Money/Credit/Debt
Highlights Maintain a pro-cyclical stance for the time being – overweight equities versus bonds, long commodities, overweight industrial equities, and underweight healthcare equities. But be warned, absent a continued decline in the bond yield and/or oil price, short-term positive impulses on the economy will fade and even turn negative later in the year. Hence in the summer months, look for opportunities to take profits in these pro-cyclical positions. U.K. economy plays can outperform once a cross-party parliamentary majority is found for a course of action that leads to an orderly Brexit (or no Brexit). Feature At the end of last year, we made a bold prediction: economies and financial markets would follow the opposite path in 2019 compared to 2018. Specifically we pointed out that “through most of 2018, global growth was decelerating while inflation was accelerating. Now this configuration is flipping: global growth is rebounding while inflation is set to collapse… 2019 will present investors a mirror-image pattern to 2018” (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekWhy 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Four months on, we are delighted to report that the mirror-image pattern is unfolding exactly as predicted. This year, stock markets are up sharply; bond markets have rallied; metal prices have made double-digit gains, growth-sensitive industrial shares are outperforming; while defensive healthcare shares are underperforming. All of these are the precise opposite of what happened in early 2018 (Chart 1-2 - Chart I-6). Chart I-2Equities: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Chart I-3Bonds: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Chart I-4Commodities: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Chart I-5Cyclicals: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Chart I-6Defensives: 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 Why 2019 Is The Opposite Of 2018 The basis for our bold prediction was twofold. We noted that China’s 6-month credit impulse “had gone vertical” (Chart I-7). Indeed, the rebound from the trough amounted to $500 billion (and still counting), equivalent to a near 1 percent shot in the arm for global GDP. Chart I-7China's 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Gone Vertical We also argued back then that “a racing certainty for early 2019 is that headline inflation will collapse. This is because the plunge in the crude oil price is about to feed through into headline consumer price indexes. Inevitably, it will seep through into core inflation too, via the impact on energy dependent prices such as transport costs.” “Coming at a time that central banks have professed a much greater reliance on incoming data, we can deduce that central banks will find it hard to tighten policy in the face of weaker headline and core inflation prints. Crucially though, the ECB and BoJ were not planning on tightening policy anyway, so the plunge in reported inflation will be much more impactful on the Federal Reserve.” Lo and behold. China’s PMI has rebounded sharply, and the Fed has stopped hiking rates. Still, central banks’ enhanced ‘data-dependency’ carries perils. The high-profile hard data – such as CPI inflation and GDP growth prints – on which monetary policy ‘depends’ is a record of what happened in the past, sometimes the distant past. This year’s market moves are the precise opposite of what happened in early 2018. Hence, enhanced data-dependency means that central banks are now ‘driving by looking through the rear-view mirror’ rather than looking at the current terrain. In turn, monetary policy expectations are driving bond and equity market valuations. By contrast, equity market growth expectations are based on the here and now; they move in synch with economic activity in real-time, leading even the survey-based PMIs. This also solves the puzzle as to why bonds and equities can sometimes give conflicting messages. Last year, the configuration of accelerating inflation with decelerating global growth hit equities and with a lose-lose: heavy pressure on both valuations and growth expectations. Furthermore, when interest rates rise from low levels they undermine the support for elevated risk-asset valuations in a viciously non-linear way. Chart I-8In 2018, Higher Bond Yields Pressured Equity Valuations At low interest rates, bond prices develop the same unattractive negative asymmetry as equities. Therefore, an extended period of ultra-low interest rates removes the need for an equity risk premium, and justifies sharply higher valuations for equities and other risk-assets. But in early 2018, as hawkish central banks pushed up 10-year global bond yield towards 2 percent, this process reversed viciously: bond prices lost their negative asymmetry, re-requiring an equity risk premium and sharply lower valuations for risk-assets at a time that growth expectations were also sliding (Chart I-8).1 By contrast, the early 2019 configuration of dovish central banks and accelerating short-term credit impulses has provided equities a ‘mirror-image’ win-win: a boost to both valuations and to growth expectations. What Happens Next In 2019? Chart I-9Headline Inflation Will Soon Tick Up Understand that the all-important impulses to an economy do not come from the level of the bond yield, oil price, net exports, inventories, and so on. The impulse always comes from the change in these metrics. And as the metrics cannot decline (or rise) incessantly, impulses always fade and then reverse. The oil price has rebounded 30 percent from its recent lows. Necessarily, this means that headline inflation prints will soon stabilise or even tick up (Chart I-9). Furthermore, central banks’ abrupt pivot to dovish has already happened. It would be hard to repeat or continue such a move. As central banks react to the inevitably backward-looking hard data prints, our expectation is that bond yields will stabilise or even tick up. Will equity markets also react positively to the better economic data prints? Not necessarily. To repeat, equity markets’ growth expectations move in synch with economic activity in real-time, leading even the survey-based PMIs. Equity markets never wait for the backward-looking data prints. China plays are tracking its short-term credit impulse which has gone vertical (Chart I-10). Hence, in 2019 to date, U.K. mining stocks are already up 25 percent; the Shenzhen Composite is already up 40 percent! Chart I-10China Plays Have Already Surged Still, the current win-win configuration can continue for a little while longer, given that a typical upswing in short-term credit impulses lasts around eight months. But be warned, absent a continued decline in the bond yield and/or oil price, short-term impulses will fade and even turn negative later in the year. The early 2019 configuration of dovish central banks and accelerating short-term credit impulses has provided equities a win-win. Hence, maintain a pro-cyclical stance for the time being – overweight equities versus bonds, long commodities, overweight industrial equities, and underweight healthcare equities. But our strong advice is: in the summer months, look for opportunities to take profits in all of these positions. When Will Brexit’s Groundhog Day End? We really would prefer not to talk about Brexit. It is not just that every day is Groundhog Day, every day is a shambolic Groundhog Day. Still, on a positive note this means that our investment strategy for Brexit has also remained a constant (Chart I-11). Chart I-11For Investors, Brexit Simplifies To A Binary Outcome It is not sufficient for the U.K. parliament to express what it is against (a no-deal Brexit); parliament must express what course of action it is for, leading to an orderly Brexit, or no Brexit, and that this course of action must also be acceptable to the EU27. At that point, irrespective of the exact course of action – a customs union, Common Market 2.0, or a confirmatory referendum in which ‘remain’ is an option – buy the pound, the FTSE250, and U.K. homebuilder shares. Theresa May’s overture to engage in a national unity strategy with the Labour Party is a step in the right direction. In this regard, Theresa May’s overture to engage in a national unity strategy with the Labour Party is a step in the right direction, because it finally puts national interest above party interest. To be clear, Brexit has been trapped in Groundhog Day because there is insufficient support among Conservative and DUP MPs for a relationship with the EU27 that would: Protect the cross-border supply chains which are vital to so many U.K. businesses. Avoid a hard customs border on the island of Ireland or between Ireland and Britain. Deliver on the narrow 52:48 vote to leave the EU, which was driven by a desire to control migration and the supremacy of the European Court of Justice; rather than a desire to strike independent trade deals, which is irrelevant for a majority of voters. The ray of light is that there is potentially a broader cross-party parliamentary majority for a course of action that would meet the above three conditions. Once it is found, U.K. economy plays can look forward to the “sunlit uplands”. Fractal Trading System* In line with the main body of this report, we continue to see evidence that the recent rally in bonds is technically extended. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to short the 10-year OAT. The profit target is 1.3 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short INR/PKR hit its 3 percent stop-loss and is now closed, leaving five open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance”, October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
