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Dear Client, I am travelling this week meeting clients in Asia, so this report has been written by my colleagues, Billy Zicheng Huang and Sophie McGrath. Greece, the epicentre of the euro debt crisis, is finally recovering. Declining net NPLs, an upturn in investor confidence and improving employment are encouraging. But there is a risk that growth will lose some momentum amid the country's exit from the third economic adjustment program. Hence, we are recommending a neutral weighting in the Greek equity market as a whole comprising four overweight ideas counterbalanced by four underweight ideas. We expect companies with essential product focus, low debt levels and strong asset health to outperform non-essential product providers, highly leveraged players and weak asset-quality counterparts. Dhaval Joshi Best Overweight And Underweight Ideas Table I-1Single-Stock Statistics On Select Greek Companies* Greece: The Long Road To Recovery Macro indicators in Greece have improved and investors have become more confident. This is highlighted by the recent upgrade of Greece's long-term sovereign credit rating to B and an oversubscribed seven-year bond sale, confirming high investor demand. Nevertheless, there is a risk that growth will lose some momentum amid the country's exit from the third economic adjustment program. Listing the improvements, economic sentiment is approaching previous peaks (Chart I-1), the unemployment rate has dropped to its lowest level since 2011 (Chart I-2) and the youth unemployment rate has fallen around 20 percentage points from its high (Chart I-3). Chart I-1Economic Sentiment Has Improved Chart I-2Unemployment Is Down... Chart I-3...Youth Unemployment Even More So Furthermore, the most intense headwinds from fiscal drag are over. In the depths of the debt crisis, fiscal drag reached 7% of annual GDP. While Greece is not set to receive a sustained fiscal 'thrust' in the medium term, it appears the worst is over on the austerity front (Chart I-4). The most promising indicator is competitiveness. Greece appears to have made the necessary adjustments to unit labor costs and is no longer a euro area outlier (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Peak Fiscal Drag##br## Is Over Chart I-5Unit Labour Costs Are Now In Line ##br##With Euro Area Counterparts Recent developments in the banking system are also encouraging. Bank liquidity has improved, and the use of ECB Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) has significantly diminished (Chart I-6). Net NPLs have declined sharply and are now covered by bank equity capital (Chart I-7). An unprecedented legal foundation is now in place to address the NPL stockpile. These measures include the introduction of electronic auctions to recover claims, the simplification of the out-of-court settlement process and reducing the liability of individuals involved. If net NPLs continue to fall, we can expect a healthier banking sector to support the economy, as witnessed in Spain, Ireland, and more recently in Italy. Chart I-6Banks Are No Longer Reliant ##br##On Emergency Funding Chart I-7Bank Equity Capital Finally ##br##Exceeds Net NPLs Despite these encouraging signs, the consumption recovery is fragile as households continue to delever (Chart I-8). Additionally, retail sales have dipped again recently (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Households Continue To Delever Chart I-9Retail Sales Have Dipped Regarding the bailout exit and debt sustainability, markets have seemingly priced in the wrapping up of the third review later this year, with the Eurogroup meeting on January 22 having recorded progress. However, what is more uncertain is whether this will take the form of a 'clean' or 'dirty' exit. The level of post-bailout monitoring that is agreed upon will ultimately dictate the pace of Greece's return to capital market normalcy. Considering the uncertainties in the overall picture, we recommend a market neutral portfolio in Greece with an overall beta of 0.15, consisting of four overweight companies versus four underweight counterparts from the consumer discretionary, telecoms, real estate, banking, consumer staples and energy sectors (Table I-2). Through our selection process we focused on companies with better growth profiles in essential sectors of the Greek economy. Table I-2Select Companies And 12-Month Beta Vs. MSCI EM Sector Specifics/Dynamics Our overweight (OW) basket performance over the past three years has been exceptionally strong relative to the underweight (UW) names. The OW basket has outperformed by 59% (Chart I-10A). However, this was primarily due to a selloff in Piraeus Bank (UW) in the second half of 2015. On a short-term horizon we see a different picture. Looking at one-year performance, the OW basket has actually just closed the underperformance gap over the past two months (Chart I-10B). Chart I-10AThree-Year Performance: ##br##Overweight Vs. Underweight Basket Chart I-10BOne-Year Performance: ##br##Overweight Vs. Underweight Basket Valuations favor the OW basket, especially from the second half of 2017 on, when OW and UW share prices began to diverge. Compared to historical valuations, OW names are currently trading close to their three-year average P/E, while their UW counterparts are trading at one standard deviation above historical P/E (Chart I-11A, Chart I-11B, and Chart I-11C). Chart I-11AOW Basket Displays Appealing Valuations##br## Relative To UW Basket... Chart I-11B...And Its Own ##br##Historical Average... Chart I-11C...While UW Basket Is Trading One Standard##br## Deviation Above Mean Non-bank OW companies display stronger operating margin dynamics, despite a recent dip, while the OW bank demonstrates superior net interest margins. Both margin trends are translating into solid profitability (Chart I-12A and Chart I-12B). Chart I-12ARobust Operational Level Performance... Chart I-12B...Feeds Into Solid Profitability Additionally, the OW basket displays more favorable debt dynamics, with debt remaining at low levels and trending down, whereas the debt ratio in the UW basket is already at an elevated level and continues to climb (Chart I-13). Meanwhile, free cash flow yield has favored UW players since mid-2016 when banks are excluded (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Debt Levels Remain ##br##Low In OW Companies Chart I-14Free Cash Flow Yield Favors ##br##UW Non-bank Names Specifically for banks, Alpha Bank (OW) enjoys a much healthier asset quality profile compared to Piraeus Bank (UW), with a combination of a lower NPL ratio and a higher tier-1 ratio (Chart I-15). Please also note that EPS growth is not shown as we normally do in our reports due to abrupt volatility in both baskets, which prevents us from drawing comparative conclusions. Dividend yield is also omitted due to the fact that most companies we have selected do not pay dividends. Chart I-15Alpha Bank Illustrates Healthier Asset Quality The Overweight Basket Jumbo (BELA GA) Jumbo (BELA GA) (Chart I-16) Chart I-16Performance Since February 2017: ##br##Jumbo Vs. MSCI EM Jumbo reported financial results for the fiscal 2017 year on October 12. Revenue increased by 7% year over year. Despite a difficult year in Greece, sales were compensated largely by organic growth in Romania and Bulgaria, with one new store open in each country respectively. EBITDA grew by 6% year over year, on the back of an effective cost management effort, while EBITDA margin remained virtually flat at 25.2%. As a result, the bottom line expanded by 8% year over year, with profit margin up 20 basis points to 19.2% Jumbo is currently trading at a forward P/E of 15.5x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 6.3% over the next three years. The company is expected to continue its strong expansion drive in Eastern Europe, with one more store open in Romania in November 2017 (the 9th store) and one more store to be open next year in Bulgaria. At the same time, a drop in unemployment and a pick-up in household consumption will help Jumbo's recovery in the Greek market, signaling upside potential for the share price. Hellenic Telecom (HTO GA) Hellenic Telecom (HTO GA) (Chart I-17) Chart I-17Performance Since February 2017: ##br##Hellenic Telecom Vs. MSCI EM Hellenic Telecom (OTE) reported full-year 2017 results on February 22. Revenues declined slightly year over year by 1.3% to €3857 million, dragged down mainly by mobile operations in Albania, where revenues declined by 11.8%. Mobile operations in Romania remained positive, aided by a strong fourth-quarter performance which saw revenues increase by 14.4% year over year. Revenue growth in Greece remained solid in both mobile and fixed line, increasing by 0.7% and 1% year over year respectively. EBITDA shrank by 1.3% year over year, while EBITDA margin remained flat at 33.8%. As a result of muted top line growth on an annual basis as well as elevated operating costs, the bottom line contracted by 20% year over year, in line with market expectations. Hellenic Telecom is currently trading at a forward P/E of 86x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 6.9% over the next three years. Management