China
Highlights The often-quoted 60% urbanization rate understates the extent of China’s industrialization. China is much more industrialized than generally perceived: the country’s industrialization rate is currently 82.5% – i.e., over 80% of jobs in China are already in non-agricultural sectors. This entails a slower rate of industrialization and urbanization going forward. Both rural-to-urban labor migration and expansion of existing cities will slow significantly over the next decade. Transforming rural areas into urban without migration will become the major form of urbanization over the next decade. Investment themes: Demand for urban property will slow considerably, while agricultural machinery sales may have sustainable growth ahead. Feature The scale of urbanization in China over the past two decades has been unprecedented in human history. China’s urban population has increased by 460 million from 1995 to 2017, outnumbering the total population of the U.S. and Japan combined. The extraordinary urbanization process, fundamentally driven by the country’s rapid and widespread industrialization process, had led to a massive migration of laborers from rural to urban areas, and in turn significant expansion of cities and a huge boom in the Chinese real estate market. Where is China now in terms of its industrialization and urbanization path? Will further urbanization be able to continue to support very high productivity growth as well as demand for its already bubbly property market? This report takes a closer look at the country’s progress of industrialization and urbanization. Industrialization Versus Urbanization Chart 1China: More Industrialized Than Perceived Urbanization commonly refers to the increase in the proportion of people living in urban areas. For China, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has two sets of data measuring the country’s urbanization rate – one uses the number of people who have resided in an urban area1 for at least six months within the period of one year, and the other uses the number of people who have only registered non-agricultural hukou.2 However, neither measure reflects the country’s industrialization level. Industrialization is defined as the transformation of an agrarian economy into an industrial one. One way to measure it is the share of employment in non-agricultural3 sectors of total employment. Based on this measure, China’s industrialization process is already reasonably advanced. Chart 1 shows that while only about 60% of the population lives in an urban area, as defined by the NBS (this is the often-cited measure by economists and strategists), World Bank data show that China’s industrialization rate is currently 82.5% – i.e., over 80% of jobs in China are already in non-agricultural sectors. This underscores that China’s development path is more advanced than is generally perceived by investors. China’s urbanization rate cannot capture the fact that there are many non-agricultural jobs held by people living and working in areas administratively classified as rural. Therefore, the 60% urbanization rate understates the extent of China’s industrialization, and overestimates potential upside in future growth. The nation is already reasonably advanced in terms of moving labor from agriculture to non-agriculture industries. This conclusion is reinforced by comparing China with developed economies (the U.S., Japan and South Korea) based on standard urbanization rates and based on our measure of industrialization: The latter points to a much smaller gap between China and advanced countries than the former (Charts 2 and 3). Chart 2China Vs. Advanced Economies: A Much Smaller Gap In Industrialization Measure... Chart 3…Than In Standard Urbanization Measure China’s industrialization rate at 82.5% is similar to South Korea in the early-1990s (Chart 4, top panel). If in next 10 years China’s industrialization progresses in line with the South Korean experience during 1991-2001, this will mean China’s industrialization pace – defined as an annual increase in the industrialization rate – will slow materially to 0.6 percentage points per year over the next decade, from 1.4 percentage points per year over the past decade (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 5 demonstrates the close correlation between the pace of industrialization and real per capita GDP growth in both China and South Korea. What is clear from the chart is that as the pace of industrialization decelerates, per capita real income growth will slow further. Chart 4Korean's Roadmap: Falling China's Industrialization Pace Ahead Chart 5Industrialization Pace Vs. Real Per Capita GDP Growth: Closely Correlated Indeed, industrialization has allowed massive rural-to-urban labor migration as well as enormous expansion of existing cities. Due to the high base, the pace of industrialization has already been slowing, and will continue to do so. Consequently, China’s industrialization-driven urbanization will also continue to lose steam, with ramifications for the economy and its various sectors. We discuss below each of the specific factors that are likely to contribute to China’s future urbanization