Equities
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Firming domestic and encouraging global macro conditions along with neutral valuations and washed out technicals suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for the S&P industrials sector. A looming positive global growth impulse, easy Chinese monetary conditions, a still buoyant energy end-market, enticing industry operating metrics and compelling valuations all suggest that now is not the time to throw in the towel on the S&P construction machinery & heavy truck (CMHT) index. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Chart 1All-time Highs Everywhere The SPX catapulted to fresh all-time highs last week following an eight month hiatus, as a de-escalation in the global trade war gained further traction. Chart 1 shows that this is a broad based equity market advance as a slew of major equity market indexes have simultaneously vaulted to new highs. Even the high-yield corporate bond market confirms this breakout with the total return index also vaulting to new all-time highs (not shown). Any further moderation in trade rhetoric from the U.S. administration could serve as a catalyst for additional gains in the SPX, and trade-affected sectors would likely lead the charge, especially post the mid-term elections.1 While the U.S./China trade spat will prove the ultimate equity market litmus test, the longevity and magnitude of the profit upcycle remain the key equity market advance pillars. On that front, a deeper dive into profit margins is in order. The S&P 500's profit margins are benefiting from the one-time fillip of lower corporate taxes in calendar 2018. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that this year's strong profits are not the result of any massaging from CEOs/CFOs of the share count. In other words, profit margins (earnings per share / sales per share) are not impacted by changes in the number of shares outstanding, unlike simple EPS growth. Chart 2 shows that SPX margins recently slingshot to all-time highs. However, excluding tech they remain below the previous cycle's mid-2007 peak. While we are not fans of excluding sectors from our analysis, the sheer size and persistence of the tech sector's profit margin expansion is surprising. Tech sector profit margins are twice the SPX's margins, and tech stocks have been pulling SPX margins higher consistently for the past 8 years as tech giants are flexing their oligopolistic/monopolistic muscle. The implication is that SPX EPS growth of 10% is likely in 2019, but the tech sector has to continue doing most of the heavy lifting given the high profit and market cap weight in the SPX. Keep in mind that the commodity complex in general and energy in particular are also adding to the recent margin euphoria. The late-2015/early-2016 global manufacturing recession-induced collapse in margins is now re-normalizing across basic resources, with margins in the S&P energy sector increasing by 11 percentage points since the Q2 2016 trough (Chart 2). Beyond the sector-related margin implications, from a macro point of view, U.S. stock market-reported employment has also been a significant contributor to the phenomenal profit margin expansion phase. Typically, stock market constituents reported job count growth peaks right before the NBER designated recession commences, on average at over an 8% year-over-year growth rate. The current labor market, while vibrant, has been trailing previous cycles by a wide margin. The most recent year-over-year growth rate clocked in at 3.5% (second panel, Chart 3). Chart 2Tech Margins Leading##br## The Pack Chart 3Smaller Than Usual Labor Footprint##br## Is A Boon For Margins National accounts data also corroborate this enticing profit margin backdrop. Average hourly earnings (AHE) have crested north of 4% in the past three cyclical peaks. Currently AHE are 130bps below that level (top panel, Chart 3). The implication is that as long as top line growth remains solid and corporate pricing power stays upbeat, profit margins will continue to underpin profits. Unlike the tech sector's excessive contribution to the SPX profit margin, the opposite rings true with regard to analysts' forward profit projections. Both on a 12-month and 5-year forward basis the S&P tech sector is trailing the SPX (Chart 4). Importantly, the latter has been at the center of a healthy debate within BCA, and decomposing this seemingly high number is instructive. A 16% long-term EPS growth rate is a tall order. However, sell-side analysts never get the shorter-term, let alone longer-term, forecasts correct. In hindsight, analysts' 5-year forward EPS growth forecasts back in 2016 sunk to an all-time low, even lower than the depths of the Great Recession (top panel, Chart 4). Currently, all we are experiencing is a move from one extreme to the other, and while we are clearly in overshoot territory, it is impossible to predict where this number will peak. Decomposing the broad market's projected long-term EPS growth rate is revealing. First, we note that the tech sector is projected to grow at half the rate predicted during the tech bubble. Second, four sectors comprise the outliers (i.e. forecast to surpass the 16% SPX growth rate) and such a breakneck pace will surely fail to materialize. Another common characteristic these four sectors share is that they all surpassed their tech bubble peak rates, something that the broad market has yet to achieve. Thus, consumer discretionary, financials, industrials and especially energy are in uncharted territory (Chart 5). On the opposite end of the spectrum, Chart 6 highlights the sectors that have yet to overtake their respective peaks and are sporting long-term EPS growth rates below the broad market. Chart 4Putting Tech Long-term Profit##br## Growth Rate In Context Chart 5Decomposing... Chart 6...Long-Term EPS Growth Netting it all out, we continue to have a sanguine cyclical (9-12 month horizon) SPX view, and our price target for 2019 remains 10% higher, assuming the multiple moves sideways leaving the onus on EPS to do all the heavy lifting.2 The week we are highlighting a deep cyclical sector that can benefit from a further de-escalation of the trade war and update one of its key subcomponents that remains a high-conviction overweight. Are Industrials Running On Empty? Last week, in a Special Report on President Trump's trade rhetoric impact on equity markets, we showed that trade policy uncertainty has risen to the highest level with the exception of the 1994 Clinton-era trade spat with the Japanese.3 While U.S. stocks have come out on top versus their global peers, within the U.S. equity market industrials have borne the brunt of the President's trade wrath (Chart 7). Chart 7Trade Uncertainty Weighing On Industrials In more detail, since peaking on January 26th, 2018, two stocks explain over 62% of the S&P industrials sector's fall: GE and MMM, two industrial conglomerates highly exposed to global trade. However, transports in general and rails in particular have been rising smartly almost entirely offsetting the industrial conglomerates' weakness. As a reminder, we are overweight the rails and air freight & logistics, underweight the airlines, neutral on industrial conglomerates and remain comfortable with that intra-sector positioning. Importantly, green shoots are emerging, warning that it does not pay to become bearish on this deep cyclical sector. Our Cyclical