Developed Countries
Last Wednesday’s post-FOMC rally proved short-lived. US equities lost all of the prior day’s gains on Thursday, with the selloff continuing on Friday. This sharp reversal tracks moves in the Treasury market. The 10-year bond yield declined by 4bps on…
Chart 1 Both the US and Global PMIs surprised to the downside this week with the US ISM Manufacturing PMI printing 55.4 vs 57.6 expected. The ISM PMI fell by 1.7 points from 57.1 while its employment sub-component fell by impressive 5 points (from 56 to 50.9). Worse still, the new orders-to-inventories ratio (NOI) remains in the free fall, foreshadowing further weakness in manufacturing activity (see chart). The disappointing NOI ratio is unlikely to be a one-off anomalous print considering a backdrop of the slowing demand for durable goods, falling consumer purchasing power, and surging oil prices. The NOI ratio contraction is also reminiscent of the 2004 episode – one of the few instances when the Fed tightened monetary policy into a slowing economy. Notably, 2004 marked the peak in cyclical/defensive equities for the entire pre-GFC cycle. When it comes to portfolio positioning, weak manufacturing data validates our recent rotation away from cyclical sectors and towards defensives (please see our most recent Strategy Report for a more detailed discussion). Bottom Line: We continue to recommend investors remain cautious and add defensive exposure to reduce portfolio volatility as the global manufacturing cycle slows down.
In lieu of next week’s report, I will be presenting a webcast titled ‘The 5 Big Mispricings In The Markets Right Now, And How To Profit From Them’. I do hope you can join. Executive Summary Just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes are setting in train a global recession. Demand is already cool, so aggressive rate hikes will take it to outright cold. The risk is elevated because central banks are desperate to repair their damaged credibility on fighting inflation, and it may be their last chance. Inflationary fears and hawkishness from central banks are weighing on bonds and stocks, and it may take some weeks, or months, for inflation fears to recede. But we could be approaching a turning point. By the summer, core inflation should be receding. Furthermore, the fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility that have signalled inflection points. Fractal trading watchlist: 30-year T-bond, NASDAQ, FTSE 100 versus Euro Stoxx 50, Netherlands versus Switzerland, and Petcare (PAWZ). US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not Bottom Line: Tactically cautious, but long-term investors who do not need to time the market bottom should overweight bonds and overweight long-duration defensive equities versus short-duration cyclical equities – for example, overweight US versus non-US equities. Feature The First World War, the historian AJP Taylor famously argued, was “imposed on the statesmen of Europe by railway timetables.” Taylor proposed that the railways and their timetables were so central to troop mobilisation – and specifically, the German Schlieffen Plan – that a plan once set in motion could not be stopped. “Once started the wagons and carriages must roll remorselessly and inevitably to their predestined goal.” Otherwise, the whole process would unravel, and an opportunity to demonstrate military credibility would be lost that might never come again. Today, could a global recession be imposed upon us by central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes? Just as it was difficult to unwind the troop mobilisation that led to the Great War, it will be difficult to back down from the aggressive rate hikes that the central banks have timetabled, at least in the near term. Otherwise, an opportunity to demonstrate inflation fighting credibility would be lost that might never come again. Just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes may set in train another global recession. Unfortunately, central banks do not have precision weapons. Quite the contrary, monetary tightening is a blunt instrument which works by cooling overall demand. But demand is already cool, as evidenced by the contraction of the US economy in the first quarter. In their zeal to repair their damaged credibility on fighting inflation, the danger is that central banks take the economy from cool to outright cold. Granted, the US economy was dragged down by a drop in inventories and net exports. But even US domestic demand – which strips out inventories and net exports – is barely on its pre-pandemic trend (Chart I-1). Meanwhile, the euro area economy is still 5 percent below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart I-2). To reiterate, by hiking rates aggressively into economies that are at best lukewarm, central banks are risking an outright recession. Chart I-1US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not Chart I-2Euro Area Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not Our Three-Point Checklist For A Recession Has Three Ticks My colleague Peter Berezin has created a three-point checklist for a recession: The build-up of an imbalance makes the economy vulnerable to downturn. A catalyst exposes this imbalance. Amplifiers exacerbate the downturn. Is there a major imbalance? You bet there is. The post-pandemic 26 percent overspend on durable goods in the US constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. Other advanced economies also experienced unprecedented binges on durable goods. The catalyst that is exposing this major imbalance is the realisation that durable goods are, well, durable. So, if you overspent on durables in 2020/21, then the risk is that you symmetrically underspend in 2022/23 (Chart I-3). The post-pandemic 26 percent overspend on durable goods in the US constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. Meanwhile, a future underspend on goods cannot be countered by an overspend on services because the consumption of services is constrained by time, opportunity, and biology. There is a limit to how often you can eat out, go to the movies, or go to the doctor (Chart I-4). Indeed, for certain services, an underspend will persist, because we have made some permanent post-pandemic changes to our lifestyles: for example, hybrid office/home working and more online shopping and online medical care. Chart I-3An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend... Chart I-4...