Sectors
Table 1 Online political betting markets are still not fully pricing our sister BCA Geopolitical Strategy’s 55% odds for the "Blue Wave" scenario. Therefore, it pays to examine what will be the likely impact of a blue wave on the US stock market. Specifically, Biden is planning to increase the US corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%, and possibly even higher. In our most recent Special Report, we have conducted a similar exercise to the one we did in late-2017, when we calculated a one time boost to S&P 500 EPS due to Trump’s tax cut. This time, however, we reversed the calculation to compute by how much S&P 500 EPS are likely to fall should Biden raise the corporate tax rate. Table 1 reveals that the hardest hit GICS1 sectors are real estate, tech and health care, and the ones faring the best are consumer staples, industrials and energy. For more information, please refer to our most recent Special Report discussing Biden and his policies’ likely effects on the US stock market.
Following our recent downgrade in the S&P banks index, we were also compelled to downgrade the S&P investment banks & brokerage (IBB) index to a benchmark allocation as it has a similar investment profile. The COVID-19 accelerated recession has not only mothballed potential industry M&A deals that were in the works, but also a number of previously announced deals have been canceled (second panel), which will weigh on the sector’s profit prospects. While “Robinhood” (retail investor) trading stories abound, margin debt remains moribund and continues to contract, despite the V-shaped recovery in all major US stock markets since the March 23 lows (third panel), spelling trouble for commission-related revenues. As a result we deem the collapse in the relative price-to-book ratio to represent a value trap rather than a value opportunity (bottom panel). Bottom Line: We are neutral the S&P IBB index. Please refer to the following Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the index are: BLBG: S5INBK – GS, MS, SCHW, ETFC, RJF.
Neutral We have recently downgraded the S&P banks index to neutral as yellow flags are waving on all three key bank profit drivers, namely the price of credit, loan growth and credit quality. More specifically on credit quality, delinquency and charge-off rates are all but certain to spike in the coming months. The third panel highlights that historically all these credit quality gauges are lagging. However, the near vertical climb in the unemployment rate recently, and persistently high continuing unemployment benefit claims near 18mn signal that non-performing loans (NPLs) are slated to soar in the back half of 2020 (bottom panel). True, the recent $2tn+ fiscal package is acting as a Band-Aid solution by putting money in unemployed consumers’ pockets, but when the money runs out on July 31, the going will get tough especially if Congress does not pass a new fiscal package. Bottom Line: We are neutral the S&P banks index. For more details on the other two key bank profit drivers, please refer to the following Weekly Report. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – JPM, BAC, C, WFC, USB, TFC, PNC, FRC, FITB, MTB, KEY, SIVB, RF, CFG, HBAN, ZION, CMA, PBCT.
Bob Farrell famously remarked “Markets are strongest when they are broad and weakest when they narrow to a handful of blue-chip names.” This could not be truer than today’s market, especially the NASDAQ. Not only are the top five SPX stocks comprising roughly 23% of the index, but the same five tech titans carry a 40% weight in the NASDAQ composite. This seems excessive and carries a lot of risk in case of even a mild disappointment. True, the collapse in interest rates has boosted the NASDAQ forward P/E to the stratosphere, but the longer these high flying stocks defy gravity the more painful the eventual snap will be (bottom panel). Already there are tentative signs of trouble brewing beneath the surface. NASDAQ breadth is sinking like a stone and this has proven a reliable leading indicator in the recent past, warning that a pullback is looming (top panel). Finally, the hypersensitive chip stocks are suffering from exhaustion, unable to outperform the tech titan led NASDAQ (middle panel). Any hiccups in the tech space will negatively reverberate in the SPX: currently the S&P tech sector plus the FANG (FB, AMZN, NFLX & GOOGL) comprise 40% of the S&P 500. Thus as tech goes so does the SPX. Bottom Line: We remain cautious on the near-term prospects of the S&P 500 until the election uncertainty lifts in November.
Overweight Consumer discretionary stocks have been on fire of late besting the SPX by 13% since our overweight inception in mid-April. AMZN (44% market cap weight in the sector) is frequently printing two standard deviation moves on daily, weekly and monthly timeframes, as COVID-19 has been an accelerant both to consumers moving away from bricks and mortar shops and toward online retail and to businesses adopting cloud services. Easy fiscal and monetary policies underpin the relentless rally (top panel). While we are participating in the advance via key overweights in internet retail and home improvement retailers (HIR), we note signs of exuberance. Our technical indicator has crossed above the one standard deviation line entering into a danger zone (middle panel). Similarly, valuations are also climbing to extreme levels, last seen in the early 1990s (bottom panel). We will keep an eye on these developments and have recently implemented portfolio risk management tools to defend against a potential air pocket. Specifically, we have instituted two stops: one in the S&P HIR, and another in the S&P internet retailers overweights at the 10% and 20% relative return marks, respectively. Should the stops get triggered, then the consumer discretionary sector will be automatically downgraded to neutral. Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P consumer discretionary sector via the S&P HIR and S&P internet retailers indexes, but should our stops get triggered, we are ready to downgrade to neutral.
