67% have posted Q3 revenues that topped expectations, which exceeded the long-term average of 55%. The surprise factor for year-over-year results in Q3 stands at 5% for EPS and 1% for sales. These compare favorably with the average EPS (4%) and sales (1%) in the past five years. We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Margins tend to peak halfway through late-cycle periods.2 Nonetheless, the results imply that Q3 will be another quarter of margin expansion. Earnings growth (Q3 2017 versus Q3 2016) is solid at 8%, and in revenues, 5%. Strength in earnings and revenues is broad based (Table 1). Earnings per share increased in Q3 2017 versus Q3 2016 in 8 of the 11 sectors. The 7.3% year-over-year drop in the financial sector is attributed to the impact of the hurricanes on the insurance and reinsurance industries. Excluding those industries, financial EPS is up by 6% from a year ago. EPS results are particularly impressive in energy (162%), and strong in technology (24%), healthcare (8%), and materials (7%). These sectors likewise experienced significant sales gains (17%, 10%, 4%, and 9%, respectively). Corporate managements are more focused on the message in Washington than on the President (Chart 1). Trump's name was mentioned only twice in the Q3 earnings calls held through November 10, doubling the total in Q2. CEOs and CFOs have cited Trump's name at least once in each earnings season since Q2 2016. The zenith in mentions occurred immediately after Trump took office in early 2017. Table 1S&P 500:##BR##Q3 2017 Results* Chart 1Managements Focused On The Message##BR##Not The Man In DC In contrast, "tax" and "reform" have appeared 13 times so far in Q3 conference calls, most often in a positive light. There were only five mentions in Q2 when investors were skeptical that a tax plan would pass this year. In the Q4 2016 reporting season following the November election, tax and reform were cited 16 times. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has consistently expected a tax package to pass by the end of Q1 2018.3 We are encouraged by the upward trajectory of EPS estimates for 2017 and 2018 (Chart 2). It is odd that the recent downtick in 2017 EPS is mirrored by an uptick in the 2018 projection. The divergence can be explained by the effect of the hurricanes on the financial sector's earnings in 2017 and the probable snapback in early 2018. Analysts expect 2019 EPS growth to slow from the anticipated 2018 clip, which matches BCA's view. However, unlike estimates for 2017 and 2018, we anticipate that EPS estimates for 2019 will move lower throughout 2018 and 2019, ahead of a recession in late 2019.4 Bottom Line: The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking and should decelerate through 2018 to a level commensurate with 3 ½-4% nominal GDP growth (Chart 3). Margins will crest in 2018. Accordingly, BCA believes that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for the equity market, albeit a smaller tailwind. This forecast excludes any encouraging effect on growth from tax cuts, which would be positive for EPS and the S&P 500 price index in the short term, but would bring forward Fed rate hikes. BCA expects growth outside the U.S. to remain robust, an additional support for EPS growth in the coming quarters. Chart 2Stability In '17 & '18 EPS Estimates, But '19 Likely To Move Lower Chart 3Strong EPS Growth Ahead,##BR##Will Start To Slow Soon Global Growth Update Synchronous global growth remains in place in 2017 and will persist into 2018,5 providing a tailwind for U.S. growth, equity markets and, ultimately, inflation. Global real GDP estimates continue to move higher, a welcome departure from the past when estimates slid relentlessly lower (Chart 4). Since the start of 2017, GDP estimates for this year have increased from 2.6% to 3.2%, while 2018 forecasts have accelerated from 2.8% to 3%. The 2019 growth projection is steady at 2.9%. This upward trajectory for 2017 and 2018 has occurred despite a recalibration by many major central banks away from accommodative policies. The improving growth forecasts could be short-circuited by aggressive central bank actions, a worldwide trade war, or escalating tensions in Northeast Asia (or a combination of all three). Falling oil prices would also challenge a quickening of world growth, but BCA's stance is that oil prices will move up significantly in the coming year.6 Chart 4Global Growth Estimates Accelerating Global leading indicators are on the upswing. The most recent update of our Global Leading Indicator (excluding the U.S.) was the strongest since 2010 when it slowed after a sharp rebound from the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Moreover, the global LEI diffusion index turned positive after a worrisome dip below 50% earlier this year. It will be a warning sign for wide-reaching growth if the diffusion index moves back below 50% (Chart 5). Industrial production (IP) overseas is expanding at nearly three times the U.S. rate (Chart 6). This suggests that U.S. economic activity will be pulled up by foreign demand. Additionally, G3 capital goods orders are climbing at the fastest pace since 2014. A stronger dollar may dampen U.S. exports and earnings, but this will be a modest offset, rather than something that derails the recovery in U.S. industrial production. Chart 5Global LEI's Pointing Higher Chart 6Supports For Global Growth In Place Global growth is important to large cap U.S. equities because 43% of S&P 500 sales in 2016 came from outside the U.S. (Table 2). Remarkably, this figure