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend Finally, the amplifier that will exacerbate the downturn is monetary tightening. If central banks follow their railway timetables for aggressive rate hikes, a goods downturn will magnify into an outright recession. So, in Peter’s three-point checklist, we now have tick, tick, and tick. Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not If economic demand is at best lukewarm, then what caused the post-pandemic inflation that central banks are now fighting? The simple answer is massive fiscal stimulus combined with the equally massive shift in spending to durable goods. Locked at home and flush with government supplied cash, we couldn’t spend it on services, so we spent it on goods. This created a massive shock in the distribution of demand, out of services whose supply could easily adjust downwards, and into goods whose supply could not easily adjust upwards. For example, airlines could cut back their flights, but auto manufacturers couldn’t make more cars. So, airfares didn’t collapse but used car prices went vertical! The causality from stimulus payments to durable goods spending to core inflation is irrefutable. The causality from stimulus payments to durable goods spending to core inflation is irrefutable. The biggest surges in US durable goods spending all coincided with the government’s stimulus checks (Chart I-5). And the three separate surges in month-on-month core inflation all occurred after surges in durable goods demand (Chart I-6). As further proof, core inflation is highest in those economies where the stimulus checks and furlough schemes were the most generous – like the US and the UK. Chart I-5Stimulus Checks Caused The Surges in Durable Goods Spending Chart I-6The Surges In Durable Goods Spending Caused The Surges In Core Inflation What Does All This Mean For Investment Strategy? Our high conviction view is that the pandemic’s inflationary impulse combined with the Ukraine war will turn out to be demand-destructive, and thereby ultimately morph into a deflationary impulse. Yet central banks are all pumped up to demonstrate their inflation fighting credibility. Given that this credibility is badly damaged, it may be their last opportunity to repair it before it is shattered forever. To repeat, just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes may set in train another global recession. That said, a recession is not inevitable. The interest rate that matters most for the economy and the markets is not the policy rate that central banks want to hike aggressively, it is the long-duration bond yield. A lower bond yield can underpin both the economy and the financial markets, just as it did during the pandemic in 2020. But to the extent that the bond market is following the real economic data, we are in a dangerous phase. Because, as is typical at an inflection point, the real data will be noisy and ambiguous. Meaning it may take some weeks, or months, for inflation fears to be trumped by growth fears. On March 10th, in Are We In A Slow-Motion Crash? we predicted: “On a tactical (3-month) horizon, the inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices combined with the choke on growth from sanctions will weigh on both the global economy and the global stock market. As such, bond yields could nudge higher, the global stock market has yet to reach its crisis bottom, and the US dollar will rally” That prediction proved to be spot on! Recession, or no recession, we are still in a difficult period for markets because inflationary fears and hawkishness from central banks are weighing on bonds and stocks, while buoying the US dollar. As such, tactical caution is still warranted. Fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility. But we could be approaching a turning point. By the summer, core inflation should be receding. Furthermore, the fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility that have reliably signalled previous inflection points (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart I-8The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The advice for long-term investors who do not need to time the market bottom is: Bonds will ultimately rally. Overweight the 30-year T-bond and the 30-year Chinese bond. Equities will be conflicted between slowing growth which will weigh on cyclical profits, and falling bond yields which will buoy long-duration valuations. Therefore, overweight long-duration defensive sectors and markets versus short-duration cyclical sectors and markets. For example, overweight US versus non-US equities. Fractal Trading Watchlist As just discussed, the sell-offs in the 30-year T-bond and the NASDAQ are approaching points of fractal fragility that have signalled previous turning points. Hence, we are adding both investments to our watchlist. Also added to our watchlist is the outperformance of the FTSE100 versus Euro Stoxx 50, and the underperformance of Netherlands versus Switzerland, both of which are approaching potential reversals. Our final addition is Petcare (PAWZ). After a stellar 2020, Petcare gave back most of its gains in 2021. But this underperformance is now approaching a point of fragility which might provide a new entry point. There are no new trades this week, but the full watchlist of investments at, or approaching, turning points is available on our website: cpt.