Dear Client, In lieu of our regular report next week, I will present our view on China’s economic recovery, geopolitical risks, and implications on financial markets in two live webcasts. The webcasts will take place next Wednesday, July 15 at 10:00AM EDT (English) and at 9:00PM EDT (Mandarin). Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Highlights China’s economic recovery continues through June, but the pace of its demand-side recovery has been more muted compared to the V-shaped rebound in 2009. The intensity of the PBoC’s monetary easing may start to taper in H2, but the central bank is likely to stay on the easing course and keep liquidity conditions ample. Bank lending to the corporate sector should increase further in H2. Chinese stocks rallied through last week’s enactment of the new national security law for Hong Kong and the subsequently announced sanctions from the US government. The existing US sanctions should have limited impact on Hong Kong and mainland China’s economies and financial markets. We remain positive on Chinese stocks despite the recent rallies in China’s equity markets. Feature June’s official and Caixin manufacturing PMIs indicate that China’s economic recovery continues at a steady rate, with the production side of the economy picking up slightly faster than the demand side. The drag on China’s economic recovery from lackluster demand growth should be temporary. Unlike in 2015 when policy uncertainties hindered the recovery in both economic activity and stock prices, the Chinese government has been determined to support its economy and job market in the current cycle. The massive stimulus implemented since March has tremendously boosted activities in China’s construction sector. While households and the corporate sector remain reluctant to spend and to invest, their marginal propensity to spend usually catches up with credit growth with about a 6-9-month lag (Chart 1). The sharp pickup in credit growth should meaningfully support China’s economic rebound, while a better global growth outlook in H2 should also provide some modest tailwinds. On June 30, the PBoC announced a 0.25 percentage point cut to its relending rates for small and rural enterprises and to its general rediscount rate. While the scale of rate cuts in H2 will unlikely match that of Q1, China’s monetary and fiscal policy support will remain in place through the rest of the year. Chinese investable and domestic equities were some of the best performers among global asset classes in June, whereas they were the third-worst the month prior (Chart 2). In the first week of July, both Chinese investable and domestic stocks rallied even further. As we noted in our last week’s report,1 China’s stronger economic outlook, less uncertainty related to its domestic COVID-19 containment, and policy support should provide more room for Chinese stocks to trend upwards. Last week’s passing of the new national security law for Hong Kong and the subsequently announced sanctions from the US government, in our view, should have limited impact on investors’ sentiment for now. Chart 1China's Household And Corporate Marginal Propensities Lag The Credit Impulse By 6-9 Months Chart 2Chinese Equities Are Taking Flight Tables 1 and 2 present key developments in China’s economic and financial market performance in the past month, and we highlight several of these developments below: Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China’s June official manufacturing PMI ticked up to 50.9 from 50.6 in the previous month. The Caixin manufacturing PMI came in at 51.2, beating the expectation of 50.5 and compared to 50.7 in May. Both suggest that China’s manufacturing sector continues to expand, however the pace of its demand-side recovery has been more muted compared to the V-shaped rebound in 2009 (Chart 3). Although the import and export subcomponents have fared better in June from the low levels in April and May, their readings in June were still below the 50 boom-bust line (Chart 4). Headwinds remain strong for global trade as the US and many of emerging economies are still struggling with the pandemic. Even without re-imposing lockdowns, the resurge in the number of new cases in the US may result in a drag on consumption and global trade. The IMF projects a 12% contraction in global trade in 2020. While the external demand may improve in H2, positive contribution to China's GDP growth from the net exports will be limited this year. Chart 3Current Recovery Lies Somewhere Between 2009 And 2015 Chart 4Demand-Side Recovery Remains Muted The employment situation in the manufacturing sector has worsened since May, and has returned to contraction following a brief improvement in March and April (Chart 5). An estimated 8.7 million new graduates in 2020,2 a historical high number, will hit the job market in July and August. As such, China’s labor market will likely remain under significant pressure. Even though employment usually lags economic recoveries, depressed expectations on the job market will refrain policymakers from prematurely withdrawing stimulus measures. Small and micro enterprises are an important part of China’s private sector, which provides 80% of jobs in China. The manufacturing PMI of small enterprises fell below the 50 boom-bust line in June, reflecting a persistent weakness in this part of China’s economy. The recent relending and rediscount rate cuts suggest that the PBoC is committed to stay on the easing course. The intensity of monetary easing may start to taper in H2, but the central bank is likely to keep liquidity conditions ample and encourage banks to accelerate lending to the corporate sector. The contraction in Chinese producer prices deepened to -3.7% (year-over-year) in May. However, we think PPI deflation