Macro Indicator remains upbeat, diverging from relative profitability (Chart 8). Domestic ex-tech output is firing on all cylinders (Chart 8), a message reviving core capital goods orders corroborate (Chart 9). All of this has resulted in firming pricing power. Tack on the reacceleration in our U.S. capital expenditure indicator (second panel, Chart 8) - capex upcycle remains a key BCA theme for the remainder of 2018 - and industrials sector stars are aligned. The upshot is that depressed relative profit growth will easily surprise to the upside (bottom panel, Chart 8). Chart 8Green Shoots... Chart 9...Appearing Not only are there U.S. macro tailwinds, but also a global growth recovery is in the offing that will herald a snapback in relative share prices. The global manufacturing PMI remains squarely above the 50 boom/bust line (fourth panel, Chart 9), and there are early signs of a budding recovery in China. The Li-Keqiang index is ticking higher, Chinese monetary conditions have eased significantly via a depreciating currency and a drop in interest rates, excavator sales continue to expand at a healthy clip, industrial profits are reaccelerating and even Chinese share prices have likely troughed. Expanding Chinese wholesale selling prices also suggest that a reflationary impulse is looming (bottom panel, Chart 9). Were trade tensions to further de-escalate, especially post the midterm elections that could serve as a powerful tonic for relative share prices. Our Industrials EPS growth model does an excellent job in capturing all these forces and is currently signaling that profits will continue to grow into 2019 (Chart 10). Valuations have returned to the neutral zone, but technicals have plunged to one standard deviation below the mean, a level that has historically been associated with playable rallies (bottom panel, Chart 10). One key risk to our optimistic take on the S&P industrials sector is the U.S. dollar. Chart 11 highlights that capital goods revenues, exports and multiples are in jeopardy if the greenback continues to appreciate. Add to that a full blown trade war between the U.S. and China - which is dollar positive - and industrials stocks would suffer another blow. Chart 10Great Entry Point Chart 11Further U.S. Dollar Appreciation Is A Risk Bottom Line: Firming domestic and encouraging global macro conditions along with neutral valuations and washed out technicals suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for the S&P industrials sector. What To Do With Construction Machinery? Early in the year, following our risk management implementation of a 10% stop on our high conviction call list, we got stopped out with a 10% gain from the high-conviction overweight call in the S&P CMHT index. We were subsequently compelled to reinstitute this high-conviction call as all of the fundamental drivers remained in place. However, our timing was not perfect, and given that bellwether Caterpillar has a near 60% foreign sourced revenue exposure, this industrial subsector also bore the brunt of the President's hawkish trade rhetoric. The key question currently is: does it still make sense to be overweight this highly cyclical industrials sub group? The short answer is yes. First, while global growth has decelerated, global trade is still expanding and the signal from the Baltic Dry Index is that the risk of an abrupt halt in global trade similar to the late-2015/early-2016 episode is small (second panel, Chart 12). In addition, the global capex upcycle remains in place and is one of BCA's two themes we continue to explore for the rest of the year. The upshot is that it still pays to remain invested in the S&P CMHT index. Demand for machinery remains upbeat across the globe. Both our global exports and orders proxies for machinery continue to grow, underscoring that a profit-led recovery in construction machinery stocks is looming (third & fourth panels, Chart 12). Second, while China is the administration's primary trade target, easy monetary conditions there will provide much needed breathing room for the Chinese economy. Already, Chinese housing construction data and the rebounding Li-Keqiang Index are pointing to a brighter backdrop for relative share prices (top two panels, Chart 13). Moreover, Chinese excavator sales are advancing at a brisk year-over-year rate, highlighting that construction machinery end-demand remains solid. Chart 12Global Growth & CAPEX Are Tailwinds... Chart 13...And So Is The Troughing Chinese Economy Third, the key energy end-market shows no signs of deceleration. The steeply recovering global oil rig count on the back of a $78 Brent crude oil price suggests that demand for oil & gas field machinery remains on the recovery path and is a harbinger of a rising relative share price ratio (Chart 14). Fourth, industry operating metrics are overheating and signal that profits will continue to surprise to the upside. Rising capex budgets have reduced industry slack (second & third panels, Chart 15). As a result, machinery selling prices have soared to the highest level since the Great Recession (bottom panel, Chart 15) and will underpin industry profits. Chart 14Energy End-market To The Rescue? Chart 15Vibrant Operating Metrics Finally, relative valuations have plunged to near one standard deviation below the average and so have relative technicals. While both can sink further, we would be taking a punt here (Chart 16). Despite our optimistic view on the S&P CMHT index's profit prospects, the appreciating U.S. dollar and recent cresting in the CRB raw industrials index represent key downside risks to our overweight call. This commodity price index is a crucial input to our machinery EPS growth model that has petered out, but at a high level. Any further steep appreciation in the greenback will likely deal a blow to the commodity complex and jeopardize the virtuous machinery profit upcycle (Chart 17). Chart 16Compelling Valuations And Washed Out Technicals Chart 17Risk To Monitor: Commodity Price Relapse Adding it up, a looming global growth pick up, easy Chinese monetary conditions, a still buoyant energy end-market, enticing industry operating metrics and compelling valuation and technical conditions all suggest that now is not the time to throw in the towel in the S&P CMHT index. Bottom Line: Were we not overweight already we would not hesitate to initiate a new above benchmark position in the S&P CMHT index. We reiterate our high-conviction overweight status. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CSTF - CAT, PCAR, CMI. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care?" dated August 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Lifting SPX Target" dated April 30, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care?" dated August 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades
Feature GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of August 31, 2018. The quant model has further lifted its U.S. allocation to overweight from neutral, and the U.K. underweight has also been reduced by half. On the other hand, Italy is downgraded and the overweight in Spain, Germany and the Netherlands are all significantly reduced, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 32 bps in August, largely driven by Level 2 model which underperformed its benchmark by 75 bps. expected, the model did not catch the "Turkey Effect" which drove deep losses in the Italian and Spanish markets. The Level 1 model slightly unperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 2 bps in August. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its benchmarks by 87bps, driven by the Level 2 outperformance of 260 bps offset by the 5 bps of Level 1 underperformance. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model," dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model Dear Client, The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model has been live since July 2016, and has outperformed the benchmark over this period in line with our back-testing. However, GICS will make significant changes to sector compositions at the end of September, most notably creating a new "Communication Services" sector, dominated by internet-related companies, to replace "Telecommunication Services". However, MSCI has not yet made available the final details of membership or historical performance of the revised sectors. Accordingly, after this update we are temporarily suspending publication of this model until full data is available and we have been able to rebuild the model using the newly constituted sectors. The GAA Equity Sector Selection Mode (Chart 4) is updated as of August 31, 2018. Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance The model continues to have a negative outlook on global growth and consequently has a net underweight on cyclical sectors. However, the magnitude of this tilt was reduced from 5.8% to 2.8%. The biggest move was a downgrade of consumer staples from a 2.5% overweight to a 1.4% underweight on the back of unfavorable momentum indicators. The only two sectors with favorable momentum are healthcare and technology. Finally, energy stocks also saw a 0.8% boost in its overweight recommendation on the back of attractive valuations. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," dated July 27, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Senior Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
Feature Desynchronization To Continue This year has been characterized by strong growth and asset performance in the U.S., and weakness everywhere else. While U.S. stocks are up by 10% year-to-date, those in the rest of the world have fallen by 3% in dollar terms (Chart 1). GDP growth in Q2 was 4.2% QoQ annualized in the U.S., compared to 1.6% in the euro area and 1.9% in Japan. Leading economic indicators point to this continuing and, therefore, to the U.S. dollar strengthening further (Chart 2). This has already put significant pressure on emerging markets, where equities have fallen by 7% this year in USD terms. Recommended Allocation Chart 1U.S. Has Outperformed Chart 2...And Leading Indicators Suggest This Will Continue There are many reasons why the desynchronization is likely to continue: U.S. growth continues to be boosted by tax cuts and increased fiscal spending which, according to IMF estimates, will add 0.7% to GDP growth this year and 0.8% next. The peak impact from the stimulus will not come until around Q1 next year. Further protectionist tariff increases. Despite August's tentative agreement between the U.S. and Mexico, the Trump administration still plans to implement 10-25% tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports, and also possibly 25% tariffs on auto imports, in September. This will - initially at least - be more negative for global exporters, such as China, the euro area and Japan, than for the U.S. China is unlikely to implement the sort of massive stimulus that it carried out in 2009 and 2015.1 It has recently cut interest rates and brought forward fiscal spending to cushion downside risk. But, given the Xi administration's focus on deleveraging and structural reform, we do not expect to see a substantial increase in credit creation (Chart 3). This indicates that emerging markets, and capital goods and commodities exporters, will continue to struggle. European banks will stay under pressure because of the problems in Italy (which will fight this fall with the European Commission over its fiscal stimulus plans) and Turkey. Euro zone equity relative performance is heavily influenced by the performance of financials, even though the sector is only 18% of market cap (Chart 4). The euro zone and Japan are also far more sensitive to a slowdown in EM growth: exports to EM are 8.4% and 6.4% of GDP in the euro zone and Japan respectively, but only 3.6% in the U.S. Chart 3China Unlikely To Repeat 2009 and 2015 Chart 4Banks Drive European Equity Performance Eventually, however, strong growth in the U.S. will become a headwind for U.S. assets too. Already, there are some signs of wage growth ticking up (Chart 5), suggesting that the labor market is finally becoming tight. Fed chair Jerome Powell, in his speech at Jackson Hole last month, reiterated that a "gradual process of normalization [of monetary policy] remains appropriate", suggesting that the Fed will continue to hike by 25 basis points a quarter. But the futures market is pricing in only 75 basis points in hikes over the next two years (Chart 6). And, if core PCE inflation were to rise above the Fed's forecast of 2.1% (it is currently 2.0%), the Fed would need to accelerate the pace of tightening. This all points to further dollar strength which will hurt emerging markets, given the consistent inverse correlation between U.S. financial conditions and EM asset performance (Chart 7). Chart 5Is Wage Growth Finally Accelerating? Chart 6Markets Pricing In Only Three More Fed Hikes Chart 7Tightening Financial Conditions Are Bad For EM We continue for now, therefore, to remain overweight U.S. equities in USD terms within a global multi-asset portfolio, despite their strong performance this year. We are neutral on equities overall and expect to move to negative perhaps early next year, when we will see some of the classic warning signs of recession (inverted yield curve, rise in credit spreads, peak in profit margins) starting to flash. Profit expectations are one key to the timing of this. Analysts forecast 22% YoY EPS growth for S&P 500 companies in Q3 and 21% in Q4, slowing to 10% in 2019. Those are strong numbers. But if companies are unable to beat these forecasts, what would be the catalyst for stocks to continue to rise? Moreover, analysts' expectations for long-term earnings growth are more optimistic currently than any time since 2000 (Chart 8). It would not take much of a downside earnings surprise - perhaps caused by the strength of the dollar, or regulatory change for internet companies - to disappoint the market. Equities: Our strongest conviction call remains an underweight on emerging markets. Emerging markets are entering what is likely to be a prolonged period of deleveraging, given their elevated levels of debt relative to GDP and exports (Chart 9). That makes them very vulnerable to the stronger U.S. dollar and higher interest rates that we expect. While EM equities have already fallen significantly, they are not yet cheap and investors have mostly not capitulated: outflows from EM funds have been small relative to inflows in previous years (Chart 10). Among developed markets, we keep our overweight on the U.S.: not only does its lower beta mean it should outperform in the event of a sell-off, but if markets were to see a last-year-of-the-bull-market "melt-up" (similar to 1999), this would likely be led by tech and internet stocks, where the U.S. is overweight. Chart 8Analysts Too Optimistic About Long-Term