path, and then conclude the report with the attendant implications for Chinese real estate and agricultural machinery sales. Falling Rural-To-Urban Migration Industrialization generally leads to urbanization by establishing manufacturing factories and generating job opportunities, which in turn induces the movement of agriculture labor to cities. Hence, rural-to-urban migration, triggered by industrialization, is typically the main driver of rising urbanization. Currently, rural-to-urban migration is falling, which is a negative signal for the pace of future urbanization. In China, the rural-to-urban migration process is indeed slowing – i.e., the number of new migrant workers moving from rural areas to cities has already decreased nearly by half, from an average of 9.3 million per year over 2009-2012 to 4.8 million per year over 2013-2017. If we exclude migrant workers aged 50 and above, the number of migrant workers (a stock variable) actually contracted last year (Chart 6). Several points suggest that the rural-to-urban migration process will likely progress at an even slower pace going forward: Declining industrial employment: Employment in industrial sectors has contracted across the board, implying less demand for migrant workers (Chart 7). Employment has contracted in all 30 industrial subsectors that the NBS monitors, and 29 of them currently have fewer employees than five years ago. Higher automation in factories, the government’s de-capacity reforms in some industries with excessive capacity (i.e., coal, steel, aluminum, cement and so on), and some labor-intensive industries (i.e. textiles) shifting to other low-labor-cost countries (i.e. Vietnam, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.) are all factors that have contributed to the reduction in industrial employment. Chart 6The Number Of Young Migrant Workers: Actually Contracted In 2017 Chart 7Declining Industrial Employment Chart 8Rural-To-Urban Migration Will Continue To Decline Aging migrant workers: The average age of migrant workers has already risen from 34 in 2008 to 39.7 last year, with 21.3% of total migrant workers now aged 50 and above. As they continue to age over the next five to 10 years, our sense is that a considerable proportion of these older migrant workers will likely move back out of urban areas because of the existence of a family support network in their villages/rural townships. Shrinking youth population in rural areas: China’s rural population has declined by 33% from its peak of about 860 million in 1995 to 577 million in 2017 (Chart 8, top panel). All else equal, the lower rural population base alone will result in smaller rural-to-city migration compared to the previous two decades. More importantly, as substantial numbers of the working-age population left their rural homes for cities, the proportion of elders in the rural population has significantly increased, while the proportion of young people has drastically decreased. The current 19-and-under cohort will be the major source of future rural-to-urban migration over next five to 10 years. Based on the NBS data, in rural areas the share of the population aged 50 and over rose to 33% in 2017, much higher than the 25% of the population aged 19 and younger. This contrasts with 18% and 36%, respectively, back in 1997. The increasing proportion of elders and the declining proportion of the young population segment in rural areas implies smaller rural-to-city migration scale going forward. Changing preferences of the rural population: In recent years, the agricultural hukou has become much more valuable than in the past. In China, the government always assigns a piece of land for farming to a person with an agricultural hukou when he or she is born. This does not apply to a person with a non-agricultural hukou. As the central government’s policy focuses more on rural development, more non-farming job opportunities will likely be created in the rural areas. Services that in the past could only be enjoyed in urban areas are now spreading into rural areas as well, suggesting farmers who have either kids or elder parents to take care of will be more willing to stay in rural areas. If we use the annual change in the rural population as an indicator to predict the scale of rural-to-urban migration, the migration started in 1996 and peaked in 2010, and will decline going forward (Chart 8, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The scale of rural-to-urban migration will likely continue to diminish in the next five to 10 years. Slower City Area Expansion Chart 9Overdevelopment Of City Area Expansion China’s industrialization-driven urbanization is not only driven by rural-to-urban labor migration, but also by the process of expanding and developing existing urban areas. In Western parlance, this factor would be described as the intense development of the territories surrounding the core of a “metropolitan area.” By establishing manufacturing factories, developing public facilities (roads, highways, subways, schools, hospitals, recreation centers, etc.), and constructing residential/commercial buildings to accommodate massive influxes of migrant workers in the rural