While losing the local elections will not upset the balance in parliament, it is a rebuke to Erdogan over his economic policy and a warning to the AKP for the future. Erdogan does not face general elections until 2023. But judging by his response to the first…
Highlights The meaningful improvement in the March manufacturing PMIs (both Caixin and official) all but confirms that a rebound in Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. The odds that investors will look through any near-term economic and/or earnings weakness are directly related to the likely magnitude of the expansion in credit over the coming year, and our research points to the need for the recent pace of credit growth to be sustained in order to stabilize the outlook for earnings. Barring a substantial breakdown in trade talks between China and the U.S., a strong March total social financing release would likely tip the scales in favor of a recommendation to increase Chinese investable stock exposure within a global equity portfolio to overweight. Feature Tables 1 and 2 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, coincident economic activity has sharply converged with our leading indicator for China’s economy, which we highlighted was likely to occur. Looking forward, while we await the March total social financing release later this month for a better sense of the likely magnitude in credit growth over the coming year, the meaningful improvement in the March manufacturing PMIs (both Caixin and official) all but confirms that a rebound in Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary The likely magnitude of the uptrend in credit is important from an investment strategy perspective, as we have highlighted that weak coincident activity raises the risk of a lagged but meaningful further decline in Chinese earnings per share over the coming few months. The odds that investors will look through any near-term economic and/or earnings weakness are directly related to the ultimate size of the expansion in credit, and our research points to the need for the recent pace of credit growth to be sustained in order to stabilize the outlook for earnings. But the bottom line for investors is that we recently placed Chinese investable stocks (i.e. the MSCI China Index) on upgrade watch, and the March PMI is a step in the direction of a recommendation to increase equity allocation to overweight within a global stock portfolio. Investors should closely watch the March total social financing data (due to be released in mid-April); a strong release, barring a substantial breakdown in trade talks between China and the U.S., would likely tip the scales in favor of a move to overweight. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data below: Chart 1 shows that coincident economic activity sharply converged in January and February with our leading indicator for China’s economy, as we had argued many times over the past several months was likely to occur. In our view, most if not all of the previously beneficial tariff front-running effect has probably washed out of the data, implying that future changes in activity measures are now more likely to reflect actual changes in underlying economic circumstances. Chart 1A Convergence That We Predicted The components of our LKI leading indicator continue to point to divergent outcomes for the Chinese economy (Chart 2). Monetary conditions have weakened somewhat over the past few months, but remain quite easy relative to history. The credit components bounced in January but are still weak relative to their history, whereas money growth is extremely weak and has shown no sign of improvement. Barring a major rise in the RMB, a continuation in the recent pace of credit growth would likely be enough to cause our leading indicator to trend higher, particularly if money growth begins to pick up. Chart 2An Uptrend In Credit Growth Will Push Our Leading Indicator Higher We noted in our March 13 Weekly Report that growth in residential floor space started was unsustainably strong,1 and the January/February data update confirmed this view. Growth in starts has decelerated by 10 percentage points from December to February, highlighting that housing construction cannot permanently decouple from sales volume and that a further deceleration is possible unless sales growth (which is currently negative) begins to pick up. The PMI rebound in March registers as one of the most important macro developments since the release of the January total social financing data. Both the Caixin and official manufacturing PMI data came in solidly positive for March, rising relative to their February values and surprising consensus expectations to the upside. Chart 3 highlights that the March Caixin data has pushed the series above its post-2010 median, whereas the official PMI has risen to its 40th percentile from essentially its lowest point in the past decade. In our view, the PMI rebound registers as one of the most important macro developments since the release of the January total social financing data, in that it all but confirms that a rebound in (still depressed) Chinese economic activity is forthcoming. Chart 3A Very Sharp Rebound In Both Manufacturing PMIs Despite having rallied significantly from their low, Chinese stocks (both investable and domestic) remain approximately 20% below their early-2018 high in US$ terms. This is in contrast to global stocks, which are only 7% shy of their 2018 high. If Chinese equities can avoid a major earnings recession, this discrepancy underscores that there is further upside for stock prices in relative terms over the coming 6-12 months. For the A-share market, however, Chart 4 highlights a potential near-term roadblock for continued outperformance versus global stocks. The chart highlights that the relative performance trend is now bumping up against the upper end of a declining trend channel that has been in place for almost 4 years, a bearish pattern that is in stark contrast to that of the investable market. Conversely, a break outside of this channel would warrant attention, as it could signal a secular change in trend for the domestic equity market. Chart 4Is The Four Year Downtrend In A-Share Relative Performance Over? Chart 5 highlights that the strange combination of consumer staples and real estate stocks have been the clear sector winners over the past month, both in the investable and domestic markets. Signs of stabilization in consumer spending explains staples outperformance, but the rally in real estate stocks is more difficult to explain given the weakness in housing fundamentals referenced above. For now, our bias is to believe that real estate stocks are benefitting as a value play, given their deep discount relative to both their respective broad markets and their global peers. Chart 5A Sharp Rebound In Staples And Real Estate Stocks China’s 7-day interbank repo rate has increased somewhat over the past month, raising speculation that the PBOC may soon proceed with a generalized cut to the reserve requirement ratio. In our view, the trend in the 3-month interbank repo rate has been more important over the past few years, as it has closely correlated since late-2016 with average interest rates in the economy and sharp declines in the rate last year preceded the pickup in credit growth observed in January. Still, additional easing from the PBOC could be significant for market participants, as it would likely be greeted positively by investors and could further stoke the belief that Chinese credit growth may overshoot to the upside over the coming 6-12 months. A stronger RMB versus the euro will be welcome news for European exporters. In contrast to a significant improvement in domestic equity prices and investor sentiment, Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads have actually inched higher over the past month. While the rise has been comparatively small (8 basis points), spreads now stand at roughly a third of their 12-month range. A rising trend in onshore corporate bond spreads is not consistent with a slower pace of defaults over the coming 6-12 months, suggesting that at least some headwinds facing the Chinese