guidance indicates that free cash flow (FCF) and adjusted capex will start to return to normal levels in 2018 after heavy investments in both its fixed and mobile network capabilities in 2017. Additionally, growing confidence in the company's outlook is signalled by its announcement of a new shareholder return policy, where 100% of the FCF will be distributed through a combination of a dividend payout and share buybacks. We expect that its recent investment in mobile and fixed capabilities and an improving Greek economy should drive a positive performance in 2018. Grivalia Properties (GRIV GA) Grivalia Properties (GRIV GA) (Chart I-18) Chart I-18Performance Since February 2017: ##br##Grivalia Properties Vs. MSCI EM Grivalia Properties reported stellar full-year 2017 financial results on January 31. The top line displayed solid results, with rental income advancing 7% year over year. Furthermore, the company realized a strong net gain of EUR18.8 million from fair value adjustments on investment property, compared to a EUR13.6 million loss in 2016. This was mainly driven by new property investments. As a result, operating profit surged by 102% year over year. All this translated into 139% year-over-year net income growth. Due to loan growth, the loan-to-value ratio grew by 8 percentage points to 14%, while NAV per share expanded by 5% year over year. Grivalia Properties is trading at a forward P/E of 15x, while the market is forecasting an EPS contraction of 1% over the next three years. The company announced in February the acquisition of office space in Maroussi, which has already been leased out to multinational companies. Two more properties were acquired in Greece in the same month. We believe a stabilizing property market leaves ample room for recovery, which is expected to support Grivalia's overweight Greek real estate portfolio and its risk diversification. Alpha Bank (APLHA GA) Alpha Bank (APLHA GA) (Chart I-19) Chart I-19Performance Since February 2017: ##br##Alpha Bank Vs. MSCI EM Alpha Bank reported solid third-quarter 2017 financial results on November 30. Net interest income improved by 2% year over year, with net interest margin growing 20 basis points to 2.9%. However, on a quarter-over-quarter basis, growth was negative. Fee income depicted a similar picture, up 2% year over year but down 7% quarter over quarter. On the positive side, operating expenses were under control, declining by 3% year over year, effectively pushing down the cost/income ratio. With the help of a decline in impairment losses, net income surged by 386% year over year. Asset quality showed a pattern of recovery: The NPL ratio went down by 7.4 percentage points to 33.2% year over year, while the tier-1 ratio improved by 1 percentage point to 17.8%. Moreover, ELA has trended down year to date. The market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 53.6% over the next three years. Despite uncertainty regarding stress testing and the overall trajectory of Greek economic growth, Alpha Bank has demonstrated a solid pace of recovery in terms of a better asset-liability mix, improved liquidity and steady disengagement with the ELA. As guided by management, ELA funding is expected to be further replaced by strong deposit inflows, deleveraging initiatives and an increase in interbank lending. The Underweight Basket Intralot (INLOT GA) Intralot (INLOT GA) (Chart I-20) Chart I-20Performance Since February 2017:##br## Intralot Vs. MSCI EM Intralot reported mixed third-quarter financial results on November 27. Top-line growth was solid, up 10% year over year, mainly boosted by licensed operations in Jamaica, Azerbaijan and Poland. This also drove up gross margin by 2.8 percentage points to 18.1% year over year. However, a cost hike took a bite out of profits, with operating expenses expanding by 8%. Along with a 49% surge in R&D costs, the bottom line was still in negative territory. On a year-to-date basis, cash flow grew by 23%. However, this was mainly boosted by financing activities, with operating cash flow almost unchanged. Meanwhile, long-term debt has grown by over 50% year over year, which has prompted questions on solvency and the ability to further carry the interest payment burden. The market is forecasting negative EPS over the next three years. We believe the 80% share sale of the company's Peruvian operations reflects its need for cash inflow and raises concerns on balance sheet health. Coca-Cola HBC (EEE GA) Coca-Cola HBC (EEE GA) (Chart I-21) Chart I-21Performance Since February 2017:##br## Coca-Cola HBC Vs. MSCI EM Coca-Cola HBC reported solid full-year 2017 financial results on February 14. Revenues came in strong, growing by 5% year over year. Sales volume in developed markets, developing markets and emerging markets went up 1%, 7%, and 7% respectively. Looking at product lines, Sparkling was the best seller, driven by new flavor launches (such as lime, lemon, and cucumber). Stripping out foreign exchange effects, FX-neutral revenue grew by 6% year over year. Cost of sales ticked up by 4% year over year. EBITDA expanded by 10% year over year, while EBITDA margin added 60 basis points to 14.3%. As a result, the bottom line expanded by 24% year over year, beating market expectations. Coca-Cola HBC is currently trading at a forward P/E of 20x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 11% over the next three years. The stock price rallied in the second half of 2017 following the company's announcement that it was acquiring 54.5% of Coca-Cola Beverages Africa (CCBA), indicating market complacency toward a strong synergy effect the deal could bring. However, given its weak profitability, CCBA is not expected to be as accretive as many investors believe. With the acquisition news priced in, CCHBC's year-to-date stock price has begun reverting to its true fundamentals. Hellenic Petroleum (ELPE GA) Hellenic Petroleum (ELPE GA) (Chart I-22) Chart I-22Performance Since February 2017:##br## Hellenic Petroleum Vs. MSCI EM Hellenic Petroleum reported full-year 2017 financial results on February 22. Revenue increased by 21% year over year, driven by higher volumes (exports +12% and +14% in domestic net sales, mainly helped by aviation and bunkering) in the refining division and improved average selling prices. However, this result was offset by higher cost of sales, up 23% year over year, driven by increased input prices, sending gross margin 160 basis points lower to 13.6%. Operating income was 4.7% higher year over year, helped by lower operating expenses. EBITDA was up 14% year over year, while EBITDA margin was 200 basis points lower, finishing at 10.6%. The company secured bottom line growth of 15.7%, but came in below the market expectation by 4.5%. Hellenic Petroleum is currently trading at a forward P/E of 6.5x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 4.6% over the next three years. The reopening of the Elefsina refinery will enable Hellenic Petroleum to return to normal capacity in 2018. However, continued maintenance work expected to end in March 2018 and higher crude prices will continue to place pressure on margins. We expect weak domestic demand to continue to impact carbon revenue, despite strong sales growth from increased tourism. Piraeus Bank (TPEIR GA) Piraeus Bank (TPEIR GA) (Chart I-23) Chart I-23Performance Since February 2017: ##br##Piraeus Bank Vs. MSCI EM Piraeus Bank delivered disappointing third-quarter 2017 financial results on November 9. Net interest income came in weak, sliding 3% year over year, with net interest margin remaining virtually flat at 2.7%. On the positive side, net fee income displayed strong growth, up 24% year over year. Operating expenses contracted by 5% year over year, pushing down the cost/income ratio by 5 percentage points to 51%. Despite robust pre-provisional income, the impairment on loans dragged down net income into negative territory, compared to a positive bottom line during the same period last year. Asset quality was a mixed bag: The NPL ratio went down by 2.6 percentage points to 48.3%, but is still the highest among its peers. The loan-to-deposit ratio declined, with ELA loan exposure trending slightly down year-to-date. The market is forecasting an EPS contraction of 8.8% over the next three years. Piraeus Bank has shown little signs of operational recovery, with most cost-savings efforts achieved through branch reductions (-8% year to date) and employee layoffs (-7% year to date). We believe the bank is still a long way away from a real turning point and prefer to monitor on the sidelines. How To Trade? The EMES team recommends gaining exposure to the sector through a basket of the listed stocks below, which would consist of overweight positions in four select Greek companies and underweight positions in the other four. The main goal is active alpha generation by excluding laggards and including out-of-benchmark plays, to avoid passive index-hugging via an ETF. Direct: Equity access through the tickers (Bloomberg): Jumbo (BELA GA) vs. Intralot (INLOT GA) Hellenic Telecom (HTO GA) vs. Coca-Cola HBC (EEE GA) Grivalia Properties (GRIV GA) vs. Hellenic Petroleum (ELPE GA) Alpha Bank (ALPHA GA) vs. Piraeus Bank (TPEIR GA) ETFs: There are no ETFs that would allow for an overweight/underweight position in the same sector. Funds: There are no funds that would allow for an overweight/underweight position in the same sector. Please note this trade recommendation is strategic and based on an overweight/underweight pair trade. We do not see a need for specific market timing for this call (for technical indicators please refer to our website link). For convenience, the performance of both market cap-weighted and equal-weighted equity baskets will be tracked (please see upcoming updates as well as the website link to follow performance). Risks To Our Investment Case Because of the overall market neutral exposure, the portfolio performance will be largely immune to the direction of Greek economic growth and political developments. Some macro risk factors stem from a slower-than-expected property market recovery, which would affect the rental income of Grivalia Properties. Other major macro risks include an oil price drop, which would benefit Hellenic Petroleum's profit margins within its refining operations. Also, a slow recovery of consumer sentiment and retail sales would put downward pressure on Jumbo's domestic top-line performance. Company specific risks worth mentioning include remarkable management efforts in CCBA's financial performance in the coming quarters. This would send the market a bullish signal on Coca-Cola HBC's stock price due to potentially strong synergies, posing upside risk to the underweight basket. Furthermore, Jumbo would be negatively affected by excessive focus on overseas markets, and thus it could miss further business development and market share expansion opportunities in the domestic market. Last but not least, asset quality remains problematic among banks, reflected by elevated NPLs, which would weigh on performance indefinitely if not properly tackled. Billy Zicheng Huang, Research Analyst billyh@bcaresearch.com Sophie McGrath, Research Assistant sophiemc@bcaresearch.co.uk
The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of February 28, 2018. After the large upgrade in January, the model has furthered upgraded the U.S. to a small overweight of 3.3 percentage points from neutral in January. This change is mainly financed by a reduction in the large overweight in the Netherlands. Directionally, the model is becoming more defensive in the sense that the sizes of large bets have shrunk two months in a row, as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 55 bps in February, largely driven by the Level 2 model which underperformed by 131 bps. The large underweight in Japan hurt the performance the most because in USD terms Japan was the best performer thanks to the strength of JPY versus USD. Since going live in January 2016, the overall model has outperformed the benchmark by 102 bps, largely from the allocation among the 11 non-U.S. countries, which has outperformed its benchmark by 345 bps. The Level 1 model has performed on par with the MSCI benchmark. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of February 28, 2018. Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance The model has turned negative on cyclical sectors by sending negative signals from the growth component. Additionally, the recent correction in equity markets has also created unfavorable momentum signals. From being overweight on cyclical sectors by 10%, the model has now turned underweight by 1.3%. However, energy stocks have seen their overweight increase by 3% on the back of favorable valuations. The biggest change was an upgrade to overweight for the utilities sector on the back of the weaker growth outlook and not so negative momentum. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
Fiscal Stimulus To Prolong The Expansion The market swoon in early February should not induce investors to lower risk. The stock market correction (the first for almost two years) was triggered by a couple of inflation and wage readings that came in slightly above expectations, and was exacerbated by some technical factors such as automated trading by volatility-target funds. But, significantly, it was not accompanied by the usual signals of rising risk aversion: for example, credit spreads barely widened and the gold price was stable (Chart 1). Volatility is likely to remain high but, as our U.S. Investment Strategy service recently found, the VIX has not been a useful indicator of recessions and bear markets: many times over the past 30 years it has spiked higher without risk assets producing negative returns over the subsequent 12 months (Chart 2).1 Recommended Allocation Chart 1Sell-Off Didn't Trigger Risk Signals Chart 2Spike In Vix Is Not A Sell Signal Fiscal policy moves in the U.S. make us believe, rather, that the current economic expansion will last longer than we previously forecast. A combination of tax cuts plus recent spending proposals (including $165 billion on the military and $45 billion on disaster relief) will boost GDP by about 0.8% of GDP this year and 1.3% next, compared to the IMF's earlier forecast of a fiscal contraction this year (Chart 3).2 Add to that the boost from the 8% trade-weighted depreciation of the U.S. dollar over the past 12 months (which should add 0.3% to growth over two years), and it is difficult to imagine U.S. GDP growth turning down any time soon. Accordingly, BCA has shifted its recession call from the second half of 2019 to sometime in 2020. Of course, this is not all good news. The U.S. budget deficit is likely to increase to 5½% of GDP in 2019, which will put upward pressure on interest rates. The fiscal impulse will hit an economy already at full capacity, and so will be inflationary. The scenario we envisage is boom-and-bust, leading to a nastier recession than we had previously expected. Nonetheless, the boost to growth should be positive for risk assets over the next 12 months. Our model of earnings growth now suggests that U.S. EPS should continue to grow at close to a 20% rate for the rest of this year (Chart 4). Chart 3Fiscal Boost To U.S. Growth Chart 4Earnings Growth Gets A Boost Too How quickly will the Fed push back against the potentially inflationary implications of this higher growth? We have found a remarkable turnaround in investors' perceptions of inflation over the past few weeks. Whereas last year most argued that structural forces (online shopping, the gig economy etc.) meant that inflation would stay depressed, now many worry that it will quickly shoot above 2% and force the Fed to tighten policy aggressively. This has caused them to over-react, for example, to the (rather obvious) statement from the last FOMC minutes that "participants noted that a stronger outlook for economic growth raised the likelihood that further gradual policy firming would be appropriate." Our view remains that core PCE inflation - the Fed's favorite measure - is likely to move back gradually to 2% (from 1.5% currently), but not accelerate dramatically. Unit labor costs remain subdued (Chart 5), the continued rise in the participation rate means there is more slack in the labor market than implied by headline unemployment (Chart 6), and inflation expectations remain low. This should allow new Fed chair Jerome Powell to continue to withdraw accommodation at a measured pace. The market has already priced in that the Fed will tighten this year at least in line with its dots (Chart 7). We expect four, rather than the Fed's projected three, hikes this year, but this should not be too hard for the market to absorb. Chart 5Unit Labor Costs Don't Point To Jump In Inflation Chart 6 Still Some Slack In Labor Market Chart 7Market Has Caught Up To The Fed We have for some months now advised long-term, more risk-averse investors to consider dialing back risk, and the volatility in February was a good example of why. We would expect further such bouts of volatility. However, with a recession still probably two years away, and a combination of stronger-than-expected growth and a Fed reluctant to accelerate tightening, the next 12 months should remain positive for equities and other risk assets. Fixed Income: We now expect the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield to rise to 3.3-3.5%. This will come from a further 40 BP increase in inflation expectations (taking them back to a level compatible with the Fed achieving its inflation target) plus a rise in the real yield, as markets start to price in the end of secular stagnation (Chart 8). The rise in global yields will be exacerbated by increasing net supply, as fiscal deficits rise and central banks wind down QE (Chart 9). We are, accordingly, underweight duration, and prefer inflation-linked bonds to nominal ones. We will likely reduce our exposure to credit before we turn defensive on equities. But, for now, strong economic growth and higher oil prices mean spread product is likely to outperform government bonds. Chart 8Inflation Expectations And Real Yields To Rise Chart 9Net Government Bond Supply To Increase Currencies: Rising interest rate differentials have failed to cause the dollar to rally (Chart 10). FX markets are trading, rather, on valuations (the euro and yen are, indeed, undervalued), on