moved lower in the past 5 years and 10 years. In 2012, 47% of S&P 500 sales came from outside the U.S.; in 2007, it was only 1% less. The drop in overseas sales since 2012 masks shifts by region. In 2016, 8% of S&P 500 sales were to Asia, up 100 bps from 2012. Europe, excluding the U.K., accounted for 6% sales in 2016 and the U.K., a mere 1%. These numbers dropped from the 2012 figures of 10% and 2% respectively. While Standard and Poor's does not separate out sales to China, that country represents a large portion of sales to Asia, which makes China and Europe the two most important regions for overseas sales. In contrast, only 3% of S&P 500 sales are made in Canada and Mexico. Table 2Most S&P 500 Sales Go To Asia And Europe While BCA's European strategists remain upbeat about growth prospects in the Eurozone,7 our outlook on China is more sanguine. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service notes that Chinese politics have shifted from tailwind to headwind for global growth in the wake of China's 19th National Party Congress.8 Meanwhile, BCA's China Investment Strategy states that the weak external demand environment faced by China in 2015 was a function of severe dislocations in the commodity and currency markets that probably will not recur in the coming 6-12 months. While Chinese export growth will moderate in the coming year, the absence of these shocks is an important factor supporting a gradual deceleration.9 Moreover, China's economic momentum is on the upswing. Real-time measures of economic activity such as electricity production, excavator sales, and railway freight traffic, all are expanding at double-digit rates, albeit down from recent peaks (Chart 7). Various price indexes also show a broadly based pickup in inflation to levels that will unnerve the authorities. Nonetheless, economic growth will slow in 2018 as policymakers continue to pare back stimulus. BCA does not foresee a substantial downturn in growth next year, but it could be hard on base metals prices. Bottom Line: Improving economic activity outside the U.S. is a tailwind for both domestic economic growth and profits of U.S. firms with significant foreign business. Moreover, surging world growth is a precondition for higher inflation. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes10 that 68% of OECD nations have unemployment rates under the organization's assessment of "global NAIRU", which has not occurred since before the Great Recession when inflation expanded in both the goods and service sectors (Chart 8). Solid foreign demand will help the economy hit the Fed's GDP target and support the central bank's additional but gradual tightening stance. Stay overweight U.S. equities and remain short duration. BCA's view that inflation is poised to turn higher also supports our duration call. Chart 7China: Healthy Growth Indicators Chart 8NAIRU Is Not Dead Yet Still Waiting For Wage Inflation Table 3Inflation Reacts With A Lag The labor market continues to tighten, which suggests that wage pressures should accelerate soon. Given that inflation is a lagging indicator, investors must remain patient. Table 311 illustrates the time lag from when full employment is reached to the turning point for consumer price inflation. During long expansions, the gap is 26 months. The U.S. unemployment rate dipped below NAIRU 12 months ago in November 2016. The implication is that investors (and the Fed) are too eager as they wait for inflation's inflection point. BCA approaches wage growth - or the lack of it - in another way. Like inflation, wage growth takes time to materialize in protracted recoveries. Charts 9 and 10 provide updates on inflation and its leading indicators that we published in August 2017. These charts reiterate that price pressures take time to emerge in "slow burn" expansions. Chart 11 shows that the ECI has trended higher since 2009, matching increases in quit rates, NFIB compensation plans, and the Conference Board's measure of jobs hard to get less jobs easy to get. Moreover, the top panel of Chart 11 shows that the ECI gains are widespread and at 73%, the percentage of states reporting unemployment rates below NAIRU suggests that wage gains are imminent (Chart 12). Chart 9In the 80s And 90s Wage Growth Did Not##BR##Provide And Early Warning On Inflation Chart 10Patience Is Required On##BR##Inflation In Long Cycles Chart 11Labor Market Is Tight Enough##BR##To Push Up Inflation Chart 1270%+ Of States Have Unemployment Rates Below NAIRU The Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker,12 which is not compromised by compositional shifts in the labor market, stabilized in the past few months after rolling over in the spring and early summer. Moreover, the Tracker remains in a distinct uptrend; at 3.6% year-over-year, it is at the lower end of the 3.3% to 4.3% year-over-year range in place before the global financial crisis (Chart 13, panel 2). Chart 13Wage Pressures Mounting Bottom Line: Wage inflation is on the upswing as the output gap turns positive for the first time in a decade and the unemployment rate moves even further below NAIRU. A persistent buildup in wages will allow the Fed to bump up rates in December and three times again next year. This supports BCA's underweight stance on duration. That said, a sudden surge in consumer price or wage inflation would trigger a more aggressive response from the Fed, and a signal of "the beginning of the end" for the recent return of the Great Moderation. Great Moderation, Interrupted? The Great Recession was eight years ago, but