economy will remain over the coming year if the recent trend in spreads continues. While CNY-USD has been largely flat over the past month, CNY-EUR has continued to rise and is now within striking distance of its 2018 high (Chart 6). This is not likely welcome news for Chinese exporters with close ties to Europe, but it may help provide a much-needed trade boost to the European economy over the coming year, whose manufacturing PMI has recently fallen to a six-year low. Chart 6A Stronger CNY-EUR Cross Will Help Boost Chinese Imports From Europe Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China Macro And Market Review”, dated March 13, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights The odds of a continued earnings contraction have not yet fallen to the point that would warrant an overweight stance towards Chinese versus global stocks over the coming 6-12 months. While we maintain Chinese stocks on upgrade watch and may recommend increasing exposure soon, the bottom line for investors is that it is still too early for us to confidently project a sustained uptrend. While most investors attribute the chronic discount of Chinese stocks relative to the global average as being due to a sizeable equity risk premium, our analysis suggests that China’s low payout ratio and mediocre earnings growth are the true causes. This implies that China’s re-rating potential is capped barring a major structural improvement in earnings growth. Investors should pay close attention to the details of a U.S./China currency stability pact that will reportedly be included in any trade deal between the two countries. Such a pact may set up an important natural experiment for CNY/USD, and could be a revelatory event for China’s exchange rate regime. Feature Last week’s FOMC meeting dominated the headlines of the financial press, and for good reason. The Fed surprised investors with a material downgrade to their expected path of the federal funds rate over the next three years, a shift that largely reflected concerns about global growth. The subsequent inversion of the U.S. 10-year / 3-month yield curve in response to the very disappointing euro area flash manufacturing PMI for March confirms that many investors remain convinced that Fed policy is too tight and that easing is likely over the coming year.1 On the positive side, investor concerns that reflationary policy is needed in the U.S. and euro area are likely overblown: the plunge in the euro area PMI at least in part reflects the near-term uncertainty over the possibility of a hard Brexit (which will probably be avoided), whereas the Fed is pausing at a level of real interest rates that is well below real GDP growth, which means that monetary policy is still stimulative for the U.S. economy (Chart 1). Chart 1U.S. Monetary Policy Is Still Stimulative But Chart 2 highlights that a generalized slowdown in global growth is responsible for at least part of the sharp weakness in Chinese export growth over the past few months, which we had been mostly attributing to a catch-up phase following a (perversely and ironically) beneficial tariff front-running effect that had temporarily boosted trade growth last year. Chart 2Global Weakness At Least Partly Responsible For A Sharp Export Slowdown Ongoing weakness in the global economy, were it to persist, would imply that China’s external demand outlook is even less encouraging than we had previously assumed. This would raise the stakes for a trade deal with the U.S. to be agreed upon soon, as well as a continued uptrend in the pace of Chinese credit growth. Investors should closely watch the new export orders component of the March NBS manufacturing PMI later this week for signs that exporter sentiment is improving, as well as the overall Caixin PMI to confirm that smaller firms continue to benefit from the PBOC’s targeted easing efforts. When Should Investors Upgrade Chinese Stocks On A Cyclical Basis? In our view, most global investors have been focused on the wrong risk factor for Chinese stocks for the better part of the past year. In the wake of the near-vertical February rise in Chinese domestic stocks, the most common question we have received from clients is whether they should be increasing their cyclical exposure to Chinese stocks in general, and A-shares in particular. In response to the January surge in credit we placed Chinese stocks on upgrade watch in our February 27 Weekly Report,2 but we are not yet ready to recommend an outright cyclical overweight. Investors should be at the ready and aiming, but should not yet fire. In our view, most global investors have been focused on the wrong risk factor for Chinese stocks for the better part of the past year. We have noted in several previous reports that investors have focused nearly exclusively on the U.S.-China trade war since the beginning of 2018, and have largely ignored a slowing domestic economy (Chart 3). Given this, it is not surprising that a sharp improvement in the odds of a deal (which occurred at the beginning of November) has led to a material rally over the past few months versus global stocks. Chart 3The Prospect Of A Trade Deal Has Been The Primary Driver Of China-Related Assets In fact, we predicted in our December 5 Weekly Report that positive sentiment about a deal would boost the relative performance of Chinese stocks over the coming few months, and recommended a tactical overweight stance at that time.3 A cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) overweight, however, is a different story. Sentiment alone rarely drives financial markets over a 1-year time horizon, meaning that investors need to have some degree of confidence that domestic demand will meaningfully improve over the next 12 months to justify a cyclical upgrade. Certainly, we acknowledge that there have been several positive developments pointing to such an outcome. Chinese monetary conditions have become extremely easy, credit is no longer contracting and surged in January, the Caixin PMI rose notably in February, and some form of a trade deal remains the most likely outcome of the ongoing talks. In addition, Chinese stocks still remain significantly below their 2018 peak (Chart 4), meaning that there is still material potential upside if Chinese earnings do not contract. Chart 4Chinese Stocks Still Have Room To Rise If The Earnings Outlook Stabilizes A moderate credit expansion appears to be underway, but coincident activity continues to weaken and earnings appear to have more downside. However, there are also several reasons to be cautious cyclically: Chart 5The Past Three Months Imply A Moderate Credit Uptrend Chart 6Chinese Coincident Economic Activity Continues To Weaken Chinese and U.S. policymakers have not only failed to set a date for an agreement to be signed by President’s Xi and Trump, but recent new reports suggest that momentum may be slowing and that a meeting may be postponed until June or later.4 Even if the deal does not fall through, material further delays could cause investors to get anxious and vote with their feet. Such a selloff could be violent, given the extremely sharp rise in domestic stock prices over the past six weeks. The evidence so far points to a moderate expansion in credit (Chart 5), reflecting the fact that policymakers are still somewhat concerned about financial stability and the need to prevent significant further leveraging of the private sector. This means that the odds are not yet in favor of a credit “overshoot” like what occurred in 2015/2016, implying that the pickup in growth is likely to be comparatively weaker this time around. Since 2010, monetary conditions and money & credit growth appear to be the best predictors of investment-relevant Chinese economic activity.5 While a moderate credit expansion appears to be underway, there has been no discernable pickup in money growth.6 This discrepancy likely means that the recent improvement in credit has occurred due to non-bank financial institutions, further suggesting that this economic recovery will probably be less powerful and less broad-based than during past cycles. While a moderate expansion in credit does suggest that China’s economy will bottom at some point in the coming months, coincident economic activity continues to decelerate (Chart 6). A continuation of this trend, particularly if coupled with an investor “crisis of faith” in the trade talks, could lead to a very significant retracement in Chinese equity prices before durably bottoming for the year. Trailing EPS growth is decelerating, but it has yet to contract on a year-over-year basis as would be implied by the net earnings revisions ratio (Chart 7) and the coincident activity indicators shown in Chart 6. Chinese investable EPS fell 30% during the 2015/2016 episode (20% for domestic stocks), implying meaningful further downside even if economic activity does not weaken as significantly over the coming months. Chart 7Net Earnings Revisions Point