areas surrounding cities, these territories have quickly expanded and have been transformed into urban areas4 over the past two decades. Statistics show that the “city area” in China has expanded 150% since 2000, almost twice the 77% rate of growth in the urban population during the same period (Chart 9, top panel). In these now formerly rural areas, local governments often bought land from local farmers and then either sold the land to real estate developers to construct new residential properties or commercial buildings or used the land to develop public facilities. As a result, living conditions and economic development in these rural areas have become “urban-like.” Looking forward, over the next five to 10 years, we believe city area expansion will slow considerably (Chart 9, bottom panel). First, local governments have already taken on massive debt to fund city area expansion over the past two decades, as part of an attempt to demonstrate the success of their economic development plans to the central government (which is usually measured by GDP). However, circumstances have changed. China’s central government now expects local governments to generate “high-quality” and environmentally-sustainable economic growth – and they are unlikely to measure the performance of local government officials simply based on GDP. In addition, containing debt/leverage (including that of SOEs and local governments) is a priority for the central government, implying that debt-fueled city area expansion is unlikely to continue. Moreover, Beijing has already shifted its policy focus from city-area expansion to rural-in-situ urbanization (discussed below). Bottom Line: Past overdevelopment and constraints on local governments suggest that city-area expansion in China will slow considerably in the next five to 10 years, constraining the country’s urbanization pace. Rising Rural-In-Situ Urbanization Going forward, the major driver of urbanization in China will be greatly different from the previous 30 years. Over the next five to 10 years, China’s urban population growth will be driven more by the rural-in-situ urbanization (urbanization without people migration) by transforming rural areas into urban. This is in contrast to urbanization through rural-to-urban labor migration and city-area expansion. The rural-in-situ urbanization – transforming townships/villages directly into towns – has become a policy focus of the central government. The Chinese central government released its first national urbanization plan in March 2014 and announced the “Rural Revitalization Strategic Plan 2018-2022” in September. Both strategic blueprints emphasize the goal of “rural-in-situ urbanization” over the next five to 10 years, to be achieved by building up villages directly into towns. There are currently about 7,000 specialty towns planned or under construction, and it seems more are on the way. However, given already high local government debt and lack of funds for a sizeable proportion of Chinese local governments, we believe a considerable portion of the development of these specialty towns will miss their initial expectations. We expect the rural-in-situ urbanization to be the major force of further urbanization in China (Chart 10). As noted above, the shifting demographic structure of China’s rural areas and the changing preferences of the rural population will also facilitate the rural-in-situ urbanization. Meanwhile, with the government’s policy support, disposable income per capita in rural areas will likely continue to grow faster than in urban areas, which may also help induce rural farmers to remain in rural areas (Chart 11). Chart 10Rising Rural-In-Situ Urbanization Bottom Line: Over the next decade, China’s urbanization will be driven more by the rural-in-situ urbanization (without people migration) by transforming rural areas into urban. Chart 11Rural Vs. Urban: Higher Disposable Income Per Capita Growth Rising “Organic” Urban Population Growth As a final point, “organic” urban population growth (births minus deaths) will likely account for a larger share of China’s rising urban population in the future. A larger urban population base, improving birth rate due to the end of the one-child policy and longer life expectancy (76.3 in 2016 vs. 74 in 2005) will result in a rising urban population going forward (Chart 12). However, unaffordable housing and rising household debt levels (Chart 13) are generating pressure on new families, suggesting the demographic dividend of removing the one-child policy may be smaller than hoped. As a result, a rising urban-area population is unlikely to offset the slowing urbanization factors noted above. Chart 12Rising "Organic" Urban Population Growth Chart 13Household Leverage: China And U.S. Structural Headwinds For Chinese Household Consumption Growth Growing Reluctance To Have More Kids Bottom Line: We believe China’s urban population growth will drift below 2.5%, the lowest in the past 30 years (Chart 14). Investment Implications A declining pace of industrialization and changing forms of urbanization will have the following ramifications: Falling rural-to-urban labor migration points to diminishing property demand