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Chart 1The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 2The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 3AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 4Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Chart 5Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 6US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal Chart 7A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 8Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 9CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 10Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 11Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 12Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Chart 13BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Chart 14The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 15The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 16Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 17US Homebuilders' Underperformance Has Reached A Potential Turning Point Chart 18Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Chart 19The Rally In USD/EUR Could End Chart 20The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 21A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 22FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 23Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
April services PMIs generally testify to the ongoing consumption pivot from goods to services. The S&P Global Eurozone Services PMI rose to 57.7 in April from 55.6 in the prior month, marking the strongest growth in Eurozone services activity since last…
As expected, the Fed hiked interest rates by 50 basis points on Wednesday, lifting the target federal funds rate to a range of 0.75% to 1%. In addition, the central bank released details of its balance sheet reduction plan, which will begin in June. For…
Broadly-defined US technology stocks have been consistently underperforming the S&P 500 since the beginning of the year. Communication Services, Consumer Discretionary, and IT have shed 24%, 20%, and 18% of their value, respectively. Two main headwinds are…
BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy service concludes that an appreciating US dollar is not yet a reason to expect a peak in US inflation or Treasury yields. Right now, there is not much evidence suggesting that the stronger dollar should force any…
Executive Summary Stocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval President Kennedy’s performance in 1962 would be ideal for the Biden administration in this year’s midterm elections – but today the Russian conflict is less likely to help the Democrats. A threat to the homeland could lift President Biden’s job approval. But most likely inflation and foreign crises will weigh on his approval. A contrarian stock rally would not help Biden’s approval but Biden’s attempts to boost his rating could deliver negative surprises for stocks. US “peak polarization” and Democratic Party policies are negative for the stock market and investor risk appetite over the next zero-to-six months. Our quantitative election models suggest Republicans will win the Senate, though uncertainty will rise as a result of the controversy over the Supreme Court and abortion. Democratic odds of keeping the White House in 2024 are 54.6% but eroding. CLOSE Recommendation (Cyclical) CLOSING Level CLOSING Date RETURN Long Municipal Bonds Vs. Duration Matched Treasuries 93.53 2-MAY-22 -1.50% Bottom Line: Overall Biden policies plus global events are neutral or bullish for US Treasuries while neutral or bearish for US stocks over a tactical time horizon (zero-to-six months). Feature President Biden is doubling down on his support for Ukraine and thus adopting the John F. Kennedy foreign policy playbook of confronting Russia ahead of the US’s midterm elections. Related Report US Political StrategyWar Not Helping Biden So Far Biden’s position today is weaker than Kennedy’s in 1962, so his reaction to Russian aggression will create more market hurdles than it removes. Bad news will come before good news, compounding bearish investor sentiment in the near term. Policy uncertainty should decline after the midterm election on November 8, which is positive for equities in 2023. Democrats Scramble Amid Recession Fear The US economy contracted unexpectedly in the first quarter at an annualized 1.4% rate. The underlying data contained some silver lining – personal consumption grew at 2.7%. But the contraction is bad news for the economy and the ruling Democratic Party. Public approval of Biden’s handling of the economy has fallen to -16.2%. The global economy continues to sputter. Risks to growth are high in Europe and China as well (Chart 1). The US policy response will take shape on the monetary and fiscal level but also on the foreign policy level. First, global risks will not dissuade the Federal Reserve from normalizing interest rates. Chairman Jerome Powell signaled on April 21 that he is willing to hike interest rates 50 basis points at a time to combat core PCE inflation at 5.2%. The market currently expects core inflation to peak at 5.2% while the Fed funds rate will hit 3.3% in 2023 before falling in 2024. The