current account positions (the euro zone and Japan have large surpluses), and on the narrative that U.S. twin deficits historically caused the dollar to weaken. Our FX strategists find this is true only when, as in 2001-3, U.S. real rates were falling; after the Reagan tax cuts in 1981, real rates rose, pushing up the dollar (Chart 11). The key, therefore, is how quickly the Fed reacts this time. The dollar currently has strong downward momentum (especially against the yen) and this could continue. But as global growth slows relative to the U.S., relative interest rates are likely to reassert themselves as a factor, causing the dollar to strengthen again. Chart 10Rising Rate Differentials Fails To Boost Dollar Chart 11Do Twin Deficits Matter For Dollar? Equities: Given the macro environment, we continue to recommend pro-cyclical equity tilts, with overweights in higher beta markets such as the euro zone and Japan, and cyclical sectors such as financials, energy, and industrials. Our underweight on EM equities is based on the risk of a slowdown in China (where tighter financial conditions point to a slowing of the industrial sector, Chart 12), the possibility of a U.S. dollar rebound, and the vulnerability of highly leveraged foreign-currency EM borrowers to a rise in U.S. interest rates. Commodities: Our energy team has further revised up their oil price forecast, on expectations that the OPEC agreement will be extended, which will cause a greater draw-down in oil inventories (Chart 13).3 They see Brent crude averaging $74 a barrel this year, with spikes above $80. However, the response of the U.S. shale industry will begin to kick in, pushing the price down to below $60 by end-2019. We are neutral on industrial commodities, which will benefit from stronger global growth but are at risk in the event of dollar appreciation and slowdown in China. Chart 12Tighter Monetary Conditions In China Chart 13Oil Inventories To Draw Down Further Please note that, due to the Easter holidays in some countries, the GAA Quarterly Portfolio will be published one day later than usual, on April 3. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Late Innings," dated 26 February 2018, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 For details, please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "March 2018," available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0: Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices," dated 22 February 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights BCA has shifted its view on how fiscal policy will impact the U.S. economy, the path of S&P 500 earnings growth and the 10-year Treasury yield. While we remain positive on risk assets, the U.S. is in the late innings of the expansion and markets have entered a new, more volatile phase. The FOMC will continue to monitor financial stability under Powell and raise rates four times in 2018. Feature The S&P 500 and other risk assets continued their recovery last week after an early February swoon. Equity volatility ebbed, but remains well above levels seen at the start of the year. The dollar rose while the 10-year Treasury yield stabilized near 2.90%. WTI oil prices climbed above $63/bbl, but remain below BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy's revised $70 target for 2018.1 It was a quiet week for economic data and news. The U.S. data that was released (initial claims, existing home sales, leading economic indicators) continue to suggest that the U.S. economy will grow well above its long term potential in the next few quarters. The data calendar is full this week, and investors will focus on Fed Chair Jay Powell's Monetary Policy testimony to Congress on Tuesday, February 27. Changes BCA has shifted its view on how fiscal policy will impact the U.S. economy, the path of S&P 500 earnings growth and the 10-year Treasury yield. Notably, minutes from the FOMC's January meeting suggest that the Fed's forecast for above-trend growth and higher inflation solidified after the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 passed late last year. The influence of the tax bill, coupled with the Senate deal on spending, has turned the fiscal impulse positive in 2018, to the tune of 0.8% of GDP. Next year's impulse will be even larger at 1.3% (Chart 1). Our expectation in early January was that the direct effect of the tax cuts would likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by only 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. The U.S. budget deficit will likely jump to about 5.5% of GDP in FY2019, up from 3.3% in last year's CBO baseline forecast (Chart 2). This increase reflects the tax cuts, but also outlays for disaster relief ($45 billion), the military ($165 billion) and non-defense discretionary items ($131 billion), spread over the next two years. A deal on infrastructure spending would add to the deficit. The additional fiscal stimulus will lift nominal GDP growth as well. Stronger nominal growth and a patient Fed will be a positive combination for risk assets, such as corporate bonds and equities. Chart 3 provides an update of our top-down forecast for the S&P 500 operating profits, incorporating the economic impact of the new fiscal stimulus. We still expect profit growth to peak this year as industrial production tops out and margins begin to moderate on the back of rising wages. However, compared with our previous forecast, the projected peak will occur later in the year and at a higher level, and the entire profile is shifted up. Most of this improvement in the profit outlook is already discounted in prices, but the key point is that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for stocks at least into early 2019. Chart 1Substantial Stimulus In The Pipeline Chart 2U.S. Budget Deficit To Reach 5 1/2 % In 2019 Chart 3The Profile For S&P 500 EPS Growth Shifts Up BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service raised its year-end target for the 10-year Treasury yield from around 3% to 3.3-3.5%, partly reflecting the U.S. fiscal shock.2 Nonetheless, extreme short positioning and oversold conditions suggest that a consolidation phase is likely in the near term. Bottom Line: Fiscal stimulus will extend the expansion to 2020, but faster growth in the coming quarters will deepen the next recession. BCA's stance remains that the next economic downturn will be triggered by the Fed's overtightening. BCA's recommended asset allocation remains unchanged: overweight risk assets and below-benchmark on duration. In fixed-income portfolios, we will probably trim corporate bond exposure to neutral or underweight in advance of taking profits on equities. The dollar should head up at some point, although not in the near term. The End Of The Low-Vol Period While we remain positive on risk assets, the U.S. is in the late innings of the expansion and markets have entered a new, more volatile phase. We have been warning of upheaval when investor complacency regarding inflation is challenged, because the rally in risk assets has been balanced precariously on a three-legged stool of low inflation, depressed interest rates and modest economic volatility. All it took was a couple of small positive inflation surprises to spark a reset in the market for volatility. The key question is whether February's turmoil represented a healthy market correction or a signal that a bear market is approaching. The good news is that the widening in high-yield corporate bond spreads was muted (Chart 4). This market has often provided an early warning sign of an approaching major top in the stock market. The adjustment in other risk gauges, such as EM stocks and gold, was also fairly modest. This suggests that equity and volatility market action was largely technical in nature, in the context of extended investor positioning, crowded trades and elevated valuations. There has been no change in the items on our checklist for trimming equity exposure. We presented the checklist in the February Bank Credit Analyst.3 Our short-term economic growth models for the major countries remain upbeat and our global capital spending indicators are also bullish (Chart 5). Industrial production in the advanced economies is in hyperdrive as global capital spending growth accelerates (Chart 6). Chart 4February's Volatility Reset Chart 5Near-Term Growth Outlook Still Solid... Chart 6... Partly Due to Capex Acceleration Nonetheless, it will be difficult to put the 'vol genie' back into the bottle. The surge in bond yields has focused market attention on the leverage pressure points in the system. One potential source of volatility is the corporate bond space. We conclude that higher rates on their own won't cause significant pain, but the combination of higher rates and a downturn in earnings would lead to a major deterioration in credit quality.4 Moreover, expansionary fiscal policy and recent inflation surprises have limited the Fed's room to maneuver. Under Fed Chairs Bernanke and Yellen, markets relied on a so-called "Fed Put". When inflation was low and stable, economic slack was abundant and long-term inflation expectations were depressed. Then disappointing economic data or