investors are now ruminating about the return of the Great Moderation era (mid-1980s to mid-2007), when subdued macroeconomic volatility often coincided with low market volatility. Then, as now, inflation was muted and stable, but unlike today, economic growth was much faster in a long expansion phase with two mild recessions (Chart 14). There have been many studies rationalizing the Great Moderation, which was observed in most advanced economies (G7 countries and Australia) roughly at the same time though not fully synchronized (Chart 15).The phenomenon13 was initially forged in 2002 by Stock and Watson and then publicized by former Fed Chair Bernanke14 in a 2004 speech.15 Chart 14Return Of The Great Moderation? Chart 15The Great Moderation: A Global Phenomenon Too! Three main causes were identified: Structural changes in the economy: improvement in inventory management as the U.S. moved away from a manufacturing-based economy towards a service-based economy, the latter less volatile. Financial innovations, for example, increased credit availability to households through the rise of securitization, allowing consumption to be more balanced; Higher efficacy of monetary policy: increased transparency and predictability of FOMC actions, which augmented the Fed's credibility to tame inflation (price stability) and foster full employment; Good Luck (smaller shocks): post mid-1980s (and up to the global financial crisis-GFC), the economy did not experience outsized shocks such as the surge in oil prices in the 1960s and the 1970s. Most investors and/or economists agree that structural changes and better monetary policy were significant drivers of the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Good luck also seems to have been a factor and there is empirical research to support it. The persistence and length of the current expansion is an indication that good luck still plays a role, with investors taking on risk and becoming complacent. That said, there does not seem to be a consensus on the single most important driver of the "Great Moderation". Interestingly, complacency in the financial markets creates vulnerability at the late stage in this expansion. It has caught the Fed's attention as evidenced in the September 19-20 FOMC minutes: "Broad U.S. equity price indexes increased over the intermeeting period. One-month-ahead option-implied volatility of the S&P 500 index - the VIX - remained at historically low levels despite brief spikes associated with increased investor concerns about geopolitical tensions and political uncertainties." Since Chair Yellen took office in February 2014, this is the most direct reference about low volatility and therefore, complacency in the financial markets. Chart 16Back To Low Correlations Among Stocks The November 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report16 discussed complacency in the context of a return of the Great Moderation. BCA believes significant complacency is signaled by the good news already discounted in equity prices, the depressed level of the VIX and the decline this year in risk asset correlations. Moreover, large institutional investors are reportedly selling volatility and thus, dampening implied volatility across asset classes. The "Great Moderation" in macro volatility is also contributing to low correlations among stocks (Chart 16). The idea is that low perceived macroeconomic volatility during the "Great Moderation" had diminished the dispersion of growth and inflation forecasts, thereby trimming the variance of interest rate projections. This allowed equity investors to focus on alpha rather than beta, given less uncertainty about the macro outlook. The focus on alpha contributed to the decline in stock price correlation. Today, dispersion in the outlooks for growth and interest rates have returned to pre-Lehman levels, helping to explain the low levels of implied volatility and correlation in the equity market (Chart 17). Some of the reduced dispersion can be justified by the fundamentals. The onset of a broadly based global expansion has calmed lingering fears that the world economy is constantly teetering on the edge of the abyss. Investor uncertainty regarding economic policy has also moderated (bottom panel). Historically, implied volatility tended to fall when global industrial production was strong and global earnings were rising in a broad swath of countries (Chart 18). Our U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service points out that, during the later stages of the cycle, equity sector correlations tend to drop. The lower correlations occur as earnings fundamentals become more important performance drivers, and sector differentiation generates alpha.17 Similarly, the VIX can fluctuate at low levels for an extended time when global growth is broadly based. Chart 17A Less Uncertain Macro Outlook? Chart 18Broad-Based Growth Lowers Implied Volatility Still, the current readings of equity market correlation and the VIX are unnerving given a plethora of potential geopolitical crises and the pending unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet. Moreover, any meaningful pickup in inflation would upset the 'low vol' applecart. Table 4 shows the drop in the S&P 500 index during non-recessionary periods when the VIX surges by more than 10% in a 13-week period. The equity price index fell by an average of 7% during those nine episodes, with a range of -3.6 to -18.1%. Table 4Episodes When VIX Spiked Bottom Line: Longer expansions and shorter recessions, alongside the decline in market volatility, may stay for a while, the result of the perceived return to the Great Moderation. Risk assets are thus vulnerable because a lot of good news is discounted. Nonetheless, we would view any pullback in equities as a healthy correction rather than the beginning of a bear market. If the next recession is not expected before 2019 (our base case), then it is too early for the equity market to begin to discount the next bear market because profits will continue to expand well into 2018. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds in the next 12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here... So Much for Populism," November 8, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View," October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything," October 25, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," October 4, 2017. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Synchronicity," September 25, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Still Some Upside In The Nickel Market," November 2, 2017. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Resynchronization," September 21, 2017. Available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2017. 8 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?," November 1, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Economy - 2015 Vs. Today (Part I): Trade," October 26, 2017. Available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No," September 12, 2017. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, November 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 12 https://www.frbatlanta.org/chcs/wage-growth-tracker.aspx?panel=1 13 Peter M. Summers, "What Caused the Great Moderation" Some Cross-Country Evidence", 2005, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City www.kansascityfed.org/ROkYZ/OcgaZ/Publicat/econrev/PDF/3q05summ.pdf 14 James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, "Has the Business Cycle Changed? Evidence and Explanations", August 2003 https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2003/pdf/Stockwatson2003.pdf 15 Governor Ben S. Bernanke, "The Great Moderation," Washington, DC, February 20, 2004, https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220/ 16 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, November 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Later Cycle Dynamics," published October 23, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights A growing list of indicators is pointing to a potential slowdown to the strong global growth. However, the key deflationary anchors in the global economy - U.S. deleveraging, Europe's crisis, and Chinese excess capacity - have been mostly slayed. Any slowdown is likely to be brief and shallow, generating a buying opportunity in risk assets. In the meantime, commodity currencies, especially the AUD, could suffer. EUR/JPY is also at risk. Buy CAD/SEK. Feature Chart 1-1Global Growth Has Boomed Global growth has continued to fire on all cylinders, and global industrial activity is at its strongest in 13 years (Chart I-1). However, five weeks ago, we highlighted three yellow flags that we believe are pointing toward a period of cooling in the global economy.1 One month later, it is time to look at the data and evidences to see if these yellow flags are being followed by additional symptoms. We posit that yes, a temporary and mild slowdown will materialize. But the global economy remains fundamentally sound. Yet, this cooling of growth could have implications for commodity currencies and EM assets. The Original Worries The key original worry that we highlighted in early October was that global money growth had been decelerating, which has historically presaged a slowdown in global industrial production, global trade and commodities prices (Chart I-2). This deceleration in money growth has only deepened since, adding further saliency to our original concern. Moreover, Chinese monetary and fiscal conditions are being tightened. The Chinese economy continues to hum at a healthy pace, and deflation has been vanquished as producer prices are expanding at a nearly 7% pace and core CPI continues to accelerate to its highest levels since 2010. This is giving Chinese policymakers an opportunity to tighten policy. Chinese monetary condition indices (MCI) are becoming less supportive of industrial activity and fiscal spending has decelerated. These policy moves potentially explain the recent rollover in the Keqiang index - which approximates industrial growth -- and the contraction in new capex projects (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Money Growth Points To A Pause Chart I-3China Is Tightening Policy Bottom Line: Global money growth continues to decelerate, and Chinese monetary and fiscal conditions are tightening. This could create a dent in global industrial activity. The Additional Worries Some other key growth indicators are also raising the alarm bell: The average of Korean and Taiwanese exports growth decelerated sharply. After having hit a peak of 32% in September, they have now decelerated to 5%. Additionally, Swedish and Australian manufacturing PMIs have also rolled over (Chart I-4). Korean and Taiwanese exports as well as Swedish and Australian PMIs are highly sensitive to global trade and the global industrial cycle. Our global growth indicator has rolled over. This indicator did forecast the rebound in industrial production in 2016 and 2017. It is now pointing toward a slowdown in global activity (Chart I-5). Likewise, our boom/bust