Policy
Highlights The pillars of dollar support continue to fall, but the missing catalyst is visibility on the trajectory of global growth. For now, we remain constructive on the DXY short term, but bearish longer term. Market internals and currency technicals have become supportive of pro-cyclical trades in recent days. There is tremendous value in the Norwegian krone, Swedish krona and British pound. Buy a basket of NOK and SEK against a basket of USD and EUR. Feature Markets are getting some semblance of calm after being flooded with vast amounts of monetary and fiscal stimulus. The DXY index, having breached the psychological 100 level, failed to break above 103, and is now in a volatile trading pattern of lower intra-day highs. The message is that the Federal Reserve’s injection of liquidity, along with generous USD swap lines for major central banks, has eased the funding crisis (Chart I-1).1 All eyes will now begin to focus on fiscal support, especially from the US. As we go to press, US leaders have agreed to a $2 trillion fiscal package. As we highlighted last week, a central bank cannot do much about an economy in a liquidity trap, but governments can step in and be spenders of last resort. While fiscal stimulus is a welcome catalyst, the impact on the economy is likely to be felt a bit later. More importantly, until the number of new Covid-19 cases peak, the global economy will remain in shutdown, and visibility on the recovery will be opaque (Chart I-2). This provides an air pocket in which the dollar can make new highs, especially if the slowdown is not of a garden variety, but a deep recession. Chart I-1A Shortage Of Dollars Chart I-2Some Reason For Optimism We continue to monitor the behavior of market internals and currency technicals to gauge a shift in market dynamics. Both liquidity and valuation indicators are USD bearish, but as a momentum currency, the dollar will benefit from any signs we are entering a more protracted slowdown. In this report, we use a simple framework for ranking G10 currencies – the macroeconomic environment, valuation and sentiment. There has been a tectonic shift in currency markets over the last few weeks which has uncovered some very compelling opportunities. This is good news for investors willing to stomach near-term volatility. In short, we like the pound, Swedish krona and Norwegian krone. Are Policy Actions Enough? Chart I-3The Dollar And Interest Rates Diverge There has been an unprecedented wave of monetary and fiscal stimulus announced in recent weeks.2 This should eventually backstop economic activity. Below we highlight a few key developments, along with our thoughts. USD: The Fed has cut interest rates to zero and announced unlimited QE. As we go to press, a $2 trillion fiscal package has been passed. This represents a much bigger monetary and fiscal package compared to the 2008 Great Recession. The near-term impact will be to boost aggregate demand, but the massive increase in the supply of dollars should lower the USD exchange rate. As a rule of thumb, lower interest rates in the US have usually been bearish for the currency (Chart I-3). EUR: The European central bank has announced a €750 billion package effectively backstopping the peripheral bond market. The good news is that the structural issues in the periphery are much less pronounced than during the 2010-2011 crisis. This is positive for the euro over the longer term, as cheaper funding should boost capital spending and productivity. GBP: The Bank of England has cut interests to almost zero and expanded QE. Meanwhile, there has been an intergenerational shift in the pound. The lesson from the imbroglio in British politics since 2016 is that cable at 1.20 has been the floor for a “hard Brexit” under normal conditions. This makes the latest selloff an indiscriminate liquidation of the pound. On a real effective exchange rate-basis, the pound is close to two standard deviations below its mean since 1965. On this basis, only two currencies are cheaper: the Norwegian krone and Swedish krona. AUD: The Reserve Bank Of Australia cut interest rates to 25 basis points and has introduced QE. The Aussie is now trading below the lows seen during the Great Financial Crisis. This suggests any shock to Aussie growth will have to be larger than 2008 to nudge the AUD lower. CAD: The Bank Of Canada has cut rates to 75 basis points and introduced a generous fiscal package. More may be needed if the downdraft in oil prices persists beyond the near term. We highlighted a few weeks ago how the landscape was rapidly stepping into one of competitive devaluations.3 We can safely assume that we are already into this zone. One end result of competitive devaluations is that as interest rates converge to zero, relative fundamentals resurface as the key drivers of currency performance. In short, the last few weeks have seen long bond yields converge in the developed world (Chart I-4). That means going forward, picking winners and losers will become as much a structural game as a tactical one. From a bird’s eye view, below are a few key indicators we are monitoring. Chart I-4The Race To Zero G10 Basic Balances Chart I-5CHF, EUR, AUD and NOK Are Supported The basic balance captures the ebb and flow of demand for a country’s domestic assets. Persistent basic balance surpluses are usually associated with an appreciating currency, and vice versa. This is especially important since the rise in offshore dollar funding has been particularly pernicious for deficit countries. Switzerland sports the best basic balance surplus in the G10 universe, followed by the euro area, Australia and then Norway (Chart I-5). Surpluses imply a constant underlying demand for these currencies - either for domestic goods and services or for investment into portfolio assets. The UK and the US rank the worst in terms of basic balances. As for the UK, the basic balance deficit explains why the recent flight to safety hit the pound particularly hard. Net International Investment Position Both Switzerland and Japan have the largest net international investment positions. These tend to buffet their currencies during crises, since foreign assets are liquidated and the proceeds repatriated home. This is at the root of their status as safe-haven currencies. There has been structural improvement in most G10 net international investment positions, especially compared to the US (Chart I-6). Should the returns on those foreign assets be sufficiently high, this will lead to income receipts for surplus countries, providing an underlying boost for their currency. Chart I-6Structural Increase In G10 NIIP Interest Rates The race to the zero bound has pushed real interest rates into negative territory for most of the developed world. This has also greatly eroded the yield advantage of the US dollar against its G10 peers (Chart I-7). Within the G10 universe, the commodity currencies (Aussie, kiwi and loonie) have become the high yielders in real terms. This yield advantage should help stem structural depreciation in their currencies. Chart I-7Most Of The G10 Has Negative Real Rates Valuation Models One of our favored valuation models for currencies is the real effective exchange rate. The latest downdraft in most G10 currencies has nudged them between one and two standard deviations below fair value (Chart I-8A and Chart I-8B). According to the BIS measure, the Norwegian krone and Swedish krona are currently the cheapest currencies, with the krone trading at more than three standard deviations below its mean fair value. Chart I-8ASome G10 Currencies Are Very Cheap Chart I-8BSome G10 Currencies Are Very Cheap Most importantly, despite the recent rise in the US dollar, it is not yet very expensive. The trade-weighted dollar will need to rise by 8% to bring it one standard deviation above fair value. This was a definitive top in the early 2000s. This rise will also knock the euro lower and push many pro-cyclical currencies into bombed-out levels, making them even more attractive over the long term. Chart I-9NOK and SEK Are Deeply Undervalued Other valuation measures corroborate this view: Our in-house purchasing power parity (PPP) models show the US dollar as only slightly overvalued, by 7%. These models adjust the CPI baskets across countries so as to get closer to an apples-to-apples comparison. The cheapest currencies according to the model are the SEK, NOK, AUD and GBP (Chart I-9). The yen is more attractive than the Swiss franc as a safe-haven currency. Our intermediate-term timing models (ITTM) show the dollar as fairly valued. The main ingredients in these models are real interest rate differentials and a risk factor. On a risk-adjusted return basis, a dynamic hedging strategy based on our ITTMs has outperformed all static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies since 2001. According to these models, the Australian dollar and Norwegian krone are the most attractive currencies, while the Swiss franc is the least attractive. Our long-term FX models are also part of a set of technical tools we use to help us navigate FX markets. Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade, net international investment positions, real rate differentials, and proxies for global risk aversion. These models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G10 and emerging market FX markets. According to these models, the US dollar is at fair value (mostly against the euro), but the yen, the Norwegian krone and the Swedish krona are quite cheap. In a forthcoming report, we will show how valuation can be used as a tool to enhance excess returns in the currency space. For now, the universal message from our models is that the cheapest currencies are the NOK, SEK, AUD and GBP. Speculative Positioning Chart I-10Speculators Have Been Taking Profits Our favorite sentiment indicator is speculative positioning. More specifically, positioning is quite useful when it is rolling over from an overbought or oversold extreme. Being long Treasurys and the dollar has been a consensus trade for many years now (Chart I-10). According to CFTC data, this has been expressed mostly through the aussie and kiwi, although our bias is that the Swedish krona and Norwegian krone have been the real victims. The key question is whether the unwinding of dollar long positions we have seen in recent days reflects pure profit-taking, or represents a fundamental shift in the outlook for the greenback. Our bias is the former. Net foreign purchases of Treasurys by private investors have reaccelerated anew. Given the momentum of these purchases tends to be persistent over a six-month horizon, it is too early to conclude that dollar gains are behind us. That said, speculative positioning has also uncovered currencies in which investor biases are lopsided. This includes the Australian and New Zealand dollars. Currency Rankings And Portfolio Tweaks The depth and duration of the economic slowdown remain the primary concern for most investors. Should the world economy see a more protracted slowdown than in 2008, then more gains lie ahead for the greenback. This is on the back of a currency that is not too expensive, relative to history. That said, there have been a few currencies that have been indiscriminately sold with the global liquidation in risk assets. These include the Norwegian krone, the British pound and the Swedish krona, among others. To reflect the fundamental shift in both valuation and sentiment indicators, we are buying a basket of the Scandinavian currencies against a basket of both the dollar and euro. Finally, our profit targets on a few trades were hit, and we were stopped out of a few. Please see our trading tables for the latest recommendations. Appendix Table I-1 Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “The Dollar Funding Crisis”, dated March 19, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please refer to Appendix Table 1. 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Are Competitive Devaluations Next?”, dated March 6, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI dropped to 49.2 while the services PMI tanked to 39.1 from 49.4 in March. Initial jobless claims hit 3.3 million, a record high, in the week ended March 20. Nondefense capital goods orders, excluding aircraft, shrank by 0.8% month-on-month in February. The DXY index depreciated by 2.6% this week. The US Senate passed a $2 trillion economic relief package, which is now pending approval by the House. The bill includes direct payments to individuals, US$350 billion in loans to small businesses and investments in medical supplies. The Fed has created a backstop for investment grade bonds by vowing to purchase as many securities as needed to prop up the market. Report Links: The Dollar Funding Crisis - March 19, 2020 Are Competitive Devaluations Next? - March 6, 2020 The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been negative: ZEW economic sentiment crashed to -49.5 from 10.4 while consumer confidence fell to -11.6 from -6.6 in March. The Markit manufacturing PMI decreased to 44.8 from 49.2 while the services PMI tumbled to 28.4 from 52.6 in March. This pulled the composite index down to 31.4 from 51.6 in March. The current account increased to EUR 34.7 billlion from EUR 32.6 billion while the trade balance fell to EUR 17.3 billion in January. The euro appreciated by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. ECB President Lagarde argued for the one-off issuance of “coronabonds,” a shared debt instrument among member economies that pools risk and lowers lending costs for the more indebted nations affected by the pandemic. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanse Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: The Jibun bank manufacturing PMI fell to 44.8 from 47.8 in March. The coincident index increased to 95.2 from 94.4 while the leading index fell to 90.5 from 90.9 in January. Imports shrank by 14% while exports shrank by 1% year-on-year in February. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. As expected, the Tokyo Olympics were postponed, striking a further blow to economic activity and the tourism sector. The government is considering a JPY 56 trillion stimulus package that includes cash payments to households and subsidies for small businesses, restaurants and other tourist-related sectors. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI declined to 28 from 51.7 while the services PMI collapsed to 35.7 from 53.2 in March. Retail sales contracted by 0.3% month-on-month in February from an increase of 1.1% in January. Headline CPI grew by 1.7% year-on-year in February. The public sector net borrowing deficit shrank to GBP 0.4 billion from GBP 12.4 billion in February. The British pound appreciated by 4.3% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of England (BoE) left rates unchanged at 0.1% and decided to continue purchases of UK government bonds and nonfinancial investment grade bonds, bringing the total stock to GBP 645 billion. The BoE has stated that it can expand asset purchases further if needed. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been negative: The Commonwealth bank manufacturing PMI decreased slightly to 50.1 while the services PMI plunged to 39.8 from 49 in March. The house price index grew by 3.9% quarter-on-quarter from 2.4% in Q4. Unemployment decreased slightly to 5.1% in February. The Australian dollar appreciated by 5.1% against the US dollar this week. The government pledged an additional A$64 billion package, bringing total stimulus to 10% of GDP. The package includes assistance for individuals and small businesses impacted by the virus. Prime Minister Morrison said that more stimulus, including direct cash handouts to households, is likely to be announced over coming weeks. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Exports increased to NZD 4.9 billion, imports shrank to NZD 4.3 billion and the monthly trade balance showed a surplus of NZD 593 billion. Credit card spending grew by 2.5% in February from 3.7% the previous month. The New Zealand dollar appreciated by 4.2% against the US dollar this week. The RBNZ turned to quantitative easing and announced the purchase of up to NZ$30 billion of government bonds, at a pace of NZ$750 million per week. The government announced fiscal stimulus of just over NZ$12 billion that includes wage subsidies for businesses, income support, tax relief and support for the airline industry. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: Headline CPI grew by 2.2% year-on-year in February. Retail sales excluding autos fell by 0.1% month-on-month in January, compared to growth of 0.5% the previous month. Wholesale sales grew by 1.8% month-on-month in January from 1% the previous month. Jobless claims soared to 929 thousand in the week ended March 22, representing almost 5% of the labor force. The Canadian dollar appreciated by 2.8% against the US dollar this week. The government approved a C$107 billion stimulus package that includes payments of C$2,000 per month to individuals unemployed due to Covid-19 and C$55 billion in deferred tax payments for businesses and individuals. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been negative: Producer and import prices contracted by 2.1% from 1% year-on-year in February. ZEW expectations sank to -45.8 from 7.7 in March. Imports fell to CHF 15.7 billion from CHF 16 billion while exports fell to CHF 19.2 billion from CHF 20.7 billion in February. The Swiss franc appreciated by 1.6% against the US dollar this week. The Swiss government proposed stimulus worth CHF 32 billion, bringing total stimulus to 6% of GDP. The package will largely consist of bridge loans to small- and medium-sized businesses, social insurance and tax deferrals. The SNB also set up a refinancing facility to provide liquidity to banks. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: The trade balance declined to 18.3 billion from 21.2 billion in February. Norwegian unemployment soared to 10.9% in March, the highest level since the Great Depression. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 7% against the US dollar this week. The Norges Bank cut rates from 1% to a record low of 0.25%, citing worsening conditions since the 50 basis point cut on March 13. Parliament approved loans, tax deferrals, and extra spending worth NOK 280 billion. The government expects private-sector activity to contract by 15-20% in the near-term. The government will likely need to draw on its sovereign wealth fund to finance spending. Report Links: Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: The producer price index contracted by 1.2% year-on-year in February, deepening from 0.4% the previous month. Consumer confidence dropped to 89.6 from 98.5 in March. The trade balance grew to SEK 13.2 billion from SEK 11.8 billion in February. The unemployment rate rose to 8.2% from 7.5% in February. The Swedish krona appreciated by 3.5% against the US dollar this week. The Swedish government bucked the lockdown strategy, choosing to keep businesses open during the pandemic. In addition, the government announced stimulus measures of up to SEK 300 billion, which includes relief for employees that have been laid off or taken sick leave. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Yesterday, BCA Research's US Bond Strategy service surveyed the Fed's COVID-19 policy response to date and assessed how successful it may be in containing three different (related) shocks: an economic shock, a liquidity shock and a credit shock. #1: The…
Highlights Duration: Last week’s bond market sell-off was a headfake and does not portend a sustained move higher in Treasury yields. We will need to see a stabilization in confirmed COVID-19 cases and signs of improving global growth before calling the bottom in yields. Keep portfolio duration close to benchmark. Yield Curve: A fed funds rate pinned at zero means that the yield curve will trade directionally with yields for the foreseeable future. The yield curve’s recent re-shaping also means that a barbelled Treasury portfolio now only offers a small yield advantage. We recommend shifting out of a barbell and into a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Corporate Spreads: High-yield spreads are now fairly priced for a default cycle of similar magnitude to the 2001/02 recession, and the Fed’s entrance into the corporate bond market is a potential game changer for investment grade spreads. Investors should increase exposure to investment grade corporates from neutral to overweight. High-yield investors with horizons of 12 months or more should also start adding exposure. Fed Policy: The Fed is frantically trying to mitigate the impact of three different (though related) shocks: An economic shock, a liquidity shock and a credit shock. We assess its progress to date and discuss what could be done next. Feature Headfake Chart 1Not A Reflationary Environment Bond yields jumped early last week, shortly after the Fed cut rates back to the zero bound. At one point the 10-year Treasury yield reached as high as 1.18%. But make no mistake, this was not the start of a protracted bond sell off. By Monday morning, the 10-year was back down to 0.75%. Evidently, the conditions for a sustained move higher in Treasury yields are not yet in place. To see why this is so, we need to look a little bit beyond the headline grabbing change in nominal yields and notice that, even when the nominal 10-year yield moved up early last week, the 10-year real yield increased much more quickly, causing the implied cost of inflation protection to fall (Chart 1). This is unusual behavior. Typically, real yields, nominal yields and breakeven inflation rates are all positively correlated. This is because an improving economic outlook usually leads investors to expect both higher inflation and a higher fed funds rate in the future, and vice-versa. When the correlation breaks down it is usually related to some policy action or constraint. For example, investors could come to believe that the Fed will keep interest rates too low for far too long, causing real yields to fall even as inflation expectations jump. Or, as is the case right now, the market could recognize the zero-lower-bound constraint on Fed policy and start to price-in a scenario where the Fed can’t cut rates far enough to jumpstart economic growth. Real yields move higher in this scenario, but inflation expectations crash. We are seeing the same dynamic of rising real yields and falling inflation expectations that was witnessed in 2008. This same dynamic of rising real yields and falling inflation expectations was witnessed in 2008, when the Fed was rapidly cutting rates but investors did not view that action as sufficient (Chart 2). Falling equity prices and a rising dollar further underscored that the environment was becoming more deflationary, not reflationary. A sustained rise in bond yields can only be caused by a reflationary environment. Chart 2Shades Of 2008 How Close To The Bottom? The relevant question then becomes: How close are we to returning to a reflationary environment? To answer this question we will rely on the checklist to call the bottom in bond yields that we unveiled two weeks ago.1 That checklist contains four factors: A stabilization in confirmed COVID-19 cases Improving global economic growth (particularly in China) Weaker US economic data A trigger from one or more technical trading rules Last week we started to see the first signs of weaker US economic data. Initial jobless claims spiked to 281k and both the New York and Philadelphia Fed regional manufacturing surveys plunged (Chart 3). We expect the bottom in bond yields will occur when the US economic data are very weak and when economies that experienced the outbreak earlier – such as China – are showing signs of rebounding. Investors will superimpose the Chinese experience onto the US. But it is still too early for that. Global growth bellwethers such as the CRB Raw Industrials commodity price index remain in freefall (Chart 3, bottom panel). We also noted that we want to see stabilization in the global number of confirmed COVID-19 cases. Essentially, this would mean the number of daily new cases falling close to zero. We are far from that point, as the daily number of new cases continues to rise exponentially (Chart 4). Chart 3Weaker US Data, But No Global Recovery Chart 4New Cases Still Rising We should also mention that we expect risk assets – equities and corporate credit – to bottom before Treasury yields, as the Fed will take care not to signal a premature removal of crisis stimulus measures. Finally, two weeks ago we described several technical trading rules that have demonstrated some success at calling troughs in Treasury yields in the past. Since last week, one of our three proposed trading rules was briefly triggered, but that signal was quickly reversed. Bottom Line: Last week’s bond market sell-off was a headfake and does not portend a sustained move higher in Treasury yields. We will need to see a stabilization in confirmed COVID-19 cases and signs of improving global growth before calling the bottom in yields. Keep portfolio duration close to benchmark. A Quick Note On TIPS In last week’s report we made the case for long-term investors to buy TIPS relative to equivalent-maturity nominal Treasuries.2 The reasoning is that TIPS breakeven inflation rates offer exceptional value relative to likely future inflation outcomes. For example, the 5-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 0.31% and the 10-year rate is 0.75%. This means that a buy-and-hold investor will make money owning TIPS versus nominals if inflation averages more than 0.31% per year for the next five years, or 0.75% per year for the next decade. Chart 51-Year TIPS Return Scenarios We also observed last week that TIPS breakeven inflation rates have turned negative at the front-end of the curve. We described this pricing as irrational because of the embedded deflation floors in TIPS. This was incorrect. While TIPS will always pay at least par at maturity, seasoned TIPS with only a year or two left to maturity already have inflation-adjusted principal values that are well above par. In other words, there is room for deflation to influence the returns from these securities before any floor is triggered. Specifically, we can take a look at the TIPS maturing in just over one year, on April 15 2021 (Chart 5). This note has an accumulated principal of just under $109 and is currently trading at an ask price of $97.63.3 According to our calculations, this security will earn 2.55% if headline CPI inflation is 0% over the next 12 months. It will only lose money if headline CPI inflation comes in at -2.49% or below. What’s more, it will return more than a 12-month nominal T-bill as long as inflation is above -2.4%. Note that the lowest year-over-year headline CPI inflation print during the Great Financial Crisis was -2.1%. TIPS offer exceptional value relative to