equity market setbacks were followed by an easing in the expectations for Fed rate hikes. This helped to calm investors' nerves. We do not think that the Powell FOMC represents a regime shift in terms of the Fed's reaction function, but the rise in long-term inflation expectations and the January inflation report have altered the Fed's calculus. The new Committee will be more tolerant of equity corrections and tighter financial conditions than in the past. Indeed, some FOMC members would welcome reduced frothiness in financial markets, as long as the correction is not large enough to undermine the economy (i.e. a 20% or greater equity market decline). The implication is that we are unlikely to see a return of market volatility to the lows observed early this year. Vol Spike The spike in equity volatility in early 2018 was extreme. Table 1 shows 10 episodes when the VIX climbed by more than 10% in a 13-week period when the economy was not in recession. The equity price index fell by an average of 7% during those episodes, with a range of -3.6 to -18.1%. Our November 13, 2017 report discussed volatility and its relationship with the business cycle, monetary policy and economic volatility.5 In that report, we noted that "any meaningful pickup in inflation would upset the 'low vol' applecart." Table 1Episodes When VIX Spiked Table 1 and Chart 7 show that a spike in volatility does not signal the end of the business cycle. However, 6 of the 10 of the upheavals outside of recessions occurred during the late stages of the business cycle. The step-up in volatility in 2010, 2011 and 2015 arose mid-cycle, while only one (2002) was in the early stages of an expansion. On average, the economic expansion lasted for an additional 41 months after the spikes noted in Table 1. Investors should be aware that the recent surge in volatility is another signal that the economy is in the final stages of the expansion. Chart 7Spikes In Vol Typically Occur Late In The Economic Cycle Volatility is not a leading indicator of equity prices. While U.S. equity prices declined during each of the episodes in Table 1, none marked the start of a bear market. U.S. stock prices were higher a year after a spike in vol in 8 of 9 episodes. The average interval between the spikes and the end of the bull market was 45 months. While there are many examples of shifts in correlation around elevated equity volatility, there is no consistent relationship between the two. Chart 8 examines the relationship between spikes in equity volatility and correlations among several key U.S. asset classes. For example, the relationship between the S&P 500 and the 10-year Treasury yield (panel 1) changed direction in about half of the 10 periods of higher vol. The correlation between the 10-year Treasury and the U.S. dollar changed in 7 of the 10 occasions (panel 2). Panel 6 shows that shifts in correlation between real Treasury yields and the S&P 500 tend to coincide with periods of higher equity volatility. On balance, however, it is not clear that a spike in equity volatility leads to widespread changes in the relationships between asset classes. Chart 8Spike In Vol Vs Stock,Bond Dollar, Oil Correlations Chart 9A shows that the correlation between S&P 500 and HY spreads do tend to flip near peaks in equity vol. Shifts in correlation between U.S. equity prices and most commodities change course more often than not around a surge in equity vol. Chart 9B shows a clear relationship between spikes in equity vol and changes in intra-S&P 500 correlations. Chart 9ASpikes In Vol Vs S&P 500 Correlation To HY And Commodities Chart 9BSpikes In Vol Vs Intra-S&P 500 Correlations The Fed's Third Mandate Revisited Chart 10FOMC Closely Monitoring Financial Stability BCA views financial stability as a third mandate6 for the central bank, along with low and stable inflation, and full employment. Financial stability was discussed at the January meeting by both Fed staff and voting FOMC members (Chart 10). However, the meeting ended prior to early February's turmoil in the stock market. Former Fed Chair Janet Yellen elevated financial stability during her tenure, leading discussions or staff briefings in 26 of the 32 meetings. New Fed Chair Jay Powell is expected to continue Yellen's lead and will likely face questions on financial stability this week from Congress, as he delivers testimony related to the Fed's semiannual Monetary Policy Report. The Fed does not provide a financial stability grade at every meeting. Fed staff described financial conditions as moderate in September and December 2013, and then again in April 2014. The next assessment (also moderate) was only in January 2016. Since then, the FOMC stepped up its discussions of financial stability. Fed staff provided an assessment of financial stability in 8 of its 16 subsequent meetings. FOMC participants debated financial stability at all but 1 of its 8 meetings in 2017, and in 13 of the 15 since April 2016. At the January meeting, Fed staff noted that valuations in financial assets were high, but that vulnerabilities due to leverage in the nonfinancial sector appeared to remain moderate. Fed staff downplayed risks in the financial sector associated with leverage and from maturity and liquidity transformation. Fed economists recently updated their quantitative assessments of the FOMC's minutes.7 The note provides a guide (Table 1 in the Fed paper and Table 2 below) to the number of quantitative descriptors in the minutes (one, a couple, a few, etc.). We use this rubric to assess the committee's latest views on financial stability, inflation and the impact of fiscal policy. FOMC meeting participants seemed less concerned with financial stability at the January meeting. That may change at the next meeting given the recent upheaval in financial markets. A couple of FOMC participants raised concerns that "a step-up in the pace of economic growth could tighten labor market conditions even more than they currently anticipated, posing risks to inflation and financial stability associated with substantially overshooting full employment". According to the FOMC minutes, for the second consecutive meeting, there was no assessment of overseas financial stability. However, at the October 2017 meeting, Fed staff had assessed overall vulnerabilities to foreign financial stability as moderate. Moreover, the staff highlighted specific vulnerabilities in some foreign economies, including weak banks, heavy indebtedness in the corporate and/or household sectors, rising property prices, overhangs of sovereign debt and susceptibility to political developments. Table 2FOMC Minutes Rubric Some FOMC participants raised the prospect that inflation would continue to fall short of the Committee's objectives, adding they observed no significant wage or inflationary pressures. However, they counselled patience before deciding whether to increase the target range for the federal funds rate. Notably, however, almost all participants continued to anticipate that inflation would move up to the Committee's 2 percent objective over the medium term as economic growth remained above trend and the labor market stayed strong. There were extensive comments from both Fed staff and FOMC participants about the impact of fiscal policy on views of the economy and inflation. Fed staff continued to assume that the tax cuts would boost real GDP growth moderately in the medium term. Moreover, they noted that the unemployment rate was projected to decline further in the next few years and would continue to run well below the staff's estimate of the longer-run natural rate of unemployment in that timeframe. FOMC participants, on the other hand, noted that there was still some uncertainty about how the tax bill would affect companies' investment or compensation plans. A number of participants bumped up their forecasts for economic growth in the near term, due in part to the bill's positive impact. Bottom Line: We maintain our base case scenario: the FOMC will continue to monitor financial stability under Powell and raise rates four times in 2018. The FOMC has revised up growth, but is reluctant to signal a faster pace of rate hikes until it sees how the fiscal impulse affects growth and inflation. This means they will be "behind the curve" as inflation lifts. However, once realized inflation climbs and inflation expectations approach 2.3%, the FOMC will have to get more aggressive. At that point, because the Fed would be targeting slower growth to curb inflation, another 'vol shock' is likely. This would be a negative signal for risk assets. Stay underweight duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices", February 22,2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Two Stage Bear Market In Bonds," February 13, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, February 2018. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, March 2018. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Patience Required", published November 13, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate", published July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-fomc-meeting-minutes-an-update-of-counting-words-20170803.htm