indicator has rolled over, further highlighting the risks to global industrial production (Chart I-6). Chart I-4Key Barometers Have Turned Significantly Lower Chart I-5One Growth Indicator Slowing... Chart I-6...And Another One Too BCA's German industrial production model has turned down (Chart I-7). Germany is at the forefront of the global industrial cycle, and its own industrial production is highly geared to global trade. This is because manufacturing represents 23% of Germany's output and Germany's exports account for 38% of GDP. Furthermore, 30% of German exports are destined to EM economies, the epicenter of the global secondary sector. Thus, if German IP weakens, it will reflect an ebbing in the global industrial cycle. The global yield curve has continue to flatten in recent weeks (Chart I-8). This could be a reflection of the deceleration in global money growth. The weakness of banks across the world in recent days suggests the message from the yield curve should not be ignored. Chart I-7Manufacturing-Sensitive Germany Set To Slow Chart I-8Global Yield Curve Still Flattening Bottom Line: Beyond the slowdown in global money growth and tightening in Chinese policy, additional signs of softness have begun to emerge. Korea and Taiwanese exports as well as Swedish and Australian PMIs have weakened, our global growth indicator has rolled over, our boom/bust indicator is also softening. Likewise, our German IP model is pointing south and the global yield curve is flattening. A deceleration in global activity is likely in the cards. Reading Market Tea Leaves A few market developments are likely to be reflecting some of the underlying shifts in growth pinpointed by the set of worries highlighted above. First, commodity currencies have begun to soften, which normally herald a period of softening growth (Chart I-9). What is very interesting is the context in which this currency weakness has begun to emerge: The Australian dollar has weakened despite strengthening metals prices (Chart I-10); Chart I-9The Message From Commodity Currencies Chart I-10Why Is The AUD Weak? The Canadian dollar has weakened despite Brent breaking out above US$60/bbl; The Norwegian krone has weakened against the euro despite the same rise in oil prices and despite a 12% surge in industrial production. Chart I-11Global High Yield Experiencing Weakness Second, the breadth of EM equities has rolled over and is falling below the zero line, indicating that more stocks within EM have begun weakening than appreciating, pointing toward a very narrow participation in the current rally. Third, junk bond prices have started to fall in the U.S., with the JNK ETF breaking significantly below its 200-day moving average, the first time since September 2014. EM high yield bond prices have also broken below their moving average, and have further punched below a key upward sloping trend line that had been in place since the beginning of 2016 (Chart I-11). The EM bond ETF (EMB) is also testing its 200-day moving average. The last point bears particular significance. If EM bonds continue to weaken, this will represent a significant tightening in EM financial conditions. EM financial conditions have eased since 2016, which was a key factor underpinning the improvement in global IP. If EM financial conditions begin deteriorating now, a crucial support to the global economy will dissipate. Moreover, falling EM bond prices tend to be synonymous with falling EM exchange rates. In fact, the Russian ruble, the Turkish lira, the South African rand, the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso have all been weakening since the end of the summer. This suggests outflows out of these markets have begun. As investors pull money out of these markets, liquidity conditions in these economies will tighten, which will hurt their economic activity. This could be the mechanism that catalyzes the softening in global industrial activity highlighted above. All these developments are also emerging at a time when new, untested leadership will soon take hold of the Federal Reserve. Now that U.S. President Donald Trump has selected Jay Powell to helm the Fed, he still has three seats to fill on the board. Historically, transition periods at the Fed can be associated with market volatility. This time around may not be an exception. Bottom Line: Commodity currencies are weakening, market breadth in EM equities is deteriorating rapidly and junk bonds as well as various EM fixed income products are experiencing weakness. Not only do these developments tend to foreshadow ebbing global industrial activity, the weakness in EM bonds could in of itself tighten financial and liquidity conditions. The latter has been a key driver of the global industrial cycle. This represents a potentially dangerous environment. How Dangerous Exactly? Chart I-12Global Utilization Not##br## Deflationary Anymore All of this sounds very dire, but the reality is more nuanced. This softness in economic activity is unlikely to be very pronounced. As we argued last week, the three key factors that have created a strong deflationary anchor in the global economy seem to have been vanquished: U.S. deleveraging is over, the euro area has healed as banks have been cleaned up, and Chinese excess capacity has been purged.2 As a result of these developments, global capacity utilization is in a much better spot than it was in 2015 (Chart I-12). This means the deflationary impulse likely to emerge out of the dynamics described above should be much more muted than it was two years ago. Moreover, commodities