Earnings Growth Chart 9Long Period Of Deleveraging Ahead For EM Chart 10No Signs Of Capitulation In EM Yet Fixed Income: Higher inflation, and more Fed tightening than the market is pricing in, suggest that long-term rates have further to rise. Fed rate surprises have historically been a good indicator of the return from U.S. Treasury bonds (Chart 11). We expect to see the 10-year yield reach 3.3-3.5% by early next year. We therefore remain underweight duration, and prefer TIPS over nominal bonds. We recently lowered our weighting in corporate credit to neutral (within the underweight fixed-income category). Junk bonds have continued to perform well, thanks to their 250 basis point default-adjusted spread over Treasuries. But spreads typically start to widen one to two quarters before equities peak, so we think caution is already warranted, particularly in the light of the higher leverage, longer duration, and falling average credit rating which currently characterize the U.S. corporate credit market. Currencies: As described above, mainly because of divergent growth and monetary policy, we expect the U.S. dollar to strengthen further, but more against emerging market currencies than against the yen or euro. Short-term, however, the dollar may have overshot and speculative positions are significantly dollar-long (Chart 12), so a temporary pullback would not be surprising. Chart 11More Fed Hikes Means Higher Long-Term Rates Chart 12Are Investors Too Dollar Bullish? Chart 13Dollar And China Hurting Commodities Commodities: Industrial metals prices have declined sharply over the past few months, on the back of the stronger dollar and slowdown in China (Chart 13). We expect this to continue. Gold, we have long argued, has a place in a portfolio as an inflation hedge. But it is also negatively impacted by rises in the dollar and real interest rates, and these are likely to continue to be a drag on performance. The oil price is currently being driven by supply dynamics: How much more oil will Saudi Arabia produce? Will the E.U. and Japan follow the U.S. in imposing sanctions on Iran? Will Venezuelan production fall further? These will make the crude oil price more volatile, but our energy strategists see Brent softening a little to average $70 in H2 this year, but with potential upside surprises taking it up to an average of $80 in 2019. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 For details on why we think massive stimulus is unlikely, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?" Parts One and Two, dated 8 August 2018 and 15 August 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
U.S. equity bears have been warning that the strength of the U.S. dollar will start to infiltrate the exceptionally strong earnings of the S&P 500. While this is intuitively correct, particularly given how much more international the S&P 500 has become (40% of earnings are generated overseas, roughly a doubling since the 1980's), empirical evidence does not support the assertion. As shown in the chart below, the S&P 500 tends to rally when the U.S. dollar is strengthening. The correlation of this effect is much stronger in an environment like today's, when the U.S. yield curve slope is between zero and 50-basis points, and flattening. The reason is a combination of money flows into U.S. dollar assets pushing multiples higher and the strong U.S. dollar putting downward pressure on rates, thus extending the business cycle. Bottom Line: BCA anticipates the dollar to be able to rise over the course of the next six to nine months, as U.S. rates are in favor of the greenback and domestic growth outperformance will continue to favor inflows into the U.S. This bullish view on the U.S. dollar currently does not constitute a reason to downgrade stocks to underweight. In fact, at this stage of the cycle, U.S. stocks and the dollar tend to rise in unison. Please see yesterday's Special Report for more details.
Highlights The indicators that led the EM selloff continue to point to more downside. Meanwhile, broader EM valuation and positioning indicators have not yet bombed out to warrant bottom fishing. In China, policymakers are not yet embracing stimulus of the same magnitude as in 2015-2016. Consequently, the odds for now favor staying put on China-leveraged plays. Feature Calling market bottoms and tops is an art -not a science - as there is no formula that works at all times, in all markets. The fundamental case for EM/China remains negative, as credit excesses of previous years have not been unwound, and commodities prices remain at risk. However, to avoid being part of a herd and to maintain investment discipline, it is vital to re-visit market indicators from time to time. In this week's report, we explore directional market indicators and valuations, and offer some thoughts on investor sentiment and positioning in EM. Putting all of these together with our fundamental analysis, we still see meaningful downside in EM risk assets, and continue recommending a defensive strategy. A Review Of Indicators The indicators that led this EM selloff continue to point to additional downside. Meanwhile, valuation and positioning indicators have not yet bombed out. Chart I-1 illustrates that EM corporate U.S. dollar bond yields continue to rise (shown inverted on the chart), entailing lower EM share prices. The message is the same whether we consider EM high-yield or investment-grade corporate or EM sovereign U.S. dollar bond yields. Chart I-1EM Share Prices Always Decline When EM Corporate Bond Yields Rise We have repeatedly highlighted1 that EM share prices correlate with EM borrowing costs rather than risk-free rates. So long as the rise in U.S. bond yields is offset by compressing EM credit spreads, EM corporate bond yields decline and EM share prices rally. But when EM corporate (or sovereign) yields rise, irrespective of whether this is due to rising U.S. Treasury yields or widening EM credit spreads, EM equity prices come under selling pressure. Chart I-2 illustrates that a similar relationship exists between China's onshore AA- corporate bond yields and A share prices. AA- corporate bond yields have not yet dropped, and, thereby, they still point to lower share prices ahead. Even though risk-free and interbank rates have plummeted on the mainland, corporate borrowing costs have not. If the Chinese authorities do indeed eradicate the perception of implicit government guarantees for the majority of corporate borrowers - one of the most important items on the government's structural reforms agenda - the odds are that corporate bond yields will rise further to price in higher risk of defaults. This would be a bad omen for corporate borrowing costs, capital spending and share prices. Our risky to safe-haven currency ratio is making new lows. Given it has historically been highly correlated with EM stocks, odds are that EM share prices will continue to drop (Chart I-3). Chart I-2China: On-Shore Corporate Bond (AA-) ##br##Yields And A-Share Market Chart I-3Risky To Safe-Haven Currencies ##br##Ratio And EM Stocks Notably, this ratio is also agnostic to the dollar's direction - it swings between risk-on versus risk-off regimes in financial markets, regardless of the greenback's general trend. Hence, it addresses the question of the direction of EM equity prices, irrespective of the dollar's trajectory. Industrial metals prices correlate with EM corporate earnings growth as demonstrated in Chart I-4. The basis is that both are affected by global growth. Presently, falling metals prices are signaling further deceleration in EM non-financials corporate EBITDA growth. We want to emphasize again that the EM selloff this year has primarily been due to the growth slowdown in EM/China rather than higher U.S. bond yields. If anything, the opposite has been occurring: the EM turmoil and growth slowdown have capped U.S. bond yields since April. Moreover, the currency selloff in EM ex-China has led to rising local currency interest rates in many developing economies. Looking forward, higher local rates entail a capital spending slump, which will weigh on EM and global growth. EM risk assets are highly sensitive to global trade growth. The poor performance of global cyclical equity sectors corroborates weakening world trade. In particular, global mining, steel, chemicals, industrials and semiconductor stocks have all broken below their 200-day moving averages (Chart I-5). Chart I-4More Deceleration In EM Corporate Profits Chart I-5Global Equities: Cyclical Sectors Have Broken Down EM equity valuations are currently roughly neutral, down from being one standard deviation above fair value in January (Chart I-6). Hence, EM stocks are not expensive, but they are not cheap either. When equity valuations are neutral rather than at extremes, the market can either rally or sell off. In brief, when equity valuations are not at extremes, the direction of share prices is contingent on the profit cycle. The outlook for EM corporate earnings at the moment is downbeat (as shown in Chart I-4 on page 3), presaging a market selloff. With respect to high-yielding EM currencies, Chart I-7 demonstrates that the aggregate real effective exchange rate for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan has dropped quite a bit, but still stands above its historical lows. Chart I-6EM Stocks Are Not Cheap Chart I-7EM Currencies Are Only Moderately Cheap Regarding credit market valuations, EM corporate credit spreads are still below their post-2009 mean (Chart I-8, top panels). EM sovereign spreads are above their post-2009 mean, but this is due to crisis-stricken outliers. Some pockets of EM, such as Argentina or Turkey,2 might be undervalued for a reason. However, sovereign spreads for EM ex-Venezuela, Argentina and Turkey are still at their post-2009 mean (Chart I-8, bottom panel). On the whole, EM market valuations have improved, but EM assets are not yet cheap to warrant bottom-fishing. Finally, investor sentiment towards EM is no longer wildly bullish as it was last year, but our sense is that the average investor believes this EM selloff will not develop into an extended major bear market. Consistent with this, investors may have hedged some of their bets, or are reducing their exposure, but they have not capitulated or gone bearish/underweight on EM assets. For example, Chart I-9 illustrates that leveraged investors - who have little tolerance for volatility - have substantially reduced their net long positions in EM ETF equity futures, yet asset managers are still very long. Chart I-8EM Credit Spreads Do Not Yet Offer Value Chart I-9EM Stock Futures: Leveraged Funds Have Sold, ##br##But Asset Managers Have Not Besides, investor sentiment on copper - a proxy for EM - is not yet depressed (Chart I-10). As can be seen on this chart, EM share prices bottom when the net bullish sentiment on copper typically drops close to 25%. That is not the case at the moment. Chart I-10Bullish Sentiment On Copper And EM Share Prices Bottom Line: Investors should stay put on EM and underweight EM assets relative to their DM counterparts in general, and the U.S. in particular. China: Juggling Contradictory Objectives China's central bank has substantially eased liquidity in the banking system, as evidenced by the 200-basis-point plunge in interbank rates. In addition, the authorities have instructed local governments to accelerate issuance of the remaining quota of their bonds. What's more, the banking regulator has urged banks to lend more to infrastructure development and to the export sector. We offer several comments and observations regarding China's current round of policy stimulus: First, there has so far been no additional fiscal stimulus announced. General government spending growth for 2018 is planned at 3%, and managed funds spending at 24.1%. Altogether public (fiscal and quasi-fiscal) spending in 2018 is projected to be 8% compared to 8.6% in 2017 and 8.1% in 2016 (Table I-1). Table I-1China: Fiscal And Quasi-Fiscal Spending (Annual Nominal Growth Rates) With no new announced public spending, front-loading previously planned spending could alter the near-term growth trajectory, but it will not affect the economy's cyclical outlook. Second, the key risk to our downbeat view is an acceleration in credit origination.3 Our baseline scenario is that regulatory tightening for banks and shadow banking as well as the ongoing anti-corruption campaign in the financial sector - both components of the broader structural reforms agenda - will continue, and will curb credit growth despite more liquidity provision by the People's Bank of China and lower interbank rates. Importantly, so far there has been little deleveraging. If the authorities allow a credit acceleration, it would negate their adherence to structural reforms in general, and deleveraging in particular. In such a case, China's growth will revive and the negative view on China-leveraged markets will prove to be wrong. Furthermore, a revival in credit growth would go against the policy priority of containing financial risks - code for not allowing bubbles to inflate further. In fact, property sales and starts have recently accelerated (Chart I-11). Stimulating money and credit now would mean inflating the real estate bubble further. Third, broad money (official M2 and our measure of M3) impulses have ticked up, but the credit impulse has not (Chart I-12, top panel). Chart I-11China: Housing Is Proving Resilient Chart I-12China: Money/Credit Impulses Importantly, the broad money impulses rolled over in the second half of 2016, yet EM/China markets and commodities prices remained resilient until early 2018 (Chart I-12, bottom panel). There was roughly an 12-month plus time lag between the rollover in the money/credit impulses and the peak in China-related financial markets. Hence, there will likely be an interval of at least six months before financial markets react to the recent improvement in the money impulses. As such, it is probably too early to bottom-fish EM/China plays. There could be considerable downside in financial markets in the next six months or so, notwithstanding short-term rebounds. Finally, the PBoC's ability to keep money market rates down will be constrained by its appetite for further weakness in the RMB exchange rate. Chart I-13 illustrates that the drop in the interest rate differential between China and the U.S. has coincided with the latest down-leg in the RMB's value. Chart I-13China: Lower Interest Rate Differential = Weaker RMB The interest rate differential between China and the U.S. is now only 100 basis points. Given that U.S. short interest rates are bound to rise further, we expect one of the following scenarios to unfold: If the PBoC opts to lower rates further or keep them at current levels, the yuan will continue to depreciate versus the U.S. dollar. This will be negative