Highlights We are shifting our U.S. recession call from late-2019 to 2020. A cheap dollar and fiscal support will give the Fed more scope to raise rates before monetary policy moves into restrictive territory. The fiscal impulse will fall sharply in 2020. By then, financial conditions will be tighter and economic imbalances will be more pronounced. As is usually the case, a downturn in the U.S. will infect the rest of the world. Emerging markets with large current account deficits and high debt levels are most vulnerable. A cyclical overweight to global equities is still appropriate, but long-term investors should begin to scale back risk exposure. Feature Records Are Meant To Be Broken The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, which contrary to popular belief does not serve as a matchmaking service for lonely-heart economists, estimates that the current economic expansion is going on nine years. If it makes it to July 2019, it will be the longest in history (Chart 1). Considering that records begin in 1854 - encompassing 33 business cycles - that will be an impressive achievement. Chart 1Nine Years And Still Going Strong There is an old adage that says "Expansions do not die of old age. They are murdered by the Fed." A year or so ago, it looked like the Fed would pull the trigger sometime in 2019. Now, however, it looks more likely that the deed will be committed in 2020. Two things have changed since the start of last year. First, the real trade-weighted dollar has fallen by 8%. According to the Fed's SIGMA macroeconomic model, this should boost growth by about 0.3% over the next two years. Chart 2U.S. Fiscal Policy Has Become##BR##Much More Stimulative Second, U.S. fiscal policy has become much more stimulative, a point very much in keeping with our Geopolitical Strategy team's long-standing view that age of austerity is giving way to a new age of populism.1 My colleague Mark McClellan estimates that the U.S. fiscal impulse will reach 0.8% of GDP in 2018 and 1.3% of GDP in 2019, up from -0.4% and 0.3%, respectively, in the IMF's October 2017 projections (Chart 2). Mark's calculations incorporate the CBO's assessment of the tax cuts, the recent Senate deal to raise the caps on defense and nondefense expenditures, and $45 billion in hurricane relief. He assumes some delay between when the bill is passed and when the spending takes place. According to the Congressional Budget Office, a little more than half of the expenditures in the 2013 and 2015 spending bills occurred in the same year the funding was authorized. These fiscal measures will cause the federal budget deficit to swell by about 2.3 percentage points to 5.6% of GDP in FY2019. Even that may be an understatement, as this does not include any additional infrastructure spending nor the possible restoration of "earmarks"- the widely criticized practice that allows members of Congress to add appropriations to unrelated bills to fund what often turn out to be politically motivated projects in their districts - which could add a further $25 billion in annual spending. Meanwhile, federal government revenue is coming in below target, which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has attributed to lower-than-expected taxable income from pass-through businesses and capital gains realizations. This problem could worsen over the next few years as creative accountants find new loopholes to exploit in the recently passed tax bill. Too Much, Too Late All this stimulus is arriving when the economy least needs it. The unemployment rate currently stands at 4.1%, 0.5 points below the level the Fed regards as consistent with full employment. It has been stuck at that number for four straight months, largely because job growth in the Household survey (which the unemployment rate is based on) has lagged the Establishment survey by a considerable margin. Given the underlying strength in GDP growth, it is likely the job gains in the Household survey will rebound strongly over the course of 2018, taking the unemployment rate down to 3.5% by year-end, well below the Fed's end-2018 projection of 3.9%. A lower-than-projected unemployment rate will permit the Fed to raise rates four times this year, one more hike than currently implied by the dots. The Fed will probably also hike rates three or four times next year. Yet, even those additional rate hikes will not come close to offsetting all the fiscal stimulus coming down the pike. In the absence of a sustained increase in productivity or labor force growth - neither of which appear forthcoming - the economy will continue to overheat. Inflation is a highly lagging indicator. It typically does not peak until well after a recession has begun and does not bottom until well after it has ended (Chart 3). The Fed knows this perfectly well, but has chosen to let the economy run hot for fear that a premature tightening will sow the seeds for a deflationary spiral. Chart 3Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator By the time the next recession rolls around, inflation will be higher and financial and economic imbalances will be greater. The fiscal impulse will also fall back towards zero in 2020 as the budget deficit stabilizes at an elevated level. It is the change in the budget balance that is correlated with GDP growth. If output is already being constrained by a lack of spare capacity going into late-2019, the subsequent decline in the fiscal impulse in 2020 could push growth below trend, leading to rising unemployment. And, as we have often noted, once unemployment starts rising, it keeps rising. There has never been a case in the post-war era where the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point that was not associated with a recession (Chart 4). Chart 4Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle A recent IMF report highlighted that changes in U.S. financial conditions strongly influence growth abroad.2 As the U.S. falls into a recession, equity prices will tumble and credit spreads will widen. Financial conditions will tighten, transmitting the downturn to the rest of the world. Emerging markets with large current account deficits and high debt levels will be the most vulnerable. The only saving grace is that interest rates will be higher in 2020 than they would have been if the recession had begun in 2019. This will give the Fed a bit more scope to ease monetary policy again. As discussed last week, this will likely set the stage for a stagflationary episode following the recession.3 For Now, Leading Indicators Look A-Okay While our baseline view is that the next recession will occur in 2020, this is more of an educated guess than a firm prediction. Many things, including an overly aggressive Fed, a sharp appreciation in the dollar, and a variety of political shocks, could cause the recession to occur sooner than anticipated. As such, we continue to watch a wide swathe of data to help guide our investment recommendations. The good news is that right now, none of our favorite leading economic indicators such as the level of ISM manufacturing new orders minus inventories, capital goods orders, initial unemployment claims, and building permits are flashing red (Chart 5). Many of these indicators appear in The Conference Board's LEI, which is still rising at a healthy 5.5% y/y pace. Historically, a decisive break below zero in the year-over-year change in the LEI has been a reliable recession indicator (Chart 6). We are still far from that point. Chart 5U.S. Leading Indicators Looking A-OKAY Chart 6U.S. LEI Is Not Flashing Red The same goes for leading financial variables such as credit spreads and the yield curve. The yield curve has inverted in the lead-up to every recession over the past 50 years (Chart 7). The fact that the 10-year/3-month slope has steepened by 30 basis points since the start of the year gives us some comfort that the next recession is still some time away. Chart 7An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession Keep An Eye On Credit Credit spreads remained well contained during the recent bout of market turbulence but we continue to watch them closely. Credit typically starts to underperform before equities do, which makes it a good leading indicator for the stock market. This is likely to be especially the case over the next two years. If there is one area where financial imbalances have accumulated to worrying levels, it is in the corporate debt arena. This month's issue of the Bank Credit Analyst estimates that the interest coverage ratio for U.S. companies would drop from 4 to 2½ if interest rates were to increase by 100 basis points across the corporate curve.4 This would take the coverage ratio to the lowest level in the 30-year history of our sample (Chart 8). Consumer staples, tech, and health care would be the most affected. Chart 8U.S. Interest Coverage Ratio##BR##Breakdown By Sector (I) Chart 8U.S. Interest Coverage Ratio##BR##Breakdown By Sector (II) We currently maintain an overweight to equities and spread product but expect to move to neutral later this year and to underweight sometime in 2019. Long-term investors should consider paring back exposure to both asset classes already, given that valuations have