nominal Treasuries for investors who are able to hold the trade for at least one year. Bottom Line: TIPS offer exceptional value relative to nominal Treasuries for investors who are able to hold the trade for at least one year. Treasury Curve: Re-Visiting The Zero-Lower-Bound Playbook Chart 6Curve Will Trade Directionally With Yields The Fed’s aggressive policy easing has caused the yield curve to re-shape dramatically during the past few weeks. The 2/10 Treasury slope is up to 55 bps from a 2019 low of -4 bps. The 2/30 Treasury slope is up to 118 bps from a 2019 low of 42 bps, and the 2/5 Treasury slope is up to 15 bps from a 2019 low of -13 bps. Looking through the recent volatility, the fact that the fed funds rate is back to a range between 0% and 0.25% means that we can dust off our yield curve playbook from the last zero-lower-bound period. Fortunately, that playbook is quite straightforward. With the front-end of the curve pinned near zero, the slope of the yield curve will essentially trade directionally with the level of Treasury yields for the foreseeable future. Chart 6 shows that during the last zero-lower-bound period, the 2/30, 2/10 and 2/5 slopes were all positively correlated with the 5-year Treasury yield. This correlation suggests one obvious strategy. If you think yields will rise, put on steepeners. If you think they will fall, put on flatteners. Or if, like us, you suspect that bond yields will be higher in 12 months but are not quite ready to call the bottom, you could hedge benchmark or above-benchmark portfolio duration by entering a duration-neutral steepener. What About Value Across The Curve? Chart 7Bullets Looking Less Expensive Until recently, investors could earn large positive carry by owning a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the Treasury curve (e.g. 2/30) and shorting the belly (e.g. 5yr), in duration-matched terms. But this has changed. The 2/10 barbell now only offers 6 bps of positive carry versus the 5-year bullet, while the 2/30 barbell and 5-year bullet offer approximately the same yield. Both the 2/5/10 and 2/5/30 butterfly spreads are also much closer to the fair values suggested by our models (Chart 7).4 Though we are not ready to call the bottom in Treasury yields, we think the 5-year yield is sufficiently attractive to initiate a duration-neutral curve steepener trade: go long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This trade should perform well if the 2/10 slope steepens going forward. Since a steeper curve is now positively correlated with the level of yields, this trade will profit if yields move higher. Viewed this way, the trade acts as a hedge when implemented alongside our conservative ‘At Benchmark’ portfolio duration recommendation. Bottom Line: A fed funds rate pinned at zero means that the yield curve will trade directionally with yields for the foreseeable future. The yield curve’s recent re-shaping also means that a barbelled Treasury portfolio now only offers a small yield advantage. We recommend shifting out of a barbell and into a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Corporate Spread Update Corporate spreads continue to widen very quickly. As such, our conclusions from last week about the amount of value in corporate bonds are already out of date. Our value assessment is based on our High-Yield Default-Adjusted Spread, which is the excess spread left over in the high-yield index after removing actual 12-month default losses. Table 1 shows how often the Default-Adjusted Spread has been in different 50 basis point intervals, and what sort of 12-month junk excess returns occurred during those periods. One conclusion from the table: To be confident that high-yield will outperform duration-matched Treasuries on a 12-month horizon, we would need to expect a Default-Adjusted Spread of at least 150 bps. Preferably, the spread would be greater than or equal to 250 bps, the historical average. The red numbers down the right-hand side of Table 1 indicate what the Default-Adjusted Spread will be for the next 12 months if the speculative grade default rate hits a specific value. For example, a default rate of 6%, which would correspond to a default cycle of a similar magnitude as 2015/16, implies a very attractive Default-Adjusted Spread of +633 bps. In contrast, a default rate of 14% or greater would lead to a negative Default-Adjusted Spread. For context, the default rate peaked at 15% and 11% in the 2008 and 2001/2 recessions, respectively. Table 1What's Priced In Credit Spreads? As of now, our base case scenario is that the current default cycle will be more severe than the 2015/16 episode but probably not as bad as the 2008 financial crisis. Something on the order of 9% - 11% seems plausible. If that’s the case, then the Default-Adjusted Spread will be somewhere between 216 bps and 394 bps. This looks quite attractive. Additionally, yesterday’s announcement that the Fed will effectively be entering the investment grade corporate bond market could be a game changer. As a result, we recommend increasing exposure to investment grade corporate bonds from neutral to overweight. For high-yield, it is possible that spreads will widen more in the near-term, but value is now sufficiently attractive for investors with investment horizons of 12 months or more to start adding exposure. We retain our neutral 6-12 month recommended allocation for now, but will re-visit the question in more detail in next week’s report. To be confident that high-yield will outperform duration-matched Treasuries on a 12-month horizon, we would need to expect a Default-Adjusted Spread of at least 150 bps. Bottom Line: High-yield spreads are now fairly priced for a default cycle of similar magnitude to the 2001/02 recession, and the Fed’s entrance into the corporate bond market is a potential game changer for investment grade spreads. Investors should increase exposure to investment grade corporates from neutral to overweight. High-yield investors with horizons of 12 months or more should also start adding exposure. The Fed’s War On Three Fronts Events continue to unfold rapidly in financial markets and in terms of the Fed’s response to the market turmoil. We conclude this week’s report with a brief discussion of the three main shocks that the Fed is frantically trying to contain. We also assess how successful the Fed’s responses might be. #1: The Economic Shock The first shock that the Fed is trying to contain is the pure shock to aggregate demand that is occurring as a result of widespread quarantine measures. In cutting rates to zero and signaling that rates will not rise any time soon, the Fed has effectively done all it can to help fight the economic shock. It should help a little. Lower interest rates will ease the debt burden of homeowners who can refinance their mortgages. They may also lower costs for firms that are able to issue debt to weather the current storm. But these effects are minor compared to the fiscal measures currently making their way through Congress.5 Next steps for the Fed: None. The Fed is effectively out of bullets to contain the economic shock. It’s all about fiscal policy now. #2: Market Liquidity Shock Chart 8Bond Market Liquidity Shock In addition to the economic shock, the Fed is also responding to a severe market liquidity shock. What we mean by a “market liquidity shock” is that investors are finding it more expensive (or difficult) to transact in certain markets because of the scarce amount of capital being deployed to those areas. This is different than credit risk (see Shock #3). We are not talking about investors having trouble transacting because there are few willing buyers of credit risk. We are talking about high transaction costs in otherwise risk-free parts of the bond market. The issue is critical because these risk-free parts of the bond market (overnight repo, for example) are often used to fund riskier investments. Disruption in funding markets can have ripple-on effects into other, less opaque, areas. We currently see several examples of disruptions to bond market liquidity (Chart 8): Repo rates have spiked relative to the overnight index swap curve (Chart 8, top panel). The iShares 20+ year Treasury Bond ETF (TLT) is suddenly trading at a huge discount to its net asset value (Chart 8, panel 2). Cross-currency basis swap spreads have turned deeply negative, meaning that it is more expensive for non-US actors to obtain US dollar funding (Chart 8, bottom panel). Wider-than-normal bid/ask spreads are being reported in the Treasury market (not shown). These disruptions are occurring because the financial system is not deploying enough capital to market-making activities in these areas. Essentially, nonfinancial firms have drawn on their revolving credit lines during the past few weeks and this has left the financial system short of cash to deploy toward market-making activities. To fix the problem, the Fed has started to transact directly (in large amounts) in both the repo and Treasury