from migrant workers. This is structurally bearish for the Chinese residential real estate market, given that most residential construction has occurred in urban areas (Chart 15). Investors holding housing units in urban areas in expectations of rampant price appreciation due to continuous large-scale rural-to-urban migration will be disappointed in the long run. Chart 14China's Urban Population Growth Will Drift Lower Chart 15Chinese Property Demand: Gloomy Outlook An emphasis on rural-in-situ urbanization suggests the government is aiming to improve the living conditions of rural households to enable them to live more similar to urban households. For income per capita in rural areas to rise faster, their productivity growth should grow more rapidly. To raise productivity in the agricultural sector, the government is aiming to implement farmland reforms as proposed by the “Rural Revitalization Strategic Plan 2018-2022.” The objective is to enable either the private sector or public sector to collate many small pieces of farmland into large ones. Large tracts of farmland will in turn allow for an improvement in productivity by applying modern agricultural techniques and machinery. Hence, we believe agricultural machinery sales may have sustainable growth ahead. The aging population and rising number of newborns suggest growth in healthcare, childcare and eldercare will outperform the real estate and raw materials sectors over the long run. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy EllenJ@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The definition of urban area and rural area in China is based on the country’s administrative divisions defined by the government. In China, cities and towns are recognized as urban areas while townships and villages are considered to be rural areas. 2 The Hukou system is a governmental household registration process to define residence in mainland China. It determines a person’s access to housing, education, medical treatment, and social welfare in a city. 3 All sectors other than the agricultural sector (farming, fishery, forestry and animal husbandry). 4 There is no clear definition or standards for the transformation of rural areas to urban areas. In general, a rural area, where has become more developed in terms of economic development, more connected to the city or town in terms of transportation and public facility access, and the residents’ living condition is more like the urban residents, is more likely to be re-defined as urban area by the local government.
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Dear Clients, This is the final publication for the year. The Emerging Markets Strategy team wishes you a very happy holiday season and a prosperous New Year! Best regards, Arthur Budaghyan Highlights The recent EM outperformance is a mid-bear market stabilization, and is at its late stage. Market signals and economic data are consistent with a further slowdown in global growth emanating from China/EM. We reiterate that global trade is heading for a period of contraction and investors should position accordingly. EM will sell off even as U.S. bond yields drop further. Feature Global investors have been increasing their absolute exposure to EM equities over the past two months, despite the ongoing drop in DM share prices.1 The common narrative is that a potential pause by the Fed next year, the trade truce between the U.S. and China and the latter’s ongoing stimulus measures are together sufficient to propel EM risk assets higher on a tactical and even cyclical horizon. In contrast, we believe the recent EM outperformance is a mid-bear market stabilization, and is at a late stage. We have written at length that neither the Fed nor the trade wars were the main culprit behind the EM selloff early this year. The key reason behind the EM and commodities selloff was the slowdown in Chinese/EM economies and global trade. China’s policy stimulus has so far been insufficient to reverse the economy’s growth slump. As such, the odds are that China/EM growth and global trade will continue to disappoint, and the EM selloff and underperformance will resume sooner than later. Market Signals EM risk assets are sensitive to China’s growth and global trade. Market signals remains downbeat on both. In particular: Global cyclicals continue to send a bleak message about the global business cycle. Global machinery, chemicals, freight and logistics as well as semiconductor stocks have been underperforming the global equity index in a falling market (Chart I-1). This is consistent with an ongoing slowdown in global growth. Chart I-1AGlobal Cyclicals Are Underperforming In A Falling Market Chart I-1BGlobal Cyclicals Are Underperforming In A Falling Market EM relative equity performance versus DM has historically been tightly correlated with global materials’ share prices versus the overall global stock benchmark (Chart I-2, top panel). Remarkably, the recent EM outperformance has not been corroborated by outperformance of global materials (Chart I-2, bottom panel). This is additional evidence that suggests investors should fade this EM rebound/outperformance. Chart I-2EM Vs. DM Is