markets are not as oversupplied as they once were; in fact, oil inventories are falling as the OPEC 2.0 setup is proving stable. This implies that commodities prices are unlikely to weaken as much as they did back then. This obviously corroborates the idea that the deflationary impact of this slowdown is likely to be smaller and also suggests that the impact on global capex should be more muted. Thus, since growth and inflation are likely to prove more resilient than in 2015, the impact on asset prices of the slowdown is likely to be short lived. If anything, it is likely to provide a buying opportunity in risk assets. Some markets are more out of line with fundamentals than others, which implies that they will suffer more. Below, we discuss key tactics that could be used to navigate this environment. Bottom Line: Because the U.S. deleveraging is over, the euro area has healed and because Chinese excess capacity has been curtailed, the global economy is less prone to deflationary tendencies than two years ago. This means that any growth slowdown will be shallow and brief. Thus, only in the assets most mispriced or most exposed to the risks above will there be playable moves that we will seek to exploit. The relevant currency market implications are explored below. Investment Implications The most mispriced asset in the face of this potential slowdown in global growth seems to be EM equities. EM stocks are very sensitive to the global industrial cycle and EM financial conditions. Both are set to deteriorate. Moreover, since 2008, EM stocks have traded closely with junk bonds, but currently EM equity prices seem very pricey relative to U.S. high yield bonds (Chart I-13). Weakening EM stock prices continue to be a negative for commodity currencies, as it implies a slowdown in global industrial activity. Moreover, commodity currencies remain over-owned. As Chart I-14 illustrates, speculators are very long "risky currencies" versus "safe currencies," implying that a slowdown in global growth, however minute it may be, is likely to be a negative shock for these investors. When these relative net speculative positions roll over, it tends to be associated with violent weakness in commodity currencies. Thus, the recent bout of weakness could only be the first innings. We think the AUD is the worst-placed commodity currency right now. Not only are speculators very long the Aussie, but as we have shown in recent weeks, the AUD is expensive against the USD, the NZD and the CAD. Its premium is so pronounced relative to other commodity currencies that, at current levels, valuations alone warrant shorting the AUD against the CAD or NZD. We are already short these crosses. It therefore follows that if we anticipate commodity currencies in general to weaken, AUD/USD also has downside. Chart I-15 makes this case. Australian equities relative to U.S. equities have historically led AUD/USD. Nearly half of the Australian equity market is financials, and Australian equities have been underperforming. This suggests investors continue to foresee a negative output gap in Australia both in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. - and thus a dovish Reserve Bank of Australia relative to the Fed, which hurts AUD/USD. Moreover, AUD/USD has overshot the mark implied by relative equity prices. Additionally, AUD/USD is expensive relative to interest rate differentials at both the short- and long-end of the yield curve. Chart I-13EM Stocks Offer##br## No Cushion Chart I-14Speculators In Commodity ##br##Currencies Are Not Ready Chart I-15AUD Is Most ##br##Vulnerable The euro could also experience some weakness. We have argued that as European financial conditions tighten relative to the U.S., this will hurt euro area inflation relative to the U.S., pointing to an environment where investors will likely once again price in monetary divergences in favor of the USD.3 Growth dynamics between Europe and the U.S. could also be affected by the tightening in China. As Chart I-16A and Chart 16B illustrates, tightening Chinese MCI or slowing Chinese M1 relative to M2 - which proxies a faster growth in savings deposits than checking deposits, and thus a rising marginal propensity to save tends to translate into slowing PMIs and industrial production in the euro area relative to the U.S. This is because Europe has a larger manufacturing sector and export sector as a share of GDP than the U.S. German exports, Europe's growth locomotive, are also highly geared to the Chinese industrial sector. Thus, when Chinese investment slows, Europe feels it more acutely than the U.S. With investors still very long the euro relative to the USD, a negative relative growth surprise on top of a negative relative inflation surprise will hurt EUR/USD. Chart I-16AEuro Area Versus U.S. Growth: ##br##Don't Ignore China (I) Chart I-16BEuro Area Versus U.S. Growth: ##br##Don't Ignore China (II) The picture for the yen is more complex. Falling EM assets and a temporary growth slowdown are positive for the yen. But bond yield differentials remain the key driver of USD/JPY. Since we anticipate the global growth slowdown to be shallow and brief, any weakness in U.S. bond yields will also be shallow and brief. Since we expect U.S. bond yields to regain vigor fast, and we doubt the global slowdown will affect the Fed's path much, the effect on USD/JPY will also be quick. Thus, we are keeping our cyclical long bet on USD/JPY. In fact, a positive U.S. inflation surprise is a growing risk that could cause bonds to sell off, hurting global