To More Downside For Earnings Chart 8 presents a helpful way for investors to make a net assessment of all of the factors highlighted above. The chart shows our earnings recession model for the MSCI China Index, and shows what is likely to occur if a trade deal causes a full recovery in Chinese exporter sentiment, China’s export-weighted RMB stays roughly at current levels, and the very recent pace of credit growth (Dec-Feb) continues along its trend. Chart 8A Trade Deal And A Moderate Credit Expansion Will Likely Stabilize The Earnings Outlook This scenario, were it to occur, would reduce the odds of a continued earnings contraction to the point that we would be comfortable recommending an overweight stance towards Chinese versus global stocks over the coming 6-12 months. While such a recommendation could come as soon as mid-April, the bottom line for investors is that it is still too early for us to confidently project this outcome. Should Chinese Stocks Be Priced At A Premium Or A Discount To Global Stocks? Most investors attribute the discount applied to Chinese stocks to a high equity risk premium (ERP), but our work paints a different picture. Besides questions about the appropriate cyclical allocation to Chinese stocks, the recent spike in interest among global investors towards A-shares has also led to a renewed focus about the degree to which Chinese stocks are cheap versus the global average. In a world where many financial assets are chronically expensive and Chinese policymakers appear to be responding to weaker economic activity, some investors question whether Chinese stocks deserve to be priced at a discount (Chart 9). Our sense is that most investors attribute the discount to a high equity risk premium (ERP) stemming from the enormous rise in Chinese non-financial corporate debt over the past decade, but our research paints a different picture. Chart 9The Chinese Equity Discount: A High ERP, Or Something More Sinister? One way of analyzing the risk premium of an equity market is to use the well-known constant Gordon growth model. Equation 1 below presents the theoretically justified 12-month trailing P/E ratio as a function of the payout ratio, the risk-free rate, the ERP, and the long-term dividend growth rate (which is equal to the long-term earnings growth rate given a constant payout ratio). Equations 2 and 3 re-arrange equation 1 to express the ERP and long-term growth rate, respectively, on the left-hand side of the equation. Equation 1: P0/E0 = (D1/E0)/(rf + ERP – g) Equation 2: ERP = [(D1/E0)/(P0/E0)] + g - rf Equation 3: g = rf + ERP-[(D1/E0)/(P0/E0)] To illustrate the approach, Chart 10 applies equation 2 to the U.S. equity market and compares it with the annual dividend discount model equity risk premium published by Professor Aswath Damodaran from New York University’s Stern School of Business,7 a well-known expert in the theory and practice of asset valuation. While there are some differences in the level of the series owing to slightly different methodologies, the overall profile of the two series is generally similar. Chart 10Our DDM Methodology For The U.S. Generates Results Similar To Other Important Estimates Proxying the market’s long-term growth expectations in a large, mature economy such as the U.S. is materially easier than is the case in an emerging market such as China. As such, instead of solving for the equity risk premium directly when judging whether China’s discount is “deserved”, we use equation 3 to solve for the implied long-term growth rate given an assumed (and very conservative) ERP range of 2-3%, using the global P/E ratio. In other words, we ask the following question: what kind of earnings growth do Chinese stocks need to achieve over the long run in order to justify the same earnings multiple as the global average, given an equity risk premium of 2-3%? Chart 11 presents the answer to this question, for both the domestic and the investable market. We use domestic 10-year bond yields as the risk-free rate in the case of the A-share market, and U.S. 10-year bond yields in the case of the MSCI China index as a proxy for the global risk-free rate. Finally, in each panel, the dashed horizontal lines denote the actual compound annual growth rate in earnings per share for each market, since the year noted next to each line. Chart 11A Low But Still Difficult L/T Earnings Hurdle Rate To Be Priced In Line With Global Stocks Two important points are apparent from the chart: The required growth rate for both markets to be priced in line with global stocks are quite low, well below Chinese nominal GDP growth. At first blush, this might suggest that the valuation discount applied to China reflects a sizeable equity risk premium that could shrink over the coming 6-12 months (i.e. a beneficial re-rating of Chinese stocks). Since 2010 or 2011, actual growth rates in EPS are materially above the required growth range in both markets. However, over more recent time horizons, particularly 2013 and later, actual earnings growth has not only been below the range but has also been extremely poor in absolute terms. This is particularly true for the investable market, which has actually recorded negative growth in 12-month trailing EPS since 2014 or 2015. A dividend discount model approach suggests that the Chinese equity market discount is justified, barring a major structural improvement in earnings growth. Chart 12 highlights the problem with China’s stock market in a nutshell. For both the investable and domestic equity markets, the dividend payout ratio is well below the global average. This is a normal circumstance for small companies with high growth potential; firms re-invest a high portion of their earnings back into the company in order to build out their asset base and deliver even higher earnings in the future. Chart 12The Chinese Discount Visualized: A Low Payout Ratio, And Mediocre Earnings Growth But panel 2 of Chart 12 shows that relative earnings for Chinese stocks versus the global average have not trended higher over the past decade, meaning that a higher earnings retention ratio among Chinese stocks has not led to a superior earnings profile. In response, global investors have rightly discounted Chinese stocks versus their global peers, a circumstance that is likely to continue unless Chinese earnings growth materially and sustainably improves. Our analysis implies that there is a natural limit to how far Chinese equities can ultimately be re-rated barring a major structural improvement in the economy, a factor that we may eventually have to contend with were we to recommend a cyclical overweight stance. Capped re-rating potential is unlikely to prevent Chinese stocks from trending higher in relative terms if economic fundamentals warrant an uptrend, but it may suggest that the duration or magnitude of the rise may be shorter than many investors hope. A Sino-U.S. Trade Deal: A Natural Currency Experiment In The Making? What explains the link between CNY-USD and the interest rate differential between the two countries? Finally, a brief note on the RMB. Since June 2018, changes in CNY-USD appear to have been closely aligned with the magnitude of proposed tariffs as a share of Chinese exports to the U.S., as would be implied in a simple open economy model with flexible exchange rates. Chart 13shows the levels implied by this framework in a variety of tariff scenarios, calculated based on the percent decline from the peak in the exchange rate in 1H 2018. As noted in our March 13 Weekly Report,8 CNY-USD today is consistent with the current tariff regime, implying potential upside if a trade deal with the U.S. rolls back some of the tariffs that have been imposed. Chart 13A Simple Equilibrium Framework Suggests CNY-USD May Rise Materially Further If Tariffs Are Rolled Back However, Chart 14 shows that CNY-USD has been closely correlated with the interest rate differential between the two countries for several years, with the relationship having recently become a leading one. Chart 14 highlights that CNY-USD has moved higher than the rate differential would imply (painting the opposite picture as that shown in Chart 13), suggesting that the currency is more likely to depreciate than appreciate over the coming 6-12 months barring tighter monetary policy in China or outright rate cuts in the U.S. Chart 14Will Policymakers Or Rate Differentials Drive CNY-USD Over The Coming Year? The relationship shown in Chart 14 is surprising, and we have struggled to understand the exact dynamics at play. As we highlighted in a September report,9 many global investors take the relationship for granted, given the strong historical link between interest rate differentials and exchange rates in developed countries. However, a major problem that arises in explaining Chart 14 is the fact that uncovered interest rate arbitrage (or the “carry trade”) cannot easily occur or cannot occur at all when one or both countries involved