is likely to bottom in Q3. Both the purchasing and producer price subcomponents of the manufacturing PMI ticked up sharply in June, while the drawdown in industrial product inventory relative to new orders has accelerated (Chart 6). The ongoing accommodative policy should provide powerful tailwinds to both economic activity and the PPI in H2. The improvement in the PPI will help to boost industrial profits growth, which turned positive in May (year-over-year) for the first time this year. We expect year-to-date industrial profits to end the calendar year with a modest positive growth rate. Chart 5Labor Market Pressure Intensifies Chart 6PPI Deflation Nears Its Bottom China’s property market indicators have notably trended up in May, with year-over-year growth in housing demand normalizing to its pre-pandemic level (Chart 7A & Chart 7B). As the demand in housing rebounded faster than the supply, housing prices have correspondingly turned the corner in May after trending down for 6 consecutive months. Chart 7AHousing Prices Ticked Up Slightly Following A Sharp Fall In Q1 Chart 7BStrong Rebound In Property Investments Chart 7B shows that housing investments and land purchases have also recovered to near their pre-pandemic levels. Financing restrictions for property developers that were put in place since 2018 have been loosened in H1, which helped to boost real estate investments. We expect the property sector financing conditions to remain accommodative through the rest of this year. Moreover, there is a possibility that the PBoC will lower the 5-year MLF (medium lending facility) rate in Q3. As downward pressures on China's labor market and household income growth intensify, the government is likely to lower the mortgage rate to ease payment constraints on households. Chart 8Chinese Stocks Rallied Through Frictions Over Hong Kong Despite the passing of China’s new and controversial national security law for Hong Kong on June 30 and the subsequently announced sanctions from the US government, stock prices in both China’s onshore and offshore markets rallied (Chart 8). While we agree the US may impose further and more concrete sanctions on China during the months leading up to the November US presidential election, our preliminary assessment points to a limited economic cost on China from the existing US sanctions. The removal of Hong Kong’s special trade status will subject Hong Kong’s export goods to the same tariffs the US levies on Chinese exports. But the raised tariffs will barely make a dent in Hong Kong or mainland China’s export status quo. Hong Kong’s economy consists mainly of the financial, logistical and services sectors. The manufacturing sector only accounts for 1% of its overall economy. Chart 9 shows that Hong Kong’s exports to the US only accounted for around 1% of its total exports and 1.3% of its GDP in 2019. More importantly, of the $5 billion goods Hong Kong exports to the US, only 10% is actually produced in Hong Kong. Most of Hong Kong's exports to the US are goods produced in China that are re-exported through Hong Kong, which are already subject to the same tariffs as the goods China exports to the US directly.3 On the other hand, US exports to Hong Kong accounts for 2% of its total exports, with a trade surplus of about $30 billion in the past two years (Chart 9, bottom panel). The US trade surplus with Hong Kong has drastically reduced since the US-China trade war broke out in 2018, suggesting that the US has already imposed restrictions on its export goods to mainland China through Hong Kong. Moreover, the large trade surplus with Hong Kong as well as China’s commitment to the Phase One trade deal may be part of the reason President Trump is unwilling to impose more substantial sanctions on China right now. The US senate and house have also passed a bill which, if signed and implemented by President Trump, will allow the US government to levy any foreign financial institutions for knowingly conducting business with individuals who are involved in jeopardizing Hong Kong’s autonomy. Chinese banks with operations in the US will be mostly exposed to such sanctions. However, Chinese banks are largely domestic-focused with very low reliance on foreign-currency funding (Chart 10). Hence, the direct impact of a deteriorating operating environment in the US will be limited on Chinese banks. Chart 9Trade Sanctions On Hong Kong Exports Have A Minimum Impact On Its Local Economy Chart 10Chinese Banking Sector Stock Performance Is Largely Driven By Domestic Policy Factors Qingyun Xu, CFA Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Upgrading Chinese Stocks To Overweight," dated July 1, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 iiMediaReport, Analysis report on current situation and development trend of Chinese employment entrepreneurship market in 2020. 3 Please see Nicholas Lardy, “Trump’s latest move on Hong Kong is bluster”. Peterson Institute For International Economies, dated June 1, 2020. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
In mid-April we boosted the S&P internet retail index to overweight as it was poised to benefit from the shifting consumer spending habits due to the COVID-19 outbreak. True, the “amazonification” of the economy is not a new phenomenon, but COVID-19 acted as an accelerant to an already powerful uptrend in online retail sales (see chart). Today, our overweight in the S&P internet retail index surpassed the 29% relative return mark since the mid-April inception, which compels us to protect profits by instituting a stop at the 20% mark. Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P internet retail index, but from a portfolio risk management perspective today we add a stop at the 20% relative return mark in order to protect profits.