liquidity conditions in the process. Chart I-17EUR/JPY: Ripe For A Correction Instead, we will hedge our long USD/JPY exposure by tactically shorting EUR/JPY. Japan will also suffer from a slowdown in global industrial activity, especially as 43% of its exports are shipped to emerging markets. Moreover, Japan has a very large manufacturing sector. However, Japanese yields have no downside from here. This means the deflationary impact of a global growth slowdown, however small it may be, will weigh on Japanese inflation expectations more than it will hurt nominal rates, resulting in higher Japanese real rates.4 This support for the JPY is likely to get magnified in EUR/JPY. Currently, speculators have been massive buyers of the euro against the yen, betting on growing monetary divergence between Europe and Japan. This has pushed net speculative positions in the euro versus the yen to levels historically associated with a reversal in this cross (Chart I-17). This pair is thus a coiled spring in the face of the risk that Japanese real rates rise against European ones, especially if investors begin pushing back expectations surrounding the first ECB rate hike. Investors have already given up hope of any tightening of policy in Japan in the foreseeable future, implying a very minimal chance of them pricing in any easing by the Bank of Japan in response to a temporary global growth slowdown. The last factor supporting shorting EUR/JPY is that Japan has a net international investment position of 60% of GDP, while Europe's NIIP stands at -3% of GDP. Also, Japanese investors have been aggressive buyers of European assets, especially since Emanuel Macron secured the French presidency, causing a positive reassessment of European political risk. In an environment where global volatility increases, Japanese investors are likely to retreat to their home market, accentuating EUR/JPY selling. Finally, CAD/SEK is likely to benefit in this environment as well, as Sweden is more exposed to EM conditions than Canada is. We are buying this cross this week, but we'll explore the reasoning behind it in greater detail next week. Bottom Line: Commodity currencies are likely to be the main casualty of the slowdown we expect to occur over the next 3 to 6 months. The AUD seems particularly vulnerable as it is expensive and investors are still very long this currency. USD/JPY could experience some downside, but we do not anticipate the growth slowdown to be strong enough to permanently knock Treasury yields off their course toward 3%. Instead, we will short EUR/JPY to protect our gains in our long USD/JPY. CAD/SEK has upside. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Melanie Kermadjian, Senior Analyst melanie@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The Best Of Possible Worlds?" dated October 6, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead" dated November 3, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "All About Credit" dated October 20, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Are Central Banks Behind the Curve Or Ahead of It?," dated July 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 For a more detailed discussion of the interplay between growth and the yen, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Down The Rabbit Hole" dated April 15, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was mixed: Initial and continuing jobless claims underperformed expectations coming in at 1.901 mn and 239,000 respectively; JOLTS job openings climbed to 6.093 mn, beating expectations of 6.091 mn, and more than the previous 6.09 mn openings; Consumer credit increased to USD 20.83 bn from USD 13.14 bn, also beating expectations of USD 18 bn. The DXY enjoyed an up week, but a large spike in German Bund yields on Thursday caused the DXY to weaken. This is most likely a temporary event prompted by the unwinding of dovish ECB trades. We expect the greenback to continue its climb alongside stronger U.S. data. Report Links: It's Not My Cross To Bear - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 European data has generally been upbeat: The German trade balance and current account improved to EUR 21.8 bn and EUR 25.4 bn, but this first and foremost reflected a 1% contraction in imports; French trade balance also improved to EUR -4.668 bn, beating expectations of EUR -4.8 bn; European retail sales increased by 3.7% on a yearly basis, and 0.7% monthly; However, German industrial production growth slowed to 3.6%. This allowed the euro to regain some of its lost value. However, we believe that euro area inflation will disappoint going forward - especially relative to the U.S. This will limit any appreciation in the euro as investors will begin pricing in a tightening of the Fed's policy relative to the ECB. Report Links: Market Update - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent Japanese data has surprised to the downside: Core machinery orders massively underperformed expectations, as they contracted by 8.1% on a month-on-month basis and by 3.5% on an annual basis. Moreover, bank lending yearly growth also underperformed, coming in at 2.8%, and declining from last month's reading. Moreover, the leading economic indicator came below expectations, at 106.7. It also declined from last month's number. After 2 years into the recovery from the 2015 commodity/ EM carnage, global growth seems prime for some slowdown. Indeed, many indicators like high yield and EM bond yields have started to break down. This is could be positive for the yen, given its risk-off currency status. However we prefer to not play this strength though USD/JPY. Instead we are shorting EUR/JPY, a cross which cancels the exposure to the dollar. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day -August 25, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed Markit Services PMI outperformed expectations, coming at 55.6. It also increased from 53.6 last month. Halifax House Prices Month-on-Month growth also outperformed, coming in at 0.3%. However, the RICS Housing Price Balance underperformed expectations, coming in at 1%. The pound has been relatively flat after plunging following the "dovish" hike by the Bank of England. Overall, we see very little upside from here on for cable, as the BoE has little incentive to hike beyond what is priced into the SONIA curve, as both consumer confidence and real retail sales yearly growth are near 3-year lows. Meanwhile, the Fed will likely surprise the market by following its projected path. This will increase rate differentials between these two countries, and put downward pressure on GBP/USD. Report Links: Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 It has been quite an uneventful week for the AUD, as it has stayed flat relative to the USD. The following data came out: TD Securities Inflation increased to 2.6% from 2.5% on a yearly basis, and 0.3% on a monthly basis; ANZ Job Advertisements increased by 1.4% in September; AiG Performance of Construction Index declined to 53.2 from 54.7; Home loans contracted b 2.3%. The RBA rate decision and statement were in line with expectations, and the AUD saw little to no movement. Governor Lowe identified several capacity issues with the economy, noting that "In underlying terms, inflation is likely to remain low for some time, reflecting the slow growth in labour costs and increased competitive pressures", and that inflation is only being boosted by tobacco and electricity. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 On Wednesday, New Zealand decided to keep its reference rate unchanged at 1.75%. The kiwi rose after the announcement, as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand brought forward their expectations for a hike from the third quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2019. Furthermore, the RNZ now expects inflation to hit the mid-point of its target range by the second quarter of 2018, nine months sooner than before. The RBNZ also toned down its rhetoric on the currency as governor Grant Spencer stated that "the exchange rate has eased since the August statement, and if sustained, will increase tradable inflation and promote more balance growth". Overall we expect the NZD to outperform the AUD. Report Links: Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Data in Canada has been positive: Ivey PMI moved up to 63.8 from 59.6, also outperforming the expected 60.2; Housing Starts increased by 222,800 annually, beating expectations of 210,000; Building permits also increased by 3.8% on a monthly basis; The most recent Business Outlook Survey report indicates that more than 40% of the surveyed businesses believe the shortage of labor has become worse, which is usually a reliable indicator of wage growth. This will allow the BoC to continue on its hiking path next year, which will mean that CAD will outperform other G10 currencies. NAFTA negotiations remain the greatest risk to the BoC view and the CAD. Report Links: Market Update - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Headline inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.7%. It stayed constant from last month's number. Meanwhile, unemployment was unchanged from last month at 3.1%. This number was in line with expectations. After peaking in late October, EUR/CHF has depreciated slightly, mainly due to the weakness in the euro. However, betting for CHF strength still means fighting against the SNB. Inflation in Switzerland is still too tepid for the SNB to stop their interventions in currency markets. Meanwhile, real retail sales yearly growth is still in negative territory. Thus, until we see a significant improvement in economic activity in the alpine country, we are reluctant to bet against the SNB. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been mixed: Registered unemployment declined from 2.5% in September to 2.4% in October However, industrial production surged to more than 12% on an annual basis Since the Norges Bank policy statement at the end of October, USD/NOK has been flat. This has been because this cross has been squeezed between two conflicting forces: On one hand, oil has gone up nearly 5% just this month. On the other hand, the rise in the dollar has counteracted any downside that rising oil prices could provide to USD/NOK. Although we continue to be bullish on oil, we are bullish on USD/NOK, as this cross is more correlated to real rate differentials than it is to oil. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data was positive this week: Industrial production's monthly growth increased to 2.2% from a 1.6% contraction; the yearly measure is growing at a 4.5% pace, albeit less than the previous 7.5%; New orders are increasing at a very high 11.2% annual pace, a good forward-looking indicator for industrial production. While the Swedish economy remains robust, the SEK will see some downside against the USD and the EUR due to the Riksbank's dovishness. Also, the recent dip in EM high yield bonds could be a risk for the Swedish economy. We are therefore opening a long CAD/SEK trade. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