maintains capital controls. It is an important conundrum, and one that we have not been able to solve. From our perspective, there are only two scenarios that explain the close relationship between the exchange rate and interest rate differentials between the two countries: The relationship is causal, implying that capital flows in and out of the country are sufficiently large to enable a carry trade. The two series are correlated because of a third factor related in some way to the other two. In our view, scenario 1 is not likely. Capital is flowing out of China, but at a much slower rate than before,10 and the relationship shown in Chart 14 did not break down following China’s capital crackdown in 2015/2016. Ruling out scenario 1 necessarily implies that scenario 2 is correct. Our best guess concerning the missing third factor is that Chinese policymakers are looking to the rate differential as a guide to set the exchange rate, in order to mimic a market-based exchange rate in support of China’s goals to progressively liberalize (and internationalize) the currency. If true, this implies that China has full control of their exchange rate regardless of the prevailing interest rate differential, but that they are often choosing to follow what the differential implies. This is significant, because if Chinese and U.S. negotiators do agree to a “yuan stability pact” as has been reported in the press, a trade deal may set up an important natural experiment for the currency. In our view, a major upward move in the rate differential is unlikely over the coming year, implying that CNY-USD will persistently deviate from the relationship shown in Chart 14 if President Trump is not inclined to tolerate any real weakness in the RMB over the coming year. While the details of the currency agreement and the trade agreement more generally could allow for some decline in CNY-USD if coupled with an offsetting benefit for the U.S. (such as materially higher U.S. exports to China for some period), our bias is to believe that President Trump does not want to see a stronger dollar over the coming year in the lead-up to the 2020 election. If true, investors should pay close attention to the behavior of CNY-USD, as it is stands to be a revelatory event for China’s exchange rate regime. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Reports “The New Battleground For Monetary Policy” and “Forward Guidance On Steroids”, dated March 26, 2019, for a detailed update on our view for Fed rate hikes and how investors should interpret the recent inversion in the yield curve. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Dealing With A (Largely) False Narrative”, dated February 27, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “2019 Key Views: Four Themes For China In The Coming Year”, dated December 5, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see “Some U.S. Officials Said To See China Walking Back Trade Pledges”, Bloomberg News, dated March 19, 2019, and “Donald Trump-Xi Jinping meeting to end US-China trade war may be pushed back to June, sources say”, South China Morning Post. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China’s Business Cycle”, dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “EM: A Sustainable Rally Or A False Start?”, dated March 7, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Professor Damodoran’s website for more information on his estimates of the equity risk premium. 8 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China Macro And Market Review”, dated March 13, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Moderate Releveraging And Currency Stability: An Impossible Dream?”, dated September 5, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows”, dated March 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
The chart above presents our China Investment Strategy team’s quarterly balance of payments-based capital flow measure (adjusted for cross-border capital flow) with our newly calculated monthly proxy. Divergences between the series exist in level terms, but…
We continue to expect copper prices to increase in the near term, as China’s credit cycle bottoms and DM central banks soften their monetary-policy stance. Fiscal and monetary stimulus in China also will be supportive of base metals prices going forward. The evolution of the Sino - U.S. trade negotiations remains a risk to our view, given how important the outcome of these talks will be for investors’ expectations and sentiment. Markets appear to be discounting a positive outcome. Anything that scuppers these talks – or results in a no-deal outcome – will be a negative for base metals, copper in particular. Our tactical long copper position is up by 1.2% since we initiated it last week. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Russian oil companies are expected to keep production lower until July, when the current OPEC 2.0 production-cutting agreement now in place expires. We expect the deal will be extended to year-end.1 Separately, the risk of a complete shutdown in Venezuela’s oil industry rose significantly, as a power failure in most of the country all but eliminated potable water supplies and significantly reduced oil exports. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. High-grade iron-ore prices got a boost this week as Vale was ordered to temporarily suspend exports from its primary port at Guaiba Island terminal in Rio de Janeiro state, according to Metal Bulletin’s Fastmarkets.2 The price-reporting agency’s 62% Fe Iron Ore Index rose $1.46/MT at $85.25/MT Tuesday. Precious Metals: Neutral. Spot gold is back above $1,300/oz, on the back of monetary policy easing among important central banks. This also is supporting base metals globally (see below). Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grain markets continue to drift sideways, awaiting definitive news re Sino - U.S. trade talks, specifically when presidents Xi and Trump will meet to finalize a deal (see below). Separately, wheat and corn inventories are expected to rise on the back of higher supplies and lower exports, the USDA forecast in its latest world supply-demand estimates. Feature Recent data releases confirm our view that global growth will remain weak in 1Q19 and early 2Q19. This will continue to put downward pressure on cyclical commodities – chiefly base metals and oil (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekGlobal Growth Slows In 1Q19 The persistence of the slowdown provoked major central banks to adopt a dovish stance in the short-term. This is easily seen in the recent actions by the U.S. Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Canada (BoC) and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), all of which have communicated a pause in their rate normalization policies.3 At the moment, the frail global growth is partly balanced by expectations of a positive outcome re the ongoing Sino - U.S. trade negotiations (Chart 2). In the coming months, we expect the effect of accommodative DM monetary policy combined with an expansion in China’s credit (more on this below) and fiscal stimulus – i.e., tax cuts announced earlier this month amounting to almost $300 billion (~ 2 trillion RMB) meant to support policymakers’ GDP growth targets – will go a long way toward reversing the earlier contraction. The effect of these policy decisions will be apparent in 2H19. Chart 2China Growth To Hook Higher China’s Credit Cycle Bottomed In December 2018 The evolution of China’s credit cycle remains a central pillar to our view commodity demand growth in 2H19 will surpass consensus expectations. The massive growth reported in China’s January credit statistics revived investors’ expectations that China’s banks will re-open the credit valves as they did in 2016.4 In our view, this number does signal a bottom in China’s credit cycle, and implies Chinese – and indirectly EM – growth will bottom sometime this year. However, we still are not expecting a complete blowout credit expansion this year. We continue to believe Chinese policymakers will focus on stabilizing credit in 1H19 with moderate increases in supply, and start increasing stimulus in 2H19 or 2020 in order to maximize its effect later in 2020 ahead of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2021. The soft February credit number released this week supports this argument.5 China’s Credit Cycle Matters For Base Metals Demand The relationship between China’s credit cycles and base metal prices endures and remains robust. We measure China’s aggregate credit using bank and non-bank claims on non-financial enterprises, households, local and central governments, and non-bank financial institutions. This corresponds to adding outstanding central and local government bonds to China’s Total Social Financing (TSF).6 The annual change in aggregate credit – or its impulses – do not perfectly capture the cycles in global base metal demand. These variables