markets. This essentially replaces the function that banks were performing until a few weeks ago. But perhaps more importantly, the Fed is also encouraging banks to deploy the capital that already sits on their balance sheets. Unlike during the 2008 financial crisis, banks now carry a lot of capital – the result of Dodd-Frank and Basel III regulations. What the banks need now is tacit permission from regulators to deploy that capital into financial markets, without concern that they will face consequences during a future stress test. Table 2Banks Have Excess Capital Even without any specific changes to regulation, Table 2 shows that the big 5 US financial institutions all carry significant buffers above the regulatory minimum 100% Liquidity Coverage Ratio and 6% Supplementary Leverage Ratio. At a minimum, these excess buffers must be deployed to aid market liquidity. Next steps: The Fed is already transacting directly in both the repo and Treasury markets, and behind closed doors it is most certainly encouraging banks to deploy more capital toward market-making activities. If these actions prove insufficient, the next step would be for the Fed – along with other regulators and possibly Congress – to offer temporary regulatory relief for banks, lowering the required Liquidity Coverage and Supplementary Leverage ratios. We view this market liquidity problem as one that regulators will be able to solve. And given the Fed’s aggressive policy response to date, we expect that regulators will get a handle on the issue and restore bond market liquidity fairly soon. #3 Credit Shock Chart 9Can The Credit Shock Be Contained? We draw a distinction between spreads widening because of a lack of market liquidity and spreads widening because investors are unwilling to take credit risk. Though admittedly, it is not always easy to distinguish between these two factors in real time. But there is no doubt that the economy is also grappling with a credit shock, in addition to the economic and liquidity shocks we already mentioned. Some evidence that market players are less willing to take credit risk (Chart 9): The average option-adjusted spread on the Bloomberg Barclays Investment Grade Corporate Bond index has spiked (Chart 9, top panel). The spread between the 3-month commercial paper rate and the overnight index swap rate has surged (Chart 9, panel 2). The Municipal / Treasury yield ratio is higher than it was during the financial crisis (Chart 9, panel 3). The 30-year mortgage rate has so far not followed Treasury yields lower (Chart 9, bottom panel). The Fed can take some measures to mitigate the negative impacts of a credit shock, and it has already taken quite a few. The Fed has set up facilities to back-stop commercial paper and short-maturity municipal debt. It also announced yesterday morning that it will, in conjunction with the Treasury department, enter the investment grade corporate bond market out to the 5-year maturity point, effectively back-stopping a large portion of corporate issuance. The Fed has not yet set up a facility to purchase longer-maturity municipal bonds, but this could be forthcoming. The Fed is also directly purchasing large amounts of Agency MBS in an effort to tighten the spread between the mortgage rate and Treasury yields. The Fed’s measures to guarantee some risky debt can help solve some problems related to a credit shock. For example, if Fed purchases increase asset values for corporate and municipal bonds, then it lessens the risk of bankruptcy both for the issuing firms and for any systemically-important investment fund that may be levered to those markets. However, Fed purchases do not guarantee that stressed firms will be able to take out new debt, nor do they prevent firms from cutting payrolls in the face of lower demand. Only direct cash bailouts from the government can fix those problems. Next steps: The Fed could add another facility to purchase long-maturity municipal bonds. It could also implement a “funding for lending” scheme similar to what the Bank of England has done. These measures, along with what has already been announced, will help ease the credit shock at the margin. But ultimately, cash bailouts from Congress to firms and state & local governments will be required. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “When And Where Will Bond Yields Trough?”, dated March 10, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buying Opportunities & Worst-Case Scenarios”, dated March 17, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Numbers quoted assuming a par value of $100. 4 For details on our yield curve models please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 The global fiscal response to the COVID crisis is discussed in more detail in Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “De-Globalization Confirmed”, dated March 20, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Market Turmoil: The combination of accelerating global cases of COVID-19, a surging US dollar and elevated market volatility has wreaked havoc on financial markets. A sustainable bottom in global risk assets (and, potentially, bond yields) requires a reversal of all three of those trends. Fed & ECB: Central bankers on both sides of the Atlantic are now committing to provide liquidity backstops for both government bonds and corporate debt by promising “unlimited” purchases. This effectively removes the left tail of the return distribution on debt of more questionable quality that has seen significant spread widening, like US BBB-rated corporates and Peripheral European sovereign debt. Fixed Income Strategy: Upgrade US investment grade corporates to overweight from neutral, and upgrade Italian government bonds to overweight from underweight, on both a tactical (0-6 months) and strategic (6-12 months) basis. Buy What The Central Banks Are Buying Chart of the WeekAre These Market Stress Points Turning? The COVID-19 outbreak has become a full-blown global health crisis, with country after country imposing lockdowns on their populations to control the spread of the disease. The economic ramifications are now obvious: a certain deep global recession, but one of indeterminate length. The investment implications are also now clear: bear markets in global equities, credit and growth-sensitive currencies and commodities. There is a new bull market, however, in pessimism. Economic forecasters are tripping over themselves to offer up the most shocking estimate of the severity of the downturn. The IMF is now expecting a recession in 2020 “at least as bad” as during the global financial crisis. Wall Street investment banks are forecasting double-digit declines in US GDP growth during the second quarter. St. Louis Fed President Fed James Bullard wins the prize for the most gloomy prediction, suggesting that we could see a 30% US unemployment rate and a -50% (!) decline in US GDP growth in Q2. Investors have seen few positive headlines on the spread of the virus, resulting in a de-risking “dash for cash” that has impeded liquidity across equity, fixed income and currency markets. Global policymakers have responded with trillions of dollars of monetary and fiscal policy announcements designed to calm nervous markets while ensuring liquidity provision for temporarily shuttered businesses, of all sizes, facing painful layoff announcements. Chart 2Get Ready For Shockingly Weak Global Economic Data Have we seen enough stimulus to stop the market turmoil? In our view, three things must all occur for a sustainable bottom in global risk assets, and potentially bond yields, to unfold (Chart of the Week): Slowing growth in new COVID-19 infections outside China. As long as the global spread of the virus shows no signs of slowing down, it will be impossible for markets to ascertain the full hit to global growth from the outbreak. A cooling off of the surging US dollar. The greenback has soared 8% since March 9, and is wreaking havoc on global borrowers who have significant USD-denominated liabilities. Global financial market volatility must peak. Volatility spikes across all major asset classes have forced investors to de-risk portfolios; lower volatility will have the opposite effect. Of late, the news on all three fronts is tentatively more positive. The US DXY dollar index is off from the peak, the VIX index of US equity volatility is off the extreme highs and the number of new cases of COVID-19 in virus-ravaged Italy has declined for the past two days. While it is still early to call a lasting peak in these measures, it is potentially a sign of optimism coming at a time when economic confidence measures like the ZEW surveys are back to 2008 levels and a China-like collapse in activity is now expected in the US (Chart 2). We now think it is time to pick through the ashes of the global market rout and begin to add back some risk in global bond portfolios. We now think it is time to pick through the ashes of the global market rout and begin to add back some risk in global bond