implication is that monetary policy will tighten quickly, even as the economy stutters, which is negative for the US equity market and investor sentiment. However, Fed hawkishness is largely priced. US long-duration treasuries are at or near fair value at 3%, according to our US Bond Strategy. Our US Investment Strategy believes that with the S&P500 already down by 13% so far this year, stocks can begin to grind upward, barring other negative surprises. Chart 1US Slows Amid Global Growth Risks Second, the White House will scramble to try to limit the damage to the Democratic Party in the midterms – with the unintentional result that negative surprises could arise from fiscal policy and especially foreign policy. On the fiscal front, congressional Democrats will redesign their budget reconciliation bill to try to gain a legislative victory. They will need to make it as close to deficit-neutral as possible to avoid fanning inflation. The odds of passage are higher than consensus expectations (26% on PredictIt). But the stock market does not want more government spending or higher taxes in a stagflationary environment. Fiscal policy is still a significant source of uncertainty in 2022, if not in 2023. On the foreign policy front, the greatest trouble looms. Russian aggression has prompted the US and its NATO allies to double down on their support for Ukraine, providing additional arms and aid. Biden’s Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the US wants to see Ukraine “a democratic country able to protect its sovereign territory … [and] Russia weakened to the point where it can't do things like invade Ukraine.”1 Finland and Sweden are increasingly likely to join NATO, which will antagonize Russia. Russia’s response is not yet known but it has issued aggressive warnings. By cutting off natural gas to Poland and Bulgaria, Moscow is warning that it may cut off natural gas to all Europe. Meanwhile Germany is embracing an oil embargo. A larger energy shock is increasingly likely. Chart 2More Bad News Before Good News Bottom Line: Monetary policy hawkishness is largely priced whereas additional fiscal uncertainty and America’s reactive foreign policy are not fully priced. This news is neutral or bullish for US Treasuries while neutral or bearish for US stocks over a tactical time horizon (zero-to-six months) (Chart 2). Biden Can Hurt Stocks, Stocks Cannot Help Biden Before addressing how Biden will try to boost his job approval, we should ask whether approval ratings have any direct impact on financial markets. The answer is largely no – or fleeting at best. During the Trump administration it was easy to get the impression that the president’s approval rating had a substantive impact on the stock market, or at least benefited stocks relative to bonds. After the first year, a correlation developed between presidential approval and the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 3A, top panel). The passage of tax cuts juiced corporate profits but also suggested that President Trump could get things done, boosting his approval rating. Oddly, however, the relationship continued even after Republicans lost Congress in 2018. Spurious or not, the correlation persisted until Covid-19 erupted. At that point Trump’s approval tanked while the stock market roared on the back of gargantuan monetary and fiscal stimulus. President Biden’s administration started off the same way, with presidential approval falling (the usual honeymoon ended) while stocks rallied relative to bonds (Chart 3A, bottom panel). But Biden’s passage of the American Rescue Plan Act and the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act in 2021 did not boost his approval rating. Going forward, Biden’s approval rating will probably stabilize at a low level in an inflationary or stagflationary context. Stocks may continue to underperform bonds over a tactical time frame but will not underperform bonds over the cyclical time frame as long as the US avoids a recession. Thus there is not likely to be close correlation between Biden’s approval and the stock-to-bond ratio. From the sector and style perspective, there is also no clear relationship with presidential approval. There may be some basis for seeing Trump’s tax cuts as positive for cyclicals relative to defensives. His term coincided with the second half of a business cycle when growth expanded. But ultimately cyclicals vacillated and went sideways. Moreover growth stocks outperformed value stocks, in accordance with President Obama’s term in office. Yet there was no correlation between Trump’s approval and growth stocks relative to value (Chart 3B, top two panels). In Biden’s case, presidential job approval has no clear correlation with cyclicals relative to defensives. There may be some relationship with value relative to growth stocks but it is far from convincing. Most likely the underlying macroeconomic dynamics that favored value stocks (i.e. recovery, inflation) coincided with Biden’s honeymoon period and then outlasted it. However, if Biden passes a reconciliation bill with tax hikes, the implication should be positive both for value versus growth stocks and for his approval rating (Chart 3B, bottom two panels). Chart 3AStocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval Chart 3BStocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval From the above data we can draw a few conclusions. On one hand, the stock-to-bond ratio and cyclicals-versus-defensives could rally again on the back of a resilient global economy and yet Biden’s approval rating could fail to recover. The distribution of wealth means that inflation and rising mortgage rates hit low-to-middle income