Akin To Global Materials Vs. Benchmark Index EM risk assets are very sensitive to both global trade and commodities prices. The majority of forward-looking indicators on global trade remain dismal (please refer to the section below for a more detailed discussion on this topic). Interestingly, the current trajectory of global equities – including the run-up in share prices before January 2018’s peak, the top formation itself, and the subsequent decline – impeccably track the same trajectory that occurred between 1998 and 2000 in terms of both oscillations and magnitude (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Are Global Equities In A Bear Market? The top in 2000 was followed by a devasting, three-year bear market. We are not arguing this global equity selloff will last that long nor be that large. What we are saying is that this turbulence will last another several months, and that there is still considerable potential for further drawdowns. Finally, the silver-gold ratio is breaking below its previous lows, including its early 2016 low (Chart I-4). Such a breakdown could be a precursor of a deflationary shock stemming from the Chinese economy. Chart I-4Beware Of Breakdown In The Silver-Gold Ratio Global Trade: A Contraction Ahead? This section elaborates on the fundamental rationale behind the selloff – the deepening global business cycle downturn stemming primarily from China/EM economies: There are several indications that the global slowdown is already hurting American manufacturing. In the U.S., the CASS Freight Shipment Index, which measures North American freight volumes and is published by the Saint Louis Federal Reserve is foretelling an impending slump in the manufacturing sector (Chart I-5, top panel). Chart I-5U.S. Growth Is Slowing Consistently, the growth rates of both total intermodal carloads and railroad carloads excluding petroleum and coal have rolled over decisively (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). As U.S. manufacturing slows, U.S. Treasury yields will drop further. In China, the slowdown is occurring not only in the industrial parts of the economy but also in household spending (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Chinese Consumer Is In A Soft Spot In the case of the industrial segments, falling new and backlog orders are heralding further deterioration in nominal manufacturing output growth (Chart I-7). Accordingly, the construction and installation component of fixed asset investment is already very weak, while equipment and instrument purchases are contracting. Chart I-7Chinese Manufacturing: Deepening Slump The key channel in which China impacts the rest of the world is through its imports. In turn, the latter are driven by the nation’s credit and fiscal spending impulse (Chart I-8, top panel). That explains the linkage between the Chinese credit and fiscal impulse and EM corporate profits (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-8The Linkages Between Chinese Credit & Fiscal Spending, Imports And EM Profits Crucially, the import sub-component of mainland manufacturing PMI has plunged well below the 50 boom-bust line and signals further downside in EM equities and industrial metals prices (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Chinese Imports Versus EM Stocks And Industrial Metals This is consistent with contracting Chinese imports from various countries (Chart I-10). This is how China’s negative growth shock is promulgating throughout the rest of the world. Chart I-10German And Japanese Shipments To China To Contract Finally, the growth rate of Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean aggregate exports is approaching zero, which is typically a bad omen for EM share prices (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Asian Exports And EM Stocks What’s more, Taiwanese shipments of electronic products parts are begining to contract, which hearalds a bleak outlook for both the global trade cycle and EM technology sector profits (Chart I-12). Consistently, semiconductor prices have continued to fall precipitously. Chart I-12Prepare For More Weakness in Global Trade Bottom Line: We reiterate that global trade is heading for a period of contraction due to the deepening growth slump in China/EM. Chinese Stimulus and U.S. Growth: Lost In Translation? We endeavor to tackle two critical questions: (1) Why has policy stimulus in China failed to stabilize growth? We have written about this extensively in previous reports and will review our key points briefly. First, regulatory tightening on banks and non-bank financial institutions is overwhelming the benefits of lower interbank rates. New regulations are constraining banks’ and financial intermediaries’ ability to expand their balance sheets as aggressively as before. Slowing credit growth has so far offset robust fiscal spending – please refer to Chart I-8. Second, in a system saddled with extreme leverage, non-performing loans and very weak capacity to service debt, the impact of lower interest rates on credit origination is likely to be minimal. This diminishes the efficacy of monetary policy easing on credit growth. China’s credit excesses are enormous, and