for China/EM financial markets; If the PBoC prefers to stabilize the RMB exchange rate versus the dollar, it will need to push up money market rates, thereby undoing its liquidity easing of the past several months. If this takes place, the odds of a credit revival will drop considerably and chances of an economic growth recovery will diminish. Given the above and the fact that EM financial markets have reacted poorly to the RMB's recent depreciation, staying negative on EM risk assets appears to be the more prudent course. We are not sure which option the PBoC will choose in the near term, but in the long run China will have to drop interest rates to soften the deleveraging process. Bottom Line: Chinese policymakers are attempting to simultaneously achieve contradictory objectives: On one hand, they want to deleverage the system and contain the property and credit bubbles. On the other hand, they are not ready to tolerate weaker growth, and have lately opted for stimulus as soon as growth has downshifted. It will be very hard to achieve these contradictory objectives at the same time. For now, policymakers are not yet embracing stimulus of the magnitude that was implemented in 2015-2016. Consequently, the odds for now favor staying put on China-leveraged plays. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "On EM Blues, Brazil And Malaysia," dated May 17, 2018, a link available on page 13. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Alert "Turkey: Booking Profits On Shorts," dated August 15, 2018, a link available on page 13. 3 Underestimating the recovery in credit growth was the reason why we misjudged the magnitude and duration of 2016-17 recovery in China. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Lesson 1: Inflation is a non-linear phenomenon. Lesson 2: Beware government interference in monetary policy. Lesson 3: An emerging markets shock is deflationary for developed markets. Lesson 4: The 'Rule of 4' for equities and bonds. Feature We took a much needed holiday last week, hoping that financial markets would enter a midsummer slumber. Our hopes were dashed. The timing of the Turkish lira crisis reminded us of the old adage: time, tide - and financial markets - wait for no man. But on reflection, our summer holiday gave us the time for some, well... reflection: a precious quality in a world that is rapidly neglecting the value of reasoned analysis. The addiction to minute-by-minute commentary and knee-jerk reaction - epitomised by the Twitterati - means that we are 'thinking fast', when we should be 'thinking slow'. So here, after some reflection, are four long-term lessons from the Turkish lira crisis. Lesson 1: Inflation Is A Non-Linear Phenomenon. Turkey's recent experience clearly demonstrates that inflation is non-linear - meaning that inflation doesn't move in a gradual or controlled fashion. Non-linear phenomena experience sudden and explosive phase-shifts (Chart I-2). In Turkey's case, a major cause of its currency crisis was that inflation recently phase-shifted out of a well-established channel to its current 16 percent rate (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekTurkish Inflation Experienced A Non-Linearity Chart I-2Inflation Can Experience A Phase-Shift People struggle with the concept of non-linearity because the vast majority of our day to day experiences are linear, meaning the output is proportionate to the input. The speed of our car depends linearly on the pressure on the accelerator pedal; the temperature in our home depends linearly on the thermostat setting; the volume of music in our headphones depends linearly on the volume setting; and so on. Likewise, the vast majority of economic models - including the infamous DSGE inflation models used by central banks - assume linear relationships.1 But some phenomena are non-linear. An example you might relate to is trying to get a small amount of tomato ketchup out of crusted-over squeezy bottle. It is impossible. You squeeze and no ketchup comes out; you squeeze harder and still nothing comes out; and then suddenly you get the explosive phase-shift: the entire bottle empties on your plate! Inflation also experiences violent phase-shifts. The main reason is that people cannot perceive small changes in inflation, making inflation expectations very sticky, which is to say non-linear. The Turkish people might not perceive inflation rising from 8 percent to 10 percent, but they would certainly perceive it rising to 16 percent. Hence, as policymakers squeeze the ketchup bottle, nothing happens at first. But at a tipping point, the self-reinforcement of inflation expectations becomes explosive. Whereupon, the whole bottle comes out. The broad money supply, M, gaps up because it becomes rational for banks to lend as much as possible. And its velocity, V, also gaps up because it becomes rational to spend the money - both newly created and pre-existing balances - as quickly as possible (Chart I-3-Chart I-6). So the product MV, which equals nominal GDP, experiences an even sharper non-linearity. Chart I-3The Velocity Of Money... Chart I-4...Is A Non-Linear Phenomenon Chart I-5The Money Multiplier... Chart I-6...Is A Non-Linear Phenomenon This begs the question: when should we worry about a sudden phase-shift in developed market inflation rates? The answer comes from Lesson 2. Lesson 2: Beware Government Interference In Monetary Policy. An economy's broad money supply, M, is dominated by loans. So to expand the broad money supply, somebody has to borrow money. This means that the danger of an inflation phase-shift rises sharply if the government can borrow and spend money at will, with the central bank creating it.2 Over the past few centuries, the British government - by periodically leaving the gold standard - did exactly this to pay for the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War and the First World War (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The British Government Created Inflation To Pay For Wars Which answers the question of when to worry. The government has to get into cahoots with the central bank. In other words, the central bank loses its independence and fiscal policy has the scope to become ultra-loose. This describes the situation in Turkey, where President Erdogan has forced the central bank to suppress interest rates, while putting his son-in-law in charge of the Turkish treasury. Could something similar happen in developed economies? President Trump's fiscal stimulus combined with his recent attempt to influence Federal Reserve policy (to more dovish) is a small step in this direction. Nevertheless, the major developed market central banks are on a hawkish path. They are squeezing less on the ketchup bottle. Therefore, the real risk of a phase-shift in developed market inflation will arise not before the next global downturn, but after it - when desperate policymakers might resort to desperate measures. In the near term, we expect developed market inflation to remain contained, and one supporting reason comes from Lesson 3. Lesson 3: An Emerging Markets Shock Is Deflationary For Developed Markets. The slowdown and recent shock in emerging markets has caused the dollar and yen to surge. Even the euro - on a broad trade-weighted basis - has held up very well through the Turkish lira crisis and is up 2 percent in 2018 (Chart I-8). Chart I-8An EM Shock Boosts DM Currencies... Meanwhile, since May, industrial