become stretched. The Dollar And The Return Of "Twin Deficits" Bigger budget deficits will drain national savings. Since the current account balance is simply the difference between what a country saves and what it invests, the U.S. current account deficit is likely to increase. How the emergence of these twin deficits will affect the dollar is a tough call. Historically, there is no clear relationship between the sum of the fiscal and current account balance and the value of the trade-weighted dollar (Chart 9). In the early 1980s, the twin deficits exploded on the back of the Reagan tax cuts and the military buildup, but the dollar strengthened. In contrast, the dollar weakened in the early 2000s, a period when the twin deficits rose in response to the Bush tax cuts, the Iraq War, and a decline in the household saving rate from the booming housing market. Much depends on what happens to real interest rates. If investors come to believe that persistently large budget deficits will lead to higher inflation, long-term real yields could decline, pushing the dollar lower. In contrast, if investors conclude that the Fed will raise rates by enough to keep inflation from spiraling upwards, real yields could rise. U.S. real yields have gone up across all maturities since the start of the year. As a result, real rate differentials have widened between the U.S. and its developed market peers (Chart 10). However, some of the increase in U.S. real rates has been due to a rising term premium, with the rest reflecting an upward revision to the expected path of policy rates. The latter is good for the dollar. The former is not, because it means that investors are starting to worry about the ability of the market to absorb the increasing supply of Treasurys. Meanwhile, rising interest rates threaten to put further pressure on the U.S. current account deficit. The U.S. net international investment position has deteriorated from -10% of GDP to -40% of GDP since 2007 (Chart 11). The U.S. owes the rest of the world about 68% of GDP in debt - almost all of which is denominated in dollars - but holds only 23% of GDP in foreign debt. Thus, a synchronized increase in global bond yields would cause U.S. net interest payments to rise. If yields in the U.S. increase more than elsewhere, net payments would rise even more. Chart 9Twin Deficits And The Dollar:##BR##No Clear-Cut Relationship Chart 10Real Rate Differentials Have##BR##Widened Between The U.S. And Its DM Peers Chart 11Deterioration In U.S. Net##BR##International Investment Position America's status as a major net external debtor could also constrain the extent to which the dollar appreciates. If the greenback were to strengthen, the dollar value of U.S. external assets would decline, as would the dollar value of interest or dividend payments that the U.S. receives from abroad. This would result in a deterioration in the current account balance and in a worsening in the U.S. net international investment position. Some Positives For The Greenback While the discussion above is bearish for the dollar, it needs to be put into some context. The U.S. current account deficit stands at 2.3% of GDP, down from almost 6% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 12). Much of the improvement in the U.S. balance of payments can be traced back to the plunge of almost 70% in net oil imports, a development that is likely to be permanent given the shale boom. Furthermore, the U.S. trade balance should benefit over the coming quarters from the lagged effects of a weaker dollar. And while we estimate that the primary income balance will deteriorate by about 0.6% of GDP over the next two years, it should still remain in positive territory and above the levels from a decade ago (Chart 13). Chart 12U.S. Balance Of Payments:##BR##Improvement Due To Sinking Oil Imports Chart 13Primary Income Balance Will Decline,##BR##But Will Remain In Positive Territory On the fiscal side, the projected rise in U.S. government debt levels at a time when the economy is booming is concerning. Nevertheless, the U.S. debt profile still compares favorably to countries such as Japan and Italy, two economies with worse growth prospects than the U.S. Italian 30-year bond yields are actually lower than in the United States. If one of the two countries is going to have a debt crisis over the next decade, our guess is that it will be Italy and not the U.S. A Cresting In Global Growth Could Help The Dollar Our preferred explanation for why the dollar began to weaken in 2017 focuses on the role of global growth as well as on technical factors. Chart 14USD Is A Momentum Winner Strong global growth - especially when concentrated outside the U.S., as was the case last year - tends to hurt the dollar. There are a number of reasons for this. First, a robust global economy pushes up natural resource prices, which boosts the terms of trade for commodity-exporting economies. Second, manufacturing represents a smaller share of the U.S. economy than it does in most other countries. Since manufacturing activity is quite cyclically-sensitive, faster global growth benefits economies such as Germany, Sweden, Japan, China, and Korea more than the U.S. Third, stronger global growth tends to boost risk appetites. This has translated into large inflows into EM funds and peripheral European debt markets. The latter have also seen an ebbing of political risk, which has translated into sharply lower sovereign spreads. The acceleration in global growth came at a time when long dollar positions had reached elevated levels. As those positions were unwound, the dollar began to tumble. At that point, the strong upward momentum that fueled the dollar rally following the U.S. presidential election was replaced by downward momentum. The U.S. dollar is one of the most momentum-driven currencies out there (Chart 14). Weakness led to even more weakness. It is impossible to know when the dollar's downward momentum will exhaust itself. What can be said is that speculative positioning has become increasingly dollar bearish. This raises the odds of a short-covering dollar rally (Chart 15). Chart 15Speculative Positioning Has Gotten Increasingly Dollar Bearish Perhaps more importantly, global growth may be peaking. China's economy has slowed, as gauged by the Li Keqiang index, which combines electricity production, freight traffic, and bank lending (Chart 16). Growth in Europe and Japan has also likely reached top velocity. U.S. financial conditions have eased sharply relative to the rest of the world (Chart 17). This, in conjunction with an easier U.S. fiscal policy, suggests that the composition of global growth will shift back towards the U.S. over the coming months. If this were to happen, the dollar could recoup some its losses. Chart 16Chinese Economy##BR##Has Slowed Chart 17U.S. Financial Conditions Have##BR##Eased Sharply Relative To ROW Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016. 2 Please see "Getting The Policy Mix Right," IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2017. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Structural Bear Market In Bonds," dated February 16, 2018. 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Leverage And Sensitivity To Rising Rates: The U.S. Corporate Sector," dated February 22, 2018. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights The euro is cheap. To cease being cheap, EUR/USD needs to approach 1.35. Euro area bonds are expensive. To cease being expensive, the yield spread between the euro area and U.S. long bond needs to compress from -135 bps to -40 bps. Never pick mainstream stock markets on the basis of seeming cheapness. Sector effects, step changes in sector valuations and currency effects make relative valuations very difficult to interpret. Always pick mainstream stock markets on the basis of the sector and currency biases you wish to express. Overweight Denmark's OMX and Ireland's ISEQ on a 6-9 month horizon. Feature A very common question we get asked is: are European investments attractively priced compared to those elsewhere in the world? To which the current answers are: yes for the euro currency; no for euro area government bonds; and highly unlikely for the aggregate European stock market. That said, we can still identify individual European stock markets that are well placed to outperform major equity indexes, including the S&P500, over the coming 6-9 months. Chart of the WeekWhen Healthcare Outperforms, Denmark's OMX Outperforms The S&P 500 The Euro Is Cheap... Says The ECB We can confidently claim that the euro is cheap because the ECB's own indicators say so.1 According to the ECB, the euro needs to appreciate at least 7% to cancel the euro area's over-competitiveness versus its top 19 trading partners. In terms of EUR/USD this translates to 1.32. Admittedly, 1.32 encapsulates a spectrum of fair values for the individual euro area economies: 1.45 for Germany; around 1.30 for France, Spain and Netherlands; and around 1.20 for Italy (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The Euro Needs To Appreciate 7% To Cancel The Euro Area's Over-Competitiveness The ECB indicators also assume that the euro began its life close to