deleveraging is probably in the very early innings (Chart I-13, top panel). Notably, company and household credit are still expanding at a 10% pace from a year ago (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-13Has China Started Deleveraging? Not Really Third, the authorities are facing a formidable dilemma between opting for lower interest rates and/or maintaining a stable exchange rate. We have been highlighting the tight correlation between the CNY/USD exchange rate and interest rates. The recent stabilization in the CNY/USD may have been due to the latest rise in Chinese interbank rates (Chart I-14). Chart I-14China's Monetary Policy Dilemma Yet, the real economy in China and its numerous indebted entities require lower (and probably zero) interest rates for a couple of years, as occurred in Japan, the U.S. and the euro area in the years following the peaks in their respective credit bubbles. All in all, it is not clear if the authorities can reduce interest rates without eliciting currency depreciation. For now, the jury is still out. Fourth, net liquidity injections into the banking system by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) have been minimal in recent years (Chart I-15, top panel). In fact, commercial banks’ excess reserves at the PBoC have been flattish over the past three years (Chart I-15, bottom panel). While the media and many commentators have been focused on the reserve requirement ratio reductions that have infused a lot of excess reserves into the banking system, there have also been many expired lending facilities from the PBoC to banks. The net result has been flattish liquidity trend in the banking system. Chart I-15Chinese Banking System's Excess Reserves Are Flattish While there is no limit on a central bank’s ability to provide more excess reserves to the banking system, spare liquidity could push interbank rates lower and possibly trigger currency depreciation. Finally, monetary and fiscal policies work with varying time lags. Critically, the aggregate credit and fiscal impulse remains in a downtrend, pointing to less imports and hence a downbeat outlook for EM corporate earnings (please refer to Chart I-8). (2) Why has global trade decelerated amid robust U.S. demand? U.S. import growth has been very robust, yet global trade has slowed (Chart I-16). Chart I-16Robust U.S. Imports Have Not Precluded Global Manufacturing Slowdown The reason behind this is very simple: U.S. and EU annual merchandize goods imports amount to $2.5 trillion and $2.2 trillion, respectively – dwarfed by EM (including China) imports of $6 trillion (Chart I-17). Chart I-17EM Imports Are Larger Than Combined U.S. And EU Imports This value of EM imports excludes China’s imports for processing and re-exporting as well as all the imports of Mexico and central Europe, which also include a lot of inputs that are processed and re-exported. In spite of these adjustments, EM imports are still considerably larger than U.S. and EU imports combined. Hence, robust U.S. final demand is in and of itself insufficient to both offset and support global trade growth when EM/China demand falters. This is especially pertinent to commodities and industrial goods, where China/EM are large consumers. Chart Patterns: Reading Market Tea Leaves There is no magical formula that can guarantee making money in financial markets. Economic data are lagging, markets can change direction abruptly, and indicators can break down or give false signals from time to time. Besides, financial markets do not move in straight lines, and differentiating the noise from the signal is not a simple exercise. The odds of making money or outperforming are higher when investors are correct in their big- picture judgements – i.e., when their thematic views on the global economic and investment landscapes are accurate. Markets can be very noisy and volatile in the short term, yet there are several critical chart patterns that we are taking comfort with as they are consistent with our macro themes. The latter are the following: Sagging China/EM growth, a deepening global trade slump, lower commodities prices and a stronger U.S. dollar/weaker EM currencies. Our Risk-On versus Safe-Haven Currency Ratio2 has relapsed since early this year after failing to break above its previous top (Chart I-18). In and of itself, this is already a bearish chart formation. Besides, it seems this market indicator is forming a potential head-and-shoulders pattern. Chart I-18A Bear Market In Risk-On Versus Safe-Haven Currencies Ratio Any relapse from current levels will validate the head-and-shoulders profile. As a result, the odds of a major plunge will rise, which would be consistent with our themes and outlook. EM share prices in dollar terms have also struggled to break above their 2007 highs in the past 10 years, despite the bull market in the S&P 500 during this period (Chart I-19). Remarkably, the EM stock index is presently sitting on several of its long-term moving averages. They make a formidable technical support. Box 1 elaborates why we use these long-term moving averages in our regular reports. Chart I-19EM Equities Are Facing An Air Pocket If these technical