metal prices have plunged 20 percent (Chart I-9) and even the crude oil price is down by 10 percent. Chart I-9...And Depresses Industrial Commodity Prices An emerging market shock also threatens the developed market banking system by impairing its foreign loans. Thereby, it risks stifling domestic credit creation. The combination of stronger currencies, lower commodity prices, and potentially weaker bank credit creation is a disinflationary headwind for developed markets in the near term. Lesson 4: The 'Rule of 4' For Equities And Bonds. If developed market inflation remains contained in the near term, it should also keep a lid on bond yields. This is significant because our non-consensus call is that the main threat to developed market risk-assets comes not from trade wars and/or a global economic slowdown; it comes from rich valuations which will become dangerously unstable if bond yields march much higher. The bond yield that matters is the global long bond yield. Effectively, this is the weighted average of its three main components: the 10-year yields on the U.S. T-bond, the German bund and the Japanese government bond (JGB). But for a useful rule of thumb, just sum the three yields. A sum above 4 - which broadly equates to the global 10-year yield rising above 2 percent - means it is time to go underweight equities. A sum between 3.5 and 4 means a neutral stance to equities. A sum well below 3.5 means an overweight stance to equities - because it would justify even richer valuations. Investment Recommendations Asset allocation: Our 'rule of 4' sum now stands at 3.3, indicating a close to neutral stance to equities. For bonds, we have since May recommended an overweight position in a portfolio of high-quality government 30-year bonds. The recommendation is performing well, and it is appropriate to stick with it for the time being. Sector allocation: Stay overweight the classical defensives versus the classical cyclicals: materials, industrials and banks. This recommendation has fared spectacularly well. Healthcare has outperformed banks by 20 percent since February, so the pressing question is: when to take profits? We anticipate at some point in the fourth quarter. Within the cyclical sectors, prefer banks over oil and gas. Regional and country equity allocation: the geographical allocation of equities follows directly from the sector allocation. Our preferred ranking of sectors necessarily means that our preferred ranking of major equity markets is: S&P500 first, Eurostoxx50 and Nikkei225 second (tied), FTSE100 third. Again, this recommendation has performed extremely well. Currency allocation: Since February, our main currency recommendations have been short EUR/JPY, long EUR/USD, and long EUR/CNY. In effect the recommendations reduce to: long JPY/USD and long EUR/CNY, and this combination has proved to be an excellent 'all-weather' position (Chart I-10). Stick with it for the time being. Chart I-10Long JPY/USD And EUR/CNY Has Been##br## A Good 'All-Weather Combination' Finally, our long-standing short Turkish lira versus South African rand position has returned a mouth-watering 73 percent in four years.3 It is time to close the short Turkish lira position and bank the profits. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models. 2 For example, by giving all public sector workers a 50% pay rise! 3 After the cost of carry, based on interest rate differentials. Fractal Trading Model* Market reaction to the Turkish lira crisis caused our two most recent trades to hit their stop-losses, but it has also created new opportunities. The aggressive sell-off in industrial commodities appears technically extended. So this week's recommended trade is an intra-cyclical equity sector pair-trade: long global basic resources, short global chemicals. The profit target is 3.5% with a symmetric stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights The persistent weakness of the RMB appears to be one important factor weighing on Chinese stocks, particularly the domestic market. CNYUSD may have some upside from current levels if the Trump administration applies only 10% rate to the second round of planned tariffs, but on balance is likely to come under further market pressure. This explains the PBOC's decision to try to support the currency. Interestingly, July brought some hopeful (albeit early) macro signals from China among the data that we track, some of which appear to have been overlooked by investors. Still, a neutral stance towards Chinese investable stocks versus the global benchmark continues to be warranted, at least until some clarity emerges about the magnitude and disposition of the export shock. Feature Economic and financial market conditions in China have not meaningfully improved since the publication of our last weekly report. Chart 1 highlights that China's economic surprise index remains in negative territory, and Chart 2 shows that Chinese investable and domestic stocks remain 22% and 29%, respectively, below their rolling 1-year high in local currency terms. In US$ terms, domestic Chinese stocks are 34% below their January peak, owing to the significant decline in CNYUSD. The BCA China Play Index and the relative performance of domestic infrastructure stocks versus global equities are two additional market indicators that we are watching closely as proxies for reflation, and neither is signaling a significant improvement (Chart 3). Chart 1Persistently Negative Economic Surprises... Chart 2...And Still In A Bear Market Chart 3Reflation Proxies Are Not Signaling A Major Economic Upturn The RMB Factor The persistent weakness of the RMB appears to be one important factor weighing on Chinese stocks, particularly the domestic market. While a weaker currency will actually help offset some of the export shock, Chart 4 shows that domestic stocks have not responded positively to the decline: the rolling 3-month correlation between the two has soared even further into positive territory over the past month, which may explain recent actions from the PBOC to help stabilize the currency. In short, the RMB appears to be acting as the "panic barometer" for domestic equity investors. Chart 4The RMB Is Acting As A "Panic Barometer" For Domestic Stocks Chart 5Some Evidence Of PBOC-Driven Depreciation The PBOC continues to maintain that it is not actively manipulating the RMB, arguing that both last year's appreciation and Q2's depreciation have occurred due to market supply and demand. Chart 5 casts some doubt on this claim, suggesting that at least some of the recent decline has been purposeful. The chart shows the standardized 1-month percent change in official reserves, measured in SDRs to help remove the impact of currency fluctuations. It highlights that the change in currency-neutral reserves has been quite elevated over the past three months relative to recent history, which is what would be expected (absent major capital outflow) if the PBOC was buying foreign currency assets to push down the exchange rate. But we agree that the extent of the decline is now probably more than what policymakers are comfortable with, which raises the question of how much more market-based pressure the RMB is likely to come under. In attempting to answer this question, it is interesting to note that the magnitude of the decline in CNYUSD over the past two months seems to have been closely aligned with the share of proposed tariffs as a share of Chinese exports