portfolios. After seeing the policy announcements of the past week, however, we are choosing to dip our toes back into the water in assets that now have direct central bank liquidity backstops – namely US investment grade corporates and Italian sovereign debt. The Fed Is Now Truly The Lender Of Last Resort … To Corporates The Fed unloaded their biggest of bazookas yesterday, expanding existing stimulus programs while introducing new initiatives that reach into parts of the US economy and financial markets previously untouched by the central bank. Specifically, the Fed did the following: Announcing unlimited quantitative easing (QE) for US Treasuries and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) Increasing the size of money market and commercial paper liquidity programs announced last week, and expanding the range of eligible assets Adding commercial MBS (CMBS) to asset purchases, which was never done even in 2008 Reviving the 2008 crisis-era Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) to make loans directly to companies, while introducing a new “Main Street Business Lending Program” that will fund small businesses directly (details are yet to be determined) Most significantly for bond investors, the Fed will begin buying corporate bonds, in both primary and secondary markets, while also providing direct lending to eligible companies through loans. This will be done through off-balance sheet Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), initially funded with $10 billion from the US Treasury and levered up by the Fed to whatever amount is necessary The Fed primary market SPV will buy newly-issued bonds with credit ratings as low as BBB- and maturities of four years or less. Eligible issuers are US businesses with material operations in the United States, although the Fed noted that the list of companies in the program may be expanded in the future. Eligible issuers do not include companies that are expected to receive direct financial assistance from the US government (i.e. no buying of bonds from companies getting bailout funds). The most significant details of the Fed’s new primary market corporate bond buying program are the numerical limits of what can be purchased. Any eligible company can “borrow” from the Fed, though bond purchases or direct loans, an amount greater than the maximum outstanding debt (bonds plus loans) on any day over the past twelve months. Those percentages are determined by credit quality: 140% of all debt for AAA-rated issuers, 130% for AA-rated issuers, 120% for A-rated issuers and 110% for BBB-rated issuers. Since those percentages are all greater than 100, this effectively means that the Fed will allow eligible companies to roll over their entire stock of debt through this program, plus some net new borrowing. The Fed is even calling this “bridge financing for up to four years” in their official term sheets for the new program.1 Issuers can even defer interest payments on the funds borrowed from the Fed for up to six months, with the interest payments added to the final repayment amount (again, any company choosing this option can do no share buybacks or dividend payments). In addition to this direct lending to investment grade rated issuers, the Fed is introducing another SPV that will buy corporate bonds of eligible investment grade issuers in the secondary market. This will be for bonds with maturity of up to five years and credit ratings as low as BBB-, with a buying limit of 10% of the entire stock of eligible debt of any single company. This secondary market SPV will also buy investment grade bond ETFs, up to 20% the outstanding shares of any single ETF. All of these programs are set to run to September 30 of this year, with an option to extend as needed. The Fed’s new initiatives represent a new step for the central bank, providing direct lending to any company that needs it. The Fed had to do this through off-balance-sheet SPVs, since direct buying of corporates is not permitted under the Federal Reserve Act. Thus, it is not like the Fed’s QE programs that used to buy Treasuries and MBS – in fact, it is the US Treasury that is taking on the initial credit risk through its $10 billion funding of each SPV. In this sense, the Fed's new program is also different than the corporate bond QE programs of the ECB, Bank of England and Bank of Japan, where the credit risk is directly taken onto the central bank balance sheet. The purpose of these new corporate bond programs is two-fold: 1. To ensure that companies do not suffer a credit crunch, either by being unable to roll over maturing corporate debt in primary markets or by only doing so at prohibitively high yields and spreads 2. To ensure the proper functioning of US corporate bond markets, by providing liquidity to both cash bonds and related ETFs. By doing this, the Fed can help mitigate the severe tightening of financial conditions that has already occurred because of the credit selloff in recent weeks. Also, by helping to reduce the extreme price/spread volatility in higher-quality credit, the Fed may be hoping this can spill over into lower volatility of other asset classes which are at the historical extremes of the past quarter century (Chart 3). Both can help mitigate the second round effects of the virtual shutdown of the US economy that has taken place to contain the spread of COVID-19. Chart 3Few Places To Hide From Historically High Volatility The Fed’s unprecedented intervention in the US corporate bond market is a positive step that has improved the risk/reward profile for US investment grade credit, coming after a period of significant spread widening that has restored some value to the asset class. We will further discuss the implications of the Fed’s actions in a corporate bond Special Report that we will publish jointly next week with our colleagues at BCA US Bond Strategy. For now, however, the Fed’s unprecedented intervention in the US corporate bond market is a positive step that has improved the risk/reward profile for US investment grade credit, coming after a period of significant spread widening that has restored some value to the asset class (Chart 4). Chart 4A New Huge IG Liquidity Backstop From The Fed Could the Fed’s actions spill over into non-US credit, as well? Chart 5This Is A Global Widening Of Credit Spreads Chart 6Signs Of USD Funding Stress, But Nothing Like 2008 The COVID-19 crisis has resulted in credit spread widening across the world, especially so for the big borrowers of USD-denominated debt in the emerging markets and US shale oil industry (Chart 5). For those issuers, a weaker USD would be more positive development, as would higher oil prices. The Fed’s other monetary policy actions – cutting the funds rate to 0%, moving to unlimited QE for Treasuries and MBS, should be helping to weaken the US dollar. The problem, however, is that all other major central banks are now doing similar policy easings as well, with even the likes of the Reserve Bank of Australia and Reserve Bank of New Zealand now starting bond-buying QE programs. This exacerbates the strong USD problem, seen in the stresses in USD funding markets (Chart 6). Simply put, the Fed cannot generate easier financial conditions, both in the US and elsewhere, through a weaker USD. Thus, the Fed has to seek other ways to ease US financial conditions – like helping cap borrowing costs for investment grade US borrowers by direct intervention in those markets. Bottom Line: The Fed’s move into buying investment grade corporate debt, and providing term lending to corporates more broadly, has effectively eliminated the left tail of the return distribution for investment grade US credit. The ECB Is Moving Towards Being The Lender Of Last Resort – For Euro Area Sovereigns The Fed is not the only central bank that ramped up its asset purchases. The ECB also increased its existing Asset Purchase Program by a massive €750bn last week, across both sovereign and corporate debt. This new program was dubbed the “Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program” (PEPP) and is to take place over the rest of 2020 in order to help fight the negative impacts on the European economy and financial markets from the COVID-19 outbreak. The most important part of the announcement of the PEPP, however, was in the loosening of previous restrictions of the ECB’s €2.6 trillion Asset Purchase Program (APP). Greek bonds were included in the PEPP by allowing a waiver to the rules of the APP that forbid the inclusion of Greece in the funding program. Also, the ECB hinted in its statement announcing the new program that the self-imposed limits on the APP could be revised, if necessary, for the more “temporary” PEPP to help fight the COVID-19 crisis. That was a clear signal to the markets that the ECB could deviate from the “capital key” country weightings, and the 33% single sovereign issuer limit, that have governed the APP. This is very positive news for Italy, where COVID-19 has been particularly devastating