groups who comprise the bulk of voters. Cyclical assets will rise if the global economy improves relative to the US economy, whereas presidential approval may not. Inflation could subside incrementally with limited benefit to the president. On the other hand, if stocks and cyclical sectors continue to underperform, it will probably be due to even worse economic outcomes that will simultaneously prevent Biden’s approval from recovering. If the economy slows further and inflation remains persistent, disapproval will rise. The problem for investors is that the latter is the likeliest scenario based on the energy supply risks in Europe and China’s difficulties stabilizing growth. The US economy cannot entirely avoid the knock-on effects of slower global growth over the next six months. Bottom Line: There is no stable relationship between presidential approval and the stock market, whether regarding bonds, sectors, or styles. There are occasional correlations that reflect coincidences of macro, market, and political cycles or major policy changes. In today’s context a rebound in cyclical assets may not help the president while a further downturn would hurt him. But the president’s attempts to boost his approval rating could hurt stocks. Inflation And Foreign Wars Tend To Hurt Presidents What can Biden do to boost his approval rating and his party’s odds in the midterm election? Not much. Foreign policy is his best option, though he is limited to a defensive or reactive foreign policy and even then the underlying economy will drive voters the most. Looking at presidential approval over time, upswings occur during periods of economic prosperity and peaks occur amid foreign belligerence that threatens the homeland. Presidential approval has slumped since the subprime mortgage crisis and today it is even lower than under President Obama (Chart 4A). Chart 4APresidential Approval Follows Peace And Prosperity, Not War And Poverty Similarly presidential disapproval rises during recessionary and inflationary periods as well as wars and scandals (Chart 4B). The Obama/Trump era saw a rise in disapproval that could resume due to inflation. Foreign wars that do not present a threat to the homeland can increase disapproval. Chart 4BPresidential Approval Follows Peace And Prosperity, Not War And Poverty The takeaway is that a homeland threat from abroad could temporarily lift the president’s approval but it will not last for long unless the underlying economic malaise is cured. The problem for Biden is that the most immediate foreign policy challenges emanate from oil producers whose reactions exacerbate the inflation problem (Russia, Iran). Biden may or may not keep relations steady with China, where disputes could drive up import prices. Bottom Line: A reactive foreign policy could provoke a threat to the homeland that boosts the president’s job approval. But more likely the weakening economy, high inflation, and foreign crises that add to inflation will hurt the president. Biden And The Kennedy Playbook President Kennedy’s experience in 1962 presents the best case for Democrats but the underlying economic and political context are different and damaging for Biden. Comparing today’s situation to comparable midterm election years, the negative outlook for Biden and the Democrats becomes clear. Comparable midterm elections feature high international tensions, high inflation, or low presidential approval on a net basis. Today the “Misery Index” (unemployment plus inflation) is comparable to the minimum levels in midterm years in the 1970s – and higher than the maximum levels in other midterm years (Table 1). The House and Senate losses during periods of high misery and low presidential approval are substantial. Table 1Misery And Midterms The 1962 midterm election is a notable exception. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy’s handling of it minimized the Democratic Party’s losses that year, with only four seats lost in the House, plus a gain of three seats in the Senate. Compare this to the typical midterm election, with an average of 27 lost seats in the House (31 for Democrats) and four seats lost in the Senate (five for Democrats) (Table 2). Table 2Kennedy’s Cuban Missile Crisis Midterm, 1962 Kennedy’s net approval averaged 55% that year, whereas Biden’s today stands at -11%. A threat to the homeland could boost Biden’s approval but today’s likeliest conflicts would worsen inflation if they occurred. The Misery Index stands at 11% this year compared to 6% in 1962. Most importantly, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Russians recognized that America would always care about Cuba’s status more than Russia because it posed a proximate strategic threat. Americans had more at stake and could take greater risks to prevent Cuba from hosting nuclear arms. Today, while the US is not trying to supply Ukraine or Finland with nuclear weapons, NATO membership would expand the US nuclear umbrella. Americans do not seem prepared to recognize that Russia will always care more about Ukraine’s and Finland’s status than Americans will. Russians have more at stake and can take greater risks. Thus while Biden’s foreign policy could easily provoke a crisis with Russia, Biden may not get the better end of the crisis like Kennedy did. Meanwhile financial markets will suffer from the spike in tensions. Bottom Line: Biden’s doubling down on support for Ukraine and NATO enlargement suggest that he does not have an interest in reducing tensions with Russia ahead of the midterm election. Yet Biden is unlikely to get the better of any reactive foreign policy that escalates tensions – at least not in time for the midterms. This dynamic