Global
Highlights In this week's report, we update the "Three Controversial Calls"1 we made at BCA's New York Investment Conference held on September 26-27th, 2016. Call #1: "Trump Wins, And The Dollar Rallies." We still see 5% more upside for the greenback. Call #2: "Japan Overcomes Deflation." Inflation expectations have moved higher over the past five months, while the yen has weakened. This trend will persist. Call #3: "Global Banks Finally Outperform." Bank shares have beaten their global benchmark by 14% since we made this prediction. European financials have finally turned the corner. Feature Call #1: "Trump Wins, And The Dollar Rallies" Chart 1From Unrealistic To Even More Unrealistic We never bought into the notion that a Trump victory would cause investors to flee the dollar. On the contrary, we argued that most of Trump's policies were bond bearish/dollar bullish. In particular, we reasoned that Trump's attempts to browbeat companies into moving production back home would help reduce the U.S. trade deficit, boosting aggregate demand in the process. Efforts to curb illegal immigration would also push up the wages of low-skilled workers. Meanwhile, fiscal stimulus would fire up the labor market at a time when it was already approaching full employment. Fiscal Deficit On Upward Path With nearly four months having passed since the election, what have we learned? First, and foremost, a big increase in the budget deficit still looks likely. As Trump's address to the joint session of Congress on Tuesday night underscored, the president has plenty of specific areas in mind where he would like to increase spending (more money for defense, infrastructure, etc.) and a long list of taxes he would like to cut (corporate and personal income taxes, estate taxes, a new childcare tax credit,2 etc.). We do not take seriously Trump's pledge to pay for increased military spending by cutting annual nondefense discretionary spending by $54 billion relative to the existing CBO baseline. Chart 1 shows that under current budgetary rules, nondefense discretionary spending is set to decline from 3.3% of GDP in 2016 - already close to a historic low - to only 2.7% of GDP in 2026. Cutting that portion of the budget above and beyond what has already been legislated is unrealistic. There simply aren't enough programs like the National Endowment for the Arts that Republicans can take to the woodshed without facing a severe political backlash (Chart 2). As long as big ticket entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare remain unscathed - which Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin confirmed would be the case earlier this week - overall government spending will rise, not fall. Chart 2Nondefense Discretionary Spending: Where The Money Goes Trump And Trade The one category where Trump would be more than happy to see taxes go up is on imports. The constraint here is political. A unilateral move to legislate large-scale import duties would be in gross violation of WTO rules and could spark a global trade war. Many of Trump's Republican colleagues, as well as a fair number of Democrats, also favor free trade and would resist such an effort. One solution that Trump vaguely alluded to in his speech is to raise duties on imports within the context of a broader tax reform bill. A border adjustment tax, for example, would bring in $1.2 trillion in revenues over ten years.3 As we argued in a Special Report earlier this year, the introduction of a BAT would be highly dollar bullish.4 Pulling Back The Welcome Mat? On immigration, Trump has sent mixed messages. On the one hand, he continues to insist that he will build "the wall" and has maintained his hardline stance on refugee policy. On the other hand, he has backed off his campaign promise to reverse Obama's executive order protecting the so-called "dreamers." This order allows immigrants who came to the U.S. illegally as children to remain in the country indefinitely, provided they do not commit a serious criminal offence. During his speech, Trump signaled a willingness to shift the U.S. immigration system towards one based on merit, similar to what countries such as Canada and Australia already have. This is an excellent idea, but it raises the question of what will happen to the 11 million illegal aliens currently residing in the country, the vast majority of whom are poorly educated. It is important to remember that U.S. immigration laws are already very strict. Trump has given the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) greater leeway in enforcing these laws, while also pledging to hire 5,000 more border agents and 10,000 additional ICE officers. As such, a "status quo immigration policy" under Trump could prove to be much more restrictive than the one under Obama even if no new legislation is passed. A key implication is that labor shortages in areas such as construction and hospitality services may intensify. Solid U.S. Growth Outlook Favors A Stronger Dollar Meanwhile, the U.S. growth picture remains reasonably bright (Chart 3). This may not be obvious from current Q1 tracking estimates, which are pointing to real GDP growth of below 2%. However, the weak Q1 numbers are mainly due to an unexpectedly large jump in imports and a sharp decline in inventory accumulation. According to the Atlanta Fed's model, taken together these two factors have shaved a full percentage point off growth. Real private final demand is still rising at nearly 3% (Chart 4). If U.S. growth stays solid as we expect, the Fed will raise rates three or four times this year, starting in March. This is slightly more than the market is currently pricing in, which should be enough to ensure that the trade-weighted dollar strengthens by another 5% or so over the remainder of the year (Chart 5). We see the greatest upside for the dollar versus EM currencies, and as we discuss next, against the yen. Chart 3U.S. Economic Data Are Upbeat Chart 4Trade And Inventories Detract From ##br##A Bright Q1 Growth Picture Chart 5Real Rate Differentials Are ##br##Driving UpThe Dollar Call #2: "Japan Overcomes Deflation" Many of the forces that have exacerbated deflation in Japan, such as corporate deleveraging and falling property prices, have run their course (Chart 6). The population continues to age, but the impact that this is having on inflation may have reached an inflection point. For most of the past 25 years, slow population growth depressed aggregate demand by reducing the incentive for companies to build out new capacity. This generated a surfeit of savings relative to investment, helping to fuel deflation. Now, however, as an ever-rising share of the population enters retirement, the overabundance of savings is disappearing. The household saving rate currently stands at 2.8% - down from 14% in the early 1990s - while the ratio of job openings-to-applicants has soared to a 25-year high (Chart 7). Chart 6Japan: Easing Deflationary Forces Chart 7Japan: Low Household Saving Rate ##br##And A Tightening Labor Market Chart 8Investors Still Not Entirely ##br##Convinced Japan Is Eradicating Deflation Government policy is finally doing its part to slay the deflationary dragon. The Abe government shot itself in the foot by tightening fiscal policy by 3% of GDP between 2013 and 2015. It won't make the same mistake again. The Bank of Japan's efforts to pin the 10-year yield to zero also seem to be bearing fruit. As bond yields in other economies have trended higher, this has made Japanese bonds less attractive. That, in turn, has pushed down the yen, ushering in a virtuous circle where a falling yen props up economic activity, leading to higher inflation expectations, lower real yields, and an even weaker yen. Stay Short The Yen Consistent with this narrative, market-based inflation expectations have risen over the past five months. But with inflation swaps still pricing in inflation of only 0.6% over the next 20 years, there is plenty of scope for real rates to fall further (Chart 8). This implies that investors should maintain a structurally short position in the yen. A weaker yen will help boost Japanese stocks, at least in local-currency terms. As a relative play, investors should consider overweighting Japanese exporters versus domestically-exposed sectors. Multinational manufacturers stand to gain the most, as they will benefit from increased overseas sales, while the highly automated, capital-intensive nature of their operations will limit the burden of rising real wages. Call #3: "Global Banks Finally Outperform" Global bank shares have risen by 25% since we made this call, outperforming the MSCI All Country World Index by 14% (Chart 9). The thesis that we outlined five months ago still remains intact (Charts 10 and 11): Chart 9Global Bank Shares Have Bounced Chart 10Factors Supporting Bank Stocks Chart 11Global Banks Are Still Fairly Cheap Improving business and consumer confidence should continue to support credit demand. Stronger economic growth will reduce nonperforming loans. Capital ratios have improved significantly, reducing the risk of further equity dilution. Yield curves have steepened since last summer, which should flatter net interest margins. Despite the run-up in share prices over the past five months, valuations remain attractive. Looking across regions, European banks stand out as being particularly attractive over a cyclical horizon of about 12 months. BCA's European Corporate Health Monitor continues to improve, foreshadowing further progress in mending loan books (Chart 12). The ECB's lending survey indicates that a majority of banks are seeing stronger loan demand (Chart 13). This suggests that credit growth is not about to stall anytime soon. Meanwhile, euro area banks are trading at a miserly 0.8-times book value, which gives valuations plenty of upside. Chart 12Euro Area: Improving Corporate Health Chart 13Euro Area: Banks See Rising Loan Demand Political Risks Chart 14This Will Not Get Le Pen Into The Elysee Palace The risk is that European political developments sabotage this thesis. Our view here is "near-term sanguine, long-term cautious." We continue to think that populism is in a long-term secular bull market. However, unlike in the case of Brexit or Trump, populist leaders in continental Europe will have to wait until the next economic downturn (probably in two or three years) before they seize power. To that extent, the prevailing - though admittedly rather myopic - consensus view is correct: Marine Le Pen will not become president this year. Keep in mind that the National Front underperformed during regional elections in December 2015, just weeks after the terrorist attacks in Paris. Despite a recent uptick in the polls, support for Le Pen is actually lower now than it was back then (Chart 14). As long as the French economy continues to show signs of tentative improvement, the establishment parties will succeed in keeping Le Pen out of power. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three (New) Controversial Calls," dated September 30, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Despite the populist sounding nature of this proposal, the Tax Policy Center estimates that 70% of the childcare credits will go to households earning $100,000 and up. See Lily L. Batchelder, Elaine Maag, Chye-Ching Huang, and Emily Horton, "Who Benefits from President Trump's Child Care Proposals?" Tax Policy Center (February 27, 2017) for details. 3 James R. Nunns, Leonard E. Burman, Jeffrey Rohaly, Joseph Rosenberg, and Benjamin R. Page, "An Analysis of the House GOP Tax Plan," Tax Policy Center (September 16, 2016). 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Feature Dear Client, I am travelling this week so this report is a little different. It is the full transcript and slides of a client presentation I recently gave. The presentation summarises several years of in-house work on applying the Fractal Market Hypothesis to real-life investing. Dhaval Joshi The Efficient Market Hypothesis Is Wrong Good morning In the next 30 minutes or so I want to challenge the way you think about financial markets. You see, at school we are taught the mainstream models of financial markets: Modern Portfolio Theory, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. And we are led to believe that these models describe the real world. But I'm sad to say that these mainstream models are deeply flawed. They simply don't describe financial markets as they behave in the real world. And in your heart of hearts, you know it. Take the supposed bedrock of financial market theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis, and look at the assumptions it makes about markets (Slide 2). Slide 2 One. That economic and market returns follow a Normal - which is to say a standard bell-curve - distribution. Really? Everybody knows that returns exhibit 'fat-tails' in which extreme events happen much more frequently than the bell-curve would suggest. By the way, this also means that a statement such as "the financial crisis was a five standard deviation - five-sigma - event with odds of 3 million to 1" is also complete nonsense. Accounting for the true fat-tails, the likelihood of extreme events is much higher than the flawed bell-curve models would suggest, as we should all now be painfully aware! Two. That the distribution is stationary - its mean doesn't change through time. Again, wrong. We know that economies and markets can and do experience regular regime-shifts or phase-shifts. Three. That markets have no memory - they exhibit no trends. Now this is getting silly! We all know that markets exhibit very strong trends. Four. That markets do not produce repeating patterns at any scale. Untrue. And five. That markets are continuously stable at all scales. Wrong again. I'm sure you'll all agree that none of these assumptions that underlie the Efficient Market Hypothesis describe the markets that we all know and work with. The good news is that there is a model that does describe the financial markets as they behave in the real world (Slide 3). It correctly assumes the return distribution is non-Normal, the mean can change over time, markets can trend, produce repeating patterns, and can generate instabilities at any scale. Slide 3 The model is called the Fractal Market Hypothesis, first proposed by Edgar Peters in 1991. Now I can see some looks of fear at the mention of this intimidating word 'fractal'. But hang in there, there really is nothing to fear. A fractal is just a pattern that repeats over and over at different scales. You come across fractals all the time, perhaps without realizing it. A cloud is a fractal - because a small part of a cloud is just a scaled-down version of the whole cloud. And for those of you who enjoy your vegetables, you will notice that cauliflowers and broccoli are fractals because the florets are just miniature versions of the whole vegetable. But perhaps the most familiar example is a tree (Slide 4). You can clearly see that a tree is just a simple pattern repeating over and over at different scales. Indeed, on this next slide (Slide 5), you see images of the twigs, branches, and trunk structure - and you could not tell them apart. Except that the twigs are on a scale of millimeters, the branches are on a scale of centimeters, and the trunk is on a scale of meters. Slide 4 Slide 5 Let's switch back to financial markets. On this next slide (Slide 6), you see three images of ten successive points on the S&P500. Again, the three images look very similar. In fact, they're very different. The first is on a scale of weeks, the second on a scale of months, and the third on a scale of years. But just like the twigs, branches and trunk, you could not tell them apart without seeing the scale. In other words, financial markets are scale-invariant. They are fractals. Slide 6 But why? And so what? To answer these questions we must now introduce the four basic assumptions of the Fractal Market Hypothesis. One. Investors are not homogeneous. The market is composed of many participants with a large number of different time horizons (Slide 7) - ranging from the milliseconds or seconds for a high frequency trader, through the days or weeks for a hedge fund to the years or decades for a pension fund. Two. These different time horizons interpret the same fundamental information differently (Slide 8). For example, a short-term technical trader interprets a rising price as a buy signal. Whereas a long-term fundamental value investor interprets the same information as a sell signal. Slide 7 Slide 8 Three. The market price reflects the combination of the short-term technical trader's interpretation of the information and the long-term value investor's interpretation of the same information (Slide 9). Crucially, this means the market is not efficient unless all time horizons are active in setting the price. Four. The stability of the market at a given price depends on plentiful liquidity - an adequate balancing of supply and demand at that price (Slide 10). When many different time horizons are active, the market is efficient and liquidity is plentiful. This is because different investors will disagree on the interpretation of the same information, and will trade with each other in volume without moving the price. Slide 9 Slide 10 However, if one time horizon becomes dominant, the market becomes inefficient and liquidity will evaporate. As investors become a 'groupthink herd', the healthy disagreement that is needed to create liquidity disappears. And the market loses its stability. So to answer the question 'why' markets are fractals, it is clear that the short-term investors generate the short-term patterns while long-term investors generate the long-term patterns. And to answer the question 'so what', it is clear that if the fractal structure breaks down, it is a warning sign that liquidity is evaporating and the market is losing its stability. Next we must discuss how we can measure the market's fractal structure, and for this I'm going to digress a little and ask you a famous question. How long is Britain's coastline? This is the question that the grandfather of fractals, Benoit Mandelbrot, first asked in 1967. Actually, it's a trick question. The answer is that there is no answer! You see a coastline is also a fractal. And the more detail you capture and measure, the longer it becomes (Slide 11). The point is that with a fractal structure you cannot measure its length or size. But the good news is that you can measure its extent of 'fractal-ness' using something called a fractal dimension. In fact the next slide (Slide 12) shows how Mandelbrot first defined the fractal dimension of Britain's coastline. Slide 11 Slide 12 Then a couple of years ago we thought why don't we extend this concept to a financial market? After all, a price chart is similar to a coastline, except that distance is replaced with time. In fact, the maths is a little more complicated, but this is how we ended up defining the fractal dimension of a financial market (Slide 13). Bear in mind that you won't find this or any of the following analysis in any textbook because it is our own unique work. Rest assured, you don't need the maths to understand the concept intuitively. Think of it like this (Slide 14). A market that is not trending tends to sweep out 2-dimensional space. So its fractal dimension might be close to 2. But a market that is trending gets less and less fractal and closer and closer to a perfect 1-dimensional line. So its fractal dimension drops close to 1. Slide 13 Slide 14 And now we get to our findings, which are both remarkable and uplifting. When we applied our unique definition of fractal dimension to different financial markets in different historical timeframes, we discovered that the tipping point of instability turned out to be exactly the same across different historical eras, geographies and asset classes. We had come across a universal property of financial markets, irrespective of generation, culture or investment. Financial markets tended to reverse their near-term trend when the fractal structure between the 65-day investment horizon and the 1-day investment horizon disappeared. Specifically, when the 65-day fractal dimension dropped to 1.25. So we called this the "Universal Constant Of Finance". You can see that this universal constant applied to the top and initial bottom of the market during the 1929 Wall Street Crash (Slide 15), and to the top and bottom of the 1987 Crash (Slide 16). It also perfectly picked the tops and bottoms of the 1990 Nikkei Crash (Slide 17), and the 1993 Bond Market Crash (Slide 18). Slide 15 Slide 16 Slide 17 Slide 18 Some financial markets also tended to reverse long-term trends when the fractal structure between the 60-month investment horizon and the 1-month investment horizon disappeared. Specifically, when the 60-month fractal dimension dropped to 1.25. You can see here (Slide 19) how this has perfectly picked many of the structural turning points in the dollar. And when we see the rare star-alignment of a long-term signal coinciding with a near-term signal, it can predict a very strong reversal in a short space of time. This is precisely what we saw ahead of crude oil's sharp bounce in early 2016 (Slide 20 and Slide 21). So to conclude (Slide 22): Slide 19 Slide 20 Slide 21 Slide 22 Financial markets are efficient only when all investment horizons are present and active in setting the price. In other words, when the market has a rich fractal structure. When investment horizons converge to a groupthink herd, the fractal structure breaks down, and the fractal dimension nears its lower bound. This is a warning sign of an impending liquidity-triggered trend reversal, either short-term or long-term. I am now happy to take any questions. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of February 28, 2017. The model has maintained its large overweight in the U.S. Within the non-U.S. level 2 model, Spain and Italy weights have been increased at the expense of Japan and Switzerland. Japan and U.K. remain the two largest underweight countries. (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, both the level 1 and level 2 models outperformed their respective benchmarks in February, resulting in a 39 bps outperformance of the aggregate model vs. the MSCI World. Since inception, the GAA model has outperformed its benchmark by 30 bps. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of February 28, 2017. The momentum component has shifted Consumer Discretionary from overweight to underweight. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
The Tactical Asset Allocation model can provide investment recommendations which diverge from those outlined in our regular weekly publications. The model has a much shorter investment horizon - namely, one month - and thus attempts to capture very tactical opportunities. Meanwhile, our regular recommendations have a longer expected life, anywhere from 3-months to a year (or longer). This difference explains why the recommendations between the two publications can deviate from each other from time to time. Highlights In February, the model underperformed global equities and the S&P 500 in USD and local-currency terms. For March, the model slightly increased its allocation to stocks and cut its weighting in bonds (Chart 1). Within the equity portfolio, the allocation to Europe was increased. The model boosted its weightings to French and Australian bonds at the expense of Canadian and Swedish paper. The risk index for stocks, as well as the one for bonds, deteriorated in February. Feature Performance In February, the recommended balanced portfolio gained 2.1% in local-currency terms, and 0.2% in U.S. dollar terms (Chart 2). This compares with a gain of 3% for the global equity benchmark and a 3.3% gain for the S&P 500. Given that the underlying model is structured in local-currency terms, we generally recommend that investors hedge their positions, though we provide suggestions on currency risk exposure from time to time. The high allocation to bonds continued to hold back the model's performance. Chart 1Model Weights Chart 2Portfolio Total Returns Weights The model increased its allocation to stocks from 53% to 57%, and cut its bond weighting from 47% to 43% (Table 1). Table 1Model Weights (As Of February 23, 2017) The model increased its equity allocation to Dutch and Swedish equities by 4 points each, Germany and New Zealand by 2 points each, and France and Emerging Asia by 1 point each. Weightings were cut in Italy by 4 points, Latin America by 3 points, Spain by 2 points, and Switzerland by 1 point. In the fixed-income space, the allocation to Australia was boosted by 8 points, France by 6 points, and Germany by 4 points. The model cut its exposure to Swedish bonds by 9 points, Canadian bonds by 6 points, U.S. and U.K. bonds by 3 points each, and Kiwi bonds by 1 point. Currency Allocation Local currency-based indicators drive the construction of our model. As such, the performance of the model's portfolio should be compared with the local-currency global equity benchmark. The decision to hedge currency exposure should be made at the client's discretion, though from time to time, we do provide our recommendations. The most recent bout of dollar depreciation was halted in February. Our Dollar Capitulation Index is below neutral levels. However, it is not extended, meaning that it does not preclude renewed dollar weakness in the near term. That said, assuming no major negative economic surprises, a relatively more hawkish Fed versus its peers should provide support for the dollar (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* And Capitulation Capital Market Indicators The risk index for commodities was little changed in February. The model continues to avoid this asset class (Chart 4). The risk index for global equities rose to its highest level since early 2010, mostly on the back of deteriorating value. Despite this, the model slightly increased its allocation to equities (Chart 5). Chart 4Commodity Index And Risk Chart 5Global Stock Market And Risk The rally in U.S. stocks - driven by optimism about the economic outlook - pushed the value component of the risk index into expensive territory. The model kept a small allocation in U.S. equities. A change in the perception about the ability of the new U.S. administration to boost growth remains a risk for this market (Chart 6). The risk index for euro area equities continues to deteriorate. However, it remains lower than its U.S. counterpart. The continued flow of solid economic data and a weaker currency should bode well for euro area stocks, although political uncertainty is a potential headwind (Chart 7). Chart 6U.S. Stock Market And Risk Chart 7Euro Area Stock Market And Risk All three components of the risk index for Dutch equities are close to neutral levels. As a result, despite the recent deterioration in the overall risk index, it remains one of the lowest among the markets the model covers (Chart 8). The risk index for Swedish stocks worsened. However, the model increased its allocation to this bourse. Swedish equities would be a beneficiary of the continued risk-on environment (Chart 9). Chart 8Netherlands Stock Market And Risk Chart 9Swedish Stock Market And Risk The momentum indicator for global bonds is less stretched in February. Meanwhile, despite its latest decline, the cyclical indicator continues to signal that the positive global economic backdrop is firmly bond-bearish. Taken all together, the risk index for bonds deteriorated in February, although it still remains in the low-risk zone (Chart 10). U.S. Treasury yields moved sideways in February as investors await more guidance from the Fed on the timing of the next hike. A bond-negative cyclical indicator coupled with the unwinding of oversold conditions - as per the momentum measure - led to a deterioration in the risk index for U.S. Treasurys. The latter is almost back to neutral levels. The model trimmed the allocation to this asset class (Chart 11). Chart 10Global Bond Yields And Risk Chart 11U.S. Bond Yields And Risk The momentum indicator remains the main driver of the risk index for Canadian bonds. As a result, the less extreme momentum reading translated into an increase in the risk index for this asset class. (Chart 12). The risk index for Australian bonds moved lower in February, reflecting improvements in all three of its components. The model included the relatively high-yielding Aussie bonds in the portfolio. (Chart 13). Chart 12Canadian Bond Yields And Risk Chart 13Australian Bond Yields And Risk The cyclical indicator for euro area bonds is near expensive levels, and the momentum indicator shows heavily oversold conditions. These two measures are offsetting the cyclical one that is sending a bond-bearish message. While the overall risk index for euro area bonds is in the low-risk zone, the country allocation is concentrated in French paper (Chart 14). The risk level for French bonds is seen as low thanks to oversold momentum. French presidential elections are probably the most important political event in Europe this year. Whether the models' heavy allocation to this asset pans out hinges to a certain extent on the reduction of investor anxiety about this political risk (Chart 15). Chart 14Euro Area Bond Yields And Risk Chart 15French Bond Yields And Risk The 13-week momentum measure for the dollar broke below the zero line, and is currently sitting on its upward-sloping trendline, drawn from the 2010 lows, that has been broken only once before. Meanwhile, the 40-week rate of change measure is still suggesting that the dollar bull market has more legs on a cyclical horizon. Monetary divergences should lend support to the dollar over the cyclical horizon, although the new administration's attempts to talk down the dollar as well as heightened policy uncertainty could translate into more volatility (Chart 16). The weakening trend in the yen hit a snag two months ago, as the 13-week momentum measure reached the lows that previously foreshadowed a consolidation phase after sharp depreciations. This short-term rate-of-change measure has bounced smartly this year reaching a critical level. Meanwhile, the 40-week rate-of-change measure is not warning of a major change in the underlying trend which remains dictated by BoJ's dovish bias (Chart 17). EUR/USD has been gravitating towards 1.05 over the course of February. The short-term rate-of-change measure seems to be holding at the neutral level, while the 40-week rate-of-change measure is in negative territory, but hardly stretched. Political uncertainty has the potential to drive the euro in near term, but the longer-term outlook is mostly a function of the monetary policy divergence between the ECB and the Fed (Chart 18). Chart 16U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* Chart 17Yen Chart 18Euro Miroslav Aradski, Senior Analyst miroslava@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Gold volatility is trending lower, suggesting unresolved economic and political issues are diminishing, and investors' confidence in the global economy is improving. This is a false positive. Uncertainty is elevated. "Known unknowns" loom large: U.S. and Chinese fiscal policy, which drive USD dynamics and commodity supply and demand, are unresolved; The outcome of French and Italian elections could shock the euro zone; The reaction functions of systemically important central banks as they navigate these risks remain opaque. Given gold's exquisite sensitivity to political and policy nuances globally, our attention naturally turns to it when we look for ways to position in the face of this political and policy-related uncertainty. Our analysis suggests the low volatility in gold markets is the result of traders and investors being driven to the sidelines, where they await clarity re politics and policy. This is keeping trading volumes low: No one wants to be long or short lacking critical information necessary to take a view on the evolution of asset-price paths. Lower trading volumes, therefore, reflect a paucity of information in the price-discovery process, which, all else equal, will tend to keep commodity prices range bound until new information arrives to propel them in one direction or the other. With fewer prints going up across markets, realized and implied volatilities remain low ... for the moment. Energy: Overweight. We are taking profits basis today's close on our WTI Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 backwardation spread initiated February 9 at -$0.11/bbl. We also will be taking profits on our Dec/19 WTI vs. Brent spread, elected February 6 at +$0.07/bbl, after WTI traded premium to Brent in anticipation a U.S. border-adjusted tax would be enacted. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper remains well bid amid transitory supply outages. Workers resumed their strike at BHP's Escondida mine in Chile, while Anglo American temporarily suspended work at its El Soldado mine in a regulatory dispute, according to Metal Report. Freeport-McMoRan declared force majeure on Grasberg deliveries. Precious Metals: Neutral. We are withdrawing our gold buy-stop, and are recommending long gold options spreads to position for higher volatility (see below). Ags/Softs: Underweight. Corn and wheat came under selling pressure over the past week, but still are holding trend-line support from end-2016. We continue to monitor these markets for signs of a short-term rally. We remain strategically bearish, however. Feature While we believe the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) holds most of the time - at least in semi-strong form (i.e., all public information is fully reflected in prices) - traders and investors now find themselves in something of a quandary.1 Much of the information needed to assess future paths for asset prices and form expectations for returns has yet to be revealed. In other words, there are large parts of markets' information sets made up of "known unknowns," which, once resolved, will be of enormous consequence to the paths taken by different asset prices. This is particularly true for gold. Our analysis suggests this lack of information is keeping trading volumes in gold markets low. As a result, the price-discovery process is stymied, which, all else equal, tends to keep prices range bound until new information arrives to propel them in one direction or the other. With fewer prints going up across markets, realized and implied volatilities remain low. Investors accustomed to viewing low volatility as an indication unresolved economic and political issues are diminishing therefore have to adapt to a new reality, one in which low volatility actually is the product of heightened uncertainty (Chart of the Week). Granted, financial stress is low. This contributes to lower volatility, particularly in gold, which is highly sensitive to U.S. real rates and USD levels. However, we find low trading volumes in gold markets also are responsible for the lower-trending realized and implied volatility prevailing in in gold markets (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekVolatility Is Low, Despite Uncertainty Being High Chart 2Realized And Implied Gold Vols Are Trending Lower This suggests there is an opportunity to position ahead of the resolution of these "known unknowns" in the gold market, given the low volatility levels we see. This is driven largely by our view that there are numerous risks in near- and longer-term price distributions, which imply much fatter tails than markets are pricing in at the moment.3 Indeed, the CBOE Gold VIX is running at ~ 13.5% presently vs. a post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) average of 18.8% p.a.4 First, The Fat Left Tail There are a number of risks pumping up the left tails of many commodity price distributions - e.g., how long China will continue to tighten fiscal policy (Chart 3), and the effect this will have on the prices of base metals and bulk commodities like iron ore and steel. And, of course, markets will continue to hang on every utterance of Federal Reserve officials, attempting to discount rate-hike probabilities and their implications for the USD and real rates, the critical drivers of gold prices (Chart 4). Chart 3China Fiscal Stimulus Grinds To A Halt Near term, these risks will continue to loom large, but they are dwarfed by a possible border-adjusted tax (BAT) being imposed in the U.S. In our estimation, this is the largest left-tail risk we've identified for commodity markets over the near term. It is being championed by Republican leaders in the U.S. House of Representatives - led by Speaker Paul Ryan and Ways and Means Chairman Kevin Brady.5 A BAT would raise the price of commodities subject to the tax in the U.S. Domestically, producers of commodities subject to the tax would benefit from this increase in prices, since it would boost their revenues and incentivize increased domestic production. This would be used to displace imports and take market share from exporters to the U.S. Once the domestic market has been saturated with the higher domestic output, U.S. producers would turn to export markets to sell their increased output. A BAT would shrink the U.S. trade deficit, which would, all else equal, raise the trade-weighted value of the USD. Our expectation is there is a 50:50 chance a BAT is enacted, but that it will exclude oil and apparel. We expect the USD would appreciate ~ 10% on the back of this scheme, on top of the 5% increase in the value of the dollar we already were expecting from the Fed's continued push to normalize monetary policy. On the back of this 15% appreciation in the USD over the next year or so, commodity prices ex U.S. would increase in local-currency terms, which would crimp demand in EM and DM economies. On the supply side, the cost of producing commodities ex U.S. would fall in local-currency terms, which would increase supply at the margin. Net, net: A BAT would cause global commodity demand to fall and supply to increase, which would, all else equal, send a deflationary impulse back to the U.S., and DM and EM economies. Fat Right Tails Permanent and transitory commodity supply losses constitute large right-tail risks for investors, in our estimation, as does stronger-than-expected demand. Chief among these are ongoing losses in copper markets in the near term, which we believe to be transitory. The massive $1 trillion+ capex cuts registered in the oil markets in the wake of the price collapse induced by OPEC's market share war leave us with low confidence our oil-price expectation of $55/bbl will prevail beyond 2018. Near term, however, the timing and type of infrastructure projects that will be funded under the Trump administration's forthcoming fiscal roadmap, and whether Congress will be supportive represent the largest right-tail risk for gold markets. Highly expansive fiscal stimulus could spur inflation in the U.S., given this stimulus will be hitting an economy that already is at or near full employment. Given the synchronized global economic recovery currently underway, we believe an inflationary impulse could percolate into near-term inflation realizations, and into inflation expectations longer term. Chart 4Markets Will Continue To Hang On Every Fed Utterance This elevated inflation risk will be bullish for gold, as we showed in recent research.6 Indeed, we noted, "All else equal, with the U.S. labor market at or close to full employment, and the Trump administration signaling its desire for stimulative fiscal policy, we would be inclined to look for inflation hedges within commodities that are highly sensitive to rising inflation." Topping that list is gold, in our estimation. Taking A View On Volatility Chart 5Gold Provides A Good Hedge For Equity Volatility Volatility is trading-market shorthand for the annualized standard deviation of expected returns for an underlying asset. It is a parameter used to price options. Options markets are unique in that they allow investors to take a view on the dispersion of the expected returns of the asset against which the option is written.7 Volatility is a calculated value, whereas the other components of an option's price - i.e., the underlying asset's price, the strike price, time to expiration, and interest rates - all are known inputs. Volatility, like the price of the underlying asset, therefore is "discovered" when a trade occurs. After an option trades and its premium becomes known, an option-pricing model - e.g., the Black-Scholes-Merton model - can be run backwards, so to speak, to see what level of volatility solves the pricing model for the value that cleared the market. This is known as the option's implied volatility, because it is the expected standard deviation of returns implied by the price at which the option clears the market. One reason investors and traders buy and sell options is to express a view on implied volatility. Option buyers who think the market is underestimating the likelihood of sharply higher or sharply lower returns can express this view by buying out-of-the-money options - calls or call spreads on the upside, puts or put spreads on the downside. This can arise for any number of reasons, but they all boil down to one essential point: Option buyers think there is a higher probability returns will be higher or lower during the life of an option than what is being priced in the options market presently.8 Option sellers, on the other hand, are expressing the opposite view. We believe the fat-tail risks we've discussed in this article are not being fully reflected in the options markets most sensitive to this information, among them the gold market. Our own assessment of these risks implies much fatter tails than we currently observe in the out-of-the-money gold options, as noted above. For this reason, we are recommending investors consider buying put spreads and call spreads against June-delivery gold. We will look to get long Jun/17 $1,200/oz puts vs. selling $1,150/oz puts, and getting long $1,275/oz calls vs. selling $1,325/oz calls, basis tonight's closing levels for the underlying contract. This is a low-risk strategic recommendation, with the put and call spreads roughly equidistant from where the Jun/17 gold contract is trading. The motivation for this recommendation is simple: We believe volatility is low, given the "known unknowns" and their associated fat tails, which are not being accounted for in options prices. This makes these options cheap. Gold Can Hedge Equity Risk As Well Our analysis reveals gold provides a good edge against rising equity volatility, as measured by the CBOE's equity volatility index (CBOE VIX).9 From 1995 to the present, gold's monthly percentage returns outperformed those of the S&P 500 61% of the time when the VIX was increasing, and 36% of the time when the VIX was decreasing (Chart 5). Over the entire sample, gold outperformed the S&P 500 in average by 2.25% in periods of increasing equity volatility as measured by the VIX. However, if we focus only on sub-sample periods where the VIX was increasing but from an already-elevated level (20% or above), gold returns outperformed S&P 500 returns by 4.57% on average. Given our assessment that current volatility is abnormally low, particularly for gold, we believe the gold options exposure recommended here will provide investors protection against increasing equity volatility, as well. Moreover, if market sentiment changes and volatility begins to increase significantly, our analysis provides evidence that gold's volatility-risk-mitigation properties increase even more when the VIX is already at a high level. Bottom Line: Markets lack sufficient information to fully price the risks in potential fat-tail events on the down- and up-side of commodity price distributions. We believe gold options - particularly put and call spreads - offer a low-risk way to position for the eventual resolution of this uncertainty. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 For an excellent discussion of the EMH, please see Timmermann, Allan, and Clive W.J. Granger (2004), "Efficient market hypothesis and forecasting," in the International Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 20, pp. 15 - 27. 2 When we regress CBOE gold volatility on first-nearby gold futures volume using daily data over January 2016 to February 2017 using an error-correction model, we find trading volume explains ~ one-third of the CBOE implied gold volatility's level. 3 Many of these risks are geopolitical in nature, which our colleague Marko Papic considers at length in "A Fat-Tails World," published February 22, 2016, in BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 We mark the post-GFC period as Jan/10 to present. 5 A BAT essentially would tax imports coming in to the U.S. and subsidize exports, using proceeds to reduce corporate taxes. We are not ready to pronounce the BAT dead, as some pundits already have. We think the market's 20% probability that such a tax becomes law is too low: We give it a 50:50 chance of passage, albeit in a watered down form likely calling for a 10% tax on imports, which likely will not include oil or apparel. Base metals and agricultural imports likely would be taxed under this scheme. We analyzed the commodity impacts of this proposed scheme in "Taking a BAT To Commodities," which was published in the January 26, 2017, issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Gold Will Perform...," dated February 2, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Call options give the buyer the right to go long an underlying asset at the price at which an option contract is struck - i.e., the option's strike price. Puts give option buyers the right to go short the underlying asset at the price at which the contract is struck. While an option buyer is not required to ever exercise an option, option sellers must take the other side of the deal if the buyer chooses to exercise. Option buyers pay a premium for the put or call they purchase. 8 This probability also can be expressed in terms or price levels, which allows investors to take an explicit view on the likelihood of a particular price being realized during the life of the option being purchased. Please see Ryan, Bob and Tancred Lidderdale (2009), "Energy Price Volatility and Forecast Uncertainty," published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, for a discussion of options markets and implied volatility. "Appendix II: Derivation of the Cumulative Normal Density for Futures Prices" beginning on p. 22 shows how to transform the returns distribution into a price distribution. It is available at https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/special/pdf/2009_sp_05.pdf. 9 Our results are similar to those reported in "Gold is still a good hedge when volatility rises," by Russ Koesterich, CFA, published by Blackrock on its Blackrock Blog September 9, 2016. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in
Highlights Markets are facing large tail risks - both negative and positive; Donald Trump is a "Fat-Tail" president; European politics offer both a right-tail risk - German Europhile turn ... ... And a left-tail risk - Italian election and a shock in France; Investors should turn to the options market for opportunities. Feature "Stock market hits new high with longest winning streak in decades. Great level of confidence and optimism - even before tax plan rollout!" President Donald Trump "tweet" - February 16, 2017 Global stocks continue their tear as the market shrugs off President Trump's tweets, European Black Swans, saber-rattling in the South China Sea, and fears of de-globalization. Some of the optimism is backed by economic data, but mostly by the "soft data," or survey-based indicators (Chart 1).1 Chart 1Not Much Behind The Optimism Aside From Animal Spirits So, why the party? It's the Animal Spirits. The bears are in retreat ... or facing deportation! We think investors are betting that the combination of the Brexit referendum and election of Donald Trump has forced policymakers to take their heads out of the sand. The market believes that policymakers have heard the angry electorate whose message is that dithering over economic policies must stop. BCA has been in this camp since last summer, when our colleague Peter Berezin penned an optimistic missive titled "The Upside To Populism."2 The hope that urgency will translate to expediency is what we think has propelled the S&P 500 to one of its best post-election performances (Chart 2). Trump's market performance is in the 83rd percentile of post-election outcomes. As promised, Trump has delivered a win. Chart 2Trump Is Winning The S&P 500 Contest The danger is that the market is extrapolating from the Trump presidency all the "right-tail" or super-positive policy outcomes without accounting for any left-tail events. Trump is a "Fat-Tails" president, an unorthodox politician that could break the gridlock and deliver positive change, but whose brand of nationalist populism may also produce paradigm-shifting crises along the way. Several indicators suggest that caution is warranted. Our U.S. Equity Strategy colleagues offer two measures of complacency, the valuation-to-volatility ratio (Chart 3) and "Complacency-Anxiety Index" (Chart 4).3 Both are stretched and suggest that the market has never been as engrossed by the right-tail narrative as today. Given our constraints-based methodology, we are concerned by how certain the market appears. It seems to believe that all the wonderful things that Trump has promised will face no constraints, while his nationalism and mercantilism will be discarded. Chart 3Market Sees Only Right Tails Chart 4Complacency Reigns First, on the domestic front, Trump faces several mounting constraints: Political capital: Trump is an unpopular president (Chart 5), at least by the standards of his peers who enjoyed a post-election "honeymoon." This could affect his relationship with the GOP-controlled Congress that hardly warmed up to him in the first place. Precedent: Congress is struggling to produce Obamacare-replacement legislation, which the GOP had six years to prepare for. This bodes poorly for the timeliness of other legislation, like tax reform. Paying for stimulus: Republicans and the White House appear to be at odds over how to pay for the coming household and corporate tax cuts. The former want to pass the controversial border adjustment tax (BAT),4 while the Trump administration may not care how tax cuts are paid for. The BAT proposal is also facing opposition from major retailers and its legality under the WTO is still in question. Infrastructure: Spending on infrastructure, which is a no-brainer and has broad public support (Chart 6), has not seen a concrete plan despite Trump's emphasis on it during his inaugural address and campaign. Chart 5Trump's Approval Ratings Dismal Chart 6Everyone Loves New Roads In addition to the domestic political agenda, investors must deal with a packed European political calendar that we elucidated in last week's report5 (Table 1) and a potential U.S.-China trade war that could spill over into military tensions in the South China Sea.6 Table 1Busy Calendar For Europe This Year Investors may have been lulled into complacency by the February 10 phone call between presidents Xi and Trump. During the call, Trump committed to uphold the "One China" policy that has formed the bedrock of the Beijing-Washington rapprochement since 1972. A week later, on February 16, China suspended all imports of coal from North Korea - 50% of the country's entire export haul - until the end of the year. The move was a big nod to Donald Trump, a message by Beijing that China can play the role of an indispensable partner - if not outright ally - in the region. These moves have put fears of trade protectionism, our main candidate for a catalyst of a market correction, on the backburner. Investors can certainly be disappointed by smaller-than-expected tax cuts and tepid infrastructure spending, but such policy reversals will only encourage the Fed to stay easy and thus prolong the party. In the context of a synchronized global growth recovery - with both the global (Chart 7) and U.S. (Chart 8) economies looking decent - investors will not be deterred from bullishness merely by congressional intrigue. Chart 7Global Growth Looks Solid ... Chart 8... And So Does U.S. Growth The problem for investors is that the main two risks to global markets in 2017 have no set timeline. Last week, we pointed out that the main political risk in Europe is the Italian election whose date could be in autumn, or even as late as spring 2018. Today we add the French election to the list, where Marine Le Pen is mounting a furious rally on the back of rioting in the banlieue of Aulnay-sous-Bois. Similarly, Trump's mercantilism may remain dormant as he focuses on immigration, the "dishonest media," and cabinet appointees, even though it is very real. His administration is laser-focused on correcting a major perceived ill of the U.S. economy: the current account deficit. Therefore, investors should certainly welcome the Xi-Trump phone call, but the fact that the two leaders spent valuable time reaffirming a policy set 45 years ago should not be encouraging. In fact, the Trump administration has since asked the U.S. Trade Representative's office to consider changing how it calculates the U.S. trade deficit. According to the Wall Street Journal, Trump's White House is looking to exclude "re-exports" - goods imported into the U.S. merely so they can be assembled and then exported - from the calculation of U.S. exports.7 This would naturally balloon the U.S. trade deficit and give the Trump administration greater political ammunition - particularly against Mexico - for retaliation. Given solid global growth data, extremely positive surveys, and a market narrative still focused on the "Upside of Populism," it is tempting for investors to throw caution to the wind. Every time we encounter a bear in a client meeting or conference, we ask if he or she would "buy on dips" in case a correction happened. Their answer is almost universally "yes." It is difficult to see how a correction occurs in such an environment, where nobody actually expects a bear market. Although we are throwing in the towel with our two hedges - both the S&P 500 and Eurostoxx hedges have stopped out, we continue to stress that the market has priced in none of the left-tail risks that remain. We have a Fat-Tail President in the White House and an increasingly binary resolution to the euro area saga in the making in Europe. Fat Tails In Europe Since late 2016, we have suspected that Merkel's rule is unsustainable.8 However, while most investors fretted that Merkel would be replaced by a Euroskeptic, we considered that outcome extremely unlikely (at least in the current electoral cycle). For one, the refugee crisis that befell Europe would be short-lived, and indeed it is now over (Chart 9). For another, Germans are not Euroskeptics. What is astonishing is how quickly the German political establishment has realized and sought to profit from these facts. Instead of opposing Merkel with a cautious choice, the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) has turned to an unabashed Europhile, former President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz. Schulz is a relative unknown in Germany and was perceived by Merkel's coterie as a lightweight. On the surface, this made sense. Schulz has no university education and worked as a bookseller before becoming a politician. However, he knows EU politics extremely well, as he has been a member of the European Parliament since 1994. He has therefore heard every Euroskeptic argument on the continent and has learned to counter it emphatically. And he seems to understand the benefits that euro area membership has bestowed upon Germany, a view he appears to share with 80% of the German public, if the latest polls are to be believed (Chart 10)! Chart 9Migrant Crisis Waning Chart 10Germans See The Euro As A Great Deal Thus far, Schulz's campaign has focused on three main lines of attack: the traditional SPD call for greater economic redistribution, general appeal for European solidarity, and blaming Merkel for the rise of populists. To everyone's surprise - other than folks who understand how Germany works - this has been a successful approach. In just three weeks, the SPD has gone from trailing Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) by double digits to leading in the polls for the first time since 2001 (Chart 11). What should investors make of Schulz's meteoric rise? For one, nobody should get too excited, as the election is still a long seven months away. However, the SPD's resurrection suggests that the German political marketplace has been demanding a genuinely pro- euro area political alternative to the overly cautious Angela Merkel for some time. In other words, Schulz has realized that the median voter in Germany is far more Europhile than the conventional wisdom and Merkel have thought. Again... Chart 10 says it all! Unfortunately for the euro, Germany's Europhile turn may be too little too late. Italy's election is a major risk. As with the threat of American mercantilism, Italian elections are a risk that we cannot properly time. Furthermore, polls remain extremely close in Italy, suggesting that the election could go either way between the establishment and Euroskeptic parties. At this point, the best outcome may be a hung parliament. Meanwhile, the ongoing unrest in the northeast suburb of Paris, Aulnay-sous-Bois, appears to have given Marine Le Pen some wind in her sails (Chart 12). She has closed her head-to-head polling gap against Francois Fillon and Emmanuel Macron to just 12% and 20% respectively. Our net assessment is that she is not going to win, but our conviction level is declining. Her subjective probability has climbed to well over 20% at this point. Chart 11Pro-Europe Sentiment Drives SPD Revival Chart 12Le Pen Lags By 12-20% In Second Round Similar rioting in 2005 launched the political career of one Nicolas Sarkozy, who, as the country's Minister of Interior, took a hard line approach to the unrest, which launched him into the presidency. The lesson from Sarkozy's rise is important for two reasons. First, unrest in France's banlieues is politically relevant. These frequent bursts of violence support the National Front (FN) narrative that the integration of migrants has failed, that the country needs full control over its borders, and that the elites in Paris are not serious about law and order. The second lesson is that centrist, establishment politicians have no problem with being tough on crime, minorities, or immigrants. Sarkozy's rhetoric in 2007 mirrored much of the FN electoral platform. There is enough time, in other words, for Macron and Fillon to do the same in 2017. This will be particularly easy for Fillon, whose immigration policies already echo those of the FN. Chart 13ECB Policy Will Stimulate Core Europe Macron, however, could be in trouble in the second round. And at the moment, he is more likely to face Le Pen in the second round than Fillon. As we pointed out in last week's missive, Macron could struggle to get right-wing voters to support him in the second round. We still do not have a historical case where right-wing voters were the ones who swung against the FN. In both the 2002 presidential election and the 2015 regional elections, it was mostly left-wing voters who swung to the center-right to keep the FN out of power. Will French conservative voters come out and support a centrist candidate like Macron who may be perceived as "soft" on crime? Time will tell. His polling appears to be holding up well against Le Pen, but her momentum is now rising. Bottom Line: Europe faces its own version of Fat Tails in 2017. On the one hand, we expect the ECB to remain easier than consensus would have it, given the mounting political risks in the periphery. We expect the ECB to ignore the broad euro area economy and focus on the interest rates that the periphery - namely Italy - needs (very low for very long time) (Chart 13). When combined with a Europhile turn in Germany and a positive fiscal thrust as the EU Commission turns against austerity, we see a Goldilocks scenario for euro area assets over the short and medium term. We are betting that this right-tail risk will ultimately prevail. On the other hand, Italian elections could knock the train off the rails at any time. Due to the announced leadership race in the ruling Democratic Party (PD), the election will most likely have to take place after the summer. Or, it may have to be put off until Q1 2018. But whenever it is announced, it will become the risk to European and global assets. For now, we continue to recommend that clients remain overweight euro area equities. However, vigilance will be needed as the market climbs the wall of worry. Investment Implications - Trading Fat Tails In A Low-Vol World What should investors do in a world that is increasingly exemplified by our Fat-Tails thesis? Current levels of the VIX suggest that the market is not pricing in a potentially higher level of volatility, which we would intuitively expect to rise in a Fat-Tail world (Chart 14). On the other hand, current low levels of volatility may merely be the calm before the storm. Investors may be "frozen" by the high probability of both left- and right-tail outcomes and thus choosing to sit on the sidelines instead of committing to any one narrative. Chart 14Volatility Extremely Low One way to think about investing in this world is to turn to the options market. The options market is unique in that it allows investors to take a view on the dispersion of the expected returns of the asset against which the option is written.9 This is because one of the critical components of a call or put option's value is the expected volatility of returns for the asset underlying the option itself. Volatility is trading-market shorthand for the annualized standard deviation of expected returns for the underlying asset. Volatility is a calculated value, whereas the other components of an option's price - i.e. the underlying asset's price, the strike price, time to expiration, and interest rates - are known inputs. Volatility, like the price of the underlying asset, is "discovered" when a trade occurs. After an option trades and its premium is known, an option-pricing model - e.g., the Black-Scholes-Merton model - can be run backwards, so to speak, to see what level of volatility solves the pricing model for the value that cleared the market. This is known as the option's implied volatility, because it is the expected standard deviation of returns implied by the price at which the option clears the market. One reason investors and traders buy and sell options is to express a view on implied volatility. Option buyers who think the market is underestimating the likelihood of sharply higher returns can express this view by buying out-of-the-money options. This can arise for any number of reasons, but they all boil down to one essential point: option buyers think there is a higher probability that returns will be higher or lower during the life of an option than what is being priced in the options market.10 Option sellers, on the other hand, are expressing the opposite view. We believe the geopolitical tail risks we have discussed in this report are not being fully reflected in the options markets most sensitive to this information, among them the gold market. Our own assessment of these risks implies much fatter tails than we currently observe in out-of-the-money gold options. For this reason, we are recommending investors consider buying $1,200/oz gold puts and $1,300/oz gold calls expiring in either June or December of this year. This is a strategic recommendation. We leave it to investors to set their own stop-loss, if they are not comfortable foregoing the full premium paid to hold these options to expiry, possibly expiring worthless. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Robert Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Downside To Full Employment," dated February 3, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Upside To Populism," dated August 19, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Bridging The Gap," dated February 6, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Congress Pass The Border Adjustment Tax?" dated February 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Climbing The Wall Of Worry In Europe," dated February 15, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?," dated January 25, 2017, and "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 "Please see William Mauldin and Devlin Barrett, "Trump Administration Considers Change In Calculating U.S. Trade Deficit," Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2017, available at www.wsj.com. 8 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Call options give the buyer the right to go long an underlying asset at the price at which an option contract is struck - i.e. the option's strike price. Puts give option buyers the right to go short the underlying asset at the price at which the contract is struck. While an option buyer is not required to ever exercise an option, option sellers must take the other side of the deal if the buyer chooses to exercise. Option buyers pay a premium for the put or call they purchase. 10 This probability also can be expressed in terms of price levels, which allows investors to take an explicit view of the likelihood of a particular price being realized during the life of the option being purchased. Please see Bob Ryan and Tancred Lidderdale, "Energy Price Volatility and Forecast Uncertainty," published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009), for a discussion of options markets and implied volatility. "Appendix II: Derivation of the Cumulative Normal Density for Futures Prices" beginning on p. 22 shows how to transform the returns distribution into a price distribution. It is available at https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/special/pdf/2009_sp_05.pdf. Geopolitical Calendar
Highlights Global manufacturing inventories are low but this does not guarantee higher share prices for global cyclical stocks. If an increase in inventories is accompanied by strengthening final demand, it will be very bullish for the global business cycle. If final demand growth falters, global cyclical plays will relapse amid rising inventories. China's inventory depletion has been due to the large fiscal and credit impulse in the past 12 months - i.e., improving final demand has been instrumental to inventory shedding. Looking forward, the mainland's aggregate credit and fiscal impulse seems to have topped out raising the odds of a reversal in EM/China plays sooner than later. The risk/reward of EM/China plays remains unattractive. Feature Global Manufacturing Inventories Global manufacturing inventories have been depleted over the past 12 months, and inventory levels are generally low (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). Chart I-1Global Manufacturing Inventories Are Low Chart I-2Global Manufacturing Inventories Are Low Could inventory re-stocking extend the current manufacturing cycle recovery worldwide? Will low inventories and re-stocking in China lengthen the nation's business cycle upswing? Chart I-3 demonstrates inventory cycles and manufacturing production within manufacturing-intensive economies. The correlation is not stable. Currently, this entails that low manufacturing inventories and a potential rise in inventories over the course of this year do not guarantee acceleration in industrial output growth. Having reviewed manufacturing inventory cycles and their correlation with share prices, we conclude that the key to share prices is final demand - not inventory swings. Manufacturing inventories have dropped in the past 12 months because final demand has been robust (Chart I-4). Historically, periods of re-stocking have often coincided with poor equity market performance. Indeed, Taiwanese, Korean, Japanese and German non-financial share prices have no stable correlation with their respective manufacturing inventory cycles (Chart I-5). In short, manufacturing inventories could rise in the months ahead, but this does not guarantee higher share prices in cyclical industries. Chart I-3Inventories And Production ##br##Are Not Always Correlated Chart I-4Robust Demand Has Led ##br##To Inventory Depletion Chart I-5Non-Financial Share Prices And##br## Inventories: Little Correlation By and large, the outlook for corporate profits is contingent on final demand rather than re-stocking. All of the above confirms that inventories are a residual of demand and supply. Stronger-than-expected demand is bullish for share prices, though it also often coincides with declining inventories. By contrast, rising inventories typically reflect demand falling behind output growth (one can define it as involuntary re-stocking) and these periods are not favorable for share price gains in cyclical industries. One caveat is that there could be a re-stocking cycle amid strengthening demand or, in other words, voluntary re-stocking. If this transpires in the coming months, it will be extremely bullish for share prices as it will supercharge output growth. While the latter scenario - inventory re-stocking amid strengthening final demand - could very well occur within the advanced economies this year, odds of such positive dynamics are low in EM/China. Bottom Line: Share prices in global cyclical sectors are driven by swings in final demand - not in inventories. Going forward, global manufacturing inventories will rise. If this rise is accompanied by strengthening demand, it will be very bullish for the global business cycle. Otherwise, global cyclical plays will relapse as inventories rise. What Drives China's Inventory Cycles Chart I-6 shows that China's manufacturing inventories typically deplete when the credit and fiscal impulse is rising, and vice versa. China's manufacturing inventories have been exhausted because demand has been strong in the past 12 months. In turn, demand strength has originated from the country's massive fiscal and credit stimulus push from the first half of 2016. Chart I-6China: Strong Policy Stimulus Led To Manufacturing Inventories Reduction That said, China's aggregate fiscal and credit impulse seems to have recently rolled over, pointing to a top in its manufacturing mini-cycle and commodities prices (Chart I-7). This signals a potential deceleration in final demand. On the whole, the ongoing modest tightening by the People's Bank of China and by the bank regulator (the China Banking Regulatory Commission) amid a lingering credit bubble is raising the odds of a moderate credit slowdown in the months ahead. Even modest credit growth deceleration will result in a negative credit impulse (Chart I-8, top panel). Meanwhile, the mainland's fiscal impulse has already dropped (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7China: Aggregate Credit And Fiscal##br## Stimulus Has Topped Out Chart I-8China: A Breakdown Of Credit ##br##And Fiscal Impulses On the whole, these developments are leading us to maintain our negative bias toward EM risk assets and China plays. What has gone wrong in our view/analysis on China in the past 12 months is that the nation's credit growth has stayed much stronger than we expected. In our April 13, 2016 report,1 we did a scenario analysis and argued that China's large fiscal stimulus push would be offset by a negative credit impulse if credit growth slowed from 11.5% to below 10%. In reality, credit growth has been between 11.5-12.5%, producing a positive credit impulse. Barring tightening by the central bank or bank regulators, mainland banks can continue originating loans/money at a double-digit pace, as they have been doing for many years (Chart I-9). In general, commercial banks do not need savings to create money/loans and there are few limits on Chinese banks originating loans "out of thin air," as we argued in our Trilogy of Special Reports on money/loan creation, savings and investment.2 Chart I-9China's Credit/Money Growth##br## Remains Rampant Therefore, if credit growth does not slow, our negative view on China's growth will be off-the-mark again. The pressure point in such a case will be the exchange rate. Unlimited money creation/oversupply of local currency is bearish for the value of the RMB. The RMB will continue depreciating, but it is not certain if it will hurt EM risk assets. It is a major consensus view nowadays that the Chinese authorities will not allow growth to suffer ahead of the Party Congress in autumn of this year. Yet, the PBoC and bank regulators are modestly tightening to "normalize" credit growth. Some clients may wonder why we are placing so much emphasis on the rollover of credit and fiscal impulses now, while placing little emphasis on these same indicators in 2016 when they were recovering. The rationale is as follows: when there is a credit bubble - as there is in China now - we tend to downplay the importance of policy easing and put more significance on policy tightening. The opposite also holds true: when the credit/banking system is healthy, we tend to downplay the impact of moderate policy tightening and put greater emphasis on policy easing. In a credit bubble, it does not take much tightening to trigger a downtrend that unwinds excesses. Similarly, moderate tightening in a healthy credit system should not be feared. From a big picture perspective, we turned bearish on China's growth several years ago due to the formation of a credit bubble. The bubble has only gotten larger and an adjustment has not yet even started. This does not justify altering our fundamental assessment of China's growth outlook. It would have been ideal to turn positive tactically on EM/China plays a year ago. Unfortunately, we did not do that. Presently, chasing the market higher might not be the best investment idea. Based on all this and given: the sharp rally in EM/China plays and widespread investor complacency and consensus that "everything" will be fine before the end of this year; modest tightening in Chinese monetary policy amid lingering credit and asset (property and the corporate bond market) bubbles; our outlook for higher U.S. bond yields and a stronger U.S. dollar; the fact that financial markets are forward looking, and timing is impossible; We believe the risk/reward of EM/China plays remains unattractive. In regard to EM ex-China, as we documented in last week's report, domestic demand in the developing economies has not recovered at all, or is mixed at best. DM final demand strength and global manufacturing inventory rebuilding will certainly help Korea and Taiwan, but not other emerging economies. The most important variables for other EM economies including China are domestic demand and/or commodities prices. If commodities prices relapse along with China's credit and fiscal impulse (Chart I-7, bottom panel), EM financial markets will suffer regardless of the growth trends within advanced economies. In fact, strong U.S. growth could lead to higher U.S. interest rate expectations and prop up the U.S. dollar. This will also be a bad omen for EM and commodities. Bottom Line: China's inventory depletion has been due to the large fiscal and credit impulse in the past 12 months - i.e., improving final demand has been instrumental to inventory shedding. Looking forward, the mainland's aggregate credit and fiscal impulse seems to have topped out, raising the odds of a reversal in EM/China plays sooner than later. Industrial Metals Inventories And Prices There is no good data reflecting industrial metals inventories globally. London Metal Exchange and Shanghai Futures Exchange data are likely not indicative of global metals stockpiles. China accounts for close to 50% of global demand for industrial metals, and its demand is critical to prices. Given that the large spike in metals prices in the past several months has coincided with improving Chinese economic data, one would expect the mainland to be the driving force behind the rally. However, Chart I-10 demonstrates that China's imports of industrial metals actually contracted in 2016. This is puzzling, but we have to take it at face value. The top panel of Chart I-11 depicts that traders' net long positions in copper are at a six-year high. This might partially explain the rally in copper in the recent months. Chart I-10China's Import Of Base Metals##br## And Base Metals Prices Chart I-11Traders Are Long ##br##Copper And Oil Clearly, China has been depleting its stock of industrial metals, and is likely primed to increase its imports. Nevertheless, periods of metals re-stocking by the mainland have historically not entailed higher industrial metals prices (Chart I-10). On the contrary, rising Chinese imports of metals have actually coincided with falling prices. One can interpret this relationship as China buying industrial metals when prices are falling. This is consistent with China attempting to buy commodities on dips. As to metals inventories in China, the picture is as follows: Steel inventories have plummeted and are low (Chart I-12). One can safely argue that there will be an inventory re-stocking cycle in China. Nevertheless, it is highly uncertain if this will be bullish for steel prices and steel stocks. In fact, there has been a mild negative correlation between steel prices and inventories; historically, when inventories have risen, prices declined (Chart I-12, top panel). This confirms that inventory levels are a residual of demand and supply, and prices are often driven by final demand - not inventories. This is also corroborated by the bottom panel of Chart I-12, which illustrates that share prices of global steel companies are sometimes negatively correlated with China's steel inventories. Stock prices occasionally sell off when inventories rise, and rally when inventories are shrinking. In contrast to steel and steel products, iron ore inventories have risen, and it seems the re-stocking cycle is well advanced (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China: Steel Inventories And Prices Chart I-13China: Iron Ore Inventories And Prices Yet, again there is no strong correlation between inventories and prices of iron ore (Chart I-13). In our discussions with clients, investors often attribute the rally in industrial metals in general and steel prices in particular over the past 12 months to supply cutbacks in China. While supply reductions have helped in the case of certain metals, it is also evident that the rally in industrial commodities has been driven by rising demand globally and in China. First, China's aggregate credit and fiscal impulse was positive until very recently, implying strengthening demand and thereby higher metals prices. Second, if there were only production cutbacks in steel and other commodities and not demand recovery, the mainland's manufacturing PMI would not have risen (Chart I-14). Finally, steel production has risen both in China and the rest of the world (Chart I-15). Hence, world steel supplies have expanded in the past 12 months. Given this has coincided with rising steel prices, it confirms there has been notable improvement in demand for steel. Chart I-14China: Steel Prices Are Up ##br##Because Of Strong Demand Chart I-15Chinese And Global ##br##Steel Production We are not experts in the ebbs and flows of commodities supplies, but it seems the Chinese government's mandated steel capacity cutbacks have not prevented rising steel output in China. In the meantime, rising prices amid rising production and falling inventories are indicative of robust final demand for many metals. Bottom Line: Industrial metals prices have risen because demand in the real economy and among financial investors has been strong. That said, a rollover in China's fiscal and credit impulse and a strong U.S. dollar will likely create headwinds for industrial metals prices over the course of this year. A Word About Oil Inventories OECD oil product inventories have continued to rise, despite supply cuts (Chart I-16, top panel). At the same time, our proxy for change in China's oil inventories has been very elevated for a while, depicting strategic and/or commercial inventory building on the mainland (Chart I-16, bottom panel). It is true that supply curtailments have been instrumental to the rally in oil prices, but the continued inventory buildup also indicates that supply is still outpacing demand. Besides, traders' net long positions in crude have spiked close to their 2014 highs (Chart I-11, bottom panel). This corroborates that demand for crude, like for copper, has partially been financial rather than from final consumers. Finally, U.S. rig counts have recovered somewhat, which may be indicative of a continued rise in America's oil output (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Oil Inventories Keep On Rising Chart I-17U.S. Rig Counts And Oil Production Bottom Line: While we do not have expertise to follow or forecast oil supply dynamics, we are biased in believing that the risk-reward for oil prices is unattractive because of a strong U.S. dollar and potentially weak EM/China asset prices, which could trigger a reduction in net long positions in crude. Investment Conclusions Complacency reigns in the global financial markets. EM equity volatility has fallen close to its cycle lows, the U.S. VIX is depressed, U.S. equity investor sentiment is very elevated and EM corporate credit spreads have plummeted to a ten-year low (Chart I-18). While the timing of a reversal is impossible, the risk-reward profile of EM financial markets is greatly unattractive. The U.S. trade-weighted dollar has consolidated recently, and might be primed for another upleg. As the U.S. dollar resumes its uptrend, EM risk assets will likely sell off. Finally, EM share prices have failed to outperform the developed bourses much, despite the rally in commodities and amelioration in Chinese growth (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Complacency Reigns Chart I-19EM Equities Have Not Yet Outperformed Remarkably, analysts' net earnings revisions for EM stocks have so far failed to turn positive (Chart I-20). Either analysts' EPS expectations were originally still too high, or companies are failing to deliver profits. Whatever the reason, the implication is that the consensus is more bullish on EM than is suggested by the underlying fundamentals. Within an EM equity portfolio, our overweights remain Taiwan, Korea, India, China, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil and Peru. We are neutral on other bourses. Finally, the EM equity benchmark is at a critical technical resistance level (Chart I-21) but odds do not favor a sustainable breakout. Chart I-20EM EPS Net Revisions Are Still Negative Chart I-21EM Stocks: A Breakout Attempt Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Revisiting China's Fiscal And Credit Impulses", dated April 13, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Trilogy of Special Reports on money/loan creation, savings and investment, titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses" dated October 26, 2016, "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016 and "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