provide interesting signals about the direction and magnitude of movements in credit, however, they do not track base metals’ price cycles accurately and consistently (Chart 3). Chart 3Metals Price Cycles Don't Track Changed In China's Credit To decompose this variable into its trend and cycle, we use a proxy of the credit cycle constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott and Hamilton filters, and the standardized 12-month credit impulse (Chart 4).7 Chart 4China's Credit Cycle Proxy We find that our credit cycle proxy Granger causes base metal prices, import volume and industrial activity (Table 1).8 On average, it leads these variables by 4-6 months (Chart 5). Hence, we believe our credit cycle proxy provides valuable information about future commodity demand in China. Table 1China Credit Cycle Correlations In fact, when regressing copper prices and the LMEX against it, we found that 60% and 58% of the variation in copper prices and the LMEX, can be explained by the linear relationship with our China credit cycle proxy, respectively (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Credit Cycle and Metals Prices Given the leading property of China’s credit cycles with respect to industrial activity and metal prices, we included this new proxy in our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index.9 This improves the correlation of our index with copper prices (Chart 7). Chart 7Credit Cycle Improves BCA's GIA Currently, our models suggest copper prices should increase in the coming months as China’s credit cycle bottoms and DM central banks soften their monetary policy stance. The evolution of the China-U.S. trade negotiations remains a risk to our view as the outcome will weigh on investors’ expectations and sentiment. China’s Vs. DMs’ Credit Cycles Between 2009 and 2014, China’s credit cycle lagged the U.S. and EU’s broad money cycles (Chart 8). This counter-cyclicality is partly explained by its elevated level of exports to the U.S. and of hard goods to Europe. When the global economic cycle works in China’s favor – i.e., when the Fed and ECB are accommodative or fiscal stimulus is deployed in either or both regions – China’s exports rise as U.S. and EU aggregate demand increases. This typically reduces the need for endogenous fiscal or monetary stimulus within China. Chart 8China's Credit Cycle Lags U.S., EU Money Cycles On the other hand, when the global economic cycle contracts and fiscal and monetary policy ex China becomes a headwind, Chinese policymakers typically need to deploy fiscal and monetary policy to keep growth going, or at least avoid a contraction in their economy. Between 2016 and 2017, DM and China credit cycles aligned and increased simultaneously. Taking into account the 4-to-6-month lag between the time credit supply is increased and commodity demand rises, this created bullish conditions for metals and oil from 2H16 to 1H18, pushing copper prices up by 60%. In 2018, both regions’ cycles rolled over. Base metals markets currently are experiencing the consequences of this contraction in credit availability and tightening of financial conditions generally. Going forward, we expect China will step in to raise domestic demand and offset the impact of the decline in credit availability elsewhere, which is affecting demand for its exports in the short-term. In the medium-term, the U.S. and EU, along with India, do not appear to be inclined to absorb Chinese exports to the extent they did in the past, which means the pivot to domestically generated growth through consumer- and services-led demand is the most viable alternative Chinese policymakers have to keep growth on target. Bottom Line: The dovish turn of major DM central banks combined with a bottoming of China’s credit cycle will support cyclical commodities at the margin in the coming months. During the second half of this year, we expect a more significant pick up in China’s credit, setting the stage for a year-end rally in base metal prices. As a consequence, the impact of China’s credit growth on base metals demand could diminish compared to previous stimulus targeting industrial demand. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Russia’s oil companies ready to cut output until July: TASS,” published by reuters.com March 12, 2019. 2 Please see Fastmarkets MB’s Daily Steel, March 12, 2019. 3 Please see “Pervasive Uncertainty, Persuasive Central Banks,” published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy March 12, 2019. It is available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see “China Macro And Market Review,” published by BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy March 13, 2019. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 See footnote 4 above. 6 For more details please see “EM: A Sustainable Rally Or A False Start?” published by BCA Research’s Emerging Market Strategy March 7, 2019. It is available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 Hamilton notes the HP filter can be problematic. In general, we agree with critics of the filter (i.e. it results in spurious dynamics that are unrelated with the true data-generating process, it has an end-point bias which affects its real-time properties, and it is highly dependent on the parameter selection). However, there are some arguments in support of using the HP filter to proxy the credit cycle. First, as long as there are no clear theoretical foundation for an accurate measurement of the credit cycle, empirical validation should remain the number one criteria by which one selects its proxy. Second, credit cycles vary in duration and this weakens the ability to construct a reliable proxy. The usual parameter used with the HP filter favors short-term cycles (i.e. ~ 2 years) while the Hamilton filter focuses on medium-term cycles (i.e. ~ 5 years). Therefore, both can convey useful information. Third, China’s aggregate credit variable in level has a quasi-linear trend and is roughly approximated by a trend-stationary process with breaks in the trend and constant. Such a process should converge in limit when decomposed using the HP filter. Please see James D. Hamilton (2018), “Why You Should Never Use the Hodrick-Prescott Filter,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 100(5), pages 831-843. and Phillips, Peter C. B. and Jin, Sainan (2015), “Business Cycles, Trend Elimination, and the HP filter,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2005. 8 Granger causality refers to a statistical technique developed by Clive Granger, the 2003 Nobel Laureate in Economics, which is used to determine whether one variable can be said to have caused (or predicted) another variable, given the past performance of each. Using standard econometric techniques, Granger showed one variable can be shown to have “caused” another, and that two-way causality also can be demonstrated (i.e., a feedback loop between the variables can exist based on the historical performance of each). 9 Please see “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy February 14, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades
Highlights Analysis on Indonesia is available below. EM financial markets have diverged from the global growth indicators they have historically correlated with. This raises doubts about the sustainability of this rally. In China, broad bank credit has not accelerated at all, while non-bank credit growth rose sharply in January. The lack of recovery in broad bank credit growth is corroborated by lingering sluggishness in broad money growth. This refutes widespread perception in the global investment community that Chinese banks have re-opened the credit spigots again. Feature The headline news has all been positive for emerging markets over the past two months: The Federal Reserve is going on hold, China is stimulating its economy, the U.S. and China are nearing a trade agreement and risk-on market dynamics are permeating worldwide. Nevertheless, EM stocks have failed to outperform the global equity benchmark (Chart I-1, top panel). Notably, EM relative equity performance rolled over in late December when global share prices bottomed. Chart I-1EM Stocks Have Underperformed DM Ones Since Late December In absolute terms, EM equities have been attempting to break above their 200-day moving average, but have so far failed to do so decisively (Chart I-1, bottom panel). When a market struggles to break out or outperform amid favorable news flows and buoyant investor sentiment, the odds are that it is facing formidable headwinds under the surface, and is at risk of relapsing. We sense EM currently fits this profile. Needless to say, investor consensus is very bullish on EM, and dominated by the above-mentioned narrative, specifically the Fed turning dovish and China stimulating, which is reminiscent of 2016 when EM staged a cyclical rally. Consequently, investors have rushed to pile into EM stocks and fixed-income. Chart I-2 illustrates