supports give in, EM equities will hit an air pocket – with the next technical support lying 25% below the current level. It is no surprise that an intense battle between bulls and bears is currently being waged. Provided EM corporate profits are set to contract in the first half of 2019, as per our analysis above, we believe these technical supports will be violated and that a major plunge in share prices is very likely. Finally, share prices of global energy and mining companies rolled over early this year at their long-term moving averages (Chart 20, top and middle panels). These long-term moving averages acted as a support in bull markets; now they have become a resistance. Hence, it makes sense to argue that energy and mining stocks remain in a secular bear market, and the 2016-‘17 advance was a bear market rally. If so, further downside in their share prices could be substantial. Meantime, global semiconductor share prices rolled over at their 2000 peak earlier this year (Chart I-20, bottom panel). This is a bad technical sign and might signify that a non-trivial slowdown in global growth may last for quite some time. Chart I-20Global And Mining Stocks Remain In A Secular Bear Market Typically, in the periods when resources and technology stocks sell off, EM equities and other risk assets perform badly. It appears we are currently in such a phase, and it will not be short-lived. Investment Strategy China/EM growth conditions continue to worsen. Tactically and cyclically, risks to EM stocks, currencies, credit and high-yielding local bonds are skewed to the downside. We continue to recommend playing EM on the short side. Playing a market on the long side when fundamentals are deteriorating and valuations are not cheap is akin to collecting pennies in front of a steamroller. The recent outperformance of EM equities and credit versus DM is unsustainable. Continue to underweight EM. For dedicated EM equity portfolios, our overweights are Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Russia, central Europe, Korea and Thailand, while our underweights are Indonesia, the Philippines, Peru and South Africa. We are considering to upgrade India from underweight to neutral. Our preferred short currency basket versus the U.S. dollar consists of the ZAR, the IDR, the CLP, the COP and the KRW. Box 1 - Our Long-Term Moving Average Framework “All through time, people have basically acted and re-acted the same way in the market as the result of: Greed, Fear, Ignorance & Hope. That is why numeric formations and patterns recur on a constant basis.” - Jesse Livermore, in Reminiscences of a Stock Operator The basis for examining price patterns with their 200-, 400-, 800-, 1600- and 3200-day moving averages (MA) – corresponding to nine months, 18 months, 3-, 6-, 12 and 24-year moving averages – is as follows: The 200-day MA is a very widely known and well-used measure. We have observed that when the 200-day MA breaks in a bull market, the next support could occur at the 400- or 800-day MA levels – i.e., the multiples of the 200-day MA. Following the same logic, we examined even longer-term moving averages such as 6-, 12- and 24-year MAs. Interestingly, we discovered that the 3- and 6-year MAs worked very well during the S&P 500 bull run of the 1950s and 1960s (Chart I-21, top panel). Besides, during the bull market of the 1980s-‘90s, the S&P 500 selloffs also found support at the 3- and 6-year MAs (Chart 21, bottom panel). Chart I-21The S&P 500 And Long-Term Moving Averages Meanwhile, the bear market bottoms in 1982 and 2002-‘03 in the U.S. equity market occurred at a very long-term (12-year) MA (Chart I-21, bottom panel). Similarly, in the fixed-income universe, throughout the more than 35-year- strong U.S. bond bull market, the rise in bond yields often topped out when 10-year Treasury yields reached their 6-year MA (Chart I-22). Chart I-22U.S. Bond Yields And Long-Term Moving Averages These observations have led us to infer that structural trends cannot be considered completely broken as and when markets cross their 200-day MA. Large selloffs (or cyclical bear markets) within structural bull markets can push prices to their very long-term moving averages such as 3- or 6-year MAs. The opposite holds true for tactical and cyclical rallies within bear markets. Besides, we have also observed that when a financial market in a selloff finds support at a particular long-term MA, it usually resumes its rally and often advances to new highs. On the contrary, when a market rallies but fails to break above its long-term MA (resistance), it often experiences a breakdown. We often apply this long-term moving average framework to analyze trends in various financial markets, and contrast and evaluate these with our fundamental economic themes. As to the question of why these numbers work, the quote above from Reminiscences of a Stock Operator could be the answer. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnote 1 BoA December survey 2 Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP & ZAR total return indices relative to average of JPY & CHF total returns (including carry). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