is negative for US and global stocks and risk assets. Election Quant Model Updates The Philadelphia Federal Reserve released a second update to its state-level coincident indicators in April, enabling us to update our quant models for the Senate election in 2022 and presidential election in 2024. The model still predicts that Democrats will lose two Senate seats, producing a Republican majority of 52-48 (Chart 5). Arizona and Georgia are the two states in which Democrats won Senate seats in 2022 but are expected to flip to the Republican side. Arizona and Pennsylvania remain toss-up states (odds of Democratic victory range from 45%-55%) but are inching downward toward likely Republican victories. Chart 5GOP Tipped To Take The Senate (Quant Election Model, April 2022) Democrats shed probability in all states once again. Odds fell the most in Arizona (-1.08 percentage point since the last update in early April) followed by North Carolina (-1.03ppt) and Pennsylvania (-0.98ppt). In seven states the Democratic odds of victory fell by more than 0.5ppts, including Arizona and Nevada (Chart 6). Overall the probability for Democrats retaining control of the Senate now stands at 48.2% (down 0.2ppt). These odds are higher than consensus even though they agree with the consensus on expecting Republican victory. Online betting markets like PredictIt are pricing in Republican control at around 79%, up 3ppt from our last update. This is overstated and the new controversy over the Supreme Court and abortion will fire up Democratic voters, making the Senate race closer to what our model suggests. Chart 6Democrats Falter Across Senate Races: AZ, PA, NC Looking ahead to 2024, our presidential election model still predicts 308 Electoral College votes for the Democratic Party, a number that has not changed since the 2020 election (Chart 7). Democrats have a 54.6% chance overall of retaining the White House. Chart 7Biden Still Tipped For 2024 (Quant Election Model, April 2022) The trend is negative for the incumbent party. North Carolina slipped out of the toss-up category and into Republican category – i.e. Democrats now have only a 44% chance of winning it. Democrats’ odds of winning Florida moved lower – it is now in toss-up territory at 54%, which comes closer to our subjective judgment that Republicans are favored there. The toss-up states have remained well anchored in the range of 40%-60% since 2020 and will play a pivotal role in future predictions. Generally the trend is for falling odds that Democrats will win these states (PA, FL, NC, AZ, and GA). Both Pennsylvania and Florida account for a combined 49 electoral votes and Florida is probably more Republican-leaning than the model says. If the three critical Rust Belt states (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan) slip into toss-up territory then the model will be flagging serious trouble for Democrats. But a lot can happen between now and 2024. In the latest update Democrats are shedding probability of winning in all states, although to a lesser degree than the past two updates. Economic data, while still negative for the incumbent party, may be deteriorating less rapidly. Biden’s approval rating improved marginally since our last update and we expect it to stabilize, albeit at a low level. Michigan recorded the largest decline in Democratic odds of victory (-1.07ppt) followed by Minnesota (-0.79ppt) and New Hampshire (-0.78ppt). Democrats shed more than 0.5ppts from their odds of victory in twelve states, nine of which they won in 2022 (Chart 8). Chart 8Democrats Shedding Odds Of Winning States In 2024 Bottom Line: Republicans are favored to take the Senate (as well as the House) in 2022. Democrats are slightly favored to retain the White House in 2024, though the model is optimistic by granting Florida to the Democrats and the election odds look to be razor-thin yet again. Investment Takeaways As we go to press, the unusual leak of a draft opinion of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito has roiled US politics. The draft argues that the landmark court case of Roe Versus Wade should be overturned. This incident reflects our “Peak Polarization” theme – that polarization will remain very disruptive in the short term yet subside over the long term. It also suggests an activist effort to escalate the culture wars ahead of the midterm election, which we have argued would be the case and implies that more unrest will follow from this event. Whether the Supreme Court overturns the landmark Roe versus Wade ruling of 1973, the battle for women voters will help sustain election-year policy uncertainty, as women’s approval for Democrats will start to recover (Chart 9). Investor sentiment will remain bearish in the very near term. A series of hurdles need to be cleared before we close our tactical long DXY trade and defensive sector tilt. We are closing our long municipal bond relative to Treasury trade for a loss of 1.5% (Chart 10). Chart 9Women Are Key Constituencies In The Midterm Chart 10Municipal Trade Fizzled Out Despite Strong Local Government Finance The overall analysis of US politics is neutral or bullish for US Treasuries while neutral or bearish for US stocks over a tactical time horizon (zero-to-six months). If recession is avoided at the critical juncture this year, then 2023 will see a rising stock market as the economy expands and political risks fall. Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Peter Weber, “Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin says U.S. believes Ukraine can win, wants to 'see Russia weakened,'” The Week, April 25, 2022, theweek.com. Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets

