Policy
There are three levels of inequality that investors need to be familiar with in the context of populism: global, national, labor. The first level starts big, on the international stage, where economic outcomes are examined on a cross-sectional basis.…
Highlights Are Markets Too Pessimistic On U.S. Growth & Inflation? What Is China’s Economic Pain Threshold To Trigger A Policy Response? Have Central Banks Become Less Concerned About Financial Markets? Feature Happy New Year! 2019 has started much like 2018 ended, with elevated global market volatility. The combination of more evidence of slowing global growth – fueled by spillovers from U.S.-China trade tensions – and central banks perceived to be overly hawkish has crushed investor sentiment. Money has flooded out of risk assets like equities and corporate debt and shifted into the traditional safe haven assets – government bonds, surplus currencies like the Japanese yen and even gold. U.S. equities and credit, which had been a refuge from the global market weakness for much of last year, have underperformed sharply as markets have moved to price in the global economic softness reaching U.S. shores. These market trends obviously run counter to our recommended positioning for overall portfolio duration (below benchmark) and credit exposure (neutral overall, favoring the U.S. over Europe and Emerging Markets). Yet we advise staying the course with our recommendations, as market pricing has become too pessimistic relative to likely global growth and inflation outcomes. The bulk of the recent decline in global bond yields has come from falling inflation expectations, which have been linked to the sharp fall in oil prices seen in the final months of 2018 (Chart of the Week). This is shown in Table 1, which presents the breakdown of the decline in the 10-year benchmark government bond yields for the major developed markets since the peak in U.S. Treasury yields back on November 8. Real yields have fallen by a more modest amount than inflation expectations in most countries, even with the pullback in cyclical indicators like the global PMI. Expected 2019 rate hikes are now fully priced out of money market curves, most notably in the U.S. Chart of the WeekSlowing Growth Is Not Why Yields Have Plunged Table 1Decomposing 10-Year Yield Changes Since The November 2018 Peak In our view, there are three vital questions regarding the recent market turbulence that must be answered before determining the appropriate global fixed income investment strategy over the next 6-12 months. The answers lead us to maintain our current recommendations on duration, country allocation and credit exposure, even with the recent market turbulence. 1) Are Markets Too Pessimistic On U.S. Growth & Inflation? The December reading for the U.S. ISM Manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) released last week showed the largest single month deceleration since 2008 (Chart 2). All the main subcomponents of the ISM index fell, including the New Orders and Export indices which are now close to falling below the 50 threshold (Chart 3). Coming on the heels of China’s PMI dipping below 50, markets became more worried that the mighty U.S. economy was being dragged down to the weaker pace of growth seen outside the U.S. Chart 2Decomposing 10-Year Yield Changes Since The November 2018 Peak Chart 3U.S. ISM Overstating U.S. Economic Weakness Yet when looking a broader array of U.S. indicators, the domestic economy still appears to be in good shape, albeit with some lost growth momentum. Consumer confidence remains solid, employment growth is accelerating, household incomes are growing at a faster pace and the personal savings rate remains elevated – all of which provide support for a faster pace of consumer spending (third panel). At the same time, the U.S. Conference Board leading economic indicator is still pointing to a healthy above-trend pace of GDP growth in 2019. U.S. Treasury yields have fallen to levels consistent with the drift lower in the ISM index (top panel), with the market now discounting one full 25bp rate cut to occur within the next twelve months. That will not happen given the tightness of the U.S. labor market and persistence of underlying domestic inflation pressures. The robust December gain reported in last Friday’s U.S. Payrolls report (+312k) may have surprised the markets, but our U.S. Employment Growth model had been signaling a faster pace of job growth for the past several months (Chart 4). The year-over-year growth in Average Hourly Earnings rose to 3.2%, the highest level in nearly a decade. With the overall unemployment still at a historically low 3.9% as labor demand is increasing, wages are likely to remain under upward pressure in the next 6-12 months. Chart 4U.S. Employment & Wages Are Accelerating Given this backdrop of economic growth that is likely to remain above-trend throughout 2019, it will be difficult to generate a sustained downturn in U.S. inflation this year, even given the lagged impact of the strong U.S. dollar and lower oil prices. While some decline in headline inflation measures is inevitable in the coming months given the rapid pace and magnitude of the 2018 oil plunge, BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy team continues to see a positive demand/supply balance helping push oil prices back towards the $80/bbl level in 2019.1 That would ensure that any decline in headline U.S. inflation would be short in duration, and of far less magnitude than the move that occurred after the 2014/15 oil plunge given the more robust domestic inflation backdrop (Chart 5). Chart 5This Is NOT A Repeat Of the 2015/16 Deflation Scare A sober assessment of the U.S. economic and inflation data leads us to conclude that U.S. interest rate markets have swung too far to the dovish side. The inflation expectations component of U.S. Treasury yields is now too low, and the Fed rate cut that is now discounted in money markets will not materialize. Rate hikes are the more likely outcome, the repricing of which will put renewed upward pressure on Treasury yields. 2) What Is China’s Economic Pain Threshold To Trigger A Policy Response? Of the potential catalysts that could turn the current investor pessimism into optimism, signs of improving Chinese growth would likely top the list. China’s economy has lost considerable momentum, with year-over-year real GDP growth slowing to 6.5% in the third quarter of last year and higher frequency data showing a further deceleration in the fourth quarter. The profit warning issued by Apple last week, prompted by an unexpectedly sharp slowing of Chinese mobile phone demand, is a sign that Chinese consumer spending may be faltering. There are several causes for the growth slump, both domestic and foreign. Chinese authorities have been clamping down on domestic leverage given elevated private debt levels, while also taking action to reduce domestic pollution levels – policies that all have helped dampen industrial activity. More recently, and more importantly, the U.S.-China tariff war has started to have a real economic impact on the economy through slowing trade activity and diminished business confidence. Given the Chinese government’s perpetual interest in maintaining domestic stability by limiting any cyclical increases in unemployment, the incentive is there for policymakers to provide renewed stimulus to put a floor under economic growth. The last such boost came in 2015/16, when the Chinese government implemented an aggressive expansion of fiscal spending alongside monetary policy measures such as interest rate cuts, reductions in reserve requirement ratios and currency depreciation. That package was enough to cause a sharp reacceleration of the Chinese economy, but only after nominal GDP growth had fallen to an 16-year low of 6.4% at the end of 2015 (Chart 6). Chart 6Nominal China Growth Less Than 7.5% Should Trigger More Stimulus … Policymakers will likely be forced into action again in 2019 if nominal GDP growth, which hit 9.6% in the third quarter of 2018, falls back below 7.5%. Forward-looking economic measures like our Li Keqiang leading indicator and the export orders component of China’s manufacturing PMI suggest that weaker growth outcome could occur by mid-2019. China’s policymakers are likely to announce some form of stimulus in the first half of the year help counteract the growth slump, which could help boost global investor confidence (especially if it is accompanied by a new trade agreement with the U.S.). While Chinese policymakers are now under more pressure to provide stimulus measures, the tools available to them are more limited than was the case in 2015/16 (Chart 7). Interest rate cuts could happen if growth continues to fall more rapidly than expected, but that would create a burst in private sector leverage that policymakers would seek to avoid. The currency could also be weakened further, but the USD/CNY exchange rate is already back to near the 7.0 level reached in the 2016 devaluation. Chart 7...Atlhough Policy Options Are More Limited Than 2016 That leaves additional cuts in the reserve requirement ratio and increases in fiscal spending as the two most likely means for China to stimulate its economy in the coming months. Yet even the fiscal channel has limits, given the much higher starting point for the budget deficit today (3.7% of GDP) than in 2015 (2%). So while the trigger for a China policy stimulus will likely be reached by mid-2019, the magnitude of the stimulus will be nowhere near as large as the 2015/16 measures. This will help stabilize global growth expectations, but likely not by enough to provide a major boost to global commodity prices or export demand from emerging market countries that are heavily dependent on China. This leads us to remain cautious on emerging market credit exposure, as we prefer to own U.S. corporate debt instead where the growth/profit outlook is better. 3) Have Central Banks Become Less Concerned About Financial Markets? A popular market narrative of late has been that the Fed “made a mistake” with its last rate hike in December. A similar argument was made for the ECB choosing the end its Asset Purchase Program last month with inflation still well short of its target and European growth decelerating. The idea that central banks had fallen “out of tune” with financial markets has spooked investors who fear that policymakers are carrying out a pre-conceived plan to normalize monetary policy without any regard to financial markets. We find this to be a highly dubious conclusion. Central bankers still care about financial markets – or, more accurately, financial conditions – but the hurdle for policymakers to respond to falling asset prices is higher now than in previous years because of a lack of spare economic capacity. Simply put, any tightening of financial conditions must be large enough to trigger a slowing of growth to a below-potential pace, resulting in rising unemployment and weaker inflation pressures. That has not been the case – yet – in the major developed economies. Financial conditions indices (FCIs) – which measure the combined impact of equity prices, credit spreads and currencies – typically lead economic growth by 2-3 quarters. The latest selloffs in equity and credit markets in the U.S. and Europe, while significant, have not been large enough to push FCIs for those regions to levels that would be consistent with below-trend growth, using the 2015/16 episode as a reference point (Chart 8). Chart 8Tightening Financial Conditions Not Signaling Below-Trend Growth...Yet Financial conditions in the U.S. are much closer to that 2015/16 reference point than in Europe, where bond yields remain very depressed and the euro is still an undervalued currency. Yet the domestic U.S. economy is in a much better state than was the case in 2015/16, as discussed earlier in this report. It is highly likely that the level of the U.S. FCI that would trigger a move to below-trend U.S. growth is much different today than in 2015/16. In other words, it would take a bigger widening of U.S. corporate credit spreads, or a sharper selloff in U.S. equity values, to generate the same type of drag on U.S. growth relative to 2015/16. Yet U.S. interest rate markets have already responded as if there was no such change in the amount of FCI tightening that would result in a more dovish Fed policy. The U.S. money markets have gone from pricing three rate hikes in 2019 to one rate cut, while bond investors have largely neutralized their bearish Treasury duration positioning (Chart 9). Chart 9USTs Now Discounting Too Much Fed Dovishness That swing in sentiment on the Fed’s next move flies in the face of the underlying health of the U.S. economic data, as well as our Fed Monitor which continues to signal the need for more Fed rate hikes (Chart 10). Our other Central Bank Monitors tell a similar story (outside of Australia), with the Monitors signaling no need for easier monetary policy but with money markets pricing out any probability of a rate hike over the next year. This leaves global government bond yields exposed to any sign that global growth momentum is stabilizing, particularly with the inflation expectations component of bond yields also vulnerable to a rebound in oil prices (Chart 11). Chart 10Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Repricing Of Rate Hikes Chart 11Bond Yields Are Now Exposed To A Rebound In Oil Prices Our conclusion is that financial conditions in the major economies have not yet tightened by enough to end the process of normalizing global monetary policy from the extraordinarily accommodative settings seen in recent years. In other words, bond yields have not yet peaked for this cycle. Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Oil Volatility Will Persist: 2019 Brent Forecast Lowered to $80/bbl”, dated January 3rd 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Risk assets have had a rough go of it since we last published on December 17th: Equities have been through the wringer, spreads have widened sharply, and the 10-year Treasury yield has tumbled to an 11-month low. We don’t put much stock in the talk that the Fed is about to go too far, … : We still judge that the fed funds rate is comfortably shy of its equilibrium level. The economy will decelerate this year, but fiscal stimulus will keep it growing above trend. … and even if market-unfriendly policies merit a lower equity multiple, … : A bull market in Washington uncertainty is a recipe for a lower multiple, and there are no signs that policy uncertainty will ebb any time soon. … we think the time has come to put our cash overweight to work: Equities priced in a lot of bad news when the forward multiple fell below 14. If earnings hold up like we think they will, a recovery to the mid-15s would deliver a double-digit gain, and that merits an equity overweight relative to cash and bonds. Feature Thanks to Christmas Eve and New Year’s Eve falling on Mondays, we haven’t published since December 17th. A lot has happened in those three weeks, starting with the FOMC’s final 2018 meeting. As we’ve gathered our bearings and tried to set a course forward through the volatility, we’ve asked ourselves several questions about markets, policy and the economy. This week’s report reviews those questions, including the ones the clients we met three weeks ago might want to ask now. Is the expansion coming to an end? Not just yet; we still think it has at least a year to run. Following several uninspiring releases, the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast of real final domestic demand has slipped to 3.3% from 3.8%, but it’s still 3.3%. That may seem too good to be true this late in the cycle, but that’s what 100 basis points of fiscal stimulus can do when injected into an economy already operating at full capacity. The IMF estimates there’s still another 40 basis points of stimulus coming in 2019, and we expect that that infusion will be enough to stave off the next recession until 2020 or beyond. Is the Fed about to make a policy mistake? We do not think so. Although the neutral, or equilibrium, policy rate is only observable after the fact, research from the head of the New York Fed holds that the FOMC is not on the verge of breaching the neutral threshold. The widely-followed Laubach-Williams model estimates that the real neutral rate is between 0.75 and 0.875%, or 2.75-2.875% in nominal terms.1 Our internal equilibrium fed funds rate model sees even more breathing room – it estimates that the (nominal) equilibrium rate is around 3%, and that it will rise to around 3⅜% by the end of the year. U.S. equities have been hypersensitive to perceived inflection points in monetary policy throughout the sell-off, which began roughly after Jay Powell said in an October 3rd interview that interest rates were “a long way from neutral.” Interestingly, though, the money market’s expectations never really budged. At the time of the Powell interview, it was pricing in a December hike to 2.50%, and a 40% chance of one more hike to 2.75%. It would take the probability of a 2.75% terminal rate up to 80% in early November, but it was again calling for a 40% chance of 2.75% when we were on the road during the two-day December meeting. It now puts the odds of an additional hike at just 4%, and says the Fed will have cut rates once by the middle of next year (Chart 1). Chart 1According To The Money Market, The Fed's Done We do not know what is behind the money market’s obstinacy, but we see an economy that has far more accommodation than it needs. While we think it’s inevitable that the Fed will tighten into a recession – that’s life with a blunt monetary policy instrument that works with long and uncertain lags – we don’t think it is on the verge of doing so. Fiscal stimulus will ensure that the U.S. economy grows above trend again this year, and there are no imbalances in housing2 or the other cyclical segments of the economy that would make the expansion particularly vulnerable (Chart 2). Elevated rates of job openings (Chart 3, middle panel) and job quits (Chart 3, bottom panel) indicate that the labor market will continue drawing in workers (Chart 3, top panel), supporting consumption and growth. Chart 2No Signs Of Overheating, ... Chart 3... And The Jobs Outlook Is Strong You aren’t still calling for four rate hikes this year, are you? Let’s call it three, now that the market-driven tightening in financial conditions (Chart 4) has already done some of the work of cooling off the economy. We take the Fed at its word when it says its actions are data-driven, and we don’t think that it will pile on when credit spreads have shot up to their 2015 oil-collapse/shale-patch-distress levels (Chart 5) and equity prices have swooned. If credit spreads retraced meaningfully, and equities went back to making new highs, four hikes might come back into play. Conversely, if spreads continued to widen and took aim at their 2016 peaks, two hikes might become more likely than three. Given our expectations for spreads (they will not approach 2015-6’s quasi-recession levels, but corporate leverage is too high to support material narrowing), and equities (the S&P 500 will be hard-pressed to eclipse September’s high), our base case is three hikes. Chart 4Tighter, Yes; Tight, No Chart 5Spreads Say It's 2015-6, ... Have the economic fundamentals really deteriorated that much over the last three months? Not that we can tell. There have been some high-profile data disappointments here and there, like the punk manufacturing ISM release last Thursday, but the overall message has been positive, and Friday’s jobs report was consistent with an economy growing above trend. The economic surprise indexes have been declining since November, but they’re not at levels that are anywhere out of the ordinary (Chart 6). Our earnings-per-share model still sees robust growth for corporate earnings (Chart 7). Chart 6... But The Data Beg To Differ Chart 7Earnings Will Decelerate, But They Won't Contract We are as discomfited by the prospect of new trade barriers as any other economists, and we have eyed the divergence between U.S. acceleration and rest-of-the-world deceleration with increasing wariness. Even for an economy as comparatively closed as the U.S., decoupling is only a temporary phenomenon. We tend to equate global activity with global trade, and generally view developing economies as especially dependent on trade. It is still early days, but we have found it mildly encouraging that EM activity and EM equities have been outpacing their DM equivalents. The growth backdrop can’t be that bad if the emerging markets are perking up. Do you still think the S&P 500 has yet to make its highs? Maybe, but we wouldn’t bet on it. We view stock prices, P, as the product of expected earnings, E, and the multiple investors are willing to pay for those earnings, P/E. If our confidence in the expansion is not misplaced, and corporate earnings match analysts’ consensus bottom-up expectations of $174, topping September 20th’s 2,930.75 closing high will require a multiple approaching 17. If analysts project year-over-year EPS gains across all of 2020’s quarters, E will rise over the course of the year, reducing the P/E expansion needed to make a new high, but an assault on the peak cannot succeed without a meaningful re-rating from today’s multiple in the 14s. Although multiple expansion has played second fiddle to earnings growth (Chart 8, middle panel) across the nine-and-a-half year bull market, it declined nearly 30% peak-to-trough in 2018, and was entirely responsible for the fourth-quarter sell-off (Chart 8, bottom panel). While we think the de-rating has gone too far, the last three months have persuaded us that a return to the 18.8 peak is too much to ask. Our working hypothesis is that the equity market has decided that Washington has become enough of an impediment that the market multiple has to come off a couple of points. Markets hate uncertainty, and the policy climate is flat-out unsettled: the principal architect and guarantor of the international postwar order repeatedly threatens to topple that order; the U.S.-China showdown does not appear to be nearing a resolution; and both political parties seem willing to sacrifice the economy to gain an advantage in 2020. In the absence of new deregulatory initiatives or tax cuts to balance out the broadly investment-unfriendly instincts of several of D.C.’s power players, a poisonous partisan climate and a dysfunctional administration can no longer be ignored. Chart 8Earnings Built The Bull Market; De-Rating Almost Wrecked It Okay, so what do you do now? We upgrade equities to overweight with the cash we raised in mid-June when we downgraded them from overweight to neutral. Although we wouldn’t bet on the S&P 500 topping 2,931, it doesn’t have to do so to generate alluring prospective returns. From a 2,500 starting point, a target of 2,750, or $174 earnings at a 15.75 multiple, would generate a 10% capital gain. If the economy holds up in line with our base-case expectation, it’s hard not to like U.S. equities at current levels. We were eager to put our cash overweight to work as we watched equities gyrate in October and November, but the combination of December’s valuation reset and the improved equity outlook from our Global Investment Strategy colleagues’ MacroQuant model encourages us to pull the trigger now. More money is made when conditions, or perceptions, go from terrible to bad than when they go from good to great. As the approaching earnings season redirects attention to the solid fundamental outlook, and the Treasury secretary stops taking actions that make investors wonder if conditions are far worse than they feared, there is a path for perceptions to improve. Chart 9Spreads Have Overreacted We continue to hold to our view that markets are underestimating the potential for inflation, making Treasuries vulnerable, especially at longer maturities. We reiterate our recommendation to underweight bonds via an underweight in Treasuries, and to hold interest-rate duration below benchmark in all fixed-income categories. We continue to recommend a neutral weighting in credit-sensitive fixed income, as the spread widening is incompatible with projected defaults (Chart 9), but we are not counting on meaningful spread compression this late in the cycle. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 From the spreadsheet containing updated estimates of the baseline model described in “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest,” by Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams, published in the November 2003 Review of Economics and Statistics, located at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/rstar, and accessed January 3, 2019. 2 We discussed housing at length in the November 19 and December 3, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Reports, “Housing: Past, Present And (Near) Future,” and “Housing Seminar,” respectively, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Fed officials consider many different economic and financial market variables, and the weight they attach to each factor depends on their own biases and pre-dispositions. Of the numerous variables that might bring the Fed toward easier monetary policy,…
Dear Client, In lieu of next week’s report, I will be hosting a webcast on Wednesday, January 9th at 10 AM EST, when I will be discussing the economic and financial market outlook for 2019 and answering your questions. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The lack of major financial and economic imbalances in the U.S., as well as the Fed’s ability to moderate the pace of rate hikes, reduce the risk of a vicious cycle where tighter financial conditions lead to slower economic growth and even tighter financial conditions. The scope for central banks to cut rates is more limited outside the United States. Imbalances are also greater abroad. Nevertheless, the news is not all bleak, with the recent rebound in China’s credit impulse being a case in point. We turned more bullish on risk assets following December’s post-FOMC equity sell-off. A moderately overweight position in global equities over a 12-month horizon is currently justified. While we continue to favor the U.S. over other bourses in dollar terms, our conviction level in this regional bias has decreased. Treasury yields are likely to rise in an environment where U.S. growth is strong enough to enable the Fed to continue raising rates. Outside Japan, global government bond yields will also increase in 2019. We are removing our long June-2019 Fed funds futures contract hedge, and we are now solely outright short the December-2020 contract. We are also taking profits on our March-2019 EEM ETF put for a gain of 104%. Feature Merry Crisis And A Happy New Fear Santa arrived early this year. The plunge in stocks allowed investors to buy some of the world’s premier companies at a mouthwatering 20%-to-30% discount to what they would have paid just a few months earlier. What a gift! Needless to say, most investors would not regard last month’s stock market performance in such a favorable light. But why not? One answer is that investors must mark their portfolios to market. Thus, even if the decline in equity prices raised future returns, it still implied a decline in present net worth. Yet, this cannot be the whole explanation, because if all investors expected stocks to bounce back quickly, they would not have sold in the first place. Clearly, many investors must have come to the conclusion that the stock market would not only go down but stay down. However, this presents a puzzle. The economic environment did not change that much in the weeks leading up to the October sell-off. Growth has slowed more recently (Chart 1), with this morning’s disappointing ISM manufacturing report being the latest example, but this appears to have been mainly a response to the souring market climate rather than the cause of it. Chart 1Tighter Financial Conditions Have Led To Slower Growth Reverse Causality? This raises an intriguing possibility: What if the drop in stock prices and jump in credit spreads that began in late September hurt expectations of economic growth by enough to justify a further discount in risk asset valuations? Such a “Financial Conditions Index (FCI) doom loop” is not just a theoretical construct. The last two U.S. recessions were both the products of burst asset bubbles — first the dotcom bubble and then the housing bubble. Could such a self-fulfilling vicious cycle be erupting again? If so, any rally in stocks or credit should be sold into, just as was the case in both 2001 and 2007. U.S. Fairly Resilient To A Doom Loop Fortunately, there are two reasons to think that such an outcome will not reoccur, at least not in the United States. First, as Box 1 explains, an FCI doom loop is more likely to unfold when economic growth becomes very sensitive to changes in financial conditions. This normally happens when economic and financial imbalances are elevated. That does not appear to be the case today. Unlike in the lead-up to the last two recessions, the U.S. private sector is a net saver whose income outstrips spending by 2.1% of GDP (Chart 2). Cyclical spending – the sum of residential investment, business capex, and expenditures on consumer durable goods – is also far below prior business-cycle peaks as a share of GDP (Chart 3). Chart 2The U.S. Private Sector Is A Net Saver Chart 3U.S. Economy: Cyclical Spending Is Still Restrained Despite recent releveraging in some categories, U.S. household debt has continued to decline in relation to the size of the economy. The ratio of personal debt-to-disposable income is now 34 percentage points below pre-crisis levels (Chart 4). Chart 4Household Leverage Is Below Its Peak U.S. corporate debt has moved in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, while the ratio of U.S. corporate debt-to-GDP has climbed to a record high, it is still quite low by global standards (Chart 5). Perhaps more importantly, corporate debt is generally held by non-leveraged institutions. If corporate defaults were to rise unexpectedly, the losses to lenders would not pose the same systemic risk to the financial sector as mortgage defaults did during the Global Financial Crisis. Chart 5U.S. Corporate Debt Is High, But It Is Higher Elsewhere The Fed’s Reaction Function It is not surprising that the stock market sell-off accelerated in early October following Fed Chairman, and failed golfer, Jay Powell’s comment that interest rates were “far from neutral.” We think that worries that the Fed will tighten too quickly are misplaced. Yes, monetary policy operates with “long and variable lags.” However, financial conditions, which lead growth, can be observed in real time (Chart 6). Chart 6Global Financial Conditions Have Tightened Most of the tightening in financial conditions since late September has been due to falling equity prices. Our baseline scenario envisions a gain of roughly 10% in the S&P 500 in 2019. A rebound in stocks of this magnitude will reverse most of the recent FCI tightening, thereby allowing the Fed to raise rates three times this year. But if equities continue to sag, the Fed will scale back further monetary tightening or even cut rates. The mere possibility of such a policy response reduces the odds of an FCI doom loop. A Mixed Bag Outside The U.S. The economic outlook is murkier outside the United States. Economic and financial imbalances are greater in the EM space and parts of Europe. Non-U.S. central banks also have less scope to respond to adverse shocks, either because of fears that looser monetary policy will spark capital outflows (as is the case in many emerging markets) or because of the presence of the zero-bound constraint on interest rates (as is the case in the euro area and Japan). Nevertheless, the situation is not that bad. EM assets have been fairly resilient over the past few months, at least in comparison to their developed economy counterparts (Chart 7). China’s credit impulse has actually perked up, an indication that while credit growth is falling, it is doing so at a slower pace. Chart 8 shows that the Chinese credit impulse is highly correlated with global industrial commodity prices. We still expect global growth to slow in the first half of 2019, but at this point, much of the slowdown has been discounted in asset markets. With that in mind, we are raising the stop on our short AUD/JPY trade to 10% and instituting a profit target of 15%. Chart 7EM Assets Have Been Outperforming Recently Chart 8The Increase In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For Industrial Commodity Prices The Perils Of Discrete Decision-Making One of the annoyances of being an investment strategist is that you often feel compelled to take discrete views on where the markets are heading. Are you bullish, bearish, or neutral? Actually, it is usually just bullish or bearish because most people regard neutral views as lacking in conviction and insight. This incentive structure is counterproductive. Not only does it cause analysts to turn a blind eye to incoming data that may challenge their thesis, it disregards how professional investors actually operate. Successful investors scale into positions as the market gets cheaper and scale out as it becomes more expensive. Trying to time the bottom (or the top) with exact precision is futile. With that in mind, we are going to tweak the way we make recommendations going forward in order to improve transparency, accountability, and accuracy. Rather than simply stating whether we are bullish, bearish, or neutral, we will assign the main asset classes a subjective score between zero and one hundred, with 0-to-40 being bearish, 40-to-60 being neutral, and 60-to-100 being bullish. We will adjust the score in every publication. To add analytic rigor to this framework, we will also compare our subjective model score with that of our MacroQuant model. Where Things Now Stand We downgraded global equities last June, but moved back to overweight following December’s post-FOMC meeting sell-off, as valuations reached that rather blurry line at which a modest equity overweight was warranted. Our subjective score for global equities currently stands at 65%, above the model’s estimate of 50%. Our moderately bullish view reflects our expectation that global growth will stabilize by mid-year and monetary policy will remain accommodative, even if the Fed raises rates by more than what the markets are currently discounting. Tempering our enthusiasm is the recognition that the business cycle is getting long in the tooth – especially in the U.S. – and that global equity valuations, while far cheaper than they were a few months ago, are still significantly less favorable than they were near past market bottoms (Chart 9). Chart 9Global Equity Valuations Have Improved Regionally, we continue to favor U.S. stocks over other developed markets, and DM over EM more broadly. However, our conviction level on this view is not high, and we are prepared to revise it if it looks like global growth is accelerating, an outcome that would limit any further dollar strength (our subjective dollar score currently stands at 70%, below the model’s estimate of 92%). Reflecting our expectation of decent global equity returns in 2019 and our waning conviction to be underweight EM, we are taking profits on in our March-2019 EEM ETF put for a gain of 104%. Please note that our view on EM is more optimistic than that of Arthur Budaghyan, BCA’s chief emerging markets strategist, who continues to see considerable downside risks to EM assets. For now, Treasury yields are likely to rise in an environment where U.S. growth is strong enough to enable the Fed to continue raising rates. We assign the 10-year yield a score of 30%, which is close to our model estimate of 32%. Accordingly, we are removing our long June-2019 Fed funds futures contract hedge, and we are now solely outright short the December-2020 contract. Core European bond yields will increase, reflecting diminished excess capacity in the euro area and the end of ECB net asset purchases. U.K. yields should also grind higher, as the odds of a soft Brexit (or no Brexit) improve. Only in Japan will yields remain contained, thanks to the BoJ’s ongoing yield curve control regime. We do not expect spread product to have a banner year, but the current yield pick-up should be sufficient to ensure that risky credit outperforms cash. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1 The Analytics Of Doom Loops When will a tightening in financial conditions stemming from lower equity prices and higher borrowing costs lead to a vicious circle of slower economic growth and even tighter financial conditions? The answer depends on how sensitive economic growth is to financial conditions in relation to how sensitive financial conditions are to growth. Figure 1 shows two equilibrium schedules, one for the economy (EE) and one for asset markets (AA). Both schedules slope downward. The EE schedule is downward-sloping because easier financial conditions boost growth. If growth is too strong given the prevailing level of financial conditions, economic activity will slow (Panel A). The AA schedule is downward-sloping because equity prices tend to fall and credit spreads rise when growth slows. If equity prices are too high and credit spreads are too narrow for a certain level of growth, then financial conditions will tighten (Panel B). Suppose economic growth is not very sensitive to changes in financial conditions, perhaps because imbalances in the economy are limited (Panel C). Then changes in financial conditions will be fleeting: A decline in equity prices or a widening in credit spreads will not hurt growth very much, allowing the stock market and credit market to quickly normalize. In contrast, suppose that economic growth is very sensitive to financial conditions, so much so that the EE schedule is flatter than the AA schedule. In this case, the economy will be vulnerable to self-reinforcing booms and busts (Panel D). In particular, a small random jump from U to UI will send the economy careening towards a doom loop of ever-weaker growth and tighter financial conditions. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
The Federal Reserve raised the target range for the fed funds rate by 25 basis points yesterday, bringing it up to 2.25%-2.5%, but was more conciliatory in its forward guidance. Specifically, the Fed made the following changes: FOMC participants significantly…
Dear Clients, This is the final publication for the year. The Emerging Markets Strategy team wishes you a very happy holiday season and a prosperous New Year! Best regards, Arthur Budaghyan Highlights The recent EM outperformance is a mid-bear market stabilization, and is at its late stage. Market signals and economic data are consistent with a further slowdown in global growth emanating from China/EM. We reiterate that global trade is heading for a period of contraction and investors should position accordingly. EM will sell off even as U.S. bond yields drop further. Feature Global investors have been increasing their absolute exposure to EM equities over the past two months, despite the ongoing drop in DM share prices.1 The common narrative is that a potential pause by the Fed next year, the trade truce between the U.S. and China and the latter’s ongoing stimulus measures are together sufficient to propel EM risk assets higher on a tactical and even cyclical horizon. In contrast, we believe the recent EM outperformance is a mid-bear market stabilization, and is at a late stage. We have written at length that neither the Fed nor the trade wars were the main culprit behind the EM selloff early this year. The key reason behind the EM and commodities selloff was the slowdown in Chinese/EM economies and global trade. China’s policy stimulus has so far been insufficient to reverse the economy’s growth slump. As such, the odds are that China/EM growth and global trade will continue to disappoint, and the EM selloff and underperformance will resume sooner than later. Market Signals EM risk assets are sensitive to China’s growth and global trade. Market signals remains downbeat on both. In particular: Global cyclicals continue to send a bleak message about the global business cycle. Global machinery, chemicals, freight and logistics as well as semiconductor stocks have been underperforming the global equity index in a falling market (Chart I-1). This is consistent with an ongoing slowdown in global growth. Chart I-1AGlobal Cyclicals Are Underperforming In A Falling Market Chart I-1BGlobal Cyclicals Are Underperforming In A Falling Market EM relative equity performance versus DM has historically been tightly correlated with global materials’ share prices versus the overall global stock benchmark (Chart I-2, top panel). Remarkably, the recent EM outperformance has not been corroborated by outperformance of global materials (Chart I-2, bottom panel). This is additional evidence that suggests investors should fade this EM rebound/outperformance. Chart I-2EM Vs. DM Is Akin To Global Materials Vs. Benchmark Index EM risk assets are very sensitive to both global trade and commodities prices. The majority of forward-looking indicators on global trade remain dismal (please refer to the section below for a more detailed discussion on this topic). Interestingly, the current trajectory of global equities – including the run-up in share prices before January 2018’s peak, the top formation itself, and the subsequent decline – impeccably track the same trajectory that occurred between 1998 and 2000 in terms of both oscillations and magnitude (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Are Global Equities In A Bear Market? The top in 2000 was followed by a devasting, three-year bear market. We are not arguing this global equity selloff will last that long nor be that large. What we are saying is that this turbulence will last another several months, and that there is still considerable potential for further drawdowns. Finally, the silver-gold ratio is breaking below its previous lows, including its early 2016 low (Chart I-4). Such a breakdown could be a precursor of a deflationary shock stemming from the Chinese economy. Chart I-4Beware Of Breakdown In The Silver-Gold Ratio Global Trade: A Contraction Ahead? This section elaborates on the fundamental rationale behind the selloff – the deepening global business cycle downturn stemming primarily from China/EM economies: There are several indications that the global slowdown is already hurting American manufacturing. In the U.S., the CASS Freight Shipment Index, which measures North American freight volumes and is published by the Saint Louis Federal Reserve is foretelling an impending slump in the manufacturing sector (Chart I-5, top panel). Chart I-5U.S. Growth Is Slowing Consistently, the growth rates of both total intermodal carloads and railroad carloads excluding petroleum and coal have rolled over decisively (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). As U.S. manufacturing slows, U.S. Treasury yields will drop further. In China, the slowdown is occurring not only in the industrial parts of the economy but also in household spending (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Chinese Consumer Is In A Soft Spot In the case of the industrial segments, falling new and backlog orders are heralding further deterioration in nominal manufacturing output growth (Chart I-7). Accordingly, the construction and installation component of fixed asset investment is already very weak, while equipment and instrument purchases are contracting. Chart I-7Chinese Manufacturing: Deepening Slump The key channel in which China impacts the rest of the world is through its imports. In turn, the latter are driven by the nation’s credit and fiscal spending impulse (Chart I-8, top panel). That explains the linkage between the Chinese credit and fiscal impulse and EM corporate profits (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-8The Linkages Between Chinese Credit & Fiscal Spending, Imports And EM Profits Crucially, the import sub-component of mainland manufacturing PMI has plunged well below the 50 boom-bust line and signals further downside in EM equities and industrial metals prices (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Chinese Imports Versus EM Stocks And Industrial Metals This is consistent with contracting Chinese imports from various countries (Chart I-10). This is how China’s negative growth shock is promulgating throughout the rest of the world. Chart I-10German And Japanese Shipments To China To Contract Finally, the growth rate of Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean aggregate exports is approaching zero, which is typically a bad omen for EM share prices (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Asian Exports And EM Stocks What’s more, Taiwanese shipments of electronic products parts are begining to contract, which hearalds a bleak outlook for both the global trade cycle and EM technology sector profits (Chart I-12). Consistently, semiconductor prices have continued to fall precipitously. Chart I-12Prepare For More Weakness in Global Trade Bottom Line: We reiterate that global trade is heading for a period of contraction due to the deepening growth slump in China/EM. Chinese Stimulus and U.S. Growth: Lost In Translation? We endeavor to tackle two critical questions: (1) Why has policy stimulus in China failed to stabilize growth? We have written about this extensively in previous reports and will review our key points briefly. First, regulatory tightening on banks and non-bank financial institutions is overwhelming the benefits of lower interbank rates. New regulations are constraining banks’ and financial intermediaries’ ability to expand their balance sheets as aggressively as before. Slowing credit growth has so far offset robust fiscal spending – please refer to Chart I-8. Second, in a system saddled with extreme leverage, non-performing loans and very weak capacity to service debt, the impact of lower interest rates on credit origination is likely to be minimal. This diminishes the efficacy of monetary policy easing on credit growth. China’s credit excesses are enormous, and deleveraging is probably in the very early innings (Chart I-13, top panel). Notably, company and household credit are still expanding at a 10% pace from a year ago (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-13Has China Started Deleveraging? Not Really Third, the authorities are facing a formidable dilemma between opting for lower interest rates and/or maintaining a stable exchange rate. We have been highlighting the tight correlation between the CNY/USD exchange rate and interest rates. The recent stabilization in the CNY/USD may have been due to the latest rise in Chinese interbank rates (Chart I-14). Chart I-14China's Monetary Policy Dilemma Yet, the real economy in China and its numerous indebted entities require lower (and probably zero) interest rates for a couple of years, as occurred in Japan, the U.S. and the euro area in the years following the peaks in their respective credit bubbles. All in all, it is not clear if the authorities can reduce interest rates without eliciting currency depreciation. For now, the jury is still out. Fourth, net liquidity injections into the banking system by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) have been minimal in recent years (Chart I-15, top panel). In fact, commercial banks’ excess reserves at the PBoC have been flattish over the past three years (Chart I-15, bottom panel). While the media and many commentators have been focused on the reserve requirement ratio reductions that have infused a lot of excess reserves into the banking system, there have also been many expired lending facilities from the PBoC to banks. The net result has been flattish liquidity trend in the banking system. Chart I-15Chinese Banking System's Excess Reserves Are Flattish While there is no limit on a central bank’s ability to provide more excess reserves to the banking system, spare liquidity could push interbank rates lower and possibly trigger currency depreciation. Finally, monetary and fiscal policies work with varying time lags. Critically, the aggregate credit and fiscal impulse remains in a downtrend, pointing to less imports and hence a downbeat outlook for EM corporate earnings (please refer to Chart I-8). (2) Why has global trade decelerated amid robust U.S. demand? U.S. import growth has been very robust, yet global trade has slowed (Chart I-16). Chart I-16Robust U.S. Imports Have Not Precluded Global Manufacturing Slowdown The reason behind this is very simple: U.S. and EU annual merchandize goods imports amount to $2.5 trillion and $2.2 trillion, respectively – dwarfed by EM (including China) imports of $6 trillion (Chart I-17). Chart I-17EM Imports Are Larger Than Combined U.S. And EU Imports This value of EM imports excludes China’s imports for processing and re-exporting as well as all the imports of Mexico and central Europe, which also include a lot of inputs that are processed and re-exported. In spite of these adjustments, EM imports are still considerably larger than U.S. and EU imports combined. Hence, robust U.S. final demand is in and of itself insufficient to both offset and support global trade growth when EM/China demand falters. This is especially pertinent to commodities and industrial goods, where China/EM are large consumers. Chart Patterns: Reading Market Tea Leaves There is no magical formula that can guarantee making money in financial markets. Economic data are lagging, markets can change direction abruptly, and indicators can break down or give false signals from time to time. Besides, financial markets do not move in straight lines, and differentiating the noise from the signal is not a simple exercise. The odds of making money or outperforming are higher when investors are correct in their big- picture judgements – i.e., when their thematic views on the global economic and investment landscapes are accurate. Markets can be very noisy and volatile in the short term, yet there are several critical chart patterns that we are taking comfort with as they are consistent with our macro themes. The latter are the following: Sagging China/EM growth, a deepening global trade slump, lower commodities prices and a stronger U.S. dollar/weaker EM currencies. Our Risk-On versus Safe-Haven Currency Ratio2 has relapsed since early this year after failing to break above its previous top (Chart I-18). In and of itself, this is already a bearish chart formation. Besides, it seems this market indicator is forming a potential head-and-shoulders pattern. Chart I-18A Bear Market In Risk-On Versus Safe-Haven Currencies Ratio Any relapse from current levels will validate the head-and-shoulders profile. As a result, the odds of a major plunge will rise, which would be consistent with our themes and outlook. EM share prices in dollar terms have also struggled to break above their 2007 highs in the past 10 years, despite the bull market in the S&P 500 during this period (Chart I-19). Remarkably, the EM stock index is presently sitting on several of its long-term moving averages. They make a formidable technical support. Box 1 elaborates why we use these long-term moving averages in our regular reports. Chart I-19EM Equities Are Facing An Air Pocket If these technical supports give in, EM equities will hit an air pocket – with the next technical support lying 25% below the current level. It is no surprise that an intense battle between bulls and bears is currently being waged. Provided EM corporate profits are set to contract in the first half of 2019, as per our analysis above, we believe these technical supports will be violated and that a major plunge in share prices is very likely. Finally, share prices of global energy and mining companies rolled over early this year at their long-term moving averages (Chart 20, top and middle panels). These long-term moving averages acted as a support in bull markets; now they have become a resistance. Hence, it makes sense to argue that energy and mining stocks remain in a secular bear market, and the 2016-‘17 advance was a bear market rally. If so, further downside in their share prices could be substantial. Meantime, global semiconductor share prices rolled over at their 2000 peak earlier this year (Chart I-20, bottom panel). This is a bad technical sign and might signify that a non-trivial slowdown in global growth may last for quite some time. Chart I-20Global And Mining Stocks Remain In A Secular Bear Market Typically, in the periods when resources and technology stocks sell off, EM equities and other risk assets perform badly. It appears we are currently in such a phase, and it will not be short-lived. Investment Strategy China/EM growth conditions continue to worsen. Tactically and cyclically, risks to EM stocks, currencies, credit and high-yielding local bonds are skewed to the downside. We continue to recommend playing EM on the short side. Playing a market on the long side when fundamentals are deteriorating and valuations are not cheap is akin to collecting pennies in front of a steamroller. The recent outperformance of EM equities and credit versus DM is unsustainable. Continue to underweight EM. For dedicated EM equity portfolios, our overweights are Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Russia, central Europe, Korea and Thailand, while our underweights are Indonesia, the Philippines, Peru and South Africa. We are considering to upgrade India from underweight to neutral. Our preferred short currency basket versus the U.S. dollar consists of the ZAR, the IDR, the CLP, the COP and the KRW. Box 1 - Our Long-Term Moving Average Framework “All through time, people have basically acted and re-acted the same way in the market as the result of: Greed, Fear, Ignorance & Hope. That is why numeric formations and patterns recur on a constant basis.” - Jesse Livermore, in Reminiscences of a Stock Operator The basis for examining price patterns with their 200-, 400-, 800-, 1600- and 3200-day moving averages (MA) – corresponding to nine months, 18 months, 3-, 6-, 12 and 24-year moving averages – is as follows: The 200-day MA is a very widely known and well-used measure. We have observed that when the 200-day MA breaks in a bull market, the next support could occur at the 400- or 800-day MA levels – i.e., the multiples of the 200-day MA. Following the same logic, we examined even longer-term moving averages such as 6-, 12- and 24-year MAs. Interestingly, we discovered that the 3- and 6-year MAs worked very well during the S&P 500 bull run of the 1950s and 1960s (Chart I-21, top panel). Besides, during the bull market of the 1980s-‘90s, the S&P 500 selloffs also found support at the 3- and 6-year MAs (Chart 21, bottom panel). Chart I-21The S&P 500 And Long-Term Moving Averages Meanwhile, the bear market bottoms in 1982 and 2002-‘03 in the U.S. equity market occurred at a very long-term (12-year) MA (Chart I-21, bottom panel). Similarly, in the fixed-income universe, throughout the more than 35-year- strong U.S. bond bull market, the rise in bond yields often topped out when 10-year Treasury yields reached their 6-year MA (Chart I-22). Chart I-22U.S. Bond Yields And Long-Term Moving Averages These observations have led us to infer that structural trends cannot be considered completely broken as and when markets cross their 200-day MA. Large selloffs (or cyclical bear markets) within structural bull markets can push prices to their very long-term moving averages such as 3- or 6-year MAs. The opposite holds true for tactical and cyclical rallies within bear markets. Besides, we have also observed that when a financial market in a selloff finds support at a particular long-term MA, it usually resumes its rally and often advances to new highs. On the contrary, when a market rallies but fails to break above its long-term MA (resistance), it often experiences a breakdown. We often apply this long-term moving average framework to analyze trends in various financial markets, and contrast and evaluate these with our fundamental economic themes. As to the question of why these numbers work, the quote above from Reminiscences of a Stock Operator could be the answer. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnote 1 BoA December survey 2 Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP & ZAR total return indices relative to average of JPY & CHF total returns (including carry). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