that asset managers’ net holdings of EM ETF (EEM) futures have doubled since October 2018. Chart I-2Investor Consensus Is Very Bullish On EM As of mid-February, EMs were by far the most overweight region within global equity portfolios, according to the most recent Bank of America/Merrill Lynch survey. The survey states that net 37% of global equity investors - who participated in the survey - were overweight EM. One of our clients that we met with on the road last week summed it up like this: “Investors have ‘recency bias’.” In other words, investors believe that 2019 will resemble 2016, and in turn have no appetite to bet against Chinese stimulus. We are in accord with this interpretation of investor behavior and the EM/China rally. Yet there are some noteworthy differences between today and 2016. First, in 2016, there was massive stimulus for China’s property market. At the time, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) monetized the unsold housing stock in Tier-3 and -4 cities via its Pledged Supplementary Lending facility. At present, there is no stimulus for real estate. Second, by early 2016 EM profits had already contracted substantially. EM profits have yet to shrink in the current downtrend. Our thesis is that EM profits will contract this year for reasons we elaborated on in depth in our previous report, Mind The Time Gap. China’s credit and fiscal impulse leads EM/Chinese profits by about 12 months, and the recent improvement in this indicator, if sustained, suggests that a trough in EM/Chinese corporate earnings will only be reached in late 2019 (Chart I-3). Therefore, as EM profits shrink, investors will likely sell EM risk assets. Chart I-3EM Corporate Earnings Are Beginning To Contract Altogether, these differences with 2016 make us reluctant to chase the current EM rally, and we continue to expect a meaningful reversal in EM risk assets in the months ahead. Monitoring Global Growth We maintain that EM is much more leveraged to global trade and China’s growth than to Fed policy. For a detailed discussion on this matter, please refer to EM: A Replay of 2016 or 2001? report from February 7, 2019. Therefore, the Fed’s dovish turn is not a sufficient reason to buy EM risk assets. To buy EM cyclically, we would need to change our outlook on global trade and Chinese imports. China influences the rest of the world via its imports. A closer look at the indicators that correlate with EM risk assets and commodities do not justify the recent EM rebound. In particular: The import sub-component of China’s NBS manufacturing PMI strongly correlates with EM share prices, excess returns in EM sovereign credit, and industrial metals prices and suggest that investors should fade this rebound (Chart I-4). Chart I-4EM Stocks, EM Credit Markets, As Well As Commodities Prices Are Driven By Chinese Imports The Caixin manufacturing PMI for China was up in February, but the NBS manufacturing PMI fell. In turn, manufacturing PMI indexes in Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Singapore are all plunging, with several of them dropping well below the 50 boom-bust mark (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Asian Manufacturing Is Contracting Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese and Singaporean shipments to China were shrinking in January, while their exports to the U.S. were resilient (Chart I-6). This confirms that global trade has been weak due to China, and that there are no signs of its reversal. Chart I-6Asian Exports To China And U.S. Moreover, Korea released its February export data, and its aggregate outbound shipments are contracting (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Korean Exports: Deepening Contraction Further, China’s container freight index – the price to ship containers – has rolled over again after picking-up late last year due to front-loading of shipments to the U.S. which were induced by the U.S. import tariffs. This signals ongoing weakness in global demand, and does not justify the latest rebound in EM financial markets in general and currencies in particular (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Global Trade Is A Risk To EM Currencies Finally, even in the U.S. where manufacturing has been the most resilient globally, the odds point to notable weakness in this sector. Specifically, the continuous underperformance of U.S. high-beta industrial stocks to U.S. overall industrials beckons a further slowdown in American manufacturing (Chart I-9). Chart I-9U.S. Manufacturing Is In A Soft Spot Bottom Line: Although financial markets are forward-looking, the recent rally has been too fast and has already gone too far. This has created conditions for a material setback as global/China growth will continue to disappoint in the months ahead. China: Credit Versus Money Growth We have been receiving questions from clients as to whether investors should heed to the message from China’s money or credit data, given they are presently sending contradictory messages (Chart I-10). Chart I-10China: Narrow, Broad Money, And Aggregate Credit Even though narrow money (M1) has historically been an excellent indicator for China/EM business cycles, the most recent (January) print – M1 annual growth rate registered a record low – was distorted due to technical/seasonal factors, and should be ignored. Specifically, deposits by enterprises plunged in January and household deposits surged as companies paid out bonuses to employees in late January ahead of the Chinese New Year that began on February 5 (Chart I-11). Provided enterprise demand deposits are in M1 but household demand deposits are a part of M2, M1 was artificially depressed in January. It will rebound in February. Chart I-11China: Technical Reasons For M1 Plunge In January Broad money provides a more comprehensive picture of money creation in China. As such, it is more relevant to compare broad money with aggregate credit. To compute aggregate credit, we add outstanding central and local government bonds to Total Social Financing (TSF). Chart I-12 illustrates the latest improvement in aggregate credit is not confirmed by either the PBoC’s broad money measure, M2, or our measure, M3 (M3 = M2 plus other deposits plus banks’ other liabilities excluding bonds). We created this M3 measure of broad money supply because in our opinion, M2 has been underestimating the extent of money creation in China in recent years due to financial engineering. Chart I-12The Recent Uptick In Aggregate Credit Is Not Confirmed By Broad Money As discussed in Box I-1 on pages 12-13, lending or purchasing of securities by banks simultaneously creates money. Therefore, bank broad credit acceleration should be mirrored in a broad money upturn. Does the lack of revival in broad money mean the latest uptick in aggregate credit data has been driven by non-bank credit? Our analysis suggests yes – non-bank credit is responsible for the strong rise in the aggregate credit numbers in January. We deconstructed aggregate credit into broad bank credit and non-bank credit (Diagram I-1). Chart I-13 illustrates that broad bank credit has not accelerated at all, while non-bank credit growth rose in January. Chart I-13China: Recent Credit Acceleration Is Due To Non-Bank Credit The lack of recovery in broad bank credit growth is corroborated by lingering sluggishness in broad money (both M2 and M3) growth (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Broad Bank Credit Is Consistent With Broad Money (As It Should Be) Consequently, this refutes the widespread perception in the global investment community that Chinese banks have re-opened the credit spigots. Chart I-15demonstrates the annual growth rate of each component of broad bank credit. While mainland banks’ loan growth to enterprises has accelerated, their lending to non-bank financial institutions has continued to shrink. Chart I-15Broad Bank Credit And Its Components In sum, broad bank credit and broad money have not revived, and their impulses are rolling over, having failed to break above zero (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The improvement in aggregate credit growth in January was due to credit provided/bonds purchased by non-banks rather than by banks. This does not tell us whether the credit growth acceleration is sustainable. For a more detailed discussion on the differences between money and credit, please refer to Box I-1 on page 12-13. Investors prefer simple narratives, and have readily embraced the story that China has opened up the credit faucets. Broad bank credit data and broad money supply data do not corroborate this thesis. It may change in the months ahead, but our point is that for the moment there is not yet a simple narrative about China’s credit cycle. Investment Implications Even though China’s aggregate credit impulse ticked up in January, the 2011-‘12 and 2015-‘16 episodes signify that its bottoming can last many months. Critically, EM financial markets have historically lagged turning points in the aggregate credit impulse. These time lags have been anywhere between three to 18 months over the past 10 years. Furthermore, in 2012 there was only a minor rebound in EM share prices – not a cyclical rally – in response to the significant rise in China’s aggregate credit impulse (Chart I-16, top panel). Chart I-16Beware Of The Time Lag Hence, even if January marked the bottom in the aggregate credit impulse – which is plausible in our opinion – EM risk assets will remain at risk based on historical time lags between the aggregate credit impulse and China-related financial markets.1 BOX 1 Why And When Money Supply Differs From Credit The following elaborates on the key differences between broad money supply and aggregate credit. 