and deadly, causing the entire country to be locked down to control its spread. The ECB could deviate from the “capital key” country weightings, and the 33% single sovereign issuer limit, that have governed the APP. This is very positive news for Italy, where COVID-19 has been particularly devastating and deadly, causing the entire country to be locked down to control its spread. Already, Italy and the rest of the EU have been given a temporary waiver of the EU’s fiscal policy targets (government deficit no larger than 3% of GDP, government debt no larger than 60% of GDP). Now that the ECB is also willing to consider suspending its own limits on asset purchases, Italy has been given the “space” to run larger deficits without the market punishment of higher bond yields – especially with the ECB only owning around 20% of the stock of Italian government debt, well below the 33% single country APP limit (Chart 7). Chart 7The ECB Can Buy More Italian Debt, If Necessary Already, the ECB announcement triggered a sharp decline in Italian bond yields (and Greek yields, for that matter) and tightening of the spread between Italian and German bond yields. So far, the threat of the ECB buying more Italy has been enough to get private investors to buy more Italian bonds, similar to Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” promise back in 2012. Draghi never had to buy a single bond to get the market to move in his favor then. In 2020, given the collapse in European growth seen so far in response to COVID-19 lockdowns, and the acute hit to the Italian economy from the virus, we suspect that Christine Lagarde will be far likely to actually buy more Italian debt – especially with even the hard-money Germans now engaged in deficit spending to stimulate the virus-stricken German economy. We interpret all this similarly to our read of the Fed’s buying of corporate debt – the ECB has changed the risk/reward profile of Italian government bonds by not only introducing the PEPP, but having it operated under different rules than the APP. Bottom Line: The ECB’s new bond buying program has significantly reduced the downside risk of Italian government debt over the next 6-12 months. Fixed Income Strategy Implications The Fed’s dramatic move into direct funding of US companies is a game changer for the US corporate bond market. By providing a full liquidity backstop to all companies, the Fed is ensuring that no US investment grade issuer will have to worry about rolling over their maturing debt in an illiquid and nervous corporate bond market. Simply put, the Fed has cut out the left side of the distribution of corporate bond returns for the foreseeable future. The same argument goes for the ECB’s increased purchases of government bonds, with promises to buy more Italian debt, if necessary. For these reasons, we are upgrading our recommended stance on US investment grade corporate debt, and Italian sovereign debt to overweight - both on a tactical (0-6 months) basis in our model bond portfolio and on a strategic (6-12 months) basis. Chart 8Upgrade US IG Corporates And Italian Sovereign Debt On CB Buying For these reasons, we are upgrading our recommended stance on US investment grade corporate debt, and Italian sovereign debt to overweight - both on a tactical (0-6 months) basis in our model bond portfolio and on a strategic (6-12 months) basis (Chart 8). We are focusing only on these two markets for now, as an initial step to increase our recommended exposure to fixed income risk assets. There may be a spillover into other credit markets and sovereign debt, like European investment grade and Spanish government bonds. For now, however, we are focusing on US investment grade and Italy, while keeping underweights in other credit markets as a hedge against a renewed flare-up of COVID-19 related market risk. Bottom Line: Upgrade US investment grade corporates to overweight from neutral, and upgrade Italian government bonds to overweight from underweight, on both a tactical (0-6 months) and strategic (6-12 months) basis. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The details of the Fed’s new corporate bond buying programs can be found here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200323b1.pdf https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200323b2.pdf Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Financial markets are in a state of upheaval, and no one knows where or when they’ll bottom: We reiterate that it’s too early to dive back into equities or spread product. The policy path is not nearly as clear as it was during the last crisis, and central banks and legislatures may be hard-pressed to blunt the effects of a pandemic until it’s contained: Developed-world central banks and legislatures are committed to doing whatever they can to aid their economies, but their measures won’t gain full traction until the coronavirus is bottled up. Uncertainty breeds opportunities, however, … : There’s a good chance that the baby will be thrown out with the bathwater as the selling accentuates and turns indiscriminate. … so we’re seeking out the most attractive risk-reward profiles: Those with cash who keep their head may find multiple opportunities to earn outsized profits. We’re actively trying to insulate ourselves from the current surge of emotion. Feature We don’t know. We don’t know where stocks will bottom, or when. We don’t know how much the economy will contract, or how long second-round effects will extend the recession. We don’t know how many businesses will go bust, or how many people will lose jobs and default on mortgages and other loans. But no one ever does in the midst of crashes, or when a sudden-stop economic tsunami looms, and only the foolish, naïve or arrogant think they do. Investing is never a sure thing, and its difficulty is a feature, not a bug. Alpha is earned by correctly intuiting securities’ future direction from a limited number of data points. We were slow to grasp the global health ramifications of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, and the probability of a 2020 recession turned out to be considerably larger than we judged. We were also off the mark when we said the economy would likely bottom swiftly, roughly tracing the course of a V. We did not foresee the economically crippling strictures that would be imposed to slow COVID-19’s spread. We now recognize that the recession will be quite severe and that the market rout has further to go for as long as the self-reinforcing adverse consequences from quarantine-like conditions continue unabated. We suspect that markets are giving short shrift to the idea that something could short-circuit the vicious circle, however, and on that basis we think the outlook may not be as unrelentingly gloomy as market action is making it out to be. To be clear, we do not think risk assets have bottomed. We do not think investors should be in any rush whatsoever to buy stocks or spread product. Investors with cash should not lose sight of the fact that they are in control right now, and they should strike a hard bargain before parting with it. We still have a constructive 12-month view, however, and we do think investors should be making lists of assets they find attractive and the prices where they’d happily own them. We sketch out the reasons why across the following pages, but the nature of the analysis departs from our typical data-driven process. Market action has left the data far behind as investors have rushed to apply valuation haircuts in advance of economic releases that are sure to be dreadful. We are therefore pulling our focus out to 30,000 feet in this report, and highlighting the mindset we’re trying to bring to the task of navigating markets caught in the throes of peak fear. Crises Happen [W]hen the crisis began, governments around the world were too slow to act. When action came, it was late and inadequate. Policy was always behind the curve, always chasing an escalating crisis. And as the crisis intensified and more dramatic government action was required, the emergency actions meant to provide confidence and reassurance too often added to public anxiety and to investor uncertainty. The force of government support was not comprehensive or quick enough to withstand the deepening pressure brought on by a weakening economy. … We believe that the policy response has to be comprehensive, and forceful. There is more risk and greater cost in gradualism than in aggressive action. We believe that action has to be sustained until recovery is firmly established.1 Monetary and fiscal policy measures can still move markets, but their full effect won't be felt until the coronavirus is contained. Here we go again. Confronted with freefalling markets and the prospect of widespread business failures, Congress is preparing a gigantic fiscal stimulus package aimed at limiting the second-order effects of the crippling measures implemented to stem COVID-19’s spread and the Fed has already raided its 2008-9 