fair value. This seems plausible. Twenty years ago, the euro area's constituent economies were broadly in internal balance and had a lot in common. Remarkably, Germany and Italy scored identically on total debt as a share of GDP as well as on exports as a share of GDP. Furthermore, euro area trade was in external balance, and the bloc's real competitiveness versus its major trading partners was exactly in line with its long-term average. After its birth, the euro first became extremely undervalued in the dot com bubble, then extremely overvalued in the global credit boom, and most recently, extremely undervalued again. Seen in this bigger picture, the euro's current ascent is just a recovery from an extreme undervaluation, an argument that even Mario Draghi made at the last ECB press conference: "Movements in the exchange rate, to the extent that it is justified by the strengthening of the economy, is part of nature." At what level would EUR/USD cease to be cheap? Based on the average of the ECB's three competitiveness indicators, EUR/USD needs to approach 1.35. Euro Area Bonds Are Expensive The yield spread between the euro area and U.S. long bond stands at an extreme -135 bps.2 This compares with an average -40 bps through the twenty year life of the euro - indicating that euro area government bonds are very expensive relative to U.S. T-bonds. Over the completion of this cycle, this yield spread is highly likely to compress to its long-term average of -40 bps, given that the yield spread just tracks relative real GDP per head - which is itself mean-reverting (Chart I-3). Interestingly, the euro area versus U.S. annual inflation differential has also averaged -40 bps (Chart I-4), so the real interest rate differential has averaged zero. This means that the so-called 'neutral' (or mid-cycle) real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. have been identical through the past twenty years. Growth in real GDP per head has also been identical (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Euro Area-U.S.: Average Interest ##br##Rate Differential = -40bps Chart I-4Euro Area-U.S.: Average Inflation ##br##Differential = -40bps Chart I-5The Euro Area And U.S. Have Generated##br## Identical Growth Per Head The past twenty years provide a good template for what the future holds, at least in relative terms if not in absolute terms. This is because 1999-2018 captures multiple manias and crises, some centred in Europe, some in the U.S. With no difference in neutral real rates over the past two decades, is there any reason to expect the future neutral rate to be meaningfully lower in the euro area compared to the U.S.? Our starting assumption has to be no. This assumption would be at risk if the existential threat to the euro resurfaced. Looking at the political calendar, the immediate concern might be the Italian election on March 4. Specifically, the anti-establishment Five Star Movement and Northern League could poll well enough to hold some sway in the next government and ruffle the markets. However, while both the Five Star Movement and Northern League have agendas that are unashamedly disruptive, anti-establishment and anti-austerity, neither party is standing on an anti-euro platform. Unless there is a major change in emphasis, the Italian election should not pose an existential threat to the euro. Our central expectation is that the euro area versus U.S. yield spread has the scope to compress substantially from its current -135 bps. In other words, euro area government bonds are very expensive relative to U.S. T-bonds. Never Pick Stock Markets On The Basis Of Seeming Cheapness Compared with currencies and bonds, stock markets are much less connected with their domestic economies. Mainstream stock markets are eclectic collections of multinational companies, with each stock market possessing its own unique fingerprint of sector and industry skews. Therefore, a head-to-head comparison of European stock market valuations either with each other or with non-European stock markets is a meaningless and potentially dangerous exercise. Two sectors with vastly different structural growth prospects - say, Financials and Personal Products (Chart I-6) - must necessarily trade on vastly different valuations. So the sector with the lower valuation is not necessarily the cheaper sector. By extension, a stock market with a lower valuation because of its sector fingerprint is not necessarily a cheaper stock market. Chart I-6Two Sectors With Vastly Different Growth Prospects Will Trade On Vastly Different Valuations Some people suggest comparing a valuation with its own history, and assessing how many 'standard deviations' it is above or below its norm. The problem with this standard deviation approach is that it assumes 'stationarity' - meaning, no step changes in a sector's valuation through time. Unfortunately, sector valuations can and do undergo major step changes when they enter a vastly different economic climate. For example, the structural outlook for bank profits undergoes a step change when a debt super-cycle ends. Therefore, comparing a bank valuation after a debt super-cycle with the valuation during a debt super-cycle is like comparing an apple with an orange. Another issue for stock markets that contain multinational companies is the so-called 'currency translation effect'. A multinational company will intentionally diversify its sales and profits across multiple major currencies - say, euros, dollars and yen - but of course its primary stock market listing will be in just one currency - say, euros. So when the other currencies weaken versus the euro, the company's profit growth (quoted in its home currency of euros) will necessarily weaken too. If investors anticipate this effect - because they see that the euro is structurally cheap today - they might downgrade the stock market's profit growth expectations. Thereby, they will also downgrade the stock market's valuation. Pulling together these complexities of sector effects, step changes in sector valuations and currency effects, we offer some very strong advice: picking stock markets on the basis of relative valuation is a wrong and very dangerous way to invest. The correct and safe way to invest is to pick stock markets on the basis of the sector and currency biases you wish to express (Chart I-7). This brings us to one of the major advantages of investing in Europe. The plethora of stock markets - each with their own unique fingerprint of sector and industry skews - means that there are always European bourses worth overweighting, whatever your economic outlook. Right now, two of our sector recommendations are to overweight Healthcare and to underweight Energy. Please review our report Beware The Great Moderation 2.0 for the underlying thesis, which we will not repeat here.3 If these sector recommendations pan out as we expect, Denmark's OMX is highly likely to outperform the S&P500 given the OMX's substantial overweighting to Healthcare (Chart of the Week). Likewise, Ireland's ISEQ is highly likely to outperform the S&P500 given the ISEQ's substantial underweighting to Energy via its large exposure to budget airline Ryanair (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Eurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 Is Just 3 Banks Vs.##br## 3 Tech Stocks! Chart I-8When Energy Underperforms, Ireland's ##br##ISEQ Outperforms The S&P 500 Overweight Denmark's OMX And Ireland's ISEQ. A final salutary observation illustrates the importance of the sector approach to picking stock markets. As a result of favourable sector biases - overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy - a 50:50 combination of Denmark and Ireland has kept pace with the S&P500 over the past 20 years, while the Eurostoxx50 has been left a very long way behind (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Sector Biases Helped Denmark's OMX And Ireland's ISEQ, But Hindered The Eurostoxx 50 Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats. The ECB calculates three Harmonised Competitiveness Indicators for the euro area versus its top 19 trading partners based on unit labour costs (ULCs), GDP deflators, and consumer price indices (CPIs), with the latest readings referring to Q3 2017 for ULCs and GDP deflators and January 2018 for CPIs. Updating these for the euro's move to February 20 2018, the three indicators suggest that the trade-weighted euro is still undervalued by 7%, 12% and 7% respectively. 2 Calculated from the over 10-year government bond yield: euro area average, weighted by sovereign issue size, less U.S. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Beware The Great Moderation 2.0' published on February 1, 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* This week our fractal model has produced a very interesting finding. The 130-day fractal dimension for the U.S. 10-year T-bond is approaching a level which has consistently signalled a technical inflection point. This suggests that the recent sell-off in bonds might be close to running its course. We are not putting on a countertrend position yet, but expect to do so within the next few weeks. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