1. Why and when do broad money and credit diverge? When commercial banks provide loans to or buy bonds (or any other asset) from non-banks, they simultaneously create new money supply/deposits. Broad money supply is the sum of all deposits in the banking system, which is why we use the terms money and deposits interchangeably. When non-bank financial institutions – in China's case financial trust and investment corporations, financial leasing companies, auto-financing companies and loan companies – as well as enterprises and households make loans or buy bonds, they do not create money. Hence, money supply/deposits is mostly equal to net cumulative broad bank credit creation. The difference between aggregate credit and money supply is due to lending activities of non-bank entities (see Diagram I-1 on page 9). Lending, purchasing of bonds, or any other forms of financing by non-bank entities does not change money supply. Thus, aggregate credit is more relevant than money supply to forecast business cycle fluctuations. Apart from the fact that banks still play a very large role in aggregate financing in China, there are a few other reasons why one should not ignore broad money and rely solely on aggregate credit: Banks can extend credit, but might choose not to classify it as loans on their balance sheet for regulatory reasons. Chinese banks did this in the past by booking loans as non-standard credit assets. In any case, when a bank lends to a non-bank it creates new deposits/money, and it is hard to conceal deposits/liabilities. In these cases, broad money supply gives a better signal about the true extent of credit growth than statistics on loans. If under regulatory pressures banks reclassify their non-standard credit assets as loans, the amount of loans will expand, even though no new lending occurs. Yet, money supply/deposits will not change. In this case, loan numbers will give a false signal and money supply will be a better indicator for new credit origination by banks and, thereby, for economic activity. The true measure of Chinese bank loans and credit data were probably disguised over the past several years because banks and non-bank financial institutions were involved in financial engineering. However, in the past two years, the regulatory clampdown forced Chinese commercial banks to unwind some of these structures and properly reclassify items on their balance sheets. Both the masking of credit assets and the ensuing reclassification could have distorted loan and credit data. This is why we use broad money supply as a litmus test to gauge banks’ broad credit origination. Given TSF includes bank loans but does not include banks’ non-standard credit assets, we believe TSF understates the amount of credit in the economy. As a result, we have not been able to calculate an accurate aggregate level of non-bank credit. Only since mid-2017, when under the regulatory clampdown, banks have stopped classifying loans as non-standard credit assets, can the annual growth rate of TSF serve as a meaningful statistic. Hence, we estimate the annual growth rate of non-bank credit only starting in 2018 (please refer to Chart I-13 on page 9). 2. Does the central bank (PBoC) create money by injecting liquidity into the system? Barring lending to or buying assets from non-banks – which does not typically occur outside of quantitative easing (QE) programs – central banks do not create broad money or deposits. Central banks create banking system reserves, which are not part of the broad money supply in any country. Money supply/deposits, the ultimate purchasing power for economic agents, is created solely by commercial banks “out of thin air,” as we have discussed and illustrated in our series of reports on money, credit and savings. 3. Why do we use impulses (second derivatives of money/credit) rather than growth rates? Our goal is to forecast a change in economic activity/capital spending/imports/enterprise revenues – i.e., a change in flow variables. Money and credit are stock variables. Therefore, a change (the first derivative) in outstanding money and credit produces flow variables. The latter measures new credit and money origination in a given period. These are comparable with flow variables like spending, income and profits. To gauge changes in flow variables, i.e., the growth rate of spending, one needs to calculate a change in new money and credit origination – i.e., change in their net flow. In brief, to do an apples-to-apples comparison, one needs to use the second derivative (a change in change) in money and credit – i.e., changes in their flows – to predict changes in flow variables such as GDP/capital spending/imports/enterprise revenues. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Indonesia: It Is Not All About The Fed Indonesian stocks have outperformed their emerging market peers significantly in the past few months as the Federal Reserve has turned dovish and U.S. rate expectations have declined. Although U.S. bond yields do strongly and inversely correlate with Indonesian stocks’ relative performance versus the EM equity benchmark (Chart II-1, top panel), we believe there are other factors – such as Chinese growth and commodities prices – that are also important to this market (Chart II-1, bottom panel). Chart II-1Indonesian Stocks: The Fed Versus Commodities In the next several months, slowing Chinese growth, lower commodities prices, and a renewed sell-off in EM markets will take a toll on Indonesian financial markets. Indonesian exports are contracting which will intensify as commodities prices fall and China’s purchases of coal and base metals drop (Chart II-2, top panel). Chart II-2Indonesia: Exports Are Shrinking Indonesia’s current account deficit is already large and will continue widening as the export contraction deepens (Chart II-2, bottom panel). Remarkably, the nation’s commercial banks have been encouraged to keep the credit taps open as the central bank – Bank Indonesia (BI) – has been injecting enormous amounts of liquidity (excess reserves) into the banking system (Chart II-3, top panel). Given these liquidity injections, bank credit and domestic demand growth have remained more resilient than would otherwise have been the case. Chart II-3The Central Bank Is Injecting Liquidity Yet, by injecting such enormous amounts of excess reserves into the system, the central bank has more than negated its previous liquidity tightening, resulting from the sales of its foreign exchange reserves in order to defend the rupiah (Chart II-3, bottom panel). The implications of such policy are that these excess reserves could encourage speculation against the rupiah, especially amid weakening global growth and falling commodities prices. Provided foreigners own large portions of Indonesian stocks and local-currency government bonds, a depreciation in the rupiah will produce a renewed selloff in the nation’s financial markets. A final point on Indonesian commercial banks: their net interest margins have been narrowing sharply (Chart II-4, top panel). Chart II-4Commercial Banks' Profits Will Weaken Moreover, as global growth slows, non-performing loans (NPLs) on the balance sheets of Indonesian banks will rise. In turn, provisioning for bad loans will also increase, and bank earnings will decline (Chart II-4, bottom panel). These dynamics will be bearish for Indonesian commercial banks, which account for 44% of the overall MSCI Indonesia index. Bottom Line: Continue avoiding/underweighting Indonesian stocks and fixed-income markets. We continue shorting the IDR versus the U.S. dollar. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please note that this represents the Emerging Markets Strategy team’s view and is different from BCA’s house view on global risk assets and global growth. The key point of contention is the outlook for China’s growth. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Regarding the European luxury goods sector, we often get following question: is it, just like the basic resources sector, a direct play on China’s growth cycle? The answer is no. Recently, the connection between the fortunes of ‘soft’ luxury goods brands like…