playbook (Table 1). Officials could lift much of Treasury Secretary Geithner’s 2009 remarks announcing the stress tests to explain the rationale for the measures they’re proposing now. The difference is that policymakers in 2008 and 2009 could directly wield their monetary and fiscal tools to backstop a wobbling banking system, whereas now, the potent resources they’ve marshaled to spur the economy won’t be able to take full effect until the pandemic recedes. Table 1Borrowing From The 2008-09 Playbook As much as investors pine for a policy measure that puts a firewall around markets, and the cumulative global monetary and fiscal responses become truly substantial, the selloff may continue to rage until withering deleveraging pressure abates. The pattern may be very similar to 2009, when the S&P 500 didn’t bottom until four weeks after the financial crisis effectively ended upon Secretary Geithner’s pledge that the Treasury would provide sufficient capital to any of the largest 19 banks that failed the stress tests (Chart 1). Chart 1Deleveraging Pressure Might Drag On Stocks Even After Policymakers Fire Their Bazookas One Damn Thing After Another As we noted at the outset, investors are currently bedeviled by a multitude of significant unknowns about the coronavirus. Even epidemiologists don’t know if social distancing measures will be enough to arrest its spread within the US, how severe the mortality rate will be, or how long it will take to develop more effective treatment protocols. The current plunge was triggered by a pandemic that hadn’t occurred on a similar scale since the 1918-19 Spanish influenza outbreak, but significant unknowns are at the heart of every financial market panic. We were in the audience at the Economic Club of New York in October 2007, during the early stages of the subprime crisis, when Fed Chair Bernanke, asked what market and economic information he would like to have to improve the Fed’s decision-making process, replied, “I’d like to know what those damn things [securitized credit products] are worth.”2 Markets’ Outstanding Characteristic As Benjamin Graham pointed out repeatedly in The Intelligent Investor, markets have a deeply entrenched tendency to overreact. “The market is always making mountains out of molehills and exaggerating ordinary vicissitudes into major setbacks.”3 “[W]hen an individual company … begins to lose ground in the economy, Wall Street is quick to assume that its future is entirely hopeless and it should be avoided at any price.”4 “[T]he outstanding characteristic of the stock market is its tendency to react excessively to favorable and unfavorable influences.”5 In times of severe stress, the market tendency to overreact at the individual-stock level radiates out to the entire market. As the buzzards circle, and the margin calls arrive, investors scramble to sell stocks that have managed to dodge the brunt of the decline, and therefore bring something closer to their perceived fair value than the stocks that have already been savaged. In Dennis Gartman’s memorable phrasing, “when the cops raid the house of ill repute, they take away the good girls and the piano player, too.” The indiscriminate selling that draws better stocks into the vortex creates opportunities, and it seems to us that there must be many sound issues that are being tarred with the same brush as companies in the travel, hospitality, restaurant and brick-and-mortar retail industries, and the oil producers who are caught in the Russia-Saudi Arabia crossfire. Outstanding Investors’ Characteristics About 25 years ago, we read the Market Wizards profiles of elite traders before interviewing for trading positions with broker-dealers. We distilled them into seven characteristics of successful traders that were at the heart of our pitch: Competitiveness, Humility, Ability to Psychologically Handle Losses, Patience, Discipline, Emotional Detachment and Willingness to Be a Contrarian. We haven’t worked on a trading desk in a while, but those qualities would suit all investors, and we think they’re especially apropos at times of peak emotion. No one can manufacture them out of nothing, but by keeping them in mind, and trying to live up to them, we can draw on the reserves we do possess to make better decisions in the midst of the rout (Table 2). Cash is precious right now, and investors should part with it only when they're certain they're getting quite a bit in return. Table 2Honing One's Mental Edge What Now? We reiterate that it is too early to re-risk portfolios. Markets in the throes of daily convulsions are not healthy markets, and we do not expect that stocks will bottom until there is evidence that the global virus infection curve is flattening. Investors should always prune or exit positions that have become poor fits as the backdrop changes, but we would not dramatically alter asset allocation strategies now. Take a deep breath, and focus on the internal aspects you can control. Cash is precious during major selloffs, because it stabilizes portfolios while the storm rages and provides valuable optionality when it inevitably ends. We would deploy it slowly, via limit orders below the market in selected stocks that have been unfairly lumped in with the most vulnerable issues. We continue to embrace the idea of writing out-of-the-money puts in stocks we would happily own at lower levels. When the VIX spent most of last week in the 70s and 80s (Chart 2), implied volatilities on single-stock options soared into the triple digits. In the four largest banks, it was possible to earn an annualized return exceeding 100% by writing an April put between 12 and 15% below last sale (Box, page 8). Similar opportunities must be available in other besieged industries. Chart 2Implied Volatility On S&P 500 Index Options Made A New All-Time High These are unquestionably trying times for investors of all stripes, but they are especially hard on those with long-only mandates. Professional investors add much of their value by saving their clients from themselves – by keeping them from succumbing to the temptation to go all-in near market tops and run screaming from risk assets near market bottoms. We all need to make a conscious effort to overcome counterproductive emotions and impulses when markets plunge; reminders that the general pattern is similar, even if the specific circumstances change, help us to keep our eye on the ball. Trying to live up to the seven items we memorized 25 years ago when trying to secure a junior seat on a trading desk does, too. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Box: Extreme Volatility In SIFI Bank Options There are two possible outcomes for an investor who writes a put option. The option will expire without being exercised, in which case the writer will pocket the premium, or the holder will exercise it, compelling the writer to purchase the stock at the strike price. The writer keeps the premium in that case, too, so that his/her basis in the stock is equivalent to the strike price less the premium. The top panel in Table 3 shows the pricing data for April puts on the four largest banks with strike prices 12 to 15% below Thursday’s closing prices. The bottom panel uses that data to calculate the implied annualized return for each put option in the event that it is not exercised, and the option writer’s basis in the stock as a share of its tangible book value in the event that it is. Table 3Insuring SIFI Equities Is Tremendously Expensive We understand that banks are on the credit front lines, and that defaults will impair their book value. We further understand that their net interest margins, and therefore their revenues, are pressured by declines in longer-term interest rates, though it is our long-held conviction that markets overestimate the largest banks’ exposure to a flattening yield curve. The decision to own them is hardly a slam dunk, but the cost of insuring against further declines is staggering. We recognize that not every investor has discretion to write puts, and it is not something to be done lightly in any event. Writers of puts on SIFI banks are being paid annualized returns of 100% because equity prices are plunging, and investors are especially worried about banks’ exposure to the spreading pain. The compensation is so high, however, that we think the risk-reward proposition merits careful consideration. It may not be a no-brainer to write puts on the SIFI banks right now, but we certainly wouldn’t buy them at these prices. Footnotes 1 Prepared Remarks by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner Introducing the Financial Stability Plan, February 10, 2009. Accessed from https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg18.aspx on March 18, 2020. 2https://www.econclubny.org/legacyarchive/-/blogs/2007-ben-bernanke Accessed on March 18, 2020. The referenced Q&A exchange begins at the 51:49 mark. 3 Graham, Benjamin, The Intelligent Investor, HarperCollins: New York, 2005, p. 97. 4Ibid, p. 15 5Ibid, p. 18