to the U.S., as would be implied in a simple open economy model with flexible exchange rates. Chart 6 illustrates the magnitude of the decline in CNYUSD that would be implied by this framework in a variety of tariff scenarios. The chart shows that the RMB has some upside from current levels if the rate on the second round of tariffs is limited to 10% (instead of the 25% that has been threatened), and no additional tariffs are levied. But it also shows that further market pressure on the exchange rate is likely if the Trump administration simply follows through with their stated plans, and especially if the U.S. moves to tariff all imports from China. Notably, in the scenarios showing a further RMB decline, all of them fall below the psychologically important level of 7 yuan to the dollar. Chart 6More Pressure On RMB To Come If Trump Merely Follows Through With His Threats Given this, it is easy to see why investors feel that they are in limbo regarding the outlook for Chinese stock prices. They can observe the reflationary outlook of Chinese policymakers, but they are also factoring in: A looming export shock of still uncertain magnitude A strong signal from authorities that the campaign to control leverage and crackdown on shadow banking will not be abandoned Persistent RMB volatility An ongoing "old economy" slowdown that was already underway prior to the imposition of tariffs Domestic Economy Crosscurrents Chart 7Closely Watched Data Releases Negatively Surprised In July Concerning the last of these factors, we have written about a slowdown in China's old economy for the better part of the past year, a view that is now sharply in the market's focus given the negative external outlook. Last week's disappointing release of the July retail sales, industrial production, and fixed asset investment data certainly did not help improve investor sentiment towards China's economy (Chart 7). Interestingly, however, July did bring some hopeful (albeit early) macro signals from China, some of which appear to have been overlooked by investors. Table 1 presents the dashboard of select macro series that we have showed in several reports over the past few months. It highlights the evolution of the key six components of our BCA Li Keqiang index Leading Indicator, four housing market series that we have found to have strongly leading properties, as well as the NBS and Caixin manufacturing PMIs. Credit growth and the PMIs are currently providing the most negative signals, in that they declined in July and are below their 12-month moving average. In the case of credit growth, this is a continuation of an almost 2-year downtrend, but the PMI weakness has been much more recent (in response to the worsening export outlook). But several indicators that we track ticked up in July, including 4 out of 6 components of our leading indicator for the Li Keqiang index (LKI). The fact that monetary conditions indexes have risen should not be surprising given the recent weakness in the currency, but growth in the money supply also ticked up non-trivially last month (possibly due to the PBOC's apparent manipulation of the RMB). In the case of M2, the tick up technically pushed the YoY growth rate (modestly) above its trend for the first time in 2 years. Table 1Some Hopeful Signs, But Credit Remains Weak There are two other points from Table 1 worth highlighting, the first of which is negative. While the LKI itself has looked reasonably strong over the past few months (in contrast to our slowing domestic demand view), it ticked down in July for the second time. In addition, the LKI has recently been propped up by two, presumably unsustainable, factors: a spurt of rail cargo volume growth that appears to be strongly linked to trade front-running in advance of the U.S. import tariffs, and a surge in electricity consumption from the services industry (which is not investment-intensive). Chart 8 controls for the second factor by presenting an alternative measure of the LKI that replaces overall electricity production with consumption in primary and secondary industries; the difference in the recent trend between the two measures is clear. Chart 8The LKI Is Being Held Up By Trade Front Running And Services The second important point from Table 1 is positive: both housing starts and sales accelerated very significantly in July, with sales being particularly notable. BCA's China Investment Strategy service has highlighted that the housing sector represented the best candidate for meaningful acceleration in Chinese economic activity, and the July data was particularly impressive. It remains unclear whether the authorities will continue to follow through with a crackdown on the property sector, despite recent statements suggesting they will: household leverage is not enormously elevated relative to GDP, but it has accelerated very significantly over the past couple of years. But if the recent strength in sales volume continues and policymakers do not respond aggressively with macroprudential measures, our conviction in a sustained residential construction boom in China would rise materially. This will be important for investors to monitor, as it could provide a critical source of investment-driven domestic demand over the coming 6-12 months. Investment Conclusions Despite the crosscurrents buffeting China's economic outlook, we can draw three conclusions that lead us to firm near-term investment strategy recommendations: Market proxies are not signaling that Chinese policymakers will end up overstimulating the economy For now, credit growth, and the domestic "old economy" more generally, continues to decelerate Further RMB weakness may be in the cards To us, these conclusions clearly argue for a neutral stance towards Chinese investable stocks versus the global benchmark, at least until some clarity emerges about the magnitude and disposition of the export shock. We also continue to recommend that investors favor low market beta sectors within the investable universe, such as classical defensives as well as industrials.1 In early-July, we opened a "shadow" trade of being long the MSCI China A Onshore index / short MSCI China index, which we said we would consider implementing in response to a 5% rally in relative dollar performance. Chart 9 highlights that this threshold has not yet been reached, and we continue to warn against trying to catch a falling knife. But Chart 10 underscores how stretched (to the downside) domestic stocks have become: versus the global benchmark, relative stock prices in US$ have fallen to an 11-year low. Panel 2 illustrates that this stretched performance is at least in part driven by the performance of U.S. equities, but domestic stocks prices are still at the very low end of their post-GFC range when compared with global ex-U.S. stocks. Chart 9Still Too Early To Buy A-Shares... Chart 10...But The Selloff Seems Extremely Late In short, the potential for a substantial bounce in relative domestic equity performance is considerable were the economic outlook to stabilize, and we will be watching closely for an opportunity to time a reversal. Stay tuned! Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Investable industrial stocks in China have become relatively low-beta, owing to the fact that they had already materially underperformed the investable benchmark prior to the emergence of trade frictions with the U.S. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
